Niccolb Machiavelli

Niccolo Machiavelli

The Laughing Lion and

the Strutting Fox

LEXINGTON B O O K S

A d i v i s i o n of
R O W M A N & LITTLEFIELD P U B L I S H E R S , INC.
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Belliotti, Raymond A., 1948-

Niccolo Machiavelli : the laughing lion and the strutting fox / Raymond Angelo
Belliotti.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-3062-9 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN- 10: 0-739 1-3062-5 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN-1 3: 978-0-7391-3064-3 (electronic)
ISBN-10: 0-739 1-3064-1 (electronic)
1. Machiavelli, Niccolo, 1469-1 527. Principe. 2. Political science-Philosophy. 3.
Political ethics. I. Title.
JC143.M3946B45 2009
320.14~22 2008031336

Printed in the United States of America

@"The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
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For Marcia, Angelo, and Vittoria
I1 mondo k degli audaci
 Contents

Preface ix

Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction: Machiavelli's Life and Times xv

Chapter One: The Prince 1

Chapter Two: The Discourses 31

Chapter Three: Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 63

Chapter Four: Machiavelli's Top Ten 99

Chapter Five: Ends and Means 137

Chapter Six: Machiavelli's Final Letter 177

Appendix A: Texts and Their Abbreviations 181

Appendix B: Biographical Notes: Medici Scorecard 185

Bibliography 187

Index 193

About the Author 197

 Preface
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC-43 BC), Roman statesman and philosopher,
remarked that moral wrongs are performed by either force or by fraud. Both
methods are unworthy of human beings and are, instead, the trademarks of
beasts: fraud flows from the cunning fox, force from the ferocious lion. Niccolb
Machiavelli (1469-1527), Florentine politician and social theorist, rejected the
classical Greek notion that peace and harmony were the natural goals of human
beings and their political structures. Citizens and their states, on the contrary,
exist in relentless struggle, conflict, and turmoil. Enduring glory, not static se-
renity, is the greatest worldly prize.
As a result, Machiavelli celebrates the guile of the fox and the power of the
lion as crucial skills for successful statecraft. Human governors have much to
learn from the animal kingdom. Machiavelli's fox, however, is never merely
cunning. He struts and preens, at least when so doing does not jeopardize his
goals. Machiavelli's lion is never merely forceful. He roars with self-celebratory
laughter, at least when so doing invigorates his spirit and facilitates his ends.
This book is an interpretation, analysis, and critique of the political theory
Machiavelli advanced in The Prince and The Discourses. Traditionally, Machia-
velli is taken to be a theorist who separated morality from politics or who cham-
pioned Roman (pagan) morality over conventional (Christian) morality. I dem-
onstrate why both of these interpretations are unpersuasive. Instead, I locate
Machiavelli's innovation in his tacit understanding of the perhaps irresolvable
moral conflicts that exist within political leaders who fulfill the duties of their
ofices while accepting the authority of absolute moral principles. Throughout
the work, I refer to Machiavelli's lesser read works-such as the Florentine His-
tories, Art of War, Lfe of Castruccio Castracani, Mandragola-to support my
argument.
Chapter 1 is a description and explanation of The Prince: the qualities he
must emulate, the political principles he should follow, and the motivation that
spurs his labors. I also analyze the nature of Machiavelli's key concepts: for-
tuna, virtic, necessitd, and gloria.
Chapter 2 is a description and explanation of The Discourses: why republics
are generally preferable to principalities; what features a republic should em-
body; why republics must expand territory and influence; why international rela-
tions are a series of zero-sum contests; the ways republics differ from tyrannies;
the need for one strong man to found or reform a corrupt state; and the insepara-
ble connection between the self-interest of political leaders--the quest for en-
during glory-and the self-interest of citizens and subjects-the need for secu-
rity, order, and political freedom.
x Preface
Chapter 3 examines the link between The Prince, where Machiavelli cele-
brates principalities, and The Discourses, where he champions republics. What
were Machiavelli's motives and purposes in writing The Prince? To gain em-
ployment? To satirize tyranny? To fool the Medici and lead them to ruin? To
scientifically study politics? To unite Italy by sounding a nationalistic call to
arms? To remedy his own existential crisis? To show the way to practice evil?
To separate morality from politics? To replace conventional morality with pagan
morality? Chapter 3 asks and answers these questions and more. This study con-
nects the first two chapters and paves the way for the remainder of the book.
Chapter 4 deepens our understanding of Machiavelli's favorite and most
despised political principles by delving into the lives of his top ten and bottom
ten historical and mythological figures. This chapter supports the historical con-
text required to understand Machiavelli's work and adds concrete narratives to
his abstract ideas.
Chapter 5 analyzes the relationship of ends and means in Machiavelli. Did
Machiavelli hold that the good end justifies the means necessary to attain it?
What is the problem of "dirty hands" in politics? Did Machiavelli understand the
issue? Did he resolve it? What strengths and weaknesses saturate Machiavelli's
political theory? What is the difference between an excuse and a justification?
Why is that difference important to understanding Machiavelli's work? Can
Machiavelli, contrary to popular belief, be viewed as contributing to critical is-
sues in moral philosophy?
Chapter 6 contains Machiavelli's final letter. I imagine him in heaven, not
hell, commenting briefly on world affairs and explaining why the United States
of America is the best example of a republic that has followed Machiavellian
principles and flourished thereby.
The book places Machiavelli in historical context but argues that his im-
plicit understanding of moral conflicts is well ahead of his time. Instead of argu-
ing for the autonomy of politics, Machiavelli grapples with the special problems
of role-differentiated morality, where the duties of public office confront the
imperatives of conventional morality. Machiavelli is a moral pessimist who in-
sists that politicians must "risk their souls" when performing their public re-
sponsibilities. As a result, the combination of virtuous private person and honor-
able public officer is rare.
Politicians and military leaders must dirty their hands in service to their
constituents. This is especially the case when one strong man founds a state or
reforms a corrupt state. History washes away-that is, excuses-many of the
horrifying deeds that are required in such cases.
The book does not try to domesticate Machiavelli and picture him as a lib-
eral humanist inclined only toward fkee govenunent. Nor does it paint him as a
cynical huckster of evil. Instead, the book offers a balanced understanding of the
Florentine, with special focus on his insights and his myopias. Machiavelli's
view of human nature and his conclusion that international affairs have always
 Preface xi
been and will always be a series of zero-sum contests leading him to stunning
discoveries and glaring errors, alike.
 Acknowledgments
I owe debts of gratitude to Joanne Foeller for her exceptional word processing,
editing, and indexing skills, and unvarying good cheer; to Jessica Bradfield and
Patrick Dillon, the team at Lexington Books who shepherded the work through
the acquisitions process; to Bill Jacobs, a terrific philosopher and wonderful
colleague, whose discussions with me about Machiavelli over thirty years ago
inspired much of this book; and to my family-Marcia, Angelo, and Vittoria-
for everything.
 Introduction
Machiavelli's Life and Times
The scholarly consensus is that Machiavelli wrote The Prince between July and
December of 1513, with the possibility that the dedication and final chapter
were added as late as 1516. He wrote The Discourses from 1513 to 1517, al-
though some historians argue it was composed mostly from 1515 to 1516, with
late adjustments in 1517. A few scholars claim that The Discourses were not
completed until 1519.' The Art of War was completed by 1517 and published in
1521; the only one of Machiavelli's major works issued during his lifetime. Ma-
chiavelli's first and best-received play, La Mandragola, was written from 1518
to 1519. The Life of Castruccio Castracani was completed by 1520 and The
Florentine Histories in 1526. The Prince was not published until 1532, and The
Discourses were published in 1532. By 1559, Machiavelli's books, all contami-
nated by the evil allegedly celebrated in The Prince, were placed on the Roman
Catholic Church's Index of Prohibited Books. Machiavelli also penned two sorts
of letters: official correspondence, The Legations, when he was secretary of the
Committee of Ten; and informal letters he wrote to his political associates and
friends. Among the recipients of the latter were Francesco Vettori, ambassador
of the Medici-controlled Florentine republic to Rome; Francesco Guicciardini,
Biagio Buonaccorsi, Filippo Casavecchia, Agostino Vespucci, and Francesco
del Nero.
Niccolb Machiavelli was born in Florence in 1469, the year that Lorenzo
deYMedici("the Magnificent") rose to power in the city. His father, Bernardo,
was a lawyer who had opposed the rule of the ruling hereditary Medici family
and who had promoted republican governments-understood as political control
by some of the city's most prominent citizens. The Machiavellis were well-
respected but far from wealthy. They were not, however, as impoverished as
Niccolb sometimes suggested. From what little information is available, Niccolb
enjoyed an untroubled, secure, warm childhood. Bernardo had helped compile
the index for an edition of Livy's history of the early Roman republic and the
publisher rewarded him with a copy of the text. Niccolb enjoyed a solid educa-
tion and, although unfamiliar with Greek, read the classical Greek and Roman
authors in Latin. Niccolb would later extensively use his father's copy of Livy's
history in his own writing. He was also enamored of modem authors such as
Petrarch and Dante Alighieri.
In 1478, when Machiavelli was nine years old, the Pazzi, a wealthy family
with an ancient Florentine lineage, plotted to oust Lorenzo the Magnificent and
assume control of Florence. Part of the scheme was economic. The Medici bank
was the most influential in Florence and much of the Medici family influence
was grounded in its capability of controlling the purse strings. Most of the tradi-
xvi Introduction
tional Medici political power in Florence, in fact, was grounded in the family's
economic advantage and shrewd manipulation of the electoral process. The
Pazzi succeeded in having the papal bank account, the grandest in Italy, trans-
ferred from the Medici bank to its control. The Pazzi accomplished this by cur-
rying the favor of Pope Sixtus IV, who harbored dynastic ambitions. The Medici
had earlier refused to finance one of the pope's adventures. This hardened Six-
tus's resolve to destroy the Medici. Pursuant to that aspiration, the pope sup-
ported an enemy of the Medici as archbishop of Pisa, a port city controlled by
Florence.
The Pazzi hired assassins to murder Lorenzo and his brother, Giuliano, in
the cathedral during a Holy Week mass. When the altar bells rang during the
Eucharist, the assassins struck. Giuliano was slain, but Lorenzo, wounded, es-
caped into the sacristy. The Pazzi, a case study in premature celebration, scur-
ried to the Palazzo della Signoria to seize power, while their minions rode
through the streets of Florence shouting, "Liberty, liberty!"
Once the Florentine masses learned of the treachery, the brief reign of the
Pazzi evaporated. The people admired Lorenzo and loved Giuliano. The Pazzi
conspirators, enjoying the hospitality of the governmental palace, were arrested
and their supporters were rounded up. The Pazzi and the archbishop of Pisa,
who had a role in the plot, were executed and their corpses were untastefully
displayed in the windows of the Palazzo della Signoria. The palaces of the
schemers and their supporters were looted and burned. The people stormed
through the streets shouting the anthem of the Medici.
Pope Sixtus, disappointed that the plot failed and stunned by the murder of
the archbishop, demanded that L o r e m be turned over to papal control. The
Florentines refused and the pope dispatched his lackey, King Ferrante of Naples,
to attack Florence and seize Lorenzo. Florence, as usual, was unprepared for
war, and the Neapolitan army met no resistance. Lorenzo escaped, sailed to
Naples, and convinced the king that the pope's annexation of Florence to his
territories would also disadvantage Naples. After protracted negotiations, the
War of the Pazzi Conspiracy ended in 1480. Lorenzo returned to Florence. The
people greeted him as a conquering hero. The Pazzi conspiracy and its aftermath
had profound effects on Machiavelli. He comments on this period of Florentine
history frequently in his writings.
Lorenzo, understandably, was deeply affected by the Pazzi experience and
the murder of his brother. Feeling more insecure, he traveled only with armed
bodyguards. He began to act more like a domineering prince instead of an avun-
cular pahone. He began to treat state revenues as personal resources in contrast
to the Medici tradition of promoting Florence with Medici funds. Lorenzo con-
stricted the city's constitution to increase his power and the authority of his con-
fidants.
In 1492, every child knows that "Columbus sailed the ocean blue." But
fewer remember that Lorenzo the Magnificent died. His son, Piero, assumed
political control. Two years later, the French, under King Charles VIII, invaded
Florence. Piero, less capable than his father, bungled the defense of the city.
 Introduction xvii

Check that: Piero was not merely less capable than his father; he was immature
and stone cold inept. He had unwisely supported Naples in its dispute with Mi-
lan and France, virtually ensuring an invasion of Florence. When the attack oc-
curred, Florence surrendered with almost no resistance, losing its control of Pisa
as well. Piero was forced into exile and republican government was restored in
Florence. Machiavelli was twenty-five years old.
The brief, brilliant, deranged influence of Girolamo Savonarola followed.
Savonarola, a Dominican friar, was as austere as the rations at Auschwitz, as
zealous as red ants at a picnic, and as driven as Donald Trump in sight of a dol-
lar. Although inelegant and gloomy, Savonarola was a spellbinding orator who
not only felt his apocalyptic sermons but lived them. From 1490, working out of
the monastery of San Marco, he spewed his fire and brimstone, criticizing the
wicked ways of Florentines and the paganism of Lorenzo. Savonarola warned of
an angry God whose imminent, final judgments would hurl terrible vengeance
upon the sordid Florentines. The people, wracked by guilt and riddled with inse-
curities, listened and cowered.
The French invasions of 1494 presented opportunity. Savonarola revealed
that Charles VIII had been sent by God to punish Italy, purify the Church, and
prepare the way for the second coming of Christ. Savonarola supported republi-
canism as a prelude to theocracy. He and his sanctimonious, puritanical disciples
were able to outlaw horse races, dice and card games, dancing, carnivals, and
brothels. Homosexuality became a capital offense. Torture and excessive pun-
ishment for moral offenses were instituted. Savonarola's main sources of enter-
tainment were bonfires of the vanities in which everything from mirrors to the
works of Boccaccio were immolated. Spiritual repression suffocated the city.
Isaac Newton's third law of motion assures us that for every action there is
an equal, opposite reaction. Traditional Catholics, rival Franciscans, bankers,
secular humanists, Medici holdouts, and miscellaneous others all had reasons to
resent Savonarola's mercurial leap to power. Sectarian bitterness ensued be-
tween the Arrabbiati ("Hotheads") and the Piagnoni ("Sobbers"), the label that
the Hotheads affixed to Savonarola's supporters who were renowned for weep-
ing during the Dominican's sermons. Savonarola descended from power even
more quickly than he had risen. As Machiavelli would later report, the friar was
astonishingly inflexible and lacked an army. His defeat was inevitable. Eventu-
ally, the Franciscans challenged Savonarola to prove his status as a prophet. In a
contest worthy of the World Wrestling Federation, an ordeal by fire was pro-
posed: a Franciscan and Savonarola would walk through flames and God would
protect the favored son. Savonarola, unable to refbse precisely the type of zany
challenge that was his stock and trade, accepted. But on "game day'' he quibbled
and nibbled over the terms and conditions of the ordeal for hours, while the en-
tire city, including Machiavelli, waited anxiously for the advertised main event.
Finally, God rendered His verdict: rained poured and the fires were extin-
guished. The people, finally recognizing Savonarola as a sincere but deluded
fanatic, arrested him. He was soon tortured, hanged, and burned in 1498.
xviii Introduction
Machiavelli had a measure of admiration for Savonarola's ability to rouse a
crowd and rally supporters, but also perceived his fatal flaws and doomed ideol-
ogy. Merchant aristocrats regained political control of Florence at Savonarola's
death. Machiavelli, at age twenty-nine, was appointed as secretary to the Second
Chancery of the Republic of Florence and a member of the Council of Ten of
Liberty and Peace. He was one of the more important administrators in the city,
an administrator specializing in foreign and military affairs. Machiavelli,
though, was not an elected official. He was a state employee, not an independent
politician.
From 1498 through 1512, Machiavelli made over two dozen diplomatic
missions to Italian city-states and European powers. This experience greatly
influenced his conclusions about international military and political affairs. Ma-
chiavelli's conviction hardened that Italy was culturally superior to the barbaric,
better-organized monarchies of northern Europe. Italy itself was divided into
regional loyalties: Venice, Milan, Florence, the Papal States, and the Kingdom
of Naples were the main players. Machiavelli understood that foreign armies too
easily threatened the balance of power on the Italian peninsula. He looked to the
glories of the ancient Roman republic for additional lessons on military and po-
litical matters. Those two sources-his experiences as a diplomat and his inter-
pretations of Roman history-would animate his thinking and writing.
Pivotal to Machiavelli's political education was his diplomatic mission to
Cesare Borgia, illegitimate son of Pope Alexander VI, who was consolidating
his power in Northern Italy through force, fiaud, and theatrical bluffs. Machia-
velli was dispatched to jolly up Borgia, and to advance and safeguard Florentine
interests. He saw in Borgia a decisive, fearless, ruthless, often brutal com-
mander. Backed by the power and influence of his father, Borgia had mastered
the unforgiving techniques that had served foreigners so well in Italy. Machia-
velli clearly admired Borgia's skills in foreign affairs-he was a conqueror-
and in internal relations--he supposedly reformed Romagna (P 7; Leg. 11.15:
7/26/02; Leg. 11.10: 10/13/02; Leg. 11.36: 11/3/02; Leg. 11.50: 11/20/02; Leg.
11.82: 12/26/02; Ltr. 247: 1/31/15; AW VII 194). Cesare advised Machiavelli
that Florence was hamstrung by waffling, compromise, and delay. Florence, as
with all cities in crisis, needed a strong man to lead resolutely. Machiavelli was
greatly impressed by Borgia in his heyday, although he was ambivalent about
the advice he rendered.
In 1502, Machiavelli married Marietta di Ludovico Corsini. His wife
proved to be undemanding and uncommonly understanding. She bore six chil-
dren, one of whom died soon after birth. Also in 1502, Piero Soderini was
elected gonfaloniere b vita, chief magistrate of the Florentine republic. Machia-
velli became one of his closest ministers. So close was Machiavelli to Soderini
that he was known as il mannerino di Soderini ("Soderini's bobo"). Machiavelli
had genuine affection for Soderini, but later became disenchanted with the gon-
faloniere 's indecisiveness and squeamishness.
Soon thereafter, Machiavelli was sent again to Cesare Borgia. As Kenneth
Bartlett reports:
 Introduction xix

[Machiavelli] saw Cesare Borgia in action. He saw an Italian who appeared to

be taking events into his own hands and directing them using the same tech-
niques as the barbarians . . . here was an Italian who may, in fact, have been
able to learn the lessons and to do something to protect Italy against those sav-
ages . . . Machiavelli became entranced once more with Cesare. He was en-
tranced by his energy, by his ruthlessness, and by his single-mindedness. Ce-
sare would not let anything-not pity, not religion, not oaths or promises-
interfere with what he saw as necessary policy. Machiavelli didn't particularly
like this, but he also realized that perhaps it was the only solution to the situa-
tion of ~ t a l ~ . " ~

Machiavelli observed the unreliable nature of mercenary troops, which

seemed to vacillate between treacherous and cowardly actions. He also noted the
danger of auxiliary troops, which were loyal to their homeland not to the country
that employed them. Machiavelli was enthralled by the accounts of the Roman
historian, Livy, who celebrated the citizen armies of volunteers that had ener-
gized Roman expansion. Such armies were not only militarily effective but they
amplified patriotism, discipline, common identity, and civic virtue. Machiavelli
petitioned Soderini. The gonfaloniere put Machiavelli in charge of military op-
erations. The citizen army that was recruited, however, consisted mainly of po-
litically disenfranchised rural peasants who lacked a strong stake in the Floren-
tine republic. In 1508, Machiavelli was put in charge of the war against Pisa,
which had been waged sporadically for over a decade. He directed the sea and
land blockage that brought about Pisays surrender in 1509. The citizen army,
over ten-thousand strong, appeared to be a success.
Soon thereafter, however, events spiraled uncontrollably and disastrously.
In 1511, the Holy League of Mantua-led by the Papal States, Spain, some Ger-
man regions, and some Italian city-states-was formed to oust the French fiom
Italy. Florence, though, was allied closely with France. What should it do? So-
derini fumbled, mumbled, and bumbled. He avoided serious participation in the
dispute, eventually sending only a token force to France. As Machiavelli had
predicted, both sides ended up despising Florence. Regardless of who won the
war, Florence would suffer the sting of retribution.
Within a year, the Holy League had largely defeated the French. Just out-
side of Florence, an elite force of Spanish veterans attacked Prato. Machiavelli's
large militia was ensconced within the thick walls of a fortress. Spanish artillery
assaulted the fortress and penetrated its walls. Machiavelli's marauders threw
down their weapons and ran helter-skelter into the countryside. Over four-
thousand people were slaughtered in Prato. No obstacle to the Holy League's
triumphant entry into Florence remained.
Soderini's prospects for remaining gonfaloniere b vita were zero. The "vita"
turned out to be only a decade. He resigned and scampered into exile. Machia-
velli resented the aristocratic political class he served. The haughty nobles often
criticized him while failing to appreciate the sensitive diplomatic positions in
which they placed him. All the while, he-more honest, capable, and patriotic
xx Introduction
than they-was dischargeable at their whim as he labored at their pleasure Ltr.
176: 1/29/09). Moreover, the aristocrats generally hindered republican govern-
ment with their amplified sense of entitlement, cynical skepticism, and deflated
commitment to the common good. They were too weak to consolidate an alter-
nate view of politics but pesky enough to swing the balance between republican-
ism and Medician principality. For Machiavelli, such aristocrats were the most
annoying segment in Florentine society. The aristocrats viewed Machiavelli
similarly.
In his Ricordo ai Palleshi (Memorandum to Supporters of the Medici), writ-
ten in late October or early November 1512, Machiavelli cautioned the Medici
against publicizing the alleged misdeeds of Piero Soderini. Doing so, would
only embolden the aristocrats who had long opposed Soderini. A wiser course of
action was available: Expose aristocratic excesses to the people; invite the peo-
ple to despise the aristocrats; and make the aristocrats dependent on the Medici
rulers. In that missive, Machiavelli stigmatized the aristocrats as "those who
play the whore between the people and the Medici." The diatribe backfired. The
Medici were currying the favor of the aristocrats to buttress their return to
power. Machiavelli's vitriol hastened his own fall from political grace. The aris-
tocrats grinned.
With Soderini's capitulation, Machiavelli would soon be between jobs.
Giovanni de'Medici, the second son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, took control of
Florence. Giovanni had strongly served the Holy League and was rewarded for
his prescience. In 1513, Giovanni was elected Pope Leo X. The Florentine re-
public was no longer. Giuliano de'Medici, youngest son of Lorenzo the Mag-
nificent, was governor of Florence.
Machiavelli was not only canned, but he was soon implicated, apparently
falsely, in a plot to overthrow the Medici. His name was included in a list in the
possession of a Medici opponent. He was imprisoned and tortured with the
strappado. Sebastian de Grazia gracefully describes the brutality:

Your wrists are tied behind your back and bound to a rope hanging from a pul-
ley. The other end of the rope is pulled down and you are hoisted up to a ceil-
ing, arms yanked up behind, your body turning almost horizontally, its weight
borne by twisted arms and shoulders. Then the rope is released and you plunge
almost to the floor, the halt virtually tearing your arms out of their sockets. The
process is then repeated, four times being a rough average for interrogative pur-
pose~.~

The strappado was crude, but earned an impressive record: Almost every-
one subjected to this torture confessed even though they knew that an admission
of guilt was typically followed by an execution. For those with an unrefined
sense of matching penalties to crimes, the strappado was an unmitigated suc-
cess. Need a perpetrator? Send the accused to the strappado. Granted the notion
of the "voluntariness" of the confession was stretched beyond recognition, but
the strappado sure did cut down on police work.
 Introduction xxi

Machiavelli survived six (count 'em) yanks of the strappado and twenty-
two days in manacles. He did not confess and from all accounts conducted hirn-
self honorably and courageously. Machiavelli later wrote that: "I should like you
to get this pleasure from these troubles of mine, that I have borne them so
straightforwardly that I am proud of myself for it and consider myself more of a
man than I believed I was" (Ltr. 206: 3/18/13). Machiavelli was released as part
of a general amnesty accompanying the election of Pope Leo X. With no pros-
pects, few resources, and much to fear, he left Florence and retired to a small
family farm near San Casciano, about seven miles outside the city. When the
weather cooperated, he could view the tower of the P a l a m della Signoria, the
seat of Florentine political authority, now so far from his grasp. In 1513, Ma-
chiavelli was relegated to Palookaville.
While in exile, Machiavelli hunted, farmed, squabbled with local mer-
chants, hung out in taverns, played card and dice games, and wrote. His two
most famous pen pals were Francesco Vettori, Florentine ambassador in Rome,
and Francesco Guicciardini, the papal governor of Romagna. Machiavelli also
participated in political discussions in the Rucellai Gardens, presided over by his
republican friend, Cosimo Rucellai.
Many of the ideas compiled in The Prince were rehearsed in Machiavelli's
correspondence with Vettori. In a letter, dated December 10, 1513, Machiavelli
poignantly details a typical day in his life which culminates in the evening as he
dons courtly garments and "converses" with great ancient writers. He also an-
nounces in that letter the completion of The Prince and his intention to dedicate
the work to Giuliano delMedici, who was briefly the governor of Florence prior
to being named a cardinal when his brother was elected as Pope (Ltr. 224:
12/10/13). Machiavelli eventually dedicated The Prince to Lorenzo de'Medici,
grandson of the Magnificent, who was the Duke of Urbino and the de facto ruler
of Florence once Giuliano left for Rome.
Machiavelli also wrote The Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius
("The Discourses'~,The Art of War, La Mandragola (The Mandrake), The Life
of Castruccio Castracani, several plays, and numerous poems. Throughout this
period, he longed to return to political ofice and implement the principles he
had derived. Despite his maneuverings and his implorations to his friends Vet-
tori and Guicciardini, Machiavelli's resume remained unsolicited.
Finally, Cardinal Giulio de'Medici commissioned Machiavelli to write The
Florentine Histories. Machiavelli was eager to work and hoped it would lead to
a return to politics, but he was anxious about describing the Florentine republic,
1494-1512. He assumed that he was expected to curry the favor of the Medici
and sully the republican era. Yet, he was an integral part of that republican gov-
ernment for fourteen years. Machiavelli solved the problem with characteristic
aplomb: he ended the book at 1492, the year Lorenzo the Magnificent perished.
Moreover, he finessed his account of Medici rule, honestly praising their foreign
policy and paying less attention to the loss of liberty attending the Magnificent's
final decade of rule. In 1525, Machiavelli traveled to Rome to present the work
xxii Introduction
to Giulio, who had been elected Pope Clement VII two years earlier.
The pope received Machiavelli's labors warmly and offered Machiavelli a
return to Florence. By 1526, Machiavelli was given minor work related to the
defensive structures in Florence. He thirsted for more critical assignments.
Events conspired against him.
The following year, the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, sacked Rome, an
event that eviscerated the power of the Medici. Machiavelli and others had im-
plored the pope to heavily fortify Rome in preparation for the emperor's unwel-
comed arrival. Instead, Clement VII negotiated a series of truces with Charles V
and released his own troops to save money. The result was completely predict-
able: The emperor, sensing easy pickings, ignored his promises, broke the peace,
and stormed into Rome. The imperial army included mostly undisciplined bar-
barians who savagely despoiled the city. For over a week, Charles's cutthroats
murdered, raped, looted, ransacked, and kidnapped. Pope Clement VII retreated
to safety. About fifty thousand Romans either fled or were slaughtered. The for-
eigners left only decay, disease, and despair behind them.
As a direct result of the sack of Rome, the Medici were, once again, ex-
pelled from Florence in 1527. Machiavelli was convinced that the revitalized
republic that emerged would thirst for his services. But Machiavelli was now
associated with the Medici, whose benefits he had cadged. No job offer was
forthcoming. He was fifty-eight years old, without hope and redemption. Ma-
chiavelli had not tasted the enduring glory he so relentlessly sought.
Niccolb Machiavelli died later that year and was buried in Santa Croce, a
Franciscan church in Florence that also contains the bodies of Michelangelo and
Galileo, and a memorial to Dante. Thousands of tourists stroll through Santa
Croce every week. They take photos of his grave. The epitaph on his tombstone
reads, "Tanto nomini nullum par elogium" ("To such a name no eulogy is
equal").

Notes
1. See, for example, Eric W. Cochrane, "Machiavelli: 1940-1960," Journal of Mod-
ern History 33 (1961): 131-133; John H. Geerken, ''Machiavelli Studies since 1969,"
Journal of the History ofldeas 37 (1976): 357-359.
2. Kenneth Bartlett, The Italian Renaissance: Part Three (Chantilly, V A : The
Teaching Company, 2005), 103-1 04,105.
3. Sebastian De Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1989), 36.
 Chapter One
The Prince
The Prince is a handbook for rulers on the art of successful statecraft; or it is a
patriotic call for Italian unification; or it is a technical book on politics not in-
tended for any particular people or locale; or it is a job application on behalf of
an author who is unemployed; or it is a self-inflicted wound by an author who is
psychologically exhausted but who desperately needs to feel alive; or it is a sci-
entific manual on politics; or it is the first, autocratic political stage of a process
that will end with self-government; or it is a satire on the duplicity of princes
intended to alert and educate the masses; or it is a politically subversive text
designed to dupe the Medici and restore republican government to Florence; or
it is an instruction guide for success through evil, perhaps inspired by the devil
himself; or it is any of another half-dozen or so plausible interpretations.
Whatever intentions, purposes, and methods animate The Prince, what is
undeniable is the ongoing influence this concise treatise exudes. The term "Ma-
chiavellian"-connoting manipulation, conniving, duplicity, and, less fie-
quently, coercion to achieve one's goals-is derived fiom The Prince. The im-
age of a successful chief executive, corporate leader, politician, military
commander, head athletic coach, or crafty teacher adopting Machiavellian tech-
niques to create and exploit images and appearances for his or her own increased
power remains vivid. Unsurprisingly, even when Machiavellianism is dispar-
aged it is with a wink and a nod as we bestow grudging admiration on the sheer
cunning and breathtaking ingenuity ascribed to Machiavelli's work.

The Dedication
The Prince is dedicated to the Duke of Urbino, Lorenzo de'Medici (1492-1 519),
grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent (1449-1492), son of Piero (1471-1503),
and nephew of Giovanni (1475-1521) who was elected Pope Leo X in 1513.
Machiavelli first intended to present The Prince to Giuliano de'Medici (1478-
1516), Lorenzo's uncle, who assumed control of Florence in 1512, when the
Holy League defeated the French and ousted the republic. But Giuliano died in
1516 and Lorenzo rose to power.
Machiavelli observes that those currying a prince's favor must present him
with a gift they consider among their most valuable. Horses, armor, gems, gold
cloth, and the like are the usual fare. Machiavelli's gift must symbolize his de-
sire to render service to Lorenzo. His understanding of the lives and actions of
2 Chapter One
great men, sharpened by a study of the classics and by his experiences in poli-
tics, is Machiavelli's most treasured contribution. The Prince summarizes and
describes Machiavelli's conclusions on these matters (P ded.)
He acknowledges that The Prince is an unworthy offering, but implores
Lorenzo to accept the gift. Machiavelli is not in a position to present anything
greater and the knowledge contained therein is the culmination of years of study
and labor accompanied by grave suffering and perils. The author notes that he
wrote The Prince without needless rhetorical flourishes or pretentious literary
adornments. He refuses to win approval for the book on the basis of clever, se-
ductive style: the diverse historical examples and importance of the issues
should suffice. Machiavelli hopes his efforts will not seem presumptuous. Just
as landscape painters must work from the valley if they are to capture moun-
tains, only a person of modest origins can accurately understand the actions of
rulers. Machiavelli reminds Lorenzo that a cruel fate has inflicted undeserved
suffering upon him. Yet he deeply yearns that Lorenzo will attain the greatness
that his good fortune and character promise (P ded.)
The conventional rendering of the dedication views it as a compendium of
literary custom, job-probing, and thinly veiled messages. The false modesty-
gosh, 1 know this gift is unworthy, but please accept it from someone who has
no resplendent material possessions to offer-fits the expectations of the period.
Likewise, the elevation of Lorenzo's personal character and its contrast to Ma-
chiavelli's poor luck and unmerited suffering establish a suitable distance be-
tween subject and ruler.
Machiavelli, though, makes it clear that he is available and willing to obedi-
ently serve Lorenzo's interests. Moreover, he has the political experience and
classical training which can vivify Lorenzo's rule. He sees from the valley,
Lorenzo scans from the lofty heights of power, and together they could develop
a formidable political relationship. Alone, each of them is incomplete: Machia-
velli lacks a position, Lorenzo needs savvy ministers. Machiavelli cannot brag
directly about his political resume. After all, he was part of the republican gov-
ernment that opposed a principality in Florence. Although Machiavelli does not
hammer the point, he is telling Lorenzo that he deeply desires and is uniquely
qualified for a position as Lorenzo's consigliere. He will serve loyally and well.
He will facilitate Lorenzo's quest for enduring glory. That Lorenzo's uncle is
the pope will not hurt their proposed joint venture one iota.

Virtu
Few words in a political text have generated as much controversy as Machia-
velli's use of virtir. Typically, translators caution readers not to associate the
term with moral virtue. That warning, though, is misleading because at times
Machiavelli does speak of moral virtir. This, however, is not the primary way he
uses the term. Virtir has been, more or less accurately, translated as efficiency,
 The Prince 3

skill, strength, excellence, discipline, manliness, admirable qualities, ability,

virtue, effectiveness, will power, exceptional qualities, vigor, greatness, courage,
intelligence, and a host of related attributes.
Consider the English word "good." We are familiar with good people, good
books, good knives, good cooks, good sex, good cars, good presentations, good
times, good athletes, good singers, good teachers, and the like. "Good" some-
times but not always connotes "moral rectitude." At other times, "good" de-
scribes a person, event, or object that performs its function well. The word "ex-
cellent" does the same. In ordinary discourse we are rarely confused because
context determines the meaning of such words. For example, we do not scratch
our heads in puzzlement over how a car can manifest moral goodness. We un-
derstand, instead, that a good car is a vehicle that rarely breaks down, runs
smoothly, and is easy to maintain.
For Machiavelli, virtir connotes an excellence relevant to a person's func-
tion. Human beings inhabit a world of scarce resources and keen competition
that coalesces uncomfortably with our bottomless ambitions and passions.
Worse, we are susceptible to the whims of Fortuna, which often conspire
against our best-devised stratagems. Only people embodying virtir are able to
cope with Fortuna, confront adversity with renewed purpose, imagine and pur-
sue grand deeds, and maintain their resolve and passion in a relentlessly com-
petitive world.
Specifically, Machiavelli refers to military virtir, political virtir, civic virtir,
moral virtir, and artistic virtir (P 7; P 8; P 12; P 14; P 15; P 19; P 21; P 25; P
26).' The qualities of excellence defining each type will differ. Military com-
manders require discipline, bravery, single-mindedness, drive, skill, energy,
military skill and knowledge, and the gumption to ignore conventional morality
when necessary. Political leaders need many of the same qualities, but also a
special shrewdness and prudence in dealing with foreign threats and internal
plots. The attributes of the lion, in order to frighten wolves, and the fox, in order
to evade traps, are crucial (P 18). Civic virtir is the hallmark of a sound republic.
Citizens, initially motivated by self-interest and personal aggrandizement, are
shaped by good laws, strong arms, and sound education into sewing the com-
mon good of an expansionist state. By moral virtir, Machiavelli means exercis-
ing the values of conventional morality. Artistic virtir defines excellence in lit-
erature and the arts. The greatest men-those able to found, reform, preserve,
and expand healthy political units-must exude military and political virtir. Such
leaders must effectively size up the prevailing situation; reflect on the available
choices, priorities, and probable consequences; and act decisively and success-
fully. Citizens in a healthy political unit must exhibit civic and moral virtic if the
unit is to continue to flourish.
Clearly, for Machiavelli the most important forms are military and political
virtir. A sound political unit, grounded in good laws and strong arms, is a pre-
requisite for the rigorous education needed to promote civic and moral virtir.
The opposite of virtic is corruption. Corruption, for Machiavelli, is weakness:
ozio (sloth or idleness), civic and moral decay, lack of discipline, softness, ti-
4 Chapter One

midity, muted will, resignation, inability to compete, hesitancy, indecisiveness,

an animo efleminato.
Much ink has been squirted discussing Machiavelli's description of the no-
torious Agathocles of Sicily, king of Syracuse. Within the space of a few sen-
tences, Machiavelli seems to contradict his own words:

One ought not, of course, to call it virtic to massacre one's fellow citizens, to
betray one's friends, to break one's word, to be without mercy and without re-
ligion. By such means one can acquire power but not glory. If one considers the
virtic Agathocles demonstrated in braving and facing down danger, and the
strength of character he showed . . . then there seems to be no reason why he
should be judged less admirable than any of the finest generals. But on the
other hand, his inhuman cruelty and brutality . . . mean it would be wrong to
praise him as one of the finest of men . . . one can attribute neither to fortune
nor to virtzl his accomplishments, which owed nothing to either (P 8).

At fust blush, the paragraph is worthy of double-talk artists such as Casey

Stengel or Doctor Irwin Corey. Did Agathocles embody and exercise virtir or
not? I interpret the passage as attributing military virtir to Agathocles, in re-
sponse to his undeniable courage and resolve in rising up through the military
ranks and seizing power. He lacked, however, political virtir because he misused
power and meted out gratuitous cruelties. Also, he was without civic and moral
virtir. We should not attribute his transient success to luck or to political virtir or
to moral virtir. As a side bar, Machiavelli claims that the "finest of men" are not
inhumanely cruel and that acquiring power is not enough to merit glory. He pre-
serves a distinction between tyrants and princes. A concern for enduring glory
should inform a prince's deeds.
Harvey Mansfield argues that "Agathocles has virtir but cannot be said to
have virtir. It is not enough to say that he uses the word in different "senses"; he
uses it in two contradictory senses as to whether it includes or excludes evil
deeds. What could be more clear, more essential, and more inconsistent than
thaty2
Mansfield's outrage misses the mark. Surely, moral virtir excludes, almost
always, evil deeds (although extreme cases include choices between degrees of
evil). Just as surely, military and political virtir include "evil well-used" (P 8). At
times, military and political leaders must transgress absolute moral principles in
order to advance their highest goals: founding, reforming, preserving, and ex-
panding a worthy state. In the chapters that follow, these distinctions will be-
come clearer. That one form of virtir aspires to exclude evil deeds but other
forms of virtir include evil well-used is no more a contradiction than saying a
good knife cuts sharply while a good doctor heals cuts is a contradiction.
The more troubling aspect of the chapter arrives later when Machiavelli,
after earlier stigmatizing the excessiveness of Agathocles's methods, includes
Agathocles among those who used evil well: "Those who use cruelty well may
indeed find both God and their subjects are prepared to let bygones be bygones,
as was the case with Agathocles" (P 8). One possibility is that Machiavelli takes
 The Prince 5

Agathocles to have used evil well in military matters, but to have used evil
wrongly in political matters. Beginning from humble origins, Agathocles rose to
military power and displayed virtic in so doing, which required evil well-used.
His political career was marred by excesses, cruelties and betrayals that Machia-
velli derides. In short, Agathocles was a political destroyer of his city, a tyrant.
That Agathocles was ruthless in obtaining military power does not faze Machia-
velli; that Agathocles was excessively cruel once he had political power, that he
acted as a tyrant instead of a Machiavellian prince, merits condemnation.
Agathocles, lacking prudence, represents ravenous ambition untempered by an
understanding of what constitutes enduring glory.

Fortuna
Machiavelli sometimes writes as if Fortuna is a personified, natural force that
consciously and capriciously plays with the circumstances of human beings. At
other times, he writes as iffortuna is only the set of circumstances within which
human beings must operate and choose alternatives (P 25).
Although he entertains and admits being drawn to the proposition that the
affairs of the world are governed completely by Fortuna, he rejects that view.
Citing the existence of free will, Machiavelli carves a spot for human agency
and prudence. Fortuna, he speculates controls only about fifty percent of human
actions. Wise human beings can take proactive and reactive measures to soften
Fortuna's fury. In an example reminiscent of Hurricane Katrina's devastation of
New Orleans, Machiavelli describes how precautions can be taken against natu-
ral disasters. By building strong, effective barriers and banks, human beings
cannot prevent torrential rivers from rising, but we can soften the amount of
damage. Likewise, once a natural disaster has struck we can erect the fortifica-
tions required to anticipate and mollify the next occurrence. The Gulf Coast had
insuff~cientbarriers and inadequate levees. As a result, Hurricane Katrina devas-
tated the area frighteningly. That Hurricane Katrina struck was unavoidable, but
the amount of damage was a function of the lack of human foresight and prepa-
ration.
The message to individual rulers is even crisper. Do not depend on past
favorable fortuna. Your fortunes will change. No person will enjoy positive for-
tuna forever. Leaders must be flexible and adjust their policies as circumstances
permit. If a ruler's attributes and actions are not compatible with present needs
then he will fail. Sometimes caution wins the day. Sometimes boldness suc-
ceeds. The character of the times is dispositive. If a man continues behaving in
his customary way, then eventually he will be defeated when unfavorable for-
tuna appears. Only if a man could alter his character as time and the situation
warrant, would his luck be consistently favorable. Next comes the shocker: But
Machiavelli has not found a man of such great prudence. Men are either unable
to go beyond their fixed characters or are unable to convince themselves to
6 Chapter One
change because their past style has been so successful. Fortuna changes, but
men cannot adjust enough.
Fortuna, like all women for Machiavelli, is both threatening and malleable.
She is capricious and thus beyond the deterministic schemes of fate; but also
subject to being overwhelmed by bold, masculine action. Unlike other women,
though, Fortuna has an endless bag of relentless tricks, while even the greatest
men are limited by their relatively-fixed characters and the seductions of past
success.
Machiavelli does not explicitly spell out the conclusion of this argument:
All men must fail in the long run. The worst of us will supplicate ourselves be-
fore Fortuna and submit meekly in defeat. The best of us will defeat Fortuna
most of the time. None of us will defeat Fortuna all of the time. Even those of
the grandest virtir, if they live long enough, will eventually confront fortuna so
unfavorable that they will fail due to inherent limitations on human flexibility of
character. Men flourish when their character and actions mesh with circum-
stances fashioned by Fortuna. Men fail when their character and actions are out
of step with the times. As a guideline, Machiavelli advises that boldness and
ruthlessness are preferable to caution: "For Fortuna is a lady. It is necessary, if
you want to master her, to beat her and strike her. And one sees she more often
submits to those who act boldly than to those who proceed in a calculating fash-
ion" (P 25).
Machiavelli astutely grasps that success requires a happy marriage between
a man's character and his situation. For example, the question, "Would Russo be
a great president?" should be replaced by "Would Russo be a great president at
this time under these circumstances?'A person's temperamental range and his
ability to adapt to fortune are limited. Instead of seeking a great ruler as such we
are better advised to assess carefully the prevailing context and select the person
best suited to flourish in that environment.
Machiavelli's sagacious, famous call for flexibility and adaptability as cru-
cial to military and political success is deflated by the dreary, insightful conclu-
sion that human beings must fail in the end. This does not mean enduring glory,
the highest prize for Machiavelli, is impossible. Far from it. Part of that glory is
fighting the strong lifelong battle against an unconquerable foe, refusing the
easy consolations of lesser men and relishing the contest as an opportunity to
manifest one's mettle. We are born of dust and to dust we shall return. But along
the way, if we retain our nerve, energize our spirit, activate our understanding,
and greet the world with brio and virtir, we, too, may earn a measure of glory.
Machiavelli was more flexible and adaptable than most human beings. His
willingness to adapt to his times is reflected in his willingness to serve republics
and principalities, as the circumstances warranted. In the end, Fortuna ground
him down and he was not trusted completely by advocates of either form of
government. He died disillusioned, the product of high expectations and unful-
filled political promise. Although he did not live long enough to know and ex-
perience it, Machiavelli eventually earned enduring glory as a writer, theorist,
 The Prince 7

and provocateur-a deserved response to his artistic virtir. Fittingly, Machia-

velli's life mirrors his teachings on the caprices and power of Fortuna.

Glory and the Quest for Immortality

For Machiavelli, the highest ends of governments are expansion and glory; the
highest end for human beings is glory. Machiavelli's infrequently noted tragic
view of life accepts that the only way to soften our mortality and finitude is to
earn an enduring biographical life. Grand military and political projects in ser-
vice to a healthy government are the typical routes to deserve such glory. People
of great passion and ambition hunger for recognition that endures beyond their
lifetimes. This motivation, whether consciously felt or not, is critical to Machia-
velli's political prescriptions.
Glory is a type of external validation-it depends on the judgments of con-
temporaries and of posterity-and thus rests on the values and understandings of
evaluator^.^ For Machiavelli, glory can be temporary or permanent. Although
Machiavelli discusses the notion of glory more thoroughly in The Discourses, he
does not ignore the topic in The Prince (P 7; P 8; P 14; P 24; P 26). The greatest
glory is bestowed on those who found, reform, or lead religions; next are those
who found republics or principalities; then those who lead armies that expand
the territorial holdings of their native land; next are exemplary practitioners of
literature and art; and, finally, all others who earn glory through achievements in
their professions and occupations (D I 10).
Success is not sufficient to confer glory in politics. Favorable fortuna may
well have caused that triumph. The principles upon which one acted and one's
virtir are most critical. Machiavelli understands that one can lose admirably and
thereby merit glory. Machiavelli denies Agathocles glory because of his villain-
ous methods and tyrannical aspirations (P 8). Machiavelli claims that men seek
glory and wealth (P 25), but, more precisely, he is referring only to certain men,
those with grandezza d'animo (nobility of passion). He understood keenly that
most of us lead obscure, quiet lives that do not vie for, much less attain, endur-
ing glory. Even among politicians and military careerists, glory is earned by
only a few.
Gloria . . . may be aptly defined as "very great fame or honor that is generally
recognized, acquired through extraordinary merits or talents, through valorous
deeds or great enterprises." Glory is a reputation for great deeds in the public
spheres4

I will return to the theme of glory when I discuss The Discourses. In The
Prince, Machiavelli is addressing those who would dismiss the false comforts,
easy conformities, tepid projects, trivial idleness, and unbearable softness of
animo efleminato. Instead, he dares those with grandezza d'anim-those glory
hounds whom Machiavelli admires and joins-to accept the challenge and com-
8 Chapter One

Pete for the only reward that persists beyond a life span and that spits in the eyes
of the dogs of mortality.

Two Human Temperaments

Two conflicting parties, representing two opposing temperaments, compose civil
principalities and can assist or hinder a prince's rise to power. The people desire
not to be oppressed, while the nobles or aristocracy want to dominate (P 9). A
prince must earn the support of one or the other of these groups. To win over the
people, he must promise to neutralize the nobles. To lure the nobles, he must
promise to oppress the masses. Machiavelli advises princes to align themselves
with the people. First, he rejects the ancient proverb that "he who builds on the
people builds on mud." True, a private citizen who depends on the masses will
be disappointed, but not a wise prince. Such a prince, who does not buckle under
adversity, is well-prepared and courageous, and is able to buoy the spirits of the
people, will be rewarded. Second, the people will demand less fiom a prince
than will the aristocrats. The people ask only that they not be oppressed, while
nobles harbor higher expectations that may conflict with the prince's agenda.
Many nobles fantasize that they are equals to the prince-a self-image that
makes them difficult to command. Third, the'people are more numerous than the
nobles. Against a hostile people a prince cannot be safe. But a prince can neu-
tralize an antagonistic aristocracy, up to and including wiping them out. Fourth,
nobles will be more likely to hatch schemes against the prince, while the masses,
embodying less ambition and passion, will merely abandon the prince in worst
case scenarios. Fifth, the people, expecting little, are more likely to be grateful
for the prince's protection than are nobles who will resist the prince when it is
expedient (P 9).
Machiavelli's counsel to win the support of the people, either initially or af-
ter gaining power, should not be taken as an enthusiastic endorsement of the
masses. His conclusions follow fiom pragmatic considerations: the people are
more numerous, less dangerous, less ambitious, harbor fewer expectations, and
are more likely to be grateful than are the haughtiest aristocrats.
As always, Machiavelli highlights the need to appeal to self-interest. The
people must understand that their well-being is tied to the flourishing of the
prince. The prince must demonstrate that he is responsible for their enhanced
security and order. The destruction of or a harm to the prince must be viewed as
jeopardizing the well-being of the people. Loyalty to the prince, as always, is
grounded on perceptions of self-interest: "He who builds on the conviction that
he is loved by others and that love will issue in selfless allegiance builds on air."

The Prince's Training and Machiavelli's Counsel

A passel of slogans capture the gist of Machiavelli's advice to princes.
 The Prince 9

Free yourse~fiomthe imperatives of conventional morality

Because of the unbridgeable chasm between how people live and how they
ought to live, princes who insist on acting on moral ideals will destroy them-
selves. Princes who refuse to transgress conventional morality at critical times
will fall because so many people lack moral rectitude. Princes must learn how to
be not good, understand when to use that knowledge and when not to use it, in
accord with necessity (P 15; P 18).
Machiavelli recognizes a host of moral virtues: generosity, philanthropy,
mercy, truthfulness, boldness, kindliness, chastity, reliability, tolerance, cheer-
fulness, and religiosity. But he insists that no prince can embody or fully prac-
tice all of these moral virtues because of the human condition and human behav-
ior which do not permit doing so if one is to be successful. A prince does need to
avoid being tagged with too many of the correlated vices if doing so jeopardizes
his position: miserliness, greediness, cruelness, untruthfulness, cowardliness,
pridefulness, lasciviousness, untrustworthiness, intolerance, hardness, and faith-
lessness (P 15; P 18).
In general, a prince should follow conventional morality where he can, but
recognize that necessity ofien militates that adhering to what are commonly
called vices facilitate the ends of the state and prince, while practicing what are
called virtues may harm or destroy those ends (P 15; P 18; P 19).
People are mystified by appearances. They judge the actions of everyone,
especially those of princes, by their results. If a prince succeeds in founding,
preserving, reforming, or expanding the power of the state-and thereby en-
hancing the well-being of its citizens-his methods will be evaluated favorably
(P 18). As I will explain in detail later, Machiavelli is not championing the nor-
mative view that "good ends justify any means." Instead, he is describing the
way the majority of people will be blinded by results when judging the ways
those ends were attained. He suggests that if their self-interest was promoted by
the results, people will rationalize away the wrongness of the means. For Ma-
chiavelli, as I will also explain later, the wrongness of the means persists even
though the prince was warranted in performing the act. A prince's default posi-
tion is following the scruples of conventional morality. But necessitbthe basic
human inclination toward self-interest; the scarcity of natural resources; the ac-
tual behavior of the vast majority of people; the zero-sum nature of international
affairs; and the vicissitudes of Fortuna-will often require transgressing the
imperatives of conventional morality as the only way to attain paramount politi-
cal ends: founding, preserving, reforming, or expanding the state. A healthy
state is required if the prince is to achieve glory and the people are to enjoy se-
curity, order, and develop civic virth.
Only if the world was as philosophers such as Plato imagined it could be
would the marriage of strict reliance on conventional morality and international
politics thrive.
10 Chapter One
But the activities of the world stray wildly from such ideals and princes who
suppose otherwise are fools who will soon relinquish whatever political power
they temporarily grasp.

Use cool, dispassionate reason to assess opportunities andpossibilities, and

to select your methodr

In the context of advising the prince on securing a grand reputation, Ma-

chiavelli warns him not to be fooled into thinking he can always choose safe
options. Every choice involves risks and safeguards against one peril which in-
creases the probability of another danger happening. The wise prince under-
stands the art of evaluating the seriousness and probability of the various disad-
vantages and in selecting the least dangerous (P 2 1).
Machiavelli acutely senses that safety, comfort, and iron-tight security are
unavailable to a prince. He must, instead, identify his options, apply a cost-
benefit analysis to each, and select the least dangerous-the one with the highest
probability for significant success and the lowest chance of ending in disaster-
as the correct move. There is complete safety, if at all, only in the womb and the
tomb. Princes who are risk-adverse lack the enlarged spirit required for success.
To aspire to never err is to surrender at the outset. The best princes are not those
who make the fewest mistakes, but those who have the highest balance of mo-
mentous successes minus miscues. Of course, the prince must also avoid devas-
tating defeats that seal his doom. Above all, the prince must maintain his poise
and sharpen his talents when those around him are panicking and witless.

Cultivate the loyalty of the masses

Machiavelli understood implicitly the difference between the coercive and

directive functions of law. Law's coercive power is its threat of punishment:
human beings, other things being equal, seek to avoid the pains and suffering of
retribution for their misdeeds. But coercive power is insufficient. If the only
reason citizens have for obeying law or complying with the prince's decrees is
fear of punishment, then once that sword is no longer dangling over their heads
they will break the law with impunity. That is, they will disobey in those cir-
cumstances where the probability of getting caught is low and the benefits to
them are reasonably high.
Law's directive power kicks in when citizens internalize the values ex-
pressed by legal prohibitions and prescriptions: when citizens accept those val-
ues as their own and no longer perceive them as externally imposed. Machia-
velli's relentless call for strong arms and sound laws underscores the need for
the prince to bring order, stability, and security to the state (P 12). A well-
ordered state is the prerequisite for the socialization process that promotes the
habits, traditions-the necessities-that advance the directive hnction of law.
Remember, human beings are naturally inclined toward wickedness; they will
toe the righteous line only when strong-armed by necessity (P 15; P 18; P 23).
 The Prince 11

Only when citizens accept for themselves that the prince's rule and his laws are
appropriate, acceptable, and, yes, even necessary will the state no longer be cor-
rupt. A tyrant can call upon the coercive power of his reign even more easily
than a prince can. But the tyrant, lacking the loyalty of the masses, rules over a
corrupt polity where the directive power of law is absent. The authority of the
tyrant is based entirely on might. When Fortuna turns against him, the tyrant
will most likely fall swiftly and certainly.
The difference between a law with both coercive and directive power, and a
law with only coercive power, is easily illustrated. For most of us, laws prohibit-
ing murder bear both coercive and directive power: I fear the severe punishment
that accompanies being found guilty of murder, but independently of that fear I
accept that murder is wrong. I would not murder another person even if I' could
do so and escape punishment. I have internalized the values constituting the
prohibition on murder and have accepted them as my own. On the other hand,
for me at least, the sixty-five mile-per-hour speed limit on the New York State
Thruway bears only coercive power. I fear the punishment of yet another speed-
ing ticket-the cost of the fine, the inconvenience of paying or bargaining down
the penalty, the unbearable evening squandered at driver's reform school--but I
have no misgivings about driving over sixty-five if I suspect I can do so without
getting nabbed by a state trooper. Assuming excellent driving conditions, typical
traffic patterns, fine road conditions, and the like, I know that I can drive over
sixty-five safely and efficiently. Moreover, the speed law is enforced sporadi-
cally-early and late in the month seem like heavy quota times-and with dis-
cretion: no one is ticketed for traveling, say, sixty-seven in a sixty-five mile-per-
hour zone. The usual "trooper's number" seems to be seventy-seven or seventy-
eight. Thus, the state itself does not reinforce the alleged values of the speed
limit. To do so would mean a vast increase in the number of tickets and in the
amount of time the police expend in monitoring traffic. Where punishment is
swift and certain the law is strengthened in both its coercive and directive hnc-
tions. Judging from the habits of other drivers, I feel safe in concluding that the
65 mile-per-hour speed limit on the New York State Thruway has little or no
directive power for around 95 percent of operators of motor vehicles.
My point is that Machiavelli understood all of this. For a prince to merely
hold his subjects in fear is not enough. He must win their loyalty: he must trans-
form what citizens first take as external rule into an internally accepted regime.
As has been sketched above and will be detailed below, the cornerstones of the
program include showing the people how their self-interest is inextricably bound
to the well-being of the prince; recruiting a strong army and instituting sound
laws; neutralizing the ambition of the nobles; implementing disciplined educa-
tion; cultivating appropriate habits and customs; enlarging the prince's reputa-
tion; and demonstrating that the system works through grand military triumphs
and a sharp system of internal rewards and punishments.
Understand, though, that Machiavelli is not championing "power to the
people." The people are strongly inclined toward evil; they are turned to the
good only by necessity; they judge mainly by appearances; they evaluate actions
12 Chapter One
only by results; they seek merely to avoid being oppressed; they will desert the
prince if he is defeated or captured; and, thus, they lack grandezza d'animo. The
people may be small-timers, but their well-being and collective loyalty are piv-
otal to the prince's successful reign and to his ascension to enduring glory.

Restrain your erotic and material lusts

The prince must exemplify the traits he wishes his citizens to embody. First,
indolence is prohibited. The prince must train physically and be prepared men-
tally. Second, the prince must be disciplined and immune to the rush to luxuries.
Third, the prince must attend most of all to military affairs. A prince must be
armed and personally command his soldiers (P 14). Fourth, the prince must re-
fiain fiom abusing the women and seizing the property of his citizens and sub-
jects (P 17; P 19). Such princely excesses invite the hatred of the masses, the
one sure trigger of the prince's demise. Fifth, he must not exude animo eflemi-
nato: he cannot act erratically, cowardly, indecisively, or timidly. To do so earns
the contempt of the people. The people may themselves embody animo eflemi-
nato, but few recognize their limitations and all expect more of their leaders.
The prince, instead, must demonstrate grandezza d'animo: he must reveal the
greatness of his actions, dignified strength, resoluteness, and endurance (P 19).
The prince, unlike Machiavelli himself, should be a patron of the arts and
sciences. He should recognize accomplished artists, scientists, and encourage
farmers, businessmen, and craftsmen in their respective trades. Workers must be
assured that their labors will be rewarded and their property will be safe. Of
course, the prince is especially keen on those who benefit his state and enlarge
the public coffers (P 2 1).
The prince should sponsor fairs and festivals at the appropriate times of the
year. He should not be removed fiom the people. Instead, he mingles with guild
and neighborhood members. But he must never cast aside his cloak of authority
and dignity (P 2 1, FH VIII 10). Playing the fool is acceptable for common folk
and minstrels, but not for the head of state. Princes must be flexible, resolute,
spirited, and worthy adversaries for Fortuna.
In sum, the prince must be a hard man. Founding, reforming, preserving,
and expanding a state are not hobbies. Machiavelli correctly senses that a genu-
ine leader must be a role model. To earn the enduring glory he seeks, the prince
cannot be a poser. The attributes of the prince must not be based on smoke and
mirrors. The great bluffer and master of deception will ultimately be only as
successful as his character permits. If the prince is not the real deal, his enemies,
his people, and the ever-present Fortuna will snatch his power and grind him
into oblivion. History will consign such a ruler to the dross bin of losers.

Keep your behavior in tune with the times

I have addressed this above. A quick recap is appropriate here. The prince
should not stake his claim on past favorable fortuna. Fortuna is a trickster and
 The Prince 13

cannot remain constant. Rulers must be adaptable and conform their actions to
present circumstances. Some princes, the least able, are effective only occasion-
ally. Most princes, typical rulers, are more often successful because their tem-
peraments suit more conditions. Only the greatest princes are flexible enough to
succeed in numerous situations. Only such rulers bear the military and political
virtd required for founding, reforming, preserving, or expanding a healthy state.
Only they merit the enduring glory that marks the best human lives. But Ma-
chiavelli's tragic view of life whispers that men are unable to adapt to all cir-
cumstances. Their fixed character and dispositions or past success militate that
their elasticity is limited. But the situations contrived by Fortuna are boundless.
Although boldness is preferable to timidity, it cannot redeem us from our fate:
All men, if given enough time, will fail in the end (P 25).
A softer reading of Machiavelli's words would state his conclusion con-
ditionally: If the prince is not flexible, if he does not adapt himself to changing
contexts, his power will perish. If a prince could adjust his temperament and
policies with the requirements of the times, his luck would never change. This
interpretation holds out the possibility that a prince of such admirable malleabil-
ity might emerge and, if so, his fortunes would always be rosy. I emphasize,
instead, Machiavelli's conviction that he has not found a man so prudent and
flexible that he can accommodate himself to all of Fortuna's caprices. If Ma-
chiavelli had intended to highlight the softer reading, he would have offered
historical or mythological examples in support. Instead, he presents only the
case of Pope Julius 11: "He did not live long enough to experience failure. But if
the times had changed so that it was necessary to proceed with caution, he
would have been destroyed. He would never have been able to change the style
of behavior to which his character inclined him" (P 25).

Establish strong armies and sound laws

A prince can hue mercenary forces, align himself with auxiliary soldiers, or
train his own army. Of these, the last is by far the best strategy. Mercenaries are
worthless. When war is not being waged they are eager to be hired and drain a
prince's finances. When war arrives, they scatter like scalded cats. They are am-
bitious, undisciplined, disloyal, ostentatious among allies, but cowardly among
enemies. Mercenaries have no motive to aid a prince's cause other than their
desire to snatch a paycheck. Their leaders are faithless and often seek independ-
ent power. Worse, when they do fight they have proved ineffective (P 12).
Auxiliaries are the forces belonging to another strong man which a prince
has brought in to defend his state. They are as useless as mercenaries, but more
dangerous. If they lose, the prince loses. If they win, they are likely to injure the
prince who hired them. Auxiliaries do have loyalties, but only to their own
country and ruler, not to the prince who requested their aid. Whereas mercenar-
ies are indifferent and lazy, auxiliaries are eager but predatory (P 13).
A successfbl prince must recruit, train, and lead his own troops. A prince's
reputation for strength must be based on his actual military capabilities. The
14 Chapter One

prince's troops can include his subjects or citizens or dependents. To lose with
his own men is preferable to winning with soldiers belonging to someone else or
those who are hired guns (P 13). As always, the prince should be self-sustaining
and rely as little as possible upon outsiders (P 10). The best foundation for suc-
cess is a loyal, disciplined army which is united in defense of the homeland (P
26). Machiavelli offers several historical examples of princes, such as Cesare
Borgia and Hiero of Syracuse, who learned the hard way that one's own men are
superior to mercenaries and auxiliaries (P 13). A strong army, beyond estab-
lishing a robust defense of the homeland is the base from which a state builds
order and stability, which in turn are required to develop sound laws. Machia-
velli sees reciprocal benefits between military and civil institutions (P 12). Only
if strong arms and sound laws are in place can a state cultivate civic virtir and
begin to compete effectively in international affairs.
, Controversially, Machiavelli advises a new prince, as a general but not iron-
clad rule, not to disarm his subjects. When a prince disarms his subjects he
courts their anger and, possibly, their hatred. Also, if he finds them unarmed, he
should arm them. When a prince arms subjects he wins their loyalty and they
become his partisans (P 20). One exception occurs when a prince annexes a
province to his state. These subjects should be disarmed, at least those who were
not the prince's allies during the conquest (P 20; P 13). Allowing subjects to
retain their arms or arming those who were previously disarmed presents dan-
gers to the prince. Plots, conspiracies, and treacheries are more easily hatched
where the perpetrators have access to weaponry. Machiavelli judges that, typi-
cally, the risk is worth the rewards to the prince: avoiding an angry, hateful
populace; nurturing loyalty; demonstrating confidence and strength; and promot-
ing vigor in the people.

