1.

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Court of Appeals

297 SCRA 469 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law – Situs – Locus Actus
Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some
co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room.
Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained
in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila,
Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she
was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince
of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence
the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada.
Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable
law should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines’ contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion
to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked the court to make a
determination of Saudia Airlines’s rights hence a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint of Morada,
she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law.
Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect
whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant
resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here because if she’ll file it in Saudi Arabia, it
will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign element involved,
is the so called “locus actus” or where an act has been done. In the case at bar, Morada was already working
in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines
officer. She was not informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into
appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous,
was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
 2. Salvador H. Laurel vs. Ramon Garcia, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, Raul Manglapus,
as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Catalino Macaraig, as Executive Secretary

_______________________________________________________________________

Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said
property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of
the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major
repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities
to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to
sell the Roppongi property.

Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not
so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic
value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will
eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of
public dominion must be faithfully followed.
 3. Kazuhiro Hasegawa And Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd., vs Minoru Kitamura
G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007
FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The
agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon
assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project.
When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this
time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement
(BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company
had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company
only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was
for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of
Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals.
Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA
could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not
applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in
issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific
performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be
assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.

HELD: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct
concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law
asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the
case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does notautomatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex foriwill often
coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for
the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the
question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a
court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the
plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and,
in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.In assailing the trial
court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c
establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the
matter submitted to it because no lawgrants it the power to adjudicate the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.What they rather raise as
grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these
grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a
contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractusmeans the “law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and
it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly
or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply
to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence
and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the
parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules
proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving
the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction,
choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet
pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply,
1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws rules. Also,
when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the
existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case,
either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction
over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into
account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies
is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations,
the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formalagreements, even in matters
regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction.
1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not
include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In
this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense.
 4. Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. vs Blayblock Transportation Services Employees
Association
GR No. L-41518/71 SCRA 621, June 30, 1976
Facts: The United states Naval Base authorities at Subic, Zambales, conducted a public bidding for a
five- year contract for the right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval base.

 This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner- operator of Guerrero's Transport Services, Inc.,
over Concepcion F. Blaylock, the then incumbent concessionaire doing business under the name of
"Blaylock Transport Services", whose 395 employees are members of respondent union
BTEA-KILUSAN.
 Guerrero refused to employ the members of the union.
 On January, 12, 1975, filed a complaint with the NLRC against Guerrero's Transport Services, Inc.
and Santiago Guerrero, to compel them to employ its members pursuant to Article 1, Section 2 of
the RP-US Base Agreement dated May 27, 1968.
 Provincial Director of the Labor Office in Zambales furnished, on August 2, 1974, a list of 46
members of respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN and former drivers of the Blaylock Transport
Service, who are within the coverage of the decision of the Secretary of Labor, and requesting
petitioner to report its action on the matter directly to the Chairman, NLRC, Manila
 Santiago A. Guerrero received a letter from Col. Levi L. Basilla, PC (GSC) Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, requesting compliance with the Order
 On June 20, 1975, Labor Arbiter De los Reyes ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals "to their
former or substantially equivalent positions without loss of seniority and other rights and privileges"
o Guerrero says that the Orders were issued by the Labor Arbiter were without jurisdiction.
 LA declared said Orders final and executory and directed petitioner Guerrero's Transport Services,
Inc. to reinstate the 129 complainants and to pay them the amount of P4,290.00 each as backwages
 October 6, 1975, issued a TRO and required the respondents to file an answer within 10 days
from notice.
 At the hearing of this case on October 20, 1975, a Compromise Agreement was arrived at by the
parties wherein they agreed to submit to the Office of the Secretary of Labor the determination of
members of the respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN who shall be reinstated or absorbed by the herein
petitioner in the transportation service inside the naval base, which determination shall be
considered final.
o The determination of WON 179 employees should be admitted was based on certain
criteria1.

