The Present Viability of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO

By A. E. P. DUFFY

ABSTRACT: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were consid-
ered necessary in the postwar period to protect member-coun-
tries from Communist aggression and conspiracy. Subsequent
developments have not always reflected the tidiness of inflexible
and implacable confrontation, however. Thus, the viability of
this postwar structure of alliances is raised ever more insist-
ently. Do NATO, SEATO, and CENTO serve any longer the
interests of the West? Or has the time now arrived for their
complete reappraisal? The view gains ground in western
Europe that there is now considerable diversity in the Com-
munist world, and that a policy of positive coexistence should
be pursued in the tackling of common problems with such coun-
tries as are ready to do so. In this fluid situation, a policy of
movement is desirable, especially in Europe, where economic
as well as political initiatives on behalf of a reconstructed

NATO can provide pointers for the continued viability of

CENTO and SEATO. The pending renegotiation of the
NATO Pact can provide such economic initiatives. It can also
provide the model of a self-supporting security system under
the Soviet-American nuclear balance.

A. E. P. Duffy, Ph.D., is Visiting Professor ofPolitical Science at Drew University.

He lectured at the University of Leeds, 1950-1963, and is a contributor to the Economic
History Review, Victorian Studies, and other scholarly journals. From 1963 to 1966 he
was a Member of Parliament, and from 1965 to 1966 he was Chairman of the Labour
party’s Economic Affairs and Finance Group in Parliament.
33
34
the end of World War II,
S INCE
and the break-up of their wartime
coalition with the Soviet Union, the
United States and Britain have con-
ducted foreign policy on the assumption
of implacable hostility on the part of
the Communists to non-Communists.
Inspired and unified by ideological con-
viction, this threat was seen as a Com-
munist conspiracy that must be con-
tained. NATO became the cornerstone
of such a policy as early as 1949, and
Communist insurrections in large parts
of Southeast Asia, the consolidation of
Communist power on the mainland of
China, aggression in Korea and Tibet in
1950, and the success of the Vietminh
in Vietnam in 1954 were taken as con-
firmation of the need for its extension.
To meet this situation, delegates repre-
senting Australia, Britain, France, New
Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippine Re-
public, Thailand, and the United States
signed the South East Asia Collective
Defence Treaty in Manila in September
1954. The structure of alliances was
completed with CENTO, formerly the
Baghdad Pact, which originated on
February 24, 1955, when Turkey and
Iraq signed a Pact of Mutual Co-opera-
tion, to which Britain, Pakistan, and
Iran subsequently acceded. After the
revolution in Iraq on July 14, 1958,
Iraq took no further part in the work
of the Pact and formally withdrew,
whereupon the headquarters were trans-
ferred to Ankara and the new name,
CENTO, was adopted on April 19,
1959. The United States is not a signa-
tory, but takes full part in the work
of the organization, and signed bilateral
agreements of co-operation for mutual
security and defense with Iran, Paki-
stan, and Turkey at Ankara on March
5, 1959.
Thus CENTO, like its sister alliances,
NATO and SEATO, was considered
necessary to protect member-countries
from Communist aggression and con-
spiracy. &dquo;It is still concerned with
this threat and still makes a most valu-
able contribution to a vital area of the
free world,&dquo; declared Mr. Michael Stew-
art, then British Foreign Secretary, at
the meeting of the Ministerial Council
of CENTO in Ankara a year ago. In
one sense, he pointed out, successful al-
liances create their own problems. He
explained:
By insuring peace they tempt the unwary
to question their continuing necessity and
to assume too readily that peace and free-
dom can be maintained without continuing
vigilance and co-operative effort.
Postwar developments have not al-
ways reflected the tidiness of inflexible
and implacable confrontation, however.
The Soviet Union, through the medium
of Mr. Khrushchev, made an early ap-
peal for peaceful coexistence, and the
United States generously donated aid to
Poland, still formally a part of the Com-
munist conspiracy. The bitterest ideo-
logical quarrels have not occurred be-
tween East and West, but among Com-
munist powers. Subversion has not
been confined to the frontier between
East and West, nor has it all been Com-
munist-inspired. Finally, the two pow-
ers that NATO and SEATO were most
concerned to protect and contain,
France and China, have been the most
insistent on playing independent roles
in the world. Thus, the viability of
this postwar structure of alliances is
raised ever more insistently. Do NATO,
SEATO and CENTO any longer serve
the interests of the West? Or has the
time now arrived for their complete
reappraisal to ensure that they relate to
the strategic, political, and financial
realities of today?
THE ALLIANCES REAPPRAISED
Since 1949 NATO has achieved an
unprecedented degree of international
military integration, ultimately respon-

