38 Sta.
Rosa Development Corporation vs CA (GR
No. 112526, 10/12/2001)
FACTS:
The case is a petition regarding Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board’s (DARAB) order of
compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Development Corporation (SRRDC),
was the registered owner of two parcel of land situated at
Brgy. Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. According to them, these
lands are watersheds which provide clean and potable
(drinkable) water to the Canlubang community and that
90 light industries are located in that area.
They were alleging respondents usurped its rights over
their property thereby destroying the ecosystem. Since
the said land provides water to the residents, respondents
sought an easement of a right of a way to and from
Barangay Castile, to which, by counterclaim, Sta. Rosa
sought ejectment against respondents.
Respondents went to the DAR and filed a case for
compulsory acquisition of the Sta. Rosa Property under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Compulsory acquisition is the power of the government to
acquire private rights in land without the willing consent of
its owner or occupant in order to benefit the society.
The said land was inspected by the Municipal and
Agrarian Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the
authorities concerned, they decided that the said land
must be placed under compulsory acquisition.
Petitioners filed an objection on the ground that:
· The area is not appropriate for agricultural
purposes.
· The area was rugged in terrain with slopes 18%
and above. (which falls under the exception in
compulsory acquisition of CARP)
· The occupants of the land were illegal settlers or
(squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land
as beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
· Whether or not the property in question is covered
by CARP despite the fact that the entire property
formed part of a watershed area prior to the
enactment of R.A No. 6657. NO
· Whether the petition of land conversion of the
parcels of land may be granted? Conduct re-
evaluation
HELD:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be
exempt from its coverage.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
· Art. 67 of PD 1067 provides that Any watershed
or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the
Department of Natural resources as a protected area.
· Watersheds may be defined as an area drained
by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a
boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent
watersheds.
We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land
form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for
watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds
ensures an adequate supply of water for future
generations and the control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that
needs to be answered now.
Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the Supreme
Court opines that the area must be maintained for
watershed purposes for ecological and environmental
considerations despite the 88 families who are
beneficiaries of the CARP. It is important that a larger
view of the situation be taken because of the thousands
of residents downstream if the watershed will not be
protected and maintained for its natural purpose.
Despite Supreme Court’s strong opinion of protection of
watersheds as an intergenerational responsibility, they,
however ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of
the case since the said land falls under exception.
39. Collado vs Court of Appeals (GR No. 107764,
10/4/2002)
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land
registration court an application for registration of a parcel
of land (“Lot”), situated in Antipolo Rizal. Attached to the
application was a technical description, stating “this
survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” The
Solicitor General filed oppositions to the application.
Petitioners (Edna Collado and her co-applicants) allege
that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial.
Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in
the concept of owners. They paid all real estate taxes and
submitted evidence to prove that there have been 9
transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-
interest. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners for having
presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title
over the property.
ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
NO.
(2) Did petitioners acquire private rights over the parcel of
land prior to the issuance of EO 33? NO.
Page 1

HELD:
(1) Petitioners concede that the Lot is inside the literal
description of Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR).
Their main claim over the Lot is that “all Presidential
proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the
MWR are subject to private rights.” EO 33 (which
established the MWR) has a saving clause that the
reservations are “subject to existing private rights, if any
there be.”
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards first
introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the
Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically,
Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias which laid the foundation that "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership
of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of
titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal
Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the
Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura
Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of
all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to
the state.
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the
national territory of the Philippine Islands through the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United
States colonial government, through the Philippine
Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act, which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Name: I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First
Set_ Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government’s title to public land sprung from the
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The term "public land"
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the
legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except agricultural
lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution
readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public
domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the
Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource: The term
"natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal,
minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features
which supply a human need and contribute to the health,
welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to
the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property
devoted to park and recreational purposes."
(2) An applicant must overcome the presumption that the
land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that
he has an interest to warrant registration in his name
arising from an imperfect title (may have been derived
from old Spanish grants or titles). In the case at bar,
petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable
right or title because of the failure to complete the required
period of possession (at least 30 years).
Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land
prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved
the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-
disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot
has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81
years prior to the filing of petitioners’ application.
Page 2
Director of Forestry vs. Villareal (GR No. L-
32266, 2/27/1989)
FACTS: The said land consists of 178,113 square
meters of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal
applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land for more than
forty years. He was opposed by several persons,
including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines. After trial, the application was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in
nature and not subject to private appropriation.
He asks that the registration be reversed. It is
undisputed by the parties that the land in dispute
is a mangrove land HOWEVER the legal nature
of mangrove swamps or manglares are still in
contention. Director of Forestry claims that it is
forestall and is not disposable. On the other hand,
Private respondents insists that it is alienable as
agricultural land.
