ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute Contemporary Southeast Asia

Students, Soldiers, Sports, Sheep and the Silver-Screen: New Zealand's Soft Power in
ASEAN and Southeast Asia

Author(s): ANDREW BUTCHER
Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 34, No. 2 (August 2012), pp. 249-273
Published by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756343
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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 34, No. 2 (2012), pp. 249-73 DOI: 10.1355/cs34-2e
© 2012 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic
Students, Soldiers, Sports,

Sheep and the Silver-Scre
New Zealand's Soft Power in
ASEAN and Southeast Asia1
ANDREW BUTCHER
Although New Zealand is a small state in the South Pacific , it has a

great interest in the stability of Southeast Asia , the safety of sea lanes
which pass through it and the centrality of ASEAN in the regional
security architecture. However, New Zealand has limited hard power
capabilities: the country's military expenditure is extremely modest and
its population and GDP are dwarfed by ASEAN as a region and by
some Southeast Asian countries. What New Zealand potentially offers
Southeast Asia , however, is its soft power. This article identifies five
of New Zealand's soft power assets - students, soldiers, sports, sheep
and the silver-screen - and critically examines whether these constitute
sufficient resources for New Zealand to engage with Southeast Asia
adequately, and make a contribution to regional stability.
Keywords: New Zealand, soft power, ASEAN.
Joseph Nye defines soft power as "the ability to get what you w
through attraction rather than coercion or payment ... [arising] f
the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies"
In listing the social indices of America's "soft power" Nye notes, int
alia , the following variables: immigration (specifically, the abilit
attract immigrants), film and television, and foreign students.3 If w
were to apply those same indices to New Zealand - a country th
Andrew Butcher is Director of Policy and Research at the Asia N

Zealand Foundation, Wellington.
249
250 Andrew Butcher
is in almost no wa
is an English-spea
three factors. First
inflows of migran
Organization for E
Second, the New Z
persons aged 20-24
OECD5 and, withi
recipient of intern
film industry is un
billion (US$2.4 billion).7
New Zealand has numerous attributes which might enhance
its soft power efforts in Southeast Asia, but these attributes do not
become soft power qualities or assets just by virtue of their existence.
In an era in which both New Zealand's military capabilities and
diplomatic presence are being reduced due to budget cuts, soft
power becomes all the more important. And it becomes especially
important in Southeast Asia. New Zealand's economic security
is contingent on the safety of the sea lanes which pass through
Southeast Asia, and strategically New Zealand relies on a stable
region and a strong ASEAN.
This article is concerned with both Southeast Asia and ASEAN.
New Zealand's bilateral relationships with Southeast Asian countries
predate its relationship with (and the existence of) ASEAN. Moreover,
New Zealand's relationships with Southeast Asian countries differ
from one country to the next (economically, militarily and historically)
and from its engagement with ASEAN as an institution. Both the
multilateral/institutional engagement with ASEAN and the bilateral
engagement with Southeast Asian countries are important in their
own right. Sometimes this engagement is distinct; other times New
Zealand may use its bilateral engagement to influence its institutional
engagement with ASEAN.
Quantifying soft power is problematic. The number of international
viewers of the Rugby World Cup and foreign students, the value
of exported goods and services, the impact of the film industry all
tell us something about the individual strengths of these particular
soft power assets, but they do not tell us their combined strength
or their long-term effects.
By contrast, quantifying hard power is relatively easier. This
article begins by briefly noting New Zealand's "small ... but strong"
hard power capabilities. Given New Zealand's limited hard power, soft
power takes on added importance. Soft power can be aspirational ,
New Zealand's Sofi Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia 251
expressed in New Zealand's national anthem; contextual , in relation

to New Zealand's nearest neighbour, Australia; perceived , by New
Zealand's allies in Asia; and cultural , through demographic shifts
and migration to and from Asia. Soft power can be important for
particular contexts and the focus in this article is on Southeast Asia
After a discussion of New Zealand's engagement with Southeas
Asia, especially economic engagement, this author goes on to argu
why Southeast Asia is important to New Zealand. The final section
discusses five of the soft power assets that New Zealand possesses
and utilizes in its soft power engagement with Southeast Asia,
namely students (international education), soldiers (defence ties),
sports, sheep (and what they signify in New Zealand's narrative
and the silver screen (film-making).
Each of these five attributes will draw on different audiences.
Sports and the silver screen contribute to a narrative about New
Zealand that is aimed at wide appeal: not only rugby players watch
rugby and not only fans of Tolkein watch Lord of the Rings. Those
who were educated in New Zealand under the Colombo Plan are
of a certain (and older) generation. Their children's views of New
Zealand will be shaped very differently. Similarly, those who reca
fondly New Zealand's military engagement in Southeast Asia a
more likely to be older members of the elite. It matters less wh
is drawn to New Zealand's multifaceted soft power and rath
more how it is used to best effect. The Colombo Plan might have
generated good experiences of New Zealand for its students but ca
soft power really have been said to be effective when one of tho
students can say "[t]he New Zealand training was wonderful" and
yet also "[flunningly enough, I haven't been back to New Zealand"
Nostalgia should not be confused for soft power. Yet there are oth
graduates of the Colombo Plan, as there are others who wat
rugby, the silver-screen, visit New Zealand and recognize its milita
contribution to Southeast Asia, who do respond with somethi
more than epithets and bouquets. Where those others are amo
the elite then New Zealand may find doors open where otherwise
they would be closed. Where those others are the mainstream th
New Zealand can shape public, as well as elite, opinion about itsel
and its place in the world.
However, data on how New Zealand's soft power in Asia is
received is hard to come by. It does not feature at all in the Chica
Council of Global Affairs 2008 Multinational Survey,9 or in the Pe
Global Attitudes Project. This might tell us, negatively, that New
252 Andrew Butcher
Zealand's soft powe