Gain knowledge of war

A prince must be armed, but to be dangerous he must lead his own troops.
He cannot lead an indolent life and retain respect. The quickest way to lose
power and relinquish your state is to shy from learning and practicing the art of
war. The unarmed man is compelled to obey the armed man. The prince must
train himself for war by hunting. Hunting accustoms the body to hardships and
forces the prince to confiont nature's topography. While engaging in sport, the
prince can study terrain and imagine military attacks and defenses. The geogra-
phy he observes will be similar to sites upon which he may have to do battle
later. Knowing his own country better also allows the prince to better defend it
from potential foreign dominators (P 14).
The prince must also study history. By observing and mimicking the meth-
ods of men with undeniable military virtir, the prince follows a long and honor-
able tradition: Alexander the Great imitated Achilles; Julius Caesar imitated
Alexander; Scipio imitated Cyrus. He who ignores history when it comes to
military matters invites disaster (P 14).
 The Prince IS
The wise prince commands his troops. He acts as a general in the field. The
well-ordered republic commissions a citizen. The prince's knowledge and train-
ing are not simply theoretical. Only in this way do healthy states advance their
causes (P 12).
Machiavelli was well familiar with a gifted prophet who ignored military
affairs: Savonarola. Once the people began to turn against him, the unarmed
ruler had no way of repelling opposition or of regenerating the faith of former
allies. He ended as all politicians who are indifferent to the military must: tor-
tured, hung, and burned (P 6).

Operate within the real as it is

Machiavelli cautions the prince to rule as Machiavelli writes: focus on real

problems, avoid abstractions and utopianism, and emphasize practicality (P 15).
The world of philosophers' imaginations is creative but useless for the purposes
of earthly governments. Princes who delude themselves or appeal to comforting
fantasies about human nature doom themselves and their homelands. History
will not judge kindly dreamers posing as rulers.
The way men live strays radically from the way they profess to live or
should live. The prince who imagines ideal polities or operates invariably ac-
cording to the scruples of conventional morality sows the seeds of his own de-
struction. The many who are not good will cannibalize a goody-two-shoes ruler
who operates under abstract principles instead of strategic cunning. Again, the
prince must learn how to be not good (P 15).
If natural resources are scarce, the ambition of glory-seekers is expansive,
and world affairs consists of a series of zero-sum contests, then the prince must
draw a tight circle around his area of concern-his state and citizens-and ad-
vance their interests to the detriment of those outside that circle. For Machia-
velli, this is the nature of the world and of human beings. Care for the well-
being of citizens or the common good does not extend beyond the state's bor-
ders. Glory is conferred in response to grand political and military achieve-
ments. These triumphs involve winners and losers. One sure way of losing is to
operate from principles and values which lack currency in the world as it is and
as it functions.

Foster a good reputation, earn respect, but act expediently

A prince should actually embody praiseworthy qualities, not just seem to

have them (P 18). But possessing so many grand characteristics is impossible (P
15). A prince, then, should follow some practical guidelines.
The prince must avoid being considered fickle, indecisive, cowardly-all
reflections of animo effeminate. Exuding strength, firmness, decisiveness, and
largeness of vision-the attributes of grandezza d'animeare required to dis-
courage enemies and win allies. Again, a prince who is not hated has few legiti-
mate concerns. One such wony is from foreign enemies; the antidote is able
16 Chapter One
soldiers and strong arms. If the prince can soften threats of foreign invasion he
will also increase order and stability within his state. The likelihood of internal
agitators forming conspiracies against the prince will decrease. If the people are
pleased with the prince's rule, potential conspirators will lose their motivation to
strike because they will understand that their actions will not be applauded by
the masses. In any event, almost all conspiracies fail. Most conspirators are mal-
contents who will rat out their fellow conspirators if expedient. The people most
likely to join a conspiracy are also the ones most apt to betray it. If the prince
has the goodwill of the people conspirators also must fear retaliation if they suc-
ceed. If, on the other hand, the people hate the prince then he should fear every-
one and everything (P 19).
The reputations of princes are amplified when the populace observes them
overcoming resistance and surmounting obstacles. A prince will not need to look
far to find enemies casting envious, covetous eyes on his territory. Defeating
these blackguards, through the arts of force and fraud, will elevate a prince. A
prince must also assess the motives of those who aided his rise to power. If they
did so out of allegiance to him, fine. But if they helped him fiom disdain of the
previous ruler, the new prince should be wary. Are his allies unrepentant mal-
contents? Or are they malleable enough to be loyal to him (P 20)? His evalua-
tions and judgments, as ever, will partly measure his political virtic.
In general, the prince will gain esteem through grand enterprises. Impres-
sive military victories, expansion of territory, stirring defenses of the homeland
are the most obvious candidates. But internal affairs are also important. The
prince must reward exceptional efforts and punish vile deeds. The people take
their cue from the prince: they will emulate rewarded actions in the hope of gar-
nering benefits and they will avoid punished deeds in order to skirt pain (P 21).
Also important to the prince's reputation is his choice of associates. For ex-
ample, a prince who allies himself with a ruler who is more powerful than him-
self courts danger and loses esteem. If the alliance triumphs, the stronger party
to it may turn on the prince and usurp his power (P 21). A prince is also evalu-
ated by his choice of ministers. An impeccable inner circle is critical to his suc-
cess and to his respect (P 22; P 23).
Like a proficient poker player, the prince tries to conceal the real strength of
his holdings. Sometimes he wants to give the impression his position is stronger
than it is in order to forestall robust internal opposition or external attack. At
other times, he may feign vulnerability in order to invite aggression which he
can easily quell. The deception in all cases is designed to amplify his overall
standing. But no one, poker player or politician, can succeed through bluffs
only. A fm basis of strength, not merely its illusion, is required. For princes, a
strong military, a well-ordered polity, and avoiding the hatred of the people are
prerequisites for continued success. No one can fool all of the people all of the
time. Certain qualities of character and tangible institutions form the ballast of
the prince's abilities to coerce and defraud the other players in the deadly game.
 The Prince 17

Understand the critical e n h of the state

The ends of the state are the personal glory of the prince and the enhanced
well-being of the citizens (P 26). Machiavelli is clear in The Prince and even
more emphatic in The Discourses that these ends require territorial expansion (P
3; P 7; D 11 2; D 11 4; D 11 6; D I1 9; D I1 21). Numerous commentators have
concluded that the well-being of citizens is only a means to the glory of the
ruler, which is paramount; that the personal power of the prince, not the good of
the state or the people, is the only true goal of a Machiavellian ruler.'
Such a reading is unfair. Rulers gather glory because they have founded, re-
formed, preserved, or expanded healthy states. A healthy state has strong arms,
sound laws, and rigorous education. The state must expand because on Machia-
velli7suncompromising world view the only other choice is enslavement. True,
the prince burns with ambizione (ambition) and unabashedly aspires to enduring
glory. That glory can be attained only by invigorating the state and enlarging the
common good.
Does it follow that the well-being of citizens is only a regrettable, but re-
quired, means to what the prince really wants? The connection between attaining
glory and benefiting the people is too tight to separate neatly. The prince's deep-
est aspiration springs, true enough, from self-interest. But he comes to under-
stand that what is in his self-interest cannot be gained selfishly. If selfishness is
ignoring the interests of others when one should not, then the prince must shun it
in order to satisfy his self-interest in enduring glory. That one cannot, in Ma-
chiavelli's view, attain glory selfishly speaks volumes. Achieving personal glory
and advancing the common good mirror the pretensions of love and marriage-
you cannot have one without the other. From the standpoint of the people, the
glory of the prince is a means to the common good. None of this assumes that
the prince has purely altruistic motives or even that his heart necessarily aches
for the plight of his people. But a Machiavellian prince must rise above selfish-
ness, must recognize the inexorable connection between advancing the well-
being of the people and attaining personal glory, and must, accordingly, cast
aside all inclinations toward tyranny. Accordingly, the well-being of citizens is
part of the definition of personal glory, rather than merely a means of attaining
it.

Remember: It is better to be feared than to be loved, but avoid being hated

The prince should strive to be considered merciful and not cruel. But being
merciful is trickier than it may seem. Cesare Borgia was thought cruel but his
methods united and reformed the Romagna. A more squeamish prince, desiring
a reputation for mercy, would have been gentler. The result would have been
continued disorder and corruption which would have been more harmful to the
state in the long run. Cruelty and mercy, then, are not always what they initially
appear to be. Being considered cruel will not jeopardize the prince's authority if
18 Chapter One
in so doing he advances the order and security of the state, and the well-being of
the people (P 17).
For the prince, being both feared and loved by the people is the best situa-
tion. But accomplishing both simultaneously is uncommon. If the prince cannot
join these two emotions in his people, it is better to be feared than to be loved.
This is the case because of human nature. People are generally ungrateful, cow-
ardly, selfish, deceptive, greedy, and inconstant. As long as the prince serves
their interests, they pledge loyalty and offer extravagant promises. They talk a
big game during high times, but come up tiny in adverse situations. Love is an
emotion that binds people through obligation. People, who are basically wicked
and self-interested, will renege on such a duty when expedient. Fear has a
greater hold because it includes dread of punishment. Love, then, appeals to the
better angels of our natures, making it thoroughly discretionary and unreliable.
Fear addresses our consistent aversion to coercion, suffering, and physical harm,
making it completely reliable and predictable. Also, whether citizens fear the
prince is more under his control than whether they love him. Accordingly, the
fear of his subjects, again, is more predictable, reliable, and controllable than is
the love of his subjects (P 17; P 18).
At all costs, a prince must avoid being hated (P 17; P 19). The people will
hate a prince only if the ruler confiscates their property or their women. When
the prince has to kill he should be able to articulate persuasive reasons and to
make a clear case. Above all, he must not seize the property of citizens: "Men
forget more quickly the death of a father than the loss of a father's estate" (P
17).
Military leaders, following the example of Hannibal, must be cruel in order
to cement discipline and to instill useful fear. Those who praise the loyalty of
Hannibal's troops but stigmatize Hannibal for his harsh measures, says Machia-
velli, miss the mark badly. Hannibal's cruelty is what made his troops loyal,
disciplined, and effective. Anticipating the words of Immanuel Kant, Machia-
velli suggests that to will the end is to will the means necessary to achieve it (P
17).
Here Machiavelli offers his coldest, narrowest, most unequivocal and cyni-
cal assessment of human nature. Especially in terms of a prince who has just
risen to power, Machiavelli claims to hold a mirror to people as they are and
when he asks, "who is the fairest of them all?" the glass shatters. He goes so far
as to accept that people value property rights over human rights to the extent that
they cherish their possessions more than the life of a parent. In these passages,
unlike other parts of his work, he offers no hope for transformation or redemp-
tion. If human beings are so desolate and intractable, one wonders, what is the
worth of the glory those with grandezza d'animo seek? Who should bother to
aspire to a fine reputation and an historical legacy among such pathetic speci-
mens? Are they even worthy of Machiavelli's imagined prince of robust military
and political virtir?
 The Prince

Develop the qualities ofthe lion and thefox

The prince should take the lion and the fox as role models. The lion fiight-
ens wolves and the fox recognizes traps. Rulers who act only as lions do not
fully understand the requirements of their office. The lion, as a metaphor for
military might, can be tricked and neutralized by clever adversaries. The fox, as
a metaphor for cunning and deception, cannot always defend itself fiom forceful
enemies. The qualities of both beasts are needed by a successful prince (P 18; P
19).
Machiavelli's pairing of the lion and the fox derives fiom two sources.
Cicero had rejected in his De Oficis the political use of fiaud and force as repre-
sented by the fox and lion. Machiavelli dismisses Cicero's position while ac-
cepting his symbols. Machiavelli is also influenced by Aesop's fable, "The Fox
and the Lion" (P 18; Ltr. 222: 8/26/13). Machiavelli's prince must sharpen the
art of deception. Although truthfulness, integrity, and promise-keeping are well-
recognized moral virtues, only those rulers willing to violate such imperatives
will succeed. A ruler must sometimes respect moral conventions and must some-
times cast off these restraints when advantageous. This is the case, again, be-
cause people are generally evil and will break their word to you; thus, the prince
should not feel compelled to keep his promises to them. A prince should follow
conventional morality, but must be prepared to do wrong if necessary. Only if
all men were morally good would this advice miss the mark. But men are
wicked (P 18; P 23).
Happily, people are easily fooled. The prince must conceal that he is play-
ing the fox. Through cunning, deception, and by picking his spots, the prince
must disguise his actual intentions. If capable, the prince will find plenty of sim-
pletons, blinded by immediate gratifications and their own illusions, who will
allow themselves to be duped. The prince must seem merciful, trustworthy, reli-
able, religious, truthful and the like. Such a reputation aids the art of deception.
But a prince must adjust his actual behavior in accord with Fortuna and neces-
sitci. Practicing the moral virtues stringently will limit the prince's range of pos-
sible actions to his detriment. Machiavelli alludes to Ferdinand of Spain as a
ruler who talked peace and truth, but practiced war and deception to his advan-
tage (P 18).
For Machiavelli, the prince must follow what virtually everyone else is al-
ready doing: Talking piety, practicing expediency. Yet, people are gabbiani
(gulls) even though they take themselves to be volpina (fox-like). How can this
be? If everyone is trying to deceive others when expedient, how are these same
players so easily taken in by the tricks of the prince? Why would they assume
that they were the only ones playing the game? Is it reasonable of Machiavelli to
assume that everyone is wicked but they are so dim-witted that they would as-
sume others practice what they preach? Can such evil simpletons delude them-
selves so easily?
In fairness, Machiavelli does caution the prince to select well the time and
occasions of his treachery. Not even a Machiavellian prince can fool all of the
20 Chapter One
people all of the time. Moreover, the game of poker provides an analogy. My
success at poker must come at the expense of other players: I cannot win unless
they lose. Poker, then, is a zero-sum event, which is the way Machiavelli con-
ceives international affairs. Everyone who plays poker knows that other players
bluff and sandbag-they try to misrepresent the strength of their cards. Indeed,
the core feature of the game is trying to read opponents while preventing them
from reading you. Some players are much better at this than others even though
all acknowledge that feature of the contest. Also, proficient players do not play
the same cards the same way all the time. To do so allows other players to more
easily figure out what they are holding. My point is that, even in an event where
everyone knows that their adversaries are trying to deceive them, some must win
and others must lose. For Machiavelli, even if all rulers in the deepest recesses
of their conniving souls assume other rulers are trying to deceive them, not all
will be equally proficient in playing the game: some must win and others must
lose. The Machiavellian prince must learn to wax the likes of Ferdinand of Spain
even though Ferdinand is practicing the same art of deception.
As for the gullibility of the people and their capability of self-deception, I
will offer two examples. First, the widespread popularity of lotteries-games of
chance in which the odds of winning are so astronomical they are barely calcu-
lable in some cases. Why do so many gabbiani squander their money so consis-
tently? Answer: The promise of a huge payoff if Fortuna smiles on your chosen
numbers and the relatively low cost of participating. Machiavelli, lacking econ-
omy savvy, did not advise his prince to start a numbers game. He should have.
Where else can a prince watch his subjects turn over money to the state with
foolish smiles and deranged avidity? How else can the state generate guaranteed
revenues without arousing the suspicion and enmity of the people? Organized
crime had this angle clocked much earlier, but the federal and state governments
have entered the fray with a vengeance.
Second, I offer the proliferation of con games and other swindles on the
American public. The telephone rings. A man informs you that you have been
selected to win a prize of, say, $50,000. Congratulations! All you have to do is
forward a check of $1,000 to the mailing address of the voice on the phone to
cover handling and local taxes on your windfall. What do you do? Why, of
course, you pony up the grand and comb the mail every day for your check of
50-Large. The money, unsurprisingly to everyone except the mark, never ar-
rives. Would aryone fall for this scam? Tens of thousands have eagerly played
the fool. The allure of "free money" at a relatively small cost is impossible for
some to resist.
The internet amplifies the possibilities. Have you ever received a missive
from Nigeria, Timbuktu, or Iran offering you a million dollars or two for acting
as a liaison for some multi-millionaire who needs to transfer funds from his un-
scrupulous land? All you have to do is forward your bank information to the
contact so he can facilitate the exchange. Who in the world would send their
confidential bank information to a complete stranger whose e-mail salutation
read "Greetings, Friend!" Ladies and gentlemen, if this scam did not sometimes
 The Prince 21

work it would no longer be offered. Instead, more of these solicitations have

spammed the internet in recent years. What did Machiavelli say about people
deluding themselves for short-term gratifications?
My point is that Machiavelli's advice, fiom the standpoint of strategy, is not
as ridiculous as it may first appear. At least, the prince can fool most of the peo-
ple some of the time. Whether his advice is acceptable from a moral standpoint
will be discussed later in this work.

Be decisive, avoid neutralily

Machiavelli prizes autonomy and action: "It is better to act and to regret it
than not to act and to regret it" (Ltr. 23 1: 2/25/14). Although he quotes Boccac-
cio in a sexual context, Machiavelli also offers a summary of his political phi-
losophy. Women, children, and academic philosophers can dream and dawdle.
Men in the political arena must act, independently and decisively.
Machiavelli disdains half-hearted measures, the kind we are tempted to ap-
ply when we are unsure of our position and options. In one of the more striking
passages in The Prince, Machiavelli cautions that "people should either be ca-
ressed or crushed. If you do them minor damage they will get their revenge; but
if you cripple them there is nothing they can do" (P 3). Is Machiavelli saying we
should divide the world into two groups: those we will treat generously and
those whom we will destroy? That seems harsh, even by Machiavellian stan-
dards. Moreover, such advice would conflict with other pieces of Machiavelli's
counsel. A prince should not simply and always act generously to his soldiers
and to his citizens. Circumstances are not so constant that only one posture is
recommended. Obviously, a prince cannot wipe out his army and citizens, ei-
ther. Thus, we should not take Machiavelli's advice on caressing or crushing
literally. The guideline is best viewed as a metaphor warning princes against
half-hearted measures. It may also be taken as a conditional injunction: If neces-
sity requires that you must injure someone do it in a way that he cannot avenge
himself against you later. Also, the passage appears in a longer discussion of
conquered states. If readers insist on taking the guideline literally they should
place it in the context of how to deal with conquered people: Treat generously
those whose loyalty the prince can win, destroy those who are truculently op-
posed to the prince's rule.
Elsewhere in The Prince, Machiavelli praises the likes of Moses, Theseus,
Cyrus, and Romulus for their decisiveness in following the "caress or crush"
principle. Having eliminated those who opposed them due to envy, they stood
fm, honored, revered, and powerful. They represent the best of those glorious
princes who have founded or reformed worthy states (P 6).
He also cites the blunder of Cesare Borgia, who could have prevented the
election of Julius I1 as pope but did not. Julius had longstanding grievances
against the Borgias, but fooled Cesare into thinking that he would forget them in
return for Borgia's support of his papal ambitions. The mistake here, for Ma-
chiavelli, is in thinking that new benefits will make men of high status and am-
22 Chapter One

bitions waive old injuries (P 7). Cesare Borgia violated the "caress or crush"
principle and paid for his transgression with the loss of his power.
Machiavelli offers a second guideline: Someone who causes another to be-
come powerful undermines his own position. He would cause that rise in power
by his creativity or through his strength, both of which would be distrusted by
the person who has grown in power (P 3). Machiavelli intends his bromide
mainly in relation to international affairs. France had facilitated the increased
power of the Church in Rome and of Spain. Soon thereafter, the Church and
Spain combined with other forces to form the Holy League which defeated
France in Italy.
A third guideline also related to a conquered state. A prince should make a
list of all the harsh measures he must take to pacify the region, then perform all
of them swiftly and only once. Repeating cruelties will make the subjects too
insecure and may cultivate their hatred. Cruelties done in one fell swoop will be
dwelt on less and will anger subjects less. Benefits to these same subjects should
be parceled out gradually so they will be savored more. This guideline is in con-
cert with Machiavelli's distinction between evil well-used and evil ill-used (P 8).
Machiavelli's fourth guideline concerns timeliness: never allow a disorder,
evil, or problem to continue in order to avoid a war. Failing to heed this advice
will not evade the war, but only delay it to your disadvantage (P 3). Machiavelli
anticipated the dangers of appeasement. Had Neville Chamberlain read and di-
gested this section of The Prince, the course of World War I1 would have been
much different.
Machiavelli's fifth guideline of decisiveness is pivotal: avoid neutrality. A
prince gains respect from unreservedly allying himself with one party in a con-
flict and being equally opposed to the other party in the conflict. If a prince re-
mains neutral, the victor in the dispute will injure him and the defeated party
will revel in that injury. The prince will be conquered by the former and receive
no aid from the latter. The victor will not want the prince as a friend because he
will be suspicious of the trustworthiness of a prince who remained neutral in
time of war. The loser in the dispute will not curry the prince's friendship be-
cause the prince withheld aid when the losing party most required it (P 21). This
guideline is closest to Machiavelli's heart. Florence, under the leadership of
Piero Soderini, maintained neutrality--or, more precisely, half-hearted support
of longtime ally France--when the Holy League entered Italy. Once the Holy
League was successful, it supported the return of the Medici and a principality,
while ensuring the exile of Soderini and the dismantling of the republic (D I11 3;
D I11 9; D I11 30).

IdentlJL and hire trustworthy ministers

Crucial to the prince's success is the ministers he includes in his inner circle
of advisers. Judging a prince by the quality of his ministers is sound. Making
inept choices of ministers is a guarantee that a prince's judgment is fatally
flawed. Machiavelli identifies three types of minds: those who understand issues
 The Prince 23

without assistance; those who understand issues with the aid of others; and those
who simply cannot understand. The first type is, obviously, preferable. The sec-
ond type is acceptable. The third type-those who are stone cold obtuse-are
useless. A prince, even if not of the highest intellect, will do well as long as he is
of the second type and surrounds himself with capable advisers (P 22).
A prince must guard against ministers who are more concerned about their
own interests than those of the ruler. Such men render poor counsel. The
prince's interests must always be paramount. The prince must, however, secure
the loyalty of his advisers by rewarding them. The prince should bestow honors,
public recognition, material incentives, and the like on worthy ministers. Doing
so demonstrates that the ministers benefit from their employment and that the
prince recognizes exemplary service to his causes. The bond of trust thereby
strengthens between the prince and the members of his inner circle (P 22).
Machiavelli shrewdly adds men who were opposed to the prince at the be-
ginning of his reign and can be easily won over. They will need the prince's
support to secure or keep their political position and will be inclined to serve the
prince loyally to overcome his initial suspicion of them and to annul any previ-
ous deeds that adversely affected the prince's judgment of them. In contrast,
those who serve the prince with overconfidence are more likely to neglect im-
portant affairs than those who need to prove their trustworthiness to the prince
(P 20).
The danger of excessive mistrustfulness is clear: No other person can
wholeheartedly be embraced. The hidden motives and masked agenda of other
people are continually at issue. A pervasive cynicism corrodes the soul and un-
dermines a robust sense of self.
Machiavelli underscores, yet again, the source of all loyalty, trust, and mu-
tuality: self-interest. By tying the well-being of his ministers to his own position
and largesse, the prince reinforces the link between them. He stresses that a
prince must choose the right people for his inner circle. Machiavelli may be
sending the Medici a job application. Here are my desired terms: I will serve
you steadfastly, placing your interests at the forefront. I expect to be rewarded
well for my service. After all, we are not fools. We understand that mutual bene-
fit is the glue of all close relationships. The Medici are not third-rate minds. You
can recognize a first-rate mind with vast experience when it presents itself to
you. Hire me and we shall all prosper. Here I am, Lord!

a Avoid sycophants

The prince's posse should not include flatterers, minions, yes-men, and
other deplorable breeds. He must, instead, select as ministers those men who
will speak the truth to power. As always, Machiavelli is concerned with proto-
col: Excessive candor and familiarity is also ill-advised; if everyone feels enti-
tled to speak frankly to the prince at any time, they will lose respect for their
ruler. False flattery and excessive candor are both undesirable and potentially
dangerous. The prince must choose wise men as ministers who will speak only
24 Chapter One

the truth to and address only those subjects designated by the prince. Only his
ministers have such access to the prince. Even they are restricted to speaking to
only those matters the prince raises. Here Machiavelli, characteristically, adds a
twist: But the prince should ask his trusted ministers about everything and attend
carefully to their replies. The prince, as evidenced by his deliberations and de-
meanor, must show his ministers that he values their advice and must encourage
their future participation. The prince should ignore all unsolicited advice &om
those who are not members of his inner circle. Once he has decided on a course
of action, the prince should act decisively. The prince will lose respect if he hur-
ries into a decision fueled by sycophants or if he changes his mind easily (P 23).
If the prince discovers that one of his ministers is trying to slide him
through the grease he should be enraged. Too much is at stake for a prince to
tolerate deceivers or those seeking to curry favor. Machiavelli concludes that
only a wise prince can be given sound advice. If an unwise prince delegated all
important decisions to a sawy minister, the arrangement would be short-lived.
The minister would soon aspire to complete rule. If an unwise prince accepts
advice from several ministers, that counsel will differ. Each minister, recogniz-
ing the prince as unwise, will offer advice that advances only his self-interest.
This is a function of the wickedness of men: they will act selfishly unless com-
pelled to be good. Accordingly, sound advice ultimately depends on the prince's
wisdom and impeccable judgment, neither of which arises fiom the sound ad-
vice of others (P 23).
Machiavelli disdains lackeys and epigones who bask in the reflected glory
of a prince while spewing inanities and falsehoods in order to elicit the prince's
trust. Such men are, at best, worthless and irrelevant, and, at worst, dangerous
and smarmy. Machiavelli may also be sending the Medici an addendum to his
job application: Hire me and I will speak truthfully and wisely to you. I will
follow protocol and know my place. I will not seek independent power. Hiring
me will itself be a reflection of your stellar judgment.

Distinguish between the art of securing and that ofpreserving power

A prince who artfully seizes power may have difficulty maintaining it and
vice versa. Machiavelli argues that those who come to power through virtir will
struggle to gain power but will easily preserve it; those who rise to power
through Fortuna will take power easily but struggle to keep it. This is so be-
cause gaining power is quicker if circumstances and the aid of strong allies or
patrons ease the way. But once attained, power cannot be maintained by luck
and strong cronies. At that point, the skills of princes become pivotal. Luck and
connections alone cannot sustain a prince (P 6; P 7).
Princes come to power through conquest, selection by countrymen, or vil-
lainy. These methods all have their unique pitfalls, but princes must understand
that the same means they used to seize power may be ineffective in holding it.
Specifically, those who ruthlessly gain power must moderate cruelties once in
office (P 8). Moreover, any harsh measures that are necessary should be done
 The Prince 25

immediately and only once (P 8). Once in power, princes must begin winning
the loyalty of the people and neutralizing the hostilities of the nobles. The
harshness of securing power must be moderated to preserve power.
In regions where customs and traditions resonate, such as in the lands of the
Church, a prince will have little difficulty maintaining power because the loyal-
ties of the people are fumly in place. But no prince can conquer ecclesiastical
territories; they constitute a special category of government, grounded in iron-
clad patterns and overseen by a higher power (P 11).
Of course, regardless of how a prince rises to power, he must be flexible if
he aspires to maintain it. Rigidity and complacency-fostered by past successes
and self-satisfaction-will spell a quick demise for the unwary prince (P 25).

Learn the recipe for success

Princes should take full responsibility for popular actions and decrees, but
delegate underlings to mete out unpopular policies and to perform unwelcomed
actions. Where possible, princes should respect the aristocracy and avoid the
hatred of the people. At times, princes who do good deeds and follow conven-
tional morality will be hated, especially where some faction of their subjects-
the people, the aristocracy, or the military-is corrupt. To hold onto power,
princes are compelled not to be good. As always, the necessity flows from the
wicked actions and dispositions of other people. Machiavelli's consistent mes-
sage is that a ruler who insists on being good when so many around him are evil
will meet a bad end (P 19).
The assassination of a prince is always possible, but not to be feared.
Princes should avoid seriously offending those who have access to them on a
daily basis. Still, a determined man willing to die himself in the course of his
treachery can assassinate a prince. We are all susceptible to destruction at the
hands of such a person. Machiavelli, not living in an age of suicide bombers,
assures princes that assassins of this stripe are extremely rare (P 19). Accord-
ingly, anxiety over assassinations is wasted effort.
Most definitively, the prince's success is a function of the compatibility of
Fortuna and virtd. Where congenial circumstances are introduced to personal
excellence, a beautiful friendship begins.

The Final Chapter

The Prince is written straightforwardly. Machiavelli's prose is lean, concise, and
eloquent, but without rhetorical flourish. He derives his conclusions allegedly
from historical examples and his diplomatic experiences. He does not wring his
hands over the supposed baseness of human beings or the series of zero-sum
contests that presumably constitute international affairs. He accepts the world as
26 Chapter One

it is and hopes to compile a manual for successful rule in that world. Machia-
velli's is an understated Jack Webb-"just the facts, ma'am9'-style.
Until we arrive at the final chapter of The Prince. Entitled "Exhortation to
Seize Italy and Free Her from the Barbarians," in that chapter we witness Jack
Webb morph into Patrick Henry. Machiavelli lets it rip: The time is ripe for a
prince to unite regional forces and kick foreign dominators out of Italy once and
forever. Calling upon the examples of Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus, Machiavelli
points out that Italy is more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the
Persians, and more defenseless than the Athenians. Italy lacks leadership. But
within grave adversity lies glorious opportunity. Once before a prince (Cesare
Borgia? Pope Alexander VI? Francesco Sforza of Milan? Pope Julius 117 Ma-
chiavelli himself?) had emerged who might serve as the instrument for Italian
redemption, but Fortuna cruelly cast him aside. But now the Medici are favored
by Divinity and the Church: "God has already shown his hand. The sea has been
divided; a cloud has escorted you on your journey; water has flowed out of the
rock; manna has fallen fiom on high. Everything has conspired to make you
great" (P 26).
Others have failed through inadequate methods and strategies, but the
Medici can succeed. New methods and means are available (translated: Machia-
velli has sketched the way and is, of course, currently between jobs and avail-
able for hire). Italians have proved themselves cleverer, stronger, and quicker
than foreigners in individual duels. Their armies have disappointed only because
of inadequate leadership: too many self-styled chiefs, too few disciplined fol-
lowers. No leader bearing grandezza d'animo has shown the blessed union of
Fortuna and virtir within his spirit. But now opportunity must not be permitted
to evaporate. Italy awaits a redeemer: "No words can describe the appetite for
revenge, the resolute determination, the spirit of self-sacrifice, the tears of emo-
tion that would greet him . . . What Italian would refuse to pledge him alle-
giance? Everyone is sick of being pushed around by the barbarians. Your family
must commit itself to this enterprise" (P 26).
Machiavelli abruptly alters cadence, message, and emotion. Why? The
scholarly consensus is that the final chapter was not written directly after chapter
25, but was added later. Still, that does not establish its purpose. That matter is
debated to this day. Here are a few of the possibilities:
1. The final chapter is the stirring resolution of the entire work. Machiavelli
seeks to unify Italy, wax foreigners, and compete effectively in international
affairs-all prerequisites of greatness for the homeland and its leaders. On this
view, Machiavelli is an Italian patriot who anticipates the Risorgimento that will
occur in about three hundred fifty years.
2. Machiavelli's scope is much narrower and focused. He aspires to unite
Italy from the north through the Papal States. He has no legitimate hope of dis-
lodging the Spanish from the Kingdom of Naples.
3. Machiavelli is uninterested in permanently uniting Italy in any form. He
will not jeopardize the independence of Florence, his true patria. Instead, he
encourages a temporary alliance among Italian regional powers to expel foreign
 The Prince 27

barbarians from the peninsula. Once that mission is accomplished, the balance
of power among the regions of Italy will be restored with each territory being
better placed to compete in international affairs.
4. The final chapter is a typical Machiavellian hustle. The author senses the
hostility that will spew in response to his first twenty-five chapters. To mollify
criticism and soften the evilness he espouses, Machiavelli stretches for a purpose
that readers will judge noble. In a classic Machiavellian misdirection, in the final
chapter he jukes readers by appearing to be what he is not.
5. Machiavelli knew that chances for Italian unification during the period he
wrote were slim to none and slim was receiving extreme unction. In the final
chapter, he satirically skewers the gabbiani who have been deluded into believ-
ing that a unified Italy is the solution to the intractable problems on the penin-
sula. The patriotic bombast, excessive flattery, and implorations to divinity are
intentionally exaggerated gestures of parody, perhaps even a tinge of self-parody
as Machiavelli repents his own occasional fantasies.
6. Machiavelli adds the final chapter out of literary obligation. The prose
stylists of the Renaissance period typically included rhetorically powerfbl and
flattering exhortations to rulers. Perhaps with an eye toward increasing his pros-
pects for publication, or perhaps to conform to literary expectations, Machiavelli
follows suit.
7. The Prince is not a manual for princely success at all. Instead, Machia-
velli is setting up the Medici for failure so the principality will fall and a Floren-
tine republic might be restored. Accordingly, the final chapter is the huge, juicy
lure that will seduce the Medici to bite and be hooked on Machiavelli's rod of
destruction.
8. Machiavelli composes an explicit final chapter to ensure that the Medici
understands that he was not merely writing an abstract treatise. His was a man-
ual for action not simply food for cognition. The final chapter, then, is the con-
summation of the courting of practice by theory.
In later chapters of this book, these conflicting, creative interpretations of
the final chapter of The Prince will be discussed further.

Machiavelli's Ideal
The keenest exemplar of Machiavelli's ideal prince is sketched in his concise
work, Life of Castruccio Castracani. Written in 1520 as an audition for Machia-
velli's Florentine Histories, this book glorifies the life and times of Castracani
(1281-1328), a military leader from Lucca. Machiavelli regards the historical
truth casually. Instead, he embellishes, distorts, and fabricates to suit his needs.
Machiavelli's aspiration was apparently to romanticize the life of an actual per-
son to illustrate the perfect prince.
Machiavelli, always appreciative of those who rose from humble origins,
depicts Castracani as an abandoned baby discovered in a vineyard by the sister
28 Chapter One

of a priest. In fact, Castracani was born to a wealthy Luccan family. As a youth,

according to Machiavelli, Castruccio excelled athletically and enjoyed reading
only books recording the deeds of military heroes. Yes, the priest under whose
care he fell tried to indoctrinate the boy with literature pertaining to churchly
matters, but by the age of fourteen Castruccio outgrew such matters. Again,
readers absorb Machiavelli's suspicion of the Church and his esteem for the
heroic ethic. Machiavelli also highlights the need for preparation: physical
strength must be honed by study of the classics. Resoluteness, cunning, and
power-the measures of the lion and the fox-blossom only from careful train-
ing.
Soon an honored mercenary soldier notices Castruccio's preeminence
among his peers and suggests the youth enter his house, among weapons and
horses. With the priest's approval, Castruccio is thereafter raised by the soldier
and soon commits to the Ghibelline cause. (The Ghibellines supported the Holy
Roman Emperor, while the Guelphs promoted the pope.)
The rest of the tale is predictable: Castruccio trashes his enemies of the bat-
tlefield; outwits those envious of his glory; exposes the betrayals of false
friends; consistently overcomes great odds; brutally murders those whom neces-
sity anoints; cons greedy, nalve nobles into ceding their authority; carefully
navigates the treacheries of Fortuna; fearlessly grasps life with a maximally
affirmative attitude; exemplifies prudence, boldness, cunning, and strength in
turn; unrepentantly dispenses evil well; and trusts only his skill and military
virtir. Amazingly, Castruccio's military strategies closely track those advocated
in Machiavelli's The Art of War. Along the way, Castruccio is honored by The
Roman people and made a senator: "Castruccio assumed this office with great
pomp and circumstances, and donned a brocaded toga with an inscription em-
broidered on its front, reading, "God wills it," and another on the back, reading,
"What God wills shall be."6
Although the historical Castruccio was married with numerous children,
Machiavelli describes him as immune to the charms of women. Yes, he engaged
in numerous sexual dalliances, but he refused to be possessed by any woman or
domesticated by family life. For a man to consign himself to the seductions of a
woman is to collaborate with Fortuna writ small.
Alas, in the end, Fortuna, as ever, triumphs. After an exhausting and fear-
some battle, Castruccio, victorious yet again, waits to greet his returning soldiers
and thank them for their indominable spirits. Perspiring profusely and exposed
to the fierce midday wind howling over the Arno river, Castruccio contracts a
fever that proves incurable. Machiavelli sensitively summarizes Castruccio's
alleged greatness and in the process his own world view:
He was kind to his friends, and to his enemies terrible; just toward his subjects,
faithless to foreigners; never when he could win by fraud did he attempt to win
by force-he used to say that it was the victory itself, not the way in which you
won the victory, which brought you glory. No man was ever bolder when enter-
ing a dangerous situation, or more prudent when getting out of it; and he was in
 The Prince

the habit of saying that men must attempt everythin+ and not be too frightened
of anything, and that God loves men who are strong.

At the end, even the Magnificent Castracani succumbs to the fi-agility of the
human condition. He confesses to his heir, Pagolo Guinigi, the son of the mer-
cenary who mentored Castracani, that Fortuna had cut short his road to fame.
He was bequeathing to Pagolo a sprawling state filled with too many enemies
harboring too much resentment. Fortuna had not permitted him the time he re-
quired to remedy his own defects and set matters straight. Machiavelli under-
scores two recurrent themes: Fortuna will vanquish us all in the end; but endur-
ing glory, Castruccio's death-bed modesty notwithstanding, is attainable by the
few of us steeped in virtir.
Curiously, Machiavelli ends the book by attributing dozens of adages and
maxims to Castruccio. Most of these, however, are gleaned or adapted fi-om
Diogenes Laertius's Lives of The Philosophers. No historical evidence exists
that Castruccio was a home-spun philosopher.8Ironically, Machiavelli otherwise
disparages philosophy for promoting an unattainable, misleading image of the
good man and dabbling in utopian visions (P 8; P 18; D 111 38). Worse, Machia-
velli lauds Cato for banning philosophers, who infected the youth with "honor-
able leisure," from entering Rome (FH V 1). Military discipline must never be
softened by aimless contemplation.
In sum, as a documentary on the life of Castruccio Castracani, Machia-
velli's work has little to recommend it. But as a brief compilation of Machia-
velli's political and military principles, the Life of Castruccio Castracani is a
stunning interpretive supplement to The Prince.

Notes
1. Russell Price, "The Senses of Virtt in Machiavelli," European Studies Review 3
(1973): 315-45.
2. Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996), 6-7.
3. Russell Price, "The Theme of Gloria in Machiavelli," Renaissance Quarterly 30
(1977): 588-631.
4. Ibid., 621.
5. See, for example, Wayne A. Rebhorn, Foxes and Lions: Machiavelli 's Confidence
Men (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 18-19.
6. Niccolb Machiavelli, Life of Castruccio Castracani (1520), trans. by Andrew
Brown (London: Hesperus Press, 2003), 20.
7. Ibid., 33-34.
8. Ibid., 551112.
 Chapter Two
The Discourses
Machiavelli's Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius ("The Dis-
courses'? are an explicit defense of the general superiority of republican gov-
ernrnents. Livy (59 BC-17 AD) was a fabled Roman scholar who wrote about
145 books, 35 of which still exist, chronicling the history of Rome. Machia-
velli's Discourses use the first ten books as a point of departure for drawing
political conclusions. Book 1 describes the mythical founding of Rome, around
753 BC, to the expulsion of the last lung, Tarquin the Proud, by rebels led by
Junius Brutus, around 509 BC. Books 2-5 chronicle the story of Rome through
309 BC, when Rome was attacked and conquered briefly by barbaric Gauls.
Books 6-10 continue the story through 293 BC as Rome began its expansion
throughout Italy. Machiavelli dates the Roman Republic from 509 BC to 27 BC,
when Caesar Augustus was named emperor. By that time, the republic con-
trolled, among other holdings, most of the Mediterranean, part of the Middle
East, Spain, and France. Machiavelli was firmly convinced that the stability,
discipline, military success, and longstanding domination of the Roman Repub-
lic contained enduring lessons and principles for sound government.
Although supposedly a commentary on Livy, The Discourses reflect seri-
ously on the recent history of Florence and Italy. Clearly, Machiavelli shared
Livy's admiration for the Roman republic. He contrasts the discipline, creative
conflict, military virtti, and commitment to the common good of the Roman re-
public at its greatest with the corruption, sectarian strife, ozio, and selfish pursuit
of luxury of the Florentines of his day. In Machiavelli's view, the decline of
Italy flowed from a failure to appreciate the lessons of Roman history and the
decadence produced by the unholy marriage of ambizione and ozio ( D I pref.).
At first glance, Machiavelli's celebration of principalities in The Prince
rests uncomfortably with his promotion of republicanism in The Discourses. But
Machiavelli never argues that one form of government is best for all situations.
In The Discourses, he is empathic that republicanism cannot be installed every-
where at any time, nor should it be (D I 55). Moreover, his relentless conviction
in The Prince that one strong man, embodying robust military and political virtu,
is required to found a fresh or reform a corrupt state is repeated throughout The
Discourses (D I 9 ; D I 17; D I 18; D I11 1). Also, Machiavelli refers to The
Prince in The Discourses and to The Discourses in The Prince ( D I1 20; D I11
19; D I11 42; possibly D I11 3 1; P 2; possibly P 8). To conclude that The Prince
describes Machiavelli's program for founding a new or reforming a corrupt state
while The Discourses explain the worlungs of a healthy republic-his favored
form of government-is reasonable even if contestable.
32 Chapter Two

The Dedication
The work is dedicated to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai, two of
Machiavelli's republican cronies, who participated in political discussions with
him in the Rucellai gardens. Machiavelli, in the style of the day, feigns modesty:
the book is not commensurate to what he owes the two men, yet it is the most
treasured thing he can offer. The book contains all Machiavelli has learned in his
study of and experience in political affairs. Of course, The Discourses must con-
tain unsound arguments, insufficiently deep discussions, and reflections of poor
judgments. Mea culpa. But, Machiavelli adds, remember that the two of you
pressured me to write the book. I would never have done so but for your insis-
tence. Machiavelli praises the recipients for the benefits they have bestowed
upon him and hopes they accept the gift in the spirit it is offered.
Machiavelli is pleased, however, that he has not resorted to the common
practice of other authors: dedicating their books to rulers in hopes of cadging
favors. Such literary charlatans praise those rulers as embodying diverse excel-
lences, while they should be scolding them for being despicable. Machiavelli,
instead, has dedicated his work to private citizens who have the generosity and
skills to rule even though they lack positions of power.
Hmrnm. Machiavelli disparages authors who seek positions, riches, and
honors from rulers. His own dedication in The Prince fits squarely in that dis-
credited category. Does this mean Machiavelli is angry at himself for stooping
to the level of a common panderer in The Prince? Or does it mean that The
Prince is not what it first claims to be? Or is Machiavelli only amusing his
friends with self-parody? Or is he merely contrasting his esteem for the excel-
lences of his pals with the low repute he confers on the rulers of his day?

Common Ground
Many themes in The Discourses elaborate on principles advanced in The Prince.

Human Nature
Men, as they have always been and always will be, are naturally evil and
will follow wicked impulses whenever possible (D I 3; D I 4; D I 5; D I 29; D I1
13, D I11 6). Some men can conceal their natures for a specified time, but their
wantonness will eventually emerge. Only necessity-in the form of laws, good
habits, and external conditions-makes men good. Necessity forces human be-
ings to respond intelligently to external conditions and to rise above their inher-
ent selfishness. Machiavelli consistently judged that human nature was so in-
clined toward evil that people were turned to the good only by necessity (D I 3).
Also, necessity often demands action that reason would oppose (D I 6).
 The Discourses 33

Still, the masses judge actions only by their results (D I pref.; D I 3; D I 39;
D I11 12; D I11 35; D I11 43). Machiavelli does not stray from his cold portrayal
of unchanging human nature. The only hope for civilized arrangements is coer-
cion: by external conditions; the force of strong a m which is the prerequisite
for good laws; the reinforcing powers of religion and education; the intemaliza-
tion of values that are first viewed as impositions, then accepted as legitimate
boundaries of action; and all these lead to good habits where actions conducive
to a healthy republic become, literally, a second nature. In this fashion, through
discipline grounded ultimately in military might, does depraved human nature
blossom into a national character where civic virtu resides.
For any such transformation to happen, human beings must have capabili-
ties for altruism or, at least, enlightened self-interest. Machiavelli never high-
lights those capabilities. Surely, they are not created ex nihilo. But instead of
seeing human beings as complex organisms of diverse potentials, some good
and some bad, Machiavelli insists that fundamentally we are wicked. This jaun-
diced view of human nature fuels his corollary belief that the overall amounts of
good and bad, and virtu and corruption in the world are constant, only their dis-
tributions in particular countries and peoples change (D I1 pref.). Together with
the inherent scarcity of natural resources, these two convictions lead Machiavelli
to the dreary conclusion that international affairs are a series of zero-sum con-
tests: my country's advance is made at your country's expense.
The rule that men do good only from necessity has a few exceptions: those
with inflated military and political virtu-such as founders or reformers of terri-
tories--embody the resources of will, passion, and ambition required to pursue
magnificent military and political enterprises. They are able to distinguish pur-
suing power for narrow ambition from striving for enduring glory. Such men,
graced with grandezza d'animo, become, with a measure of compatiblefortuna,
legends (D 1 9).
Founders and reformers introduce new policies, laws, and social patterns.
Most important, they transform citizens through a necessity whose ballast is
strong arms, compelling laws, and vigorous religion. In this manner, men of
political and military virtu bend evilly inclined human beings toward the com-
mon good. Founders and reformers, with their unvarying eye on enduring glory,
aspire to create a political order that endures beyond their lifetimes and that en-
ergizes civic virtu among the people. Unlike tyrannies, that neither transform
citizens in salutary ways nor endure for a significant period, praiseworthy prin-
cipalities and republics are self-consciously redemptive (P 8: D I 10). Paradoxi-
cally, the quest for enduring glory and national salvation blends uneasily with
the brutal, ruthless measures Machiavelli warmly endorses. Moreover, men
graced with moral virtu do not typically resort to the cruelties required to found
and reform worthy social orders; nor do they yearn to be political saviors. Evil
men, on the other hand, are unlikely to covert corruption into civic virtu (D I 18;
D 126).
The rare founder or reformer Machiavelli venerates is a good, strong man
with exceptional charisma. He must inspire his subjects by the manner in which
34 Chapter Two

he lives and the aplomb with which he wields military and political authority (D
I11 1). Most strikingly, he must brandish evil well even though he is not initially
inclined to do so. He must knowingly dirty his hands in service to his own en-
during glory and the common good. That almost all of Machiavelli's exemplars
are mythological figures should not surprise.

The Primacy of Military Strength

Might may not make right in the deepest moral sense of that term, but might
is a prerequisite for good government which is the prerequisite for good laws
and the other socializing influences that nurture the common good and instill
civic virtti (D I 4; D I 19; D I11 31; D I11 33). Perversely, given the nature of
people, military strength is required to promote the conditions required for the
flourishing of conventional morality. Without the order, discipline, and security
fostered by military might, a healthy state cannot exist. Without a healthy state
to direct the forces of necessity, human beings remain in their corrupt, wicked
original position. Also, the founding of a fiesh or the reforming of a corrupt state
requires cruelties: evil well-used. Accordingly, initial acts of evil are required
for moral virtu to have even an opportunity to be realized. These fust deeds are
whitewashed by the pious rhetoric that ensues. In short, military virtu under-
writes all the artistic, literary, musical, and other cultural achievements so cher-
ished by civilized people (AW I 17-19).
A republic must have its own troops. For reasons discussed in The Prince,
auxiliary and mercenary soldiers are, at best, useless, and, at worst, dangerous to
the health of the state (D I 2 1; D I 43; D I1 20). Able soldiers are more important
to victory than material resources (D 11 10). An armed citizenry not only in-
creases prospects for success in battle, but also advances discipline, order, and
strengthens the common good (D I 2 1;D I1 30).
Prayers for "world peace" are fatuous illusions. First, such a peace is unat-
tainable given human nature, natural scarcity, and the zero-sum features of in-
ternational affairs. Second, even if it could be achieved countries would suffer
thereby: complacency, softness, and corruption would ensue. An idle military is
ozio 's workshop. For Machiavelli, a political community has three choices: en-
joy a temporary peace that fosters vulnerability; engage in war lustily and unre-
pentantly; or go belly-up and collaborate in your own subjugation.
Machiavelli does entertain the ancient Tuscan method of securing self-
government for communities that cherish their liberty more than they aspire to
enduring glory: form a league of several republics with equal authority. He re-
jects that method both on historical grounds-the Etruscan cities exercising this
approach were conquered by Romans lusting after the enduring glory arising
from military conquest-and from theoretical considerations-the zero-sum
nature of the world suggests that the Tuscan method invites foreign invasion (D
I1 4; D I1 5). The Roman method, based explicitly on conquest and military su-
 The Discourses 35

periority, is preferable given the way the world and its people are structured (D I
46; D I1 19; Ltr. 219: 8110113).
Machiavelli is described as a man who separates morality from politics,
who insists that politics cannot be governed by moral considerations. I hope to
demonstrate in thls book that such a view is misleading and fails to capture the
complexity of the Florentine's thought. For Machiavelli, though, war is beyond
conventional morality; war is not governed by moral considerations. He does not
recognize the ancient moral distinction between jus ad bellurn (the rightness of a
nation's cause for entering a conflict) and jus in bello (the rightness of a nation's
conduct while waging that conflict). Given the zero-sum contest that is world
affairs, the bottomless ambition of men for heroic glory, and conditions of natu-
ral scarcity, war is inevitable. Expansion of territory is critical for the survival of
republics and principalities alike (D I 5; D I 6; D I1 pref.; D 11 19). Waging war
is grounded in necessity, prudential strategies, and fortuna. What does moral
goodness have to do with that? Likewise, conduct in war is guided by the need
to win. Commanders must use whatever fraud and force they can muster. The
best military leaders are the most innovative and bold in creating tactics and
ruses to befuddle and overwhelm their enemies. A policy of expansionism nur-
tures social unity, invigorates boldness and endurance, and fends off corruption
and ozio. Thus, for Machiavelli the expression "moral rules for the initiation and
conduct of war" is an oxymoron.
Machiavelli insisted on the unity and mutually sustaining nature of civil and
military life. A country's armed forces reveal its general capabilities as a nation.
His insistence on the indivisibility of civil and military vitality provided Ma-
chiavelli another reason that engaging in war is a required state activity. More
strikingly, Machiavelli outlines how military success is connected to social life.
Military might is the prerequisite for the sound laws, robust religion, and disci-
plined education that inculcate civic virtu and an appreciation of the common
good. Civic virtu cannot exist where military virtu is absent. Roman military
prowess was the ballast for the social, political, and cultural institutions that
reinforced the values required for continued military success. Hannibal was an
astonishingly formidable enemy, but his defeat was guaranteed: Carthage was
corrupt, while Rome glistened with civic virtu (D I 11; D I1 19; D I1 27; D I11
3 1).
Most strikingly, military strength is the prerequisite for human redemption.
As individuals, we are nasty, brutish, and selfish. Only in a healthy, robust po-
litical community can civic and moral virtu, sacrifice for the common good, and
identification with a wider identity and interests flourish. Such a political com-
munity is grounded in the order, stability, and security provided only by strong
anns. The contemporary recruiting slogan of our armed forces-"Be All You
Can Be"-was anticipated, literally, in the work of Machiavelli.
Because military superiority is required for a healthy republic which pro-
motes order, security, freedom, and civic virtu, military commanders are prime
candidates for enduring glory (D I1 27; D 111 42; D I11 45).
36 Chapter Two

The Need for Decisive Leadership

As in The Prince, Machlavelli warns against half-way measures, indeci-
siveness, mealy-mouth compromise, appeasement, and other such diseases of
impoverished command (D 1 26; D I1 15; D I1 23; D I11 30; D I11 40). Strong
leaders cannot turn squeamish at the thought of using cruelty well in service to
the state ( D I16; D I11 3; D I11 30). As always, leaders must be flexible and ad-
just their actions to the times and tofortuna (D I1 29; D I 1 30; D 111 9; D I11 31;
D I11 37). They must avoid invoking the hatred of their subjects (D I11 19). They
must guard against envy, remain magnanimous in good and in bad times, and
cultivate an admirable reputation (D I11 30; D I11 31; D I11 34). Military com-
manders must study history and learn topography through hunting (D I11 39).
They must not merely talk a big game; they must be role models who lead the
Army into battle and prove their valor (D I11 38). As always, fear is a superior
motivator than is love (D I1121).
Machiavelli preserves the distinction between tyrants and princes that he es-
tablished in The Prince. Machiavelli, for example, derided Giovampagolo
Baglioni as a vulgar tyrant who murdered his relatives to seize control of Pe-
rugia. Worse, when he had to chance to cut down the militarily threatening Pope
Julius I1 and the entire College of Cardinals-which could have in one fell
swoop rid the country of internal oppression-he cravenly withdrew (D I27).
Tyrants confuse selfishness with enlightened self-interest: They seize power
to plunder and destroy a state, instead of reforming it. They do not merit glory
because they are indifferent or hostile to the common good. Tyrants mistake
infamy for glory. Their states stagnate because they are bound together only by
fear of the coercive power of law and arms. Any benefits that accrue to such a
state flow only to the tyrant. No sense of a common good exists. Anyone who
demonstrates military or political virtli must be destroyed by the tyrant lest his
own position weaken. Civic virtu is impossible in a tyranny because its prereq-
uisites are ignored or discouraged. Mistaking power as such as the highest goal,
the tyrant invites the hatred of his subjects and his denunciation by history (D I
10; D I17; D 125; D 133; D I1 2: D 111 3; D I11 6; D I11 26).
In short, for Machiavelli the leadership provided by wise princes and the
guidance required by t h v i n g republics are not totally separate and are often
compatible (D 147; D 148; D I59; D I 1 2; D I11 6).

The Distinction between Evil Well-Used and Evil Ill-used

As in The Prince, Machiavelli underscores the distinction between evil
well-used and evil ill-used. The former is done at once, in the name of the com-
mon good, does not include gratuitous violence, and is not repeated. The latter is
sporadic, recurring, done for the ruler's own interests, and often includes gratui-
tous cruelties. Again, the connection between how a ruler uses evil and whether
he is hated is paramount. Again, for Machiavelli, it is better for a ruler to be
 The Discourses 37

feared than loved, but he must not be hated if he is to succeed (D I 45; D I1 19;
D I11 21).

The World as Zero-Sum Contest

Machiavelli envisioned international affairs much like the Ultimate Fighting
Championships, without the bans on eye-gouging and fish-hooking. Activities
such as pacifism weaken a country's military and civil order thereby inviting
attack from stronger nations. He is convinced that the world is always in the
same overall condition: the total amount of virtu and total amount of corruption
is constant. What changes is the distribution of virtu and corruption in individual
territories. He explains reallocations that have occurred throughout lustory and
concludes that contemporary Italians and Greeks who admire the past and decry
the present have a point. Their pasts were more glorious than their presents. The
masses generally lack civic virtri as they disrespect religion, law, and military
service. Political leaders are even worse. They expect to be honored as divinities
even though they are feckless commanders. Yes, the overall virtli in Italy and
Greece has declined, but not the amount in the world. While contemporary Ital-
ians and Greeks compare unfavorably to the greatness of their ancestors, to con-
clude that the good old days as such were better on the whole than the present is
an error: Only the distribution of virtli and corruption has changed (D I1 pref.; D
11 5).
Human desires and appetites, left unfettered, are insatiable. We want more
and more, but resources are limited by natural scarcity. Frustration and disap-
pointment are the inevitable result (D I1 pref.; D I11 21). Although Machiavelli
does not draw out the implications, they are clear. One implication is that human
desires cannot remain unfettered. Instead, they must be channeled into construc-
tive outlets with possible fulfillments. Left to our natural inclinations we are
doomed: the world will never answer our implorations or satisfy our expecta-
tions. The second implication is stark: The world is a competitive battleground
for virtu. The success of one country must come at the expense of other coun-
tries. To remain regionally fragmented is to ensure limited success, vulnerability
to the domination of others, and insufficient virtu. Either a strong nation-state
must be formed or one region must be strong enough to conquer the others. Only
then can the state become a successful player in world affairs. A country does
not have a realistic option of withdrawing from the game. Even if it wants to
retreat to peaceful self-sufficiency, other nations will not permit the choice (D
I11 2). Either the country gains respect through flexing its virtu or it will be hu-
miliated and subjugated (D I 38; D 11 13; D I1 14; D I1 15). Accordingly, world
affairs are a series of zero-sum contests generated by the arnbizione driving hu-
man nature, conditions of natural scarcity, and the constant total amount of
overall virtu. Paradoxically, the entire zero-sum game is jeopardized when one
nation becomes so dominate that others cannot effectively compete. Under such
38 Chapter Two

circumstances, the dominant nation tends toward corruption because of the lack
of worthy enemies to test and sharpen its collective military and political virtu
(AW I1 77-81; D 153).
Why the overall amount of virtu must remain constant is a puzzle. Only if
virtu is defined entirely by successful outcomes, by political and military wins
as opposed to losses, can this be the case. Otherwise, even when one country
wins and another loses both could demonstrate virtu, although one may be supe-
rior to the other. Remember, Machiavelli generally disparages those who judge
deeds only by their results instead of by their principles of action and quality of
performance. He disapprovingly observes that the multitude is misled by ap-
pearances and outcomes (D I11 35; D I 9; P 18). Moreover, exercising virtu is no
guarantee of success or glory (D I11 30). Surely, one man or an entire country
can display admirable amounts of virtu but lose a military contest or political
event through bad luck, unfavorable circumstances, or the greater virtli of the
opponent. The result-a military or political loss-should not prove a lack of
virtli as such. Boldness, energy, valor, and intelligence do not evaporate merely
because they fail their purpose. If so, then the overall amount of virtu in the
world could increase even though the sum total of military and political wins
and losses remained constant. Machiavelli neither entertains nor resolves this
puzzle.
We should pay heed that Machiavelli's "world" was limited: the five major
regions of Italy, France, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, and regions of Germany
constituted his "international battleground." Obviously, communication, trans-
portation, science, and technology were primitive. Wars, themselves, were mild
affairs compared to the devastation of the World Wars of the twentieth century
and the current possibility of nuclear annihilation. In his Florentine Histories,
Machiavelli presents a stirring account of the battle of Anghlari in 1440 in
which Florence preserved its domination in Tuscany. He notes that the fighting
waged for about twenty-four hours with only one casualty: a soldier fell off his
horse and was trampled to death (FH V 33).' Whether war would seem so neces-
sary and heroic to him under conditions in the twenty-first century remains in
doubt.
For Machiavelli, military conquest, especially when plausibly evaluated as
the victory of heroic virti over an irredeemably corrupt enemy, vivifies a nation.
It presents opportunities for expression of the deepest human emotions, and,
indeed, demands their revelation: unspeakable sadness and grief as loved ones
perish; justified rage at the acts of the enemy and vows of vengeance; undeni-
able experiences of history-making, of leaving footprints as one participates
courageously in a grand epic; intense spasms of self-esteem as precarious occa-
sions to prove oneself to self and intimates have been encountered and sur-
passed; and soul-searing intimacy as collective efforts at rebuilding national
infrastructure transform the world, as in one's youth, to a forum of seemingly
infinite possibilities.
Of course, military defeat produces our deepest feelings of shame: a linger-
ing sense of historical impoverishment; convictions of inferiority, betrayal, and
 The Discourses 39

divine abandonment; a profound understanding of failure. The world becomes,

as in one's terminal moment, a place without hope, pity, or compassion.
That so many people who have encountered large scale war describe that
time as their defining moment, as the extended period when they felt most alive
is unsurprising. Much was at risk. Apathy and collective narcolepsy were im-
possible. Prostrate, complacent faithlessness was not an available option. In war
the price of humanness rises astronomically. We understand viscerally, and not
merely rationally, the radical indeterminacy of life: the dread of cosmic exile,
the longing for infinite redemption.
However, to urge a celebration of the wonders of war--especially given the
horrifying scale of modern military conflicts-would be mindless. My point is
only to understand that as the postmodern cultural smog descends upon us-as
we mimic Sisyphus in our routinized life of technical adjustments, as lived ex-
periences are replaced by ersatz images and representations, as the pleasures of
manual labor and of the body are increasingly enjoyed vicariously, as the com-
modification of the world intensifies-ur sense of wonder and of possibility,
our opportunities for intense human emotion, our very humanness are in jeop-
ardy.
Under such circumstances, the pathology of war, as the struggle for feeling
writ large, is a pathetic reminder of our historical condition. Accordingly, the
ultimate success of nonviolent resistance and pacifism as a way of life depends
on massive numbers of socially-organized people viscerally understanding them
as necessary remedies for postmodern somnambulance and the remorseless sav-
agery of a world eclipsed.
Machiavelli, though, insists the overall condition of the world remains the
same. The contemporary concerns I identify are, for Machiavelli, merely the
latest version of an endless song. He boldly steps where I evade: military con-
quest is required to energize a nation.