ISSUES: Are mangrove swamps classified as
public forest lands?
RULING: YES. Part of our public forest lands,
they are not alienable under the Constitution or
are they considered public agricultural lands; they
may be acquired under private ownership.
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be
understood as comprised within the public forests
of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited
Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
The legislature having so determined, we have no
authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion.
The statutory definition remains unchanged to
date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and
invoked by the executive department. More
importantly, the said provision has not been
challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or
unconstitutional assuming the requisite
conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and
scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so
must be respected. We repeat our statement in
the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
That determination having been made and no
cogent argument having been raised to annul it,
we have no duty as judges but to apply it.
It follows from all this that the land under
contention being admittedly a part of the
mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a
minor forest license had in fact been issued by the
Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be
considered forest land. It could therefore not be
the subject of the adverse possession and
consequent ownership claimed by the private
respondent in support of his application for
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
registration. To be so, it had first to be released
as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land
pursuant to the certification the Director of
Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The Respondent even showed, a survey of the
land and its tax declaration to support its claim,
however the court held that the same is
insufficient especially now that the land is a forest
land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision
is immediately executory.
41 Atok-Big Wedge Mining Corporation
vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 88883,
1/18/1991)
G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located
sometime between December 25, 1930 and
December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by
A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better
known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-
called Declaration of Location.
The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim
was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining
Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia
mineral claim, together with other mineral claims,
was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining
Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company, Inc. (Atok for short;
herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on
November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has
been in continuous and exclusive ownership and
possession of said claim up to the present .
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation
fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia
mineral claim together with other mineral claims
owned by Atok has been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of
Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application for
lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia
mineral claim.
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan
Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr.
Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He
constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964.
The lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462.
When he first constructed his house below the lot
of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not necessary
for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a
nipa hut. And no one prohibited him from entering
the land so he was constructing a house thereon.
It was only in January 1984 when private
respondent Consi repaired the said house that
people came to take pictures and told him that the
Page 3
lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has
been paying taxes on said land which his father
before him had occupied .
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok
informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of
Atok, that a construction was being undertaken at
the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private
respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes
instructed the cashier to go and take pictures of
the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and
other security guards went to the place of the
construction to verify and then to the police to
report the matter.
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for
forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi ,
which was dismissed after due hearing by the
MTC of Itogon in favor of Liwan Consi. Petitioner
ATOK appealed to the RTC of Baguio, which
reversed the decision of the MTC, ordering
defendant Liwan Consi to vacate the premises of
the Fredia Mineral claim, restoring possession
thereof to the plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company. Defendant Liwan Cosi was further
ordered to remove and demolish the house he
constructed in the premises of the land of Fredia
Mineral claim.
In a petition for review filed by Liwan Consi with
the CA, the CA rendered its decision dismissing
the subject forcible entry action, and further rule
in part that: Liwan Consi had a possessory right
over the property which may mature into
ownership on the basis of long-term possession
under the Public Land Law. Thus, it held that both
Consi and ATOK are of equal footing with regards
to the subject lot, holding possessory titles to the
land. The petitioner through its long term
occupancy while respondent mining firm being
the claim locator and applicant for lease on the
mineral claim.
ATOK filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual's long term
occupation of land of the public domain vests him
with such rights over the same as to defeat the
rights of the owner of that claim.
HELD:
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok
had secured a patent for as held in the Gold
Creek Mining Corporation case, for all physical
purposes of ownership, the owner is not required
to secure a patent as long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws; his possessory
right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as
good as though secured by patent (Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed
that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied
with all the requirements of the law regarding the
maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then
in force removed it from the public domain. By
such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights
over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or obtaining of a patent over
it. As the land had become the private property of
the locators, they had the right to transfer the
same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok .
As in the instant petition, the record shows that
the lot in question was acquired through a Deed
of Sale executed between Atok and Fredia
Mineral Claim.
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok
have exclusive rights to the property in question
by virtue of their respective mining claims which
they validly acquired before the Constitution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the
public domain except agricultural lands, subject
to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of
acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes
(Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent
contends that his predecessor-in-interest has
been in possession of said lot even before the war
and has in fact cultivated the same. Since the
subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's
possession of the subject lot no matter how long
did not confer upon him possessory rights over
the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-
possession. Should a question arise regarding
the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors,
the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents
a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK
has been in continuous and exclusive possession
of the Fredia mineral claim while private
respondent's possession started only sometime
in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon.
Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights
than private respondent, Liwan Consi, the former
being "the one longer in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it
was really petitioner who was in actual physical
Page 4
possession of the property. Having been deprived
of this possession by the private respondent,
petitioner has every right to sue for ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can
further be declared and held that petitioner Atok
has the exclusive right to the property in question.
42 PALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
FACTS:
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15
parcels of land covered by Executive Order No.
40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these
lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio
and Carmen Palomo two months before his death
in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original
certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of
Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October
1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by Executive
Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park," under the control, management, protection
and administration of the defunct Commission of
Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau
of Forest Development. The area was never
released as alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain and, therefore, is neither
susceptible to disposition under the provisions of
the Public Land Law nor registerable under the
Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however,
continued in possession of the property, paid real
estate taxes thereon and introduced
improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan
and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner
Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the
parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000
from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not forest land may be
owned by private persons.
HELD:
The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain. It is in the law
governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable. There is no
question that the lots here forming part of the
forest zone were not alienable lands of the public
domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements
introduced by petitioners, the fact that the
government failed to oppose the registration of
the lots in question is no justification for
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing
improvements on the lots.
43 Republic vs Southside Homeowners
(GR No. 156951, 9/22/2006)
FACTS:
The subject matter of these proceedings for
declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a
total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as
the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio where,
military officers, both in the active and retired
services, and their respective families, have been
occupying housing units and facilities originally
constructed by the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock
corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP
military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to
secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal a title – Transfer Certificate of Title in its name
to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084
on October 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized Deed
of Sale purportedly executed on the same date by then
Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The
total purchase price as written in the conveying deed
was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter
It appears that in the process of the
investigation conducted by the Department of Justice
on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the
aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and
eventually referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the
examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner
Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the puported
signatures in the document are forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel
V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173
directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No.
15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officer’s
Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel
within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in
behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC
of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and
cancellation of title suit against the private respondent
SHAI, purported signature thereon of Palad is a
forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the
application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of
the purchase price; and c) the property in question is
inalienable, being part of a military reservation
established under Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked
(and later offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale dated
October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No.
15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent, then defendant
SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and “B” as its Exhibits
"1" and “2,” respectively.
During the trial, the Republic presented as
expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro
Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093
and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit “A”
is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his
Page 5
signature appearing in the same document and denied
ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary
public holding office outside of the LMB premises.
Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not have
had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a
reservation area which, apart from its being outside of
the LMB’s jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented
an opposing expert witness in the person of Police
Inspector Redencion Caimbon who testified that
Palad’s signature in Exhibit “A” is genuine. Mrs.
Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise
testified, saying that applications to purchase were
signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr.
Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full of the
contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7,
1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
Republic’s complaint as it considered the parcels
covered by the deed in question as no longer part of
the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to
the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period
material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be,
and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful
private conveyance?
RULING:
Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the
inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same
having not effectively been separated from the military
reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of
land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public
uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus
reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject
to sale or other disposition until again declared
alienable. Consistent with the foregoing postulates,
jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like
the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private
appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and
declared as disposable and alienable public land. And
until a given parcel of land is released from its
classification as part of the military reservation zone
and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation
as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a
military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is
devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or
for defense. The same is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area
subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale formed
part of the FBMR as originally established under
Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent
SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner
Republic had not presented evidence that “subject land
is within military reservation,”and even dared to state
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the
government and therefore removed from the concept
of public domain per se its own evidence themselves
belie its posture as their evidence both the TCT and the
Deed of Sale technically described the property as
situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio
which is now renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a
military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its
underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423.
In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the
proclamation’s specific area coverage to prove the
nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title
embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and
hence, beyond the commerce of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale
purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its
authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite
classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into
a disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAI’s
unyielding stance that would have the Republic in
estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB
Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should
have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped
by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or
agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly
sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time
of the supposed transaction were, still part of the
FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987
Constitution forbids private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain, except through lease for a limited period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances
and inferences deducible from the case, also cast doubt
on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a
conclusion that the deed is spurious.
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature
on the deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert
corroborated Palad’s allegation on
forgery.Respondent SHAI’s expert witness from the
PNP, however, disputes the NBI’s findings. In net
effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel
each other out.
2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila,
possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes,
Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad
nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City
to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was
then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped
“Received” by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or
at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No.
15084 was issued. In other words, the whole
conveyance and registration process was done in less
than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite
surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while
in the exercise of his functions as the bureau’s
authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another
city just to have a deed notarized.