is so small it is har
Australia which, ac
much more than it
Small ... but Strong

New Zealand's hard p
is very small indee
Zealand in the Inter
Military Balance . C
for most other co
2011, New Zealand
sole paragraph dev
of "damned with f
The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is small, but it draws on
a strong national military tradition. New Zealand forces have been
involved in almost every conflict in which the country's larger
allies have been involved over the last century, and forces remain
deployed overseas. Despite funding shortfalls and capability losses
including the withdrawal from service of jet combat aircraft a
decade ago, the NZDF is characterised by high training standards,
professionalism and morale. The November 2010 Defence White
Paper promised to maintain and enhance existing capabilities, and
to provide some additional elements (such as short-range maritime
air patrol). However, there were no promises of any significant
increase to the defence budget.12
In 2011, New Zealand military personnel were deployed in seven

theatres (all of which, except Egypt, were under the banner of the
United Nations): Afghanistan (188 as part of the International Security
Assistance Force and one observer with the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan); Egypt (28 as part of the Multinational
Force and Observers, one training unit, one transport unit); Iraq
(one observer as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Iraq); the Middle East, which The Military Balance notes separately
but does not further define (seven observers as part of the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization); the Solomon Islands (five
personnel as part of Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon
Islands); South Sudan (one personnel and two observers as part
of United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan); and
Timor-Leste (80 personnel as part of the International Stabilisation
Force, one infantry company and one observer with the United
New Zealand's Soft Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia 253
Nations Integrated Missions in Timor-Leste).13 However, as can be

seen, these troops were relatively modest in number.
Outside of military expenditure, hard power takes on other forms:
the size of a country's population and economy, its natural resources,
military expenditure, social stability,14 membership of international
forums and organizations, the global profile of its political leaders,
the historical role that a country has played, and so on. Countries
that have extensive hard power assets can use them to apply coercive
military pressure or as economic leverage.15 New Zealand, however,
does not have the military power to threaten other countries nor
apply economic sanctions, with the possible exception of a small
country like Fiji. Indeed, almost by definition, New Zealand has to
use soft power to achieve its ends: it is all it has at its disposal.
Yet, as explained below, even New Zealand's hard power, such as
it is, may be best understood as a soft power tool.
Economic links may also be considered as part of New Zealand's
soft power engagement, though clearly they can also form an
important part of hard power. The strongest economies in the world,
America and China, can use their economic strength as leverage in
asserting their interests. However, New Zealand's economy is by
no measure one of the strongest in the world. It is not, and will
never be a member of the Group of 20, is heavily reliant upon its
external markets and is highly vulnerable to exogenous economic
shocks. New Zealand holds virtually no economic leverage over its
major trading partners. Therefore, part of New Zealand's tightening
and deepening web of relationships with Asia finds form in various
and interlinking free trade agreements (FTAs), including one with
Australia and ASEAN (the Australia and New Zealand Free Trade
Agreement or AANZFTA).
AANZFTA has created a free trade area among the twelve
economies of Australia, New Zealand and the ten ASEAN members
amounting to more than 600 million people with a combined GDP
of US$2.7 trillion. Taken together ASEAN and Australia are New
Zealand's most significant trade partners. ASEAN is New Zealand's
fourth most important export destination (behind Australia, the
European Union and China), with two-way trade amounting to US$10.2
billion. In the past five years New Zealand's exports to ASEAN and
Australia combined have risen by 61 per cent (compared with 33
per cent to the rest of the world). Two-way trade with ASEAN and
Australia combined in the past five years has increased by 38 per
cent and in the past ten years by 62 per cent.16
254 Andrew Butcher
New Zealand's 4.3

nificance compared
terms of GDP, New Zealand's US$138 billion (estimate for 2010) is
paltry compared with ASEAN's $1.5 trillion. New Zealand's trade
with ASEAN represented only 0.3 per cent of total ASEAN trade
and its share of the inflow of foreign direct investment to ASEAN
was a mere 0.1 per cent.17 It may be fairer to compare New Zealand
with individual countries of ASEAN, but even here New Zealand
does not stand up well, its GDP exceeding only that of the less
developed ASEAN countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam.18 The thinness of New Zealand's economic engagement
with Southeast Asia is costly. Not only are there untapped markets
but, strategically, there is a risk that should New Zealand's heavy
economic reliance on China run into troubled waters, it will not
have the depth of economic engagement in Southeast Asia required
to ensure, let alone sustain, its economic growth and security.
By comparison with other countries, as we have seen, New
Zealand's relative GDP means that it is a small economy. But what
about its soft power appeal as a advanced capitalist and industrialized
economy in its own right? One way we might consider the efficacy
of this appeal would be to consider why people migrate to New
Zealand. The Longitudinal Immigration Survey: New Zealand (LISNZ)
reveals that the main reasons migrants choose New Zealand were the
relaxed pace of life or lifestyle (44 per cent), the climate or clean
green environment (40 per cent) and to provide a better future for
their children (39 per cent). None of the main reasons for migrants
coming to New Zealand include because it is perceived as a wealthy
country or as a place where they themselves might become wealthy.19
Indeed, it is the images of clean, green and relaxed lifestyle that
are reinforced by some of the soft power attributes noted later in
this article.
"Make Her Praises Heard Afar"
While soft power cannot be quantified in the same way as hard power
- such as in warships, dollars, or GDP - we may nevertheless
suggest that because of New Zealand's limited hard power, its soft
power becomes all the more important. Stephen Hoadley has suggested
that New Zealand's exercise of soft power is expressed in verse in
its national anthem [written in 1876]: "make our country good and
great" and "make her praises heard afar".20
New Zealand's praises would have to be heard far indeed. A