The Classification and Cycle of States

Borrowing freely from classical political theorists such as Plato, Aristotle, and
Polybius, Machiavelli sketches a classification of states and their evolutionary
cycle in The Discourses (D I 2). The three good states are principality, aristoc-
racy, and democracy. The three bad states are tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy.
Good states are grounded in law, nurture the common good, and promote civic
virtu. Bad states are based on the selfish interests of their rulers, ignore the
common good, and advance nothing beyond the immediate concerns of those in
authority. States arise and degenerate in a typical pattern: A principality is estab-
lished by the power of one man or by selection by the people; eventually rule
passes through hereditary succession; a prince gains power who is imprudent,
unwise, and ineffective; his subjects fear and hate him; and the prince deterio-
rates into a tyrant. This is the passage from a good principality to a corrupt tyr-
40 Chapter Two

anny. As the excesses of the tyrant increase, honorable elements in the state in-
stigate disorders and hatch conspiracies; the strongest and most influential men
rally the masses and take up arms; the rebellion is successful; and the noblest
assume political power. This is the passage from a bad tyranny to a good aristoc-
racy. The aristocracy is for a time lawful and effective. But rule passes, typically
to the sons of the nobles; greed and unbridled ambition return to the state; men
take up arms; a rebellion ensues and is successful; the victors assume command.
T h s is the passage from a good aristocracy to a bad oligarchy, rule by the
wealthiest. The oligarchy advances the interests of the wealthy to the detriment
of the people; the masses come to hate the oligarchs; men take up arms; a rebel-
lion is successful and the people take control. This is the passage from a bad
oligarchy to a good democracy. The democracy pushes for more and more free-
dom at the expense of order, stability, and discipline; the democracy gradually
mo~phsinto excessive liberty, a license of unfettered entitlement. This is the
passage from a good democracy to a bad anarchy. The disunity, chaos, and un-
bearable randomness of anarchy is quelled when a strong man emerges and in-
stalls a principality. This is the passage from a bad anarchy to a good principal-
ity. And the cycle continues.
The main reasons for governmental change are the rise of incompetent lead-
ers, usually through hereditary succession, and the exaggeration of the virtues of
a particular form of state until those virtues turn to vices. The virtues of a princi-
pality are order, speed, and stability. But in the wrong hands those virtues turn to
autocratic rule. The virtues of an aristocracy are wisdom, maturity, and business
experience. But if exaggerated those virtues turn to greed, unfettered ambition,
and wealth for only a few. The virtues of a democracy are popular consent, free-
dom, and opportunity. But these virtues can be pushed into chaos, inflated sense
of entitlement, and extreme individualism.
The cycle is not airtight. Sometimes foreigners gain control at one point or
another or citizens may internally create a mixed constitution, such as a republic.
Machiavelli takes a republic to be the best form of government, other things
being equal. But he recognizes that some territories are suited by custom, tradi-
tion, and history for a principality, not a republic (D I 55). For the founding or
reform of a state, Machiavelli stresses the need for a strong man to execute the
harsh measures required to impose unity and order. For preserving a healthy
state, he champions mixing the interests and temperaments of many (D I 9).
Where citizens exude civic virtli and enjoy a rough economic equality, a repub-
lic will amplify security, freedom, and expansionist aspirations. But where such
conditions are lacking, a republic may facilitate factionalism, ozio, and pave the
way to tyranny. A principality is especially recommended for conquered peoples
because a prince regards all of his subjects equally. In any case, a healthy state
must preserve and expand its power. The alternate is to risk the state's own sub-
jugation. Republics, over the long haul, are best able to expand because of the
mutually-sustaining relationship between its civic and military institutions.
Republics combine elements of each good type of government. In Rome,
the consuls represented the monarchical, the senate represented the nobles, and
 The Discourses 41

the plebeians represented the democratic multitude. After he completes his dis-
cussion of the classification and cycle of states, Machiavelli speaks of only three
types: principalities, republics, and tyrannies.

The Common Good

The prerequisites of the common good are freedom, equality under the law, a
measure of free speech, and ability to participate in government. To serve the
common good an action or policy must actually do good, must benefit the large
majority of citizens, and be understood by those citizens as benefiting them. The
most apparent actions serving the common good increase the prospects of the
survival, order, and security of the state, all of which enhance the possibility that
citizens will flourish. It is within the common good that the individual is re-
deemed: elevated from the doom and gloom of unfettered ambizione, he gains a
wider identity, and focused realistic goals and projects. The common good is not
universal. Its vitality depends on a secure, healthy expansionist republic which
triumphs over foreigners. The common good is not merely an aggregation of
individual interests, but the well-being of the whole which is more than just the
sum of its parts. Order, stability, the rule of law, and wider sense of identity
serve not only the republic itself but also the larger society (D I 2; D I1 2; D I11
22; FH IV 3-7; FH V 11; FH V 32, FH V 37). The ideals and social practices
that human beings create are grounded in our natural needs and capabilities, and
tested by the results they produce in our lives.
Understanding the common good is akin to recognizing the transcendent
dimension of any successful collection of people. For example, the greatness of
an athletic team cannot be accurately known by totaling the positive attributes of
each member. A great team is more than the sum of individual talents. The way
players contribute to the team, how they meld together, whether they enhance or
detract from the abilities of teammates, all affect the unit's success. The best
five individual players do not always form the most successful basketball team.
Republics are similar. The common good is more than the sum of individual
interests and satisfactions. At its most splendid, the common good involves par-
ticipating in a wider identity and pursuing important purposes that go beyond the
self. The common good reinforces a sense of personal worth and contribution by
connecting citizens to a cause greater than the interests of each person consid-
ered in isolation. Arthur Murphy described the common good as "not what eve-
rybody wants when each is concerned to please [only] himself or all have been
made submissive to the same mass pressures. It is the interest than can justify
itself as public on terms of equity that apply to all, the terms of agreement that
distinguish a community from a manipulated crowd."*
For Machiavelli, the distinction between a community and a manipulated
crowd is less clear cut. In any event, he insists that only through communal at-
tachments can human beings transform their inherently dismal natures into a
42 Chapter Two

magnificent national character. Alone we are decrepit, estranged, and selfish.

Corruption involves selfishness, shortsightedness, indolence, and physical de-
cay. The obsession with perceived past injustices and the desire for revenge-
which is often antithetical to enduring glory-also characterize corrupt citizens.
The laws and policies of a corrupt country struggle mightily and futilely to re-
write the past instead of focusing sharply on the present and future (FH I11 5; FH
I11 3; FH IV 14). Together we may become worthy of enduring glory. Recogniz-
ing our wider identities and feeling the bonds of communal projects nurture pa-
triotism which is critical in a republic. For Machiavelli, engaging in politics al-
lows human beings to fully realize their potentials.
Machiavelli's understanding of how a strong republic advances the common
good is reminiscent of a general aspect of the human condition. Many argue that
existential tension is at the heart of human experience: our yearning for intimate
connection with others and the recognition that others are necessary for our
identity and freedom coalesces uneasily with the fear and anxiety we experience
as others approach.3 We simultaneously long for emotional attachment yet are
horrified that our individuality may evaporate once we achleve it. This dishar-
mony may never be fully reconciled once and forever, and so we find ourselves
making uneasy compromises and adjustments during our life's journey as we
oscillate along the continuum whose endpoints are radical individuality and
thorough immersion in community, respectively. Individualism offers the prizes
of feelings of specialness, empowerment, and uniqueness; but, if exaggerated,
ends in estrangement, alienation, and crushing solitude. Community displays the
awards of feelings of connection, enduring bonds, and invigorating intimacy;
but, if distorted, degenerates into subservience, loss of identity, and suffocating
conformity.
Human freedom, for Machiavelli, is not a libertarian paradise which sancti-
fies the (negative) liberties of atomistic individuals. Instead, the Florentine
blesses the inescapable bonds we discover among fellow citizens that permit a
wider identity which is necessary for nourishing civic virtu and for liberating
people from their unnecessary domination by foreigners. Human freedom, in its
fullest dimension, requires robust community, not arms-length bargaining by
unattached individuals. For Machiavelli, the individualistic contractualism at the
heart of libertarianism presupposes a healthy government founded on thick,
communal, military, and political principles.
Machiavelli tells us that as individuals we are doomed to act upon the
wicked, evil impulses of our natures. Only in community can the forces of ne-
cessity be brought to bear and energize the better angels of our being. Only a
strong republic-based, as ever, on strong arms, sound laws, robust religion, and
disciplined education-can generate the conditions that promote civic virtu,
respect for the common good, and connection to a wider identity. Only in a
strong republic is the common good the guiding principle of political action (D
I1 2). Machiavelli understood that a state founded on national unity has a greater
chance to flourish than one harboring divergent languages, traditions, and laws
(P 3). Principalities may be required in territories where the prerequisites of re-
 The Discourses 43

publican rule are absent; but the wise prince begins the process that anticipates
republicanism in the next generation.
Machiavelli primarily champions the negative freedom of citizens-from
the oppression of tyrants and foreigners-but also appreciates some positive
freedoms-to propose new laws and to indict those who commit offenses
against the liberty of the state (D I 18; D I 7; FH I1 34). As with all positive per-
sonal values, appreciation of the common good is grounded in self-interest. Ef-
forts on behalf of the common good maximize prospects for power, glory, secu-
rity, and order. The common good, then, is tangible and material. Individuals
find their fulfillment only within appropriate political communities, only in the
common good. Without leaders, bristling with military and political virtu, the
common good is elusive. If a political community lacks a sense of the common
good-if it is corrupt-then strong princes are required to reform the situation.
The foundation of the common good, as always, lies in self-interest: human be-
ings are grateful to those who protect them and make their lives more secure and
orderly. They understand that service to the common good is not entirely self-
less, but advances their individual interests as well (D I 2; D I1 24).

Why Republics Are Best

Principalities, at their best, offer strong rule that controls the ambitions of aristo-
crats and the masses alike, and govern under the rule of law. Machiavelli fa-
vorably cites the French monarchy for its commitment to law, and the order and
security that its citizens enjoy (D I 16; D I 58; D I11 1). But even the best princi-
palities are limited: order and security fall short of full liberty. Principalities, for
example, limit or prohibit political speech. Moreover, principalities must disarm
their citizens lest the people rise up against the aristocrats or monarch. As a re-
sult, principalities must often employ foreign mercenaries, who produce dis-
mally. Thriving republics, in contrast, include the elements of citizens' political
participation and expanded civil rights. There institutionalized conflict between
the aristocrats and the masses invigorates the state. Macluavelli advises that a
politically active people and a citizen militia nurture liberty and civic virtri.
Accordingly, Machiavelli argues that republics are more enduring, more
stable, acd more likely to expand than principalities (D I 2; D I 5; D I 6; D I 11;
D 1 29; D I 58; D I1 2; D I1 4; D I1 6; D I1 9; D I1 21; D I11 9). Republics, unlke
principalities, do not depend on the military and political virtri of one man. Prin-
cipalities, then, tend to deteriorate with the aging or death of their prince. In
most cases the successor to the prince is a less capable heir (D I 11). The citi-
zens of a republic live in freedom, with prospects for upward mobility, settled
expectations, secure property, and a sense of civic virtri (D I1 2). A republic is
more flexible when confronting fortuna than is a principality because it makes
use of diverse temperaments whereas a principality is limited to the adaptability
of only the prince (D I 11; D I 17; D I11 9). Best of all, republics are best able to
44 Chapter Two

expand: their stability; ability to adapt; nurturing of civic virtu; training and use
of disciplined soldiers; sense of common good; and competitive spirit fuel he-
roic military deeds (D 11 2; D I1 4; D I1 6; D 11 9; D I1 21). Republics are prefer-
able to principalities, as a general rule, because they include more freedom and
more stable power, which promote more success in the race for enduring glory.
Republics are better able than principalities to navigate adeptly between the
power of the lion and the craftiness of the fox. In sum, republics are the superior
form of political community because they best understand, reflect, address, and
soften the inherently wanton inclinations of human nature (D I 39).
Machiavelli underscores the need for both force and fraud. Sometimes fraud
is enough to rise to power, but force is rarely sufficient. To climb from humble
origins to lofty places requires fraud and usually force. The imperatives of the
lion and fox that princes must follow to ensure success are also incumbent on
republics. Once republics become established and powerful, force alone may be
enough for continued prosperity (D I1 13).
Machiavelli's message is as cold as steel tempered too hard. The world is a
competitive battleground. A nation's choices-unless it is astonishingly insig-
nificant-are to expand or to be subjugated. The bluff, guile, courage, knowl-
edge, and panache of a political leader must be backed by strong arms. Condi-
tions of scarcity, the basic nature of human beings, the rush for glory by those
with grandezza d'animo, and the relentless whims of fortuna compel the need to
triumph or to be destroyed. The call for enduring peace is a tinny hustle. A long-
standing peace lures citizens into ozi-the indolent, soft, undisciplined, unwor-
thy life-where leisure and the pursuit of luxury are paramount (D I11 16).
Whereas for Socrates the unexamined life is not worth living, for Machiavelli an
unadventuresome, unheroic scramble for la dolce vita is no life at all. Ozio, the
lack of heroic action, and a deficiency of virtu lead to political ruin (D I1 30).
Machiavelli does not renege on his gruff assessment of human nature. Left
to our own devices we are nasty, brutish, and selfish. Only a strong state offers
redemption. Only such a unit can exploit conditions of necessity to compel hu-
man beings toward civic and moral virtu. Inclination to a common good is un-
natural for us. Patriotism and national character must be carefully promoted.
Only they can elevate human beings from myopic focus on our greedy, grasping
yearnings to a sense of common identity, shared good, and the importance of
heroic deeds. For Machiavelli, only a healthy state can elevate human beings
from their alienated, pathetic, natural impulses. True, he ignores that coopera-
tion, shared purposes, mutual aid, and the like must also be potentials within us.
Otherwise, we would not even be susceptible to transformation. But his point,
persuasive or not, is that such communal values would remain dormant but for
the agency of a healthy, expansionist state.
Patriotism, if overly inflated, morphs into rabid nationalism. In Machia-
velli's work the differences between the two are close to zero and zero is suffo-
cating from lack of space. Viewing the world as a series of zero-sum contests
where increased virtu is a prize transcending the annexing of new territory en-
tails that the common good extends only to one's own people. Territorial
 The Discourses 45

boundaries, however, are constantly changing and the circle of one's own people
also expands with time, socialization, and assimilation. Machiavelli makes no
appeal to master races, chosen people, or genetically superior tribes. We are all
vicious, evil snots. But within us is the capability to rise above our wantonness if
and only if a healthy, expansionist state bestows its guidance.
Expansion can occur through joining a confederation, making alliances, or
obtaining subject states. Machiavelli considers the Roman model, whereby
Rome sought alliances and if it conquered a territory Rome absorbed it into the
Roman state-as the best. Subjugating states, the way of ancient Athens and
Sparta is the worst method because it invites hatred, prevents assimilation, and
discourages maximum productivity. Confederations are generally too weak an
association and consume some of a state's independence. The Roman model
treats the citizens of defeated countries the best and quickly begins the healing
process that eases the way to full assimilation (D I 5; D I 6; D I1 3; D I1 19).
One might argue that Machiavelli was not endorsing territorial expansion
based on aggressive conquest of other states, but expansion flowing from alli-
ances or even confederations. Military aggression might be viewed as a last re-
sort. But expansion is paramount to security. Given Machiavelli's zero-sum
conception of world affairs, his notion of human nature, and the condition of
natural scarcity, Machiavelli underscores the need to bring other nations under
your domain. He is in favor of treating those nations reasonably once they come
under your domain, but he surely does not minimize the need for predatory con-
quest. Alliances and confederations are generally a stage toward gearing up for
larger battles.
A question arises as to whether the freedom and well-being of the citizens
in a republic are merely means to the fhndamental purposes of the state: the en-
during glory of military and political leaders, and the historical grandeur of the
nation. Because the common good and individual liberty are requirements for
the enduring glory of leaders and the lasting stature of the nation, I conclude
their relationship is tighter than that between an end and a means. Part of the
definition of the enduring glory of leaders and national grandeur is the extent to
which the common good and civic virtu advance. This is the case regardless of
the conscious intentions upon which the leaders acted. Political leaders must
renounce the selfish motivations of tyrants and act from enlightened self-
interest, which benefits their citizens and subjects.
No political community, however, endures forever (D I11 5). Decline and
corruption are inevitable as nations become victims of their own success and fall
prey to corruption. The lack of vigorous enemies, the seductive comforts of ozio,
the caprices of fortuna, and annoying class strife will conspire against perma-
nent domination (D I11 1). Nations, like all living organisms, are born to suffer
and perish. But within the process lie possibilities for the only prize worth striv-
ing for: enduring glory, the recognition that certain individuals and political
communities are more than a cut above the others. This, again, is the reward
Machiavelli offers to those who heed his advice.
 Chapter Two

Institutionalized Conflict
Conventional wisdom held that the Roman republic perished because of internal
conflict. Machiavelli disagreed. Machiavelli distinguished carefully between
sectarian factionalism and beneficial conflict within a state. Factionalism is the
result of instability, the corruption of civic virtu, the collapse of a sense of com-
mon good, and the pursuit of narrow interests. Beneficial conflict is the creative
result of robust institutions. The Roman republic perfected the art of using the
tensions between the interests of the people and those of the nobles to practical
advantage. By developing institutional outlets-in the case of the nobles the
senate, in the case of the people the plebeians-the Romans funneled conflict
into the development of sounder laws, increased liberty, and greater flexibility.
Public assemblies, debates, forums, and a political role for the two major social
classes are critical to the health of a republic. At its apex, class discord in the
Roman republic did not result in bloodshed, exiles, or violence undermining the
common good. Instead, it facilitated freedom and invigorated a passionate state.
By providing institutional outlets for natural conflict within the social classes,
the Roman republic prevented discord from degenerating into armed struggle.
To pretend that the grandi (aristocrats) and the populo (multitude) do not have
natural conflicts is fatuous and denies the two different temperaments prevalent
in a state. Class structures, then, are both psychological and economic. More-
over, institutional outlets for conflict sharpen civic virtu and guard against ser-
vility and ozio. Instead of viewing the clash of class interests as adversity, the
creative nation uses it for practical advantage: a balance of power that energizes
a mixed constitution and facilitates civic virtli (D I 2; D I 3; D 14; D I 5; D I 6).
Animo (spirit, passion, heart) is the measure of a man's ability to impose his
will and shape his own destiny. A function of social circumstances and subject
to fortuna's caprices, animo combines the prudence of practical reason with
personal virtu. Whereas Plato located human fulfillment in peace, harmony, and
internal coherence, Machiavelli insists that the greatest human beings seek
glory. Neither contentment nor serenity is sought by the best of our species. In-
stead, the most passionate among us aspire to glory, the recognition of their su-
periority.
Ambizione (ambition, drive) is the greatest threat to and the grandest re-
source for an orderly republic. Unbridled ambition is selfishness: greed, tyranny,
and alienated striving. If unlimited, private ambition eviscerates political com-
munity. But ambition constrained by necessity-the discipline generated in a
republic by strong anns, sound laws, vital religion, and focused education in the
proper political context-is required for greatness and glory. The ability to
weave equilibrium between the two dominant temperaments in a nation-the
grandi and the populo-measures the success of a republic. Republican order is
not the denial or repression of conflict, but its institutionalized transformation.
The interplay of opposing vectors and the resulting tension is much healthier,
says Machiavelli, than a false harmony forged by the oppression of one class for
 The Discourses 47

the benefit of the other. Aspiring for peace, tranquility, and internal harmony
bears the stench of animo efleminato. Recognizing competition, inner turmoil,
robust energy, and ambizione in its politically effective form stirs the majesty of
grandezza d 'animo.
Republics need ambitious citizens who seek honor, reputation, and a meas-
ure of glory. Yet if these awards are sought and attained inappropriately, tyranny
may result. A fine line exists between salutary ambition and tyrannical avarice.
Pivotal to the distinction is the source of honor and reputation. If citizens gain
repute from deeds that enlarge the common good and buttress liberty then their
republic benefits. If citizens gain honor from purely private maneuvers-lending
money, marrying off daughters, protecting other people from the magistrates-
then their republics are injured. Private benefits make the recipients indebted to
their benefactors and encourage those honored to think they can compt the pub-
lic and violate the law. Public benefits, in contrast, are institutionalized, open to
all citizens, and recognize service to the entire republic (D I11 28). Again, ac-
cepting and providing robust institutional outlets for ambizione is crucial for a
successful republic. Denying or trying to repress ambizione is an ingredient in
the recipe for republican failure.
In sum, conflicts are inevitable and arise from human nature, from ambizi-
one and animo. Within those passions reside the best and worst human possibili-
ties. Unfettered ambition leads to the failure to establish or the destruction of
political communities. In such cases, human beings remain in their selfish, de-
praved condition. Where conflict is institutionalized, where respect for law, the
common good, and social solidarity remain, it animates and strengthens political
community.

The Office of Dictator

Machiavelli enthusiastically endorses the office of dictator in a republic. The
dictator's role emerges only during emergencies, for a limited time, and for pre-
cise duties. He rejects the view that the office of dictator undermined the Roman
republic. Conventional wisdom insisted that Julius Caesar was able to assume
political power under cover of being a lawful dictator. Machiavelli, while agree-
ing that Caesar was a tyrant, argues that the real culprits were prolonged terms
for military commanders and the corruption pervading Rome during Caesar's
ascension. Where the dictator's power was limited to specific duties, his term
was brief, and the Roman people embodied civic virtu, the state benefited from
that office. The need for a dictator during emergencies stems from the deliberate
pace at which a republic acts. During emergencies, republics either remain true
to their procedural laws, in which case they will often act too slowly to succeed;
or republics knowingly skirt their procedural law in order to move with alacrity,
in which case a custom of breaking laws for good purposes arises. Such a cus-
tom, however, leads to a republic breaking laws for bad purposes. (Note: Ma-
48 Chapter Two

chiavelli is sensitive, at least here, to the dangerous consequences of adopting an

"end justifies the means" mentality.) Establishing an office of dictator for emer-
gency situations remains loyal to legal processes while permitting flexibility not
otherwise available in republics. Machiavelli observes that the Romans were
wise in allowing the consuls, whose powers were most infringed upon by the
emergence of a dictator, to choose the man who would occupy the position. Be-
cause the consuls were directly involved their misgivings were softened. At later
stages of the Roman republic, the consuls themselves were given dictatorial
power (D I 34).

Luxuries and Wealth

Mutual respect and rough equality of wealth are more important than equality of
rank. Extreme disparity of wealth and access to political power only through
wealth eviscerate mutual respect. Corruption and the loss of love for liberty arise
from class strife and social inequality (D 111 25; D I 17; D I 55; FH I11 1). The
public treasury should be bountifbl, but citizens should live austerely (D I 3; D I
21; D I 37). The state needs wealth to mount military campaigns, secure re-
sources for the common good, and guard against the caprices of fortuna. Citi-
zens, however, should not live extravagantly. The adoration of riches leads to an
indolent, undisciplined, selfish life that undermines civic and moral virtu. If too
many have too much they will lose focus on what benefits the common good.
Machiavelli sees the potentially corrupting influences of wealth on human char-
acter. He wants a populace that is lean, tough, disciplined and invigorated by
competitive, military values. He disparages the soft life which he thinks is fueled
by excessive wealth. Moreover, if citizens are too wealthy their allegiance to the
state will weaken. Remember, loyalty is based primarily on self-interest. If citi-
zens need the state they are more lrkely to labor patriotically for the republic.
The rush for luxury, the weakening of military rigor, and the factionalism of
class strife had eviscerated the republic of Florence. If too many citizens become
independent power brokers they may view the state as a pesky hindrance to their
private pursuit of wealth. Machiavelli does not promote libertarianism, which he
sees as a corrupting influence in a republic. Conflicting desires for wealth, in
fact, drove an irreconcilable schism between the Roman people and the senate, a
division which bred corruption (D I 37; D 111 25). The narrow, private interest in
amassing wealth conflicts with appreciation of the common good. In a corrupt
principality or republic this conflict is inevitable, but in a healthy, robust repub-
lic it withers away (D I 18; D I1 2).
Machiavelli cites admiringly the legend of Lucius Qumtius Cincinnatus.
When a consul and his army were besieged and military defeat seemed immi-
nent, the Romans appointed Cincinnatus, a small-time farmer, to the office of
Dictator. Summoned while he was plowing his few acres of land, he donned his
toga, scurried to Rome, and recruited an army. Cincinnatus thrashed and plun-
 The Discourses 49

dered the enemy, and freed the consul. He did not allow his soldiers to share in
the plunder of those who sought to plunder them. He chided the consul and de-
moted him to a legate of the senate. Cincinnatus returned to his fann (D I11 25).
For Machlavelli, the lessons are bright and telling: austerity breeds civic
and moral virtu; poverty should not preclude opportunities for rank and honor;
luxury promotes ozio; and the labor and character of a citizen are correlated.
Citizens should be evaluated by their contributions to the common good, their
frugality, and self-discipline, not by the size of their bank accounts. Accord-
ingly, the race for wealth diverts men from sharp political focus; the austerity of
citizens and a rough economic equality are needed to attain civic virtti (D I 37;
D 111 25).
In contrast, Machiavelli despised the gentiluomi (well-bred gentlemen) who
lived in luxury without working. Their fortunes spurted from their estates, which
they enjoyed courtesy of the labors of others. The worst of this breed also owned
castles staffed by obedient subjects. The gentiluomi cast a death spell on repub-
lics, toward which they are thoroughly hostile because widespread freedom did
not serve their narrow interests (D I 55). The gentiluomi embody ozio leavened
by selfishness. They barter their honor for false glitter.
Machiavelli's unequivocal preference for the heroic life gushes forth in his
discussion of austerity. Physical comfort and material accumulations are unwor-
thy consolations for those who are inadequate for higher military and political
callings. He locates a robustly meaningful life in the public realm of interna-
tional competition, not in private striving for more shining trinkets and baubles.
Cincinnatus was hard, tough, and intolerant of nonsense. Moreover, he glistened
with military and civic virtri. We should all be so graced.

Religion
In The Prince, Machiavelli only alluded to his misgivings about the role the
Church had played in Italian politics (P 7; P 11; P 21). Given that his audience
for that book was the Medici, one of whom was the current pope and several of
whom had been high-ranking prelates, that was a percentage move. In The Dis-
courses, though, Machlavelli relished his opportunity to lay out the case against
the Church.
Most important, Machiavelli celebrates religion as a forceful instrument for
establishing order and security, promoting military discipline, reinforcing good
laws, and coercing people to behave well. In his ranking of glorious men, Ma-
chiavelli places leaders and founders of religion in first place (D I 10). Religion
is the most powerful agent of social control. A robust religion nourishes the
homeland, energizes patriotism, and promotes military defense (D I1 2). Accord-
ingly, Machiavelli reveres the majesty of religion and takes it most seriously.
Any powerful agent, however, can be used in service of Machiavelli's most
cherished principles or against those values. Unhappily, the Catholic Church is
50 Chapter Two

the major culprit of The Discourses. Why so? First, the Church has interpreted
scripture and has established doctrines that corrode military values. The chief
character traits admired by the Church-humility, contemplation, compassion,
kindness, indolence, contempt for worldly goods, yearning for transcendent re-
ward-undermine the race for worldly honor and enduring glory. Roman relig-
ion, paganism, treasured the values closest to Machiavelli's spirit: overcoming
resistance, physical valor, greatness of spirit, boldness, competitive victory, and
worldly success. Although it might have been interpreted differently, Church
doctrines and dogmas nurture Machiavelli's most despised specimen: animo
effeminato. The Church keeps weak men feeble by offering easy consolations
and excuses. The Romans were more freedom-loving and braver than Renais-
sance Florentines because of the different values promoted by their respective
religions. These differences do not merely reflect Machiavelli's abstract aes-
thetic preferences. No, they bear practical implications: the Romans lived in
freedom, while contemporary Florentines and other Italians live in various forms
of servitude (D I 11; D I 13; D I1 2; D 111 33).
Second, the Church has set a poor example. Its leaders have talked piety and
reverence but practiced wickedness and blasphemy. As a result, the people pay
lip service to Christian values but remain corrupt. The Church has squandered
its moral authority and its potential for being a force of necessity which could
make men behave well. Third, the Church has kept Italy divided and politically
weak. The Church has not subjugated regional princes; has brought in foreign
dominators to defend against any Italian prince who seems strong enough to
unify the peninsula; and has zealously protected its own power to the detriment
of the country as a whole. In sum, the Church has promoted and has benefited
from a divided, corrupt Italy (D I 12).

The Multitude and the Prince

Conventional wisdom and the great Livy himself insisted that the multitude was
unreliable and worthless. Machiavelli, perhaps surprisingly, disagreed. Whoever
rules a state-whether a group or an individual-will make serious errors if not
constrained by sound laws. The multitude, in fact, is generally more prudent,
stable, and reasonable than is a sole prince. Republics are generally superior to
principalities. The rule of law is critical. An unrestrained prince is a madman, an
unrestrained multitude is licentious. When constrained by law, as in a sound
republic, the multitude rules better than a prince constrained by law. When un-
constrained by laws, the multitude will make fewer and less serious errors than
an unconstrained prince. The unconstrained multitude can be put on the right
path by a lecture from one who is good and wise. The unconstrained prince re-
fuses counsel from anyone. The only way to correct such a prince is to slay him.
The cruelties of the multitude are directed toward those it fears will undennine
the common good, while the excesses of a prince are aimed at those he fears
 The Discourses 51

threaten his self-interest. Furthermore, the multitude, when making political

appointments, judges merit better than do princes because they are less easily
misled by gossip, rumor, and speculation. Both the multitude and the prince,
however, should seek the advice of able ministers in such cases (D I 58; D 111
34).
In sum, the multitude is better than a prince at maintaining the status quo,
but a prince is better at founding a fresh or reforming a corrupt state. The multi-
tude acts from habit and custom. One of the prime purposes of a republic is to
transform the inherently selfish natures of the crowd into a concern for the
common good through law, religion, and education which make civic virtu, lit-
erally, second nature. Princes are less influenced by custom and tradition and
are, thus, more free to innovate and create (D I 17; D I 39).
Machiavelli is not discussing the multitude in its raw, uncultivated condi-
tion. He is not retreating from his firm conviction that left to its own devices the
multitude is strongly inclined toward selfishness and wickedness. In The Dis-
courses, he is referring to the multitude refined by citizenship in a healthy re-
public, a multitude elevated by a measure of civic virtu and concern for the
common good. Still, even such a multitude must remain constrained by sound
laws. If the multitude is unrestrained it will not be as horrible as an unrestrained
prince. This is less of a paean to the masses than it may first seem. An unre-
strained prince is a tyrant with sole power. He can wreak irreparable damage
more easily and thoroughly than can a multitude tempered by internal conflict.
Where Machiavelli makes a concession to the people is when he argues that a
constrained multitude-the refined citizens in a healthy republic-rule better
than a constrained prince. This repeats Machiavelli's general rule that republics
are preferable to principalities based on their stability and capability for expan-
sion.
Rulers may violate the laws they have enacted without changing those laws.
Doing so, however, is unwise and self-defeating. By respecting the rule of law,
rulers amplify their own power and standing (D I 45). The greatest source of
authority for a ruler lies in the security, satisfaction, and esteem of his subjects
(D I 16; D I 58). Rulers are role models. The directive power of law is rein-
forced when those in charges honor the rule of law.

Returning to Founding Principles

Machiavelli reminds us that nothing lasts forever. Government institutions, po-
litical parties, and religious units should be designed for ongoing reform. They
should be brought back to their founding principles in order to endure. As time
passes, the virtu embodied by institutions at their outset tends toward corruption.
To return to founding principles occurs through external accident or internal
foresight. Sometimes threat of attack or destruction wrought by foreign domina-
tors reminds a state that it must reaffirm its commitment to the common good,
sound laws, and healthy religion. Sometimes a state has the wisdom to require
52 Chapter Two

through law that its institutions assess and regenerate their vitality. Sometimes
the political virtd of one strong man and the skillful policies he follows has the
same effect as such a law (D I11 1). Consolidating power in one man, however,
must be temporary. In the long run, a single ruler will lack the flexibility needed
for enduring success (D I11 9).
In Rome, the tribunes of the people, the censors, opposed the unbridled am-
bition and unrestrained pride of men. Machlavelli cites favorably a fifteenth-
century Florentine dictum that government should be thoroughly reformed every
five years. He would be satisfied, however, with a ten year cycle. Reforming
government involved inspiring the same terror and harshness of its founding.
When states are lax citizens dare to innovate and to speak evil. The remedy is to
crush those who act badly before their treacheries come to fruition. At times,
one man with abundant virtli inspires so much respect and admiration that good
people want to imitate him and bad people are ashamed to live under principles
contrary to his. Machiavelli singles out St. Francis and St. Dominic in the thir-
teenth century. By living lives of poverty and imitating the life of Christ they
brought people back to religion as it once was. They founded new religious or-
ders, the Franciscans and Dominicans, that preserved Christianity and stand as a
bulwark against the contemporary squalor of the Church (D I11 1).
Principalities, too, reform themselves to return to their founding principles.
Enforcing laws against a ruler or noble is a leap in the right direction. But should
they become lax in enforcing the law against the influential, they would need to
correct the problem with major action or risk the fall of the government (D I11
1).
The call to return to origins should not be taken literally. Machiavelli did
not believe that a country could turn back history and selectively erase the past.
Instead, he counseled the rejuvenation of complacent countries ambling on the
road to corruption. Reformists in such nations should consult their own tradi-
tions for reforms rather than adopting the ways of foreigners. Machiavelli an-
ticipates Thomas Jefferson's position that revolution is required every genera-
tion. A state can go it the easy way, by building self-correcting processes into its
institutions, or it can do it the hard way, by revitalizing itself through cruelties
similar to those accompanying its founding. Adjustment, change, and innovation
are required because political institutions otherwise stultify. The goal of return-
ing to founding principles is renewal of the commitment to law and to the com-
mon good.

Charges and Accusations

The right of public accusation is required to preserve freedom in a republic. A
public accusation is a charge brought by those entrusted to guard the liberty of
the republic. The charge is lodged before the appropriate magistrate, council, or
before the people. The charge is brought against those who threaten public fiee-
dom, regardless of the standing or influence of the alleged perpetrator. This right
 The Discourses 53

is paramount because it deters wicked citizens from harming the state lest they
be summarily flattened. Also, this right provides an outlet for the resentments
that accumulate in a city against individual citizens. Without such a legal outlet,
aggrieved citizens will act outside the law to satisfy their vengeance. Illegal ac-
tion of thls sort not only contaminates the instant case but also fosters a collapse
in the rule of law (D I 7).
Machiavelli is well aware that the right of public accusation may be abused.
He cavalierly dismisses the danger: "If the law makes it possible for an individ-
ual citizen to be executed when he does not deserve to be, this does little or
nothing to undermine the political stability of the republic. The law is enforced
without private violence or foreign troops being involved, and it is these that
destroy political freedom" (D I 7). Machiavelli regards it as inevitable that at
times a mass of citizens will resent a person whom they see as a threat to the
freedom of the republic. That resentment will be virtually uncontrollable. With-
out a legal outlet to adjudicate the matter, that mass of citizens will act illegally
with dire consequences to the rule of law. With a legal outlet, Machiavelli ac-
cepts unsqueamishly that some innocent parties may be oppressed. Those errors,
however, do not jeopardize public liberty because neither private vengeance nor
use of foreign troops-the scourges of lawfulness and liberty-are involved.
He adds to the message by citing the dangers of private slander. First, they
can be levied wildly and irresponsibly. The right of public accusation requires
an airing of evidence and examination of supporting grounds. Slanders can be
hurled by anyone in any place. Second, slanders, being private, are often be-
lieved by listeners and can be spread indiscriminately. The right of public accu-
sation is discharged in a legal setting so they are less common than slanders.
Despite the typically flimsy basis for most slanders they can generate powerful,
pernicious effects (D I 8).
At first reading, Machiavelli's casual disregard for wrongful punishment is
beyond disturbing. Would not wrongful convictions and executions also have a
deleterious result for the rule of law? Does making the masses responsible for
charges of wrongdoing and for executions reinforce popular government at the
expense of the innocent? Must the common good involve the many oppressing
the few? Is not one of the functions of government the repression of lynch mobs
regardless of their deranged zeal?
Much depends on how the public right of accusation plays out in practice.
The fact that wrongful convictions will take place does not distinguish the right
of accusation from any law presently enforced in any country. Are innocent
people convicted and executed in the United States? A number more significant
than we might have imagined, it turns out. Are there people included in that
number who have engendered the hostility of the multitude? Worse, many of
those executed were disadvantaged not by their individual attributes but by their
race or ethnicity, it turns out. T h s is not to single out the United States. Similar
claims can be reasonably advanced against other legal systems. Lacking a
method of pure procedural justice-one that would guarantee accurate out-
comes-all legal systems oppress some innocent people.
54 Chapter Two

True, Machiavelli's right of public accusation could be used to placate the

mob at the expense of the unpopular. But that is not a necessary feature of the
program In Machiavelli's day, mob action was more common than we experi-
ence today. Internal police forces were either nonexistent or rudimentary. Pri-
vate vengeance was a constant threat to the rule of law. Providing a legal chan-
nel, as Machiavelli suggests, might well prevent more violence than it
encouraged. As he says, a legal process, unlike a lynch mob, at least demands an
examination of the evidence.

Divination
Machiavelli enjoyed the hocus-pocus of divination, augwy, and celestial omens.
He assures readers that important events in a city are always foretold by revela-
tions or soothsayers or celestial clue. Machiavelli soberly notes that prior to the
death of Lorenzo de'Medici (the Magnificent), the cathedral in Florence was
zapped at its apex by lightning; the day prior to Piero Soderini's ouster from
power, the main Palace in Florence was struck by a thunderbolt; just prior to a
French attack on Rome, a plebian in ancient times reported hearing a supra-
human voice at midnight instructing him to tell the magistrates that the French
were coming; the religious mystic, Savonarola, had predicted numerous events
correctly prior to the arrival of King Charles VIII of France. Machiavelli adds
that he could include countless other examples, but does not want to bore read-
ers with repetition. Machiavelli suggests the celestial intelligences, blessed with
foresight and compassion, are responsible for warning human beings by means
of natural signs. Suitably alerted, people can hatch schemes of resistance (D I
56).
What, exactly, could citizens do to avert the death of Lorenzo? Suppose
they would, in unison, screech at the sight of lightning, "Look up in the sky! The
cathedral has been hit by lightning. Poor Lorenzo, the reaper approaches!" Then
what? Start making funeral arrangements? Get a one day start on easing the way
for the next Medici ruler?
Much the same can be said about the removal of Soderini. Given the re-
sounding victory of the Holy League in 1512, citizens did not need a roadrnap to
conclude that the gonfaloniere a vita was headed out of town with alacrity. In
fairness, some of Savonarola's predictions and the plebian's warning about the
arrival of the French, if taken seriously, might well have triggered precautions.
But most alleged signs fiom celestial intelligences reek with ambiguity. Such
signs recall the ancient example of the commander who sought guidance from
the Delphic Oracle. The lung was hoping to wage war against a powerful en-
emy, but needed the added ballast of an endorsement fiom the oracle. He asked
the oracle if he should attack his foe. The oracle's reply, an absolute classic, was
"If you go to battle, a great nation will fall." The king, of course interpreted the
 The Discourses 55

message to fit his needs, declared war, and suffered a horrible defeat. Chalk up
yet another correct prediction for the cagey oracle.
Machiavelli also spends time on the ancient art of divination by poultry.
Professional diviners-yes, folks made their living this way-would help decide
when the army should attack the enemy. If the chickens ate when offered food
then that augured well for the army. If the chickens refused nutrition then that
augured badly for the army. A crucial part of military strategy, then, was a skill-
ful observation of the feeding inclinations of poultry. Apparently, the placebo
effect-the irrational, good faith belief that augury was an accurate predictor-
was more important than reality. Confidence in battle is crucial to success and
knowing that a favorable augury blessed your combat buoyed the spirits of sol-
diers. Machiavelli gives an example of a deceptive, but effective, manipulation
of this practice. But he also includes a case where a military commander ignored
an unfavorable augury, waged war, lost badly, and was punished severely for his
imprudence (D I 14).

Women
Machiavelli's view of women is generally uninspiring. First, his notion of animo
efleminato connotes a distressing unmanliness, a subjugation to emotions, a flee-
ing from heroic struggle, and surrender to ozio (D I 19; D I11 46). Machiavelli
assigns to the nature of women precisely those qualities he most disdains. Sec-
ond, he envisions fortuna as a woman: a seductress with powers to lure men
from heroic struggle and to thwart their pursuit of enduring glory. She is capri-
cious, unpredictable, relentless, and unstable (D I1 29; D I1 30; D 111 9; D 111 31;
D I11 37). In The Prince, he advises the prince to treat fortuna as he would any
other woman: be bold, master her by beating her and striking her (P 25). Third,
Machiavelli chronicles several occasions when women have caused the downfall
of states. One city was ruined by class strife between plebeians and nobles gen-
erated by a dispute over who should marry a certain woman. He cites Aristotle's
judgment that rulers often fall from power due to some injury, typically sexual,
done to a woman (D 111 26). In such instances, Machiavelli is blaming the vic-
tim, it would seem, but he nevertheless reinforces his opinion in The Prince
where he advises rulers not to transgress against the property and women of
their subjects (P 17; P 19). His concern is not for the sanctity of property rights
or for women's liberation, but for the ongoing authority of the prince. Fourth,
Machiavelli warns rulers against losing their sense of purpose through dalliances
with women. Women must be excluded from military camps: They "make sol-
diers idle and seditious" (AW VI 165).
Wayne Rebhorn summarizes Machiavelli's view of women well:

Machiavelli's notion of the way a truly heroic prince deals with members of the
opposite sex: to maintain his self-possession, he either avoids them, evaluates
them as though they were objects, or possesses them as such lest they possess
56 Chapter Two

him . . . If Machiavelli's prince is encouraged in one way to keep his distance

from fortuna and women, it is even more important that he actually engage
them-and the worlds of nature and history which they symbolize-but on his
own terms, that is, in ~ombat.~

Hanna Fenichel Pitkin argues that:

The feminine constitutes "the other" for Machiavelli, opposed to manhood and
autonomy in all their senses: to maleness, to adulthood, to humanness, and to
politics . . . nothing is more striking in Machiavelli's explicit remarks on
women than his contempt for the "weaker sex" . . . Women are dumb, fearful,
weak, indecisive, and dependent. They are childishly nalve and easily manipu-
lated. . . . Yet, at the same time they are contemptible, foolish, and weak,
women also somehow possess mysterious and dan erous powers; they consti-
B
tute a threat to men, both personally and politically.

Men inextricably entangled with women risk unhealthy transformation.

Unless they keep a clear eye on the proper role of women-as pleasurable diver-
sion-they may luxuriate in passion to the detriment of paramount military and
political affairs. The allure of women, then, poses two threats to Machiavellian
manhood: "it threatens a man's self-control, his mastery of his own passions,
and it threatens to infect him with feminine so fines^."^ Moreover, "women are a
danger for conquerors . . . because they are invested with other men's sense of
honor."' Thus, Machiavelli insists that the most certain way for rulers to avoid
being hated is to resist the temptation to seize the property or women of their
subjects and citizens (P 17).
Machiavelli lauds, however, Caterina Sforza Riario, wife of the Count of
Forli. Conspirators killed her husband and captured Caterina and her young
children. The conspirators felt insecure because they had not seized the fortress
at Forli. Those within the fortress refused to surrender. To break the impasse,
Caterina promised that if the conspirators would send her into the fortress she
would convince the holdouts to relinquish it. She offered the conspirators her
two children as hostages to ensure her cooperation. The conspirators agreed. As
soon as she was safely ensconced in the fortress, she spewed invectives at the
conspirators for their treacheries and vowed revenge. As for her offspring, Ca-
terina exposed her genitals and assured the evil doers that she had the means to
conceive more children (D I11 6).
Notice, though, that Caterina's actions stray radically from the expectations
of the proper Renaissance women. She uses her own children in a duplicitous
scheme to save herself and redeem the honor of her slain husband.' She exposes
her genitals-generally not considered a lady-like maneuver-as a graphic re-
minder of her own reproductive prowess and willingness to sacrifice her existing
children. Machiavelli, never particularly sentimental about the sanctity of family
relations, praises Caterina not for her robust femininity, but for her combative,
aggressive heroic posture. She represents the woman able to cast aside feminine
qualities for the pursuit of grander deeds. By detailing her exploits, Machiavelli
 The Discourses 57

may even hope to award her a deserved measure of enduring glory. (If so, I am
pleased to do my part to help that cause.)
Machiavelli also praises the boldness of Epicharis, one-time mistress of the
deranged emperor Nero. Epicharis entered into a conspiracy with Piso and oth-
ers against Nero. Epicharis tried to recruit a captain of Nero's guard, but the
captain ratted her out to Nero. Epicharis, however, was so adamant in protesting
her involvement that her moxie won the day. Nero did not condemn her (D I11
6). The lesson here underscores the pitfalls of executing a successful conspiracy
more than it demonstrates the qualities of womanhood. The subtext is that if
cornered and lacking all high ground, false indignation and stentorian bravado
may still reap victory.
He also cites Marcia, a chief concubine of the unorthodox emperor Com-
modus. (Yes, a "chief concubine" is to be distinguished from a small-time mis-
tress.) She and two prominent members of the praetorian guard had indiscreetly
chided Commodus for his undignified public behavior. Cornmodus, never one to
laugh off a slight, wrote their names down on a hit list (Lest he forget whom he
intended to murder?). He placed the list under his pillow (To induce sweet
dreams? To conceal the identity of his intended victims from prying eyes?). A
young boy, apparently yet another one of Commodus's love interests, picked up
the list while Commodus was out of the room. The boy met Marcia as he was
leaving; she took the slip from him. Once she figured out that it was not Com-
modus's holiday shopping list, she advised the other people named. The three
conspirators acted peremptorily and killed Commodus that night. Machiavelli
applauds the trio's policy of doing unto Cornmodus before Commodus did unto
them (D I11 6).
Machiavelli's dreary images of women reflect his relatively dismissive ap-
proach to family relations. His wife and five children were far from Machia-
velli's primary concern. He was a philandering husband and a concerned, but far
from doting, father. Recall, also, that two of Machiavelli's favorite political sto-
ries-those involving Caterina Sforza Riario and Lucius Junius Brutus--centered
on parents who collaborated in the deaths of their children in service to political
principles.
Whereas Italian peasants, particularly in the south and in Sicily, pledged al-
legiance to I'ordine della famiglia, Machlavelli located human redemption in
wider political communities. L 'ordine della famiglia, prescribed relations within
and responsibilities to their family, and their appropriate conduct toward those
outside the family.*The code was clearly protective in that it created, at least in
theory, an intimate shield, a zone of security, against the oppressive economic
and social structure of impoverished Southern Italy and Sicily. But the isolating
and parochial implications of the code were equally stark: stranieri (strangers)
were neither to be trusted nor consulted; amici di cappello (those to whom one
tips one's hat) were to be regarded with a cool politeness and only at a distance.
Not only was there no concept of an international brotherhood and sisterhood,
there was little appreciation of those outside one's village.
58 Chapter Two

Yet there is a deep humanism reflected in the code. Within one's circle of
intimates the code often demanded strenuous sharing and contributions to joint
interests. But such tribalism also deepened and legitimated antecedently existing
cynicism toward outsiders. There are two obvious contemporary postures one
might assume when confronting l'ordine della famiglia. The first, and probably
most common, is the ideology of dismissal: Here is a clearly primitive code
which right-thinking people would now reject straightaway as unsophisticated
tribalism emerging from an uneducated people's struggle with overwhelming
economic and social forces. Are not we fortunate to claim membership in a more
progressive polity under more salutary socioeconomic circumstances? The sec-
ond contemporary response is the ideology of sentimentalization: The l'ordine
della famiglia is viewed as a better, more spiritually rewarding, historical mo-
ment where a code of affection transcended socioeconomic oppression and
pointed the way to a true family ethic, a microcosm of what human relations can
realize in existential crisis. What have human beings gained in the modem
Western world if they have purchased better material conditions using the cur-
rency of the souls? Has the disintegration of family values been too h g h a price
to pay? Both perspectives contain a seed of truth, but exaggerate the virtues and
vices of the code.
Women played critical roles in implementing the code. They ruled much in
the private realm, which was the paramount arena for life. According to 1 'ordine
della famiglia, if miscellaneous stranieri were untrustworthy, governments, ar-
mies, and bureaucracies were downright lethal. They must be eluded at all costs.
If complicity is compelled, treat such institutions as the devil writ large. Ma-
chiavelli, even in the sixteenth century, would reject l'ordine della famiglia as
suffocatingly narrow. The code is geared for meager survival in an unspeakably
cruel world. Machiavelli has a more splendid vision. Yes, the world is harsh,
unforgiving, and grim. But within political community is the opportunity to
grasp greatness, to dominate instead of being oppressed, to make an indelible
mark in history, to earn a place in the pantheon instead of merely groveling for
survival. The family is not an appropriate unit of salvation. Only a thriving, ex-
pansionist republic can redeem feckless human nature. The family is too paro-
chial a unit for anything more than the false solace of animo efleminato. Ma-
chiavelli affiliates himself with the powerful, the worldly-the players in
internal affairs. For the most part, he repudiates the timid, insular masses. Great-
ness requires relegating women to their place and cultivating manly character.
Readers may discount the magnitude of appropriate criticism by tagging Ma-
chiavelli a man of his times, but they should not downplay his misogynism No
excuses are offered here.

Machiavelli and Nietzsche

Several of Machavelli's key themes anticipate the work of Friedrich Nietzsche
 The Discourses 59

(1 844-1900).' For example, Machiavelli's disparagement of Christianity's effect

on human character and its preoccupation with reward in the world beyond, pre-
figures Nietzsche's description of the master and slave moralities. For
Nietzsche, the master morality defines "good" in terms of men's character, not
their actions. Under this view, "good" equates to worldly success: achieving
one's goals of conquest, fame, wealth, and adventure; and embodying pride,
strength, passion, and guiltless joy. Nietzsche's relishes the master morality's
limit-breaking activities and robust nobility. Moreover, the master morality pre-
figures some of Nietzsche's broad themes: the need to transcend present con-
texts and create values out of the abundance of one's life and strengths; the de-
sire to creatively use passion; the joyful affirmation of this world; the
manifestation of self-possession; the lack of repressed hostility; and the produc-
tion and honoring of higher human types. In short, Nietzsche's master morality
closely tracks Machiavelli's depiction of Roman (pagan) religion.
The master morality, which for Nietzsche symbolizes the Greeks of the
Homeric age, did not perceive itself as unconditional or universal. This morality
did not prescribe how others (nonrnasters) should conduct their lives and under-
stood explicitly that its evaluations pertained only to a certain type of human. In
that vein, masters sought friends and adversaries only from members of their
own rank.
The master morality was dominant and ruled over slaves. These slaves,
however, developed their own version of morality. Slave morality reflected and
sustained what was beneficial for the masses or herd of men. The slave moral-
ity's notion of "good" applied to the actions and intentions of men, instead of
their character. Because the herd is inherently mediocre its values celebrate
sympathy, kindness, and general benevolence: virtues that serve the weak and
aspire to widespread equality. The values of masters-such as power, self-
assertion, and world success-were retranslated in slave morality as vices.
While the masters were essentially indifferent to slaves, viewing them as differ-
ent human types, slaves bore resentment toward masters. The emergence and
victory of slave morality-ensured by its alleged grounding in divine impera-
tives-placed obstacles in the path of potentially superior man, promoted social
conformity, and disparagement of worldly success. In sum, Machiavelli's stem
description of Christianity's conquest of Roman (pagan) religion anticipates
Nietzsche's account of the unfortunate triumph of slave over master morality.
Machiavelli's contrast between grandezza d'animo and animo efeminato
foreshadows Nietzsche's distinction between the ubermensch and the last man.
The last man represents a no-saying response to the understanding of inherent
cosmic purposelessness. The pursuit of minimal exertion and avoidance of suf-
fering resound with the shallowness of narrow egalitarians, who pursue a super-
ficial "happiness" that suffocates their possibilities for intense love, creation,
longing, exertion, and excellence.

"We have invented happiness," say the last men, and they blink. They have left
the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves
60 Chapter Two

one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth. Becoming sick and
harboring suspicion are sinful to them: one proceeds carehlly. A fool, whoever
still stumbles over stones or human beings! A little poison now and then: that
makes for agreeable dreams. And much poison in the end, for an agreeable
death. One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful
lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich:
both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both re-
quire too much exertion. . . . Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same.
. . . "We have invented happiness," say the last men, and they blink (Z 1,
"Zarathustra's Prologue," 5).

The highest ambitions of last men are comfort and security. They are the
extreme case of the herd mentality: habit, custom, indolence, egalitarianism,
self-preservation, and muted will to power prevail. Last men embody none of
the inner tensions and conflicts that spur transformative action: they take no
risks, lack convictions, avoid experimentation, and seek only bland survival. Is
not Nietzsche indebted to Machiavelli's vivid portrayal of animo efleminato and
the dangers of corruption by ozio?
The iibermensch (overman), by contrast, is the symbol of human beings
overcoming themselves to superior forms. Nietzsche does not give us a definite
description, but the overman represents a superhuman exemplar that has not yet
existed (Z 11, "On Priests"; Z I, "Zarathustra's Prologue," 3; Z I, "Zarathustra's
Prologue," 4; Z I, "On the Gift-Giving Virtue," 3; WP 1001; WP 983). Clearly,
the overman would be joyous, in control of his instinctual will to power, able to
forge an admirable unity and style out of his inherent multiplicity, severe with
himself, in control of his desires, a sublimator and refiner of cruelty, an unre-
pentant bearer of great suffering, a pursuer of "truth" who is aware of the essen-
tial unity of truth and illusion, a creator and imposer of values and meaning, who
experiences his existence as self-justifying. The overman will remain faithful to
this earth and not defer gratification in hopes of transcendent salvation in an-
other world, he will possess great health and be able to experience the multiple
passions he embodies, he eschews the easy path of last men, he understands the
value he creates is simply what he embodies, he celebrates a justified self-love,
he is free from resentment and revenge, he wastes no time in self-pity, he is
grateful for the entirety of his life, he understands and maintains a clear distance
between himself and the herd, and he exemplifies the rank order of life. The
overman "shall be the meaning of the earth" in that the overman endows life
with value and redeems the species's inherently meaningless tragic existence. In
sum, the overman is a higher mode of being that approximates the human aspira-
tion for transcendent greatness.
The overman represents the full process of Nietzschean becoming-
recurrent deconstruction, reimagination, re-creation-the virtues of the active
nihilist. To prepare to even approximate the joyful ovennan, we must pass
through "three metamorphoses" of discipline, defiance, and creation. The spirit,
like a camel, flees into the solitude of the desert to bear enormous burdens; the
spirit, like a lion, must transform itself into a master, a conqueror who releases
 The Discourses 61

its own freedom by destroying the traditional "thou shalts"; but it is not within
the power of the lion to create new values so the spirit must transform itself into
a child whose playful innocence, ability to forget, and capacity for creative
games signals the spirit's willing its own will (Z I, "On the Three Metamor-
phoses").
The notion of overman-as symbolic, dynamic, indeterminate-provides an
ideal toward which to strive. It is as an (unattainable) ideal that the overman
confers meaning and creates values." The overrnan symbolizes a refashioning of
our sensibilities and aspiration in service of an enhanced life. It points a direc-
tion rather than specifying a clear goal. The ubermensch is the symbol of hu-
mans overcoming themselves to superior forms. Nietzsche does not give us a
definite description, but the overman represents a superhuman exemplar that has
not yet existed (Z 11, "On Priests"; Z I, "Zarathustra's Prologue," 3; Z I,
"Zarathustra's Prologue," 4; Z I, "on the Gift-Giving Virtue," 3; WP 1001; WP
983).
Clearly, the overman would be joyous, in control of his instinctual will to
power, able to forge an admirable unity and style out of his inherent multiplicity,
severe with himself, in control of his desires, a sublimator and refiner of cruelty,
an unrepentant bearer of great suffering, a pursuer of "truth" who is aware of the
essential unity of truth and illusion, a creator and imposer of values and mean-
ing, who experiences his existence as self-justifying. The overman will remain
faithful to this earth and not defer gratification in hopes of transcendent salva-
tion in another world, he will possess great health and be able to experience the
multiple passions he embodies, he eschews the easy path of last men, he under-
stands the value he creates is simply what he embodies, he celebrates a justified
self-love, he is free from resentment and revenge, he wastes no time in self-pity,
he is grateful for the entirety of his life, he understands and maintains a clear
distance between himself and the herd, and he exemplifies the rank order of life.
The overman "shall be the meaning of the earth" in that the overman endows life
with value and redeems the species's inherently meaningless tragic existence. In
sum, the overman is a higher mode of being that approximates the human aspira-
tion for transcendent greatness.
Nietzsche's highest value is amorfati ("love of fate"), a maximally affirma-
tive attitude toward life. The iibermensch is Nietzsche's grandest human exem-
plar because he best embodies amor fati. Does not the overrnan draw heavily
upon Machiavelli's understanding of grandezza d'animo and the glorious men
graced with military and political virtli?
Nietzsche never acknowledged his intellectual debts to Machiavelli-he
was not a writer who footnoted diligently-but he did nod appreciatively in Ma-
chiavelli's direction.

A German is almost incapable ofpresro [rapid tempo] in his language. . . . But

how could the German language, even in the prose of a Lessing, imitate the
tempo of Machiavelli, who in his [The Prince] lets us breathe the dry, refined
air of Florence and cannot help presenting the most serious matters in a bois-
62 Chapter Two

terous allegrissimo [extremely brisk, lively manner], perhaps not without a ma-
licious artistic sense of the contrast he risks-long, difficult, hard, dangerous
thoughts and the tempo of the gallop and the very best, most capricious humor?
(BGE 28)

Nietzsche's rank order of men, obsession with his historical legacy, thor-
ough immersion in the tragedies and exhlarations of this world, disdain for the
corruption of contemporary religion, suspicion that the world replicates cycles,
celebration of struggle and the smashing of obstacles, nostalgia for the values of
the ancients, and contempt for softness and indolence are only a handful of his
cherished themes that recapture Machiavelli's vision.

Notes
1. Although among the papers of Leonardo da Vinci, who recorded the battle of
Anghiari in a mural in the Signoria Palace, are notes in Machiavelli's handwriting that
reflect a great number of causalities in that conflict. See Giuseppe Prezzolini, Machiavelli
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1967), 41. Nevertheless, wars fought in Italy during
this time "were not fought by large conscript armies in which tens of thousands of people
died on the battlefield. They were fought by small professional mercenary armies led by
professional mercenary captains, condottiere . . . there was not a huge amount of vio-
lence, and very often the wars fought by these professional condottiere were more like
ballets rather than actual armed conflicts in which thousands of people were killed."
Kenneth R. Bartlett, The Italians before Italy: Part Two (Chantilly, VA: The Teaching
Company, 2007), 193-1 94.
2. Arthur Murphy, "The Common Good," Proceedings and Addresses of the Ameri-
can Philosophical Association 24 (1950): 12.
3. See, for example, Raymond Angelo Belliotti, Seeking Identity: Individualism and
Community in an Ethnic Context (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), ix-xiii,
191-193.
4. Wayne A. Rebhom, Foxes and Lions: Machiavelli's Confidence Men (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 180.
5. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune Is a Woman (Berkeley, CA: University of Cali-
fomia Press, 1984), 109, 110.
6. Ibid., 117.
7. Ibid., 118.
8. See, for example, Belliotti, Seeking Identity, 2-4.
9. See, for example, Raymond Angelo Belliotti, Stalking Nietzsche (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1998).
10. Ibid., 84-86.
 Chapter Three
Methods, Motivations, and Purposes:
The Prince
Much scholarly debate focuses on Machiavelli's methods, motivations, and pur-
poses for composing The Prince. To participate in this debate is to begin to un-
derstand more deeply the significance of Machiavelli's labors.

The Prince Teaches Evil

The earliest and one of the most influential interpretations of The Prince is that
the book instructs rulers in the art of evil and is the product of the devil. Six-
teenth century clerics warned that Machiavelli's writing would lead to the de-
generation of European politics and the moral decay of civilization. By 1559, all
of Machiavelli's works were condemned by the Roman Catholic Church and
placed on its index of prohibited books. Extolling force and fraud, praising evil
methods of statecraft, applauding murder, ignoring or minimizing love and
friendship, elevating cynicism to an art form, debasing religion, glorifying auto-
crats, advising endless treachery and scheming, and manipulating reality, Ma-
chiavelli was viewed as an instrument of the Dark Side and "Machiavellian"
became a shorthand invective for duplicity and thuggery. For centuries the
dominant picture of Machiavelli was that of a dangerous man who divided the
world into con men and rubes, gangsters and marks. Machiavelli's alleged ob-
session with the conquest, preservation, and expansion of political power at the
expense of moral and spiritual values was unanimously disparaged by clergy of
all denominations, dramatists, poets, monarchs, and other righteous thinkers.
This interpretation retains vitality today in the popular conception of Ma-
chiavelli and in the ongoing use of "Machiavellian" to connote political and
personal opportunism and expediency. Also, numerous writers argue that Ma-
chiavellianism so understood is not even an effective recipe for the success it
seeks. For example, Jacques Maritain, an influential twentieth-century Catholic
philosopher, observed:

Moral conscience answers and cannot keep from answering, just as when it is
tempted by any profitable fault: it is never allowed to do evil for any good
whatsoever. . . . Machiavellianism is an illusion [of immediate success], be-
cause it rests upon the power of evil, and because metaphysically, evil as such
has no power as a cause of being; practically, evil has no power as a cause of
any lasting achievement.'
64 Chapter Three
Earlier writers, beyond rejecting Machiavelli's alleged evil, also punctured
the practicality of his counsel. How can a prince establish or maintain obedience
if his imperatives are disagreeable and evaluated as unjust by the people? How
can love and friendship be possible in a principality managed by Machiavellian
guidelines? Are men truly so simple that they can be defrauded continually and
still hold to their ways? Can men, as Machiavelli supposes, be simultaneously
scoundrels and opportunists yet be thoroughly gullible? How can a prince de-
fraud an enemy yet retain the confidence and trust of other prince^?^
I will not evaluate The Prince-teaches-evil interpretation here. Most of the
remainder of this book tries to put Machiavelli's advice to rulers in context and
to assess Machiavelli struggle with good and evil. I will, however, introduce a
contemporary version of The Prince-teaches-evil interpretation that is more sub-
tle than the thoroughly disparaging earlier versions, and that deeply admires
Machiavelli's shrewdness and originality.
Harvey Mansfield, refining the labors of Leo Strauss, is wary of the back-
lash of writers who offer apologies and excuses for Machiavelli, who force the
Florentine into the mold of a liberal humanist by whitewashing his wickedness,
and highlighting his patriotism and invocation of the common good.
Although Machiavelli's difficulty [with the notion of evil] can be sensed by
anyone of ordinary moral experience, it is obscured by scholars who make ex-
cuses for Machiavelli, conceal the wickedness of his advice and thus blindly
rob him of the glory he claimed for having begun the scholarly practice of mak-
ing such excuses. To excuse Machiavelli is to dismiss not only every popular
but also every interesting sense of the word "Ma~hiavellian."~

Mansfield, probing Machiavelli's silences, indirect discourse, and relentless

humor, aspires to invigorate the bad boy in Machiavelli as a means of unsettling
the comfort of scholars whose interpretations have domesticated him and of re-
instating the anxiety readers should feel when they experience him. Mansfield
assumes a basic unity in Machiavelli's writing, although he concedes that Ma-
chiavelli uses different rhetorical modes when addressing distinct audiences.
Machiavelli's concern is not uniquely with Florence or Italy. He is a founder of
modernity because his concern is with mankind generally, he shuns the certi-
tudes and dogmas of Christianity, he replaces moral virtue with secular self-
interest, he anticipates the theoretical distinction between facts and values, he
aspires to soften the hold of classical rhetoric, he amplifies the glory of military
virtir, he scoffs at the courtesies of the Renaissance gentleman, and he prefigures
the political theory of the modems. The Prince, in Mansfield's view, is "the first
and the best book to argue that politics has and should have its own rules and
should not accept rules of any kind fkom any source where the object is not to
win or prevail over other^."^ Machiavelli makes himself a prince by composing
texts that influence, even rule over, generations of political theorists. According
to Mansfield, Machiavelli "wants to defend 'the world' against those who have
caused it to become weak. Since he cannot rule directly, he will be the master-
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 65

mind behind the operation, mastering future generations through his mind."'
Yes, he is a teacher of evil who venerates personal glory and political power
grounded in cruelty and autocracy. Machiavelli's alleged commitment to repub-
licanism is exaggerated. He is more interested in showing princes the techniques
for their own aggrandizement. The Prince is a summary of The Discourses for
potential military and political rulers. The Discourses, rather than being a paean
to republicanism, reveal that collective political action-grounded in military
aggression and expansion-is required for sustaining the private realm of family
and the prerogatives of rulers.
Mansfield's view that Machiavelli is a citizen of the world coalesces un-
easily with the Florentine's undeniable patriotism and his contention that the
world is a zero-sum contest such that one political unit's victory and glory must
come at the expense of another's defeat and humiliation. Could Machiavelli be
indifferent to who wins and loses? Granted, as Mansfield points out, no antece-
dently chosen people or superior ethnicity is present. But as a contingent matter,
Machiavelli is a Florentine with some special level of commitment to the Italian
peninsula. He is not quite the citizen of the world that Mansfield supposes any-
more than a pitcher on the roster of the Cleveland Indians is simply a ballplayer
hoping to view an interesting baseball season. Antecedently, the Indians had no
call on his allegiance, but once on their roster he is no longer a spectator but a
participant in a series of competitive, zero-sum events. The same pertains to
Machiavelli.
Perceiving Machiavelli as a founder of modernity must be tempered by the
Florentine's numerous markings as a man of his age. For example, he took seri-
ously the power of divination, augury, superstition, astrology, and Fortuna as a
vortex of natural forces and random events (P 25; D I 14; D 1 56; D 11 2; D I1 29;
D I1 30; D I11 19;D 111 3 1; D 111 37). Reading Machiavelli's musings on such
matters may well give readers the impression that belief in the power of the
malocchio (evil eye) would amount to epistemological progress.6 Mansfield also
bestows much credit upon Machiavelli's clairvoyance. His alleged scheme to
"mastermind" future generations would be beyond bold given that his works
were published only after his death, at which point he was hardly at the zenith of
popularity and influence.
Mansfield's project of preserving Machiavelli's pizzazz is admirable and
his indictment of interpreters who reduce Machiavelli to a liberal humanist
blandly endorsing the pieties of self-government is telling. But those choices-
Machiavelli as a refiner of evil or Machiavelli as Abe Lincoln lite--do not de-
fine the terms of the debate. In this chapter, several other possibilities emerge.
More important, one of the purposes of this book is to resuscitate Machiavelli's
flair and passion in the context of certain conundrums in moral philosophy.
Tasty irony, that. In so doing, a fuller examination of the extent of Machiavelli's
wickedness will surface.
66 Chapter Three

The Prince Is an Esoteric Work

Some interpreters argue that The Prince is an esoteric work not meant for a mass
audience: its counsel was intended to reach only a few Italian ears in a specific
time. On this view, The Prince was not a general handbook for princely success,
but intended only for a particular time and its specific circumstances. The condi-
tion of Italy in the early sixteenth century was the setting, the newly established
Medici connection in Rome and Florence was the audience. Thus, Laurence
Burd argues:

To understand The Prince aright, it is not only necessary to go back to Machia-

velli's age; the book must also be restored to Machiavelli's country. The Prince
was never meant except for Italians, and Italians too of a given period; indeed,
we may go further, and ask whether it was ever intended even for all ~talians.'