Page 6
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public
land application to purchase required under Section 89
of the Public Land Act. There is also no record of the
deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying
an application to purchase, inclusive of the
investigation report and the property valuation. The
Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date
November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto
Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of the
LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court
attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B.
Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition
Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at
the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining
to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI
states that the “deed of sale specifically meritorious
Official Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full
payment of the agreed purchase price” An official
receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove
payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203
as its evidence of the required payment, it failed to
present and offer the receipt in evidence. We can thus
validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it does,
that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which
appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never
been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses
for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB
the corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix
of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible,
SHAI’s witnesses’ account taxes credulity to the
limit.
TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal issued on the basis of such Deed are declared
void and cancelled
44 Republic vsAlagad (G.R. No. L-66807
January 26, 1989)
FACTS: On or about October 11, 1951,
defendants filed an application for registration of
their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga,
Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares,
reflected in survey plan Psu-116971, which was
amended after the land was divided into two
parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476
hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421
hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971,
amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the
stereo-typed ground that applicants and their
predecessors have not been in possession of
the land openly, continuously, publicly and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased
to be a part of the public domain. It appears that
barrio folk also opposed the application.
Issue: WON that applicants and their
predecessors have not been in possession of
the land openly, continuously, publicly and
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894
HELD:
The case, then, has to be decided alongside
these principles and regretfully, the Court cannot
make a ruling, in the first place, because it is not
a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in
possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving
at a conclusive disposition 31 We therefore
remand the case to the court a quo to determine
whether or not the property subject of
controversy is foreshore. We, consequently,
reverse both the Court of Appeals and the trial
court and reinstate the Republic's complaint.
45 SIAN Enterprise vs. FF Cruz (GR no.
146616, 8/31/2006) FERNANDEZ, Pauline
August Momongan
SIAIN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. F.F. CRUZ &
CO., INC.
500 SCRA 406 (2006)
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed
does not remove it from its classification of
foreshore area subject to the preferential right to
lease of the littoral owner.
Facts:
Western Visayas Industrial Corporation
(WESVICO) filed a foreshore lease application
over the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots
registered in its name. It eventually withdrew the
application and filed a petition for registration
over the same foreshore land with the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The case was,
however, archived as WESVICO‘s
representative could no longer be contacted,
and later on, WESVICO has ceased operations.
F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the Bureau
of Lands, Iloilo City a foreshore lease application
over a foreshore land, a portion of which is
adjacent to the lot previously occupied by
WESVICO. Sian Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN)
purchased the properties previously owned by
WESVICO from the Development Bank of the
Philippines. It subsequently filed a foreshore
lease application over the foreshore land
adjacent to the properties it bought from DBP.
Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the
foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz’s foreshore
lease application overlapped that covered by its
foreshore lease application, SIAIN filed a protest
8 alleging that it being the owner of the property
adjoining the overlapping area, it should be
given preference in its lease.
F.F. Cruz, argued that SIAIN must not be given
preferential right since the area in dispute is
classified as ―reclaimed‖ and that the
ownership was not by means of accretion. This
argument has been sustained by the Land
Page 7
Management Bureau.
Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary, SIAIN was
upheld, declaring that there was no basis to
declare the area as ―reclaimed‖. F.F. Cruz
however appealed to the Office of the President
which overturned the decision of the DENR
Secretary and found that the area is reclaimed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision. Hence, the present petition. SIAIN
contends that the evidence overwhelmingly
proves that the disputed area is foreshore land
and not reclaimed land which thus entitles it
preferential rights over the
ISSUES:
Whether the disputed land is a ―foreshore‖ or
―reclaimed‖ area
HELD:
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed
does not remove it from its classification of
foreshore area subject to the preferential right to
lease of the littoral owner.
It bears noting that it was not the reclamation
that brought the disputed foreshore area into
existence. Such foreshore area existed even
before F.F. Cruz undertook its reclamation. It
was ―formed by accretions or alluvial deposits
due to the action of the sea.‖ Following
Santulan, the littoral owner has preferential right
to lease the same.
Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the
President, as affirmed by the appellate court,
littoral owner WESVICO cannot be considered to
have waived or abandoned its preferential right
to lease the disputed area when it subsequently
filed an application for registration thereover. For
being a part of the public domain, ownership of
the area could not be acquired by WESVICO. Its
preferential right remained, however. Its move to
have the contested land titled in its name, albeit
a faux pas, in fact more than proves its interest
to utilize it.