former British colony, it is approximately 1,600 kilometres from
its nearest neighbour Australia, and has a population of only 4.3
million. New Zealand is the 52nd largest economy in the world by
nominal GDP, according to the International Monetary Fund, and, by
these measures, is in the company of modest powers such as the
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Peru and Kuwait. Like other small countries,
New Zealand has a big neighbour it can call on if its security is
threatened. Australia has the economic weight and military capabilities
that New Zealand does not. Despite this very lop-sided asymmetry,
economically, and in every sense, New Zealand's closest relationship
is with Australia. Malcolm Cook has argued that no two other
countries in the world have such a close bilateral relationship.21
In an article which is concerned with New Zealand and its
relationship with Southeast Asia it may seem odd to mention Austr
at all. But, as Cook has argued, "Australia and New Zealand
long stood together in their post-colonial aspirations for engage
with (or, for some, more hopefully as part of) Asia", throu
multitude of formal initiatives and informal ties.22 This "stan
together" is, Cook argues, also perceived externally to Australia
New Zealand. He notes "many capitals to our [i.e. Australia
New Zealand's] north ... naturally pair Australia and New Ze
together when they consider the two countries' place in the A
Pacific region."23 Likewise, however, "Australia and New Ze
also often stand together in mutual consternation on the outs
looking in on East Asian regional efforts."24 While New Ze
and Australia can and do engage distinctly and sometimes com
with each other in Southeast Asia, they are not so discrete
we can treat one without considering the other. It is not that
Zealand's soft power is defined, in this context, in oppositio
Australia's hard power - that would be a simplistic, asymmetr
and unfair binary. But if, as Cook argues, New Zealand and Aust
are perceived by their northern neighbours more often toget
than apart, then we need to treat New Zealand's engagement i
context of Australia's engagement too.
For example, interlocutors in Track II talks between New Zea
and China, which this author participated in, raised the questio
whether New Zealand was also expecting to host US military person
in the way that Australia did, in Darwin. The (diminishing) day
between New Zealand's and Australia's relationship with the Un
States is raised in Track II dialogues elsewhere too. New Zea
responds that it is not an ally of the United States, certainly
256 Andrew Butcher
in the way that Au

from (not together
is sustainable is of a
New Zealand's sof
and allies in Asia. A
"New Zealand's contribution [to the] ratification and environmental
norms to the cause of reducing global carbon dioxide emissions."25
Additionally, Sato argues that, depending on how New Zealand
uses its soft power, it could be a "persuasive friend" playing an
influential role in "the making of ... international regimes" which
can "discipline China's military and economic behavior".26 Here, at
least on Sato's assessment, New Zealand has soft power assets that
Japan does not have and that New Zealand can use its soft power
for Japan's interests' vîs-à-vis China.
New Zealand's soft power is also seen as an asset in ASEAN.
Daljit Singh has noted that "with its assets of soft power and omni-
directional foreign and trade policies, New Zealand has done well
to overcome its handicaps of a small population and geographical
remoteness from Asia"27 and that New Zealand's strength in soft
power belies its small size.28 "New Zealand's soft power attributes
[being multi-ethnic, having excellent governance, strong support of
global institutions and the international rule of law, being principled
and trustworthy, and adopting a non-confrontational approach to
sensitive issues and being a stable and mature democracy]", Singh
asserts, "are seen as clearly adding value to ASEAN and Southeast
Asia , like a breath of fresh air to a region still plagued by many
social, economic and governance problems."29 Soft power may be
less tangible than hard power; it may be more "walking softly" than
"carrying a big stick" but to New Zealand's regional allies it is a
viable and important contribution by New Zealand in its dealings
with Asia.
Cultural ties between New Zealand and Asia are also deepening.
New Zealand's ethnically Asian population, at nine per cent in 2006
(the most recent census), is proportionally greater than its Pacific
population and is set to equal its indigenous Maori population by
2026. 30 New Zealand's rapidly changing population - New Zealand's
Asian population was 3 per cent in 1996 and is projected to rise to
16 per cent in 2026 - is a significant and important contributor to
its soft power. Immigration from Asia to New Zealand grew
exponentially from 1986 to 2006, but has slowed since then.31 Within
New Zealand's Asian populations, there are a significant number of
Chinese (from mainland China and across Southeast Asia), Koreans
and Indians (historically from Fiji, though an increasing number

from India), as well as sizeable populations of Malaysians and
Filipinos. For New Zealand, its Asian populations and their links
to their native countries may also be considered as an increasingly
important aspect of the country's soft power. These people-to-
people links are evident in various ways: in the 300,000-strong
crowd, of Asians and others, who turn out to celebrate the Chinese
New Year Lantern Festival in New Zealand's largest city of Auckland;
in the role of New Zealanders in Asia (some of whom are New
Zealanders of Asian origin) as aid- workers, teachers and business-
people,32 and in the business links between Chinese migrants
to New Zealand and their suppliers, employers and customers in
China.33
The people-to-people links between Southeast Asia and New
Zealand form an important part of its soft power engagement with
the region. Robert Didham has estimated that there are between
8,000 to 12,000 New Zealanders in Southeast Asia, compared to
approximately 50,000 Australians. In 2006 there were nearly 60,000
people born in Southeast Asian countries residing in New Zealand
and about ten times that number (600,000) in Australia. As recorded
in the 2006 census, the majority Southeast Asia-born populations
were from the Philippines (15,282) and Malaysia (14, 457). 34 Didham
goes on to note that there is a significant exchange of people between
Southeast Asia and New Zealand, both those with or without New
Zealand citizenship, and at an average net gain by Southeast Asia
of nearly 150 New Zealand-born New Zealand citizens per year.35
New Zealand's Engagement with Southeast Asia