Issue: WON Guerrero can be compelled to abide by the treaty and the compromise agreement? YES
Held:
o Pursuant to Section 6 of Article I of the Philippine-U S. Labor Agreement of May 27, 1968, the
United States Armed Forces undertook, consistent with military requirements, "to provide security
for employment, and, in the event certain services are contracted out, the United States Armed
Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority consideration to affected
employees for employment.
o A treaty has two (2) aspects — as an international agreement between states, and as municipal
law for the people of each state to observe.
o Being part of municipal law, the provision of the treaty forms part of the contract between
petitioner and the U.S. Naval Base authorities.
o In view of said stipulation, the new contractor is, therefore, bound to give "priority" to the
employment of the qualified employees of the previous contractor. It is obviously in
 recognition of such obligation that petitioner entered into the afore-mentioned
Compromise Agreement
o Under the Compromise Agreement as embodied in the Resolution of this Court dated October 24,
1975, the parties agreed to submit to the Secretary of Labor the determination as to who of the
members of the respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN shall be absorbed or employed by the herein
petitioner Guerrero's Transport Services, Inc., and that such determination shall be considered as
final.
o The Compromise-Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract and has the force and effect
of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and their privies.
o For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and
is enforceable by execution upon approval by the court.
o Since the resolution of the NLRC of October 31, 1973 required the absorption of the applicants
subject to the conditions therein contained, and there being no showing that such conditions were
complied with, the Labor Arbiter exceeded his authority in awarding back wages to the 129
complainants.
 5. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894)

March 28, 1894

Syllabus

In an action by the representatives of a railroad employee against the company to recover damages for the
death of the employs caused by an accident while in its employ, which is tried in a different state from
that in which the contract of employment was made and in which the accident took place, the right to
recover and the limit of the amount of the judgment are governed by the lex loci, and not by the lex fori.

A railroad company is bound to furnish sound machinery for the use of its employee, and if one of them is
killed in an accident caused by a defective snow-plough, the right of his representative to recover
damages therefor is not affected by the fact that, some two weeks before he was sent out with the
defective machinery, he had discovered the defect, and had notified the master mechanic of it, and the
latter had undertaken to have it repaired.

Some alleged errors in the charge of the court below are examined and held to have no merit.

The plaintiff below, who was the administrator of the estate of Hugh M. Munro, sued in the District Court
of the fourth Judicial District of Minnesota to recover $25,000 damages for the killing of Munro on the
10th day of January, 1888 at or near a station known as Gray Cliff, on the Northern Pacific Railway, in
the Territory of Montana. The complaint contained the following allegations:

Page 154 U. S. 191

"That on the said 10th day of January, 1888, the said Hugh M. Munro, now deceased, was in the employ
of the said defendant corporation within the Territory of Montana in the capacity of locomotive engineer,
for hire and reward by the said defendant paid, and that the duty of running a locomotive engine upon said
defendant's line of railway within said territory was by said defendant assigned to said Hugh M. Munro
on the said 10th day of January, 1888, and the defendant directed and ordered the said Hugh M. Munro to
run a certain locomotive engine, the property of said defendant, known as engine 'No. 161,' over and upon
its said railway in said territory; that prior to and at the time the said orders were so presented to said
Munro, there had been, and then was, a severe snowstorm in progress, and defendant's line of railway
over and upon which said Munro was so ordered to run said engine was covered with drifting snow
theretofore accumulated thereon, and then fast accumulating, notwithstanding which the said defendant
corporation did willfully, improperly, negligently, and carelessly refuse and neglect to send a snow plow
ahead of said engine No. 161 to clear the snow and ice from said defendant's said track, which had
accumulated and was accumulating thereon by reason of said storm, so as to render the passage of said
engine No. 161 safe and proper."

"That there was attached to the forward part of said engine No. 161 a certain attachment known as a 'pilot
plow,' an appliance constructed thereon for the purpose of clearing the railway of snow and ice
accumulated thereon and render safe the passage of the engine to which said plow was attached over and
upon said railway of defendant."