As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO‘s
petition for registration which, as stated earlier,
was archived by the trial court, pursued but
eventually denied, WESVICO would not have
been barred from filing anew a foreshore lease
application. Parenthetically, the petition for
registration of WESVICO was archived not on
account of lack of interest but because it ceased
operations due to financial reasons.
46 Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila (GR No. 14869)
ENERO, Jomari Ivan Tagud
FACTS:
In 1913, cadastral proceedings were conducted
to settle the title to a considerable tract of land in
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
the Province of Rizal. The Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila (church) and other private
parties were claimants of 13 cadastral lots that
comprised the contested property. The lower
court ruled in favor of the private claimants. Upon
appeal, the church invoked that the composition
title of the church with the Spanish Government
included the subject property. The church then
presented one witness and rested. The private
oppositors then called their respective witnesses
to prove title by possession, and rested. The
church thereafter made an offer to present
additional testimony intended to show that the
possession of the private claimants had been
interrupted and that it was merely possession
through the tolerance of the church. However, the
counsel for the oppositors objected to the entry of
additional testimonies which was sustained.
ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in refusing the entry the
church’s additional testimonies?
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The object of a cadastral petition is that the title to
the various lots embraced in the survey may be
settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, promoted by the Director of
Lands, somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and
investigation leading to a judicial decree. In one
sense, there is no plaintiff and there is no
defendant. In another sense, the Government is
the plaintiff and all the- claimants are defendants.
As a general rule, courts should adhere to the
usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence
that governs registration proceedings. However,
in registration proceedings where so many
parties are involved and action is taken quickly
and abruptly, opportunity should be given to
parties to submit additional corroborative
evidence in support of their claims of title, if the
ends of justice so require. This case was
remanded back to the lower court with the church
being allowed to admit additional testimonies in
the interest of justice and ascertainment of truth.
JOM
47 AbelleravsFarol (GR No. 48480,
7/30/1943)
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA, petitioner,
vs.
MEYNARDO M. FAROL, ET AL., respondents
Facts:
Abellera, in a previous case concerning the
same real estate involved herein, sued
Hermegildo Balanag and others who are either
the same parties in this case or the latter's
predecessors in interest, alleging ownership of
the land. But his complaint was dismissed by the
Court of First Instance on two grounds:
(1) prescription in favor of defendants; and
Page 8
(2) the deed of donation of these lands to him
had not been formally accepted according to
Article 633 of the Civil Code.
Upon appeal to this Court, the judgment of the
trial court was affirmed on the second ground
aforementioned. It appears in that decision of
this Court that after the perfection of the appeal,
Abellera executed a public document formally
accepting the donation of the land, and
presented and deed of acceptance together with
proofs of notification of acceptance to the donor,
as ground for new trial.
In July of 1918, or four months after the above-
mentioned decision of this Court, petitioner
herein brought another action for recovery of the
land against the same defendants in the
previous case.
The second suit was later dismissed by the
Court of First Instance and transferred to
cadastral case No. 5 which included the
hacienda in question that had in the meantime
been subdivided into lots.
The latter through counsel moved that Abellera's
claim over the lots concerned be dismissed on
the grounds of res judicata and prescription.
Issue:
Did the cadastral court, on the ground of
res judicata, have any power to entertain the
motion to dismiss Abellera's claim and bar him
from presenting evidence to prove his ownership
of these lots?
Ruling:
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient.
The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral
cases when two conditions are present: (1)
analogy or need to supplement the cadastral
law, and (2) practicability and convenience.
The principal aim is to settle as much as
possible all disputes over land and to remove all
clouds over land titles, as far a practicable, in a
community.
To attain this purpose, the cadastral court should
allow all claimants ample freedom to ventilate
whatever right they may assert over real estate,
permitting them, in keeping with the law of
evidence, to offer proofs in support of their
allegations.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a
cadastral case res judicata is available to a
claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of
another claimant, nevertheless prior judgment
can not set up in a motion to dismiss.
48 Gayapanao vs. IAC (GR No. 68109,
7/17/1991) CLARK, Immaculate Gonzales
Gayapanao vs. IAC (GR No. 68109,
7/17/1991)
FACTS:
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Severino Gayapanao and his siblings questioning
the decision of the IAC in upholding the validity of
the sale of the land between their father
Constantino and their sister. The 2 hectare land,
subject of this case is part of 10 hectare
homestead land registered in the name of
Constantino Gayapanao under OCT. The final
order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of
patent was issued on December 10, 1937. On
November 15, 1938, Constantino Gayapanao
executed a private deed entitled kasulatan ng
bilihan in favor of Simeona Gayapanao and his
husband.