The combined and deepening engagement of New Zealand's cultural,
demographic and economic links with Asia provide a platform on
which to assess New Zealand's use of soft power in Asia. This
article, however, adopts a narrower focus. The interest here is with
New Zealand's soft power engagement with Southeast Asia, for the
following reasons: first, Southeast Asia is geographically and historically
closer to New Zealand than other parts of Asia; second, through its
active and early participation in the Colombo Plan, New Zealand
helped educate some of Southeast Asia's elite from the original
ASEAN countries, particularly Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore;
third, through the participation of NZDF personnel in Southeast Asia:
to Borneo, Singapore and the Philippines during the Second World
War; to conflicts in Malaya, through its responsibilities as a member
258 Andrew Butcher
of the Australia-Ne
to which New Zealand committed elements of all three services,
including the newly formed New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS);36
and reluctantly and modestly (in the form of a battalion), during the
Konfrontasi ;37 and Vietnam dining the Vietnam War (around 3,500
New Zealand military personnel served in South Vietnam between
June 1964 and December 1972);38 fourth by welcoming refugees from
Cambodia and Myanmar and large migrant populations from other
Southeast Asian countries, New Zealand has become a home for
many displaced Southeast Asians.
"A Need to be Unsentimental": The Importance of Southeast Asia

to New Zealand
New Zealand's economic links with Southeast Asia are only part of
its engagement with the region. There are defence and aid ties to
Southeast Asia, and political ties to ASEAN, to which New Zealand
has been a Dialogue Partner since 1975, and through ASEAN's
subsidiary bodies, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), which
New Zealand joined in 2005. New Zealand's various soft power
attributes may be applied to anywhere in the world. So why does
New Zealand's soft power in Southeast Asia matter?
As the global centre of gravity shifts from the trans-Atlantic to
Asia, New Zealand will face stark choices between its history (i.e. th
United Kingdom) and its geography (the Asia-Pacific). Economically
New Zealand's ties with Asia are becoming deeper and thicker, but
perhaps also unbalanced. Its heavy economic reliance on China, to th
extent that it is now New Zealand's second largest trading partner
may seem to some observers as an inevitable consequence of th
remarkable pulling power of the world's second largest economy.
But New Zealand has suffered once before in relying too heavil
on one market at the expense of others. When the United Kingdom
moved its preferential treatment from New Zealand to Europe in
the 1970s, New Zealand's economy went into shock. Strengthening
economic ties is good in and of itself but it also has a larger
purpose.39 Strategic, diplomatic, educational, aid and defence ties,
alongside economic engagement, all reinforce each other. There ar
much more than mercantile reasons for New Zealand to strengthen
its ties with ASEAN.
We may consider New Zealand's relationship with Southeast
Asia as comprising three "s"': soldiers, students and sentiment.
New Zealand's values are demonstrated through the various forms
of its soft power. On "soldiers", New Zealand contributed military

personnel to Asia and educated some of Southeast Asia's elite (in the
context of the spectre of Communism) because it held certain value
- about democracy, freedom, the rule of law - to be important
Similarly, New Zealand trades with and encourages tourism from
Asian countries because these represent an important economic
value of growth and prosperity. On the former point, New Zealander
Robert Ayson argues that "[i]t is important for New Zealanders not
to be shy about the democratic traditions which our own national
experience reflects. And we should not for a minute think that
an emphasis on democratic freedoms in foreign policy necessarily
separates us from our friends and partners in Asia."40 New Zealand
shares democratic values with Japan, Korea, India and Indonesia
though "[t]heir respective variations on this theme [of democracy
are not always completely familiar to us."41 On "students", it is the
Commonwealth bond that drew Colombo Plan students to New Zealand
and unites the members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements
(FPDA, i.e. Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK)
though neither Malaysia nor Singapore "are hardly poster children
for the values of a western liberal democracy".42 But, on "sentiment",
Terence O'Brien has warned, "there is a need to be unsentimental.
New Zealand is largely a petitioner with ASEAN."43
ASEAN has deliberately given New Zealand a strategic foot-
hold in the region, particularly through its membership of the East
Asia Summit (EAS). In the E AS, New Zealand can sit at the table
with not only the ASEAN powers but the Great Powers as well.
Only two US Presidents (Lyndon Johnson and Bill Clinton), two US
Secretaries of State (George Schultz and Hillary Clinton), and one
Chinese President (Hu Jintao) have ever visited New Zealand. All of
them visited only once, and in the case of Presidents Clinton and
Hu, their visits were primarily to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Leaders' Summit in Auckland. ASEAN provides the
invitation card for New Zealand to meet these, and other, leaders, and
in a context that arguably is favourable to New Zealand's interests,
and more frequent than bilateral visits might allow.
These leaders' level meetings are increasingly important. China's
growing economic influence provides it "with greater latitude to
expand its political influence", including in "shaping the development
of regional architecture and, in the process, further[ing] its influence
[in ASEAN]".44 With respect to the regional security architecture,
this finds form in China's preference for the ASEAN Plus Three
(APT, where China is one of three extra-regional powers and one of
260 Andrew Butcher
thirteen members)
numerically at lea
Zealand. The stabil
a region, the freed
of some of New Z
New Zealand's national interests. In the EAS, New Zealand is a
participant, has a voice and makes a contribution, which it would
not have, arguably, without either ASEAN centrality in any form of
regional architecture, or in the APT.
New Zealand's use of its soft power matters because, to a large
extent, that is all New Zealand has. Several thousand students came
to New Zealand under the Colombo Plan.45 It is New Zealand's soft
power, through these students especially, that have cultivated some
of the political elite in some Southeast Asian countries, especially
Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore.46 New Zealand was not the only
country to educate Southeast Asians or defend Southeast Asian
countries. Yet New Zealand kept its troops in Singapore longer than
either the Australians or the British, and retains military ties with
both Malaysia and Singapore through the FDPA (as, to be fair, do
Australia and Britain). In education, the small-size of New Zealand's
population at the time of the Colombo Plan meant that most New
Zealand households had some contact with a Southeast Asian
student.47 And that goodwill counts for a great deal. The num
of students who came to New Zealand under the Colombo Plan,
or even as fee-paying foreign students at the same time, might be
diminishing in number and influence, but New Zealand's reputation
will, for a time at least, outlast them.
Yet is soft power enough? Even if there is a desire for New
Zealand to invest in more military hardware or to engage its
military more often and in more places, such a desire is not
realistic given the economic and political climate in Wellington.
Constrained economic circumstances require a suite of different
tools and responses. Conventional diplomacy, of course, plays an
important role. However, New Zealand's formal diplomatic efforts
are currently being severely culled through a cost-cutting exercise
and reorientation of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. But
is soft power sufficient to "project" New Zealand's voice? Does soft
power deliver for New Zealand's national interests? Does it sufficiently
demonstrate a willingness to commit to the security of Southeast
Asia, the stability of ASEAN, and the delicate balance required to
accompany a rising China?
New Zealand's economic growth through its trade with Asia is