The major Italian city-states were ferociously independent and quarrelsome

at a time when France and Spain were prospering from their respective consoli-
dations. The disunity of the Italians, according to Burd, led to two crucial conse-
quences. First, the role of the individual was amplified: "When a government
was revolutionized, the change was ascribed to the influence or ability or force
of one man; and it is true that in many cases the individual was indeed the im-
pelling force of a revol~tion."~ Machiavelli, as evidenced in the final chapter of
The Prince, shared the conviction of his age and exaggerated the power of a
single person to mold national history. Ambitious individuals and class conflict,
along with the self-serving machinations of the Church, fueled the instability of
Italy. Second, a general distrust, animated by observing a corrupt Church and
the crumbling of moral and civic virtir, was pervasive: "the perpetual necessity
of watching themselves or their neighbors produced among the political rings
that governed Italy a sense of mutual distrust; they were very zealous for their
parochial fatherland: they were prepared to go to all lengths in its defense; but
they dared not arm their own citizens, who might be made the instrument of
conspiracy.yy9
Under such conditions-foreign dominators flexing their military might, a
vague sense of the need for Italian unification tempered by suffocating mutual
distrust and the conniving of ambitious power mongers-the advice of The
Prince gains currency. The strength of the lion and the shrewdness of the fox
must be conjoined in a single man of abundant political and military virtir to
unite Italy gradually through might and cunning. To apply Machiavelli's politi-
cal principles to other situations at other times is to distort their meaning. As
general guidelines his principles betray morality and will not attain their aims,
but that is not an indictment of Machiavelli's advice; it is, instead, a function of
our own misreading of his purpose and the intended scope of the work.
While this interpretation earns initial plausibility-anticipating a mass audi-
ence for The Prince would certainly have been presumptuous and Machiavelli's
emotional intensity does sometimes overwhelm his intellectual perspective when
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 67

he entertains possibilities for the unification of Italy and the influence one great
man could have in effectuating the event-it ignores several foundational
themes in his work. Several of these themes coalesce uneasily with the view that
the political advice in The Prince is restricted to one time and place: That the
world has been and will always be a zero-sum contest; that human nature is un-
changing; that the overall amount of virtic is constant, but the amount in particu-
lar countries varies through time; that history repeats itself; and that political
conclusions can be derived from the past, particularly from events in ancient
Rome. Whether taken as general principles the counsel in The Prince "runs
counter to all commonly accepted canons of morality and . . . [is] hopelessly
fallacious and inadequate'"' may or may not be true. But if true it does not
amount to substantial evidence that Machiavelli wrote The Prince merely as a
handbook for the situation at that time. If that was his aim, moreover, we would
expect more explicit references to that cause beyond the emotional finale.
The Prince-is-an-esoteric-work interpretation starts from the perspective
that Machiavelli's political advice is immoral and ineffective. To redeem the
significance of the work, it contextualizes The Prince to its specific time and
place. Unfortunately, doing so ignores the scope of Machiavelli's aspirations
and misconstrues the implications of some of his most cherished conceptual
building blocks.

The Prince Is a Scientific Work

Some argue that Machiavelli's work is historical and scientific. He did not write
only for Italy or Florence. He did not write only for his time. Instead, he aspired
to record his observations, experiences, and the general political principles that
could be derived therefrom. Machiavelli did not compose The Prince in order to
solve a particular problem-reforming a corrupt Florence or uniting a chaotic
Italy-but to systematically reveal guidelines for successful statecraft. On this
view, Machiavelli is obsessed by the zero-sum contest of international military
and political affairs. This fascination, not the success of this or that political
player, energizes his work. The Prince, like a treatise on organic chemistry, is
neither moral nor immoral. Machiavelli is not advocating or denigrating moral-
ity; he is merely describing what is and is not effective in attaining certain gen-
erally desired political goals.
In the words of Ernst Cassirer:

All [Machiavelli's] counsels are "hypothetical imperatives," or to put it in the

words of Kant, "imperatives of skill." Here, says Kant, "there is no question
whether the end is rational and good, but only what one must do in order to at-
tain it. . . . To be sure [Machiavelli]had his personal feelings, his political ide-
als, his national aspirations. But he did not allow these things to affect his po-
litical judgment. His judgment was that of a scientist and a technician of
political life.""
68 Chapter Three

Machiavelli, then, is rendering advice to any leader, virtuous or evil, who

participates in international affairs. His advice is the same for all such power-
seekers. Unlike Plato, he does not search for universal, theoretical principles
based on logic and morality. Instead, Machiavelli reveals what is effective given
the world as it is and has always been. At the core of his political science is his
view of human nature. Leonard Olschki observes:
Machiavelli had a more consistent and refined scientific instinct than Leonardo
[da Vinci] because his whole philosophy was based on axiomatic assumptions
which made his system of thoughts and facts possible and consistent. He be-
lieved that human nature was always and everywhere the same and that the real
sense of history can be understood because . . . men . . . never had changed
their motion, order, and power.'2

In sum, whatever one wants to say about Machiavelli's other political, his-
torical, literary, and comedic works, The Prince should be taken seriously as a
handbook for political success. Given the hypothetical imperative that some
leaders will embrace-worldly political success-The Prince offers the methods
and techniques to attain it. Machiavelli perceived a world of incompetent, inef-
fective power seekers who bungled, stumbled, and mumbled. His higher values
were efficiency, effectiveness, rhetorical skill, and cognitive excellence. Thus,
Norman Wilde writes:
Machiavelli was not a man of enthusiasms. The motives that moved him were
neither personal ambition alone nor a pure love of the public welfare, but rather
a hatred of bungling and a contempt for half-measures that meant inefficiency.
His was an intellectual rather than a moral passion, an interest in political effec-
tiveness rather than a sympathy with the results to be produced . . . it was as a
contribution to the science of political efficiency that he offered the principles
drawn from history and his own experience."

This interpretation has a plausible foundation. Machiavelli's method was

empirical: he offered historical examples and anecdotes for virtually every piece
of advice he advanced. Advocates can point to textual evidence that he was not
merely preoccupied with Italian interests. For example, in one chapter of The
Prince, Machiavelli seems to analyze at length the six errors French king Louis
XI1 made in his invasion of Italy. But for such mistakes, Machiavelli concludes,
Louis XI1 could have succeeded (P 3). Moreover, Machiavelli's tone is gener-
ally cool and detached. When discussing normative matters, he almost always
describes what he takes to be the state of the world and concocts a recipe for
success-as defined by attaining a political goal.
But if Machiavelli was a scientist, he was an especially sloppy researcher.
He was far fiom objective. He chooses his historical illustrations and anecdotes
carefully, selecting only those that support his foregone convictions. He is not
above falsifying historical accounts if doing so supports his conclusions better
than the actual events. His adoration of the Roman republic as the source of
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 69

most historical truth does not mirror a dispassionate scientific perspective. These
charges are not the smug, anachronistic conclusions of twenty-fust century crit-
ics. These allegations and more were levied against Machiavelli by Francesco
Guicciardini, one of his contemporaries and best friends (see chapter 5).
Further, the interpretation in question is hard put to make sense of the final
chapter of The Prince. This chapter varies radically in tone, style, and passion
from the rest of the work. Even if it was added later to the main text, it was
added. Perhaps it is an afterthought to help lure the Medici into hiring Machia-
velli as an advisor. But is it likely that the author of that chapter did not really
care who won the zero-sum contest that constituted international affairs?
Certainly, Machiavelli hoped to have practical effects in the world, not
merely chronicle an abstract political theory. Chapter 3 of The Prince should not
be taken as advice to the king of France. Was he sent a copy of the text? Was
there any reasonable probability that he would read it? It may well be advice on
some of the things the regional states of Italy must do to avoid continued foreign
domination. Aware of what might bring about his fall, a wise prince would initi-
ate proactive measures. Machiavelli is not telling foreigners specific ways to
capture Italy in the spirit of dispassionate statecraft. Instead, he may well be
informing the prince on how to unite Italy by avoiding the serious errors com-
mitted by Louis XI1 and Cesare Borgia. Perhaps an Italy united, either temporar-
ily or as a permanent federation, could then even attack France.
Machiavelli's "enthusiasms," "personal feelings," "political ideals," and
"national aspirations" intruded on his political judgment frequently. If part of his
enterprise was founding a political science modeled on the techniques of the
natural sciences, he failed dismally. It does not follow that he lacked scientific
aspirations, only that The Prince is much more than a technical treatise and as a
technical treatise it is inadequate.

The Prince Is a Nationalistic Call to Arms

Readers are puzzled by Machiavelli's apparent celebration of principalities in
his best known text when contrasted to the clear preference for republican gov-
ernments he demonstrates in his other work and own life. The emotional final
chapter of The Prince also is in sharp divergence with the prose and texture of
the rest of the test.
These, and other, interpretive riddles are thought by some scholars to be re-
solved by understanding Machiavelli as a fervent Italian patriot who aspires to
unveil a blueprint for Italian unification. This reading of Machiavelli gained
momentum in the middle and late nineteenth century, during and after the period
of the Italian Risorgimento. In that vein, Pasquale Villari (1827-1917) wrote:
"Machiavelli proceeds to draw his conclusions, then at last the practical side and
real aim of [The Prince] are clearly seen. It is a question of achieving the unity
of his Italian motherland and of delivering it from foreign rule. This was cer-
tainly the holiest of object^."'^ Francesco De Sanctis (1817-1883) adds: "Let us
70 Chapter Three
therefore be proud of our Machiavelli . . . the bells are ringing throughout the
land announcing the entry of the Italians into Rome. The temporal power is fal-
ling. The shout arises, 'Long live Italian unity!' 'Glory to Machiavelli.' "I5
On this view, The Prince is precisely what it presents itself to be: a manual
for princely success. But that success is qualified. The new ruler should use his
power to reform a corrupt, weak state as preparation for the emergence or return
of a healthy, expansionist republic. The manipulative, conniving, forceful meas-
ures of the prince--exercising the subtle wiles of the fox and the frightening
domination of the lion-are the prerequisites for the vigorous republic Machia-
velli mythologizes in The Discourses. Moreover, the prince's overarching goal
is to make himself, or at least render the scope of his authority, obsolete. The
Prince, then, is the beginning but not the end of Machiavelli's heroic account of
political triumph.
According to the Machiavelli-as-patriot interpretation, The Prince is a man-
ual for unification in an unsettled context. Once the monarch attains national
unity, promotes the common good, and nurtures a strong national character, his
power should be dispersed. Once the conditions required for a sound republic
are in place, the advice of The Discourses should prevail. Many supposed differ-
ences between The Prince and The Discourses can be reconciled once we under-
stand that The Prince was written as a battle plan for one situation, reforming a
corrupt state and unifying Italy, while The Discourses was a general account of
Machiavelli's political philosophy and showed his appreciation for popular
forms of govenunent in those countries enjoying favorable conditions.
In Machiavelli's judgment, the five loose-knit regions of Italy were in a dire
predicament in the early sixteenth century. They could either remain disunified
and provide easy targets for invading barbarians or they could follow the leader-
ship of a strong man, rise above factional bickering, and unite for the greater
good: Either continued victimization or unification. In The Prince, Machiavelli
argues that the regionalized people of Italy were generally corrupt-they lacked
civic virtir-so the monarch would sometimes be forced to use fkaud and coer-
cion to unify the nation, invigorate citizens, and fend off external aggressors.
Sounds peculiar, does it not? The cure for corruptness is fkaud and coercion?
What Machiavelli meant was that the prince, while governing, should not al-
ways abide by the standards of conventional private morality. If certain inher-
ently evil practices had to be used, that should be thought of as "evil well-used"
because they flow from necessity: external forces, antecedent events, compelling
circumstances. Necessity will often compel the ruler to commit deeds that are
correctly judged immoral when performed outside the political arena: miserli-
ness, cruelty, deceit, and promise-breaking are often preferable, politically, to
liberality, mercy, honesty, and promise-keeping. The purpose, though, of the
prince's strategies is unequivocal: He maximizes his prospects of earning endur-
ing glory by imposing order and security, and beginning the reformation of his
corrupt citizens and subjects.
Machiavelli was convinced that only an absolute monarch can transform a
corrupt society. In his judgment, civic virtir in Italy had disintegrated and this
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 71

made a popular republic impossible. Virtic could only be spawned through

proper laws, training, and education. The corrupt, fiagrnented state cannot reha-
bilitate itself. Instead, an omnipotent lawgiver must mold it by crafting a pure
social foundation based on strong arms and sound laws. The strong nation-state
prevents foreign intrusions, and eventually helps citizens rise above selfish indi-
vidualism, establishes communal bonds, increases the material and spiritual
quality of life, and cultivates personal and national virtir.
In The Discourses, Machiavelli praises republicanism. The only thing that
underwrote the prince and his actions was the supreme importance of achieving
national unity. Once this goal is attained and the nation solidified, the scope of
the prince's power is contracted and a mixed government arises. Having guided
the newly created nation-state from conditions of weakness to a condition of
strength, the prince has made autocracy obsolete. Virtic is then best secured
through republicanism. A Machiavellian republic has a system of checks and
balances much like those that existed among the consuls, senate, and plebeians
in the ancient Roman republic.
This interpretation can muster considerable textual support. First, Machia-
velli consistently argues, beyond what he says in The Prince, that the military
and political virtic of a single leader is crucial for founding a new regime or re-
forming a corrupt state (D I 9; D I 17; D I 18; D 111 1). Machiavelli recurrently
a f f m s his conviction that an autocratic leader, who often employs force and
fiaud to secure his ends, is a critical stage in the development of a healthy state.
Second, this interpretation makes sense of the emotional final chapter of
The Prince. The stirring call to arms is nothing more than a summary of the
main point of the work: to rally support for the unification and redemption of
Italy. The earlier chapters of the book were the methods required to begin re-
forming a corrupt, newly conquered territory. The final chapter is the overarch-
ing purpose of that quest.
Third, this view reconciles Machiavelli's fascination with principalities in
The Prince with his undeniable preference for republicanism elsewhere. The
Prince is a necessary stage of development for new or corrupt territories not yet
prepared for self-government. Moreover, advocates of this view can point to
textual support in The Discourses for Machiavelli's position that although re-
publican rule is generally best, not all states have the prerequisites in place for
self-govenunent (D I 55).
Fourth, that Machiavelli was deeply patriotic is undeniable. His commit-
ment to public service, his love of country, his conviction that political activity
animated his soul, and his willingness to sacrifice for the public good resonate
throughout his life and saturate his private correspondence (Ltr. 224: 12/10/13;
Ltr. 270: 5/17/21; Ltr. 331: 4/16/27).
Fifth, this interpretation underscores why a republic should, when propi-
tious, replace a principality. Republics are more flexible than principalities,
more able to adapt to changing circumstances, better equipped to conquer new
territories, and, thus, more likely to endure (D I 29; D I1 2; D 11 4; D I1 6; D I1 9;
D I1 21; D 111 9; D 111 28). Given Machiavelli's overall political philosophy,
72 Chapter Three

concluding that a principality is sometimes a required stage in the process of

building a forceful republic is reasonable.
Sixth, this view can account for Machiavelli's desire to seek employment
with the Medici even though he was part of the former republican government
of Florence and, after that regime was ousted, he was suspected of participating
in an anti-Medici conspiracy and tortured thereafter. Machiavelli's job search is
not crass opportunism; instead, he sought political office in order to help a new
prince sow the cultural seeds that would eventually be reaped as the prerequi-
sites for a return to republicanism. Hopefully, Italian liberation would also re-
sult. Machiavellian, then, writes The Prince as one more instance of his relent-
less public service and devotion to his country.
Seventh, in addition to the final chapter of The Prince, advocates of this in-
terpretation can point to textual evidence in The Discourses that Machiavelli
aspired to a united Italy. There he indicts the Roman Catholic Church as the
perpetrator which has thwarted Italian solidarity:

No geographical region has ever been unified or happy if it has not been
brought under the political control of a single republic or ruler, as has happened
in France and Spain. And the only reason why Italy has not been unified as they
have been, the only reason why she does not have a republic or a prince who
has been able to acquire control of the whole territory, is the existence of the
church (D I 12).

The Machiavelli-as-patriot interpretation of The Prince, though, faces major

objections. The most daunting is the problem of the transition. Surely Machia-
velli did not suppose that a prince, after acquiring new territories and painstak-
ingly crafting the civic virtic of the populace through strong arms, sound laws,
and robust religion, would quietly release his power in deference to republican
rule? The more reasonable dynamic is that such a prince would luxuriate in his
power and privilege and, if anything, would strive for more of the same. The
prince's quest, after all, begins in private ambition coupled with the recognition
that tyranny does not issue in enduring glory. He must facilitate the common
good and promote civic virtic in order to develop a healthy, expansionist regime
able to compete vigorously in international military and political affairs. If he
efficiently and effectively advanced these goals, would he not reason that he
deserved to be honored and obeyed, not shunted aside for an experiment in self-
government?
One response by advocates of the Machiavelli-as-patriot interpretation is
that Machiavelli did expect the transition to go smoothly. For example, he
praises Romulus for establishing a senate and yielding most of his power to it,
reserving only the authority to command the army after war had been declared
and of convening the senate itself (D I 9). Here Machiavelli expresses his pref-
erence for a powerful prince to cede absolute control in deference to the com-
mon good.
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 73

This response is plausible, but would more likely be seen as an illustration

of Machiavelli's romanticism and cockeyed optimism. That Romulus is a
mythological figure underscores the point. A better response may be available,
however. The transition takes time. For a corrupt, impotent territory to blossom
into a robust state with the prerequisites for a successful, expansionist republic
would take a generation or more. All princes are mortal. The bane of good gov-
ernment has been hereditary rule. The death of an exemplary leader is followed
by the inept bungling of his vainglorious, dopey son (D I 2; D I 19). The transi-
tion from autocratic princely control to a self-governing republic should be
gradual. Throughout the prince's lifetime the prerequisites of republican rule are
nurtured through strong arms, sound laws, robust religion, and promotion of
civic virtir. Near or at the prince's death, transfer of power from the executive
ofice to the senate and the people should take place proportionate to the state's
readiness for self-government. The process could continue until a full-fledged
republic is in place. The animating impulse for the transition, as always, is self-
interest. The glory of the prince is amplified by the process, and a republic is
more flexible, more likely to expand, and more enduring than a principality.
Both the people and the prince thereby gain by an orderly transition. The prince,
especially, should understand all this given the cornerstones of his endeavors are
securing power to attain enduring glory. Near death, his earthly power is about
to evaporate, but the quest for lasting glory is still negotiable.
My response on behalf of the Machiavelli-as-patriot interpretation is far
from airtight, but it does offer a plausible chance that the transition from princi-
pality to republic can occur. Ancient Rome, Machiavelli's favorite historical
launching pad, made the transition. Why not sixteenth-century Florence or
Rome? Machiavelli does, however, place enormous importance on the value
military and political leaders bestow on their historical legacies. Is the quest for
enduring glory-which certainly animates Machiavelli's labors-truly para-
mount for men who embody military and political virtir?
This leads to a second objection confronted by this interpretation. Could
Machiavelli have truly thought that the unification of Italy was possible in the
sixteenth century? Remember, the unification of Italy, the Risorgimento, did not
occur until the middle and late nineteenth century. In the sixteenth century, the
regions and city-states of Italy were in such disarray and the military power of
foreign countries was so dominate that it would seem only a utopian of the most
gullible stripe could have taken the unification of Italy seriously.
Conditions in Italy were, indeed, dim at that time. The five principal re-
gions-Milan, Venice, Florence, the Roman Papacy, and the Kingdom of
Naples-treasured their independent power. Transitory alliances and coalitions
with foreign powers thwarted any region that threatened the balance of power.
Machiavelli bristled when chronicling the Church's dogged role in preventing
Italian unification (P 12; D I 12), but also saw it as a potentially powerful tool
for reformation. This potential was never actualized. Any strong, unified Italy
would prove a secular threat to the Church's near monopoly of authority. The
Church was indifferent, at best, and hostile, at worst, during the nineteenth cen-
74 Chapter Three

tury Risorgimento. When Machiavelli's works were published posthumously,

the Church immediately placed them on its index of forbidden reading. Still,
Machiavelli understood that the major political achievements in Europe were
being accomplished by strong princes with unified countries (D I 12). Given his
private correspondence, to conclude that Machiavelli was gravely pessimistic
that Italian unification would occur soon is reasonable. Yet, he harbored a
dream-that sometimes distorted his political vision--of an Italy freed from the
domination of foreign government and united, to some measure, in common
cause. When reflecting soberly on the chaos of his country and the machinations
of the Church, realism and pessimism enveloped him. When consulting his heart
and when overwhelmed by his overflowing ambizione, the dream seduced him.
He fantasized a movement, led by the Medici family in Florence or Rome,
guided by a politically savvy chief minister, Machiavelli himself, that would
leave an illustrious, indelible imprint on the pages of history.
The details of that dream, though, are hazy. A narrow reading, probably
most recommended, of the final chapter of The Prince, takes it to be a liberation
movement that casts aside the domination of foreign governments and armies (P
26). This would entail at least a temporary military alliance among the major
Italian regions, but not automatically a united Italy thereafter. If Machiavelli did
have a permanently united Italy in mind-and I suspect this was part of his
dream-it did not include the entire peninsula, but ended in the south with the
Papal States of Rome.
It is hardly to be supposed that Machiavelli contemplated anything so chimeri-
cal as the expulsion of Spain from its southern kingdom. Naples had always
been apart from Italy; its whole history was in complete contrast to that of the
rest of the peninsula; it had not been included in that Lombard kingdom whose
crown had been assumed by the medieval Emperors. The Italy which Machia-
velli dreamed of as united and free was bounded on the south by the States of
the church.16 (Emphasis added)

Nevertheless, a critic would object that the dynamic and tradition of pre-
serving the independent power of individual regions in Italy was too strong to
sustain even a dream of permanent unification. The self-interest of regional
power brokers and the self-image of vested aristocrats depended upon their in-
fluence within their domains. Italian unification entailed that regional preroga-
tives would yield to national priorities. Suppose Machiavelli, himself, had to
choose between either a united Italy headed by, say, Rome or the status quo with
a strong, independent Florence? Would "his country" not be deemed Florence?
The trajectory of Machiavellian politics, though, is toward a united Italy.
Suppose Florence or Rome, through the Medici power connection, became
strong enough to begin acquiring new territories. Remember, every robust prin-
cipality or republic has expansionist aspirations, according to Machiavelli (P 3;
D I1 2; D 11 4; D I1 6; D I1 9; D I1 21). Where are the most likely prospects for
expansion? Where did the ancient Romans fust expand? Not in South Afiica,
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 75

China, or the East Indies. Not in France or Spain, at least not in the beginning.
The vital expansionist state would, almost necessarily, start in Italy by bringing
less powerful regions under its domain. Perhaps, afier initial successes brought
larger, stronger armies with more experience and confidence, even those pesky
Spaniards could be dislodged from the Kingdom of Naples.
Granted, a grand canyon of difference separates (a) the regions of Italy vol-
untarily and freely uniting in common cause, and forming a nation-state once
and forever from (b) one strong region emerging and conquering the other areas.
In both cases the peninsula would be under one federal government, but the tone
and tempo would be much different.
My point, though, is that the debate about what type of unified Italy, if any,
Machiavelli imagined should be informed by his general political principles. I
would suppose that from his vantage point the most glorious climax would be a
united Italy, led by Florence with Machiavelli as chief consigliere, which could
begin expanding beyond Italy. The next best choice would be a united Italy, led
by Rome with Machiavelli as chief consigliere. In any case, with or without
Florence, Rome, or Machiavelli, the logic of Machiavelli's political principles
concluded that a united Italy was the natural result of the emergence of a strong
principality or republic on the peninsula. Contemporary political conditions,
regional traditions, and a hostile Church protective of its own privileges not-
withstanding, a version of Italian unification would eventually transpire. That
the blessed event would not occur until more than three hundred forty years afier
Machiavelli's death attests to the might of Fortuna.

The Prince Separates Politics from Morality

An influential interpretation of The Prince is most closely associated with
Benedetto Croce (1 866-1952). According to Croce, Machiavelli strove to sepa-
rate the moral sphere from the political domain. Conventional morality cannot
apply to political maneuverings, which are governed by strategic and prudential
prerogatives that elude moral evaluation.
Machiavelli discovered the necessity and the autonomy of politics, politics
which is beyond good and bad morals, which has its own laws against which it
is futile to rebel, which cannot be exorcised and banished from the world with
holy water."

Machiavelli's political prescriptions are not immoral because politics are

independent of moral assessment. Politics is public, morality is private, and this
autonomy is required for the proper functioning of social life. Conventional mo-
rality does not govern political affairs, and actions and policies operating on
different assumptions are doomed to disaster, at worst, or irrelevance, at best. As
Machiavelli observes, only if all men were good would this not be the case (P
76 Chapter Three

18). But as human nature is radically flawed, public responsibility and private
rectitude are distinct spheres of activity.
Croce's view is reflected in a more general interpretation of The Prince: that
the book is an exercise in realism; that Machiavelli's writing is purely descrip-
tive. True, he draws conclusions of what a prince should do given the conditions
of the world and of politics, but such prescriptions are prudential and strategic,
not moral. Machiavelli's methods are the means of his time, indeed all times,
and the only ones offering hope for political success. This . . .just in . . . politi-
cal leaders sometimes lie, connive, threaten, plot, coerce in order to attain their
ends and advance the interests of their polity! What is the source of the scandal?
Not even Plato, who insisted that virtue and knowledge must be joined in the
paradigm of the philosopher-king, would be surprised by such news. Plato
would bemoan the separation of morality from politics, but he would not deny
that as an empirical matter that division existed. Whereas Plato hoped to change
the world through his utopian vision, Machiavelli aspires to succeed politically
in the world as it is. Machiavelli is not championing the autonomy of politics
from morals nor is he delighted that the world is as it is. Instead, the successful
statesman will learn how to gain the competitive edge in a world not of his mak-
ing. His constituents deserve nothing less.
True, Machiavelli is also convinced that the world cannot be changed be-
cause of inherent defects in human nature, the zero-sum nature of international
affairs, and the natural scarcity of desired resources, but this, too, is a descrip-
tion of reality. Strong men will press forward to establish, preserve, and extend
their power: "The fust law of internal policy is to hold on to power, of external
policy it is to extend your imperialism."'8 Again, Machiavelli does not confer
moral blessings on these circumstances and events. He does not, as did Thrasy-
machus, conclude that "might makes right" and that conventional morality con-
sisted of guidelines in the interests of the strongest in society. Instead, for Ma-
chiavelli effective use of force and fraud translate to political success, which is
beyond moral assessment.
This interpretation at once liberates Machiavelli from charges of immorality
and honors him for sharply observing the political world and compiling a hand-
book for political success. Unfortunately, it overly simplifies Machiavelli's writ-
ings. First, although Machiavelli undoubtedly saw himself as a realist, his vision
was clouded. His convictions that the state of the world and of human nature are
fixed; that ambition and power-mongering are the key to understanding men;
that international affairs are by their very nature zero-sum contests; and that hu-
man motivation flows only from self-interest all betray his myopia. Second, that
Machiavelli separated politics from morality, although a popular mantra, is stone
cold false. Machiavelli subjected politics to moral assessment at numerous cru-
cial junctures and in subtle complex ways. Part of Machiavelli's innovation and
genius resides in his intuitive feel for the nuanced ways morality intrudes on
politics, and for the inner tensions simmering within conventional morality it-
self. Although Machiavelli rarely addresses such matters explicitly, they implic-
itly underwrite many of his major themes. To begin to understand these connec-
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 77

tions, we must examine the challenging interpretation of Machiavelli's work that

concludes that at the heart of The Prince is a clash of two incompatible value
systems: conventional (Christian) morality and pagan (ancient Roman) morality.

The Prince Is a Clash of Value Systems

Giuseppe Prezzolini offers a subtle, challenging interpretation of The Prince.
Machiavelli does not separate politics from morality, only from a certain version
of Christian morality. Machiavelli weds politics to a pagan morality that places
state interests above all religion and honors only those religions that render the
masses "loyal and governable."'9 Prezzolini frnds the origins of Machiavelli's
position in a pessimistic Christianity best exemplified by St. Augustine. The
great theologian bifurcated the City of God from the City of Man as two distinct
ways of life. Damned by original sin, human beings could not legitimately hope
to attain justice and moral goodness in worldly, political communities. The state
ministers to those who are morally deficient. Only if all people abided by Chris-
tian morality would the state be unnecessary. But people do not. Only in the
afterlife will perfect justice be realized. Earthly governments, then, will always
transgress against moral law. St. Augustine foreshadowed Machiavelli's notion
that to succeed politically leaders must often cast aside conventional morality.
St. Augustine's position itself is prefigured in the Bible where Jesus advises
Pontius Pilate that "My kingdom is not of this world" (John 18:36).
Isaiah Berlin echoes Prezzolini's view, but erases the references to pessi-
mistic Christianity. The Prince, says Berlin, details a clash of two value systems:
a pagan (Roman) ethic and the conventional, Christian morality. Instead of con-
ceiving Machiavelli as positing two autonomous guiding-action realms, the
moral and political, Berlin sees the conflict in Machiavelli waged within moral-
ity itself. Machiavelli, then, is not advocating the separation of politics from
ethics, but only the marriage of politics to a morality different from the conven-
tional, Christian version.

[Machiavelli plants] a permanent question mark in the path of posterity. It

stems from his de facto recognition that ends equally ultimate, equally sacred,
may contradict each other, that entire systems of value may come into collision
without possibility of rational arbitration, and that not merely in exceptional
circumstances, as a result of abnormality or accident or error . . . but (this was
surely new) as part of the normal human situation.20

The pagan or Roman morality embodies goals as ultimate and legitimate as

those celebrated by Christianity. Christianity treasures faith, hope, charity, love,
mercy, adoration of God, forgiveness of transgressions by enemies, selflessness,
compassion for others, redemption of the soul, suspicion of worldly goods, and
focus on earning a blissful afterlife. This, for Machiavelli, is an ethic for private
people seeking transcendent salvation. Roman religion stressed the establish-
78 Chapter Three

ment, preservation, and expansion of a well-ordered social whole. This required

men of character: "inner moral strength, magnanimity, vigor, vitality, generos-
ity, loyalty, above all public spirit, civic sense, dedication to the security, power,
glory, expansion of the patria."21 Through glittering displays, bloody sacrifices,
sound laws, and carefully defined education, the Romans sanctified pagan vir-
tues: "Power, magnificence, pride, austerity, pursuit of glory, vigor, discipline
. . . this is what makes states great."22This, for Machiavelli, is an ethic for lead-
ers in public roles striving for personal (worldly) glory and the founding, re-
forming, or preservation of a healthy, expansionist polity. Such social ends, Ma-
chiavelli insists, are natural and prudent for men to pursue.
To wholeheartedly welcome Christian morality is to consign oneself to po-
litical fecklessness. To uncompromisingly embrace Roman morality is to risk
losing one's soul. Machiavelli notes that Christianity, instead of being miscon-
strued in the spirit of ozio, could have been designed in ways that facilitated
military and political virtii (D I1 2; D I 12). Unfortunately, the corrupt Church of
Rome molded spiritual doctrine in unpatriotic, efeminato ways. While Machia-
velli does not condemn conventional morality, he advises public officials to
learn how not to be good (in the Christian sense) and, instead, cultivate the craft
of the fox and the intimidation of the lion (P 15; P 18).
For Machiavelli, the importance of Rome as an example largely flows fiom
the extent and duration of its power, that Rome could have influenced so many
peoples for so long a time makes it the supreme case of collective civic virtii.
Through his study of ancient Rome, Machiavelli found support for his instinc-
tive personal values: passion for competition, zest for honor, yearning for com-
munity, and distrust of other states. The Romans recognized no difference be-
tween moral excellence and reputation; praise was what every citizen most
desired; to place personal honor above the interests of the entire community was
considered barbaric; citizens were educated to harness their ambition in service
to the common good, although in their relations with other states and stranieri,
no such limitations constricted their competitive instincts.23
Machiavelli also found ballast for his convictions that the quest for virth
was a zero-sum competition that required valiant combatants taught through
proper laws, family values, and military and political contests.

Ruthless competition was regarded as the basis of all civic virtue. . . . Hardness
was a Roman ideal. The steel required to hunt out glory or endure disaster was
a defining mark of a citizen. It was instilled in him from the moment of his
birth. . . . To raise heirs successfilly, to instill in them due pride in their blood-
line and hankering after glory, these were achievements worthy of a man. . . .
"Gain cannot be made without loss to someone else." So every Roman took for
granted.24

Men, then, have two choices. Those entering public life cannot effectively
be responsible for the lives and security of their constituents while obeying the
imperatives of Christian morality. Those who do choose to diligently follow
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 79

those commandments should focus on their personal salvation, but refrain from
military and political leadership. Berlin is clear: "This is not a division of poli-
tics from ethics. It is the uncovering of the possibility of more than one system
of values, with no criterion common to the systems whereby a rational choice
can be made between them . . . men choose either a ood, virtuous private life,
or a good, successful social existence, but not both." f Accordingly, for Berlin,
'
Machiavelli's originality consists in his evisceration of a foundational tenet of
Western philosophy: the conviction that all genuine values are ultimately com-
patible.
Berlin does not allege that Machiavelli's conscious intention was to chal-
lenge the moral thinking of Western philosophy. On the contrary, Machiavelli's
purposes were practical: to have an effect on the political world and to hang out
an advertisement for employment. But a careful reading of this work leads Ber-
lin to conclude that he has identified a hitherto ignored source of Machiavelli's
innovative thinking. The incommensurability of two, clashing, internally legiti-
mate moral systems is the fuel that implicitly drives Machiavelli's writings.
The Prezzolini-Berlin interpretation is insightful: Contrary to popular judg-
ment, Machiavelli does not divorce politics from morality. Still, this interpreta-
tion is too clean and tidy. The relationship of conventional morality to Machia-
vellian politics is more complicated than they suppose.
Political leaders must follow conventional (Christian) morality if they can,
but must be prepared to do wrong if necessary (P 18). Politics, then, is not sim-
ply divorced from conventional morality. Complying with the imperatives of
conventional morality remains the default position. More important, conven-
tional morality continues to evaluate political actions. To call evil "well used" is
to highlight the necessity of cruel measures but also to underscore that those
means remain "evil"-as judged by conventional morality (P 8). When the
masses judge only by results they stray from the principles of conventional mo-
rality and from the guidelines for wise assessment of political efforts (P 18; P
25; AW I 29-32; D I11 35; D I 9; D I 53). In fact, Machiavelli's political pro-
gram is required primarily because of a breakdown in conventional morality and
a weakness of human nature. If all human beings obeyed conventional morality,
Machiavelli explicitly recognizes that his advice to political leaders would be
woefully inadequate (P 18). The pagan (ancient Roman) morality of The Prince
is required because of the failure of conventional morality, probably because of
defects in human nature itself, to command strict allegiance. Moreover, Machia-
velli disparages tyranny: politics are conducted morally when directed toward
the common good, not when pursued only for selfish advantage (P 8; D I 10; D I
17; D I 29; D I 34; D 1 17). When certain means are "excused" because of the
critical importance of the ends they attain, the excuse is rendered from the per-
spective of conventional morality (P 18; D I 9). That harsh means are only ex-
cused and that they remain "evil" even if well-used implies that the wrongness
of the actions persists for Machiavelli even though the actions were warranted.
This can be a judgment only from the perspective of conventional morality. Pa-
gan morality, presumably, would have no reason to excuse or to label as "evil"
80 Chapter Three

what it would take to be perfectly reasonable and acceptable measures to secure

its ends.
The strictures of conventional morality must also underwrite the sound laws
and disciplined education required to nourish the moral and civic virtir of the
masses. The imperatives of ancient Roman morality are needed to promote the
military and political virtir of government leaders. Moreover, ancient Roman
morality, or something akin to it, is required to establish the order, security, and
framework that make conventional morality possible.
Machiavelli requires, it would seem, a reformation of religion, which he
takes to be the foundation of all moralities. He accepts conventional morality
and understands his society cannot simply turn back the clock and act as if
Christianity never occurred. They cannot merrily trip back to the era of the Ro-
man republic, accepting its religions and superstitions as their own while erasing
the history of Christianity. He recognizes that Christianity is not inherently in-
compatible with a robust religion that could advance state interests (D I1 2; D I
12). He is, of course, not betting his farm in San Casciano that the Church in
Rome will step lively in making the required reforms in its approach. The
Church had its own secular, not merely religious, power and prerogatives to
preserve. (For example, the Church fought strenuously for centuries to retain
Latin, not Italian, as the official language of the peninsula, a strategy designed to
retain a source of its ideological hegemony.)
In sum, the relationship of Machiavellian politics to morality is more com-
plex than the Prezzolini-Berlin interpretation suggests because (a) Machiavelli
accepts absolute principles of conventional morality-principles that are abso-
lute not in the sense that they cannot be legitimately overridden, but because
violations of these principles retain an element of wrongness even if justified or
excused (see chapter 5); (b) Machiavelli keenly appreciates the particular duties
of public ofice-the extra responsibilities, the imperative to advance the inter-
ests of constituents over those of foreigners, and the need to advance the collec-
tive interest embodied by the state; and (c) Machiavelli underscores the necessi-
ties of international affairs-the intrusions of Fortuna, the zero-sum nature of
the contest, the deficiencies of human nature, and the natural scarcity of re-
sources. Machiavelli does not merely argue that Roman (pagan) morality over-
sees politics, while conventional (Christian) morality governs private life.
The life of a political leader is lived in tensions among the three competing
vectors sketched in the previous paragraph. It is not as if such a leader merely
casts off the cloak of conventional morality when he enters his ofice or job
quarters, and adorns himself in the liberating dress of a Roman pagan. Such ac-
tion would increase the likelihood of his degenerating into a tyrant or an official
who used cruel measures when they were not required. Machiavelli never ex-
plores the interior life of his imaginary prince or those of his historical princes,
most of whom are merely mythical anyway. To say that Machiavelli's political
leaders, if proper to their posts, would suffer existential angst seems a legitimate
inference. But Machiavelli never says that or even touches on the possibility.
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 81

Perhaps the implications of the meanderings of his argument eluded him. Per-
haps he never clearly recognized his own internal conflicts.
The competing moral and political vectors pressing down upon a Machia-
vellian ruler are deep, dark, and dense. Their conflicting demands cannot be
simultaneously fulfilled. Comedian Me1 Brooks famously remarked about mon-
archical privileges, "It's good to be the king!" A contemporary interpreter of
Machiavelli might rejoin, "It's not easy to be a wise prince."

The Prince Is the Product of Existential Crisis

Italian novelist, Alberto Moravia (1907-1990) offers a relatively obscure, but
uncommonly insighthl, take on The Prince. Moravia views Machiavelli as sin-
cere, candid, and open. In short, Machiavelli was not by character or disposition
"Machiavellian." "Machiavellianism," the code of force and fraud in statecraft,
has existed and will continue to flourish as long as human beings are present.
Machiavelli "discovered its scattered fra ments in history and put them together
in a single vigorous and terrible mold!"The Prince is the product of an unbal-
anced, passionate author in the midst of existential crisis. Machiavelli subjugates
all other values, sentiments and meaningfbl projects to politics. His prince has
nothing but the pursuit of a vaguely defined glory and a passion for politics that
is its means. For Moravia, the prince mirrors Machiavelli's own exhausted,
spiritually spent condition.

Accordingly for Machiavelli, so emotionally dried up and exhausted, worn out

and weakened, politics meant much more than a simple occupation and duty,
much more than an intellectual pastime; politics were the goad and a reason for
living-an artificial means of feeling morally alive. This desperate clinging to
political life, now that the moral and religious life was dead, explains first of all
the abstract thought in Machiavelli, which was not nourished by any deep ethi-
cal feeling; and it ex lains also the particular form Machiavelli had to adopt to
express his thought.2.p

Having risen and fallen in politics, having suffered the torments of the
strappado in response to suspicions that he was involved in political conspiracy,
Machiavelli yearned for freedom and republican rule. He bristled at his exile
from the political arena. Guglielmo Ferrero framed Machiavelli's mental an-
guish:

The Prince was the supreme humiliation of a chained Titan, a mendicant

prophet. We feel throughout its tormented pages the anguish of a frightfbl mor-
tification. There is a time in the life of every man when, in his struggle with his
fellow beings, he becomes inpatient and cries out that all men are beasts and
must be treated as beasts. But most men confine themselves to thought or
speech. Machiavelli relieved his feelings in a book.28
82 Chapter Three
A poignant letter to Machiavelli's friend Francesco Vettori details the trivia
of his typical day-hunting thrushes, quarrelling with merchants, trash-talking
during card and dice games played with local workers, navigating a rude, squab-
bling world-punctuated by his return home. He then enters his study, adorns
himself with royal garments, and reads-no converses-with ancient authors: "I
nourish myself on that food that alone is mine and for which I was born. . . . And
for four hours at a time I feel no boredom, I forget all my troubles, I do not
dread poverty, and I am not temfied by death." (Ltr. 224: 12/10/13)
Machiavelli, then, is trapped in a world of habit and routine leavened by di-
version. His most meaningful time is spent alone, conversing with classical au-
thors in search of political relevance. The elegance, lofty purposes, and dignity
of Machiavelli alone in his study contrast with the vulgar, coarse minutia of the
cafoni who surround him. Moravia insists that Machiavelli "needed to see him-
self unrecognized and underestimated in order filly to realize his own value."29
Machiavelli's moral exhaustion deprives him of the serene autonomy of the
truly liberated and triumphant spirit. Instead, he writes The Prince to stimulate
"the deadly weight of his apathy."30Under the weight of existential crisis, Ma-
chiavelli is neither normal nor balanced. His desire to serve the Medici betray
his desperation 'Yo escape drowning in apathy, indifference, in the boredom of a
life without passions or employment-this drives him to inflict mortal wounds
on himself, merely in order to feel that he is alive; to serve in order to have a
f~nction."~'The political science of The Prince is distorted, incomplete, and
disproportionate as Machiavelli's political passion turns back on itself to
heighten his feeling of being alive. The worldview, excesses and conflicts in The
Prince, then, mirror the antecedent psychological struggle occurring within its
author. Having distanced himself fiom religious and spiritual value, Machiavelli
inflates the technical and military prowess of the ancient Romans.
The first twenty-five chapters of The Prince are a "logical, rigorously in-
evitable, cruel outburst of Machiavelli's moral passion."32 The final chapter of
The Prince trumpets the call to expel foreign armies and reconstruct the home-
land. As the Machiavellian prince, in Moravia's view, has first destroyed the
culture, tradition, freedom, religion, and arts that mainly constitute the home-
land, reconstruction is appropriate. The final chapter is "the sigh for liberation
and redemption of a man who had been driven throughout the whole book to the
most remorseless and unbearable concl~sion."~~ Machiavelli-morally ex-
hausted yet unable to recognize his condition-writes The Prince, consciously
or not, to elevate himself out of indifference and to regain the sense that he is
alive. Unable to gain catharsis fiom religion or morality, he desperately grasps at
patriotism: "Machiavelli tried to manage the impossible transmutation of a vast
sum of negative values into one single positive value: the patria."34
Moravia's psychological reading of The Prince is, of course, speculative
and contestable. I am unconvinced that Machiavelli was truly disco~ectedfrom
moral and spiritual values, and hope to demonstrate those links in this work.
That Machiavelli wrote in order to feel alive and valuable is true, but not un-
usual. We all pursue our most treasured projects at least in part for those rea-
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 83

sons. That Machiavelli's primary passion was political can be refashioned to

praise him, not castigate his lack of other significant outlets for creativity. Had
Moravia attended to Machiavelli's obsession with virtir and disdain of ozio his
analysis would have been more refined and, perhaps, more measured. To call
Machiavelli's concern for politics an "artificial" means of feeling morally alive
is simply unfair. Moravia's reading of the messages in The Prince would have
benefited from Machiavelli's discussions of similar themes in The Discourses
and The Art of War.
For example, Machiavelli's dismal portrayal of human nature in The Prince
(P 7;P 8;P 15;P 17;P 18) is mirrored in The Discourses (DI 3;D I 4; D I 5; D
I 29;D I1 13;D 111 6). Although he concedes that people can be transformed by
a salutary republic-which presupposes the potential for goodness in human
nature-Machiavelli insists that only necessity can turn the trick (DI 3; D I11
12). Contra Ferrero, The Prince does not merely record Machiavelli's assess-
ment of human nature at the point of his deepest despondency; it reflects, as
does The Discourses, his considered judgment.
The power of Moravia's interpretation, in my view, is his insight that Ma-
chiavelli was struggling with the human condition, that he was undergoing exis-
tential crisis. A man of great expectations and undeniable talent was deeply con-
flicted about his place in a world that was, at best, indifferent and, at worst,
savage. Those tensions are reflected in his writing and in the, yes, moral intui-
tions that animate some of his major political themes.

The Prince Is a Satire

This interpretation has a long history and takes ingenious twists and turns. The
claim is that Machiavelli was a foe of tyranny and his purpose could not have
been to instruct power mongers, but to unmask their pretensions, reveal their
way of operating, and teach the multitude of their evil machinations. Machia-
velli was, under this view, an investigative reporter bent on exposing the ways
of tyranny in order to neutralize their efficacy. By mocking the fashions of au-
tocracy, under cover of refining them, Machiavelli was able to exemplify duplic-
ity for salutary purposes. First offered by a sixteenth century Italian jurist and
Oxford law professor, Alberico Gentili, and later echoed by renowned philoso-
phers such as Baruch Spinoza and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the position that The
Prince is a satire, not science, remains influential.
The evidence for this view is wide and deep. First, Machiavelli and his fam-
ily had a long history of commitment to republican rule that is mirrored in Ma-
chiavelli's other writings and in his correspondence with friends. Some writers,
in fact, claim that "The Prince contradicts everything else Machiavelli ever
wrote and everything we know about his life."35 Moreover, The Prince is dedi-
cated to Lorenzo de'Medici, scion of a long line of Florentine rulers opposed to
republican rule. Worse, the Medici, after ousting the republicans in 1512
through the military agency of the Holy League, were in charge when Machia-
84 Chapter Three

velli was tortured because he was thought to be involved in a conspiracy against

them. Garrett Mattingly states this point compellingly:

I suppose it is possible to imagine that a man who has seen his country en-
slaved, his life's work wrecked and his own career with it, and has, for good
measure, been tortured within an inch of his life should thereupon go home and
write a book intended to teach his enemies the proper way to maintain them-
selves, writing all the time, remember, with the passionless objectivity of a sci-
entist in a laboratory. . . . But it is a little difficult for the ordinary mind to com-
pass.36

Second, the hero of The Prince is Cesare Borgia. Rumors swirled about
Borgia in his own time and many interpreters are hard put to consider him a
suitable exemplar for emulation:

A Medici was being advised to emulate a foreigner, a Spaniard, a bastard, con-

victed, in the court of public opinion anyway, of fratricide, incest, and a long
line of abominable crimes, a man specially hated in Tuscany for treachery and
extortion and for the gross misconduct of his troops on neutral Florentine soil,
and a man, to boot, who as a prince had been a notorious and spectacular fail-
ure . . . we can scarcely believe that his commendation of the Borgia was seri-
ously meant.37

Further, Machiavelli in his historical poem, First Decennale and in his dis-
patches on official missions for the Florentine government, The Legations, often
casts Borgia in an unflattering light. By drawing the most offensive comparison
possible, the argument goes, Machiavelli intends to show readers the logical
consequence of princely employment of force and fraud.
Third, reading The Prince as satire leads to an understanding of chapter 26,
the famed exhortation to liberate Italy from the barbarians. Interpreters argue
that this plea is out of place, both rhetorically and practically, unless we take it
as "irony turned inward, the bitter mockery of misdirected optimism."38Neither
the time nor the players nor circumstances were ripe for an Italian liberation
movement. Surely, Machiavelli's emotional ending is no more than a taunt of
Medici weakness and, perhaps, his own past misguided fantasies.
The Prince-as-satire interpretation is challenging but unpersuasive. That
Machiavelli, despite a history of opposition to Medici rule and attachment to
republican regimes, sought employment under the Medici is beyond dispute
(Ltr. 224: 12/10/13). Although Mattingly's wonder at how Machiavelli could
seriously apply for a job with his apparent political enemies seems compelling at
first blush, a more careful examination of Machiavelli uncovers his reasons.
Machiavelli burned with political ambizione, he sought glory and a piece of im-
mortality won in the political arena. To stand by, to spectate, is to court ozio
(sloth). The idle man-separated from military and political struggle-embodies
muted will, a pacified spirit, and resigned soul. For someone such as Machia-
velli to be removed from the competitive arena is to be denied the spiritual nour-
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 85

ishment that animated a robustly meaningful life. Moreover, if hired as a con-

sigliere to the Medici he might well be able to serve his state, begin the process
of invigorating civic virtir, and facilitate the conditions of salutary expansionism.
Machiavelli's quest for employment does not flow from opportunism or cyni-
cism. Instead, his undeniable patriotism and commitment to a vigorous, com-
petitive life fuel his aspiration.
Machiavelli's choice of Cesare Borgia as the contemporary hero of The
Prince is difficult, but not impossible, to explain. The other heroes of the work
are either mythological or ancient: Brutus, Moses, Theseus, Romulus, and the
like. Machiavelli, who enjoyed mixing ancient history with contemporary
events, needed to present someone from his own time. But the city states of Italy
were a mess: dominated by foreign governments, manipulated into division by
the papacy, and too disorganized to promote moral and civic virtir among the
citizenry. The pool of plausible candidates was thin. Cesare Borgia, through a
combination of good fortune and military flair, attained a demonstrable measure
of success in a short time. True, once his papal father died and his own health
weakened, his period of fame and power evaporated. Machiavelli, though, was
clearly impressed by Borgia's moxie and panache (Ltr. 247: 1131/15). While he
later perceived frailties and overreaching, Borgia remained the best contempo-
rary example of numerous Machiavellian principles. Also, that Borgia was uni-
versally disparaged in his own time is an exaggeration.39
Moreover, Cesare Borgia's father, Rodrigo, became Pope Alexander VI in
1492 and greatly assisted his son's mercurial rise to military and political influ-
ence. By the time Machiavelli was composing The Prince, Giovanni de'Medici
had been elected Pope Leo X and his nephew, Lorenzo, was the leader of Flor-
ence. Prior to Lorenzo, his uncle, Giuliano deYMedici,was in power in Florence.
The parallels between the two families are clear. Machiavelli sends the message
that the familial connection that energized Cesare Borgia's power was in place
between the Medici. Given the pervasive authority of the Church in Italian po-
litical intrigues, Lorenzo, like Cesare earlier, was best situated to call upon
Rome for support. Whereas Cesare was done in, in Machiavelli's view, by bad
luck-his own frail health and the death of Pope Alexander VI-and one stun-
ningly bad exercise of judgment-allowing the election of Pope Julius 11-no
such daily double of doom seemed headed for Lorenzo de'Medici. Accordingly,
Cesare Borgia bore a special relationship that added to his significance as an
exemplary prince given the leader to whom The Prince was dedicated.
Mattingly oversells the extent to which Machiavelli's other writings expose
conflicting evaluations of Borgia. For example, The Legations, written during
the four month period in late 1502 and early 1503 during which Machiavelli
served as Florentine envoy to Borgia, extol Duke Valentine's greatness, reso-
luteness, prudence, courage, confidence and strength (Leg. 11.27; 1 1.40; 11.82;
11.95). Only at and after the duke makes his critical mistake-allowing the elec-
tion of longtime Borgia foe, Pope Julius 11--does Machiavelli point out Borgia's
errors. Machiavelli and numerous others foresaw that Pope Julius would be
unlikely to keep his promises to Borgia and shortly thereafter the short, thrilling
86 Chapter Three
ride of Duke Valentino would spiral disastrously downward (Leg. 13.18; 13.22;
13.26; 13.30; 13.35; 13.57). The Legations do underscore the conclusion that
readers should not take literally Machiavelli's observation that "Duke Valentino,
[is a man] whose deeds I should imitate on all occasions were I a new prince"
(Ltr. 247: 1/31/15). Surely this remark is sarcastic or exaggerated. Borgia did
not fall fiom power only because his father died and he himself became ill. Ce-
sare played the gabbiano when he allowed himself to be sweet talked by Julius
11. Not only did Machiavelli not approve of that deed, he foresaw its calamitous
result. Nevertheless, given the available choices, that in numerous, critical re-
spects no "better model [for a new prince] to imitate than Cesare Borgia" existed
remained reasonable (P 7).
Also, Machiavelli reiterated the princely qualities he cherished in his Life of
Castruccio Castracani. The point of this work was not to present an unbiased,
historically accurate account of Castracani, but to compose a fantasy-an early
version of a comic book featuring a superherHhat correlated with Machia-
velli's desiderata for military and political virtir. Machiavelli's Castracani is a
perfected Cesare Borgia. Yet the Life of Castruccio Castracani is not considered
a satire.
Those who argue that Machiavelli was trying to teach the multitude about
the evil ways of Renaissance politicians face yet another major roadblock. Ma-
chiavelli could have no expectation at the time that he wrote that The Prince
would be favored with mass distribution. Unlike today when advance literary
publicity lures brisk hardcover sales followed by paperback editions and movie
rights, Machiavelli's work received little or no immediate attention. The Prince
was not even published until after Machiavelli had died. As one commenter ob-
served:
If Machiavelli was not sincere when he wrote [The Prince], I should lose all
faith in the sincerity of any writer. And a man does not write deliberate camou-
flage to blind the eyes of osterity when he does not know that what he writes
will ever meet those eyes.4

Moreover, on the day in 1516 that Machiavelli offered The Prince at the
Medici palace in Florence, Lorenzo was also given a gift of several hunting
dogs. More fascinated by the hounds than Machiavelli's prose, Lorenzo never
read The ~ r i n c e . ~If' the intended recipient and the person to whom the work
was dedicated ignored it, any hope that The Prince would reach a mass contem-
porary audience would have been delusional.
That the stirring final chapter of The Prince chronicles Machiavelli's self-
mockery and his taunting of the Medici's impotence is one of several possible
renderings, and far from the most convincing. The passion for liberating Italy
&om foreign invaders is abiding in Machiavelli. Indeed, Dante and Petrarch pre-
figured Machiavelli's rabid patriotism. True, at the time he wrote, the practical
possibilities of that dream being realized were slim to none, and slim was termi-
nally ill. Machiavelli knew this. Still, political agenda are often underwritten by
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 87

lofty ideals and grand designs. The Machiavellian prince is not, contrary to
widespread opinion, obsessed only with securing personal power. Glory cannot
be attained by such tyranny (P 8). Aspiring princes must have purposes more
majestic than enslaving their people. Certainly, the creation of an expansionist
principality or republic, one capable of regenerating the moral and civic virtir of
citizens, depends on expunging Italy of foreign control. Even if that end was
fanciful at the time Machiavelli wrote, it remained part of his long-range vision.
More fundamentally, Machiavelli was not repulsed by princely rule. He
consistently argues that the military and political virtir of one man is required to
found or reform a city; he writes admiringly of numerous harsh measures such a
man must undertake; and he explicitly concludes that not all cities or regions are
prepared for republican rule, some embody the prerequisites suited only for
principalities (P 7; D I 9; D I 17; D I 18; D I11 1; D I 55). To argue that The
Prince is a satire assumes that Machiavelli advocates only republican govern-
ments and that he unequivocally opposed monarchies. His other writings do not
support that argument.
Finally, Garrett Mattingly himself came to reject the view that The Prince
was a satire. Apparently ignoring his own contribution to that interpretation,
Mattingly indicted eighteenth-century theorists for expounding the view:

The proposal that The Prince was conceived as a satire is the kind of anachro-
nism which only the eighteenth century could have perpetrated. Machiavelli
knew perfectly well that satires were compositions in verse . . . He would have
failed completely to understand the proposition that The Prince was a satire.42

In sum, The Prince-as-satire interpretation underplays Machiavelli's practi-

cal intention to affect the political world and overplays his inclinations to play
the jester.