"That on the said 10th day of January, 1888, the said defendant corporation knowingly, willfully,
negligently, and carelessly allowed to be and remain upon said engine No. 161, attached thereto as
aforesaid, a certain pilot plow the iron braces, bolts, and rods of which were broken, imperfect, and
insufficient, by reason of which condition the said plow was loose and insufficiently secured to the pilot
of said engine, allowing the said pilot to raise up and ride over obstructing

Page 154 U. S. 192

snow and ice instead of cutting through the same, as was the intention of its construction, rendering the
running of said engine upon said railway dangerous, and that the said defendant well knew of the broken,
defective, and dangerous condition of said engine No. 161 at the time the said Hugh M. Munro was so
ordered to run the same upon and over said railway, notwithstanding which the said defendant corporation
did negligently and carelessly furnish to said Hugh M. Munro said engine, with the said broken and
imperfect pilot plow attached thereto, to run over and upon its said line of railway."

"That while said Hugh M. Munro was running said engine in performance of his duty as such engineer
and pursuant to the orders of said defendant corporation, and before daylight on said 10th day of January,
1888, near Gray Cliff, in said Territory of Montana, the said engine struck an accumulation of snow and
ice which said defendant had carelessly and negligently allowed to accumulate upon its said railway track,
and the pilot plow of said engine, by reason of its broken, loose, and imperfect condition aforesaid, did
ride upon said accumulation of snow and ice, thereby derailing said engine and throwing the same from
said railway track, whereby the said Hugh M. Munro was instantly killed."

"* * * *"

"That the law of the Territory of Montana governing actions for recovery of damages for causing death
was on the 10th day of January, 1888, and now is, sections 13 and 14 of title 2 of said chapter 1 of the
first division of Code of Civil Procedure of the Territory of Montana, which said sections of said law of
said territory are in the words and figures following, viz.:"

"SEC. 13. A father, or, in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may maintain an action
for the injury or death of a child, or a guardian for the injury or death of his ward."

"SEC. 14. Where the death of a person not being a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for

Page 154 U. S. 193

damages against the person causing the death, or if such person be employed by another person who is
responsible for his action, then also against such other person. In every action under this and the
preceding section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just."

The case was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, where an
answer was filed by the defendant denying the averments of the complaint and alleging that the death of
Munro was caused solely by his negligence and carelessness, and not by the negligence of the defendant
or any of its servants or employees.

There was a verdict and judgment below in favor of the plaintiff for $10,000. To review that judgment,
this writ of error is sued out. The errors assigned are as follows:

"First. The court erred in charging the jury as follows:"

" Did it fail to discharge any duty which the law imposed upon it for the safety of its employee, the
plaintiff's intestate? If it did, and if such negligence was the cause of the death of the engineer, Munro,
then the plaintiff is entitled to recover."

"Second. The court erred further in charging the jury as follows:"

" The charge in this complaint is that this death was caused by the derailment of the engine, which took
place because the plow was out of repair as described, or at least that the defendant had not used
reasonable care in clearing its track, and that when the engineer, in that condition, arrived at this cut, two
miles from Gray Cliff, the snow had accumulated to such an extent that the engine was thereby derailed,
and that it was this negligence which caused the death."
"Third. The court erred further in charging the jury as follows:"

"Many states have different laws. The law in this state until recently was that only $5,000 could be given
in a case of death. It has lately been increased to $10,000."

"Fourth. The court erred further in charging the jury as follows:"

"If you believe from all the evidence in the case that the plaintiff is entitled to recovery, then it is for you
to determine what compensation you will give for the death of the plaintiff's intestate. The law of
Montana limits it to such an amount as you think would be proper under all circumstances

Page 154 U. S. 194

of the case, and that is the law which will govern in this case."

"Fifth. The court erred further in refusing to give to the jury the following request tendered by defendant's
counsel: 'You, the jury, are instructed to find a verdict for the defendant.'"

"Sixth. The court erred further in refusing to give to the jury the following request, tendered by
defendant's counsel: 'The laws of Minnesota limit the amount of damages to be recovered in this case to
five thousand dollars.'"

"Seventh. The court erred further in refusing to give to the jury the following request, tendered by
defendant's counsel:"

" The court instructs the jury that unless they find that it was customary for defendant company to send a
snow plow in advance of the trains running east from Livingston during storms of this character, and that
unless, further, the accident occurred by reason of the negligent and careless failure of the defendant to
send such snow plow in advance, they will find for the defendant."