contingent upon the region remaining safe and secure. Without land
borders for its exports to cross, New Zealand is heavily reliant on the
safety of maritime trade routes. Freedom of navigation and sea lane
security are all immovable requirements for New Zealand's national
interest. It is not drawing too long a bow to argue that whatever
disrupts that freedom of navigation, whether territorial disputes,
piracy or maritime insecurity generally, threatens those interests.
Ian Storey has described Southeast Asia as "China's economic
hinterland"48 and China's expanding economic influence extends
to New Zealand as well. New Zealand, as with the countries and
institutions of ASEAN, has to navigate the difficult terrain, and
make difficult choices, with respect to its "longstanding and close
security partnerships" with Australia, America, Britain and Canada,49
alongside its growing economic relationship with China, now New
Zealand's second largest trading partner. The terrain on which those
choices are made will include Southeast Asia.
In multiple ways, therefore, New Zealand will need to mak
delicate choices to balance Chinese, ASEAN, American and Australian
interests. Bilateral relationships, however, are not that simple, nor
determined along one line only. New Zealand can and does, of
course, maintain multiple relationships at once. However, these
multiple relationships do not run along parallel tracks or fit neatly
into independent strategies of engagement for each relationship.
Indeed, these multiple relationships become all the more complex and
difficult when there are competing interests and expectations. When
decreasing diplomatic resources meet increasingly complex issues
- which is the situation New Zealand now faces - then the role
that soft power can play becomes both important and necessary
Track II diplomacy may be conceived as another form of soft
power and on this New Zealand is strengthening its hand. F
example, through the Asia New Zealand Foundation, which lea
New Zealand's Track II engagement with Asia, there are now
annual Track II dialogues with countries where New Zealand has
had limited influence, including Myanmar, and with established
dialogue partners in Australia, ASEAN, Vietnam, China, India, Japan,
Korea and Taiwan. Track II dialogues expand the conversation, both
in content and in contributors. The role of other non-government
organizations, including in Track III, may also become increasingly
important as so-called non-traditional security issues become important
domestically for Southeast Asian countries and for the region more
generally.50 In other words, "soft power" is not the exclusive property
262 Andrew Butcher
of professional dip
across multiple tra
For New Zealand's
it is crucial that it b
with Southeast Asi
and briefly, five so
to its engagement
sheep and the silve
Students
Joseph Nye has argued that academic and cultural exchanges between
the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War played
a significant role in enhancing America's soft power.51 Along with
defence ties, New Zealand's educational ties with the region are the
longest and historically most resonant in Southeast Asia. Within the
OECD, New Zealand is the eighth largest recipient of international
students, though it has the highest per capita rate of international
students in the OECD at 15 international students per 1,000 people.52
Education is one of New Zealand's top five export earners. The vast
majority of overseas students in New Zealand (about 75 per cent)
come from Asia.
Under the Colombo Plan, New Zealand first educated Asian
students from India, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and in Southeast Asia
from the former British territories (Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak,
North Borneo), and Thailand,53 from the Plan's inception in 1950
(the first students arrived in New Zealand in 1951) until the 1980s,
when the educational and training work became integrated into
New Zealand's bilateral aid programmes.54 The Colombo Plan was
a Commonwealth initiative under which Commonwealth countries
(originally Australia, Britain, Canada, Ceylon [Sri Lanka], India, New
Zealand and Pakistan)55 educated Asia's elite as part of a broader
suite of activities designed to stem the tide of communism sweeping
across Southeast Asia:
[i]ts Western founders were motivated to advance Asian development

by factors including the success of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding
postwar Europe, growing fears that Asian countries might fall victim
one by one to communism, and a concern to bolster elites in newly
independent countries that many believed had been ill-prepared
to go it alone. The Plan's Asian founders, not unnaturally, were
concerned to advance the social and economic development of
their countries within the context of a new grouping in which all
members would have equal status. Initially the Plan was intended
to last only a few years."56
The Colombo Plan still exists today as an economic and social