sible for a hard-core force of 3,000 jet-
fighters and 23 divisions. It also led to
the setting-up of the Warsaw Pact, cap-
able of deploying not only 3,000 jet-
fighters, but 85 divisions. Obviously, it
was United States nuclear power in the
background which made NATO mili-
tarily credible, for Mr. McNamara has
now revealed that there are 7,000 nu-
clear weapons available to NATO. If
reliance on nuclear deterrent strategy
contributed to the postwar stability of
Europe, it also masked the internal con-
tradictions of NATO. But growing
cost-consciousness on the part of the
United States, as well as Britain, now
exposes a whole series of differences on
strategy, manpower, supply levels, and
reinforcements. Without doubt, the
future of Europe is being gradually re-
shaped, but not by any conscious de-
sign. The sentiment grows, therefore,
that these developments should be used
to reshape NATO to meet present-day
needs.
The same view is entertained of
CENTO, as its Middle East members
demonstrate more anxiety about neigh-
bors other than the Soviet Union: Iran
about Egypt, Pakistan about India,
Turkey about Greece over Cyprus, and
Britain and the United States about
their growing commitments to the Arab
conservatives. Moreover, Iran’s recent
agreement to accept Soviet military aid
and the report that Pakistan has en-
tered into a similar arms transaction
are taken as further evidence that
CENTO has outlived its military role
of providing defense against Soviet at-
tack.
SEATO presents an equally obvious
case of the need for drastic review.
France boycotts it; Pakistan enters into
an arms accord with the Soviet Union;
the response of member-nations to the
situation in Vietnam runs counter to
the organization’s &dquo;rule of unanimity.&dquo;
Clearly, this is a time when events
35
are fast the pattern of world
changing
politics, and when specific policies
formulated in one decade need to be
questioned in the next. Three principal
factors require consideration-the na-
ture of the the strategy of re-
threat,
sponse, and the economic implications.
THE NATURE OF THE THREAT
Is communism still essentially one
system, inherently aggressive, and leav-
ing the West no alternative but to con-
tain it by a series of pacts? Or, are
there not now various manifestations of
it permitting a much more fluid ap-
proach to each Communist country?
There is much evidence that political
and economic changes are, in fact, tak-
ing place in eastern Europe. They have
evoked a ready response in western
Europe, where the view gains ground
that there is now considerable diversity
in the Communist world, and that a
policy of positive coexistence should
be pursued in the tackling of common
problems with such countries as are
ready to do so.
THE STRATEGY OF RESPONSE
This is strikingly reflected in the pro-
ceedings of the ministerial council of
NATO, meeting in Paris last Decem-
ber. For the first time, the discussion
between the ministers revolved not
around &dquo;deterrent&dquo; and &dquo;defense&dquo;
against Communist aggression, but
around &dquo;d6tente&dquo; with the Soviet Un-
ion and eastern Europe. Almost all
declared that the structure of the alli-
ances must be changed, the emphasis
on its military aspects reduced, and the
scope of its political and economic ac-
tivities increased.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
To some extent this has already hap-
pened in connection with NATO. In-
creased emphasis on political and eco-
nomic activities is now urged with re-
36
spect to CENTO and SEATO, as the
Egyptians and the Chinese harness and
manipulate local movements in order to
promote their interests and eliminate
those of the West. The defeat of such
a movement in Indonesia suggests that
further countermovements should be
directed towards the promotion of the
indigenous strength of the countries of
both areas. Hence, the problems facing
the alliances, if still political and stra-
tegic, will increasingly become financial
and economic.
A REVISED NATO AS A MODEL FOR
CENTO AND SEATO
In this fluid situation, a policy of
movement is desirable, especially in
Europe, where political and economic
initiatives on behalf of a reconstructed
NATO can provide pointers for the
continued viability of CENTO and
SEATO. The renegotiation of the
NATO Pact, which must be undertaken
by 1969, can provide such economic
initiatives, for it will compel member-
countries to address themselves pre-
cisely to those economic problems which
progressively hamper the working of
the alliances. They include, first of all,
the foreign exchange consequences of
troop locations and the desirability of
multilateral financial agreements de-
signed to neutralize them. But balance-
of-payments difficulties will not be no-
ticeably eased unless, secondly, there is
a conscious effort to match the volume
of liquidity with the requirements of
world trade. The creation of new in-
ternational monetary reserves, though
facilitating international investment, will
not suffice to close the &dquo;technological
gap&dquo; unless it is associated, thirdly, with
further economic integration. Such
developments Europe in would assuredly
meet the most urgent needs of CENTO
and SEATO, which are ( 1 ) increased
aid, at present limping badly, (2) capi-
tal loans for development, and (3)
help to redress adverse terms of trade.
The prospects for NATO renegotia-
tions are not promising, for the détente
encourages centrifugal tendencies on
both sides of the Atlantic. Some of
America’s allies are suspicious of her
desire for a Washington-Moscow world,
and chafe under her monopoly role;
others call for a rival force to the
United States; yet others persist in pur-
suing domestic economic policies di-
rectly inimical to the NATO Pact. On
the other hand, the trend toward a new
system of European security coincides
with renewed interest by Britain in
joining the Common Market. For
Britain is peculiarly fitted to (1) help
provide Europe with a broader base for
further economic integration; (2) work
toward a system that can keep the
peace in Europe, but under the Ameri-
can and Russian nuclear balance; (3)
maintain the Atlantic Alliance; and (4)
help to keep Europe outward-looking
and sensitive toward the economic
needs of CENTO and SEATO. Thus,
a reconstructed NATO may well be re-
garded as a model for CENTO and
SEATO-the model, that is to say, of a
security system with a greater positive
content and under the Soviet-American
nuclear balance: the means, the combi-
nation of economic and defense arrange-
ments. It would also have the merit of
assisting member-countries fulfill their
obligations under articles 55 and 56 of
the United Nations Charter.
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
The NATO and Warsaw Pact mili-
can only be modified
tary dispositions
or otherwise transformed into peace-
making bodies in the context of an
agreement on European security, of
course. The time may be ripe for such
a conference. Mr. Rapacki, Polish
Foreign Minister, has renewed his cam-