The Prince Is a Subversive Work

A variant of The Prince-as-satire interpretation is a reading that takes Machia-
velli to have subversive intentions: to use the Medici by setting them up to fail
after advancing Machiavelli's own purposes. What could be more Machiavel-
lian! For example, The Prince itself demonstrates why princely failure, not suc-
cess, is the certain outcome. Machiavelli insists that human beings act fiom
habit and their fixed characters. At times, when Fortuna allows, temporary suc-
cess is attainable. Butfortuna is not fixed and circumstances will arise where the
inflexibility of human beings must signal their downfall (P 25). Machiavelli's
well known call to adaptability and shifting with the times is undermined by his
fm conviction that our actions flow from our immutable characters and fixed
dispositions. If true then The Prince is, at best, a chronicle of transitory glory.
We all must fail in the end. Accordingly, we cannot take seriously the main-
stream perception that The Prince is a manual on princely s u c ~ e s s ? ~
88 Chapter Three

Moreover, Machiavelli presents virtir as an animating force in his depiction

of military and political success. Yet, he applies the notion of virtir so haphaz-
ardly that it is worthless as a conceptual tool. For example, Machiavelli exalts
Borgia as a man of virtir, but takes Agathocles of Sicily to task for actions that
are indistinguishable (P 7; P 8). If one of his two main engines for glory is
flawed at its core, how can The Prince be taken seriously as a handbook on gov-
em~nent?~~
Also, Machiavelli's other animating concept is also problematic. Machia-
velli vacillates between seeing Fortuna as a controlling force that mocks human
aspirations and efforts, and insisting that some human beings-those embodying
virtir-have the capabilities of managing Fortuna effectively (P 7; P 13; P 25).
The fkagility of Machiavelli's most cherished conceptual linchpins-virtir and
F o r t u n e i s taken not just as a malady of logic but as revealing a cryptic mes-
sage: The Medici must fail but Machiavelli can gain.
In that same vein, Machiavelli advances a bleak picture of human nature in
The Prince, insisting, among other things, that men are untrustworthy. But he
then argues that what a successful prince needs most is a trusted consigliere (P
22; P 23). How can this be squared? Can a prince truly rely on clever, independ-
ent advisers bent on advancing their own interests? The prince may control the
powers of the lion, but intimate advisers make the prince vulnerable to the con-
niving~of the fox. The only consistent thread in The Prince is Machiavelli's
dogged commitment to using for his own ends those to whom he offers his ser-
vices ostensibly as a mere instrument. Machiavelli is a robust Machiavellian
after all!
In that vein, Stephen M. Fallon writes:

Machiavelli places himself in a position to outfox the master he ostensibly

serves. His aims in The Prince are threefold: to gain employment, to lure his
employer into the untenable position of the prince in the text, and to promote
Florentine expansion.4s

Machiavelli offers success to the prince who follows his advice, yet the
conclusions of his arguments implicitly demonstrate that failure must result. In
the early part of the work, careful readers detect three paramount obstacles the
Medici must confkont: they are new princes; they rule a former republic; and
they attained power through foreign armies and fortuna (P 3; P 6). But like all
gabbiani (gulls), the Medici, Machiavelli suspects, will believe only what com-
forts them. The tacit message-the stone cold truth-will fly by their trusting
eyes.
This interpretation tends to take a kernel of legitimate criticism and explode
it into a series of motivations that far outstrip the evidence. For example, while it
is true for Machiavelli that no man can always succeed and healthy governments
do not endure forever (P 25; D I11 9), it does not follow that The Prince is not a
manual for the only success available to princes or human beings in general.
Machiavelli said similar things about the need for flexibility in facing fortuna,
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 89

the fixed characters of human beings that resist change, and the transitory power
of even the grandest nations in The Discourses (D 111 9; D I1 pref.; D I 11). Does
it follow that The Discourses is not a manual for republican success, but, in-
stead, a ruse to bring down popular government? The problem arises from set-
ting too high a bar for success. For Machiavelli, the world is the context for a
zero-sum contest that no individual or nation can win perpetually. Indeed, even
great gains-more power, more wealth, further territorial expansion-sow the
seeds of eventual defeat as peace, idleness, fewer external threats, and less vig-
orous enemies cultivate softness. Machiavelli's measure of success is the gran-
deur of a relatively enduring expansionist government, best illustrated in the
Roman republic.
Machiavelli is keenly aware of human limitation: no person is best suited
for all situations; no nation will reign supremely forever; Fortuna will act recur-
rently to upset the most careful human plans. More tellingly, Machiavelli em-
braces a tragic view of life: Human beings are born to suffer and die; our deep-
est yearnings for personal immortality, connection to enduring value, and the
revelation of a rational, just cosmos are most likely futile; all things must pass.
Yet within that context lie prospects for the most worthwhile quest open to us:
the pursuit of relatively enduring glory forged on military and political battle-
grounds where excellence of the human spirit may be rewarded.
The interpretation at issue does not offer a reason why Machiavelli would
allegedly leave unnecessary cryptic messages in The Prince. If his intention was
to eviscerate the power of the Medici why not simply include all and only pre-
scriptions that would promote that end? Why include conflicting advice that
allegedly illustrates the ineffectiveness of those prescriptions? Was Machiavelli
leaving clues for only the most discerning readers? Was he trying to ensure that
historians and political theorists did not blame him for not knowing the political
score once the Medici took the advice of his manual and suffered a resounding
collapse? Any such speculation makes a groundless leap of faith given the fact
that the work was not even published during Machiavelli's lifetime.
The malleability of Machiavelli's twin conceptual foundations-virtir and
Fortuna-is also overstated. Several of the puzzles and apparent conflicts dis-
solve once we understand the differences between military virtir, political virtir,
political and military virtir, moral virtir, and civic virtir. Likewise, recognizing
the difference between Fortuna, as a personified force meddling in human ac-
tivities, andfortuna, as a set of circumstances partially constituting the context
of human choices and actions, softens misunderstanding of Machiavelli's texts.
In the case offered, Agathocles is taken to be a tyrant acting only fiom pursuit of
personal power; he is bent on enslaving a once-free people. Machiavelli consis-
tently denigrates tyrants and tyranny (P 8; D I 10; D I 17: D I 33; D I1 2). Borgia
is believed by Machiavelli to be the best contemporary example of a prince able
to loosen the grip of external domination and expand territory through a combi-
nation of good fortune and considerable military skill. Machiavelli takes him, at
least at times, as one able to begin the process of reforming a corrupt state,
whereas Agathocles is seen as one determined to establish and amplify the bo-
90 Chapter Three

nds of subjugation. Whether Machiavelli was correct in those assessments is

contestable. That he made the relevant distinctions is clearer.
Machiavelli's musings on fortune are extensive and varied (P 7; P 13; P 25;
D I1 29; D I1 30; D I11 9; D 111 31: D 111 37). What emerges is a view that For-
tuna will eventually defeat the greatest of men and nations because her vicissi-
tudes are too numerous and complex. Human beings have fixed dispositions and
characters that permit some flexibility to adapt to fortuna, but not enough to
hold Fortuna at bay forever. However, leaders graced with practical wisdom,
another type of virtir, have the power to forestall Fortuna's triumph by acting
boldly when fortuna favors them, hunkering down when fortuna opposes them,
and seizing the moment when fortuna is neutral. Fortuna will eventually win as
great leaders are effective only at certain times and within particular contexts
due to their temperament. But the greatest leaders have some flexibility and are
able to pursue the needs of their times. Fortuna is not omnipotent. Within her
caprices are opportunities to earn the enduring glory that characterizes the no-
blest among us.
Machiavelli's views on the general untrustworthiness of people and the
need for a prince to indentify trustworthy advisors are also explained. How are
trust, loyalty, and political allegiance acquired? Such jewels are won by demon-
strating to advisors that their interests are tied inextricably to the well-being of
the prince. No advisor is antecedently trustworthy. Advisors, as do all human
beings, will be inclined to pursue their own interests. But by properly rewarding
ministers for their fine work, by discouraging toadies and yes-men, and by nur-
turing an identification of the minister's interests with those of the prince, good
advisors will become trustworthy because it is in their interests to do so (P 22; P
23). Granted, this picture of human nature is not especially cheery, but it is quite
consistent with Machiavelli's general depiction of human motivation.
Another daunting problem for those who argue that The Prince is merely a
satire or an exercise in political subversion is the number of references to The
Prince that are included in Machiavelli's other writings. Such references are
invariably serious and do not easily coalesce with the view that The Prince is a
satirical or subversive anomaly (D I11 19; D 111 42; possibly D I11 31; Ltr. 224:
12/10/13; Ltr. 247: 1/31/15).
The Prince-as-political-subversion interpretation, though, has an even more
cutting version. Mary Dietz argues that Machiavelli intended to undermine the
Medici by rendering advice that, if followed, would dissolve their power and
hasten the restoration of the Florentine republic.46 The Prince exemplifies the
deception that it advises. It appears to embolden a prince with methods and man-
ners for success, but if followed the prescriptions of The Prince accelerate the
prince's demise. The work is political action, not political theory.
Dietz points out that Machiavelli advises the prince of a formerly-free city
to take up residence inside the city's walls. Yet he also warns that former repub-
lics are replete with vengeful citizens yearning to be fiee. Do not such lovers of
fieedom jeopardize the well-being of a prince living among them?47
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 91

Machiavelli also advises the prince to arm his subjects or refrain from dis-
arming them (P 20). But would not an armed citizenry increase the possibility of
revolutionary plots against the prince? Would not a civilian militia be more
likely to destroy the man who has transformed a republic into a principality?
Machiavelli insists that only princes who fear their own citizens should
build fortresses; those who fear foreign invasion more than internal rebellion
should not build fortresses (P 20). As Machiavelli otherwise demeans the politi-
cal savvy of princes who fear their own people and cautions against trusting
foreign nations the clear conclusion is that wise, powerful princes should not
construct fortresses. But Dietz points out that a fortress symbolized the end of
popular govenunent and the emergence of an elite power structure. Moreover, in
the Renaissance context fortresses were thought to be crucial to defend against
outside aggression. Machiavelli continues to offer the Medici advice that will
energize republican aspirations and accelerate the overthrow of the prince.48
Machiavelli warns princes to avoid generosity, which he associates with
lavish, ostentatious displays and expenditures. He argues that wasting resources
will compel the prince to tax the people mercilessly and to be obsessed with
maximizing revenues to offset his extravagance. Eventually, such a prince, who
began with the intention of being thought generous, will gain a reputation as a
miser and be hated by the masses (P 16). The power of a prince who is hated is,
of course, muted and fragile (P 17). Dietz points out that this advice ignores how
the original Lorenzo de'Medici, the Magnificent, had lured the support of the
masses through his well-founded reputation for g e n e r ~ s i t y .Moreover,
~~ Ma-
chiavelli recognized that fact in another of his works (FH VIII 8). Surely, his
advice in The Prince has a concealed intention: to urge the Magnificent's grand-
son to tighten the purse strings, gain an immediate reputation as a tightwad, and
simmer the hatred of the people to his own detriment.
Dietz also hammers competing interpretations of The Prince. One of the
most influential, sketched above, views The Prince as the first phase in a series
of political events that will eventually pave the way for republican rule. The
heroic politics of The Prince is required to facilitate the mass politics of republi-
canism detailed in The ~ i s c o u r s e sBut
. ~ ~why would a prince who had amassed
such power divest himself! Is not the history of executive rule quite the con-
trary? Does not power whet the appetite for more, not the patriotic impulse for
less? Or at the death of the prince how is mass politics likely to emerge? By
undermining this common view of the relationship of Machiavelli's two more
famous books, Dietz hopes to increase the plausibility of her own reading of The
Prince.
Also, Dietz notes that Machiavelli's scheme to gain employment under the
Medici is reminiscent of his laudatory depiction of Junius Brutus in The Dis-
courses ( D I11 2). Lacking arms, sufficient confederates, and a powerful position
to wage an open war against the kings of Rome, Brutus disingenuously ingrati-
ated himself with those in power. Machiavelli offers Brutus as an exemplar for
those, who otherwise lack resources for effective rebellion, but are frustrated
92 Chapter Three
with their present ruler. Is this not the tack that Machiavelli was taking in writ-
ing The Prince?

Machiavelli's strategy . . . [is] to promise greatness to the Medici lord and thus
render him susceptible to the hrther flatteries that will, in fact, undo him. No-
where in The Prince is . . . the strategy as evident as in the famous chapter 26
. . . we might read Machiavelli's final call to action as the "bait" . . . [Lorenzo
will become] the dupe of his own grandiose expectations of earthly power and
political immortality."

In sum, Dietz's main target is the herd of contemporary gabbiani who take
Machiavelli at his surface level, those who interpret him in The Prince as ren-
dering his best advice on how a ruler with absolute power can reform a corrupt
state and cast the foundation for an expansionist republic. Such readers defang
Machiavelli by making him less Machiavellian and more congenial to modem
methods. Unfortunately, in Dietz's view, this interpretation denies in Machia-
velli the guile of the fox and, lacking that quality itself, stumbles into the trap
the Florentine set for the Medici.
Dietz's understanding of the text is uncommonly interesting but the evi-
dence for her conclusion is also frighteningly thin. For example, Machiavelli
does offer a new prince who acquires territory that had previously lived under its
own laws three alternatives in The Prince: destroy the conquered city; live there
in person; or let the city continue under its own laws, pay tribute, while the new
prince establishes an administrative elite that will be loyal to him (P 5). The first
two are the best choices. Here "destroying the conquered city" translates to re-
structuring the government and scattering the original inhabitants. The residents
of a former republic do not easily cast aside their allegiance to liberty, will wait
for a crisis, and move to restore their freedom. Thus, destroying the conquered
city is often wise. Elsewhere, and under somewhat different circumstances, Ma-
chiavelli advises a new prince to live within a newly conquered city (P 3; P 6).
So the Medici have two real choices-destroy Florence or live there. The prob-
ability that Lorenzo will destroy Florence is nil, so, for all practical purposes,
Machiavelli is advising Lorenzo to live within the city. Dietz takes this as dan-
gerous, citing Machiavelli's own words (P 5). Surely, she argues, Machiavelli is
setting Lorenzo up for a fall.
But Machiavelli offers similar advice in The Discourses about a prince liv-
ing among the masses (D I 10; D I 16). Moreover, he often denies that the Flor-
entines are a liberty-loving people whose memories burn with a desire for repub-
lican rule (FH VIII 8; D 1 2; D I 38; D I 49). If the prerequisites of Machiavelli's
alleged scheme to destroy the Medici from within include a freedom-loving
people who formerly lived under strong republican rule then the prospects of
success, known to Machiavelli as evidenced in his other writings, were dim.
Also, the Medici were well known in Florence and had thrived during various
earlier periods. Their choice to live within the city, strive to win the favor of the
people, and nurture new allegiances would not be a radical move.52
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 93

Machiavelli consistently advises political leaders to cultivate the good will

of the people as opposed to currying favor with nobles (P 7; P 9; D I 16; D I 40;
D I 58). Dietz takes this advice to be duplicitous. Yet this conclusion is difficult
to applaud when Machiavelli's prescriptions in The Prince are echoed in his
other writings. Are these writings, also, attempts at subterfuge? Granted, Ma-
chiavelli's voluminous writings are not always consistent, but where they do
converge insisting that duplicity is present is a tough sell. What might under-
write the charge? What reference might establish the "truth?Machiavelli's
guidance is often contestable and, at times, wildly off the mark. But poor advice
is not automatically fraudulent.
His ruminations on constructing fortresses are extensive and meandering.
Dietz takes the words in The Prince, counseling the Medici to avoid fortresses
and rely on the good will of the people, as clear evidence of Machiavelli's
scheme to destroy the new rulers. In that chapter, however, Machiavelli points
out that "it is impossible to pass definitive judgment on any of these policies
[including those on fortresses] until one considers the particular circumstances
that existed in the state where the policy was adopted" (P 20). He also approves
of building fortresses as defenses against internal rebellion and external attack,
as was done by the Romans. Yet he cites examples of rulers who destroyed all
the fortresses in their newly-conquered territory: "We must conclude that for-
tresses are useful or not, depending on circumstances, and that, if they are useful
at one time, they may also do you harm at another. . . . I would praise both those
who build fortresses and those who do not" (P 20). Such counsel is as illuminat-
ing as pointing out that it may or may nor rain tomorrow depending on atmos-
pheric conditions. One principle that emerges is that rulers more afraid of their
subjects than of external threat should build fortresses and rulers more fearful of
foreign powers should not construct fortresses. The only definitive advice ren-
dered is a reiteration that rulers are in huge trouble if their subjects hate them:
the good will of the multitude is more important to a ruler's security than the
safety provided by fortresses.
Strikingly, Machiavelli provides similar, but more defrnitive advice on for-
tresses in The Discourses (D I1 24). True, Machiavelli is at times clearer that
constructing fortresses is especially detrimental to a republic (Ltr. 3 12: 6/2/26),
and popular opinion did identify fortresses with autocratic government. But
given the ambiguity on this subject in The Prince and the more definitive dis-
cussion in The Discourses, to conclude that Machiavelli is diabolically setting
the Medici up is rash. Even if one decides that his advice is unwise it does not
follow that it is duplicitous, especially in light of the twists and turns in his
thinking on this subject.
Dietz scores points with her argument on the difficulty of the transition
from principality to republic and the hurdle advocates of The Prince-as-a-
nationalistic-call-to-arms interpretation must clear. I have discussed the matter
above and will only summarize here. Machiavelli assumes, perhaps naively, that
a prince is most concerned with his own glory, his legacy, his place in history.
The highest glory resides in founding, preserving, or reforming a relatively en-
94 Chapter Three
during expansionist state. Republics are more likely to endure and expand than
principalities. To lay the groundwork for the transition from principality to re-
public is in the interest of the prince whose vision involves a piece of imrnortal-
ity. Perhaps Machiavelli is projecting his own yearning for immortality and en-
during glory on the prince. In an event, though, he understands the prince as
being moved by events that will transpire only after his death. Machiavelli's
preoccupation with enduring glory fuels his labors. For better or worse, he takes
that prize to be the highest worldly laurel. Whether Machiavelli is correct in that
assessment is deeply contestable; whether he is correct about the motivational
power of the quest for enduring glory is far from clear; that he is sincere in cele-
brating the quest for enduring glory is indisputable.
On the topic of princely generosity, Machiavelli admits that those on their
way to becoming rulers should gain a reputation for generosity. He cites Julius
Caesar as a successful practitioner of that strategy. He also lauds Caesar and
Alexander for being generous with the spoils of war (P 16). As Dietz points out,
Machiavelli advises those who have acquired power that they cannot afford to
squander their own or their subjects resources. This strikes me as sound fiscal
management, not evidence of a nefarious scheme to undermine a new prince.
That the original Lorenzo de'Medici, the Magnificent, gained through his repu-
tation for generosity may have been a function of the longstanding ability of the
Medici to control banking in Florence and the fact that their rule was grounded
on economic preeminence. Without such disproportionate material stature, his
political power may well have faded. Moreover, after the Pazzi conspiracy and
the treacheries of Pope Sixtus IV, the final decade of the Magnificent's reign
featured economic austerity. Lorenzo had depleted the Medici financial empire
with his earlier generosity and in his later years raided the state treasury for his
own purposes. Perhaps Machiavelli learned a lesson. In any event, Machiavelli's
musings on princely generosity do not seem revolutionary enough to carry the
weight of Dietz's conclusions about The Prince.
Dietz also takes Machiavelli to task for advocating an armed citizenry. New
rulers should not disarm subjects; if they find their subjects unarmed they should
arm them; and they should raise their own armies (P 20). An armed citizenry,
Dietz observes, is more likely to rebel and unseat the prince. Machiavelli's ad-
vice on this matter, however, is consistent throughout his writings (P 12; P 13; P
14; D I 21; D I 43; D I1 20; D I1 30; AW 1 14-20; AW 7 207-210). An armed
citizenry is required to compete effectively in the zero-sum contest of interna-
tional politics and military affairs. Mercenary and auxiliary troops are unreliable
and ultimately feckless. In principle, an armed citizenry is more dangerous to a
prince: increased possibilities for conspiracies, rebellions, and lower-level chan-
ceries arise. But an armed citizenry is indispensable for security against external
aggression and to satisfy the hunger for territorial expansion. On this Machia-
velli could not be clearer.
A distinction, though, between having a "private army" or "national troops"
and training a "civilian militia" is rele~ant.'~Some of Machiavelli's passages
and examples are better understood as supporting a private army or national
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 95

troops, rather than a civilian militia. But others (D I 21; D I1 30; AW I 14-20)
may be read in terms of raising a civilian militia. Moreover, that Machiavelli
favored a civilian militia is clear from his own life. In 1507, Machiavelli was
appointed secretary of war. He raised a civilian militia. Atler a victory at Pisa in
1509, thr.t militia failed dismally at Prato during the Holy League's artillery as-
sault in 15 12.

[Machiavelli was convinced that] the armed citizenry would be a very definite
obstacle in the path of anyone who contemplated seizing power. Second, a mili-
tia would always . . . serve as the fundamental instrument of civic education, a
means of instilling a people with respect for authority and a sense of common
purpose. Third, a militia would be less costly to a state than a standing army.54

All this, of course, can be spun in different directions by propagandists for

their own agenda. Supporters of Dietz may insist that the failure of Machia-
velli's experiment showed him that civilian militia were not successful and, be-
sides, they were a hallmark of republican, not monarchial, regimes. Thus, his
advice in The Prince sets up the Medici for a fall should they swallow his coun-
sel. Critics of Dietz will maintain that Machiavelli was committed, for better or
worse, to civilian militia and his advice in The Prince is sincere, even if many
think it misguided. Also, the civilian militia that spit the bit at Prato was not
Machiavelli's ideal unit. The militia was composed of disenfranchised peasants:
"The militia was composed of noncitizens, the Florentine subjects of the rural
cantado, not of the citizens with a patriotic devotion to their country as pre-
scribed by Machiavelli in The Art of ~ a r . " 'Despite
~ the pitiful defeat at Prato,
Machiavelli never lost faith in the value of a civilian militia (AW I 30). Does
this issue, then, amount to strong evidence that Machiavelli was trying to slide
the Medici through the grease?
Even if Machiavelli could dupe the Medici through the allegedly disingenu-
ous advice in The Prince, even if he could lay the foundation for a return of the
republic, how would that serve his grand design? The Florentine republic was in
place prior to the victory of the Holy League in 1513. How did that work out?
To drive the barbarians out of Italy either much of the peninsula needed to unite
or one region would have to become strong enough to conquer most of the oth-
ers. Without the Medici connection in Rome, the chances of that region being
Florence were close to zero. The supposed cleverness Dietz believes animates
The Prince could have accomplished exactly what?
After the crisis in Italy and the sack of Rome in 1527, the Medici were,
once again, expelled and a republic was restored in Florence. Machiavelli enthu-
siastically applied for high government office. But having cozied up to the
Medici, Machiavelli was viewed suspiciously by some of his former republic
cronies. They denied Machiavelli a post. Dietz takes this as delightful irony:
Machiavelli had outfoxed himself. He had tried to fool the Medici into imple-
menting advice that would have led to their ruin and the return of republican
rule. But he ended up fooling only his republican friends into believing that he
96 Chapter Three

was rendering aid and comfort to the Medici, and when the republic was re-
stored he was shut A critic of Dietz interpretation, however, would con-
clude that Machiavelli's republican friends were not fooled at all. They under-
stood The Prince for what it was and were leery of what they took to be
Machiavelli's wavering republican sympathies. They demanded stricter ideo-
logical obedience to the republican-party line than Machiavelli thought war-
ranted. Fortuna will subdue us all in the end.
Advocates of The Prince-as-subversion interpretation might appeal to a pas-
sage in one of Machiavelli's letters to his friend, Francesco Guicciardini: "for
some time now I have never said what I believe or never believed what I said;
and if indeed I do sometimes tell the truth, I hide behind so many lies that it is
hard to find" (Ltr. 270: 5/17/21). Is Machiavelli referring to the beginnings of
his writing the Florentine Histories, a work commissioned by the Medici in
which Machiavelli would have to finesse his considered judgments of the role
the rule of the Medici had played in the degradation of Florence? Is he referring
to his pillow talk while courting women? Is he indicting his past literary work,
including The Prince? Is he referring to his daily discussions with merchants,
friends, workers? Not clear.
Advocates might also spin the confirmation in The Discourses of some
principles unveiled in The Prince in their direction. For example, The Dis-
courses is an unabashedly republican work. If the same principles and advice on
crucial matters are in The Prince that appear in The Discourses perhaps that
means that Machiavelli is giving advice effective in republican government to a
leader of a principality. Would not implementing republican guidelines in a
principality lead to ruin for the prince? Accordingly, that Machiavelli's advice in
The Prince is consistent in critical areas with that given in The Discourses
counts infavor of The Prince-as-subversion interpretation!
The problem of this strategic move should be obvious. Some political prin-
ciples, perhaps most, might well be effective in both republics and principalities.
That Machiavelli offers consistent counsel on a host of military and political
matters in The Discourses, The Prince, and his other historical and military work
cannot automatically stain the sincerity of his advice in The Prince unless some-
one begs the main interpretive questions. This is especially the case because
much of The Prince derives from two of Machiavelli's letters to Vettori (Ltr.
219: 8110113; Ltr. 222: 8/26/13; also Ltr. ,121: 9113-21106).
In sum, unless one insists that The Discourses (and, perhaps, The Art of
War) is also a fraudulent, deceptive work, where Machiavelli's position on a
subject is consistent, strong evidence emerges that his advice in The Prince is
not duplicitous. Whether such counsel is wise, effective, appropriate, and the
like are separate questions. The Prince-as-political-subversion interpretation is a
delicious offering because it claims that The Prince exemplifies the precise prin-
ciples it expounds. The interpretation encourages us to play the sleuth, find more
clues to Machiavelli's scheme, and unmask the alleged deep structure of his
vision. Best of all, the interpretation encourages a reader to luxuriate in the self-
image of a volpe, not wallow in the simplicity of a gabbiano. Unfortunately,
 Methods, Motivations, and Purposes: The Prince 97

advocates o f this interpretation derive broad, rash conclusions from skimpy,

ambiguous textual and historical evidence. While I have not disproved their the-
sis, in the strict logical sense o f that term, they must advance much more to erect
a persuasive case.

Notes
1. Jacques Maritain, "The End of Machiavellianism," The Review of Politics 4
(1942): 13,31.
2. See, for example, Frederick the Great, "Should a Prince Keep the Faith?" in Ma-
chiavelli: Cynic, Patriot or Political Scientist?, ed. De Lamar Jensen (Lexington, MA: D.
C. Heath and Company, 1960), 5-8.
3. Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996), 264.
4. Ibid., 176.
5. Ibid., x.
6. See, for example, Anthony J. Parel, The Machiavellian Cosmos (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1992).
7. Laurence Arthur Burd, introduction to Niccolb Machiavelli, I1 Principe, ed. Laur-
ence Arthur Burd (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1891), 14.
8. Ibid., 24.
9. Ibid., 25.
10. Ibid., 28.
11. Ernst Cassier, The Myth of the State (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor,
1955), 191, 194.
12. Leonardo Olschki, Machiavelli the Scientist (Berkeley, CA: The Gillick Press,
1945), 32.
13. Norman Wilde, "Machiavelli," Internatio~lJournal ofEthics 38 (1928): 217.
14. Pasquale Villari, The Life and Times ofNiccol6 Machiavelli, trans. Linda Villari
(London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1929), 516.
15. Franceso De Sanctis, "Long Live Italian Unity: Glory to Machiavelli," in Ma-
chiavelli: Cynic, Patriot or Political Scientist?, ed. De Lamar Jensen (Lexington, MA: D.
C. Heath and Company, 1960), 25-26.
16. Sir Richard Lodge, "Machiavelli's I1 Principe," Transactions of the Royal His-
torical Society 13 (1 930): 8.
17. Benedetto Croce, "The Autonomy and Necessity of Politics," in Machiavelli:
Cynic, Patriot or Political Scientist?, ed. De Lamar Jensen (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1960), 13.
18. Max Lerner, introduction to Niccolb Machiavelli, The Prince and The Dis-
courses, ed. Max Lerner (New York: Random House, 1950), xiv.
19. Giuseppe Prezzolini, "The Christian Roots of Machiavelli's Moral Pessimism,"
Review of National Literatures 1 (1970): 28.
20. Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2001), 74-75.
21. Ibid., 4 3 4 4 .
22. Ibid., 44.
23. Tom Holland, Rubicon (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 5, 108-149.
24. Ibid., 33, 109, 113, 143.
 Chapter Three

25. Berlin, Against the Current, 7 1.

26. Alberto Moravia, "Portrait of Machiavelli," Partisan Review 22 (1955): 359.
27. Ibid., 362.
28. Guglielmo Ferrero, "Machiavelli and Machiavellism," Foreign Affairs 17
(1939): 575.
29. Moravia, "Portrait," 363.
30. Ibid., 364.
3 1. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 369.
33. Ibid., 370.
34. Ibid.
35. Garrett Mattingly, "Machiavelli's Prince: Political Science or Political Satire?"
The American Scholar 27 (1958): 483.
36. Ibid., 486.
37. Ibid., 488.
38. Ibid., 490.
39. See, for example, Rafael Sabatini, The Life of Cesare Borgia (Teddington, U K :
The Echo Library, 2006); Gustavo Sacerdote, Cesare Borgia (Milan, IT: Mondadori-
Medusa Publishers, 1950; Clemente Fusero, Cesare Borgia (London: Pall Mall Press,
1972).
40. Lodge, I1 Principe, 13.
41. Edmond Barincou, Machiavelli (New York: Grove Press, 1961), 76-78.
42. Garrett Mattingly, "Machiavelli," in Renaissance Profiles, edited by J. H. Plumb
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1961), 33.
43. Stephen M. Falion, "Hunting the Fox: Equivocation and Authorial Duplicity in
The Prince," PMLA 107 (1992): 1183.
44. Ibid., 1184.
45. Ibid., 1186.
46. Mary Dietz, "Trapping the Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception,"
The American Political Science Review 80 (1986): 777-799.
47. Ibid., 783.
48. Ibid., 787-788.
49. Ibid., 783-785.
50. Ibid., 780
5 1. Ibid., 795-796.
52. John Langton and Mary Dietz, "Machiavelli's Paradox: Trapping or Teaching
The Prince?' The American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 1278-1279.
53. Ibid., 1286.
54. Neal Wood, introduction to Niccolb Machiavelli, The Art of War, ed. and trans.
Neal Wood (Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press, 1965), xxvii.
55. Ibid.
56. Dietz, "Trapping the Prince," 796.
 Chapter Four
Machiavelli's Top Ten
As noted, Machiavelli chose historical events and famous people to illustrate his
military and political lessons. He often examined his selections through distorted
lenses. The following top ten and bottom ten lists are not intended as scientific
conclusions about whom Machiavelli esteemed or disparaged most. Instead, the
lists are rough rankings that discuss figures or movements that Machiavelli used
to underscore his most cherished political and military principles.'

Top Ten
1. Romulus (ca. 770 BC-ca. 716 BC)
The legend of the founding of Rome centers on the nearby city of Alba
Longa, where Aeneas had settled much earlier after fleeing from Troy. Rhea
Silvia, a vestal virgin of Alba Longa, became pregnant. She claimed that her
suitor was the god Mars. Seduction by a god was one of the few available de-
fenses against a sacrilege punishable by death. Rhea skirted capital punishment
and bore twin boys. The twins were seized by the king's men and dumped into
the Tiber River. Happily, the twins were tossed up on a river bank and nurtured
by a she-wolf until they were discovered and adopted by a shepherd, Faustulus.
The twins, Romulus and Remus, grew up among shepherds and other coarse
men. After allegations that Remus had stolen cattle, he was taken before a mag-
istrate, a former king, in Alba Longa. Romulus rounded up enough men to
march on the city and rescue Remus. The magistrate took the opportunity to
regain the throne. Romulus and Remus decided to found their own city.
Romulus and Remus quarreled over which was the best hill upon which to
build. Romulus killed Remus when Remus disdainfully leapt over Romulus's
walls on the Palatine hill. As the first king of Rome, Romulus gained a reputa-
tion as a great warrior. Machiavelli honors Romulus for being an armed founder
of a city (P 6); for establishing strong laws that were the preconditions for secu-
rity, order, and civic virrir (D I 1); and for killing Remus and, later, Titus Tatius,
a Sabine who had been elected to share office with Romulus (D I 9). Machia-
velli insists that the founding of a republic or principality requires one person in
charge. While those who resort to violence and cruelty to destroy a thriving city
merit guilt, those who do so to found or reform a city are excused: "A wise man
will never criticize someone for an extralegal action undertaken to organize a
kingdom or establish a republic. He will agree that if his deed accuses him, its
consequences excuse him" (D I 9).
100 Chapter Four
According to Machiavelli, Romulus should be judged favorably by history.
He acted in accord with the common good, not from self-aggrandizement. After
all, he soon established an effective senate with extensive influence. Romulus
retained only the power to command the military once war was declared and the
authority to summon the senate. In this manner, the original institutions of Rome
were more in line with constitutional and participatory politics, not tyrannical
absolutism (D I 9). In sum, Machiavelli concludes that Romulus should be for-
given, not blamed, for slaying Remus and Titus Tatius. Establishing the consti-
tution of a republic requires one man of excellence acting for the common good.
To what degree the rich narrative of Romulus, Remus, and the founding of
Rome is legend and to what degree, if any, it is fact remains a matter of dispute.2
This debate, though, should not directly concern students of Machiavelli. Nor
should we quibble over the details of Machiavelli's historical rendering of
Romulus. Was he truly motivated by the common good? Did Romulus really
divest his power and welcome the authority of a senate? Did he not, according to
legend, become increasing arrogant and arbitrary? Was he not assassinated by
some senators because he abused his power?
Machiavelli focuses only on Romulus as founder. That Romulus had to kill
his own brother and an elected officer adds to his luster from a Machiavellian
perspective. Romulus demonstrated that he was willing to bloody his nose and
dirty his hands in the face of necessity. The laws and strong military he intro-
duced demonstrate the prerequisites for security, order, and civic virtic that de-
fine a healthy, expansionist republic. That he acted from a vision of the common
good-at least in Machiavelli's telling-highlights his deserved claim to glory
and immortality.

2. Moses (ca. 1392 BC-ca. 1272 BC)

Born during the Jewish enslavement in Egypt, Moses was subject to the
pharaoh's decree that all male Hebrew children be killed at birth by drowning in
the Nile River. Moses's mother hid him for three months, refusing to deliver
him to be killed. Instead, she set him adrift on the Nile in a small, primitive
craft. The pharaoh's daughter, hearing the crying child floating on the river, had
one of her maids fetch Moses. Moses's sister, Miriam, observed all this and
asked the pharaoh's daughter if she wanted to employ a Hebrew woman to nurse
Moses. The pharaoh's daughter agreed and, unknowingly, hired Moses's mother
as the nurturer. As Moses grew, he was brought to the pharaoh's daughter and
was raised as her son (Exodus 2: 1-10).
Moses grew up, then, under privileged, secure conditions. One day, stunned
at seeing an Egyptian pummeling a Jewish slave, he killed the Egyptian and
buried him in the sand. The next day, he intervened in a dispute between two
Hebrews and discovered that at least one of them knew that Moses had slain the
Egyptian. Aware that he would be in danger for having killed an Egyptian carry-
ing out the commands of the pharaoh, Moses fled to Midian (Exodus 2: 11-15).
Immediately, Moses found more trouble. The seven daughters of Reuel, a
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 101

Midian priest, were drawing water for their father's flock of sheep when shep-
herds drove them away. Moses defended the girls and helped water their flock.
The grateful Reuel adopted Moses as a son, gave him one of his daughters, Zip-
porah, in marriage, and appointed him overseer of his sheep (Exodus 2: 16-21;
3: 1).
After forty years as a shepherd, Moses drove the herd to Mount Horeb,
where he was shocked to see a burning bush that was not destroyed. Having
secured Moses's attention, God identified Himself and commanded Moses and
his brother, Aaron, to travel to Egypt and demand that the pharaoh free the Isra-
elites. Moses reluctantly agreed (Exodus 3: 1-4; 4: 20-3 1).
The pharoah refused Moses's request, ten plagues befell Egypt, after which
the 600,000 Hebrews escaped. A few months later, Moses ascended Mount Sinai
and descended with the Ten Commandments (Exodus 5-18; 19: 20-25). He then
found the Israelites dancing naked, worshipping a golden calf. Moses called for
supporters, the sons of Levi responded, and Moses ordered the murders of 3,000
men (Exodus 32: 19-28).
Machiavelli esteems Moses for being an armed prophet (P 6); for taking an
enslaved people and pointing the way to reformation (P 26); for being a law-
giver with concern for the common good (D I 9); and for understanding that "in
order to have his laws accepted and his proposals adopted, [Moses had] to mur-
der vast numbers of men, men who opposed his plans for no other reason but
envy" (D I11 30). Moses is an exemplar of military and political virtir, an em-
bodiment of the necessity of using violent means to attain worthy ends, under-
written with a divine imprimatur. Although not explicitly recognized in Machia-
velli's writings, Moses exhibits other worthy Machiavellian traits. Prior to the
killings of the three thousand, Moses refused God's invitation of starting a new
nation and, after the killings, Moses offered to have himself blotted from the
divine book (Exodus 32: 10-13, 32-33). Moses, then, was a kindred spirit to
Machiavelli: he loved his country more than this own soul. Machiavelli expects
nothing less from great liberators and founders.
Moses is confronted by an extreme emergency. His people are enslaved,
their liberation depends on his military and political virti, his concern for
strictly personal glory evaporates, force becomes necessary to maintain unity,
and squeamishness is unwarranted.
If you are discussing nothing less than the safety of the homeland, then you
should pay no attention to what is just or what is unjust, or to what is kind or
cruel, or to what is praiseworthy or shameful. You should put every other con-
sideration aside, and you should adopt wholeheartedly the policy most likely to
save your homeland's life and preserve her liberty (D 111 41).

The killings of the three thousand resonate with familiar Machiavellian

themes: how envy and ambition engender discontent that blossoms into conflict-
ing sects that foster rebellion; the connections between ingratitude, fear, and
102 Chapter Four

hatred; the necessity of employing violence to establish or maintain the common

good (D I 8; D I pref.; D I11 30). While one might argue that Moses, unlike
Romulus, required divine agency to accomplish his mission, that can be tallied
on Moses's behalf: Even the omni-benevolent Judeo-Christian God understands
that violence in the name of patriotism is sometimes recommended. Moreover,
Moses, unlike Romulus, was a religious reformer. The importance for Machia-
velli of religion, properly fashioned, in supporting good arms and good laws in
setting the preconditions for security, order, and civic virtic is difficult to over-
state.
Moses crushed the bonds of slavery and demonstrated that religious com-
mitment could animate heroic deeds. The Florentines of Machiavelli's time were
also enslaved. Lured by economic security, they had squandered their civil liber-
ties and were dominated by foreigners. They, too, needed a redeemer, a Moses
who could wed military and political virtic to resoluteness, unsqueamishness,
and prophetic vision. God would smile on such a man (P 26).

3. Cyrus (ca. 590 BC-ca. 530 BC) and Theseus (ca. 1300 BC)
I have joined Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian Empire, and Theseus,
legendary slayer of the Minotaur and founder of Athens, into one slot. Although
effusively honored in Machiavelli's work, they appear fewer times than do
Romulus and Moses.
Cyrus's political career began in a way that Machiavelli consistently dispar-
aged. He inherited the throne of Anshan when his father died. Hereditary mon-
archies were systematically weak by Machiavelli's reckoning. But one does not
become known in history as "the Great," by being a loser. Anshan was not an
independent state. Cyrus, as his father before him, was under the tight-fists of
Median overlords. Sensing the resentment of his people, Cyrus called for a re-
volt against the oppressive Medes. The rebellion lasted about four or five years.
The Persian army was successful and conquered the Median Empire around 550
BC. But Cyrus was not finished. Understanding well the Machiavellian principle
of expansion, he conquered most of Southwest Asia and much of Central Asia,
creating the largest empire the world had yet seen. Along the way, the Lydian
Empire, under Croesus, and the Neo-Babylonian Empire, under Nabonidus, fell
to Cyrus's well-organized military machine. By the end of Cyrus's reign, the
Persian Empire enveloped Asia Minor and Judah in the west to the Indus River
in the east.
Machiavelli lauds Cyrus for seizing an opportunity and welcoming the
blessings of Fortuna. Cyrus understood that the Persians bristled under the rule
of the Medes and that the Medes were weak and unmanly from extended peace
(P 6; P 26). This recurrent Machiavellian theme vibrates throughout this work:
war and politics are required to exemplify and sharpen virtir, and to resist ozio.
An extended peace corrupts military and political virtic and softens the cultural
fabric of society.
C y m was also the model for Scipio, according to Machiavelli. Chaste, af-
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 103

fable, kind, and generous, Cyrus was a wise ruler who recognized that peacetime
was not a time to rest aimlessly, but to prepare for upcoming adversity and con-
flict (P 14; D I11 22). Moreover, Cyrus was generous in the proper way. He la-
dled out the fruits of his army's plunder, pillage, and expropriations. He spent
the money of his victims, while remaining frugal with his own wealth and that
of his subjects (P 16). In this manner, Cyrus gained a deserved reputation for
generosity without jeopardizing the economic standing of his polity. In sum, his
subjects felt deep personal affection for Cyrus, whose army was filled with loyal
supporters (D I11 22). Although not explicitly noted in Machiavelli's writings,
we can be certain that Cyrus's expansionist zeal resonated warmly within the
Florentine's bosom.
The story of Theseus is no less glorious. After proving his royal Athenian
heritage by lifting a heavy rock and removing the sword and shoes that lay be-
neath, Theseus decided to walk the bandit-infested road from Peloponnesus to
Athens instead of boarding a ship. He confronted a colorful cast of miscreants
along the way, a group rivaled only by the characters currently employed by the
World Wrestling Federation. Periphetes the Club-Bearer, Sinnis the Pine-
Bender, Phaea the Sow, Sciron the Megarian Robber, and Cercyon the Wrestler
all challenged Theseus as he strode toward Athens. Theseus slew the fearsome
quintet, forcing each perpetrator to suffer the same torments that their previous
victims had endured.
Once he had established his right to royal lineage, Theseus went to Mara-
thon and confronted a ferocious bull that had stalked the locals. He captured the
beast, took him back for display in Athens, then traveled to Delphi where he
sacrificed the bull to the god, Apollo. Soon thereafter, Crete demanded its trib-
ute, due every nine years, from Athens-seven girls and seven boys-which
was reparation for the murder of the eldest son of King Minos of Crete while a
guest of the king of Athens. Allegedly, the fourteen children were placed in a
labyrinth where they were eaten by a frightening Minotaur, a devastating com-
bination of man and bull.
Theseus volunteered to be one of the victims. When the ship arrived at
Crete the daughter of the king immediately fell in love with Theseus and gave
him a ball of twine to mark his trail in the labyrinth. After the numerous horrify-
ing foes he had already conquered, Theseus found the Minotaur easy prey. Atler
killing it, Theseus led the Athenian hostages back home.
In a twist worthy of Romeo and Juliet, King Aegeus of Athens, erroneously
thinking his son Theseus was dead-because of the color of the sail flying on
the returning boat--committed suicide. Theseus ascended to power. He decided
to gather the scattered Athenians into one city, after settling lingering disputes
among them and convincing them that a stronger central government served
their common interests. Theseus terminated the monarchy and instituted a par-
ticipatory regime. He made Athens the sole location of the new city-state, effec-
tively relinquishing most of his own political power. To expand the city-state,
104 Chapter Four
Theseus invited foreigners to immigrate and gain the same civil liberties as the
natives.
Although eventually meeting an unhappy end, triggered by his capture of
the Queen of the Amazons, which led to further escapades such as the abduction
of Helen of Sparta (later of Troy), Theseus's legend underscores several Ma-
chiavellian themes: the need for strong central government; the noble, voluntary
yielding of political power in service to enduring glory and the common good;
and the assimilation of foreigners into an expanding polity.
Theseus, too, is praised by Machiavelli for recognizing and seizing oppor-
tunity. Theseus demonstrated his strength of purpose by turning the apparent
adversity of the Athenians being scattered abroad into practical advantage (P 6;
P 26; D I 1). Romulus, Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus are Machiavelli's models of
armed founders of states. Possessing great military and political virtic, they rec-
ognized Fortuna was favorable to their vision and ambizione, and through
strong arms and sound laws, they set the foundation for secure, well-ordered
states that promoted civic virtir.

4. Numa Pompilius (ca. 750 BC-ca. 673 BC)

After Romulus had died, probably slain by conspiratorial senators, Numa
Pompilius was selected to be the next king of Rome. Numa, contemplative and
philosophical by temperament, was reluctant to accept the post. Rome was an
uncivilized mosaic of Sabines, Romans, runaway slaves, fugitives, and smaller
tribes. Numerous disparate traditions and customs coalesced uneasily. Numa,
although not a warrior by nature, had a shrewd political insight. Rome needed a
common culture to bind it more tightly. That culture would most easily be at-
tained through strong religious rituals and institutions. Numa concluded that
religion could best sustain the laws and customs that Romulus had initiated.
Numa Pompilius prefigured the glorious Machiavellian union of strong arms and
strong laws, underwritten by a vital religion that promoted military and political
virtir. Civic virtir, territorial expansion, security, order, and prosperity were
highly likely to follow.
Machiavelli gushed over Numa's acute vision that religion was essential for
civilized life. The power of the gods exceeds that of any man or group of men in
compelling citizens to behave. The appeal to divine authority, then and now, is
the ultimate political trump. Numa Pompilius, understanding that his own power
was insufficient to command complete allegiance, claimed to have a special re-
lationship with a nymph who passed him advice from the gods on matters of
governance. The unsophisticated nature of his subjects facilitated Numa's design
(D I 11).
At one point, Machiavelli praises Numa in stronger terms than even Romu-
lus:
Anyone who reads the history of Rome with care will recognize how usehl re-
ligion was when it came to commanding armies, to inspiring the populace, to
 Machiavelli's Top Ten
keeping men on the straight and narrow, to making criminals ashamed of them-
selves. So that ifone had to debate to which ruler Rome owed more, to Romu-
lus or to Numa, I rather think that Numa would come infirst ( D I 1 1). (Empha-
sis added)
For Machiavelli, religious worship is required for political greatness. Even
the greatest human ruler leads a finite life. The power of religion endures. The
crucial question is not whether to nurture religion in the polity. The critical ques-
tion is what kind of religion to foster. The answer, for Machiavelli, is not an
emasculated Christianity, with its eye on a transcendent world that rewards the
meek, humble, and downtrodden. The solution is a robust religion that promotes
the military and political virtic required to establish or invigorate the security,
order, and civic virtic necessary for an expansionist republic. Ave, Numa Pom-
pilius!

5. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (236 BC-183 BC)

Scipio was first recognized for his valor at the battle of Ticinus at the outset
of the Second Punic War. Boosted by this renown, he was elected as a military
tribune at a young age. He was part of the Roman disaster at Cannae, but gained
fhther honor for his brave quelling of a mutiny after the defeat. Although un-
derage, he won election as a curule aedile. A cultured warrior, with a fondness
for Greek philosophy, literature, and art, Scipio accepted the military command
of the campaign against the Carthaginians in Spain at a time when no one else
had the moxie to do so. He was only around twenty-five years old and the lowest
political rank eligible for such an imperium was a praetor, whose legal age was
thirty-nine. Scipio's self-confidence, glowing wisdom, and love of country won
the day, however.
Scipio waged an enormously successful campaign, showing great skill in
winning allies and appropriate compassion to conquered tribes, eventually
starching the Carthaginians in the Battle of Ilipa. While completing the subjuga-
tion of Spain, Scipio fell seriously ill. A mutiny began in the Roman army and a
revolt among some of its Spanish allies. The focus of the rebellion was insuffi-
cient pay and lack of support from the Roman government. Scipio recovered and
soothed the uprising.
Returning triumphantly to Rome, Scipio was elected consul in 205 BC. His
popularity and string of military victories began to arouse envy, particularly
from Fabius Maximus who had served as (temporary) dictator and crafter of
Rome's strategy of containment against Hannibal in Italy. Scipio presented a
stirring reply, arguing that the time was ripe to take the war to Hannibal's home
turf. The Senate was moved and offered a compromise solution: Scipio would
receive permission to cross into Africa if he judged it advantageous, but he
would receive no troops to add to the garrison stationed in Sicily.
Scipio went to work. He amassed volunteers and donations for an attack on
106 Chapter Four

Carthage. When in Sicily, he mitigated past grievances the locals bore against
Rome. With his typical aplomb, tact, and generosity, Scipio attracted Sicilian
allies to his cause. He recaptured Locri, at the toe of Italy, from the Carthagin-
ians. He left an administrator in charge, who zealously plundered and ladled out
atrocities. The Locrians appealed to the Senate. Scipio's political enemies used
the occasion to attack him for facilitating loose, military discipline. A commis-
sion was sent to investigate. By this time, Scipio had pacified the Locrians. No
one levied charges against Scipio.
The commission traveled to Sicily to examine Scipio's military prepara-
tions. Its members were impressed and, upon returning to Rome, they gained the
Senate's approval for Scipio to invade Africa. In Africa, the luster of Scipio's
military skill gained enduring glory. Although consistently outnumbered, he
outmaneuvered the Carthaginians and Hannibal at every turn. After the climatic
Battle of Zama, the victorious Scipio moved toward Carthage. The enemy sur-
rendered. Scipio laid out his terms: Carthage must destroy its naval and elephant
corps; it could no longer wage war outside of Africa; inside Africa, Carthage
could wage war only with permission from Rome; and for fifty years it must pay
annual indemnities to Rome. Scipio returned to Rome in an extended triumphal
parade, adding much wealth and incalculable pride and honor to the republic.
Scipio was elected as one of the two consuls, the capstone of a Roman po-
litical career. When numerous Romans demanded that Hannibal be processed
through the street of Rome in disgrace, imprisoned, and killed, Scipio spoke out
and resisted. Eventually, though, Hannibal was stalked from Carthage into exile.
Scipio entered his second consulship soon thereafter.
Scipio's last military campaign was against King Antiochus of Asia Minor,
who had invaded Greece. Scipio's forces eventually prevailed. Scipio's adver-
saries in the Senate levied accusations against him: embezzling, acting outside
his authority during the Asian campaign, corrupting military discipline, and a
few nebulous background charges such as excessively un-Roman (pro-Greek)
behavior. Scipio gave an inspired address that prevented his arrest. But the mes-
sage was clear: Rome was unsafe for Scipio. He went into voluntary exile at his
villa near Naples, where he died a few years later.
Machiavelli commends Scipio for his affability, compassion, generosity,
and equanimity (P 14; D I11 31). He contrasts Scipio's civic-mindedness with
Julius Caesar's overreaching power-mongering (D I 10; D 1 17). As a military
commander, Machiavelli celebrates Scipio's flexibility in devising tactics to fit
the immediate situation and his innovative strategies that used the enemy's, par-
ticularly Hannibal's, apparent strengths against him (D 111 9; AW IV 113, 115,
122; AW VI 171, 172, 193,195).
Three specific incidents cement the glory of Scipio. First, after a great vic-
tory in Spain, some of Scipio's Roman soldiers came upon an extraordinarily
beautiful girl. They brought the woman to Scipio and presented her as a gift to
their commander. Scipio, though, learned that the lady was the fiancee of a
Spanish chieftain, Allucius. Showing his own self-restraint and keen diplomatic
insight, Scipio sent for Allucius and reunited him with his betrothed. The
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 107

woman's parents were overjoyed and sent money and gifts to Scipio. The noble
Roman gathered the bounty and presented it to Allucius as a dowry. These acts
of kindness and generosity, uncommon in the ancient world under such circum-
stances, were reported widely among the Spanish tribes. Allucius, himself, vol-
untarily joined Scipio's cause with almost 1,500 warriors fiom his tribe (AW VI
179; D I11 34). Machiavelli remarks, "Of all the methods that can be taken to
gain the hearts of a people, none contribute so much as remarkable examples of
continence and justice . . . [Scipio's action] was a circumstance which was more
conducive to the reduction of Spain than any force of arms could have ever
been" (AW VI 179).
Second, earlier in Scipio's career, before he had reached the age of twenty-
one, while he was a military tribune, the Carthaginians crushed the Roman war
machine at Cannae. Around 70,000 Romans were killed. Scipio escaped with
about 10,000 others. Most of the survivors, shocked by the magnitude of the
defeat, waited docilely and prepared to surrender. About 4,000, one of whom
was Scipio, left the rehgee camp, evaded Hannibal's patrols, and fled to
Canusium. Still imperiled and less than four miles from the battlefield, the group
appointed Scipio and another man as commanders. But a mutiny was soon
hatched among some young nobles, who were conspiring to flee Italy. The loy-
alists were stunned by reports of this mutiny and contemplated their response.
Scipio simply acted. With sword in hand, he stormed into the heart of the muti-
neers' assembly and swore an oath to Jupiter that he would never desert his
country or permit any fellow citizen to shirk his duty to Rome. Should he fail to
fulfill his pledge, he called upon the god to strike him and his family down with
a shameful death. Scipio then called upon the others to take the same oath, un-
derscoring the request with a threat: if anyone refused, Scipio would draw his
sword against him. Scipio's ferocity, sincerity, and sheer audacity emboldened
the entire assembly. Everyone rose to take the oath. The Roman Senate followed
Scipio's lead. Rome refused to surrender or even negotiate with the victorious
Hannibal despite its stunning manpower losses at Cannae and the revolt of major
allies in southern Italy (D I 11; D I11 34). For Machiavelli, Scipio showed how
boldness can often seize the moment; how a brave deed that serves the common
good and stands as an example to others can enhance the reputation of a man of
virtu striding down the road to glory. Furthermore, Scipio is another exemplar of
republican valor who loved his country more than his own life, using an appeal
to religion as the ballast for civic virtu.
Third, Scipio's earliest military feat, when he was only seventeen, occurred
at the battle of the River Ticinus. Scipio's father was commanding Roman
forces headed for Spain against the Carthaginians at the outbreak of the Second
Punic War. Hannibal's forces outnumbered the elder Scipio's by at least two to
one. The young Scipio, a neophyte in battle, was safely stationed with a body-
guard on a small hill to the rear of the battlefield. The Romans were routed.
Scipio's father was wounded and fell from his horse. The remaining Roman
108 Chapter Four

forces retreated. The young Scipio pled with his bodyguards to charge the en-
emy. Sensing that under the circumstances doing so was not a percentage move,
they demurred. Undeterred, the young Scipio charged into the enemy forces
encircling his father. His bodyguards, shamed by their timidity and animated by
the courage of young Scipio, followed the youth into the battle. The enemy,
awed by the sheer bravado of the deed, lost heart and departed. Young Scipio
had saved his father's life. After the battle, the boy was recommended for the
corona civica, the highest Roman military commendation. Young Scipio re-
fused, remarking that the deed was its own reward (D 111 34).
Machiavelli prizes equanimity in great men and great states. Sustaining re-
solve, maintaining poise, and retaining dignity are critical to greatness. Fortuna
grinds away, human beings, states are finite, and adversity is never far away. We
should not be overconfident in victory or disconsolate in defeat. Machiavelli
attributes to Scipio, probably erroneously, the adage that: "For the Romans, if
they are beaten in battle, do not lose heart; and, if they win, they do not make a
habit of being overconfident" (D I11 3 1). No surrender, no excuses, no gloating,
no manic depression-The Roman Way!
Scipio, even for Machiavelli, was not perfect. The Florentine notes a minor
rebellion of Scipio's army in Spain against him that was allegedly caused by
Scipio's excessive leniency: "But, because [Scipio's] authority was subordinate
to that of the senate, not only were the consequences of this defect mitigated, but
it even enhanced his reputation" (P 17).
Ingratitude is a threat in every republic. Machiavelli was convinced that
Romans were the least ungrateful of any people who controlled an empire. But
even the Romans expressed ingratitude on one occasion. Because Scipio had
defeated a mighty enemy and his reputation was so impeccable, marked by un-
commonly fast success at a young age, and his virtti was so undeniable and ap-
parent, his personal authority roused suspicion. Cato the Elder, who was hon-
ored in the late republic as a model of old Roman virtues, but who in fact was an
unscrupulous, petty politician who raged with jealously, led the charge against
Scipio that eventually sent the hero of Zama into voluntary exile. Machiavelli
seems to mitigate the ingratitude of the Romans, by noting that ingratitude in
republics is less severe and frequent than in principalities, and that people who
are ungrateful fiom suspicion "have no choice" (D I 29; D I 58). But in a poem,
"Ingratitude," Machiavelli celebrates Scipio effusively-"But God from heaven
had already sent, A divine man, born in a Roman home, Such as the earth will
never see his like . . . This famous and indomitable hero, Showed to us all the
only way that leads, To the most lofty limit of man's glory . . . Another Scipio
cannot be found . . . And an infinite service full of good, Was met with infmite
ingratit~de."~
Perhaps most of all, Scipio highlights the Machiavellian theme that no sin-
gle person is the right man for all circumstances. Rome benefited fiom having
Fabius Maximus ("the Delayer") in charge of the military strategy for The Sec-
ond Punic War when the best tactic was not to lose, to keep Hannibal contained
in Italy, to impede the enemy's progress while gearing up for the grand finale.
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 109

Scipio was the right man, though, to win the war, to take the fight to enemy soil,
to devise successful tactics for glorious victory (D I11 9). We are all limited be-
ings, none of us is capable of adapting to every situation. Fortuna and mortality
will eventually defeat us all.

6. Cesare Borgia ("Duke Valentino") (1475-1507)

Cunning grifter, colorful mountebank, ferocious warrior, charismatic oppor-
tunist, ruthless gangster, intellectual strategist, deceptive charlatan, cold-blooded
murderer. . . . Cesare Borgia was all of these and more. He was the illegitimate
son of Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia. During the same year that Columbus sailed for
the new world, the cardinal became Pope Alexander VI. Cesare was immedi-
ately the beneficiary of the first of a recurring string of nepotistic acts: he was
named archbishop of Valencia and soon thereafter was anointed as a cardinal. At
first, Cesare was content to enjoy la dolce vita in Rome. But, as Machiavelli
would have fondly predicted, ambizione seethed within Cesare Borgia.
[Borgia was] a cold, relentless egotist, using men for his own ends, terrible and
even treacherous in his reprisals, swift as a panther and as cruel where his anger
was aroused, yet with certain elements of greatness: a splendid soldier, an unri-
valled administrator, a man pre-eminently just, if merciless in that same justice
. . . boundless in audacity, most swift to determine and to act, not impulsive.
Cold reason, foresight, and calculation were the ministers of his indomitable
wi1L4

The ecclesiastical life, although brimming with benefits and security, was
too domesticated. He cast large green eyes upon the political position of his
older brother Giovanni, Duke of Gandia, who was the main architect of Pope
Alexander VI's political stratagems. The Duke of Gandia was murdered. Insid-
ers attributed the slaying to Cesare. In fairness to Borgia, numerous other sus-
pects also had motive, opportunity, and means to dispose of the duke.' With the
death of his older brother, Cesare assumed the role of the pope's political
hatchet man. He traveled to Naples and crowned Frederick of Aragon king. Af-
ter receiving permission from the pope and the College of Cardinals, Borgia
renounced the priesthood. God's loss was Treachery's gain. Borgia brought
Louis XI1 a papal edict annulling Louis's marriage so the monarch could wed
his latest favorite. Louis showed his gratitude by appointing Cesare the Duke of
Valentinois and pledging military aid for Cesare's proposed military adventures.
The pope dispatched Cesare to subdue the province of Romagna. With the
aid of French auxiliaries, Swiss and Italian mercenaries, a dose of fraud, a meas-
ure of theater, an over pouring of ruthlessness, and recurring violence, Borgia
was soon on the move: Imola, Forli, Pesaro, Rimini, Faenza, Piombino,
Camerino, Urbino, and other regions soon fell under Cesare's heavy hands. A
conspiracy, though, quickly ensued against him. Led by some of the princes
110 Chapter Four

ousted by Borgia, such as the Orsinis and some of Cesare's own captains, such
as Vitellozm Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, and Gianpagolo Baglioni, revolts at
Urbino and elsewhere were temporarily successful. But Louis XII, presumably
savoring his new marriage, pledged additional help. That, along with a rupture
in the solidarity of the conspirators, swung the pendulum in Borgia's favor. For
his part, Cesare managed, through fraud and savagery, at Sinigallia to eliminate
the captains who had betrayed him.
Early in 1503, Borgia went to Rome to track down the last of the Orsinis.
He was amassing troops for a new offensive in central Italy, when both he and
the pope contracted a virulent fever. The pope died. Cesare was incapacitated.
Without his father's support, Borgia's power, especially his alliance with King
Louis XII, softened. Pope Pius 111 replaced Alexander VI, but he was old and ill.
Borgia's hold on conquered regions began to loosen, town by town. Pope Pius
111 died and was replaced by Pope Julius 11, who had long opposed the Borgias.
The new pope demanded all of Cesare's remaining territories be restored to the
church. Borgia was arrested, but was freed when he surrendered his territories.
Borgia went to Naples and was there arrested under order of King Ferdinand of
Spain. He was a prisoner in Spain for two years, but escaped and found refuge at
the court of his brother-in-law, the king of Navarre. He died fighting on his be-
half at Viana.
Unlike other members on the top ten list, Borgia and Machiavelli were con-
temporaries who met several times and sized each other up. Machiavelli was
among a Florentine legation that spent two months with Borgia. Bishop Fran-
cesco Soderini, ambassador of the legation, described Borgia in glowing terms:
This lord is very magnificent and splendid, and so spirited in feats of arms that
there is nothing so great but that it must seem small to him. In the pursuit of
glory and in the acquisitions of dominions he never rests, and he knows neither
danger nor fatigue. He moves so swiftly . . . he knows how to make himself be-
loved to his soldiers and he has in his service the best men of Italy . . . his wit
and eloquence never fail him.6

Machiavelli acknowledges that Borgia acquired power through Fortunu-

namely, his father's influence and allies. Cesare laid the foundations for hture
power, though, by his military and political virtu. His ultimate demise flowed
fiom a change in Fortunu-his own untimely ill health and the death of his fa-
ther (P 7). After Borgia had destroyed the power of the Colomas in Romagna,
he faced several obstacles. He doubted the reliability of his own military forces,
he could not be certain of the continued support of Louis XII, and he doubted
the allegiance of the Orsini troops. His reliance on the military forces and good
will of others was bound to be his undoing (P 7).
Borgia responded resolutely. He moved against the Orsini and Coloma by
luring nobles allied to them in Rome to his side through promises of pensions
and power. After the Orsini and some of Cesare's own captains spawned the
rebellion at Urbino, Borgia hatched the glorious stratagem that won Machia-
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 111

velli's approval. Cleverly hiding his true intentions, Borgia arrived at a rap-
prochement with the Orsini. Their leaders, along with Borgia's formerly traitor-
ous captains, arrived at Sinigallia to celebrate their supposed reunification (P 7,
P 8) Later that night, Vitelli and Oliverotto were strangled. The others were dis-
posed of soon thereafter. Neither man showed moxie at the end. Vitelli begged
that the pope be petitioned to give him a plenary indulgence for his sins.
Oliverotto sobbed and feebly tried to rat out Vitelli as the true and only source
of the injuries perpetrated upon Duke Valentino.
[Borgia] was a ruthless gangster and an expert confidence man, and the revolt
of some of the smaller gangsters, his captains, gave him an opportunity to dis-
play his talents. Machiavelli watched, fascinated, while Cesare, all mildness
and good will, lured his mutinous subordinates into a peace conference, lulled
their fears, invited them to a banquet to celebrate their renewed friendship, and
when they arrived unarmed and unescorted at a rendezvous where Cesare had
hidden his bodyguards, had them seized and murdered. Machiavelli was de-
lighted at the virtuosity of the performance.7

Borgia's telling of this incident differs. He claimed that the Orsini and
Oliverotto, under the guise of reconciliation, had amassed a major military force
at Sinigallia and were planning a h l l scale attack. Borgia took them by surprise
in a classic, justified preemptive strike.*
Another highlight of Borgia's reign, for Machiavelli, occurred in Romagna.
Finding that ineffective nobles had exploited their subjects, and that internal
corruption and destructive conflict-led by hordes of robbers, bandits, and
criminals-were pervasive, Borgia acted decisively. He bestowed complete
power over the region to the cruel, effective, Remiro d'Orco. Quickly, dYOrco
established order through harsh and extralegal means. Then, fearing that the
inhabitants were coming to hate d'Orco, Borgia named a civil court of justice to
investigate complaints against him. The people received the message that Borgia
could be tough-he had appointed d'Orco-and he could be just-as he named
a court to examine d'Orco excesses. To prevent the people ffom wrongly con-
cluding that Borgia was not completely in charge, Cesare had d'Orco killed. For
theatrical and symbolic effect, he had d'Orco sliced in two and the bodily halves
placed in the comers of the town piazza, with a chopping board and a bloody
knife beside them. The citizens of Romagna were at once pleased, awed, and
shocked (P 7).
The conventional interpretation of this horrifying deed is that Borgia used
dYOrco,then disposed of him when convenient and advantageous for Borgia: the
autocratic governor was merely following Cesare's orders and was murdered
when he was no longer required for Borgia's purposes. The more charitable ren-
dering is that d'Orco grossly exceeded what was necessary to pacify Romagna,
expropriated and sold food for his own profit, and was also part of the conspir-
acy-involving Vitelli, the Orsini, and Oliverotto-against Borgia: the tyrant of
112 Chapter Four
Romagna was properly slain for offending Borgia's sense of justice and for plot-
ting against him?
Prior to his father's death, Borgia had gained the friendship of Roman no-
bles, made allegiances in the College of Cardinals, and consolidated his power
in conquered territories. Knowing his father was mortal, Borgia aspired to ac-
quire so much force and influence that he would be able to independently resist
any attack. Cesare, wisely, moved to distance himself from reliance on merce-
nary troops, the French, and the papacy (P 7).
Fortuna, though, turned against Cesare Borgia. He could not complete his
master plan. He and his father were both seriously ill. His father died. Then,
Cesare, his judgment weakened, made a huge mistake. He eventually allowed
Julius I1 to be elected pope. Borgia apparently had enough influence to prevent
this. Cesare agreed to throw his support to Julius. In return, Borgia was to retain
control of conquered land and be placed in charge of the papal army. The great
con man misread Julius's intentions. Predictably, the new pope, a longtime en-
emy of the Borgias who both feared and hated Cesare, reneged on his promises
and moved successfully against him (P 7; D I11 4).
Regarding military matters, Machiavelli called Borgia "a model to be imi-
tated" (P 13; Ltr. 247: 113 1/15). He had used French auxiliary troops to conquer
Imola and Forli. Sensing these were unreliable, he switched to the mercenary
troops of Orsini and Vitelli. Finding these dangerous and treacherous, he under-
stood that he must form and train his own troops. At this point, Borgia's reputa-
tion soared as it was apparent that he was in total command of his own forces (P
13). Machiavelli also praised Borgia's military tactics (D 11 24; AW VII 194).