RTC’s decision: The contract of sale between
Simeona Gayapanao and her father is null and
void for having been executed with the 5 year
prohibitory period provided under Section 118 of
the Public Land Law
CA’s decision: It reversed the decision of the RTC
and uphold the validity of the sale.
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in upholding the
validity of the sale?
RULING:
No, the provision of law which prohibits the sale
or encumbrance of the homestead within 5 years
after the grant is mandatory.
From the date of the approval of the application
and for a term of five (5) years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions cannot be subject to encumbrance or
alienation, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period. The only exception
mentioned by the law is the sale or encumbrance
in favor of the government or any of its branches,
units or institutions.
In a number of cases, we have consistently ruled
that a sale of homestead within the five (5) year
prohibitive period is void ab initio and the same
cannot be ratified nor can it acquire validity
through the passage of time.
49 Republic vs Garcia (GR No. L-11597,
5/27/1959) CEBALLOS, Jesus Cadavez
Facts:
Garcia was granted a homestead patent
for his 23.21 hectares of land. After 3 years and
3 months later (April 14, 1950), he sold 19
hectares to the lot to several persons. For this
reason, the CFI of Cotabato decreed the
reversion of the property in favor of the
Government for violating the selling the property
within the prohibitive period of 5 years from date
of issuance under Sec. 118 of CA 141.
Garcia contends that he did not violate
the said provision since the sale was not
registered and that it was not the entire land was
sold.
Page 9

Issue:
Whether or not Garcia violated the Sec.
118 of CA 141.
Held.
Yes, he did.
The Supreme Court held that it is enough
that the property, in whole or in part, was
alienated or encumbered within the prohibitive
period except in favor of the Government, Sec.
118 of CA 141 partly provides: Except in favor of
the Government or any its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provision shall not be subject to
encumbrance of alienation from the date of the
approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to
the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period, but the improvements or
crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, association, or corporations.
Such alienation is a sufficient cause for
reversion to the State of the whole grant. In
granting a homestead to an applicant, the law
imposes as a condition that the land should not
be encumbered, sold or alienated within five
years from the issuance of the patent. Sec. 124
of CA 141 provides: Any acquisition, conveyance,
alienation, transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the provisions of
section118, 120, 121, 122, and 123 of this Act
shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or
permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed,
actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to
the State.
50 Lee Chuy Realty Corp vs Court of
Appeals (GR No. 104114, 12/4/1995)
CAMASURA, Jayson Ug-ay
Facts:
A valuable piece of land located at Meycauyan,
Bulacan, with an area of 24,576 sq. m. and
covered by OCT No. 0-5290 is disputed by Lee
Chuy Realty Corporation and Marc Realty and
Development Corp. Such land was originally co-
owned by Ruben Jacinto(one-sixth), Dominador,
Arsenio, Liwayway all surnamed Bascara and
Ernesto jacinto(collectively owned the remaining
five-sixths).
On Feb. 4, 1981, Ruben Jacinto sold his one-sixth
pro-indiviso share to LEE CHUY REALTY which
was registered 30 April 1981. On 5 May 1989 the
Bascaras and Ernesto Jacinto also sold their
share to MARC REALTY which was registered on
16 October 1989.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Lee Chuy Realty claims that it was never
informed of the existence of the sale between
Marc Realty and the Bascaras/Jacinto. Marc
Realty insists that Lee Chuy verbally notified of
the sale and was given a copy of the deed of sale.
On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed
a complaint for legal redemption against MARC
REALTY and consigned in court a manager's
check for 614,400. MARC REALTY insisted that
the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action there being no allegation of prior
valid tender of payment or a prior valid notice of
consignation.
On Dec 26, 1990, the trial court ruled in favour of
Lee Chuy Realty which stated that there was a
valid tender of payment and consignation. It also
stated that neither a separate offer to redeem nor
a formal notice of consignation is necessary for
the reason that the filing of the action itself, within
the period of redemption, is equivalent to a formal
offer to redeem.
On 1 February 1991 MARC REALTY filed a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition with Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction which was referred to the Court of
Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the
lower court and ruled that "a prior tender or offer
of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to
the filing of an action for legal redemption” and
that "there must be tender of the redemption price
within the required period because the policy of
the law is not to leave the purchaser's title in
uncertainty beyond the established 30-day
period.
MARC REALTY contends that prior tender of
payment is a condition precedent to the filing of
an action in court in order to validly exercise the
right of legal redemption. LEE CHUY REALTY
however argues that the filing of the action itself
is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, which is
a condition precedent to the valid exercise of the
right of legal redemption.