paign for a nuclear-free zone in
Mr. Kosygin’s recent tour of western
European capitals has helped; so has the
restarting of the Geneva talks. Many
signs are set fair for a European se-
curity conference, when such topics as
troop reductions, denuclearized zones,
and guarantees for existing frontiers
could be raised and subsequently ex-
plored. Such a conference indeed may
have to precede the signing of the nu-
clear nonproliferation pact.
Prospects for a security conference
are enhanced by current economic de-
velopments. Eastern as well as western
European countries are beginning to act
on their initiatives to promote better
relations with their neighbors, as they
become aware that their prosperity, like
that of other small countries in Europe,
depends on access to larger markets.
Despite foreign exchange difficulties,
trade between Communist eastern Euro-
pean countries and the European Com-
mon Market doubled between 1958 and
1965, according to figures released mid-
March by the Common Market statis-
tical office. Accelerating economic
growth in eastern Europe will empha-
size the desirability of transforming bi-
lateral East-West trading arrangements
into multilateral ties, which may yet
culminate in some kind of association
with a common market enlarged to in-
clude Britain and other European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) countries.
THE OUTLOOK FOR CENTO
SEATO
The encouragement of political and
economic as well as defense co-opera-
tion is already an object of CENTO and
SEATO. Many co-operative economic
enterprises have been promoted under
the CENTO program. The governments
of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan have car-
ried this idea even further with the es-
tablishment of their own organization,
Regional Co-operation for Development,
37
Europe. in 1964. As in Europe, such economic
developments call into question the old
protective alliances. It is difficult to
conceive of any other market for Iran-
ian natural gas than the Soviet Union,
for example.
Similarly, the greatest hope for South-
east Asia is that a counterweight to Chi-
nese power may also be built through
regional groupings. Already there is in
existence the embryonic Association for
Southeast Asia, consisting of Thailand,
Malaysia and the Philippines, but as yet
it has too few members to have much
regional impact. It is to be hoped that
Indonesia may soon be prepared to take
the lead in forming a more imposing re-
gional structure. A stronger South-
east Asian grouping could co-operate
in its turn with a broader Asian organ-
ization and thus place the relatively
backward nations in this area in an
economic relationship with Japan and
India, and all of them in a stronger po-
sition to deal with China, if need be.
To build a self-supporting security
system in Southeast Asia is a job that
has to be done, for the moment, by
America and Britain. But it is a job
that will, in the end, have to be taken
over by the Asians themselves, if there
is ever to be a natural equilibrium in
that area. It will be a fragile structure
to begin with, and dependent therefore
on American and British striking forces
serving as a nuclear long stop and pref-
AND
erably operating off-shore in the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. It will be increas-
ingly dependent on public opinion
within, so there will be a continuing
need to avoid the occasion of anti-
American and anti-British feeling. It
will also be dependent on economic aid
and, ultimately, international monetary
reform. Diplomacy has never been so
swift and so accessible as today, nor
military weaponry so sophisticated.
Yet, international monetary relation-
ships remain comparatively primitive.
38
On the basis of the broad concepts
discussed, the following general proposi-
tions are advanced:
1. NATO, SEATO, and CENTO
have all outlived their postwar
roles, and are no longer viable
militarily or politically.
2. They do retain an important
economic potential, however.
* *
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Q: Do you think that in the future
the division between the countries of the
world is going to be between the North,
which is rich, and the South, which is
poor-a division which at least showed
itself in the conferences at Geneva in
1964 and which has developed since
then and become institutionalized in the
&dquo;Group of 77&dquo; at the United Nations?
Do you think that this division will
have something to do with the de-
velopment of the three alliances that
you discussed?
A: I think that this is a very real
contingency. That is why I stress the
importance and the desirability of aid.
I was interested to read, since prepar-
ing my paper, the proceedings of the
meeting last week in Tokyo of the
United Nations Economic Commission
for Asia and the Far East. Mr. Nyun,
the Executive Secretary, said: &dquo;We are
witnessing the phenomenon of an in-
creasing gap between the developed and
the developing countries.&dquo; This seemed
to me to be another way of saying ex-
actly what you have just said. We
must all be familiar with some such
possibility from our own personal ex-
perience : in terms of brain drain that
is offsetting aid granted to such coun-
tries, as well as exchange difficulties
that hamper trade.
I was arguing this afternoon that we
3. With the United States and
Britain overextended, this eco-
nomic potential will be devel-
oped to provide self-supporting
security systems, strengthened
by economic integration within
and economic assistance from
without, harnessing both nation-
alism and regionalism.
*
have nowreached the point where this
problem be tackled only systemati-
can
cally. Itcan no longer be discharged on
a charitable basis, or on the basis of
the nineteenth-century poor-law outlook.
I grant that it may not be easy to link
aid with reserve currency creation, but
we must see the two as objectives. I
am cheered by the very real evidence of
recent months that many leading figures
in the West, connected with the World
Bank and other such organizations, now
see the need to treat the difficulties
arising from deficits and on balancing
of payments separately from reserve
currency creation, and both, of course,
separately from aid.
But I am arguing that the first two
are now a condition of the third. I
must say that I do not find it difficult
to believe that, without some such con-
structive steps being taken soon, the
situation that you have just now postu-
lated, and which was envisaged in To-
kyo last week, may very well come to
pass.
Q: Considering the growth of Gaull-
ism in France and in Germany, and one
can add the growth of the Common
Market and of aid programs, could it
not be said that NATO is really an
anachronism, not only militarily, but
also economically?