A proof of the splendid discipline prevailing in Cesar's army is afforded during

his brief sojourn in Pesaro. . . . Occupation by such an m y was, naturally
enough, cause for deep anxiety on the part of a people who were but too well
acquainted with the ways of the fifteenth century men at arms. But here was a
general who knew how to curb and control his soldiers. Under the pain of death
his men were forbidden from indulging any of the predations or violences usual
to their kind.''
Machiavelli admired Cesare Borgia's glowing ambizione, military insight,
ability to practice fraud and administer force, and willingness to do what was
necessary to found or reform a state: "I cannot think of any better example I
could offer a new ruler than that of his actions" (P 7). Borgia, though, does not
occupy the same realm as Romulus, Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus. They were
stunningly more successful, establishing polities that endured; nor did they
commit the sort of major blunder that plagued Borgia.
Machiavelli also uses Borgia indirectly to once again indict the use of
power by the church (P 11). For the most part, Cesare was the instrument of
Pope Alexander VI. He was eventually done in by Pope Julius 11. The church,
yet again, had failed to act in the best interests of the country. It placed its own
interests ahead of the common good.
 Machiavelli's Top Ten

7. Lucius Junius Brutus (ca. 545 BC-ca. 509 BC)

The early Romans bristled under the monarchy of Tarquin the Proud. The
plebeians were forced into oppressive involuntary servitude, the aristocrats were
subject to recurrent purges. The son of Tarquin, Sextus, ignited the flame of
revolution. Sextus, smitten by the beauty of a married woman, Lucretia, made
his intentions known to her. She refused his amorous overtures. Sextus raped
her. Lucretia, upon being released from Sextus's custody, spewed the truth to
her husband and father, then committed suicide.
The masses of Rome, led by Lucius Junius Brutus, revolted and drove Tar-
quin, who quickly lost his pride, out of Rome. Brutus was especially instrumen-
tal in winning the military to his cause. A republic was instituted. Roman leaders
would be elected by an assembly of the entire army; they would serve only one-
year terms, and share political power with a colleague. Brutus and the husband
of Lucretia were elected as the first consuls of Rome.
Brutus restored the power of the senate and the new Roman republic was on
its way. The husband of Lucretia, who was himself a Tarquin, drew suspicion
and was soon forced into exile by the people. Shortly thereafter, agents of Tar-
quin the Proud returned to Rome to discuss the return of the tyrant's personal
property. They also took the opportunity to ferment counter-revolution and
found an unlikely audience in Brutus's wife and two sons. The young men
joined the conspiracy against the republic. Happily, the traitors were exposed
and brought to justice. Brutus had to choose between the rule of law and his
family. He chose the rule of law and all conspirators, including his two sons,
were executed under Brutus's supervision. Tarquin the Proud had not punished
his son, Sextus, for the rape of Lucretia. Brutus could not make the same mis-
take.
Within less than a year, Brutus, who now passionately despised all Tar-
quins, led the military defense when Tarquin the Proud's Etruscan allies
marched on Rome. Legend has it that one of Tarquin's sons and Brutus clashed
head-on, each dying at the hands of the other.
The English novelist, E. M. Forster (1879-1970)' famously intoned that "If
I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I
should have the guts to betray my country." The Roman historian, Plutarch (ca.
45-ca. 120), as evidenced by his description of Lucius Brutus, would probably
have agreed.
That ancient Brutus was of a severe and inflexible nature, like steel of too hard
a temper, and having never had his character softened by study and thought, he
let himself be so far transported with his rage and hatred against tyrants, that,
for conspiring with them, he proceeded to the execution even of his own sons."

Not so, Machiavelli. The Florentine hails Brutus as "the father of Roman
liberty." Recognizing that condemning two sons and supervising their execution
114 Chapter Four

is extraordinarily harsh, Machiavelli excuses, even commends, Brutus's action

as required for the preservation of freedom. Brutus publicly and decisively de-
stroyed those who sought to overturn the newly-formed republic. Machiavelli
reminds everyone that hostility to the state is not mollified by time or gifts (D 111
1; D 111 3). The horrifjring actions of Brutus are classic cases of evil well-used.
The survival of a new state requires extraordinary men willing to perform, at
times, acts that shock the conscience. Machiavelli insists that "killing the sons of
Brutus''-a metaphor for destroying those plotting against self-government-is
the most effective and reliable means of preserving a state that has recently ac-
quired freedom (D I 16; D 111 1; D 111 3). Brutus enforced the law and levied the
ultimate punishment upon his own blood. Machiavelli nods approvingly and
reminds us that he "loves his country more than his soul."

8. Lycurgus (ca. 850 BC)

The legend of Lycurgus underscores the austerity, strength, and civic-
mindedness of the warrior society, Sparta. According to Plutarch, Lycurgus was
seemingly in line to inherit one of the two kingships of Sparta when his father
and older brother died. One complicating factor, though, remained. His older
brother predeceased his pregnant wife. If she gave birth to a boy he would be the
proper heir of the kingdom. The woman, sensing opportunity and placing per-
sonal advancement above maternal instinct, offered to abort the fetus if and only
if Lycurgus would marry her and make her queen. Lycurgus feigned agreement
but insisted that the pregnant woman not risk her health by undergoing an abor-
tion. Lycurgus would see to it that upon its birth the baby would be destroyed.
When the baby was born and brought to him, Lycurgus celebrated the infant
as one of the rightful kings of Sparta. The citizens of Sparta, highly impressed
by a man who would yield kingly power out of principle, insisted that Lycurgus
rule in his capacity as guardian of the newborn. As we might suspect, the
spurned mother of the newborn, her relatives, and conniving associates were
dissatisfied with the proposed arrangement. They spread lies and conspired to
poison popular opinion against Lycurgus. Troubled by such treacheries, Lycur-
gus decided to leave Sparta and travel until the kingly succession was sorted out.
Lycurgus visited Crete, Ionia, and Egypt. He studied literature, politics, and
military matters. Predictably, the Spartans, acknowledging Lycurgus's exem-
plary character, pleaded with him to return as king. Prior to accepting, Lycurgus
visited the Delphic Oracle for guidance. The oracle assured Lycurgus that the
state that adopted his laws would become the most famous in the land.
Lycurgus introduced a senate with power equal to the two royal houses of
Sparta. The people voted on crucial questions, but the senate decided when such
votes were taken. He reformed land ownership, dividing real estate equally. His
goal was to eliminate the crux of crime, envy, and civic divisiveness: the pursuit
of luxury.
Lycurgus banned ownership of gold and silver, allowing only money made
of iron. The iron was brittle and lacked inherent value. Imports of luxuries, rob-
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 115

bery, and bribery allegedly disappeared 6om Sparta forthwith. Civil lawsuits,
poverty, and covetous economic striving were replaced by equality and inde-
pendence.
He banned all unnecessary occupations. The race for wealth became point-
less. All meals, consisting of simple, bland food, were eaten together at public
facilities. Critically, Lycurgus claimed that his laws were underwritten by the
Delphic Oracle, who was an intermediary of the god Apollo. The laws were not
to be put in writing. Instead, they would be impressed upon the minds of citizens
through education, custom, and habit. Accordingly, Lycurgus focused on strictly
organizing the education of children, including the relations between men and
women. He also attended to military policy, including the use of music to stir
martial emotions.
Helots, slaves conquered by the Dorians, performed the manual labor.
Sparta, fearing influences that might corrupt its system, banned foreign travel
and foreign visitors. When Lycurgus was confident that his laws and educational
reforms had been internalized, he called the citizens to an assembly and told
them he was traveling to consult the Delphic Oracle on a most important matter.
He implored the two kings, the senate, and the people to swear to obey the es-
tablished laws and not to change them until he returned. They complied readily.
Lycurgus departed. He never returned.
Machiavelli salutes Lycurgus as the sole author of laws that promoted
Sparta's flourishing for eight-hundred years because they served the common
good (D I 2; D I 9); for establishing a constitution with distinct roles for kings,
aristocracy, and the people that resulted in internal harmony for eight centuries
(D I 2); and for establishing equality of wealth and less equality of status such
that the populace was less ambitious for power, as only a few citizens held posi-
tions of political stature and they lived removed fkom the people (D I 6). The
masses did not fear their rulers and did not seek political power because the
kings were appointed to ofice, influenced by the aristocratic senate, and their
best guarantee for remaining in power was to secure the people 6om harm (D I
6). Unsurprising, Lycurgus wisely appealed to divine authority as the source of
his founding laws (D I 1I).
Lycurgus's phobias against foreign influences wrought mixed blessings.
Lycurgus conceived of an insular, self-sufficient polity with limited material
needs. This aspiration nurtured internal harmony-as corrupting influences were
minimized and a smaller populace is more easily governed than larger units (D I
6). But by prohibiting immigration and foreign trade, Sparta's population was
relatively stagnant. This prevented Sparta from becoming a thriving expansionist
state (D I1 3).
Lycurgus, though, manifests the classic attributes of a successful founding
politician. He embodied political virtir, he prudently used religion in service of
the common good, and he had a clear vision of the best governmental constitu-
tion for his time and place. While he was not required to slay any relatives, dis-
116 Chapter Four
pose of large segments of his own people, or lead any stirring military con-
quests, Lycurgus exemplifies the consummate Machiavellian law-giver.

9. Marcus Furius Camillus (ca. 447 BC-ca. 365 BC)

Camillus served the Roman republic as a censor, military tribune (six
times), and dictator (five times). The post of dictator was instituted in times of
crisis and for a short term. Separating truth fiom fiction in the legend of Camil-
lus, as with so many ancient heroes, is often impossible.
Camillus's first major military success was the defeat of Veii, a strong, cul-
turally advanced Etruscan city, through siege. Camillus seized an impressive
Veian statue of Juno, queen of the gods, and returned it to Rome. Shortly there-
after, Camillus prevailed against Falerii in a unique fashion. The tutor of chil-
dren of prominent Falerian families conspired to place himself in a favored posi-
tion. He presented the children entrusted to him to the Romans and assured
Camillus that the Falerians would surrender once they understood whom Camil-
lus held hostage. Camillus, with keen and unflinching conviction in the Roman
military way, refused the treachery. He then returned the sniveling tutor back to
Falerii under custody of the children. The Falerians, impressed by Camillus's
honor and integrity, surrendered.
One would think that such a glorious victory, won by exemplary character
and not through bloodshed, would have been an unambiguous triumph for the
noble Camillus. Not exactly. His soldiers aspired to plunder Falerii and were
also rankled by Camillus's distribution of the plunder garnered from Veii. These
misgivings, along with slander spread by a few envious Roman power-brokers,
led to charges of misappropriation of state funds. Camillus was forced into exile.
Meanwhile, huge trouble was brewing. The fearsome Gauls attacked the
Romans at Allia, just eleven miles outside the capitol. Roman allies deserted, the
Roman army was outflanked, and Rome was about to fall into the barbaric
clutches of the enemy. The Romans play their trump card: they recalled Marcus
Furius Camillus and appointed him Dictator. Camillus gathered up the remain-
ing soldiers strewn about the countryside and marched on Rome. The Romans in
the capitol had agreed to pay the Gauls a handsome ransom. As the ransom was
being weighed, it became clear that the Gauls had altered the scales to exact a
higher ransom than the agreement had decreed. When the Romans called them
on this chicanery, the Gauls sneered, "Woe to the conquered." Such arrogance
rarely goes unrequited. Camillus arrived with his army and, after assessing the
situation, informed the haughty Gallics that Rome had decided to pay them not
with gold, but with steel. The Romans, under Camillus, defeated the Gauls, who
presumably salvaged their crooked weighing scale and returned home.
The Latins and Volscians, sensing opportunity, attacked Rome almost im-
mediately. Camillus and his army had enough remaining verve to repel the at-
tack. After this victory, a large segment of the populace, fearing the city of
Rome was becoming too alluring a military target, expressed a desire to emi-
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 117

grate to Veii. Camillus and other patriots argued against this and their passionate
entreaties won the day.
But twenty years after their victory at Allia, the Gauls, proving that the
world cannot keep grasping barbarians down for long, again attacked the Ro-
mans at the River Anio. The aging Camillus, who had studied Gallic military
tactics intensely, engineered yet another Roman victory. As one of his final po-
litical acts, Camillus resolved a raging, internal conflict between the Roman
nobles and the Roman masses: He convinced the senate to thereafter elect one
patrician, representing the nobles, and one plebian, representing the masses, to
share the post of consul. Soon after, Camillus contracted and died from the
plague.
Machiavelli cites the case of Camillus as illustrating the dangers of slander
in a republic. Despite his deserved reputation, excellent character, military and
political virtir, and widespread admiration from the Roman masses, Camillus
was susceptible to the slanderous treacheries of a few envious Roman connivers,
particularly Manlius Capitolinus (D I 8: D 111 8). The Florentine celebrates Ca-
millus as a leader who knew how to use religion in service of military and po-
litical success, both for securing the statue of Juno and in keeping his soldiers
prepared for attack (D I 12: D I 13). Machiavelli talks of how Fortuna gave
Rome a horrifying shock-the invasion by Gaul-but did not want to destroy
Rome. Fortuna, then, allowed for the exile of Camillus but not his death, as he
was apparently the only general capable of turning back the invaders (D I1 29).
Most important, Machiavelli takes Camillus as a man of military and political
virtir, who overcame the envy of others once conditions dangerous to Rome
loomed and the masses understood that Camillus had used the office of dictator
only to serve the common good, not for personal gain, and that Rome required
his unique abilities to stave off disaster (D 111 30). So well had Camillus organ-
ized and trained his army that he was able to elevate their morale in one battle
where they were badly outnumbered by merely reminding them to maintain their
poise and focus on doing what they were used to doing. Another stirring exam-
ple of Roman magnanimity, this (D 111 3 1).

10. Marcus Aurelius (121-180)

Marcus Aurelius embodied the ideal of the philosopher-king. He reigned as
Roman emperor from 161 until his death. Although not a stunningly original
thinker, Marcus exemplified and refined Stoicism. As a ruler, Marcus Aurelius
was moderate, just, and effective during troubled times. The fabled Pax Romana
was breaking down. Marcus struggled with internal discord-aggravated by
natural disasters such as famines and plagues-and external threats from Ger-
manic tribes in the north and Parthians in the east. But Marcus persevered and
improved social conditions for the disadvantaged, slaves, and criminals. He also
fiercely persecuted Christians, particularly in Gaul, because he viewed them as
superstitious immoralists whose values jeopardized the principles underlying
118 Chapter Four

Roman greatness.
The family life of Marcus Aurelius was troubled. His wife, Faustina, was
rumored to be an instigator of a conspiracy against Marcus, while his son,
Cornmodus-who was widely thought to be the product of Faustina's adulterous
affair with a gladiator-was anxiously eyeing the throne. One school of thought
is that Marcus was poisoned by a medical doctor in the employ of Comrnodus.
Once Comrnodus assumed power at Marcus's death, his reign exhibited ex-
cesses of corruption, sadism, cruelty, and debauchery similar to those that de-
voured the terms of Nero and Caligula.
In The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, historian Edward Gibbon de-
scribed Marcus Aurelius7slife:
His life was the noblest commentary on the precepts of Zeno [founder of Stoi-
cism]. He was severe to himself, indulgent to the imperfections of others, just
and beneficient to all mankind. He regretted that Avidius Cassius, who excited
a rebellion in Syria, had disappointed him, by a voluntary death, of the pleasure
of converting an enemy into a friend; and he justified the sincerity of that sen-
timent, by moderating the zeal of the senate against the adherents of the traitor.
War he detested . . . but when the necessity of a just defence called upon him to
take up arms, he readily exposed his person to eight winter campaigns on the
fiozen banks of the Danube, the severity of which was at last fatal to the weak-
ness of his constitution. His memory was revered by a gratehl posterity, and
above a century after his death, many persons preserved the image of Marcus,
among those of their household gods.'2
The gods of the Greco-Roman world did not provide clear rules of behavior
for everyday life. Human beings living during those periods observed natural
phenomena and their own personal qualities. Lacking a refined science to pro-
vide explanations, they mythologized their observations into a pantheon of dei-
ties-fertility, love, pestilence, famine, thunder, rain, power, anger, and the like,
were all represented. Stories were conjured that accounted for the occurrence of,
say, famine-the governing deity in this area must have been offended by hu-
man conduct. Elaborate ceremonies intended to please the gods were estab-
lished, as well as rituals of atonement after the gods had been offended and had
retaliated. Beyond the felt need to curry favor with the gods and avoid divine
retribution, few specific principles of behavior followed. Philosophy was the
discipline that filled this void and tried to answer the hndamental questions of
human existence: What is the good life? Why am I here? What, if anything, is
my destiny? How should I live my life?
For around five centuries, philosophical schools of thought such as Stoi-
cism, Epicureanism, Cynicism, Socratic-Platonism, among others, competed for
advocates and disciples. Romans were generally tolerant of foreign deities and
religious practices. But Christianity, as viewed by Marcus Aurelius and many
others, was founded on passiveness and, at best, muted allegiance to the state.
These values were unsuited to the continued vitality of the Roman Empire. Con-
ventional Roman wisdom insisted that veneration of the state was required of all
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 119

good citizens. Christianity, influenced strongly by Platonism, adamantly con-

tended that this world is a pale imitation of a higher reality. Where, as here, for-
eign religious practices were inconsistent with the values of Roman greatness,
tolerance was misplaced. Accordingly, Gibbon's commentary to the contrary
notwithstanding-Marcus Aurelius was "beneficient to all mankind"--the em-
peror expressed no qualms about his persecution of Christians.
Marcus Aurelius composed his Meditations during the time he was repel-
ling an insurrection in the Danube. The work consists of reflections, aphorisms,
and principles by which good people should live their lives. A historically influ-
ential text, the Meditations crystallize Marcus's refinement of the Stoic tradition.
At the crux of Stoicism are commitments to inner harmony, and single-minded
pursuit of virtue.
If we take this position firmly, expecting nothing and avoiding nothing, but in-
stead remaining content simply that we have conducted ourselves in accordance
with what we know to be right, and with truthfulness with our fellow man, then
this is the path to a happy life, and there is no man or god who can prevent us
from following it."

The Stoics defined happiness as inner tranquility. Their recipe for attaining
happiness included minimizing desire, controlling our own judgments and atti-
tudes, and acting in accord with natural law. Stoics explained how and why fol-
lowing this recipe makes us happy by analyzing human desire and our relation-
ship to the world.
The broader critique of Stoicism is by now a clichk. While Stoicism can
bring consolation to those struggling under harsh conditions, its expectations are
too low for general use. The expansive richness and creativity of human experi-
ence are sacrificed on the altar of accommodation. Although it does not insist on
passivity, Stoicism inclines in that direction. Outlooks such as Stoicism, that
appeal to fate have trouble accounting for robust action. Stoicism's kernel of
insight--do not dwell on misfortune, put suffering behind you, do not become
intoxicated with unimportant pursuits or frivolous desires-is obscured by its
demand that nothing else matters that much. Even on its own terms it fails to
distinguish earned tranquility from simulated tranquility. If Bob is peaceful be-
cause he has been hypnotized into thinking his life is other than what it is, or
because he has been drugged, then his tranquility does not translate into a wor-
thy happiness. Instead, it is merely a simulated, unearned state of mind. Bob has
been tricked into thinking his unsatisfying life is satisfying. Worthwhile happi-
ness must be earned, not merely induced. Stoicism, though, wisely points out
that happiness is not simply achieving a set of external conditions, not just flour-
ishing. Happiness requires some fit between a person's expectations and results,
as well as an extended internal peace.
Part of the greatness of Marcus Aurelius is that he sensed weaknesses in
Stoic doctrine and tried to refine it. For example, he understood well the Stoic
120 Chapter Four
conviction that if one chooses not to value anything in life-other than the
agency one has over his or her own judgments and attitudes-then one cannot
lose anything of value. But Marcus concluded this conviction signals a retreat,
even a withdrawal, from the world. He anticipated, then, a modem criticism of
Stoic rectitude. For Marcus Aurelius, worldly engagement entailed that we must
risk disappointment in the results of our projects and sorrow at the loss of those
people whom we cherished.
He also adjusted classical Stoicism's division of phenomena into things
fully under our control and everything else. Instead of siding with the inflexible
Stoic orthodoxy that a person's will is sufficient for making morally correct
choices, Marcus Aurelius concluded that the will must be helped by things not
under its control. In such matters, human will "needs the help of the gods and
fortune."14 Marcus, then, ends up with three categories of phenomena: those
fully under the control of a person's will, those outside the control of human
will, and those partially under and partially outside the control of human will.
Sometimes we should invest significant emotion in events over which we
have no control and which do not seriously harm the common good. The loss of
people whom we cherished and the destruction of our dearest projects are two
such cases. Even if those losses do not measurably detract from the common
good and even if we have no control over them, sorrow is appropriate. Marcus
Aurelius intuited that suffering, contrary to orthodox Stoicism, is not an evil as
such. Our struggles with suffering are a crucial part of creating worthy selves.
The possibility of cosmic meaninglessness, the lack of any inherent order
and purpose in our world, repelled Marcus Aurelius. He prefigured the existen-
tial tension of the twentieth century: Human beings have a compelling need to
understand reality in meaningful and purposive ways, but the cosmos seems
indifferent to our yearnings. Marcus responds through faith--belief, conviction,
and action in the face of radical uncertainty. Again adjusting Stoic orthodoxy
and refusing to accept cosmic meaninglessness because doing so devalued hu-
man intellect and reason, he places his faith in a type of pantheism. The divine is
the universe and all things, including human beings.
All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is
hardly anything unconnected with any other things. For things have been coor-
dinated, and they combine to make up the same universe. For there is one uni-
verse made up of all things, and one od who pervades all things, and one sub-
stance, and one law, and one reason.,B
The eternal journey of the divine is assumed to be worthy and grand, al-
though ineffable. Marcus Aurelius locates the meaning of human life in its role
in advancing the divine goal. The divine, for Marcus, is not an independent be-
ing or substance, but rather the process of glorious cosmic evolution toward
more valuable ends.
Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance and
one soul; and observe how all things have reference to one perception, the per-
 Machiavelli's Top Ten
ception of this one living being; and how all things act with one movement; and
how all things are the cooperating causes of all things which exist; observe too
the continuous spinning of the thread and the contexture of the web.I6
As a faith, Marcus Aurelius understood that his world view could not be in-
dependently and rationally proved. His faith, though, spawned a practical advan-
tage: it vivified engagement with the world and nourished healthy human rela-
tions. A worthwhile human life must be purposive. The highest human purpose
is contribution to society. The most valuable human skills are scarce and make
the greatest positive impact on the common good.
Marcus Aurelius, unsurprisingly, advised us to accept our mortality and
view death as transmutation and not as an end. Part of our gratitude for our lives
required that we perceive our deaths as necessary for the cosmic cycle. He does
not champion personal immortality. Instead, our souls persist after death only to
reenter the cosmos and the flow of nature.
Machiavelli describes Marcus as "unassuming, a lover of justice, hater of
cruelty, sympathetic and kind" (P 19). He is singled out as a ruler who lived
honorably, was widely respected because of his great virtic, was never hated, and
was steadfastly able to maintain the military and the masses in their appropriate
roles (P 19). Marcus Aurelius is offered as a paradigm of a "prince" who ruled
effectively and garnered glory in preserving a well-established state (P 19). Al-
though Marcus inherited rule of Rome, his was not a hereditary monarchy be-
cause Marcus had been adopted, in part because of the early recognition of his
superior character. As evidence of Marcus's effectiveness, Machiavelli remarks
that Marcus did not need praetorian guards or specific legions to defend himself.
Instead, his way of life, the good will of the people, and the esteem of the Ro-
man Senate was suflcient for his security (D I 10). Although not explicitly
stated by Machiavelli, Marcus Aurellus also stands as an emperor who wisely
employed religion and philosophy to underwrite strong arms and strong laws, all
of which nourish civic virtic. Moreover, Marcus was firmly rooted in living the
right sort of life in this world, unlike Christianity which sought redemption and
personal immortality in a transcendent realm. Although Machiavelli preferred
republics to principalities, he lavished expansive praise on the few emperors,
such as Marcus Aurelius, who ruled honorably, in service to the common good,
and with the result of increased civic virtir. In fact, Machiavelli describes only
two Roman emperors with the honorific term "virtir":Marcus Aurelius and the
wicked, but often effective, Septimus Severus.

B. Bottom Ten
1. The Christian Church
Machiavelli's criticisms of Christian religion flow through all his writings.
122 Chapter Four

While he recognizes and celebrates the role that religion should have in creating
a healthy, expansionist republic, he sharply rebukes the role that Christianity has
taken in Italy.
First, he bemoans the values Christianity has embraced. Roman religion ad-
vocated greatness of spirit, bravery, boldness, physical action, vigor, passion,
and the quest for worldly glory. Christianity venerates humbleness, contempla-
tion, softness, indolence, suffering as the road to redemption, and disdain of
worldly honor. In a critique that prefigures that of Nietzsche, Machiavelli argues
that Christianity has weakened the conditions required to promote military and
political virtir, and has thereby fostered civic corruption and ozio. Enduring suf-
fering without complaint replaced overcoming resistance and obstacles. Casting
a too appreciative gaze toward eternal salvation, Christianity has debased the
material values that spawn earthly glory. As a result, Machiavelli concludes that
the people have degenerated to the status of animo efeminato (D I pref.; D I1 2;
D I 11).
Second, Machiavelli attacks the political strategies Christianity favored.
Constantly aligning itself with this or that foreign dominator, the Church en-
sured that Italy remained fragmented and easy prey for barbarians. Instead of
subjugating regional princes, the Church brought in a foreign oppressor to sub-
due any Italian prince who was seemingly strong enough to unity the country. In
so doing, Christianity kept sharp focus on its own aggrandizement and power to
the exclusion of developing wider civic virtir (P 12; D I 12; P 6; P 3).
Third, the Florentine laments opportunities squandered. Religion has spe-
cial authority to command the obedience of human beings, to establish order and
security, to ordain salutary laws, to reinforce military and civic discipline, and to
energize respect for the common good. Instead, Christianity, by the values it
embraced and the self-serving political strategies it employed, nurtured only
civic weakness (D I 12; D I 13; D I 1; D I 11).
Fourth, Machiavelli excoriates the hypocrisy of the church hierarchy. While
living as pampered and corrupt authorities, they preached the virtues of poverty,
austerity, and humility. The result was a loosening of piety and religious devo-
tion among the people. Lacking glowing religious examples, the people, to the
detriment of the common good, have become irreligious and evil (D I 12; D I11
1).
In sum, the Roman Catholic Church requires a complete redirection, per-
haps a retum to founding principles, in order to assume its rightfbl function in
the revitalization of Italy.

2. Gaius Julius Caesar (100 BC-44 BC)

As a young man, Julius Caesar was captured by pirates. Although not in a
strong taunting position, he purportedly swore to his captors that he would track
them down and crucify them once he was freed from their clutches. After being
ransomed, Caesar fulfilled his oath. This tale better captures the character of
Caesar than does any battlefield account of his destruction of the Gauls, any
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 123

story of political maneuvering with Pompey and Crassus, or any rendition of his
numerous stirring speeches.
Either the legend of Caesar's insolence in the face of his pirate captors is
true or it is false. If true, we enjoy the vision of a relentless warrior, confident
even when seemingly confronting hopeless odds and a resolute enemy. If false,
we chuckle at the shameless self-promotion of a youth turning desperate adver-
sity into practical, political advantage. In either case, Caesar did hunt and slay
the offending pirates. You do not tug on Superman's cape, you do not spit into
the wind, and you surely do not accost, threaten, or falsely confine Gaius Julius
Caesar.
In a world where a small, gifted class of men smolder with ambizione, Cae-
sar was aflame. He served as aedile at the age of thirty-five and two years later
wangled the post of pontifex maximus, probably through bribery. A year later,
he became praetor. After serving as governor of Spain, he formed a political
triumvirate with the wealthy Crassus and the great general, Pompey. His older,
more experienced partners assumed they could use Caesar for their own pur-
poses then discard him when convenient. They were dialing a radically wrong
number.
With the help of the triumvirate, he was elected as a consul in 59 BC. He
proved to be a gifted politician who was able to enact the triumvirate's political
program despite strong opposition in the senate. Within a year, Caesar launched
a ten year campaign in Gaul. He served as his own military propagandist, com-
posing The Conquest of Gaul in a lean, crisp rhetorical style. Critics in the sen-
ate objected that the Gallic war was conducted more to satisfy Caesar's bound-
less quest for glory and riches than for definable Roman purposes. This was
Caesar's launching pad for his major aspiration: to become absolute ruler of the
Roman republic. With added wealth, military reputation, and a loyal, expanding
army, Caesar laid the foundations to attain that goal. He proved during the Gal-
lic campaigns that he was Rome's greatest general.
His enemies in the senate, especially Cato the Younger (95 BC-46 BC), an
uncompromising advocate of traditional Roman republican values, issued an
ultimatum: Caesar must resign as pro-counsel of Gaul, yield his army, and return
to Rome. Upon his return, his opponents would levy charges against him, de-
stroy him politically, and call for his exile.
After failing in attempts to negotiate his way out of the impasse, Caesar and
his army crossed the Rubicon River, the boundary of his province, and marched
on Rome. Civil war ensued. Pompey led the forces of Caesar's senate enemies.
Caesar marched through Italy into Rome, meeting weak resistance. At the battle
of Pharsalus in 48 BC, Caesar's forces, although badly outnumbered, routed
Pompey's army. Caesar showed mercy at the end of the battle, insisting on no
unnecessary killings or reprisals. Following Pompey to Egypt, he installed Cleo-
patra, who bore him a son, as queen.
After campaigns in Africa, Asia, and Spain, Caesar had eliminated all seri-
124 Chapter Four

ous senate opposition and he had achieved his ultimate goal: he was absolute
master of Rome. By 44 BC, Caesar was declared Dictator for Life. He dressed in
the fashion of the ancient Roman kings, but rejected that title. Caesar did not
embark on any radical reforms, content, instead, to enjoy the trappings of power
and privilege while reigning pragmatically. Always restless, Caesar strategized a
war against Parthia. Prior to his embarking, a conspiracy, led by Marcus Iunius
Brutus, Cassius Longinus, and a host of senators, was hatched. Although the
plan was not a closely guarded secret, the assassins slew Caesar by brutally
stabbing him repeatedly at the feet of a statue of Pornpey. The Ides of March has
never been the same.
Machiavelli is remarkably contemptuous of Caesar. With other members on
his bottom ten list, he typically mentions the brutal effectiveness of their efforts
or their military virtu even though his overall evaluation is decidedly negative.
With Caesar, Machiavelli is unsparingly critical. The only positive remark about
Caesar, despite his undeniable prowess as a warrior and military strategist, in
The Prince and The Discourses is that he used the money of others wisely-
Caesar plundered and pillaged his military victims, and used that money gener-
ously instead of squandering his own wealth or that of the Romans (P 16). (In
fairness, Machiavelli does examine Caesar's military virtu in The Art of War
[AW 1 34; 2 55-56; 3 96; 4 111, 120, 123-4; 5 146-7; 6 1756, 178-9; 7 201,
2 111.)
Machiavelli contrasts the tyrannical Caesar with the civic-minded Scipio; he
chastises those who have been mesmerized by Caesar's power and apparent suc-
cess; he sneers at Caesar as an evil-doer; as the destroyer of Rome; as the man
who placed the yoke of slavery on the necks of Romans, while blinding the peo-
ple to that reality; he labels Caesar a tyrant who exploited the corruption of the
people for his own benefit; he depicts Caesar as a man who greedily abused the
office of Dictator by extending the term of that office without authorization from
the people (D I 10; D I 17; D I 29; D I 34; AW 1 17). In contrast to warriors and
politicians who channel their personal ambition to found or reform states in the
long-term interests of the common good, Machiavelli concludes that Caesar was
a rabid opportunist who drove the final nail of tyranny into a corrupt republic.

3. Utopianism
Philosophers such as Plato, St. Thomas More, and countless other philoso-
phers sketched what they took to be perfect polities. Given their aims-refining
the human mind, attaining eternal salvation, establishing peace and harmony,
advancing human understanding-they crafted societal structures, laws, domes-
tic and foreign policies, organs of enforcement, and political institutions that
facilitated their ends. Their method was utopian: constructing an ideal city or
state to demonstrate what perfect human relations and life would reflect. Uto-
pian thinkers do not claim that their master plans could ever be realized, but
insist that their political creations represent ideals by which we can measure
existing states. As with all ideals, we should strive toward utopian prescriptions
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 125

while understanding that, at best, only approximations are possible. The closer
we can live up to those ideals the better human life will be. Our utopian ideals,
then, serve as mirrors which evaluate the political realities that human beings
construct.
Machiavelli sternly rebukes utopian methodology as unhelpful and, worse,
as dangerous. We should not operate fiom our imagination or fantasies. To do so
is to play the fool in the complex zero-sum game of international politics. We
must, instead, develop our political theory and practice fiom the way states actu-
ally exist and operate. We must learn from history-particularly from the exam-
ples of ancient Greek and Rome, and from contemporary agents-and develop a
science of politics based on the unfolding of events in the world. Utopias are for
dreamers. Machiavelli aims to change the world, or at least describe and explain
the world so well politically that those who have the power can flourish on the
competitive battlegrounds of military and political affairs. Men of military and
political virtir should not indulge their wish fulfillments or waste time in politi-
cal fantasy. To succeed, they must grapple with Fortuna while being acutely
aware of the actual ways of the world (P ded.; P 18; P 26; D ded.).
Although Machiavelli did not labor at archival history, his selection and un-
derstanding of examples were often distorted, and his political science was al-
most always in service of his predetermined conclusions, his self-image was
anti-utopian. Even the greatest thinkers fall prey to self-deception and psycho-
logical denial.

4. Oliverotto Euffreducci (Oliverotto da Fermo) (ca. 1475 BC-

1502 BC)
The short, colorfbl life of Oliverotto Euffieducci illustrates the limitations
of pursuing ambizione only for personal gain. Oliverotto was raised by a mater-
nal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, a leading figure in Fermo. As soon as practicable,
Oliverotto joined the mercenary forces of Paolo Vitelli. He fought for Vitelli on
behalf of the French at Pisa and Naples. In 1499, the Vitelli army was fighting
for the Florentines against Pisa. Florence accused Paolo and Oliverotto of trea-
son. Paolo was executed, but Oliverotto was freed because of the intervention of
the political leaders of Fermo. Oliverotto then joined with Paolo's brother, Vitel-
lozzo Vitelli, and served Cesare Borgia. Due to his boldness, developing mili-
tary virtir, and passionate character, Oliverotto rose in the ranks to become sec-
ond only to Vitellozzo. The Vitelli mercenaries were critical to Borgia's
conquest of Piombino.
A man of Oliverotto's ambizione, ability, and self-image cannot remain a
second banana for long. He concocted a plan to seize control of Fermo, enlisting
the support of Vitellozzo and of self-serving malcontents within Fermo.
Oliverotto wrote to his uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and asked for an invitation to
return to Fermo and reacquaint himself with his childhood. He added that he had
126 Chapter Four

entered the military to gain honor and he would arrive at Fermo with one hun-
dred men-as a way of showing the citizens of Fermo that he had used his time
away from home wisely. Oliverotto assured his uncle that his return would bring
honor to everyone involved. In short, Oliverotto painted an appealing picture of
"local boy makes good" and returns home in gratitude to appreciative homefolks
(P 8).
Uncle Giovanni bought the act-hook, line, and sinker. Giovanni saw to it
that his nephew was accorded every honor and all due respect by the citizens of
Fermo. He ensured that Oliverotto lodged at his home. Oliverotto, after transact-
ing the required arrangements, invited his uncle and the most influential citizens
of Fermo to an elaborate feast. After the meal and appropriate entertainment,
Oliverotto began discussing serious political and religious matters. When the
others began contributing to the discussion, he suggested they all retire to a more
private room to continue the conversation. As soon as they all entered that room,
Oliverotto's soldiers fell upon and murdered Giovanni and the others (P 8).
Oliverotto then mounted his steed, took possession of Fermo, and lay siege
to the government building. The remaining authorities, sensing the political tide
was swaying radically, pledged to obey Oliverotto and agreed to set up a new
regime with Oliverotto at its head. Within a year, Oliverotto was securely en-
trenched at Fermo, having established new military and political structures (P 8).
Oliverotto conquered Camerino on behalf of Borgia, then played a role in
the mounting conspiracy against Duke Valentino. Just as he was about to pursue
the expansion of his authority to other towns, Oliverotto met his master. Poetic
justice and, probably, political justice was served by Borgia's plot at Sinigallia,
which climaxed with the strangulation of Oliverotto. Fittingly, Borgia's attack
bore striking resemblances to Oliverotto's treachery at Fermo.
Why, then, does Borgia make Machiavelli's top ten, while Oliverotto is
consigned to Machiavelli's bottom ten? Although noting Oliverotto's military
virtir, Machiavelli suggests that Oliverotto, instead of acting to inaugurate a new
state or reform a corrupt state, enslaved a state that was otherwise viable.
Oliverotto acted selfishly and only in pursuit of his own ambizione, not in long-
term service to the common good; he murdered a relative and fellow citizens in
the course of destroying Fermo; and his purposes did not lead to enhanced order,
security, and the preconditions for civic virtir. Oliverotto clearly lacked political
virtir, civic virtQ and moral virtir. Oliverotto destroyed Fermo and continued evil
well beyond the time and extent necessary. Rightly or wrongly, Machiavelli
judges otherwise with regard to Cesare Borgia. For the Florentine, Borgia was in
the process of reforming the corrupt state of Romagna by ensuring order, secu-
rity, stability, and new laws-ingredients of the recipe required for developing
civic virtir.

5. Agathocles of Syracuse (361 BC-289 BC)

A poor, but honest potter's son, Agathocles raged with ambizione. He
joined the military as soon as possible and rose step by step until he was su-
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 127

preme commander. Agathocles wanted more. Prefiguring Julius Caesar, he

sought absolute power. Pursuant to that aspiration, he entered into a conspiracy
with a Carthaginian general who was mounting a military campaign in Sicily.
One bright, sunny morning, Agathocles, under cover of discussing political
issues, convened the senate of Syracuse and its wealthiest, most influential citi-
zens. At a prearranged signal, soldiers murdered the entire lot of Syracuse's fin-
est. With few obstacles remaining, Agathocles, after less than thorough consid-
eration of alternatives, named himself absolute ruler of Syracuse. Later, the
Carthaginians defeated his army twice and advanced to the walls of Syracuse.
There Agathocles left part of his army to defend the city and transported the rest
to Africa to attack Carthage. He proved an able commander, forcing Carthage to
release its siege of Syracuse and seriously threatening to overrun the Carthagin-
ians that stayed home. Carthage sued for peace, agreeing to leave Sicily in return
for its security in Africa (P 8).
Machiavelli recognizes Agathocles's military virtic, his skill in working
himself up through the ranks, the boldness of his tactics, his eagerness to con-
front danger and take risks, and his successful quest for power. Little, if any, of
Agathocles's success could be attributed to Fortuna. Still, Machiavelli is criti-
cal:
One ought not, of course, to call it virtir to massacre one's fellow citizens, to
betray one's friends, to break one's word, to be without mercy, and without re-
ligion. By such means one can acquire power but not glory (P8).

Agathocles was an admirable general: brave, strong, overcoming resistance

and adversity. But his long-term cruelty ill-used, brutality, and wickedness rele-
gate him to infamy. In short, much like Oliverotto and Caesar, he lacked politi-
cal, moral, and civic virtic. Agathocles, in the short run, used cruelty well, but in
the long run he enslaved a free state. The selfish ambizione and inhumane pur-
poses of the tyrant cannot merit glory, for Machiavelli. Murdering one's fellow
citizens and betraying one's friends are acceptable only in service of humane
purposes such as founding a state or reforming a corrupt state. Similar brutality
perpetrated against a military enemy is often a required part of military virtir.

6. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (163 BC-133 BC) and Gaius

Sempronius Gracchus (153 BC-121 BC) (The Gracchi Broth-
ers)
The Gracchi brothers were grandsons of the fabled Scipio Africanus, con-
queror of Carthage in the Second Punic War in 202 BC. Tiberius, following in
his grandfather's tradition, won a military prize for being the first combatant to
scale Carthage's walls during the final destruction of that city in 146 BC. He
next served under Hostilius Mancinus in a campaign against the Celtiberians.
Mancinus's strategies failed and only a negotiated peace was possible. The
128 Chapter Four
Celtiberians, untrusting of Romans generally, would talk only with Tiberius
Gracchus, who hammered out a fair, honorable peace. The compromise saved
much of the Roman army, but if Tiberius was expecting laurels he was stun-
ningly mistaken. The Roman people were accustomed to smoking the opposi-
tion, not retreating with their armor between their legs. Mancinus was con-
demned. A new commander embarked and in time destroyed the Celtiberian
nation. Tiberius's honor was besmirched and his promises dismissed. He never
forgot or forgave the ingratitude.
Eventually elected as a tribune of the plebeians, despite his aristocratic ori-
gins, Tiberius understood how wealth had begun to influence all aspects of Ro-
man life. Roman citizens were not taxed, many senators were obliged to vested
interests, and a class of wealthy oligarchs used bribery as an electoral weapon.
Roman agriculture was dominated by the wealthy who used slave labor, while
small farmers were unable to compete and became fewer in number. These
events had a negative impact on the Roman army, which had traditionally
staffed its army with conscripted peasants.
Tiberius proposed a land reform bill which would confiscate and redistrib-
ute large amounts of real estate held by wealthy Romans, including senators.
Unsurprisingly, the senate was less than enthusiastic. Another tribune vetoed the
bill. Tiberius, more stubborn and brave than prudent, took his case to the people.
After Tiberius vetoed virtually every piece of official business coming before
the tribunes, Roman government was grid-locked. He proposed that either the
tribune opposing his land bill remove his veto or be removed fiom office. The
people, tribe by tribe, voted in favor of the motion. The recalcitrant tribune was
removed. The original Gracchus land bill was approved, but the senate refused
to release the funds required to implement its provisions.
To obtain the funds necessary to activate land reform, Tiberius persuaded
the people to accept the offer of deceased King Attalus of Pergamum, who had
bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people. Tiberius had interfered with the
senate's cherished prerogatives in foreign policy. Tiberius lost the remnants of
his support in the senate and when he stood, against tradition, for reelection as
tribune he was killed in a bloody riot led by his senatorial enemies. Tiberius's
corpse and those of more than one hundred of his supporters were thrown in the
Tiber River, symbolically relegating them to the lowest rank of criminals.
Gaius Gracchus was the natural heir of Tiberius's efforts. Gaius was a
gifted orator and administrator, who, like Tiberius, became a tribune. Gaius was
painstaking in driving a stronger wedge between the nobles and the people. He
made capital punishment for Roman citizens legal only if the defendant had a
trial before the people; he excluded senators from sitting on juries in certain
types of cases; he enacted law that provided that a politician removed fiom of-
fice by the people was ineligible to run in future elections; he stabilized the price
of grain, which impaired the wealthy importers from adjusting prices to maxi-
mize their profits given world events; he instituted tax farming, whereby com-
petitive corporate bidding, from which senators were exluded, determined who
collected taxes in Roman provinces in return for a percentage of the take. In
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 129

sum, to call the Gracchi brothers polarizing is akin to calling free lunches popu-
lar.
His enemies in the senate hoped to undercut Gaius's connection to the peo-
ple by inaugurating their own fraudulent reform program. That, and an incident
in which Gaius pushed a senatorial opponent who was then stabbed by one of
Gaius's supporters, led to another bloody riot during which hundreds of Grac-
chus's supporters were killed. Gaius, himself, was either slain or committed
suicide.
Machiavelli concedes that the intentions of the Gracchi were pure, but their
prudence and sense of timing were abysmal. The Florentine's own position on
wealth in a republic was clear: keep the public treasuries flush, keep the citizens
lean and hungry (D I 37). The Gracchi aspired to redistribute wealth and de-
crease the property disparity between rich and poor. The agrarian land reform
was to apply retroactively-confiscating real estate already held by nobles.
Moreover, the reform provided that real estate taken from enemies would be
divided among the Roman people. The healthy conflict between grandi and
populo, so crucial to Roman liberty and the invigorated, expansionist republic,
degenerated into factionalism and sectarian violence. The grandi resented being
deprived of land they already possessed, and realized that dividing the seized
property of military enemies and spreading it among the populo was a lost op-
portunity for the grandi to increase their wealth. Worse, the agrarian reform
legislation seemed defective as it was retrospective, ambiguously crafted, and
easy to misapply.
In future generations, civil wars between the populo (led by Marius) and
grandi (headed by Sulla), then between Caesar and Pompey, which led to the
destruction of the republic, could be traced, says Machiavelli, to the unhealthy
class hostilities generated by the Gracchi brothers. From the period of the Grac-
chi and the battles over land reform, social unrest and class conflict radically
increased, to the detriment of the republic (P 9; D I 4; D I 6; D I 37; D I 18).
Machiavelli calls the class enmity flowing from the agrarian reforms "the cause
of the destruction of [Roman] political freedom" (D I 6). The Gracchi initiative
led citizens to the take up of arms, to spill their brothers' blood, and to resort to
private remedies for perceived public evils. Such transgressions of law, political
custom, and social habit corroded civic virtir and, according to Machiavelli, in-
augurated the downward spiral of the Roman republic.

7, Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498)

Savonarola was a Dominican priest who relentlessly railed against renais-
sance humanist values, the corruption of the papacy, and preoccupation with
material goods. He first preached in Florence at the age of thirty without suc-
cess. He left for Bologna where his apocalyptic style began to draw attention.
He was recalled to Florence around 1489 and immediately drew a receptive au-
dience. Claiming to communicate directly with God and unveiling his numerous
130 Chapter Four

prophetic visions, Savonarola targeted Pope Alexander VI and the Medici rulers
of Florence. He preached energetically about the final days of the world and the
need to cleanse souls in preparation for final judgment. Perhaps aided by a
widely held superstition that the year 1500 would mark the end of the earth, the
increasing economic disparity in Florence between the rich and the poor, and the
rapid spread of a plague--probably syphilis spread by returning seafarers,
Savonarola's haunting message of impending gloom and doom leavened by the
possibility of salvation resonated among the people.
In 1494, Charles VIII of France invaded Florence, as Savonarola had pre-
dicted, and ousted the Medici. Savonarola filled the political gap by serving as
the spiritual leader of Florence. He struggled mightily to use his influence to
create a Christian theocracy. He and his followers inaugurated bonfues of the
vanities in which luxuries of all manner-fancy clothes, mirrors, cosmetics,
secular art, musical instruments, dice, chess pieces, humanistic poetry, and the
like-were immolated in the town square. Paintings by masters such as Michel-
angelo and Botticelli were among the treasures burnt. Savonarola was to fin and
recreation what Vince McMahon is to refinement and good taste.
Savonarola, emboldened by his success, ratcheted up the flames of his in-
tensity. Demanding the regeneration of Christian spiritual values, veneration of
asceticism, and repudiation of secular frivolity, he and his supporters organized
a morality police. Through spying, rumor gathered from informants, speculation,
and gossip, they passionately excoriated alleged wrongdoers, often publicly, and
warned of impending retribution.
Our unworthy attributes, the ones that lead to our demise, are usually just
our worthy features, the ones that led to our ascension, exaggerated. So, too,
with the well-meaning, deluded, fanatical Dominican friar. Predictably, he had
gone too far. The world was not coming to an end, Savonarola's prescriptions
had not enhanced the quality of life, and the people began to understand the
dangers of his excesses. He was excommunicated by an increasingly irritated
Alexander VI, outbreaks at his monastery occurred, and Savonarola was taken
prisoner. Accused of heresy and schism (trying to split the union of the Church),
Savonarola and two of his main associates were tortured, hung, and burned.
Their ashes were dumped eagerly into the Arno River.
Machiavelli appreciated the wiles that allowed Savonarola to ascend to in-
fluence and his passion for cultural reform. Also, Savonarola used religion for
political purposes. He convinced numerous Florentines that he communicated
directly with God, even though he performed no miracles or extraordinary
deeds. His own example, the unwavering certitude of his message, and the con-
ditions of his time were enough to garner short-term success (D I 11). Machia-
velli, though, would point out that Savonarola's religious values were unworthy
of a thriving, expansionist republic. That the friar understood the crucial connec-
tion between religion and politics counts in his favor, but the particular religious
and political values Savonarola exalted strike a sour note for Machiavelli. Mild-
ness, meekness, spiritual contemplation, and resolve in the face of suffering are
unreliable substitutes for Roman physicality, pursuit of glory, passion, and mili-
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 131

tarism. Vigor trumps delicacy.

Savonarola was inflexible, fanatical, and focused on the transcendent
world-an infallible roadmap to failure. While Machiavelli could admire the
friar's verve, boldness, and, especially, keen awareness of the corruption in the
Church, he anticipated Savonarola's fall: "he acts in accordance with the times
and colors his lies accordingly" (Ltr. 3:3/9/98). Savonarola's deceptions were
too thin to endure, a textbook case of ineffective reform grounded on shaky
rhetoric.
Moreover, Savonarola was partisan and failed to comply with a law he had
urged upon Florence. To give citizens added security, the friar had helped enact
a right of appeal from sentences in political cases. Shortly thereafter, five citi-
zens were condemned by the government to death. They lodged their right to
appeal, but they were denied that right. Savonarola, who viewed the condemned
men as his enemies, refused comment: "This took away more of the Friar's in-
fluence than any other event . . . revealing his ambitious and partisan spirit . . .
[the event] brought him much censure" (D I 45). The rule of law can be a stem
mistress.
Finally, Savonarola was an unarmed prophet. He was destroyed as soon as
his moral authority fell into question because of his fanaticism. Savonarola
lacked the means-the strong arms and secular laws-required to harden the
resolve of his remaining supporters or to persuade critics to obey his decrees (P
6). Moses and Romulus understood that in founding or reforming a state, ene-
mies harboring envy had to be slain. Machiavelli credits Savonarola with that
same knowledge. The friar, though, lacked a political or military position from
which to launch the required assault. He had only the fire of his pulpit and the
tenuous support of his followers (D 111 30). Again, the message is that the un-
armed prophet or the leader who cannot or will not take the horrifying steps re-
quired for political success must fail. Government is not run by prayers alone.

8. Piero Soderini (1450-1513)

Appointed to office three years before Soderini rose to power, Machiavelli,
in his positions as secretary to the second chancery of the Republic of Florence
and as a member of the Council of Ten of Liberty and Peace, flourished in So-
derini's service. Piero descended from a distinguished Florentine family and was
named prior of Florence and, later, ambassador to France under the Medici. Af-
ter the French, under Charles VIII, ousted the Medici, the peculiar, fiery four
year influence of Savonarola held sway. Once the friar was burnt to a crisp,
merchant aristocrats regained political control of Florence. Within four years,
Piero Soderini was elected gonfaloniere b vita. The lifetime post lasted only a
decade. Machiavelli had deep affection for Soderini, who proved to be a com-
passionate political centrist who greatly admired Machiavelli. Under Soderini,
Machiavolli embarked on over two dozen diplomatic missions where he learned
countless lessons about political intrigue. Soderini, in concert with Machiavelli's
132 Chapter Four

advice, instituted a Florentine militia to replace reliance on mercenary and auxil-

iary troops. In 1509, Pisa surrendered to Florence, bringing much honor to So-
derini and to Machiavelli, who was in charge of military operations.
But by 1511 a chilling political wind was blowing in Europe. The Holy
League of Mantua was formed. Led by Spain, with the aid of some German and
Italy city-states, and the Vatican, the alliance was neither holy nor a league. Its
expressed purpose was to drive the French out of Italy. Soderini was always
sympathetic to the French, who had assisted him in several ways during his rise
to and maintenance of political power. He straddled the fence, avoiding signifi-
cant entanglement. His heart was with the French, his head concluded that the
Holy League was too formidable a foe. So Soderini vacillated, sending only a
token military force to France. As a result, Florence, as Machiavelli had warned,
was despised by both sides.
By 1512, the Holy League, with Swiss intervention, had waxed the French.
The Medici, who had allied with the league, ousted Soderini, dismissed Machia-
velli, and regained political control of Florence. Soderini fled to Ragusa, then
was called to Rome under Pope Leo X. He remained in Rome trying to advance
the interest of Florence until he died in 1513.
For Machiavelli, Soderini's patience, generosity, and indecisiveness sealed
his downfall. Instead of killing the sons of Brutus-those antirepublicans who
were doing the Holy League's bidding within Florence-Soderini was concilia-
tory, offering compromise and gifts. Soderini feared that to eliminate the sons of
Brutus would require exercising special powers that, even if successful in the
short run, would destroy the office of gonfaloniere 6 vita. Soderini failed to un-
derstand that the success of the Holy League was radically more likely to de-
stroy that office and the republic of Florence as well. As a result of Soderini's
reluctance to dirty his hands, he fell from power, was exiled, and the republic
was destroyed. Political hostility is not domesticated by time or mollified by
presents (D I11 3).
Soderini's ultimate weakness was the frailty that eventually destroys all
politicians: inflexibility. During his fust nine years in office, his moral virtir and
civic virtir reaped great benefits for Florence. When the times changed-when
ruthlessness, decisiveness, and harshness were needed to stem the rising, hostile
political tide-Soderini could not adapt. Moral and civic virtir cannot guarantee
triumph over jealousies, political intrigues, hatred, and a bad turn of Fortuna (D
1119; D 111 30).
Machiavelli was the envoy charged with explaining Soderini's wishy-washy
policies to Louis XI1 of France. Despite Machiavelli's warnings, Soderini in-
sisted on political neutrality to the detriment of the republic. Even after it was
clear that the Holy League would triumph, Soderini was wrongly convinced that
the Spanish would accept money in return for keeping the Medici out of Flor-
ence (Ltr. 203: 9/16/12; P 21).
Although retaining numerous fond memories of Soderini, Machiavelli
summarized in an epigram his judgment of a politician unwilling to do what was
necessary to save the Florentine republic, a leader who strove to retain his moral
 Machiavelli's Top Ten

purity at the expense of his country.

The night Pier Soderini passed away,

His soul was halted on the brink of hell;
And Pluto yelled: "No hell for you-you fool!
In children's limbo you can only stay.""

9. King Louis XI1 (1462-1515)

Louis XI1 ruled France for seventeen years. He made his royal bones prior
to becoming lung by commanding the French army in an invasion of Northern
Italy. The French conquered Milan, were expelled, but, later, after Louis had
become king he neutralized the League of Venice, the alliance that had driven
Louis's predecessor, Charles VIII, from Italy in 1495. By 1499, Louis XI1 had
dominion over Milan, which he held until being crushed by the Holy League in
1512.
Around 1476, Louis was compelled to marry Jeanne of France, the daughter
of his second cousin, King Louis XI. After the death of Charles VIII, who left
the world without an heir to the throne, Louis XI1 assumed the monarchy. He
aspired to annul his marriage to Jeanne and wed Anne of Brittany, widow of
Charles VIII. With an eye toward expansionism, Louis XI1 hoped a marriage to
Anne would bring Brittany under the French sphere of influence. But Jeanne
contested the annulment and Louis advanced shaky, contradictory grounds. An
insider deal was required. Enter Pope Alexander VI (Rodngo Borgia) and his
son, Cesare. Borgia brought Louis XI1 a papal edict annulling Louis's marriage
to Jeanne. In return, Louis appointed Cesare the Duke of Valentinois and prom-
ised military aid for Cesare's upcoming military escapades.
Louis allied with Ferdinand of Aragon to conquer the Kingdom of Naples
around 1502. But within a year, the countries quarreled and the Spaniards drove
Louis out of Naples. Nine years later, the Holy League pushed Louis out of
Northern Italy. Then, King Henry VIII of England attacked France on one side
while Swiss mercenaries, acting for the Germans, launched an invasion from
another side. Louis negotiated a settlement.
Louis's union with Anne produced two surviving daughters. Anne, though,
died in 1514. Within months, Louis XI1 married Mary Tudor, sister of Henry
VIII. Louis probably hoped for one final chance to spawn a male heir and an
alliance with England would greatly relieve his foreign relations problems.
Louis, however, died within three months.
History has been kind to Louis XII, depicting him mainly as a temperate,
compassionate ruler. Some, such as Machiavelli, question his fortitude, robust-
ness, and understanding of foreign policy.
Machiavelli spends considerable time and space chronicling Louis's errors
in trying to hold territory in Italy where the region was much different from
134 Chapter Four
Louis's native land, France. Twice, he lost Milan. The frst time "all that was
needed to throw him out was Duke Ludovico [Sforza] growling on his borders"
(P 3). The second time he fell prey to the Holy League around 1512. Machiavelli
charges Louis with six major errors: the king squandered alliances with weak
states of dubious military worth; he invited a powerful foreign state, Spain, to
intervene in Italy; Louis did not spend enough time in or live in Italy; nor did he
establish French settlements in Italy; he enhanced the strength of one of the
more effective Italian regions, the Papal States; and Louis launched an untimely
attack against Venice (P 3). Machiavelli is unswayed by those who would argue
that King Louis wisely permitted the Papal States to seize Romagna and Spain
to swallow up the Kingdom of Naples to evade war. The Florentine, anticipating
boilerplate wisdom emerging after World War 11, insists that appeasement is
ineffective military strategy; it only delays the battle until a time less favorable
than the present (P 3; P 11). Machiavelli, of course, is referring to the subse-
quent defeat of France by the Holy League.
Machiavelli stresses that by continuing the policies of King Louis XI, Louis
XI1 enlarged the reputation of the Swiss, upon whom France relied for infantry,
at the expense of France's own military capabilities. France's infantry was weak
or nonexistent, and its cavalry depended on the Swiss for support. The French
ended up so impressed by the Swiss that they were afraid to fight them and
without Swiss support they were unable to defeat anyone else. Louis XI1 did not
understand that an armed force combining mercenaries and natives is, in the
long run, inferior to an army of citizens only (P 13).
In passing, Machiavelli notes that King Louis XI1 was hostile toward the
Florentines, although Florence's vacillating foreign policy contributed to the
unfortunate situation (D I1 15). King Louis XII, perhaps a moderate, beloved
ruler in France, remains a poster monarch for inept, unworthy foreign and mili-
tary strategies. As international policy is the ultimate ground of civic virtir for
Machiavelli, Louis's reign was doomed to failure.

10. Marcus Manlius Capitolinus (died ca. 384 BC)

Marcus Manlius was a Roman consul who, according to legend, was in the
capitol prior to an assault by the Gauls, circa 386 BC. Alarmed by quacking of
the sacred Roman geese, he repulsed the first assaulters and help drive the Gallic
force from the hill. For his heroic deed, he won great acclaim and added to his
name-literally. Henceforth, he was known as Marcus Manlius Capitolinus.
Shortly thereafter, though, with the Gauls seemingly in control, Roman forces
scattered about the countryside, and the ransom of Rome agreed upon, the glow-
ing valor of Marcus Furius Camillus redeemed Roman pride and chased the Gal-
lic barbarians out of the city.
Manlius, according to historians Livy and Plutarch, was a proud, jealous
noble who despised his peers for usurping his glory. He was especially envious
of Marcus Furius Camillus. Had not Manlius staved off Gallic defeat and sof-
tened the enemy? Why was Camillus the toast of the town? He had only taken
 Machiavelli's Top Ten 135

advantage of the Gauls as the ransom was being parceled out, when the barbari-
ans were lax and off guard. Manlius had confronted the savages when they were
hlly armed and intent on seizing the Capitol. Surely, but for Manlius's pluck,
Camillus's fortunate opportunism would have been impossible. So reasoned the
self-serving mind of Marcus Manlius Capitolinus.
Accordingly, Manlius simmered with frustrated expectations, unrequited
entitlement, shameless self-pity, and abject jealously of Camillus's widening
reputation. Then, he boiled over. He spread rumors that Camillus had embezzled
public funds, an allegation that had earlier forced Camillus into exile. Then he
took up the cause of plebian debtors against their patrician creditors. Roman law
dealt harshly with debtors who were unable to repay their obligations. Manlius
worked hard to circumvent the law and appealed to the people directly. Faction-
alism between wealthy and poor increased. Manlius wrapped himself in populist
garb in order to elevate his reputation and deflate the standing of Camillus, who
was a patrician creditor. Manlius's scheme backfired. He was impeached, ac-
cused of sedition, alleged to have kingly aspirations, eventually sentenced, and
tossed by tribunes from the top of the Tarpeian rock, near the site of his greatest
moment at the capitol.
Machiavelli refuses to impute charitable motives to the actions of Marcus
Manlius Capitolinus. He accepts the historians' assessment and paints Manlius
as having a boundless appetite for glory, a mean-spirited jealously toward Ca-
millus, and a recklessly predatory streak-all of which exacerbated class fac-
tionalism to the detriment of Rome (D I 8). According to Machiavelli, Manlius
slandered Camillus and when called to account for his allegations, he would
not-because he could not-substantiate the charges. Machiavelli concludes
that Manlius's end was well deserved and an appropriate manner to dispose of
slanderers who pander to class division (D I 8; D 111 8).
The Florentine also assures readers that any misgivings the people bore af-
ter Manlius was eased off the Tarpeian rock were grounded on Manlius's admit-
tedly admirable actions against the Gauls. But Machiavelli remained convinced
that had Manlius been brought back to life Romans would have condemned him
to death again (D I 58). The execution of Manlius was a prime case of the rule of
law in action (D 111 1).
Manlius embodied a repellent urge to seize political power, but did not
properly evaluate the temper of the times. His efforts to foment riots against the
senate and disrespect for the rule of law were properly answered by a Roman
people who still retained civic virtic. Manlius was executed so Rome could re-
main f?ee (D 111 8). So must end all power-mongers in a state where the common
good flourishes.

Notes
1. In composing the biographies and histories of the figures discussed in this chap-
136 Chapter Four

ter, I consulted Machiavelli's accounts as well as the following sources: Plutarch, The
Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, trans. John Dryden, ed. Arthur Hugh Clough,
vol. 1 and 2 (New York: The Modem Library, 1992); Philip Matyszak, Chronicle of the
Roman Republic (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2003); Edward Gibbon, The Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1-3 (New York: Everyman's Library, 1993); Mary T.
Boatwright, Daniel J. Gargola, and Richard J. A. Talbert, The Romans (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2004).
2. See, for example, John Noble Wilford, "More Clues in the Legend (or Is It Fact?)
of Romulus," New York Times, June 12, 2007; Peter Kiefer, "Cave May Hold Secrets to
Legend of Ancient Rome," New York Times, November 21,2007.
3. Niccolb Machiavelli, Lust and Liberty: The Poems of Machiavelli, trans. and ed.
Joseph Tisiani (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1963), 103, 106-108.
4. Rafael Sabatini, The Lfe of Cesare Borgia (Teddington, UK: The Echo Library,
2006), preface, 162.
5. Ibid., 61-71.
6. Ibid., 166-167.
7. Garrett Mattingly, "Machiavelli," in Renaissance ProJiles, ed. J. H . Plumb (New
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1961), 26-27.
8. Sabatini, Borgia, 193.
9. Ibid., 187-188, 193-194.
10. Ibid., 125-126.
11. Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, trans. John Dryden, ed.
Arthur Hugh Clough, vol. 2 (New York: The Modem Library, 1992), 572.
12. Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1-3 (New
York: Everyman's Library, 1993), 8 S W .
13. Marcus Aurelius, "The Meditations," in Essential Works of Stoicism, ed. Moses
Hadas (New York: Bantam Books, 1960), 3.12.
14. Ibid., 1.17.
15. Ibid., 7.9.
16. Ibid., 4.40.
17. Machiavelli, Lust and Liberty, 47.
 Chapter Five
Ends and Means
The renowned twentieth-century political theorist, Leo Strauss, expresses force-
fully a popular view of Machiavelli:
Contemporary tyranny has its roots in Machiavelli's thought, in the Machiavel-
lian principle that the good end justifies every means. At least to the extent that
the American reality is inseparable from the American aspiration, one cannot
understand Americanism without understanding Machiavellianism which is its
opposite.'