Lee Chuy filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied
Issue:
WON a formal offer to redeem accompanied with
tender of payment a condition precedent to the
filing of an action for the valid exercise of the right
of legal redemption; is the filing of the action with
consignation equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem
Held:
No.
In Hulganza v. Court of Appeals14 the Court,
citing previous decisions, declared that the formal
offer to redeem, accompanied by a bona fide
tender of the redemption price, within the
prescribed period is only essential to preserve the
Page 10
right of redemption for future enforcement beyond
such period of redemption and within the period
prescribed for the action by the statute of
limitations. Where, as in the instant case, the right
to redeem is exercised through judicial action
within the reglementary period the formal offer to
redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of
the redemption price, while proper, may be
unessential. The filing of the action itself is
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
In sum, the formal offer to redeem is not a distinct
step or condition sine qua non to the filing of the
action in Court for the valid exercise of the right of
legal redemption. What constitutes a condition
precedent is either a formal offer to redeem or the
filing of an action in court together with the
consignation of the redemption price within the
reglementary period.
The doctrine in Tolentino, Tioseco and Belisario
cases was jettisoned by the Court of Appeals on
the ground that they do not involve legal
redemption by a co-owner but by a mortgagor. It
concluded that the application of the rules on
legal redemption by a co-owner differs from the
legal redemption by a mortgagor. But the law
does not distinguish; neither should we. For sure,
the principle in the aforecited cases is applicable
regardless of whether the redemptioner is a co-
owner or a mortgagor. Public policy favors
redemption regardless of whether the
redemptioner is a co-owner or mortgagor,
although perhaps with unequal force and effect
since each is given a fixed but different period. A
co-owner desirous of exercising his right of legal
redemption is given a period of thirty (30) days
from notice of the sale within which to avail of the
right to redeem.15 Under the free patent or
homestead provisions of the Public Land Act a
period of five (5) years from the date of
conveyance is provided,16 the five-year period to
be reckoned from the date of the sale and not
from the date of registration in the office of the
Register of Deeds.17 The redemption of
extrajudicially foreclosed properties, on the other
hand, is exercisable within one (1) year from the
date of the auction sale as provided for in Act No.
3135.
51 MALTOS VS HEIRS OF BORROMEO
PRINCIPLE: The sale of a parcel of agricultural
land covered by a free patent during the five-year
prohibitory period under the Public Land Act is
void. Reversion of the parcel of land is proper.
However, reversion under Section 101 of the
Public Land Act is not... automatic. The Office of
the Solicitor General must first file an action for
reversion.
G.R. No. 172720, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS,
petitioners, v. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO
BORROMEO, respondents
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
FACTS: On February 13, 1979,
EusebioBorromeo was issued Free Patent No.
586681 over a piece of agricultural land located
in San Francisco, Agusandel Sur, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-9053. On June
15, 1983, well within the five-year prohibitory
period, EusebioBorromeo sold the land to
EliseoMaltos. EusebioBorromeo died on January
16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death,
he allegedly told his wife, Norberta Borromeo,3
and his children to nullify the sale made to
EliseoMaltos and have the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was
within the five-year prohibitory period. On June
23, 1993, NorbertaBorromeo and her children
(heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of
Title and Reconveyance of Title against
EliseoMaltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of
Deeds of Agusan del Sur. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 946. EliseoMaltos and Rosita
Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer,
arguing that the sale was made in good faith and
that in purchasing the property, they relied on
EusebioBorromeo's title. Further, the parties were
in pari delicto. Since the sale was made during
the five-year prohibitory period, the land would
revert to the public domain and the proper party
to institute reversion proceedings was the Office
of the Solicitor General. The Register of Deeds of
Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer, arguing that
the deed of sale was presented for Registration
after the five-year prohibitory period, thus, it was
ministerial on its part to register the deed. The
heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was
not a valid defense because the prohibitory
period appeared on the face of the title of the
property.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are the legal
heirs of the late EusebioBorromeo.
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed
property within the prohibitory period is valid or
binding.
HELD: 1.The five-year period prohibiting the sale
of land obtained under homestead or free patent
is provided under Section 118 of the Public Land
Act, which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government
or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or
legally constituted banking corporations, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance1 of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of
any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said
period; but the improvements or crops on the land
may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified
persons, associations, or corporations.