development programme based in Sri Lanka.57
Educating Southeast Asian students under the Colombo Plan
has been, for New Zealand, "the gift that keeps on giving", as one
of New Zealand's High Commissioners in the region put it to this
author.58 The deep reservoir of goodwill by those who studied in
New Zealand at that time, both as Colombo Plan students and,
later, private fee-paying students, is a well that has not yet run dry.
Anecdotally New Zealand had at one time, among its graduates, half
of the Malaysian cabinet.
It might be argued that the Colombo Plan is no longer relevant
for New Zealand and its soft power engagement in Southeast Asia.
At one level that is true. Those who New Zealand educated during
the period of the Colombo Plan are now mostly retired. But, the
Colombo Plan in New Zealand "came to stand, and in popular
perception still stands , for a particular collection of attitudes and
practices in international education. ... [A]nd a feeling that New
Zealand ... is benefiting short and long-term from the contacts that
are established ... through the presence of Colombo Plan students
in New Zealand."59 The Colombo Plan students in New Zealand
at this time "were objects of interest, sympathy and curiosity, n
of resentment or fear"60 and the nostalgia associated with it
New Zealand (even if not in other countries that hosted Colombo
Plan students) is remarkable, given the first Colombo Plan stud
arrived in New Zealand over sixty years ago. Today there is
powerful economic argument in New Zealand's export educat
industry, which was not present in 1951, but it is these attitud
and perceptions that shape New Zealand's soft power vision of i
export education, whether that is based in reality any longer
not. Indeed, the divergence between the nostalgia and the realit
presents a great risk to the long-term effectiveness of this soft pow
tool for New Zealand.
Fee-paying students from Southeast Asia continue to study in
New Zealand, although not in as high numbers as they used to.
In the past decade students from Southeast Asia in New Zealand's
tertiary institutions have dropped from almost half to less than
ten per cent of the Asian student body in the period 2003-05, but
more recently this rate has reversed slightly with every one in five
Asian international tertiary students coming from Southeast Asia
in 2008.61
264 Andrew Butcher
Outside of full-f
contributes in othe
through the English
whereby programm
come to New Zealand
New Zealand's aid b
are both similar and different to the Colombo Plan: similar in
cultivating relationships with potential leaders, different in that
is not done in the hope of stemming the flow of communism.
Soldiers
Soft power can also come in military garb, as it has done on several
occasions in the last sixty years. It continues to find form in the
FPDA and in New Zealand's collaboration with Malaysian and
Singaporean troops in Afghanistan; these provide tangible long-term
effects on goodwill on both sides.
New Zealand kept its troops for longer in Singapore than either
Britain or Australia and is still an active member of the FPDA. It
has also had a long-term role in training military personnel from
ASEAN countries. The FPDA may be more symbolic than strategic
in that it serves more as a "comfort pillow". However, symbolism
can be strategic too. The FDPA plays a small but important role
in New Zealand's relationship with Southeast Asia and illustrates
the importance of retaining alliances with specific states besides
maintaining political relations with a regional institution such as
ASEAN. The FPDA also connects New Zealand's historical engagement
with the region with its contemporary concerns, namely the stability
of Southeast Asia as a region and the security of its trading routes.
New Zealand's 2010 defence white paper describes the FPDA as
"New Zealand's most significant operational security link to Southeast
Asia ... [which] will continue to provide a valuable anchor for the
presence of our defence assets in the region".62 Regionally it has
benefits too: the FPDA provides a forum for cooperation between
Malaysia and Singapore, which might not otherwise happen.
Sports
Arguably New Zealand's biggest brand is its rugby team, the All
Blacks, and sport in general is a central part of New Zealand's
identity. Fitness in New Zealand, Charlotte Macdonald argues, was
and is about being "strong, beautiful and modern".63 New Zealand
has a great belief in teams: witness the overwhelming support for the
All Blacks during the 2011 Rugby World Cup and how that played
into a patriotic narrative about New Zealand "punching above its
weight" and showing itself off to the world.
Sport also plays an increasingly important role in the integration
of immigrants in New Zealand. In New Zealand, table tennis and
badminton teams have seen an increase in players from Asia. One
table tennis regional sports organization in Auckland notes that of
its registered players, 90 per cent are Asian, with the bulk from
China and the rest from South Korea.64 Football (or soccer) in New
Zealand has benefited from the arrival of Southeast Asians, while
cricket has benefited from Indian migrants.65 Sports, like religion,
crosses ethnic boundaries and national borders. The All Blacks have
played in Hong Kong and Japan, and New Zealand sports persons
have competed at the Commonwealth Games in Kuala Lumpur.
"Rugby diplomacy" was in action in New Zealand just prior
to the start of the Rugby World Cup, when the Foreign Minister
hosted the Pacific Islands' Forum. The wider potential diplomatic
leverage of rugby is reinforced when one notes that the New Zealand
Foreign Minister is also responsible for the Rugby World Cup and
that during the Rugby World Cup, New Zealand diplomats were
diverted from their usual consular tasks abroad to provide support
for New Zealand's hosting of the tournament. As this author noted
at the time:
In a region [Asia] where military expenditure is increasing, New

Zealand could do worse than use the RWC [Rugby World Cup]
for its diplomatic efforts. And over the next six weeks and 42
matches there will be those in the region looking not at the rugby
fields but rather at the symbolism: did New Zealand divert its
foreign affairs resources for logistical support only, or because
it realises there's a bigger game in town, longer than just a few
weeks, with much higher stakes, and that even if soft power is
all New Zealand has got, it knows how to use it. ... Diplomacy
and rugby are literally hand-in-glove this week. This is soft power
in its most "Kiwi" form66
Looking further back, New Zealand Herald columnist Tapu Misa,