In two sentences, Strauss accuses Machiavelli of being the father of tyran-

nical movements such as fascism and communism, the proud exponent of the
principle that the good end justifies every means, and anti-Americanism even
though Machiavelli died about two hundred fifty years prior to the founding of
our republic.
Strauss goes on to charge that Machiavelli, sensing that he needed to soften
and misdirect readers fiom the harshness of his principles, cleverly added the
final chapter of The Prince to stir hearts and to cloud minds.
The information regarding the political prerequisites of the liberation of Italy is
withheld in [chapter 261 which is explicitly devoted to the liberation of Italy
because Machiavelli desired to keep the noble and shining end untarnished by
the base and dark means that are indispensable for its achievement. He desired
this because the teaching that "the end justifies the means" is repulsive, and he
wanted the The Prince to end even more attractively than it began.2
Moreover, Strauss insists that Machiavelli understood and advocated that
fieeing Italy firom the barbarians required nothing less than a political and moral
revolution.
The liberation of Italy means a complete revolution. It requires first and above
everything else a revolution in thinking about right and wrong. Italians have to
learn that the patriotic end hallows every means however much condemned by
the most exalted traditions both philosophical and religious.'

Did Machiavelli Ever Write That

"The Good End Justifies Every Means"?
In a word: "No." The closest he came-and from a philosophical standpoint the
138 Chapter Five
difference is akin to that between the heights of Mutt and Jeff-is in The Prince.
In some English and American translations of that work, particularly those com-
posed in the fust half of the twentieth century, the phrase "end justifies the
means" appears. For example, the Modem Library edition of The Prince, based
on a translation by Luigi Ricci in 1903 as revised by E. R. P. Vincent in 1935
reports:
In the actions of men, and especially of princes, from which there is no appeal,
the endjustiJies the means. Let a prince therefore aim at conquering and main-
taining the state, and the means will always be judged honorable and praised by
every one, for the vulgar is always taken in by appearances and the issue of the
event (P 1s ) . ~(Emphasis added)

Those translators projected a principle or phrase unknown to Machiavelli

upon his work, perhaps to make it relevant to contemporary readers. In every
translation I have read in the past, say, thirty years that phrase is absent. For
example, David Wooten's translation is an example of contemporary English
renderings:
In the behavior of all men, and particularly of rulers, against whom there is no
recourse at law, people judge by the outcome. So if a ruler wins wars and holds
on to power, the means he has employed will always be judged honorable, and
everyone will praise them. The common man accepts extemal appearances and
judges by outcome (P 18)' (Emphasis added)
Machiavelli is making an empirical claim: the masses, as a matter of fact,
evaluate actions, especially those of politicians, by their results. Machiavelli is
not lodging a normative claim: he is not concluding that human beings should
evaluate actions only by their outcomes. He is not arguing that the end justifies
the means as a feature of sound moral principle. In fact, Machiavelli's observa-
tion that "the common man accepts extemal appearances" is more redolent of
condescension than affirmation. The implicit message is: Wise men, spurning
mass opinion, would do well not to evaluate actions only by results. In fact, Ma-
chiavelli rejects the proposition that the results of actions are necessary or suffi-
cient for properly evaluating those actions (P 25; AW I 29-32; D 111 35; D I 9; D
I 53). But Machiavelli insists systematically throughout his writings that politi-
cians must operate on the way human beings are, not as they ought to be. Thus,
rulers must recognize the manner in which their actions will be evaluated by
most people.

Even If Machiavelli Did Not Write the Words-

"The Ends Justify the Means9'-Do Not His
Doctrines Clearly Rest on That Principle?
A critic might agree that Machiavelli never penned the words nor vividly under-
 Ends and Means 139

stood the normative implications of the phrase. Still, she might counter, large
amounts of his doctrine tacitly endorse Strauss's interpretation. And not just
what Machiavelli says in The Prince about the salutary uses of fraud, force, co-
ercion, and the like. In The Discourses, Machiavelli is unrepentantly giddy when
recalling the stunning cruelty of Romulus killing his brother (D I 9), Brutus
overseeing the execution of his sons (D I11 1; D I11 3), and Moses helping to
whack three thousand of his countrymen (D I11 30; D I11 41). The Florentine
relentlessly exalts strong men of robust military and political virtir who are will-
ing to dirty their hands in service of founding or preserving a healthy, expan-
sionist state, or reforming a corrupt state. What is this other than implicit agree-
ment that "the good end justifies every means"?
As an aside, the imagined critic's strong case obliterates one of Strauss's
points: that Machiavelli tried to honey coat his political messages in The Prince
by adding an emotional finale. In his unabashedly republican paean, The Dis-
courses, Machiavelli reveled in the horrifying deeds of Romulus, Brutus, Moses,
and a bunch of others. He never tried to whitewash their slayings; instead, he
used such mind-boggling actions to graphically underscore his unyielding politi-
cal message: The great leader bent on securing military and political glory must
not shy from bloody business that would petrify lesser men. In The Prince, Ma-
chiavelli composed twenty-five chapters of strategies, much of them relying on
force and fraud, to found a principality. To speculate that one patriotic chapter at
the end of that book would pull shades over the eyes of readers is unreasonable.
Even the most simpleminded supporter of Machiavelli cannot successfully turn
him into a liberal humanist. Nor would the Florentine aspire to that label.
To demonstrate my conclusion that Machiavelli did not hold, even tacitly,
the principle that "the good end justifies every means," I must begin with two
sets of distinctions.
The first distinction is between justiJications and excuses. To just~fian act
is to defend the act as just, right, and appropriate. The perpetrator of the act ad-
mits performing it, but advances reasons which claim to show that the act was
proper; he accepts responsibility for the act, but argues that he should be exoner-
ated from blame because the act was not blameworthy: "I did act X and was
responsible for X, but I should not be blamed for X because X was not wrong
because of R (the reason or set of reasons allegedly supporting the performance
of X)." Human beings try to justify acts that are typically viewed as unjust,
wrong, or inappropriate by appealing to the special set of circumstances giving
rise to that act. "I lied to spare grandma's feelings" may be a valid justification.
Imagine that grandma is a wonderful lady but mediocre baker. She spends time
and effort concocting an apple pie for your enjoyment. When you visit, she
proudly slices you a piece. Having tasted her cooking efforts in the past, you
would rather swallow a locust washed down with motor oil than pound down
her pie. Still, you choke down the dessert, praise it effbsiveiy as one of the best
confectionaries you have ever sampled, and thank your grandmother. Although
lying to your grandmother is almost always wrong, in this case you may well be
justified because you know how sensitive she is to criticism. Acts that are typi-
140 Chapter Five
cally wrong are sometimes justified by appeals to self-defense, necessity, emer-
gency, unavoidable conflict of interests, avoidance of gratuitous harm, and the
like. Such conditions may demonstrate that an action that is usually or almost
always wrong is, under the circumstances, morally right.
To excuse an act is not to defend the act as just, right, and appropriate. In-
stead, the perpetrator petitions to be exonerated from blame, either partially or
entirely, because he was not completely responsible for performing it. The agent
of the act may claim that he did not actually intend to perform the act, perhaps
because he was incompetent at the time he did it or because he was coerced into
doing it: "I did act X and X is morally tainted, but I was not (completely) re-
sponsible for doing X because of C (some special set of circumstances such as
coercion, incompetence, lack of intent, or the like).6 An excuse presupposes
wrongdoing and precludes justification. If an act is justified then an excuse is
neither required nor appropriate. "The dog ate my homework" is a classic ex-
cuse. Student claims she did her schoolwork, but she cannot turn it in to her
teacher because her curious canine gobbled it up. The student is not asserting a
justification-she is not asserting that failing to turn in homework is appropri-
ate--but, instead, says that she is not responsible for the failure. Assuming she
was neither negligent nor reckless in placing the homework too close to her
bowser, she may have a legitimate excuse. Actions are excused because they
were done inadvertently, accidentally, through mistake, under duress or other
necessity, from non-blameworthy ignorance, by someone with diminished men-
tal capabilities, while temporarily deranged, while under the influence of drugs
in a non-blameworthy way, while suffering from a mind-altering disease or
while insane, and the like. All such underlying conditions mitigate or erase the
moral agent's responsibility for wrongdoing.
The second distinction, one Machiavelli makes, is between evil well-used
and evil ill-used (P 8). The distinction turns on traditional moral considerations:
intention, motivation, foreseeable and actual results of actions. Evil well-used is
aimed at securing the most valuable goals: founding or preserving a healthy,
expansionist state, or reforming a corrupt state; driving out foreigners as a prel-
ude to the other ends; facilitating the common good by removing obstreperous
elements as a last resort; and the like. Such evil occurs in one fell swoop, it does
not persist. And the means used are compelled by necessity; they are required
for the valuable goals. Finally-and this is probably redundant-the valuable
goals serve the common good.
Effective mercy may require evil well-used, harsh measures needed for or-
der, security, and unification. A chief executive should not shrink fiom being
considered cruel if his purpose is to keep citizens united, faithful, and safe. The
sensitive ruler-who is too squeamish to use evil well-may, through misguided
short-term compassion, permit rebellions and insurrections to develop which do
more long-range harm than the cruelest ruler (P 18; P 19; P 2 1; D 111 3: D 111 9;
D 111 30; Ltr. 203: 9/16/12).
Evil ill-used is, at bottom, gratuitous cruelty. It is not required to attain the
most valuable goals and may be counterproductive to those ends. Evil ill-used is
 Ends and Means 141

often disproportionate, recurrent, and frustrates the common good. Moreover, it

sometimes advances the cause of tyranny.
Using the two sets of distinctions, I would argue that Machiavelli never
calls evil anything other than evil.' Accordingly, Machiavelli does not enter the
realm of justification, only that of excuse (P 18; D I 9). Military and political
leaders are often forced by necessity in service of the most valuable ends to per-
form actions that are normally morally abhorrent and remain morally tainted
even during exigency. Such leaders take responsibility for the choices they
make, but not for the circumstances that induced those selections. The exercise
of military and political virtic often requires unpleasant choices that issue in
morally-tainted, but excusable, actions. Leaders must choose between degrees of
evil, avoid unnecessary cruelty and follow conventional morality if possible, but
be prepared to exercise harsh means when unavoidable to attain paramount
goals (P 17; D I11 3).
Machiavelli rejects the notion that every means are permissible for any
valuable goal. The means must be necessary to attaining the most valuable po-
litical goals; they must pass the criteria of evil well-used. The private ambition
of founders, preservers, and reformers of states is insufficient. The common
good must be implicated in the goals. Furthermore, the nature of the state is cru-
cial. The state must be effective, aim at the common good, and have the requi-
site purposes. In sum, tyrannies are unworthy. Not every action that serves every
state is a candidate for Machiavelli's approval. Crucially, Machiavelli's program
is not a general moral theory, but a recommendation only for chief political offi-
cers: the prince in a principality, the monarchical or executive element in a re-
public. The Florentine is not counseling private citizens in their everyday deal-
ings, despite the laughable ways that contemporary writers of self-help literature
struggle to trade on his name (The Machiavellian Way to Corporate Power,
How Machiavelli Would Train Your Dog, Let MachiaveNi Guide Your Rise up
the Job Ladder).
Accordingly, the language of justification is misapplied to Machiavelli; not
every good goal is a candidate for his approval, only the most valuable political
ends; not every means are acceptable even for those most valuable political
ends; the private ambizione of military and political leaders is always insuffi-
cient; the domain of his advice is restricted to chief political executive officers
in salutary principalities and republics; he does not think the most refined
evaluations of political actions focus solely on outcomes; he never calls evil
anything but evil; he argues against the rule of offsetting good against evil; and
he often invokes necessity as the coercive engine of political actions. Necessity
compels human beings to act as reason demands under the given circumstances
(D 1 24; D 111 12).
If the actions of chief political officers were always morally j u s t 8 e b i n
the typical sense of unambiguously morally right under the circumstances-then
they would not need to learn how not to be good. Yet Machiavelli takes that
knowledge to be crucial for effective statecraft (P 15; D I 9; D I 18). The capa-
bility and willingness to use evil well are uncommon personal attributes, but
142 Chapter Five
required of those aspiring to exercise robust military and political virtir (D I 18).
Aspiring leaders must overcome moral squeamishness and dirty their hands as
they perform morally dubious acts. The attainment of earthly power and endur-
ing glory are the rewards Machiavelli identifies for those few who can accom-
plish the mission (P 8; P 26; D I 10). Of these, the more important is deserved
glory, which confers on men a spark of immortality and permits them a measure
of revenge on the grim reaper.
Furthermore, Machiavelli accepts the validity of conventional morality for
ordinary citizens and in the private realm. He also takes conventional morality
as relevant for leaders and commanders, at least when they are managing inter-
nal affairs. Power obtained through inhumanity and evil ill-used cannot reap
enduring glory (P 8; D I 10; D I11 40). Nor does Machiavelli, contra Berlin, em-
brace Roman (pagan) morality as the sole appropriate guide for political and
military leaders. One of his major themes is the conflict between the imperatives
of conventional morality and the duties required by the political and military
offices of power. The imperatives of morality do not simply evaporate.
In sum, Machiavelli, contra Strauss, is not inciting a revolution in values.
Nor does he state or implicitly adopt an obtuse slogan such as "the good end
justifies every means." Nor does he tack on the final chapter of The Prince as
the ultimate manipulation of shallow readers. Nor does he embrace tyranny,
either consciously or tacitly. Moreover, he might well consider the United States
of America the best historical exemplar-surpassing, except for duration of
worldly supremacy, even his beloved Roman Republic--of his principles. But
that is a story for later telling.
If Machiavelli advances a normative doctrine on these matters then the rele-
vant principle is "a fav e n d excuse some (typically horr~JLing)means." We
must now examine the reasons for and persuasiveness of that principle.

What Ends Trigger Excuses? Why?

A chief political executive must follow conventional morality if possible, but be
prepared to transgress morality if necessary (P 18). Only a few ends excuse the
use of means that are almost always wrong: Founding or preserving a healthy,
expansionist state, or reforming a corrupt state; driving out foreigners as a prel-
ude to founding or invigorating a state; facilitating the common good by remov-
ing obstreperous elements as a last resort; and the like. These ends, for Machia-
velli, are required for a social life that can transform the people in positive ways,
allow military and political leaders to satisfy their yearning for glory, and confer
on a nation the reward of immortality.
A fragmented, corrupt city-state ensures the further degeneration of citizens,
foreign domination, and the collapse of civic and moral virtir. Without a strong
nation-state, citizens are vulnerable and insecure, suffer from a poor competitive
position in relation to other nations, and endure an impoverished quality of life.
 Ends and Means 143

A strong nation-state thwarts foreign invasion, teaches citizens to rise above

selfish individualism, nurtures communal bonds, increases public wealth and the
spiritual quality of life, and promotes civic and moral virtic. For Machiavelli, the
choices are few and stark: A nation will either be fragmented, corrupt, and vul-
nerable to foreign domination or a nation will be unified, saturated with civic
virtic, and able to dominate. The difference between the two types of situations
begins with the degree of military and political virtic embodied by a nation's
leaders; it continues with the quality of a nation's armed forces, laws, religion,
and education.
A popular television show in the 1980s, Hill Street Blues, featured a hard-
scrabble police sergeant, Stan Jablonski, who supervised morning roll call. After
disseminating information and outlining the day's agenda, Sgt. Jablonski ad-
vised his fellow officers: "Let's do it to them before they do it to us." This cap-
tures part of Machiavelli's philosophy. Because of a scarcity of resources and
the nature of human beings, the world is a zero-sum contest (P 3; D I1 pref.).
Competition between states is inevitable; governments will always wage war on
one another; a successful state is one that has a strong, well-prepared military
and expansionist aspirations; the freedom of my homeland depends on the defeat
of yours. Enduring peace can be purchased only at the cost of enslavement. We
have to do it to you before you do it to us. And rest assured that if we do not,
you will. If Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-1882) observed that, "In this
world a man must be either anvil or hammer," sign up Machiavelli as a thumper.
Contemporary moralists argue that preemptive military strikes are war-
ranted if and only if a potentially wrongful aggressor poses a sufficient threat:
"A manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation [by the potentially
wrongful aggressor] that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situa-
tion in which waiting or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies
the risk" are the elements that determine whether a sufficient threat is present.8
Sufficient threat, then, does not automatically require the promise of an immi-
nent attack.
Under Machiavelli's worldview, foreign states alwuys have a manifest in-
tent to injure; their degree of active preparation is limited only by the strength of
their military and their other martial adventures; and waiting or doing nothing
magnifies the risk because it allows some potential aggressors to grow more
powerful. Accordingly, for Machiavelli the line distinguishing legitimate pre-
emptive military strikes fiom wrongful aggression becomes much fuzzier than
the boundary drawn by contemporary moralists. Prudential considerations may,
though, warrant waiting to be attacked instead of striking first (D I1 12).
More subtly, moralists who cringe at this world-view will recoil at Machia-
velli's corollary. The existence of moral virtic and civic virtic depends on mili-
tary and political virtic; the exercise of military and political virtic-because of
the nature of the world and human beings (D I 1; D I1 pref.; D I11 43)--requires
morally horrifying deeds at times; thus, the enterprise of morality itself is
grounded in founding acts that morality judges abominable. The aspects of life
human beings hold dear-art, science, religion, order, family relations--depend
144 Chapter Five

on the security generated by military and political virtk (P 12; P 19; D 111 33).
Lefi to their own wits, human beings are strongly inclined toward wickedness (P
18; P 23). Patriotism, the pursuit of a common good, and the development of
civic virtk must be nurtured; they are not natural human impulses. Without
these, human beings are alienated and wallow in their basest, natural instincts.
Only a state with strong arms, powerful laws, a robust religion, and sound edu-
cation can transform citizens (D I 4; D I 16; D I 55). Proper habits, internaliza-
tion of morality, and compliance with moral and civic virtk occur through the
necessity grounded in military and political virtk (D I 1; D 12; D 1 11; D I 12).
Effective leadership and unshakeable resolve when confronting the unpleas-
ant choices posed by adversity transform the character of citizens. The military
and political virtir of leaders and the civic and moral virtk of citizens are mutu-
ally sustaining. Moses participated in the slaying of three thousand golden calf-
worshipping Israelites (Exodus 32: 19-28). As far as we know, God did not
flinch.

What Is the Result?

Given the nature of the world and of human beings, expansionism is the best,
really the only, way of serving the common good, resisting civic corruption, and
promoting the health of the state. Well-trained and disciplined citizen-soldiers
must contend for glory, honor, and victory. Again, your nation cannot withdraw
from the international zero-sum game (D 111 2). Even if your nation, perhaps
because of the domesticating influence of Christian religion, desires to opt out of
the contest, other nations will not permit it (D I 6; D I 19). Strength and vigor
bear respect and honor; appeasement, humility, and avoidance court servitude
(D138;DII 13;DII 14;DII 15).
Machiavelli's moral circle is tight. When dealing with fellow citizens, a
chief political officer must follow conventional morality if possible, but, if nec-
essary, some evil acts are excused by the paramount value of a few ends (P 18;
D I 9; D I11 12; D 111 41). But when wheeling and dealing in international af-
fairs, where zero-sum military and political games abound, success is critical.
Again, follow conventional morality if possible and prudent. Preemptive action,
though, is the rule, not an exception. Always remember that given the scarcity of
resources and basic human nature, Sgt. Stan Jablonski stated it correctly: "Let's
do it to them before they do it to us." Machiavelli insists that international af-
fairs are conducted in a context that English political philosopher, Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679), would later call a state of nature: an arena where moral
restraints go unobserved and where each party is at war against everyone else.
Under conditions of supreme emergency-when the safety and survival of
your country is at stake-Machiavelli advises that "you should pay no attention
to what is just or what is unjust, or to what is kind or cruel, or to what is praise-
worthy or shameful. You should put every other consideration aside, and you
should adopt wholeheartedly the policy most likely to save your homeland's life
 Ends and Means 145

and preserve her liberty" (D 111 41). Contemporary ethicists define supreme
emergencies in terms of imminent, horrifying danger. Respecting moral laws
prohibiting harm to innocent people may facilitate, under such circumstances,
the enslavement or extermination of a nation by a wrongfhl aggressor: "A world
where entire peoples are enslaved or massacred is literally unbearable. For the
survival and fieedom of political communities-whose members share a way of
life, developed by their ancestors, to be passed on to their children-are the
highest values of international ~ociety."~ For Machiavelli, failure under such
circumstances invites servitude, the breakdown of sound arms and laws, and the
collapse of civic and moral virth.
Chief political officers are placed, fiom the outset, in an ambiguous moral
position. The duties of their offices preclude a purely impartial appraisal of al-
ternative actions. Morality from a God's-eye view demands we consider equally
the interests of all those affected by our actions. An innocent life crushed in one
state bears the same moral disvalue as an innocent life destroyed in another
state. Chief military and political officers represent particular countries and bear
special responsibilities to their citizens. They are not simply calculating whether
to let innocents in the abstract perish, but are instead contemplating letting their
own people die. The security and protection of their citizens is one of the pri-
mary responsibilities of their office. Unless one holds a chillingly abstract ethi-
cal position-lives are lives, we have equal responsibility for everyone, no spe-
cial duties to anyone-the normative relevance for chief military and political
officers that their own citizens are threatened is unmistakable. They cannot be
moral impartialists and satisfy the strictures of their offices. The moral and po-
litical puzzle is to spell out how much partialism is appr~priate.'~
Moreover, Machiavelli recognizes a distinction between a politician manag-
ing internal matters and a military commander manipulating foreign affairs:
"There is a moral element in Machiavelli's notion of political glory, he thought
there were modes of conduct incompatible with political glory, whereas this
element is absent from his notion of military glory, for this sort of glory is
achieved through deserved success in war, whatever the methods used."" Gen-
eral William T. Sherman famously intoned that "War is Hell." Machiavelli
would disagree: war is worse than hell. At least in hell people presumably reap
what they have sown; they receive deserved retribution for their freely chosen
deeds. In war, appeals to notions of desert and merit lack an audience.
In a movie debuting in 1970, Patton, lead-actor George C. Scott appears be-
fore an American flag and instructs his troops, "No SOB ever won a war by dy-
ing for his country. Wars are won by making the other SOB die for his country"
(paraphrased.) We can imagine Machiavelli smiling.

The Case for Partialism

The duties of military and political office require leaders to place special value
146 Chapter Five
on the interests of their constituents. In fact, the entire moral enterprise, under-
stood properly, presupposes the partiality in personal relations. That is, the sorts
of dispositions and virtues that comprise the moral enterprise can only be ac-
quired through the experiences and habits learned in personal relations charac-
terized by partiality. Personal relations are nonfungible: if X has a personal rela-
tionship to Y, then Y is one of X's ends and that end is precisely Y and not any
other person. The particularity of the other person grounds the value and bond of
friendship, at least in part. Also, the intimacy of fkiendship promotes general
virtues such as honesty, loyalty, empathy, and self-making. Intimacy requires
partiality--by definition, we cannot be intimate with everyone-and treating
family and friends preferentially is sound.12
We must recognize that the unique and valuable ends of family and per-
sonal relations cannot be achieved without the socially recognized institutions of
family and friendship. While the precise nature and strictures of these institu-
tions are reimaginable, some form of family and friendship is necessary lest im-
portant values evaporate. By viewing morality merely as a set of abstract rules
and principles, impartialists-those who insist that everyone's interests must be
considered equally in all cases--open themselves to the charge that they ignore
paramount functions of morality such as developing and nurturing personal rela-
tionships as well as trusting local communities.
Partialists also illustrate the alleged poverty of viewing the value of per-
sonal relations in purely instrumentalist terms. If some impartialists are willing
to admit a certain level of partiality only because doing so has an instrumental
value for the general moral enterprise, they miss the mark. Personal relations
bear value for their own sakes. Imagine being in a personal relationship and dis-
covering that the other party has done certain actions for you only out of a sense
of duty or from an ideal of universal beneficence or for reasons of general moral
development. You would likely conclude that the other has misunderstood the
nature of personal relations. Personal relations are not merely different in degree
from impersonal relations, they are metaphysically different in kind: the meta-
phors of mutual bonds, connectedness, attachments, although faintly capturing
the truth, are too effete.
Personhood presupposes partiality in the sense that one's identity and per-
sonal integrity must consist in part of projects, aspirations, and life's plans that
have unique status in one's priority of values simply because they are hers. To
require people to calculate impartiality would be to alienate them from their atti-
tudes, convictions, projects, and actions. Also, a world in which I considered
everyone's interests equally would be a world in which profound affection for
others no longer existed, a world that eliminated the values of specialness and
belonging. Intimate friendships involve the parties' recognition of each other as
special, noninterchangeable people. They and only they have certain unique
qualities, or combinations of them, or ways of embodying and expressing them.
We do not live in a sea of undifferentiated "humanness."
The trick, though, is to carve out an appropriate place for partialism in
moral theory and practice. Not all partialism in personal relationships is fair. Nor
 Ends and Means 147

does legitimate partialism in international affairs-the times when promoting

the interests of one's country is warranted-underwrite ignoring the well-being
of the world community generally. This is especially the case if, contrary to Ma-
chiavelli's view, international affairs are not conducted in a state of nature.

Was Machiavelli a Tribal Act Consequentialist?

A tribal act consequentialist or, more narrowly, tribal act utilitarian, strives to
select the course of action that, under the circumstances, best advances the col-
lective interests of his group. He is not a classic utilitarian who impartially con-
siders the interests of every human being (or every sentient being) affected by
actions spurred by moral choice. Instead, he restricts his domain of concern to a
small unit-perhaps country, city, organization, or family. Unlike non-
consequentialist moralists, who insist that individuals have rights that insulate
them from being used for the public good or in service of advancing the interests
of the majority, the tribal act consequentialist has only the communal good at the
forefront of his moral calculations. Individual rights, under this view, are re-
spected only insofar as doing so promotes the best, overall results. Moreover,
they are subject to recurrent scrutiny as new situations and circumstances arise.
At first blush, to label Machiavelli a tribal act consequentialist seems fair.13
He is willing to transgress conventional morality in deference to the common
good; he considers the interests of his city-state or nation as monumentally more
important than the interests of foreigners or the international community as a
whole; he is willing, at times eager, to sacrifice individuals for what he takes to
be the common good; and he carehlly calculates the respective outcomes of
contemplated actions.
But first judgments, like visiting relatives and shiny rings, do not always
pass carefbl examination. Machiavelli advises chief political officers to follow
conventional (non-consequentialist) morality if possible, both domestically and
internationally. In a well-grounded polity, doing so domestically will be the
norm. Some excusable transgressions, though, will occur. "The sons of Brutus"
must be eliminated if they threaten the safety and security of a republic; found-
ing or preserving a healthy, expansionist state, or reforming a corrupt state will
require evil well-used; promoting the common good will occasionally demand
the removal of recalcitrant elements. But, domestically, not every action is sub-
ject to consequentialist moral or political calculations. The default mindset is
compliance with conventional morality. Violations of those norms are more cir-
cumscribed than the number occurring under tribal act consequentialism. Dem-
onstrating that a marginal gain in the collective interest can be attained by, say,
oppressing a minority group or exploiting an individual is insufficient to trigger
an excusable transgression under Machiavelli's view.
Internationally, conventional morality is followed if and only if strategically
and prudentially sound. But given the structure of the world as a zero-sum game,
148 Chapter Five

the nature of human beings, and the need for preemptive military and political
action, Machiavelli pays no lip service to the brotherhood and sisterhood of na-
tions. Accordingly, his judgments on such matters are grounded in expediency;
his military responses are often disproportionate; and he extols the principle of
"doing unto others before they do unto you." Even here, though, the structure,
boundaries, and composition of the tribe change. As foreigners are defeated and
brought under the umbrella of Machiavelli's expansionist republic, they gain
moral status he would previously deny them. Eventually, they become citizens
worthy of domestic consideration. Machiavellian membership has its privileges.

The Problem of Dirty Hands

In politics and elsewhere, we sense at times that a particular action is the best
course to pursue, but that o w efforts nevertheless involve doing something
wrong. Chief political officers must often transgress clear, paramount moral
principles and are rightly required to do so by the demands of their positions.
The paradox of being morally required to violate moral standards seems ir-
resolvable and deeply unsatisfying.
Michael Walzer eloquently poses the critical questions for the problem of
"dirty hands."
Sometimes it is right to try to succeed, and then it must also be right to get
one's hands dirty. But one's hands get dirty from doing what it is wrong to do.
And how can it be wrong to do what is right? Or, how can we get our hands
dirty by doing what we ought to do?I4

The notion of "dirty hands" is as old as the Bible. Pontius Pilate, Roman
governor of Judea, offers the crowd a choice of prisoners, one of whom would
be released. The crowd selects Barabbas as the fortunate son, while calling for
the crucifixion of Jesus. Pilate's query, "But what evil hath he done?" only
hardens the crowd's resolve. Fearing a possible riot should he push his case,
Pilate washes his hands before the multitude and self-servingly judges that "I am
innocent of the blood of this just person" (Matthew 27: 15-24). If only the prob-
lem of dirty hands was so easily dissolved.
The phrase "dirty hands" is found in Jean-Paul Sartre's play of the same
name in which the revolutionary protagonist declares:
How you cling to your purity, young man! How afraid you are to soil your
hands. . . . Purity is an idea for a yogi or a monk. You intellectuals and bour-
geois anarchists use it as a pretext for doing nothing: To do nothing, to remain
motionless, arms at your sides, wearing kid gloves. Well, I have dirty hands.
Right up to the elbows. I've plunged them in filth and blood. But what do you
hope? Do you think you can govern i ~ o c e n t l ~ ? ' ~

In the same vein, Machiavelli often derides sensitive, self-styled goody two-
 Ends and Means 149

shoes politicians who, in the name of morality, refuse to do that which is neces-
sary to establish or preserve a healthy, expansionist state, or reform a corrupt
state; to expel military barbarians as a prelude to founding or invigorating a
state; and to slay the sons of Brutus in order to save the republic (P 21; D I 38; D
I1 13; D I1 14; D I1 15; D I11 3; D 111 9; D 111 30; Ltr. 203: 9/16/12). Preoccupied
with his own self-image as a virtuous person, the timid leader self-indulgently
sacrifices his country on the mantle of his moral ego. The military or political
chief officer, then, who aspires to moral purity may become strategically para-
lyzed, fail the duties of his office, and jeopardize the well-being of his country
and its citizens: "The integrity of the martyr is saved at his own ex ense,
whereas the statesman's refusal to compromise is paid by his people."'gDirty
hands situations typically involve overriding the claims and interests of an indi-
vidual or group to promote the collective interests of the whole or the unit which
the moral agent represents.
Bernard Williams sketches the systematic nature of the paradox of dirty
hands for politicians:
A politician might find himself involved in, or invited to, such things as: lying,
or at least concealment and the making of misleading statements; breaking
promises; special pleading; temporary coalition with the distasteful; sacrifice of
the interests of worthy persons to those of unworthy persons; and (at least if in
a sufficiently important position) coercion up to blackmail."
Other, more dramatic dirty hands enigmas include "the justification of po-
litical assassinations as an action that can dramatically correct the course of his-
tory; whether it can be right to yield a targeted judge to terrorists in exchange for
the safety of many innocent hostages; what to do if one should meet a guerrilla
leader who stipulates that if one will personally slay just one small peasant he
will spare the rest of the otherwise-doomed group; and whether, as a leader of a
country in civil war, one ought personally to order that a captured opponent be
tortured to extract information that one expects will save lives.""
The paradox of dirty hands apparently rests on two convictions: seemingly
absolute moral prohibitions sometimes must yield in political (and in everyday?)
contexts; and a good person will feel and be guilty from having broken those
prohibitions, while a person bearing political virtir will understand the necessity
of sometimes doing so. Some dirty hands cases flow from social forces demand-
ing wrong-doing; where wrong-doing is elicited as an unintended consequences
of social processes.
Chief military and political officers, acting on our behalf and in our name,
sometimes act in ways that are incontestably condemned by conventional moral-
ity except that under unusual circumstances such acts prevent great harms or
achieve great goods. Choosing under imperfect conditions and with only prob-
abilistic evidence, the officers judge that no other morally permissible alterna-
tive exists and that the likelihood of securing the desired ends is high. The con-
templated act is experienced, simultaneously, as required and prohibited. Good
150 Chapter Five

people seem forced to reject their principles for the sake of accomplishing cru-
cial goals. They are pressured by necessity into acting on consequentialist
grounds, yet are judged deficient by non-consequentialist moral principles.
Machiavelli sensed this acutely. He points out that founding or reforming a
corrupt state requires extraordinary, violent, cruel means. Morally virtuous men
are unlikely to be drawn to such tactics. Morally evil men gleefully adopt the
necessary means, but are unlikely to promote the good thereafter. The desired
combination-a morally good man willing to temporarily embrace evil and use
it well-is extremely rare (D I 18). This accounts for the gushing praise Ma-
chiavelli lavishes on the few who fit the bill: Moses, Romulus, Theseus, Lycur-
gus, and their like.
The crux of the paradox of dirty hands for political officers is the partialism
demanded by their stations. Impartial morality, where everyone's interests are
equally important, competes with the partiality of the executive, who is charged
with advancing the particular interests of his own citizens or specific group.
While the degree of warranted partialism is contestable, the existence of a duty
to be partial is clear. (This tension also appears, typically less strikingly, in eve-
ryday morality wherein moral agents advance the interests of their families,
fiends, and loved ones instead of promoting the more abstract general good.)
Government officials, as agents of the public, are responsible for greater,
more enduring consequences than private citizens. Unlike everyday people, they
have control of the coercive, violent apparatus of the state. Their roles often re-
quire that they advance the interests of their citizens above those of the interna-
tional good. To shrink from using evil well is to betray the trust of their con-
stituents.
A common solution to the problem of dirty hands, at least for Machiavelli,
is to claim that he advances two autonomous, often competing, realms of value:
the political and the moral.I9 At times, proper political action requires violating
the demands of morality. Chief military and political officers act in our name for
wider purposes, but their roles demand that they perform deeds that violate our
morality.
This solution is appealing and has a long, distinguished genesis. Unfortu-
nately, it is unpersuasive. Machiavelli does not posit two independent moral
spheres of value. As I have argued earlier, for Machiavelli, politics is con-
strained by conventional morality domestically. Variances from conventional
morality are excused by several critical purposes domestically; while, interna-
tionally, Machiavelli places morality in the context of the conditions of the
world and of human beings. Although this position bleeds firom conceptual and
empirical wounds, it does not advance two independent moral spheres-the po-
litical and the moral. Machiavelli concludes that political necessity sometimes
excuses the transgression of conventional moral principles. Moreover, even if
Machiavelli did posit two autonomous realms of value that could somehow re-
solve the paradox of dirty hands for chief political officers, he could not help
private citizens make terrifying choices in tragic moral dilemmas. Although the
paradox of dirty hands may well be a core aspect of political and military life-
 Ends and Means 151

as tragic dilemmas happen frequently and systemically-it also infects individ-

ual moral options at crucial times.
The magnitude, gravity, and number of dirty hands dilemmas are most strik-
ing in military and political contexts, but everyday people also confront them
now and then. In the novel, Sophie's the lead character is imprisoned
at Auschwitz with her two children. A vicious Nazi doctor orders her to choose
between the lives of her seven-year-old daughter or her ten-year-old son; other-
wise, both will be killed. Sophie, permitted only a few seconds to answer, saves
her son. She is consumed with guilt she never overcomes, which, of course, was
the point of the doctor's offer. From the standpoint of moral logic, her forced
choice between two unbearable options exonerates her from responsibility if her
act was justified: she was forced by necessity to select one of her children or
refuse to select one in which case both would be killed. Still, she experiences an
unspeakable anxiety, the legacy of the moral impurity that haunts her act. Saving
a child was a valuable end; doing so by selecting another child to perish is horri-
fying; if coercion and necessity hmish only an excuse, then some guilt may
remain.
Morality is directed toward the appropriate navigation of the roles we un-
dertake in our web of personal relationships. Politicians assume a role most of us
never face. They act in the name and on behalf of an entire nation, state, county,
or city. They control the coercive power of those social units. Their responsibili-
ties are wider and deeper than those of ordinary citizens. They sometimes take
risks or are called on to make decisions with frightening foreseeable and numer-
ous unforeseeable consequences. In that vein, the problem of dirty hands is a
critical feature of military and political life. Still, all of us in personal and pro-
fessional relationships, some of which conflict at times, and are thereby subject
to gravely ambiguous moral choices.
Consequentialism offers another possible solution. Only if every moral
choice is made with an eye toward maximizing the good in the instant situation,
and only if every relevant reason for and against an action in that situation is
taken as a moral reason, and only if all moral reasons are measurable by a com-
mon standard, then no moral dilemmas or deeply ambiguous moral choices
should arise. Sometimes our calculations will be difficult to sort through and the
long-range effects of our actions are typically speculative, but at least in princi-
ple a correct, justified moral answer should exist. Even in rare cases of a quanti-
tative and qualitative tie-two alternative actions produce the same overall good
effects-we would be justified in choosing either course. Although fallible hu-
man beings acting in good faith will surely make some mistakes in perceiving
and computing the possible results of their actions, that does not vitiate the fact
that a morally right answer exists.
Such an act consequentialism, though, is untrue to moral experience. That
all reasons for and against an action are commensurable is highly unlikely; that
all the relevant reasons for and against an action are moral reasons is equally
suspicious; that the good must be tallied and maximized on each occasion does
not square with how we make moral choices; and that deeply ambiguous moral
152 Chapter Five

choices can be whisked away by abstract theory falsifies the anguish of numer-
ous political and moral decisions. Moreover, act consequentialism wrongly ex-
cludes the dispositions of moral agents and how they factor into perceptions of
actions. The only relevant disposition under this view is the inclination to
maximize good consequences in particular cases.
Rule consequentialism, which takes moral standards as mere guidelines that
may be ovemden in particular cases, fares only a tad better. When we do violate
our moral rules we justify those transgressions in ways that honor the status of
our moral standards independently of their utility in previous cases. We do not
take our moral rules to be grounded in and dependent upon only their capability
of maximizing the good in particular cases. We do not ground the authority of
moral principles only in their useklness. Accordingly, justified variances from
our moral rules are less frequent than act utilitarianism would sanction.
In any event, neither route is open to Machiavelli. He is not a moral conse-
quentialist bent on maximizing the good on each occasion. Although he does not
sketch an ethical theory and never invokes natural laws, his writings assume a
conventional morality that identifies good and bad acts apart from their instant
context. He tacitly accepts the existence of moral standards that are not hostage
to recurring calculations of utility in the immediate circumstances. Machiavelli's
standards are conventional. Although he deeply admires Roman (pagan) moral-
ity, he neither accepts it as a wholesale replacement for conventional morality
nor does he unveil a new morality. Habitual responses and internalized disposi-
tions, nurtured by good laws and vigorous religion, are pivotal to civic virtir. But
chief military and political officers must learn to use evil well; they must navi-
gate their roles and social relationships outside the comforting embrace of easy
moral justifications. Only if Machiavelli was a full-blown consequentialist
would chief military and political officers be advised only to become better cal-
culators and discerners of the good. Machiavelli's counsel would be purely epis-
temological and, perhaps, psychological. But Machiavelli is not a rabid moral
consequentialist and he insists that chief military and political officers must
learn how not to be good, how to live in the quagmire of ambiguity where their
actions are not fully morally justified, but (only partially) excused because of the
pressures of necessity and the ways of the world.
The core debate on the problem of dirty hands is between moral pessimists
and moral optimists. Moral pessimists find an intractable guilt in morally am-
biguous cases even where our actions are excused. Moral optimists argue that if
our actions in such cases are justified we are innocent, and if our actions are
excused we are not responsible for any wrong and thus are not guilty.
Walzer argues for the moral pessimists. When recognized moral rules are
overridden, their normative force remains: "We know we have done something
wrong even if what we have done was also the best thing to do on the whole in
those circumstances . . . this does not mean that it isn't possible to do the right
thing while governing. It means that a particular act of government may be ex-
actly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it
guilty of a moral wrong."2' If a chief political officer violates conventional mo-
 Ends and Means 153

rality in service of, say, Machiavellian-endorsed goals-if he uses evil well-he

is both simultaneously morally right and morally wrong: he may be establishing
or reforming a corrupt state, but he is also employing evil. If a chief political
officer refuses to soil his hands and abides by conventional morality, he is also
both simultaneously morally right and wrong: he honors conventional morality,
but at the expense of the polity: "It is by his dirty hands that we know [the moral
politician]. If he were a moral man and nothing else, his hands would not be
dirty; if he were a politician and nothing else, he would pretend that they were

Walzer is not concluding merely that a politician will sometimesfeel guilty,

but that he will be morally guilty in such circumstances. He argues that the best
solution is for the politician to pay a socially expressed penance or penalty pro-
portionate to his deeds. The politician's felt angst, guilt, and internal suffering
are insufficient because they depend too much on the sensibilities of the particu-
lar politician and they lack social expression. The politician's acts were commit-
ted in our name and on our behalf. The measure of his atonement is his willing-
ness to publicly accept a proportionate penalty or penance. Walzer notes, sadly,
that there are no authorities who could administer the appropriate penalty and no
social institutions up to the task.23Moreover, chief political officers have a duty
to conceal their dirty hands from us to the extent possible. Citizens may know,
abstractly, that their leaders must soil their hands but are usually shrouded from
the exact occasions.
Walzer's formulation-an act can be the best moral alternative yet be mor-
ally wrong-underscores the paradox of dirty hands, but stuns logicians. Walzer
seems to be violating the basic laws of logic when making the point in this fash-
ion. That logical frail is assaulted by moral optimists.
Moral optimists2'argue that if an act is truly the best moral alternafive-
whether based on consequentialist or non-consequentialist grounds-then the act
is justified. If the act is justified then the politician who commits it is responsible
for it but innocent because no wrongdoing has occurred. If the act in question is
morally excused then the action was not, strictly speaking, morally right but the
politician is not responsible for it because his compliance was coerced. Coerced
acts are involuntary and cleanse us of moral culpability. Accordingly, the con-
ventional logic of the relationships between voluntariness, responsibility, moral
culpability, justification, and excuse militate that no act is simultaneously both
right and wrong in the sense moral pessimists describe.
If, afier performing certain political acts requiring horrifying means, a chief
political officer feels guilt that is a psychological problem. He has no reason to
feel such if his action was, indeed, morally justified or excused. Perhaps he
needs a short lecture on basic moral concepts. Or as one moral optimist puts it:
"[Walzer's moral pessimism] is conhsed philosophy and bad psychology. If our
good politician knows that he is doing wrong, then he should not do it: no one
can act rightly by acting wrongly. Given that he acts rightly and conscientiously,
then, if he believes himself to be guilty, what he needs is therapy, not pen-
a n ~ e . "In~ sum,
~ feeling guilty in such circumstances is not a sign of a morally
154 Chapter Five
sensitive politician, but a person who is either morally confused or irrational.
Machiavelli was neither a moral theorist nor an academic philosopher. He
is, though, invariably cited in discussions about the problem of dirty hands, and
is sometimes credited with being the first writer to articulate the paradox.26 He
suggested that chief political officers, those exercising robust military and po-
litical virtic, must be willing to risk their souls in fulfilling their duties in service
of their country. Machiavelli, though, never explores the interior life of those
historical figures he admired. He never acknowledges explicitly the emotional
experience of moral transgression that pervades contemporary accounts of the
paradox of dirty hands. The internal horror Sophie endured finds no parallel in
the deeds of Romulus, Moses, Brutus, Borgia, and their ilk. Was Machiavelli,
implicitly, a moral optimist or moral pessimist?
Machiavelli fastidiously, even excitedly, reports the shocking deeds of
Romulus, Moses, Brutus, Borgia, and several others. He never questions
whether alternate actions were available to them. Might Romulus have reasoned
with his brother? Was there a way short of murder that could have resolved the
situation? Did Moses truly have to help whack the three thousand nitwits intent
on worshipping a golden calf of their own invention? Was his method really a
last resort? Might Brutus have finessed the judicial problems of his sons yet pre-
served the republic? Machiavelli never explores or even raises such queries. On
one level, then, he endorses such bloodcurdling exploits as understandable, as
excusable. But Machiavelli does not view the actions as justifiable in the con-
temporary, philosophical sense of that term. His heroes have learned how not to
be good.
The most charitable philosophical reading of Machiavelli's position is that
although the mortifying acts of Romulus, Brutus, and others are excused, the
agents of those deeds nevertheless bear a measure of moral culpability. Unlike
fervent moral optimists, Machiavelli does not take these types of excuses to
completely cleanse moral agents from all responsibility. These excuses greatly
mitigate responsibility, but do not erase all vestiges. That is why chief military
and political officers risk their souls.
Machiavelli, then, is a moral pessimist, but he does not locate the paradox
of dirty hands in a logical puzzle: How can it be morally wrong to do what is
morally right? Instead, the problem of dirty hands arises fiom the inability of
some excuses to totally exonerate moral agents from all responsibility, culpabil-
ity, and guilt. For Machiavelli, some moral excuses do not cleanse completely,
some military and political actions are not entirely coerced, and the moral agent
bears some responsibility for the deeds to the extent his action was voluntary.
When shocking acts that typically offend the conventional moral conscience are
performed under circumstances where they are excused from a Machiavellian-
vantage point-when evil is well-used-the deeds are still problematic even
though required to promote the greatest values. Although consequences play a
major part in Machiavelli's strategic calculations, he is not a straightforward
consequentialist in matters of morality. Despite his systematic recognition of
necessity, he does not take that circumstance as a complete justification of hu-
 Ends and Means 155

man action. Nor does Machiavelli take necessity as a complete excuse that to-
tally cleanses human agents of all moral responsibility: "Dante and Petrarch also
seek the redemption of Italia, but Niccolb is the only one to point out that the
agent of that redemption must enter evil and risk his soul."27
Whereas classical ethical theory sought to eliminate or soften evil, Machia-
velli aspires to find a preacher to teach the people "the way to go to the Devil. . .
and learn the way to Hell." (Ltr. 270: 5/17/21) Machiavelli wants people to learn
how to cope with evil in order not to fall prey to its allure and be defeated by it.
What does it mean to risk one's soul in fulfilling one's duties to country?
Machiavelli is far from explicit. It might mean eternal damnation in the fires of a
theological hell. Perhaps the additive culpability of numerous instances of evil
well-used is enough for a man to lose his soul. (But didn't God cheer Moses for
wiping out the 3,0007 Won't God lavishly honor the prince who liberates Italy?)
For Machiavelli, the cost may be worth the candle. In his play, Mandragola, the
lover Callimaco rages, "the worst that can come to you is to die and go to hell;
but how many others are dead! And there are so many good men in hell! Are
you ashamed to go there? Face your lot; flee evil, but, not being able to flee it,
bear it like a man; do not prostrate yourself, don't degrade yourself like a
woman" (M 4:l). For Machiavelli, "Hell is an exclusive club. For real men
only."28 Machiavelli insists that he loves his "native city more than my own
soul" (Ltr.33 1: 4/16/27). He lauds those citizens who "esteem their fatherland
[much more] than their souls" (FH 111 7: AW I, 7).
He recognizes Plato, Plutarch, Livy, Tacitus, and other famous men of antiq-
uity. These, he is told, are the damned of hell, because it is written: "The wis-
dom of this world is the enemy of God." As they stroll off, Niccolb hears him-
self being asked, "With whom would you rather go?" "Me?" he said, ''1 am not
tagging along with those ragbags to go to paradise. I am staying with that other
company, to talk about the state and go to
Machiavelli, though, is hopeful that God will not permit men of admirable
military and political virtir to fry in hell because of a few moral technicalities.
Aside from the biblical examples of Moses, Peter, and David, Machiavelli sus-
pects God's forgiveness is more expansive than commonly tho~ght.~'After all,
God, too, is neither a moral theorist nor an academic philosopher. Praise the
Lord!
Risking one's soul can also bear an earthly connotation. The appropriate use
of evil transforms the agent. What we do reflects and reinforces the values we
embrace, or not. The number, magnitude, and far-reaching effects of violent acts
tear into the fabric of personal character. Might not chief military and political
officers become morally desensitized? Might they not rationalize the use of evil
where it is not well-used? Might not each use of evil strike a corrupting influ-
ence? Is not the common good hostage to the chief political officer's capability
of maintaining his soul in the face of many confrontations, internationally and
domestically, with the forces of evil?
The healthy polity does not want to be led by militarists and politicians who
156 Chapter Five
have lost their souls: "Only those who are reluctant or disinclined to do the mor-
ally disagreeable when it is really necessary have much chance of not doing it
when it is not necessary."" Yet to run that risk is precisely what such leaders
must do. Although Machiavelli does not delve into the interior life of his heroes,
the ability to rise with full hearts, despite countless temptations and situations
which militate otherwise, is pivotal for leaders to preserve a healthy, expansion-
ist state. Is it possible for such leaders to preserve their sensibility to moral costs
yet use evil well on a continuing basis? Does occupying public office permit a
leader to depersonalize his morally disagreeable acts?
Although many of a politician's decisions in dirty hands situations are
rightly concealed from public scrutiny, even those that are revealed will be
judged by the multitude only by their success in attaining critical goals, accord-
ing to Machiavelli (P 18). The public, then, is an untrustworthy evaluator of a
politician's actions in such cases. Success may have blossomed through good
luck or accident. Failure and disappointment may have resulted from bad luck or
an unavoidable sequence of events. Judging actions only by their results is an
unreliable guide. Appropriate social expression, evaluation, and limitation of a
politician's anguish in dirty hands contexts is unavailable. Are chief military and
political officers, then, the only rightful judges of their own cases? Must they
retain a supra-moralism that empowers them to evaluate what they do independ-
ently from their doing it? Or does Morality, in imagined personified form, hover
over a politician's decisionmaking? Or God?
To understand the interpretation with which I am saddling Machiavelli, let's
return to Sophie's choice, then some military examples. A moral optimist32
would argue that Sophie should not feel guilty because she was not guilty. In the
novel, Sophie repeatedly insists that she is unable to choose between the lives of
her son and her daughter. Either because she loves them equally or because the
respective values of the lives of her children are incommensurable, Sophie can
arrive at no judgment. But the Nazi persists, as all virulent Nazis must. He
forces Sophie to make a choice by threatening to kill both children if Sophie
does not select one to live. Sophie relents and chooses her son. The moral opti-
mist, however, insists that Sophie is not revealing a preference for her son over
her daughter, but merely a rational desire that one child survive rather than both
children die. The coercion, duress, and vicious pressure that the Nazi places on
Sophie exonerates her from any guilt because her actions were not voluntary.
Indeed, she did not make a choice in any meaningful sense at all. Sophie is not
morally culpable because she is not responsibility for the death of her daughter.
Her deed is fully excused, perhaps even justified under the circumstances. That
Sophie feels pervasive guilt which greatly contributes to her later suicide is a
tragic consequence of the horrifying event, but utterly unnecessary. A proper
understanding of the logic of voluntary acts, moral responsibility, coerced
choices, justification, and excuse concludes that Sophie was not in fact guilty of
anything except performing the only rational deed available under the circum-
stances. She did the "ri t thing" given the petrifying context.
Moral pessimists,&owever, take the distinction between (a) not preferring
 Ends and Means 157

her son over her daughter and (b) merely desiring, rationally, that one child sur-
vive rather than both children die to be a thin reed on which to base the case for
Sophie's innocence. Sophie's act was coerced by a type of necessity, but she
nevertheless intentionally betrayed her daughter. Sophie was moved by moral
considerations to commit a moral violation: "In order to minimize further evil,
arising from the unchecked evil of these immoral circumstances, the agent is
forced to cooperate with evil, firthering its immoral projects."34 Yes, Sophie
desired rationally that one child survive rather than both children die, but she
chose her son. She could have chosen her daughter (and, thus, betrayed her son).
The point of the sadistic Nazi's proposition is that Sophie must be implicated in
the death of one of her children. His offer did not flow from benevolence: "Hey,
today is Goebbels's birthday. We should let a child live. Mothers know best.
Your call, Sophie dear." Yes, Sophie has minimized evil. She has acted rea-
sonably under the paralyzing circumstances. Still, Sophie's felt guilt is appropri-
ate. She is part of the causal chain of decisions leading to her daughter's death;
her intentional act, a choice forced by necessity, selected her son's life and her
daughter's death; and her hands are dirty. Even though the context provides a
clear moral excuse, Sophie is morally stained. The excuse supplies incomplete
bleach. To argue that Sophie is in need of a quick lecture on the logic of ethical
concepts or extended psychotherapy to expunge her irrational guilt is to grossly
misconstrue moral experience.
Being a moral pessimist, Machiavelli-if he was willing to apply his politi-
cal analysis to a private, personal choice-would probably intone, dramatically
and approvingly, that Sophie has risked her soul for love of her family. Her act
was forced by necessity, which supplies a legitimate excuse. Such excuses,
though, do not exonerate completely. The sadistic Nazi has succeeded in dirty-
ing Sophie's hands.
Does the manner in which Sophie made her choice make a difference?
Moral pessimists will insist that she did ultimately select her son to be saved. To
claim that Sophie merely desired that one child live instead of two children die
is a tad disingenuous. But suppose that Sophie took out a coin, flipped it-
heads, my son lives; tails, my daughter lives-and abided by the results. Here no
preference for the life of one child over the other exists. But would tossing a
coin to determine who lives and who dies be taken as cavalierly devaluing life
generally? Would Sophie's hands still be stained for callous disregard? Or might
she appeal to a principle of fairness: each had equal chance to survive?
Suppose the Nazi upped the stakes. He gives Sophie a loaded gun. She must
select only one of her children to live. She will register her choice unmistakably
by shooting the other child. Is she refuses, the Nazi will shoot both with Sophie
as the audience. (If Sophie takes the pistol and tries to shoot the Nazi both chil-
dren will be murdered but only after they are excruciatingly tortured while
Sophie watches.) If Sophie shoots one of her children-perhaps after a coin toss
to determine which one-does this affect her guilt? Should it?
What if Sophie had refused to choose the life of one child over the other?
She clutches her genitals and sneers at the Nazi, much like Caterina Sforza Ri-
158 Chapter Five

ario during the Renaissance, (D I11 6) "I can make more babies." Both children
are killed. Has Sophie washed her hands, a la Pontius Pilate? Is she morally pure
even though she did not minimize evil? Or has she betrayed both of her chil-
dren?
Machiavelli, again, was not counseling personal morality. His domain was
military and political. Sophie's choice, thus, is uncommonly interesting but not
the best illustration of his position.
Consider President Truman's decision in 1945 to attack Hiroshima with an
atomic bomb. Spurred by concern that Nazi Germany was on the verge of build-
ing an atomic bomb, scientists urged President Roosevelt to beat Hitler to the
discovery. The scientists succeeded in their pleas, atomic bombs were produced,
and eventually dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. President Truman gave
three reasons for his decision to use these weapons of mass destruction: Japan
had attacked the United States without warning at Pearl Harbor; Japan had vio-
lated international law by treating prisoners of war (POWs) inhumanely; and the
bombing of Japan would shorten the horrors of the war by forcing an immediate
surrender.35
Moralists would raise immediate concerns. Atomic bombs cause wide-
ranging harm to innocent citizens-those who are civilians, those opposed to the
war, those who are inherently innocent because they are infants or mentally in-
competent, and those belonging to fkture generations who will endure the resid-
ual effects of the bombing. Even if the government and the leaders of Japan for-
feited certain rights because of their transgressions of international law it does
not seem that all of the people of Japan forfeited their basic human rights.
Moreover, the use of atomic bombs-at that time the most destructive weapon
devised by human beings-might well be a disproportionately grave response to
the wrongs committed by the Japanese state against the United States. Using
such fearsome weaponry was unprecedented and seems to assume that once
wrongful aggression takes place the defending nation may rightfully use any
means to attain victory; that the defenders are exonerated from all moral blame
regardless of their methods; that having a just cause in war guarantees that a
nation's means of engaging in that war are automatically purified.
Advocates of Truman's policy argued that the leaders of Japan, sensing the
war was lost, braced for a last-ditch defense. Amassing about two million sol-
diers, Japan hoped to make the upcoming battle so costly that the Allies, suffer-
ing high casualties, would negotiate a peace. The Allies calculated that an inva-
sion of Japan could result in one million Allied deaths with Japanese losses
much higher. The use of atomic bombs, on the other hand, would be so psycho-
logically terrifying-if the United States could drop bombs on two Japanese
cities with such ease and horrifying effects, they could in principle destroy the
entire Japanese mainland-that the war would end more quickly with fewer
deaths on both sides.36
The estimates of casualties by the United States were based on the premises
that Japan would fight tenaciously to the end and that the United States would
 Ends and Means 159

accept only unconditional surrender. Walzer argues that these premises are sus-
pect:
The Japanese case is sufficiently different from the German so that uncondi-
tional surrender should never have been asked. Japan's rulers were engaged in
a more ordinary sort of military expansion, and all that was morally required
was that they be defeated, not that they be conquered and totally overthrown.. . .
If killing millions (or many thousands) of [innocent] men and women was mili-
tarily necessary for their conquest and overthrow, then it was morally neces-
sary-in order not to kill those people-to settle for something less.37

Whether the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was morally
justified by contemporary standards is not crucial to the illustration. We do
know that President Truman, although he expressed confidence publicly in the
rightness of his decisions, harbored misgivings privately. He was concerned that
destroying hundreds of thousands of Japanese people, almost all civilians, was
frightening. He told confidants that atomic bombs were not military weapons at
all, but used to kill women, children, and unarmed citizens. Truman gave orders
to stop atomic bombing.38
Let's assume that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were morally
justified or excusable. If President Truman felt guilty for his decisions even
though he suspected that they were appropriate under the circumstances would
that guilt be misplaced, properly remedied by psychological therapy, or a sign of
irrationality? In a world where our calculations of results are uncertain but
where extreme devastation is stark and incontestable our moral universe is more
ambiguous than philosophical niceties permit. To say, "Hey, if the bombings
were unjustified then they should not have occurred. If the bombings were justi-
fied or excusable then no guilt is appropriate because no wrong has been done,"
is too facile. We often wonder whether our actions were justifiable or excusable
given the complexity of the contexts in which we make choices. Those doubts
are not always easy to dismiss. Perhaps we feel guilty because we are unsure
whether we did the right thing and a short lecture in the relationship between
moral concepts is not enough to assuage our guilt. Nor would psychotherapy
remedy our lot.
Still, moral optimists would insist that feeling guilty does not mean you
should feel guilty or that you were guilty. Moral pessimists would rejoin that
excuses are often only partially exculpatory. For pessimists, Truman should feel
guilty because he does bear some guilt for ordering the bombings even if we
assume that his decisions were, all things considered, warranted by the duties of
his office.
Machiavelli is a moral pessimist, but this example is international in scope.
Because of his penchant for preemptive military action and his inclination to see
supreme emergencies everywhere, he would evade deep moral guilt. On the
other hand, he could never imagine weapons as indiscriminately destructive of
life as atomic bombs. The existence of such arms might have precipitated a revi-
sion of his principles.
160 Chapter Five

During World War 11, English operatives broke a German message code
and concluded that the Nazis were about to bomb Coventry. If the citizens were
warned and evacuated, the Germans would have been alerted that their code had
been broken. This breakthrough was thought to increase the probability that the
Allies would eventually defeat the Axis powers, but if the Germans knew about
it they would devise another code. Winston Churchill allegedly decided not to
order the evacuation of the town, thereby preserving the illusion that the German
codes were still effective. Doing so, failed to adequately protect the citizens of
Coventry. Whether this account-which has been disputed-is accurate in all
respects is not crucial for my purposes. Let us suppose that the chief political
officer of England, under the circumstances described, intentionally and know-
ingly permitted the bombing of Coventry in deference to the perceived greater
good of winning the war.
Assuming the probabilities and consequences of the action were correctly
calculated, many would argue that Churchill's action was warranted under a
lesser-of-two-evils or lose-a-battle-to-win-the-war theory. True, the innocent
citizens of Coventry were used as mere means for a greater good, but evacuating
them would have resulted in much greater overall carnage. Thus, a moral opti-
mist would conclude that Churchill's action was justified or completely excus-
able; that he was innocent of wrongdoing; and that he should feel no guilt about
his decision.
A moral pessimist might argue otherwise. The sacrifice of innocent citizens,
without their knowledge and consent, is morally objectionable. The situation
does not appear to be a supreme emergency wherein the force of moral prohibi-
tions eases. Churchill's action is excusable, but not entirely so. Some residual
guilt is, therefore, appropriate. Machiavelli, assuming he did not view the situa-
tion as a supreme emergency, would cast his vote with the moral pessimists.
Moral optimists have a better way to resolve the paradox of dirty hands.
The paradox results, they would argue, fiom taking moral principles as absolute,
at least in the sense that they cannot legitimately be overridden by aggregating
public consequences. Yet, in political contexts duties of office require that such
moral principles be overridden. Political morality, which depends so heavily on
consequentialist reasoning, seems to conflict with private morality, which rests
on absolute principles and individual rights whose normative force remains
steadfast in the face of aggregate utility. Accordingly, the good politician who
discharges his duties of office apparently compromises his goodness as a private
person because he violates moral norms. He soils his hands.
The moral optimist, however, reminds us that the moral structure of politi-
cal decisions is not different fiom that of private morality. Moral principles,
expressing individual rights, remain prior to aggregate utilities, but bear differ-
ent weight in relation to one another. Politicians, instead of servilely following
consequentialist winds, make moral decisions where moral principles and indi-
vidual rights conflict. Citizens and foreign governments must, at times, be de-
ceived and coerced by political acts, but only where more fundamental moral
principles and individual rights are in play. Political and military leaders face so-
 Ends and Means 161

called dirty hands situations more than private citizens because they must pro-
tect the rights that have been entrusted to them. Their offices require them to
make decisions about conflicts of moral principles and individual rights which
are not at stake in private decision-making. Still, political and military leaders
should decide from the same framework that animates conventional morality.
The test is always which moral principles and individual rights are stronger, not
a differentiated morality that privileges consequentialism in politics but absolute
principles in private decision-making. Accordingly, politicians who must over-
ride certain principles and rights to honor others more compelling are not guilty
and should feel no guilt. They may sense regret for having infringed the rights of
some innocent people, but if they accurately judged the case and advanced the
stronger moral claims their hands are clean. The pardox of dirty hands, then,
emerges fiom a confusion: wrongly concluding that two separate kinds of nor-
mative reasoning are required of public officials and private citizens, and that in
fulfilling his public duties the good politician must automatically renege on his
private moral duties.39
This version of moral optimism is the cleanest way to sanitize the problem
of dirty hands only if every apparent case of consequentialist political reasoning
can be accurately redescribed in terms of (non-consequentialist) moral principles
and individual rights. Violations of moral norms in the name of utility are ille-
gitimate; moral principles and individual rights often conflict; as long as military
and political leaders satisfy the more compelling principles and rights their
hands are clean even where harms have been inflicted on those with lesser moral
claims.
Moral pessimists, however, will doubt whether all consequentialist political
reasoning can be accurately redescribed as a struggle of (non-consequentialist)
moral principles and individual rights. Moreover, Machiavellian moral reason-
ing often trades off more important rights of foreigners, from the standpoint of
objective morality, to advance less important rights of his compatriots. To say
that such trade offs are categorically wrong is to erase the problem of dirty
hands by semantic fiat. The strong partialism required by military and political
office is a prime agent fueling the problem of dirty hands. This is so even under
contemporary moral outlooks that would not go as far as Machiavellian partial-
ism. Also, in domestic contexts politicians at times sacrifice paramount interests
of a few people for lesser interests of the multitude. To argue in such instances
that only a struggle of conflicting principles and rights, and not consequentialist
considerations, is in play is unpersuasive.