The main purpose in the grant of a freq patent of
homestead is to preserve and keep in the family
of the homesteader that portion of public land
Page 11
which the State has given to him so he may have
a place to live with his family and become a happy
citizen and a useful member of the society. In
Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation
of a family home is the purpose of homestead
laws. The policy of the state is to foster, families
as the foundation of society, and thus promote
general welfare. . . .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated
on public policy. Its violation gives rise to the
cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the
land and its improvements to the government at
the instance of the latter. The provision that "nor
shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any
debt contracted prior to that expiration of the five-
year period" is mandatory and any sale made in
violation of such provision is void and produces
no effect whatsoever, just like what transpired in
this case. Clearly, it is not within the competence
of any citizen to barter away what public policy by
law seeks to preserve.
In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act
is applicable since title already vested in
EusebioBorromeo's name. Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was
made within the five-year prohibitory period.
Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the
property in favor of the state. However, this court
cannot declare reversion of the property in favor
of the state in view of the limitation imposed by
Section 101 that an action for reversion must first
be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.
2.
The doctrine of in pari delicto non orituractio is
inapplicable when public policy will be violated.
The in pari delicto rule is provided under Articles
1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code. Article 1411
pertains to acts that constitute criminal offenses,
while Article 1412 pertains to acts that do not
These provisions state:
ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the
illegality of the cause or object of the contract,
and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both
parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
action against each other, and both shall be
prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the
Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or
instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the
things or the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the
parties is guilty; but the innocent one may claim
what he has given, and shall not be bound to
comply with his promise.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or
forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both
contracting parties, neither may recover what he
has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
performance of the other's
undertaking;cralawlawlibrary
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at
fault, he cannot recover what he has given by
reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfilment of
what has been promised him. The other, who is
not at fault, may demand the return of what he
has given without any obligation to comply with
his promise.
The case under consideration comes within the
exception above adverted to. Here appellee
desires to nullify a transaction which was done in
violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari
delicto would apply to her because her
predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale
with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but
because the subject of the transaction is a piece
of public land, public policy requires that she, as
heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it
because it was given by law to her family for her
home and cultivation. This is the policy on which
our homestead law is predicated. This right
cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence
of any citizen to barter away what public policy by
law seeks to preserve." We are, therefore,
constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the
present action it being in furtherance of this
fundamental aim of our homestead law.
As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the
question now arises as to who between the
parties have a better right to possess the subject
parcel of land. This issue was addressed in
Santos:
What is important to consider now is who of the
parties is the better entitled to the possession of
the land while the government does not take
steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon
annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is
reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As
against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is
no more entitled to keep the land than any
intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants.
Their right to remain in possession of the land is
no better than that of appellee and, therefore,
they should not be allowed to remain in it to the
prejudice of appellee during and until the
government takes steps toward its reversion to
the State. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err
in ruling that while there is yet no action for
reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the property should be conveyed by
petitioners to respondents.
With respect to Appellees' claim for the
reimbursement of the improvements on the land
in question, they are hereby declared to have lost
and forfeited the value of the necessary
improvements that they made thereon in the
same manner that Appellants should lose the
value of the products gathered by the Appellees
from the said land. We are constrained to hold
that the heirs of the homesteader should be
declared to have lost and forfeited the value of
the products gathered from the land, and so
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should the defendants lose the value of the
necessary improvements that they have made
thereon.

Reversion is a remedy provided under Section

101 of the Public Land Act:

SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the

Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead,
in the proper courts, in the name of
Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land

fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public
domain. The general rule is that reversion of
lands to the state is not automatic, and the Office
of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file
an action for reversion. The objective of an action
for reversion of public land is the cancellation of
the certificate of title an|l the resulting reversion of
the land covered by the title to the State| This is
why an action for reversion is oftentimes
designated asj an annulment suit or a
cancellation suit. Since an action for reversion
presupposes that the property in dispute is owned
by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, being the real
party-in-interest.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that

reversion is not automatic. Section 29 of the
Public Land Act provides:

SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has

begun, the purchaser, with the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may
convey or encumber his rights to any person,
corporation, or association legally qualified under
this Act to purchase agricultural public lands,
provided such conveyance or encumbrance does
not affect any right or interest of the Government
in the land: And provided, further, That the
transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any
installment due and payable. Any sale and
encumbrance made without the previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce shall be null and void and shall
produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and
reverting the property and all rights to the State,
and all payments on the purchase price
theretofore made to the Government shall be
forfeited. After the sale has been approved, the
vendor shall not lose his right to acquire
agricultural public lands under the provisions of
this Act, provided he has the necessary
qualifications.

In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel

of land was issued to EusebioBorromeo. This
shows that he already had title to the property
when he sold it to petitioner EliseoMaltos. Thus,
Section 101 of the Public Land Act applies.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources Page 13