A: I could not go as far as that. I
certainly do not think that NATO is
an anachronism militarily-not yet.
Clearly, it needs to be looked at very
closely in the light of today’s needs and
those of tomorrow. And, far from
sharing your view about its economic
capacity, I think that it now has a po-
tential that needs to be harnessed not
only to the other alliances, but also to
the development of the poorer countries
of the world. It certainly has the
wealth: 80 per cent of the wealth of
the world, excluding the Soviet Union,
is to be found in the Atlantic Alliance.
It needs, however, to be systematically
promoted, organized, and distributed.
It was also said in Tokyo last week
that none of the advanced countries of
the West have yet achieved their own
target of contributing one per cent of
gross national income to the underde-
veloped countries. That is not quite
true. One country has done this; in-
terestingly enough, it is France.
Q: Can you explain why our United
States, after helping to set up the United
Nations and signing its covenants, has
shown an unwillingness to trust its own
creation, and rather puts its trust in
the greatest military apparatus the
world has ever seen? Fundamentally,
is it not true that most of our frustrat-
ing world problems have their source
in that mistake? Finally, to correct
this situation, would not our most hope-
ful course be to strengthen the United
Nations and to present our faith in it
to the world as we remove our military
posture over the world.
A: I am delighted to answer ques-
tions of this kind. But I think you will
appreciate that you have almost an-
39
swered the question yourself. It is
simply that certain countries felt that
it was necessary to take steps to protect
themselves after the war, rightly or
wrongly, that they set up certain alli-
ances rather than looking to the then
infant United Nations. However de-
plorable this may seem to some eyes, it
nevertheless represented a policy that
secured widespread agreement in the
Western world.
And one of the most powerful reasons
why so much discussion is now going on
about the future of NATO is because
it has been so successful. And I did say
in behalf of Mr. Stewart, former British
Foreign Secretary, that this view was
entertained with respect to other alli-
ances as well. And because these alli-
ances have been so successful, they have,
perhaps, lulled some citizens of the
member-countries into a sense of se-
curity that Mr. Stewart does not think
is justified.
I
was taking a slightly different view,
you may recall, in my paper. I was
trying not to enter into any judgments
about the justification of these postwar
postures and alliances, but rather to
suggest that they now need to be scruti-
nized afresh. I hope that I convinced
you of the possibilities of their trans-
formation into security systems with
a positive content and, who knows,
eventually into peace-making bodies.
I argued, on the basis of coincidental
economic developments, that the re-
markable degree of military co-operation
which made NATO successful, however
deplorable it might be to some people,
is now reflected in the economic sphere.
International co-operation in the eco-
nomic sphere is now as indispensable
to the renewal of NATO, or whatever
might take its place, as military inte-
gration was in the 1950’s.