Why Do Some Excuses Only Partially Exonerate?

Moral optimists remind us that conventional moral wisdom insists that if strict
necessity is in play-if a moral agent is forced to choose-then her responsibil-
ity for moral unpleasantness evaporates because she did not act freely. Those
moral pessimists, such as Machiavelli and Walzer, who conclude that some ex-
162 Chapter Five

cuses only partially exonerate and that vestiges of moral guilt appropriately dirty
the hands of the agent must account for why this is so.
One possibility arises from the conditions of choice. When writing philoso-
phy our examples come neatly packaged: epistemological ambiguities are neatly
smoothed over, probabilities are easily proclaimed, and calculations of results
are tidily stipulated. Sound pedagogical reasons exist for doing so. We want to
illustrate a principle or point without having to quibble over distractions. In the
real world of military and political decision-making, however, critical choices
are often made under conditions of radcal uncertainty. Leaders, denied the com-
forting certitudes of philosophical examples, may well agonize over whether
their choices will cause moral unpleasantness without securing the desired bene-
fits. Have they acted in vain?
This possibility undoubtedly accounts for the feeling of guilt some leaders
bear, but is less successful in demonstrating that excuses only partially exoner-
ate. Leaders facing radical uncertainty--over facts, probabilities, and out-
comes-must still act. If they act in good faith, doing the best they are able un-
der the circumstances, they do not seem culpable when events later conspire
against them. They might feel guilty, from the outset right up until they discover
their decision did not trigger the desired effects. But in the court of moral logic it
does not follow that they are responsible for any moral wrongs merely because
of the conditions under which they choose.
A second possibility is that guilt and the feelings of dirty hands is an emo-
tional response to choosing in a situation where incommensurable values are in
play. Perhaps Sophie understood intuitively that a mother forced to select one
child's life over another child's life has no proper standards of comparison. She
cannot evaluate, from any common criteria, the two possibilities she is offered.
The situation resists rational resolution. To be compelled to press down on one
side instead of the other is to be ushered into a hall of irrationality.
Again, this possibility accounts for feelings of guilt, but not the reality of
guilt. Sophie may have reasons to be guilty and might even be guilty, but the
incommensurability of the values in play cannot indict her in the court of moral
logic. If her choice was unavoidably irrational it does not follow that she is
guilty of any wrongdoing.
A third possibility is that guilt arises from the manner in which the official
performs the act. Determining what to do-deliberating over ends, means, and
alternatives-is only one part of the action. The other part is executing the act in
an appropriate manner. Abraham Lincoln's mantra, "with malice toward none,
with charity for all," addresses what he took to be the proper spirit in which to
approach decision-making and to carry out the acts required for restoration of
the republic. An agent can perform the right action for morally flawed reasons: I
can save a drowning child because I seek to be honored, not because I care about
the value of human life or because I recognize that so acting is the morally right
thing to do. An agent can perform morally disagreeable actions in a laudable
manner: The restoration of the republic after the civil war required some harsh
measures that Lincoln hoped would be performed in an appropriate fashion.
 Ends and Means 163

This possibility, though, can account for feelings of guilt in dirty hands
situations only where politicians perform actions from inappropriate reasons or
cany out their decisions with a malignant spirit. In such cases, the politicians
would have to recognize the wrongness of the manner in which they performed
the deeds in order to suffer the anguish. But even there, the deserved anguish is
an add-on and not the core of guilt. Politicians need not perform morally dis-
agreeable acts in an improper manner. When they do, they add another dimen-
sion of possible guilt-the wrongness of their manner of carrying out the act-to
whatever guilt is appropriate to the act itself. Moreover, when politicians per-
form morally disagreeable acts in a proper manner, the issue of whether guilt
from the act itself is appropriate remains. In sum, this possibility expands the
question of guilt but does not touch the primary matter first raised.
A fourth possibility is that guilt arises because agents sense their own nega-
tive transformation. Performing acts recognized as morally disagreeable can
compt character. Our settled righteous dispositions, our instinctive responses,
and our ethical sensibilities are threatened by a series of situations in which we
must transgress paramount moral principles in deference to a supposed greater
good. We may feel guilty as we sense that it becomes easier and easier to carry
out such deeds. We may perceive that we are risking our souls-jeopardizing, or
at least compromising, our core values that partially constitute who we are. Guilt
may dog our sense of incremental corruption.
Again, this possibility raises only the origins of our feelings of guilt, not
whether we are in fact morally guilty of anything. In this case, even the feeling
of guilt may be too strong a description. Regret, a sense of loss, and ambiva-
lence about our occupation may be more accurate than feeling guilty about our
personal transformation. Moreover, the core question remains: Independently of
our misgivings or even our feelings of guilt, are we guilty?
A fifth possibility creases the mark. Suppose a moral agent is not restricted
to only two morally disagreeable choices. For example, no one is burdened with
an antecedent duty to become a military or political leader, or to remain a leader
once he has assumed the post. In a dirty hands situation, the chief military and
political officer has another choice beyond the two unpleasant options: he may
resign. Strictly speaking, a military or political leader bears some responsibility
for not choosing this third option. Even if he cannot resign, without gravely
jeopardizing citizens, at the moment of choice, the fact that he assumed leader-
ship with full knowledge that the job description included facing circumstances
that would dirty his hands is enough to render him somewhat responsible for
moral transgressions that occur.
Peter Digeser adds ballast to the moral pessimist's position:
By being given a set of alternatives that are morally dubious, politicians can, to
a degree, be excused for dirtying their hands. The excuse of necessity does di-
minish blame . . . but it does not remove blame altogether. Officeholders who
are placed in a position in which they must dirty their hands have the option of
164 Chapter Five
resignation . . . the fact that they seek oftice and desire to hold onto it does im-
ply something about the moral responsibilities that attach to

The idea here is that necessity is not strict in such cases. The military or po-
litical officer has a third way. He has an excuse that partially exonerates him
fiom full responsibility, but not choosing the third way and assuming the duties
of office knowing that he inevitably would confiont dirty hands situations bur-
den the moral agent with some degree of responsibility.
A sixth possibility is also apparent. "The dog ate my homework" is a feck-
less response if I placed the paper in Fido's feeding dish, ladled gravy over it,
and covered it with the dog's favorite dinner. Or if I was negligent in placing my
homework in a spot inviting to my dog, I cannot convincingly shuck all respon-
sibility for the loss. That is, if I am responsible, fully or partially, for the circum-
stances under which my homework disappeared, I cannot properly invoke my
canine's appetite as a legitimate excuse for my failure to pony up the work in
class. Accordingly, when military and political officers, by their antecedent acts,
are partially responsible for the circumstances under which they brave unappeal-
ing choices, they bear proportionate responsibility and are only partially excused
in the court of moral logic.
A seventh possibility is more controversial. Might the enormity of the viola-
tion of a nearly absolute moral principle warrant only a partial excuse for the
moral agent? Murdering a brother, helping to slay three thousand fellow coun-
trymen, overseeing the execution of sons, exploiting a confederate by using him
to pacify a region and then slicing him in two when convenient, a mother's
choosing to save the life of a son over the life of a daughter . . . are not these
transgressions of moral principles that are absolute or nearly so? Even if the acts
were warranted by extraordinary circumstances, should not their mortifying na-
tures render the agents partially responsible? Should not their excuses be only
partially exonerating?
The moral optimist would be unswayed. To call a moral principle nearly ab-
solute just means that it may be overridden on only a few occasions. If the in-
stant case is one of those occasions then no squeamishness about the numerous
times when the principle may not be violated is called for. If the instant case is
not one of those rare occasions, or if the principle is altogether absolute, then the
agent should not violate the principle at all. In either case, no guilt or even feel-
ings of guilt should arise.
The moral pessimist, perhaps smuggling in epistemological uncertainty and
uncertainty of attaining desired outcome, would insist that some acts are so hor-
rifying, even if warranted, that feelings of guilt would arise in all but the most
insensitive moral agents. More telling, those feelings reflect the partial responsi-
bility borne by the agent who is only partially exonerated.
Moral pessimists press their point. An action may be justified or excused,
yet still be somehow wrong. When making an overall evaluative judgment of
whether to perform an act given the circumstances-whether based on conse-
quentialist or non-consequentialist grounds-we may properly conclude that the
 Ends and Means 165

act is justified or excused. But the morally unavoidable features of that act still
count against the action and its agent. That is, the overall judgment of what to
d o - t h e proper evaluation that we should perform the act--does not expunge all
the wrongness of the values that constitute that act. The wrongness of certain
parts of the act persists as a disvalue. The feeling of guilt that results is righteous
and appropriate, not simply an unwarranted neurosis that merits psychological
therapy or a lecture on the logic of moral concepts.41
Moral principles are absolute not in the sense that they cannot be overridden
under particular circumstances, but in the sense that even when they are justifia-
bly or excusably overridden the wrongness of transgressing them remains. The
experience of having dirty hands resonates with that conviction. The most im-
portant cases of dirty hands include significant "betrayals of a person, value, or
principle."42 Although Machiavelli lacked the conceptual apparatus of twenty-
first century moral philosophy, he intuitively accepted that dirty hands were the
inevitable consequence of the clash between absolute moral principles, the re-
quirements of public office, and the necessities of navigating in the zero-sum
contest that adjudicates international affairs. The actions, even if excusable in
Machiavelli's view, of political leaders nevertheless strain from the persisting
wrongness of some of their constitutive values. That is why strong men blessed
with military and political virtf must risk their souls to found, reform, and lead
their nations.
To think otherwise is to conflate justified acts which contain no disvalues as
part of the overall judgment that they should be performed with justified or ex-
cused acts that do. For example, working for famine relief, helping my neighbor
paint her house, and feeding my dog are all morally permissible, justified acts
that, other things being equal, include no disvalues or wrongful components.
Dirty hands situations-which by definition do include disvalues and wrongful
components--often result in proper judgments that acts are justified or excused.
To assess all justified acts in the same way-they involve no overall wrongness,
exonerate the agent from all responsibility, and thus involve no guilt-is to dis-
tort our moral experience and grossly minimize the anguish of moral choice.
Some dirty hands situations, such as Sophie's, implicate the agent in execut-
ing the immoral designs of another person. Sophie was immorally coerced into
sparing the life of one of her children at the expense of the other. Her action was
justified-in that she minimized the amount of evil possible under the circum-
stances. Yet, she senses the stain on her hands or, more accurately, the compro-
mise of her soul. Should Sophie feel morally righteous? After all, she did the
best she could under the circumstances? What would it say about her if she was
able, perhaps after a quick talk on the logic of moral concepts, to brush off the
tragedy of having been forced to bring about the death of her daughter? Having
the appropriate moral response is crucial to a filly human life. The feeling of
guilt is evidence of understanding that even justified or excused acts do not al-
ways purify the wrongness or disvalues they embody.
The moral optimist may well be correct: Sophie is not morally culpable. But
not all guilt flows from moral culpability. Michael Stocker observes:
166 Chapter Five
There is shame and guilt in regard to one's ancestors and in regard to one's fel-
low citizens, colleagues, and others with whom one identifies. So, too, there is
shame and guilt over what one merely brings about--e.g., the shame and guilt
even a careful driver might feel over the death of a child who suddenly darts in
front of the car.43
The constituting values of an overall evaluation of what to do and how to
act do not disappear as values once the evaluation is finalized. What is required
under the circumstances may still be bad even though justified or excused. Justi-
fied or excused betrayals of a person, value, or principle retain their wrongful
features; an accurate, overall assessment that they are the best we can do under
the circumstances does not cleanse all wrongness and disvalue.
I am arguing, then, that a morally pessimistic version of the problem of
dirty hands is implicit in Machiavelli's work and that I find that rendition com-
pelling. Critics will howl. First, they will accuse me of yoking Machiavelli to a
supra-historical framework of analysis and obsessing over the logic of moral
reasoning at which Machiavelli would scoff. Second, many will contest the co-
herency of moral pessimism in this context.
In response, I will go further. With Walzer, I take Machiavelli, with the
possible exception of Aristotle, to be the first theorist to understand intuitively
and acutely the problem of dirty hands in military and political matters. Yes, I
am making his view explicit in the context of twenty-first century moral con-
cepts. I am not claiming he operated with these concepts. But he participated in
the tension between accepting absolute moral principles, recognizing the duties
(particularly the obligation to advance the interests of constituents over those of
foreigners) of public office, and the necessities urged by particular circum-
stances. Surely, for Machiavelli, principles are not morally good only because
they are useful. Machiavelli is not a utilitarian in that sense. He did not work out
the resulting implications nor did he resolve the conundrums. But, then, I am not
sure we can smooth out the irregularities either.
An eighth possible explanation of why some excuses only partially exoner-
ate revolves around the problem of questionable partiality. Suppose Sophie's
choice was between the lives of her two children or the lives of fifty equally
innocent youths: If she chooses to save the lives of her children, the fifty others
will be slaughtered; if she chooses to save the fifty, Sophie's own children will
be slain. If Sophie chooses to save the life of her children, does she bear any
responsibility for the deaths of fifty innocent children? Is her partialism justified
or fully excused or only partially excused? Let's change the case again. Sophie's
choice is between having her two children tortured excruciatingly for two weeks
or the lives of fifty equally innocent children: If she chooses to save the lives of
the fifty others, her children will be tortured; if she permits the torture, the lives
of fifty children will be spared. In this case, the values to be compared are no
longer lives to lives, but lives to periods of torture. Sophie chooses to prevent
her children from being tortured. Is she partially responsible for the deaths of the
fifty others?
 Ends and Means 167

Military and political officers are required by their job descriptions to pro-
mote the interests of their partisans over the interests of the international good.
The extent of warranted partialism is contestable-no contemporary moralist
would endorse the degree of partialism advocated by Machiavelli in interna-
tional affairs. But might some responsibility and some guilt for harmful out-
comes to foreigners arise from implementing partialistic reasoning under condi-
tions of rmcertainty? Might some occasions of preferring the interests of our
own to the interests of outsiders exonerate moral agents incompletely?
In all such appeals, moral optimists will insist that a right answer exists. If
the act is permitted then it is justified and the moral agent incurs no guilt. If she
feels guilty that is a psychological, not philosophical, concern. Only if the act is
unjustified does guilt ensue. In such cases moral agents should feel guilty be-
cause they are guilty. Moral pessimists rejoin that moral experience is not so
neatly packaged. Degrees of uncertainty pervade our assessment of circum-
stances, weighing of alternatives, deliberation over means, and evaluation of
different ends. The duties of public office complicate matters further because the
ideal moral vantage point of impartialism is compromised systematically: mili-
tary and political leaders must promote the interests of their country.
Machiavelli must remain a puzzle for contemporary moralists. His under-
standing of necessity, contrary to current usage, does not allow a chief political
officer to lodge a legitimate claim of justification. Necessity permits only a
claim of excuse which does not fully exonerate the actor from responsibility in
Machiavelli's court of morality. For Machiavelli, limitations on a leader's range
of alternatives do not fully exonerate him from responsibility. Machiavelli takes
moral principles to be absolute, or almost always so, and violations are evil in
proportion to the havoc they cause. Leaders are sometimes partly responsible for
the antecedent conditions that nurture necessity, the horrifying nature of certain
of their acts, and their prior understanding of the inevitability of resorting to evil
when they freely assumed office combine to make them partially responsible for
moral horrors that ensue. Leaders who have already lost their souls-those who
feel no pangs of conscience when violating moral norms-are too likely to pro-
mote tyranny. The perhaps impossible task for chief military and political offi-
cers is to preserve their souls while consistently and systematically using evil
well. Machiavelli's model invokes a solitary actor, estranged from simplistic
evaluations by results only, aspiring to but suspicious of honors conferred by the
masses, commanded by the duties of office to advance the interests of his coun-
try above those of the international community. Surrounded by packs of jackals
and wolves immersed in a zero-sum contest in which the winners harvest glory,
power, and virtir while the losers suffer humiliation, impotence, and servitude,
leaders must soil their hands and risk their souls.
The multitude will, naively, judge only by the results. If the evil used turns
out to facilitate desired ends-such as the founding, preserving, or reforming of
a healthy, expansionist republic-the masses will judge the means praiseworthy.
If the evil used does not succeed, the people will evaluate the means harshly.
But actual outcomes flower from numerous causes, some of which are planted
168 Chapter Five
by Fortuna. To evaluate leaders only by results is to bestow too much credit or
too much blame for circumstances and events outside their control. Machiavelli
stresses the current situation and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
alternative possibilities. Our predicted outcomes and assessment of present cir-
cumstances arise from our own acts and evaluations. The actual results occur, at
least in part, from things beyond our command.

Is the Doctrine "A Few Ends Excuse Some Means"

Just as Pernicious as the View that the
"Good End Justifies Every Means"?
Harvey Mansfield warns that "It is sometimes claimed in extenuation of Ma-
chiavelli that he never said, 'the end justifies the means.' No, but he said worse:
that the end makes the means honorable, and that moral men believe this."" I
would deny that what Machiavelli said is "worse." More fundamentally, Ma-
chiavelli says that the means will be judged honorable because the masses are
lured by external appearances and evaluate actions only by their outcome (P 18).
Machiavelli, then, is not claiming that the judgment of the masses, which he
considers vulgar in this context, "makes" the means honorable in any higher
sense. Moreover, the problem of dirty hands illustrates how one can argue that
an action is tainted with evil but required by the duties of office and is, thus,
honorable to perform. Moral optimists will dispute that analysis, but the position
of moral pessimists such as Machiavelli is at least plausible and in my view per-
suasive.
I have argued that for Machiavelli only a few ends excuse the use of means
that are otherwise wrong: Founding or preserving a healthy, expansionist state,
or reforming a corrupt state; driving out foreigners as a prelude to founding or
invigorating a state; facilitating the common good by removing obstreperous
elements as a last resort; and the like. These ends, for Machiavelli, are required
for a social life that can transform the people in positive ways, allow military
and political leaders to satisfy their yearning for glory, and confer on a nation
the reward of historical immortality.
Still, a critic would respond, those "few ends" cover more ground than first
suspected. None of the goals listed is attained by merely a single act. They all
require numerous, perhaps recurring, uses of evil. In what way does the doctrine
"A few ends excuse some means" amount to a moral improvement over the
view that "The good end justifies every means"?
The critic is correct that my interpretation of Machiavelli's positions still
endorses numerous harsh, cruel measures in the name of treasured goals. No
whitewash of Machiavelli is possible or desired on that score. But the excuse
doctrine narrows the scope of what defines a "good end." Not just any desired
goal legitimizes every means used to attain it. Moreover, the excuse doctrine
 Ends and Means 169

caps the amount of moral disagreeableness at the level of evil well used. Any
measures exceeding that cap call into question the ends sought. That is, going
beyond the level of evil well used suggests a leader is most probably a tyrant
focused on the accumulation and exercise of power as such, instead of a Ma-
chiavellian executive striving for personal glory in the context of transforming
citizens for the common good.
Further, the excuse doctrine implicates a leader's conscience in a way that
the justification view does not. If my actions are fully justified, as moral opti-
mists never tire of pointing out, I have no reason to feel guilty because I am not
guilty: my action was the morally right thing to do under the circumstances. If
my actions are excused in a fashion that only partially exonerates me from re-
sponsibility, I should harbor some guilt and serious misgivings. If so, perhaps in
the future I will be more reluctant-than I would be under the justification
view-to use cruelty in circumstances where it is not warranted. Perhaps under
the justification view it is easier in the future to rationalize the use of harsh
means and to dismiss countervailing reasons.
I must temper my argument by pointing out, again, that Machiavelli does
not delve into the psychology of his historical favorites, nor does he examine the
interior life of his hypothetical military and political leaders. Accordingly, I am
not claiming that Machiavelli stated, or even held explicitly, the contrasts that I
am urging. I am proposing, instead, that such contrasts are implicit in Machia-
velli's work as we interpret it in a contemporary framework.

Assessment of Machiavelli
Evaluating a thinker who wrote centuries ago invites charges of anachronism:
foisting a twenty-first century perspective on a sixteenth-century writer; expect-
ing the writer to anticipate five hundred years of military, political, economic,
and historical developments; and stridently chiding the writer for his shortcom-
ings as a clairvoyant. A degree of anachronism is inevitable, even clarifying.
Too much is unfair and obfuscating.
I'll begin with problems in Machiavelli's work that were discernible in his
own time, as evidenced in the work of one of his closer friends, Francesco Guic-
ciardini (1483-1540). Guicciardini was a lawyer by trade who played significant
roles in Italian politics as Florentine ambassador to Spain and Papal Governor of
Romagna. He also wrote, among other things, Florentine History; Ricordi, a
series of maxims and aphorisms on politics and life; the History of Italy; and
Considerations on the "Discourses" of Machiavelli. While Machiavelli held
ofice in the Florentine republic, Guicciardini eyed him suspiciously as So-
derini's acolyte. Once the Holy League ousted Soderini in 1512, the two men
shared an enmity toward Medici rule in Florence, although that sentiment did
not stop either man from seeking employment from the Medici. In 152 1, Ma-
chiavelli, while traveling as an emissary to the Franciscan friars in Capri, passed
170 Chapter Five

through an area governed by Guicciardini. The two men enjoyed lively, pro-
found political discussions and soon began a series of correspondences that
ended only when Machiavelli died. Machiavelli had famously written to another
friend, Francesco Vettori, "I love Messer Francesco Guicciardini, I love my na-
tive city more than my own soul" (Ltr. 331: 4/16/27).
If Machiavelli represented cool calculation punctuated, and often distorted,
by fiery idealism, Guicciardini was the iceman: unabashedly ambitious, ob-
sessed with personal honor, disdainful of religious sentiment, seemingly devoid
of personal warmth, relentlessly contriving, and committed to the primacy of
reason over passion and will. Guicciardini was shorn of both illusion and hope.
He shared several principles with Machiavelli: the deceptions and guiles of poli-
tics; a strong conviction that a state was only as enduring as its military might;
and the need to free Italy from the oppression of foreign dominators and internal
clergy. But Guicciardini, unlike Machiavelli, was not a dreamer. The aristocratic
iceman did not entertain thoughts of a savior who could redeem the honor of the
Italian peninsula. To perceive a need was not to conjure a solution.
[Guicciardini] knew that without some renown and respect a man could amass
riches but rarely preserve or increase them. He also knew that the lofty ideals
he cherished would not interfere with his personal success only if he considered
them his own private prejudices. He could speak of piety, honor, liberty, jus-
tice, morality, and the hope to see Italy freed from foreign oppressors to a few
trusted friends. . . . But his decisions in the world were never to be dictated by a
desire to change it.45

Guicciardini's objections to Machiavelli are both methodology and substan-

tive. Although he takes many potshots at Machiavelli's method at arriving at
political conclusions, Guicciardini has three major misgivings. First, he argues
that Machiavelli's idolization of ancient Rome skews his political conclusions.
He charges that Machiavelli's worship of Rome leads him to ignore differences
in historical circumstances and lures him into misleadingly idealizing the poli-
cies and actions of the Roman republic as a nearly perfect standard (C 1 29; C I
49; C 111 24; R C 110; R C 117). Second, Guicciardini accuses Machiavelli of
asserting his conclusions too categorically and universally. Too often, Machia-
velli writes as if a matter can be settled by a bright-line rule where more nuance
is present and derives broad conclusions from inadequate evidence (C I 3; C I
26). Finally, Guicciardini rejects Machiavelli's quest to discover political rules
of behavior from the dustbin of selective history (C I 39; C I 40: R C 114). In
sum, Guicciardini pegged Machiavelli, ironically, as too impractical and idealis-
tic.
On matters of substance, Guicciardini is even more leery. He lodged nu-
merous objections to details in Machiavelli's position. The following six objec-
tions illustrate the trajectory of Guicciardini's criticism.
First, he rejects Machiavelli's view of human nature. For Guicciardini hu-
man beings, contrary to Machiavelli's view, are naturally inclined to seek the
g o o d ( C I 3 ; R C 134;RC 1 3 5 ; R B 4 ; R Q 4 ) .
 Ends and Means
All men have a natural inclination to goodness, and, all other things being
equal, like good better than evil, and if any have a different tendency, it is so
far contrary to what is normal for others, and against the first object given by
nature, that he must rather be called a monster than man (C I 3).

Despite this natural inclination to the good, Guicciardini notes that human
nature is fragile and easily tempted to stray from righteousness. A system of
rewards and punishments must reinforce our natural inclination lest we stumble
toward moral degeneration (R C 134; R Q 4).
Second, Guicciardini is an unabashed aristocrat who harbored no faith in
the judgments of the masses. Whereas Machiavelli took the multitude to be bet-
ter evaluators of at least a few matters than a prince, Guicciardini relentlessly
disputed that finding (C I 2; C I 5; C I 7; C I 58; R C 140; R C 201; R B 113).
A people full of ignorance and confusion, and possessing many bad qualities,
can only be expected to overthrow and destroy everything. . . . One cannot deny
that a people in itself are a treasury of ignorance and confusion. Hence, purely
popular governments have at all times been short lived (C I 5; C I 58).

Third, Guicciardini, while acknowledging the necessity of harsh measures

at times, takes Machiavelli to task for too readily accepting violent means where
more humane alternatives are available (C I 26).
The prince must take courage to use these extraordinary means when necessary,
and should yet take care not to miss any chance which offers of establishing his
cause with humanity, kindness, and rewards, not taking as an absolute rule
what [Machiavelli] says, who was always extremely partial to extraordinary
and violent methods (C I 26).
Fourth, Guicciardini undermines a crucial Machiavellian conviction: that
the amount of good and bad in the world is constant; that the state of the world
is always the same in every age, with only the location of privilege, power, and
relative greatness changing. This conviction is important in setting up Machia-
velli's portrait of the world as a zero-sum contest in which one nation's gain
must be purchased by the losses of other nations. Guicciardini argues that the
amount of overall virtd, the quality of art, the level of military discipline, the
refinement of literature, the vitality of religion, and the temper of social customs
do not remain constant through history. One historical era, overall, is not just as
corrupt and as glorious as every other (C I1 pref).
Fifth, Guicciardini calls into question Machiavelli's understanding of the
greatness of Romulus and, by extension, Machiavelli's general depictions of his
historical heroes. According to Guicciardini, Romulus was "thought to have
been assassinated by the senate for arrogating to himself too great authority"
instead of conforming to Machiavelli's account wherein Romulus ceded most of
his power to the senate, retaining only the authority to convene that body and to
command armies during war time (C I 9).
172 Chapter Five

Sixth, unlike Machiavelli, Guicciardini rejected the possibility of a unified

Italy.
Guicciardini, a thoroughly practical man . . . regarded any scheme for the unifi-
cation of Italy as the idle vision of a dream; indeed he was almost inclined to
think it undesirable in itself, and to regard the stimulating influence of a num-
ber of independent states as a compensation for the weakness of a divided na-
tion. In any case he was convinced that Italy could not cut herself adrift from
the past. . . he rejected the idea of a great and general fatherland for all Italians,
the notion of which had been gradually permeating the intellectual atmos-
here.^^
Finally, Machiavelli, in a meandering argument, concludes that in a republic
that has not been corrupted attacking some citizens whom ought to be rewarded
and being suspicious of some who merit confidence are "mistakes" that bear a
benefit: citizens remain good and less ambitious because they fear punishment
(D I 29). Guicciardini rejoins that "every kind of ingratitude and injustice is al-
ways pernicious and the republic must be ordered in such a way that the good
are always honored and the innocent not alarmed" (C I 29).
Guicciardini's complaints anticipated the core of modem objections to Ma-
chiavelli's writing. Machiavelli claimed to derive his political conclusions from
observations about human nature and historical examples, mostly drawn from
the Roman republic. Despite his aspiration and subsequent reputation, Machia-
velli was far from objective. He selected his examples carefully, choosing only
those that supported his foregone convictions. He was not above falsifying his-
torical accounts if doing so supported his conclusions better than the actual ac-
counts. Why would a supposed detached political scientist use such unreliable
and disreputable methods? Despite his renown as the founder of cool, calculat-
ing, dispassionate statecraft, Machiavelli embodied deep idealism and romanti-
cism. Disgusted by the rancid disgrace of being dominated by barbarians, while
at the same time observing the skills and courage of individual Italians in duels
and competitions involving only a few, Machiavelli placed his trust in the ascent
of one great man to wreak vengeance and to drive the stranieri from his home-
land. Following the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, he was convinced that once
this "Superman" emerged, the masses would be spiritually transformed, a repub-
lic could emerge, virtic would flourish, and the state would prosper. His treatises
are not the labors of an objective scientist, but rather the poems, yearnings, and
implorations of a lover. His emotions, passion, and anguish permeate his writ-
ings. They frequently cloud his thinking, they sometimes animate his insights,
but they always starkly reveal the source of the blood in his veins. In short, the
methodological strengths and weaknesses of Niccolb Machiavelli flow fiom his
relentless patriotism.
The differences between Guicciardini and Machiavelli on human nature are
ones of degree and starting point. Although Machiavelli's picture of human na-
ture is harsher-stressing the inherent inclination toward selfishness and short-
term benefit-he also details possibilities for transformation. Sound leadership,
 Ends and Means 173

strong arms, well-crafted laws, and robust religion nourish civic and moral virtir.
A multitude that is initially turned to anarchistic chaos can be molded into ex-
emplifying a praiseworthy collective national character. Such change is possible
only if human nature contains prospects for the good. While Guicciardini em-
phasizes the inherent inclination of human nature to seek the good, his consid-
ered view of quality of the people's judgment is less sanguine than Machia-
velli's. For Guicciardini, the initial turn toward the good does not issue in
practical wisdom. To say that human nature includes possibilities for good and
for evil is trivial, but true. Machiavelli's depiction of human nature is undoubt-
edly harsh, disproportionate, unfair, and unpersuasive. But these distortions are
tempered by Machiavelli's profound faith in the power of a strong state and its
prospects for elevating the masses. His drawing of human nature, then, is more
of a prelude to the importance of strong leadership and sound government than a
claim to metaphysical precision.
That Machiavelli's writings celebrate violent means and extraordinary
measures is beyond dispute. Machiavelli is proudest when he venerates deeds
that most people would find unspeakable: murdering a brother for political rea-
sons; supervising the execution of counter-revolutionary sons; zapping three
thousand countrymen who falsely worship; eviscerating a governmental patsy in
order to shock and awe townsfolk. Machiavelli does not seriously consider
whether other means of resolving the situations were recommended nor does he
explore the consequences for the interior life of those who commanded the kill-
ings. Ironically, despite his dark vision of human nature, Machiavelli is most
appreciative that Romulus, Brutus, Moses, and Borgia acted in ways from which
most leaders would shrink: they learned how not to be good when necessary.
More profoundly, Machiavelli's world view lines up a relentless interna-
tional zero-sum contest that morphs into a self-fulfilling prophesy. Once na-
tional leaders are convinced that the world is a battleground for survival, glory,
and virtic, they have additional reason to act in ways that reinforce that convic-
tion. Preemptive military strikes, aggressive expansionism, and "doing it to them
before they do it to us" calculations are muted only by the strength of a coun-
try's armed might, its current international commitments, and other prudential
considerations. From Machiavelli's sony vision of international relations, arises
a vicious cycle: assuming that a state of nature exists ensures that it does exist.
Guicciardini neatly undermines Machiavelli's observation that the overall
amount of virtir in the world remains constant. This thesis is important for Ma-
chiavelli's zero-sum worldview. On its face, the thesis is unconvincing for the
reasons beyond those advanced by Guicciardini. Even if the overall results or
comparative positions of, say, four nations remain the same, the quality of their
participation in international affairs-ne measure of virtic-may increase in all
cases. For example, the overall records of all teams in the American League in
professional baseball must balance out to a .500 percentage, an equal number of
wins and losses. But the overall quality of play in 2007 is clearly superior to the
quality of play in 1905. Modem athletes, independently of the use of perform-
ance-enhancing drugs, are faster, larger, stronger, and have access to superior
174 Chapter Five

training methods and much better equipment. True, the overall records of all
teams must end in a constant .500 win-loss percentage, but it does not follow
that the overall amount of baseball excellence remains the same. And this should
be especially so for Machiavelli, who otherwise disparages those who judge
actions only by their results. Accordingly, within Machiavellian philosophy is a
philosophical nugget that can destroy his view that the overall amount of virti
remains constant: virti cannot be judged by results alone. Once we abrogate the
position that the overall amount of virtii in the world remains the same, we take
the first step in mollifying Machiavelli's depiction of the world as a series of
ruthless zero-sum events.
Rarely is Machiavelli interpreted as a man undergoing existential crisis. Yet
that is precisely what he suffered. He was haunted by an obsession to resist the
Grim Reaper; to carve out a piece of enduring glory; to realize an historical im-
mortality bestowed only on those able to harness ambizione, attain military and
political virtii, and transcend the natural depravity of mankind. Mortality, extinc-
tion, to evaporate from the historical record . . . these were the punishments
meted out to the multitude who led lives of tranquil desperation. Nothingness
and indifference were the cruelest cosmic responses to the deepest human yearn-
ings.
The grand aspirations, profound patriotism, burning ambition, and relentless
passion of Machiavelli's interior life, though, coalesced uneasily with his
worldly fortunes.
[Machiavelli] lived an irregular, almost bohemian life. He was a brilliant fail-
ure, never really managed to achieve his ends: he never made love to the
women he wanted, satisfied his ambitions, reached the top in his political career
and was never taken seriously as a thinker during his lifetime. He died penni-
less: he never even succeeded in persuading the republic of Florence to pay his
arrears and to reimburse him for his expenses. He never managed to get his im-
mortal works published. He was the permanent victim of political changes. . . .
Such is the fate of very intelligent men who are, however, not intelligent
enough to conceal their intelligence and lull other people's fears and suspicions
to sleep. Machiavelli was, in reality, too much of a dreamer and an optimist to
achieve practical resu~ts.~'

Machiavelli, unlike Nietzsche, never anticipated the glory history would

render him. When discussing the types of men who merit praise, Machiavelli
lists heads and founders of religion, founders of republics or principalities,
commanders of armies who have expanded territorial holdings, and, finally, au-
thors (D I 10). Although he burned to earn enduring glory in service to his coun-
try as a political consigliere, Machiavelli attained historical prominence as an
author. At his death, he could not have forecasted the literary distinction his
work would reap. He never fully understood the teeming artistic virtii he exuded.
Ironically, Machiavelli, during his lifetime, was never Machiavellian enough to
realize his dreams.
 Ends and Means

Notes
1. Leo Strauss, Thoughts on MachiaveNi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958), 13-14.
2. Ibid., 67.
3. Ibid., 67-68.
4. Niccolb Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, trans. Luigi Ricci and ed. E.
R. P. Vincent (New York: Random House, Inc., 1950), 66.
5. Niccolb Machiavelli, Selected Political Writings, ed. and trans. David Wootton
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 55; Dante Germino, "Second
Thoughts on Leo Strauss's Machiavelli," Journal of Politics 28 (1966): 803-807.
6. See, for example, John Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," Proceedings of the Aristote-
lian Society 57 (1956-1957): 1-5.
7. Germino, "Second Thoughts," 805.
8. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Harper Collins Publishers,
1977), 80-8 1.
9. Ibid., 254.
10. Raymond Angelo Belliotti, Seeking Identity: Individualism and Community in an
Ethnic Context (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 4-28.
11. Russell Price, "The Theme of Gloria in Machiavelli," Renaissance Quarterly 30
(1977), 628.
12. Belliotti, Seeking Identity, I f 14.
13. I have made that mistake more than once. See Raymond Angelo Belliotti, "Ma-
chiavelli and Machiavellianism," Journal of Thought 13 (1978): 293-300; Raymond
Angelo Belliotti and William S. Jacobs, "Two Paradoxes for Machiavelli," Terrorism,
Justice, and Social Values, ed. Creighton Pedan and Yeager Hudson (Lewiston, NY: The
Edwin Mellen Press, 1990): 1-14.
14. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," Philosophy
and Public Affairs 2 (1973): 164.
15. Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays (New York: Random House,
1976), Act V, p. 223-224.
16. arti in Hollis, "Dirty Hands," British Journal of Political Science 12 (1982):
390.
17. Bernard Williams, "Politics and Moral Character," in Public & Private Morality,
ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 59.
18. S. L. Sutherland, "The Problem of Dirty Hands in Politics," Canadian Journal of
Political Science 28 (1995): 482483.
19. See, for example, Benedetto Croce, "The Autonomy and Necessity of Politics,"
in Machiavelli: Cynic, Patriot or Political Scientist?, ed. De Lamar Jensen (Lexington,
MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1960), 13-16.
20. William Styron, Sophie's Choice (New York: Random House, 1979).
2 1. Walzer, "Political Action," 171, 161.
22. Ibid., 168.
23. Ibid., 179.
24. See, for example, Gerald F. Gaus, "Dirty Hands," in A Companion to Applied
Ethics, ed. R. G . Frey and Christopher Wellman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003):
167-79; H. Oberdiek, "Clean and Dirty Hands in Politics," International Journal of
Moral and Social Studies 1 (1986): 4 1-6 1; R. M. Hare, Essays in Political Morality (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
176 Chapter Five

25. Oberdiek, "Clean and Dirty Hands," 53-54.

26. See, for example, Walzer, "Political Action," 175.
27. Sebastian De Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1989), 35 1.
28. Ibid., 323.
29. Ibid., 341.
30. Niccolb Machiavelli, "An Exhortation to Penitence," in The Chief Work and
Others, ed. and trans. Allan H. Gilbert (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 170-
174.
31. Williams, "Politics and Moral Character," 64.
32. Gaus, "Dirty Hands," 176-178.
33. Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990).
34. Gaus, "Dirty Hands," 176.
35. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 264.
36. Ibid., 266-267.
37. Ibid., 267-268.
38. Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-
1946, ed. John Blum (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 473474.
39. Alan H. Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics (Totowa, NJ:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1980), 70-73.
40. Peter Digeser, "Forgiveness and Politics: Dirty Hands and Imperfect Proce-
dures," Political Theory 26 (1998): 7211119.
4 1. Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values, 9-36.
42. Ibid., 18.
43. Ibid., 30.
44. Harvey Mansfield, Machiavelli S Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996), 27.
45. Luigi Barzini, The Italians (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1964), 171.
46. Laurence Arthur Burd, introduction to Niccolb Machiavelli, N Principe, ed.
Laurence Arthur Burd (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1891), 26.
47. Barzini, The Italians, 165-166.
 Chapter Six
Machiavelli's Final Letter
To My Honored, Very Magnificent Readers and Friends Everywhere,
but especially the United States of America:

I have been unable to write for about four hundred eighty years. I have so
much to tell, I have learned so many glorious things, but today I can only begin.
I was wrong! The Eternal Prince is more forgiving than those earthly ban-
dits-the priests and prelates-lead people to believe. Upon my death, I was
immediately escorted into the Realm of Highest Honor. I honesty thought it
would go the other way. I had thought that the most interesting afterlife would
be in hell, conversing with bold scoundrels willing to risk their souls for their
homelands and for enduring glory. But there is no hell. We make our own hell
on earth by creating false limits and living in abject conformity to false idols of
our own making.
I am very grateful to have earned enduring glory posthumously. I sought
recognition so assiduously while I was alive, but I lurked in all the wrong places.
My literary talents far outstripped my political and military aptitudes. As a man
of action, I was insufficiently Machiavellian. Here, in the Realm of Highest
Honor, my discursive flair is better served. Best of all, no cursed barbarians gain
entry.
How the world has changed since I departed. We view the changes in sci-
ence, technology, communication, transportation from our vantage points in
Omega City and even we immortals marvel at human ingenuity. In other re-
spects, however, the world never changes. (I am pleased to have gotten that
point correct even in the sixteenth century.) The world remains a competitive
battle ground; only the weapons and methods vary. I never foresaw the power of
economics. I thought only in terms of military force and political skill. Para-
phrasing one of my new friends, Mario Puzo, "a diplomat can steal more politi-
cal influence with a briefcase full of money than thousands of men with guns."
The United States of America-what a glorious republic! Granted, a repub-
lic much different than I had imagined, but the critical elements glow brightly:
institutionalized conflict among the social classes; a wonderfkl tradition of free
speech; unequaled military might; a commitment to expanding influence; a
country built on welcoming new people and transforming them; and which na-
tion in history better practices the intimidation of the lion and the deception of
the fox? I must also mention your founding acts: Driving the Red Coats into the
sea; murdering and marginalizing the natives who inhabited the land; and en-
slaving a foreign, darker-skinned people to serve as inexpensive labor. These
brutalities were not inflicted at the command of one great man, but a small cote-
178 Chapter Six

rie of founding fathers assumed their proper roles. Were not these atrocities
transgressions of traditional morality? Have they not been excused by the
scribes of history? Sure, they are duly noted and scolded as deplorable, horrible,
excessive, and the like. But then what?
Americans conquered territories such as Texas by force; abandoned allies
who had benefited them such as France; exploited countries internally troubled
such as Panama; attacked Spanish Florida; waged war with Mexico, all the
while under the banner of God, natural law, and political justice. The methods
were necessary given the fortunes and necessities of the times and the results
have been worthy. You have fought wars to win, using your superior technology
to great advantage. You dropped atomic bombs on an enemy during World War
I1 and called it merciful. You dropped poisonous chemicals, Napalm, on an en-
emy in a later war and called it strategic defoliation. You stockpile the latest and
most devastating nuclear weapons and struggle mightily to prevent other coun-
tries fiom acquiring them. You argue that only the United States of America will
use such weapon wisely; other nations will wrongly threaten and attack their
neighbors. Yes, the competitive edge is a beautiful thing!
Better still, you expand your influence through economic leverage. You
control other countries and their foreign policy through their dependence on
your economic largesse. (I must confess I never saw this coming. I was eco-
nomically nalve.) You build temporary allies only to turn them into enemies
when expedient. Yet, your greatest enemies in the world war, once defeated,
became some of your closest allies. You have come to understand the art of gen-
erosity in victory. Yes, winners can afford to be gracious-at least once the
hardcore belligerents have been destroyed.
And what are your intelligence agencies but instruments of force and fiaud?
All the while your public relations machine strikes responsive chords in the peo-
ple: support the troops wherever they are, whatever they do, and for whatever
reasons they are doing it; the enemy are hordes of evil-doers; those opposing
military solutions are soft, traitorous, and render comfort to the despicable en-
emy. Beautiful! No country has ever embraced, refined, and implemented my
political principles as well as the United States of America.
You have made mistakes; more it seems in the last few decades. You have
misperceived your self-interest. What was the scheme two decades ago? You
sold weapons to one enemy in return for its help in releasing hostages held by
another enemy, then used the profits fkom the sale to promote counterrevolution
in yet another country. All this violated your laws. But your princes wisely cre-
ate buffers between themselves and such machinations; their ministers protect
them from responsibility. You call it "plausible denial." I cheer that expression.
You sometimes confuse overwhelming a defenseless enemy and toppling its
government with establishing a salutary ally. At times, you utterly confuse the
history and traditions of your target. Could you truly have believed that your
latest enemy would wave democratic flags the moment its dictator was de-
stroyed? Did you really think that the conditioning of centuries of oscillating
between political repression and theocratic control could be totally expunged
 Machiavelli's Final Letter 179

with the destruction of the reigning autocrat? You are obliged to offer no apolo-
gies except a few to your own people for wildly misunderstanding your own
interests and miscalculating the national character of others. Be careful. Such
errors can facilitate your downfall.
While you are relentlessly accumulating most of the world's scarce re-
sources, you implore the heavens for world peace. Why not? Is not world peace
in the self-interest of the nation holding the best military, technological, and
economic cards? The world, although stunningly larger than I had imagined,
remains a zero-sum arena in crucial respects.
My own country, Italy, has disappointed. Why, it cannot even produce
babies these days. Italy has proved unworthy of its Roman legacy. And Florence
. . . how the mighty homeland has fallen: a city of tourists, gold merchants,
leather emporiums, and a gaggle of cafoni riding vespe with cell phones stuck in
their ears!
No, the United States is the true progeny of the Roman republic. (You are
even named after an Italian.) America, I salute you. Buona Fortuna!

25 December 2007
Niccolb Machiavelli,
in Omega City,
The Field Beyond
 Appendix A
Texts and Their Abbreviations
As is common practice in Machiavelli scholarship, where I have cited from Ma-
chiavelli's writings the references in all cases have been given immediately in
the text and not in the endnotes. All references are to chapters or sections, not
page numbers, unless otherwise stated. For example:

References

AW245= The Art of War, Book 2, page 45 (Wood edition)

D155= The Discourses, Book I , chapter 55
FHI3= Florentine Histories, Book I, section 3
Leg. 13. 18 = The Legations, #13, section 18
Ltr. 247: 1/31/15 = Letter 247: January 3 1, 1515
(Atkinson and Sices edition)
M4:l = Mandragola, Act Four, Scene One.
P 18= The Prince, chapter 18

Abbreviations

AW The Art of War. Edited and translated by Neal Wood. Cambridge, MA:
De Capo Press, 1965.

D Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius ("The Discourses'~in

The Chief Works and Others. Edited and translated by Allan H. Gilbert.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989.

D Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius ("The Discourses'~in

Selected Political Writings. Edited and translated by David Wootton.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994.

FH Florentine Histories. Edited and translated by Laura F. Banfield and

Harvey C. Mansfield. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Leg. The Legations in The Chief Works and Others. Edited and translated by
Allan H. Gilbert. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989.
182 Appendix A

Ltr. Machiavelli and His Friend: Their Personal Correspondence. Edited

and translated by James B. Atkinson and David Sices. DeKalb, IL:
Northern Illinois University Press, 1996.

Ltr. The Letters of Machiavelli. Edited and translated by Allan Gilbert,

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.

M Mandragola. Translated by Mera J. Flaumenhafi. Prospect Heights, IL:

Waveland Press, Inc., 1981.

P The Prince in The Chief Works and Others. Edited and translated by
Allan H. Gilbert. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989.

P The Prince in Selected Political Writings. Edited and translated by

David Wootton. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994.

Citations to Francesco Guicciardini

"Considerations on the 'Discourses' of Machiavelli" in Se-

lected Writings. Edited by Cecil Grayson. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965.

CI29= "Considerations on the 'Discourses' of Machiavelli," Book I,

chapter 29.

R= Maxims and Reflections (Ricordi). Edited and translated by

Mario Domandi. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1972.

R C llO= Ricordi, Series C, number 110.

Citations to Friedrich Nietzsche

BGE = Beyond Good and Evil (1886). Translated and edited by Wal-
ter Kaufinann. New York: Random House, 1966.

BGE 28 = Beyond Good and Evil, section 28.

WP= The Will to Power (fiom unpublished notebooks, 1883-1888).

Edited by Walter Kaufmann; translated by Walter Kaufinann
and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House, 1967.
 Texts and Their Abbreviations 183

WP 983 = The Will to Power, section 983.

Z= Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-1885) in The Portable

Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vi-
king Press, 1954.

Z I= Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Book I , "On the Three Metamor-

phoses." Translated by Walter Kaufrnann. New York: Viking
Press, 1954.
 Appendix B
Biographical Notes: Medici Scorecard
Medici: Dynastic family of rulers who dominated Florentine politics fTom 1434.
They were expelled in 1494, returned in 1512, expelled again in 1527, and re-
turned in 1530. They were major players in Florence and Rome during the Ren-
aissance.

Cosimo de'Medici (1389-1464): From 1434-1464, he was the unelected, de

facto ruler of Florence. His political influence flowed from his control of bank-
ing and personal connections. He masterminded the Peace of Lodi (1454-1494)
whereby the five major regions of Italy (Venice, Milan, Florence, Papal States,
and Kingdom of Naples) halted armed hostilities.

Lorenzo de'Medici ("the Magnificent") (1449-1492): Grandson of Cosimo.

Ruled Florence from 1469-1492. A target of the Pazzi conspiracy of 1478, he
escaped. Renowned as a patron of the arts. Father of Giovanni de'Medici, Pope
Leo X.

Giuliano de9Medici (1453-1478): Brother of the Magnificent. Murdered in

1478 during the Pazzi conspiracy. Father of Giulio de'Medici, Pope Clement
VII.

Giulio de'Medici (1478-1534): Son of Giuliano, who was slain during Pazzi
conspiracy. Elected as Pope Clement VII in 1523. While a cardinal, he com-
missioned Machiavelli's Florentine Histories in 1520. Botched the defense of
Rome circa 1527.

Piero de'Medici (1471-1503): Eldest son of the Magnificent. Ruled Florence

from 1492-1494. A feckless ruler with few political skills, he was ousted by
Florentine citizens after bungling the defense of the city from the invasion of
Charles VIII of France. Died while later serving in the French army.

Giovanni de'Medici (1475-1521): Middle son of the Magnificent. Elected as

Pope Leo X in 1513. That election triggered the amnesty that released Machia-
velli from prison. A spendthrift who patronized banquets, arts, theater, poetry,
and numerous charities, he expanded the practice of selling indulgences to raise
money for the bankrupted papal treasury.
186 Appendix B

Giuliano de'Medici (1478-1516): Youngest son of the Magnificent. Briefly the

ruler of Florence around 1512 and the person to whom Machiavelli fist wanted
to dedicate The Prince. Resigned and became Duke of Nemours by marriage to
French royalty.

Lorenzo de'Medici (1492-1519): Son of Piero (1471-1503), grandson of the

Magnificent. Upon the resignation of his Uncle Giuliano (1478-1516), Lorenzo
grew in influence in Florence, taking the title of captain general. Pope Leo X
also appointed him Duke of Urbino. Machiavelli dedicated The Prince to him.
Lorenzo is rumored to have died from the effects of syphilis.
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 Index
accusation, public, 52-54
act consequentialism, 15 1-52
Aesop's fable, 19
Agathocles of Syracuse, 4-5, 1 2 6 2 7
ambizione, defined, 46-47
amor fati, 6 1
animo, 46
animo effeminato, 7, 12, 15,47
armies, xix, 13-14,34,94-95
artistic virtli, 3
The Art of War, 95
atomic bomb, 158-59
auxiliary armies, 13-14
Baglioni, Giovampagolo, 36
Bartlett, Kenneth, xviii-xix
behavior, control of, 13
Berlin, Isaiah, 77-79
bonfires of the vanities, xvii, 130
Borgia, Cesare, xviii-xix, 21-22, 84,
85-86,109-12
bottom ten of Machiavelli, 121-35
Brutus, Lucius Junius, 113-1 4
Buondelmonti, Zanobi, 32
Burd, Laurence, 66
Caesar, (Gaius) Julius, 122-24
call to arms, The Prince as, 69-75
Camillus, Marcus Furius, 116-17, 134-
35
Capitolinus, Marcus Manlius
Cassirer, Emst, 67-68
Castracani, Castruccio, 27-29, 86
charges, 52-54
Charles V, xxii
Charles VII, king, 54
Charles VIII, king, xvi-xvii
Christianity, 77-8 1
Church, Catholic, 49-50,72-74
Church, Christian, 121-22
Churchill, Winston, 160
Cicero, 19
Cincinnatus, Lucius Quintius, 48-49
civic virtli, 3,35
Clement VII, pope, xxi-xxii
Commodus, 57, 1 18
common good, 4 1-43
common ground in The Prince and The
Discourses, 32-37
communal good, 147
conflict, institutionalized, 46-47
con gameslswindles, 20-21
The Conquest of Gaul, 123
consequentialism, 151-52; tribal act,
147-48
corruption, 3-4
counsel of Machiavelli, 8-25
Croce, Benedetto, 75-76
cycle of states, 39-41
Cyrus (the Great), 102-3
decisiveness, 2 1-22
The Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire, 118
Delphic Oracle, 54-55
De Officis, 19
De Sanctis, Francesco, 69-70
dictator, office of, 47-48
Dictator for Life, 124
Dietz, Mary, 90-96
Digeser, Peter, 163-64
Diogenes Laertius, 29
dirty hands, 148-6 1
The Discourses, 3 1-62, 70; dedication,
32
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus
Livius, 3 1-62
divination, 54-55
the divine, 120-21
domination, 8
"Duke Valentino," 85, 109-1 2
Egypt, Jewish enslavement in, 100-101
ends and means, 137-74
"ends justify the means," 138-42
Epicharis, 57
esoteric work, The Prince as, 66-67
Eumeducci, Oliverotto (da Fermo),
125-26
evil: ill-/well-used, 4-5,36-37,70,79,
140-41; The Prince teaches, 63-
65
excuses, 140, 161-68; triggers for,
142-44
"Exhortation to Seize Italy and Free
Her from the Barbarians," 26
existential crisis, The Prince as product
of, 81-83
expansionism as goal of governments,
7,45, 144
Fallon, Stephen M., 88
familiglia, I'ordine della, 58-59
Faustina, 118
fear better than love, 17-1 8
Ferrero, Guglielmo, 8 1
"a few ends excuse some means," 168-
69
final letter of Machiavelli, 17-179
First Decennale, 84
Florentine Histories, xxi, 38,96
Fogliani, Giovanni, 125-26
Forster, E. M., 1 13
fortresses, 9 1, 93
fortuna/Fortuna, 5-7, 12-13,29, 89-
90
Fortuna is a lady, 6
fox, qualities of, 19-2 1
"The Fox and the Lion," 19
Gentili, Alberico, 83
gentiluomi, 49
Gibbon, Edward, 118
Gloria, 7
glory, 145; quest for, 7-8
"good," 3, 59
"the good end justifies every means,"
137-38
Gracchi Brothers, 127-29
Gracchus, Gaius Sempronius, 127-29
Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, 127-
29
grandezza d'animo, 7, 12, 15,47
Grazia, Sebastian de, xx
Guicciardini, Francesco, 69, 169-73
guilt, 153, 162-63
hatred, avoidance of, 18
Hill Street Blues, 143
history, study of, 14-15
Hobbes, Thomas, 144
Holy League of Mantua, xix, 132-33
human nature, 32-34
human temperaments, 8
Hurricane Katrina, 5
hypocrisy of church hierarchy, 122
ideal prince, 27-29
immortality, quest for, 7-8
Index of Prohibited Books, xv, 74
Italy, liberation of, 137
Julius 11, pope, 13
justifications, 139-40, 141
land reform bill, 128
last men, 59-60
law, functions of, 10-1 1
laws, 14
leadership, need for, 36
The Legations, 84-85
Leo X , pope, xx
Life of Castruccio Castracani, 27-29,
86
lion, qualities of, 19-21
Lives of the Philosophers, 29
Livy, 3 1
Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth, 143
Lorenzo the Magnificent. See
de'Medici, Lorenzo
lottery analogy, 20
Louis XII, king, 68-69, 133-34
"love of fate," 61
lusts, erotic and material, 12
luxuries, 48-49
Lycurgus, 114-15
Machiavelli, Niccolb: assessment of,
169-74; biographical information,
xv; death of, xxii; as diplomat,
xviii; epitaph, xxii; in exile, xxi;
family, xviii; letters, xv, xxi;
works, publication dates of, xv
"Machiavellian," l,63, 8 1
Machiavelli and Nietzsche, 58-62
Mandragola, 155
Mansfield, Harvey, 4,6445,168
Marcia, 57
Marcus Aurelius, 117-21
Maritain, Jacques, 63
masses, 50-51; loyalty of, 10-12
Mattingly, Garrett, 84-85, 87
de'Medici, Giovanni, xx
delMedici, Giuliano, xx
de'Medici, Giulio, xxi
de'Medici, Lorenzo, xv-xvi; ancestors,
1 politics and morality, The Prince
de'Medici, Piero, xv-xvi
Meditations, 119
mercenaries, 13
metamorphoses, three, 60-6 1
military strength, primacy of, 34-36
military virtu, 3, 35
ministers, trustworthy, 22-24
moral choices, 152
morality, conventional, 9-10; master,
59-60; and politics, The Prince
separates, 75-77
moral optimism~pessimism,152-67
moral pessimist, Machiavelli as, 1 5 6
57,162
moral virtu, 3, 35
moral virtues, 9
Moravia, Alberto, 8 1-83
Moses, 100- 102
the multitude, 50-5 1
Murphy, Arthur, 41-42
neutrality, avoidance of, 21-22
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 58-62
Numa Pompilius, 104-5
Oliverotto da Fermo, 125-26
Olschki, Leonard, 68
opportunities squandered by Christian
Church, 122
oppression of the masses, 8
optimism, moral, 152-67
Oracle, Delphic, 54-55
overman, 60-62
partialism, case for, 145-47
patriotism, 44-45,71-73
Patton, 145
Pazzi, attempt to overthrow the Medici,
xv-xvi
Pazzi Conspiracy, War of the, xv-xvi
pessimism, moral, 1 5 2 4 7
philosopher-king, 117
Pisa, war against, xix
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, 56
"plausible denial," 178
Plutarch, 113
poker analogy, 16,20
political strategies of Christianity, 122
political virtri, 3
separates, 75-77
Pontius Pilate, 148
power, securing and preserving, 24-25
Prato, battle for, xix
Prezzolini, Giuseppe, 77
Prezzolini-Berlin interpretation, 79-81
The Prince: dedication, xxi, 1-2; final
chapter of, 25-27, 86-87;
methods, 63-99; motivations, 63-
99; and the multitude, 50-5 1;
purposes, 63-99
principles, founding, 5 1-53
punishment, threat of, 10
Puzo, Mario, 177
reality, 15
reason, use of, 10
Rebhom, Wayne, 55-56
religion, 49-50
Remus, 99-100
republics are best, 43-45
reputation, value of, 15-16
result for Machiavelli, 144-45
Riario, Caterina Sforza, 56-57
Ricci, Luigi, 138
Ricordo ai Palleshi, xx
Roman history, influence on
Machiavelli, xviii
Romulus, 99-100
Rucellai, Cosimo, 32
rule consequentialism, 152
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 148
satire, The Prince as, 83-87
Savonarola, Girolamo, xvii, 15,54,
129-3 1
scientific work, The Prince as, 67-69
Scipio Africanus, Publius Cornelius,
105-9
Sherman, William T., 145
Sixtus IV, pope, xvi
Soderini, Piero, xviii-xx, 110, 131-33
Sophie S Choice, 151 , 15658, 162,
165-66
speed limit analogy, 11
state, critical ends of, 17
statecraft handbook, The Prince as, 1
states, classification of, 39-41
Stocker, Michael, 165-66
Stoicism, 117, 119-20
strappado, xx-xxi
Strauss, Leo, 137, 139
subversive work, The Prince as, 87-97
success, recipe for, 25
sycophants, avoidance of, 23-24
Theseus, 103-4
three thousand, killing of, 101-2
top ten of Machiavelli, 99-121
training of Prince, 8-25
tribal act consequentialism, 147-48
Truman,Harry S, 158-59
iibermensch, 60-62
United States, 177-79
Urbino, Duke of, xxi, 1
Urbino, rebellion at, 109-1 1
Utopianism, 124-25
values of Christianity, 122
value systems, clash of, in The Prince,
77-8 1
Villari, Pasquale, 69
Vincent, E. R. P., 138
virtti, 2-5,35-39, 89, 121, 143-44,
173-74
Walzer, Michael, 148, 152-53, 159
war, knowledge of, 14-1 5
"War is Hell," 145
War of the Pazzi Conspiracy, xv-xvi
wealth, 48-49
Wilde, Norman, 68
Williams, Bernard, 149
women, 6,55-59
Wooten, David, 138
zero-sum worldview, 37-39, 173-74
 About the Author
Raymond Angelo Belliotti is Distinguished Teaching Professor of Philosophy at the
State University of New York at Fredonia. He received his undergraduate degree from
Union College in 1970, after which he was conscripted into the United States Army
where he sewed three years in military intelligence units during the Vietnamese War.
Upon his discharge, he enrolled at the University of Miami where he earned his master of
arts degree in 1976 and doctorate in 1977. After teaching stints at Florida International
University and Virginia Commonwealth University, he entered Harvard University as a
law student and teaching fellow. After receiving a juris doctorate from Harvard Law
School, he practiced law in New York City with the firm of Barrett Smith Schapiro
Simon & Armstrong. In 1984, he joined the faculty at Fredonia.
Belliotti is the author of eight books: JustifLing Law (1992), Good Sex (1993), Seek-
ing Identity (1995), Stalking Nietzsche (1998), What Is the Meaning of Human Life?
(2001), Happiness Is Overrated (2004), The Philosophy of Baseball (2006), and Watch-
ing Baseball Seeing Philosophy (2008). Good Sex was later translated into Korean and
published in Asia. What Is the Meaning of Human Life? was nominated for the Society
for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy's Book of the Year Award. He has also
published sixty articles and twenty-five reviews in the areas of ethics, jurisprudence,
sexual morality, medicine, politics, education, feminism, sports, Marxism, and legal eth-
ics. These essays have appeared in scholarly journals based in Australia, Canada, Great
Britain, Italy, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, and the United States. Belliotti has also
made numerous presentations at philosophical conferences, including the Eighteenth
World Congress of Philosophy in England, and has been honored as a featured lecturer
on the Queen Elizabeth II ocean liner.
While at SUNY Fredonia he has served extensively on campus committees, as the
chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, as the chairperson of the University Senate,
and as director of General Education. For six years he was faculty advisor to the under-
graduate club, the Philosophical Society, and he has sewed that function for I1 Circolo
Italiano. Belliotti has been the recipient of the SUNY Chancellor's Award for Excellence
in Teaching, the William T. Hagan Young ScholarlArtist Award, the Kasling Lecture
Award for Excellence in Research and Scholarship, and the SUNY Foundation Research
& Scholarship Recognition Award. He is also a member of the New York State Speakers
in the Humanities Program.