"Eighth. The court erred further in refusing to give to the jury the following request, tendered by
defendant's counsel:"

" The court instructs the jury that unless they find that the defendant carelessly and negligently furnished
to the deceased engineer a plow attached to his engine the iron bolts and rods of which were broken,
imperfect, and insufficient, and that by reason of which condition the said plow was loose and
insufficiently secured to the pilot of said engine, and that when the said engine struck the snow at the cut,
as testified to, the pilot plow of said engine, by reason of its said broken, loose, and imperfect condition,
did ride upon the accumulated snow and ice at said cut, and that thereby the said engine was thrown from
the track, the jury will find for the defendant. "

Page 154 U. S. 196

 6. International School Alliance Of Educators v. Leonardo A. Quisumbing
333 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000
FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local
hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.
RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to
explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires
perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
 7. Cayetano Lim and Marciano Lim, vs. The Insular Collector of Customs,

G.R. No. L-11759 March 16, 1917

The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular Collector of Customs may lawfully deny
entry into the Philippine Islands to two children aged 8 and 14 years, respectively, under and by authority
of the Chinese Immigration, Laws, it appearing that the children arrived at the Port of Manila
accompanied by and in the custody of their mother, a Filipino woman; that they were born in China, out
of lawful wedlock; and that their father was a Chinese person.

It is contended, on behalf of the Insular Collector of Customs, that these children being Chinese persons
are denied the right of entrance into the Philippine Islands under the express terms of the Chinese
immigration laws. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf of the children that they are entitled to enter,
regardless of the provisions of the Chinese immigration laws, since the admitted facts, as it is said,
disclose that they are citizens of the Philippine Islands; and for the further reason, that their mother, who
is entitled to their custody and charged with their maintenance and education, is clearly entitled to take up
her residence in the Philippine Islands and should not be required, to that end, to abandon her minor
children.

Without discussing or deciding any of the contentions of the parties as to the rights of citizenship of these
children, actual or inchoate, we are of opinion that by analogous reasoning to that upon which the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the wives and minor children of Chinese merchants
domiciled in the United States may enter that country without certificates, these children must be held to
be entitled to enter the Philippine Islands with their mother, for the purpose of taking up their residence
here with her, it appearing that she is natural guardian, entitled to their custody and charged with their
maintenance and education. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459.)

In the case just cited the court said:

While the literal construction of the section would require a certificate, as therein stated, from
every Chinese person, other than a laborer, who should come into the country, yet such a
construction leads to what we think an absurd result, for it requires a certificate for a wife of a
merchant, among others, in regard to whom its would be impossible to give the particulars which
the statute requires shall be stated in such certificate.

"Nothing is better settled," says the present Chief Justice, in Lau Ow Bew vs. United States (144
U. S., 59) "than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the
legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid and unjust or an absurd conclusion.

The purposes of the sixth section, requiring the certificate, was not to prevent the persons named
in the second article of the treaty from coming into the country, but to prevent Chinese laborers
from entering under the guise of being one of the classes permitted by the treaty. It is the coming
of Chinese laborers that the act is aimed against.

It was said in the opinion in the Lau Ow Bew case, in speaking of the provisions that the sole
evidence permissible should be the certificate: "This rule of evidence was evidently prescribed by
the amendment as a means of effectually preventing the violation or evasion of the prohibition
against the coming of Chinese laborers. It was designed as a safeguard to prevent the unlawful
entry of such laborers, under the pretense that they belong to the merchant class or to some other
of the admitted classes."

It was also held in that case that although the literal wording of the statute of 1884, section six,
would require a certificate in the case of a merchant already domiciled in the United States and
who had left the country for temporary purposes, animo revertendi, yet its true and proper
construction did not include his case, and the general terms used in the act were limited to those
 persons to whom Congress manifestly intended to apply them, which would be those who were
about to come to the United States for the first time, and not to those Chinese merchants already
domiciled in the United States who had gone to China for temporary purposes only, with the
intention of returning. The case of Wan Shing vs. United States (140 U. S., 24), was referred to,
and attention called to the fact that the appellant therein was not a merchant but a laborer, who
had acquired no commercial domicile in this county, and was clearly within the exception
requiring him to procure and produce the certificate specified in the act. The rule was approved,
and the differences in the two cases pointed out by the Chief Justice.