described how rugby "has never just been a game for New Zealand",
and adds "[a]nd those of us who marched against the 1981 Springbok
Tour [of New Zealand] (the final match was played at Eden Park
30 years ago today) were in no doubt of rugby's significance to
national identity and pride, here and in apartheid South Africa."67
266 Andrew Butcher
Sheep
One of the most distinguishable "Kiwi" attributes of New Zealand
is its sheep population. New Zealand has 40.1 million sheep, which
amounts to 10 sheep per person68 and the New Zealand's economic
engine are its primary industries (i.e. agriculture, forestry, environment
and natural resources, biosecurity and animal welfare, food safety,
fisheries).69 Each country has particular characteristics with which it
is associated abroad. These characteristics form part of a narrative
about a country, or reinforce existing held views. For New Zealand,
it may be argued that sheep could be read as a signifier for "clean
and green", for "100% pure", for "easy lifestyle"; recall the reasons
noted earlier as to why migrants choose to live in New Zealand. Take
those attributes further and particular political positions come into
view, including New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance or commitment
to addressing climate change, for example. The narrative about New
Zealand and its soft power thus becomes internally coherent and
consistent. This narrative then shapes expectations - recall further
the comments about New Zealand's soft power vis-à-vis Japan and
ASEAN, noted earlier - and become somewhat self-fulfilling.
Sheep are more than just a signifier: they contribute in multiple
ways to New Zealand's economy, including through tourism.
Genuinely, many visitors who come to New Zealand expect to see
sheep. Tourism to New Zealand is increasing from across Asia. In
2008, China overtook Japan to become New Zealand's fourth largest
tourist market70 and is projected to overtake the British and American
markets in spending by mid-2012 and in tourist numbers by 2014. 71
Tourism is a central plank of New Zealand's economic success, and
increasingly so as that success is tied to Asian markets.
As the Southeast Asian economies grow, so does the expectation
that these economies will provide an increasing number of tourists
to New Zealand. Concomitant with this is the ambition for greater
and better connectivity; increasing direct flights from New Zealand to
Southeast Asia is one feature of this ambition (to that end, Garuda
Airlines will resume direct flights from Jakarta to Auckland in late
2012).There is potential traffic the other way as well. New Zealand
is increasingly used as a gateway to and from Southeast Asia and
Latin America. Of all these indices, tourism rests most on how
New Zealand projects itself to the world, but it also depends on
exogenous factors outside New Zealand's control. Budget airline Air
Asia had a short-lived presence in New Zealand, but the combined
factors of the 2011 Christchurch earthquake (coinciding, unfortunately,
with Air Asia's initial offerings in New Zealand), the airline's own
economic troubles, and the global economic crisis, meant that i
did not last.
"Connectivity", to use the current vernacular, reinforces other
aspects of New Zealand's soft power: it eases travel for migrants,
students and tourists from Asia to New Zealand, and opens up
routes the other way for more New Zealanders to see, experience
and do business in Asia. Sheep are an attraction for tourists to New
Zealand; what they signify is an attraction for those who see New
Zealand's soft power as an important asset in Southeast Asia.
Robert Ayson argues "For many years we have been encouraged
to think first and foremost about New Zealand's interests in an
even deeper economic interaction with Asia. ... [T]hese mate
interests upon which a good part of New Zealand's economic
wellbeing appears to rest",72 dominate New Zealand's approach
Asia generally and say something about the value placed upon, a
sought from, New Zealand's bilateral and multilateral relationsh
with Asian countries. Indeed, New Zealand's tourism, education and
film-making industries are set within an understanding of economic
growth. The growth of tourists from Asia to New Zealand is not
just good for New Zealand's tourism industry; it is good for New
Zealand's economy. It is not incidental therefore that New Zealand's
Prime Minister is also the Minister for Tourism.
The Silver-Screen
Tourism is New Zealand's largest export earner and generates 10

per cent of the country's GDP. Latterly, that has been reinforced by
the success of New Zealand's film industry. The silver-screen is the
most recent tool in New Zealand's soft-power armoury. Films by New
Zealand directors and filmed in New Zealand, including The Piano
and The Lord of the Rings trilogy have reinforced the "clean, green"
image of New Zealand and generated tourism campaigns of their
own. New Zealand projects itself, literally, onto the silver-screen.
Film is not only used as a tourism tool in Asia and elsewhere in
the world. New Zealand also has collaborations in the film industry,
with Singapore and South Korea, and an increasing number of Indian
films are being produced in New Zealand.
The economic significance of the film industry in New Zealand
increased significantly in the 1990s and reputedly generated NZ$500
million ($394 million) in foreign exchange in the 1999-2000 financial
year, which was a dramatic increase from NZ$86 million ($68 million)
268 Andrew Butcher
in 1995. 73 The New

of NZ$2.7 billion ($2
value of this indust
horticulture sectors.
had gross revenue o
Recalling Nye's rec
of soft power for t
industry in New Zea
The Lord of the Rin
"clean and green" Ne
the silver-screen, as
narrative about who New Zealand is and what it stands for.
Conclusion
The narrative New Zealand presents to the world about what it

stands for - articulated through tourism campaigns, films, or the
experiences of students and soldiers and sports tournaments - is
one that it uses to great effect. It positions New Zealand as a nice
place to visit and projects New Zealanders as people who "punch
above their weight" in what they contribute to the world.76
These various soft power attributes - students, soldiers, sports,
sheep and the silver-screen - provide a suite of tools at New Zealand's
disposal, with which it can project its voice,77 advance its interests,
and through which it can make its "praises heard afar". Sometimes,
however, this soft power can border on the sentimental and the
nostalgic. Sentimentality is, however, no substitute for strategy.
This paper has focused on Southeast Asia and ASEAN as the
forums in which New Zealand's soft power may be viewed. These
various soft power links to Southeast Asia are both historic - the
Colombo Plan, the various military contributions, the FPDA - and
contemporary, through links in trade and tourism. New Zealand also
has links to ASEAN - as a Dialogue Partner, a member of the EAS
and, with Australia, party to the AANZFTA. New Zealand's engagement
with Southeast Asia and ASEAN is "both/and" not "either/or";
the bilateral relationships are as important as the multilateral and
sometimes the distinction between the two is blurred. Furthermore,
New Zealand's soft power assets in Southeast Asia may also play
a wider role: in contributing to a secure region, a stable ASEAN,
and to issues of regional concern and security.
Hard power is easier to quantify than soft power, and New
Zealand's military and economic "hard power" is "small ... but strong"
and modest. It is not only a small economy with low military expen-
diture; it is also a country that is favoured by its migrants because of