To hold that a certificate is required in this case is to decide that the woman cannot come into this
country at all, for it is not possible for her to comply with the act, because she cannot in any event
procure the certificate even by returning to China. She must come in as the wife of her domiciled
husband or not at all. The act was never meant to accomplish the result of permanently excluding
the wife under the circumstances of this case, and we think that, properly and reasonably
construed, it does not do so. If we hold that she is entitled to come in as the wife, because the true
construction of the treaty and the act permits it, there is no provision which makes the certificate
the only proof of the fact that she is such wife.

In the case of the minor children, the same result must follow as in that of the wife. All the
reasons which favor the construction of the statute as exempting the wife from the necessity of
procuring a certificate apply with equal force to the case of minor children of a member or
members of the admitted classes. They come in by reason of their relationship to the father, and
whether they accompany or follow him, a certificate is not necessary in either case. When the fact
is established to the satisfaction of the authorities that the person claiming to enter, either as wife
or minor child, is in fact the wife or minor child of one of the members of the class mentioned in
the treaty as entitled to enter, them that person in entitled to admission without the certificate.

We are not advised of any provision of Chinese law which differentiates the status of infant children, born
out of lawful wedlock, from that of similar children under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. We
assume, therefore, that in China as well as in the Philippine Islands such children have the right to look to
their mother for their maintenance and education, and that she is entitled to their custody and control in
fulfilling the obligations towards them which are imposed upon her, not only by the natural impulses of
love and affection, but also by the express mandate of the law. And it having been held on the highest
authority that the general terms of the Act were limited to those to whom Congress manifestly intended to
apply them as set forth in the foregoing opinion, and that "nothing is better settled than that statutes
should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so
as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion," we are of opinion that the Chinese Immigration Laws
should not be construed so as to exclude infant children of a Filipino mother, born out of lawful wedlock,
seeking entrance to the Philippine Islands for the purpose of taking up their residence with her in her
native land.

It has been suggested that such a ruling opens the door to fraud and evasion, but we are not much
impressed with the force of this suggestion, knowing as we do that the immigration authorities have been
furnished by the law with peculiarly effective machinery for its enforcement, well calculated to defeat any
attempt to make an unauthorized or improper use of so manifestly reasonable an exception from the literal
construction and application of its general provisions.

Some confusion seems to have arisen in the court below as to the precise nature and effect of the
somewhat inartificial pleadings upon which these proceedings were submitted. The case appears to have
been submitted upon an answer to an order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue
upon the petition filed on behalf of the infant children. In the form in which the answer is couched, there
is much in the contention of the appellee that the trial court should have treated the answer as in substance
and effect a demurrer to the petition, admitting the truth of the facts alleged therein, but praying judgment
as to whether it sets forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and to justify the issuance of the
writ. We are inclined to think, however, that the understanding of the parties and of the court below was
that the answer should be treated rather as in the nature of a return to a writ of habeas corpus, accepting as
true the allegations of the petition but maintaining the legality of the detention upon the facts thus
submitted. Without considering at this time whether in habeas corpus proceedings the respondent may,
without consent of court, demur to, instead of answering an order to show cause why the writ should not
issue, and without considering or deciding the course which should be pursued where a respondent
attempts to file a demurrer to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in lieu of the return prescribed by the
statute to the writ when actually issued; we treat the answer to the order to show cause in the case at bar
as we think the parties and the court below understood it should be treated, that is to say, as in substance
and effect the return which the Insular Collector desired to make to the writ of habeas corpus issued or
assumed to have been issued in response to the petition on behalf of the children held in custody by him.

We conclude, therefore, that, it appearing that the respondent Collector of Customs is detaining the
petitioners under an erroneous construction of the immigration laws, and it appearing from the facts
disclosed by the administrative proceedings that these children are entitled to admission into the
Philippine Islands, the order entered in the court below should be reversed, and in lieu thereof an order
should be entered directing the discharge of these children from the custody of the Insular Collector of
Customs, with the costs in both instances, de officio. So ordered.