its clean, green, relaxed image. New Zealand's soft power attributes
reinforce this narrative. Some of New Zealand's Asian neighbours
recognize elements of this soft power, though only Australia, seem
ingly, surveys its public to see whether this admiration for New
Zealand extends beyond some of Asia's elites. Indeed, it is these
elites who might have more reason to favour New Zealand's sof
power credentials, as they were the ones who were Colombo Plan
students, or still admire New Zealand's long military contributions t
the region. And where the views of elites matter, and where thos
elites can thus turn these soft power credentials to tangible benefit
to New Zealand, then that is all to New Zealand's favour.
But the outcome of New Zealand's soft power, while not incidental,
is not central either. These various soft power tools provide a
context for New Zealand's engagement with Southeast Asia. Without
extensive military hardware or economic might, New Zealand relies
heavily on the views of its past and current graduates, its military
links, its self-portraits through tourism and film, and its economic
links through trade. It both sings its own praises afar, and relies on
others to join in the chorus. Arguably, Southeast Asia and ASEAN
are more important to New Zealand than New Zealand is to them,
but through students, soldiers, sports, sheep and the silver-screen
New Zealand seeks to show that it might be small and far away
but that it still projects power, albeit softly.
NOTES
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as a seminar in Singapore o

24 October 2010 at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies where the author
was a Visiting Fellow. The author is grateful for the feedback provided at that
seminar and for comments by Ian Storey, Richard Grant and the two anonymous
reviewers on an earlier version of this paper.
2 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:
Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.
3 Ibid., p. 33.
4 Department of Labour, Migration Trends and Outlook 2010-2011 (Wellington:
Department of Labour, 2011), p. 8, <http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/
migration-trends-1011/migration-trends-1011.pdf>.
5 Ibid., p. 12.
6 Department of Labour, Life After Study: International Students' Settlement
Experiences in New Zealand (Wellington: Department of Labour, 2010), p. viii,
<http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/life-after-study/life-after-study.
pdf>.
270 Andrew Butcher
7 Statistics New Zealand, "Film Lights Up Screen Industry in 2011", Media

release, 2 April 2011, <http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/industry_sectors/
film_and_television/ScreenIndustrySurvey_MRlO-l 1 .aspx>.
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Colombo Plan at 50 (Wellington:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), p. 14.
9 Christopher Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia: Results of a
2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion (Chicago: The Chicago Council on
Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute, 2009), <http://www.thechicagocouncil.
org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline% 20Reports/Asia% 20Soft% 20Power% 202008/
Soft% 20Power% 202008_full% 20report.pdf>.
10 Fergus Hanson, The Lowy Institute Poll: Australia and New Zealand in the World,
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for International
Policy, 2012), p. 3, <http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/lowy_poll_2012_web3.
pdf>.
11 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), p. 270.
12 Ibid., p. 270.
13 Ibid., p. 271.
14 Nye, Soft Power , op. cit., p. 3.
15 Ibid., p. 5.
16 I am grateful to Vangelis Vitalis for providing these data.
17 Singh, ASEAN's Perspective of New Zealand's Place in Asia , op. cit., p. 6.
18 Ibid. New Zealand also has a higher GDP than Brunei, but Brunei's per-capita
GDP, which may be a more accurate reflection of economic strength, is higher
than all ASEAN countries except Singapore.
19 Department of Labour, Motives and Processes of Migration (Wellington: Department
of Labour, 2009), <http://dol.govt.nz/research/migration/lisnz/ff/DOL10705-19-
LisNZ-FastFacts-4-Migration-Motives.pdf>.
20 Stephen Hoadley, "From Defence to Security: New Zealand's Hard Power,
Soft Power and Smart Power", New Zealand International Review 32, no. 5
(September-October 2007): 18-21.
21 Malcolm Cook, Standing Together in Single File: Australia's Views of New
Zealand in Asia (Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2010), p. 4,
<http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/AsiaNZ_Outlook_13June.
pdf>.
22 Ibid., p. 1.
23 Ibid., p. 2.
24 Ibid.
25 Yoichiro Sato, Lining up a Persuasive Friend: Japan's Expecta

New Zealand can Contribute to Asian Security (Wellington: Asia
Foundation, 2011), p. 2, <http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.o
Asia_NZ_Outlook_l 6 . p df> .
26 Ibid., p. 1.
27 Daljit Singh, ASEAN's Perspective of New Zealand's Place in Asia (Wellington:

Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2011), p. 1, <http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.
org.nz/files/Outlook_Asean% 2 7s_perspective_of_NZ% 2 7s_place.pdf>.
28 Ibid., p. 6.
29 Ibid., p. 17, my emphasis.
30 Richard Bedford and Elsie Ho, Asians in New Zealand: Implications of a
Changing Demography (Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2008), p. 11,
<http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/AsiaNZ%200utlook%207.pdfc>.
31 Ibid., p. 11.
32 Alan Gamlen, Engaging Asia: The Role of the Diaspora (Wellington: Asia New
Zealand Foundation, 2011), <http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/
Asia%20NZ%200utlook%2015.pdf>.
33 Paul Spoonley and Carina Meares, Chinese Businesses and the Transformation
of Auckland (Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2009), <http://www.
asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/Asia% 20NZ% 20Chinese% 20Businesses.
pdf>.
34 Robert Didham, Intersections: Southeast Asia and Diaspora Engagement
(Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2009), p. 5, <http://www.asianz.org.
nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/11490%20AsiaNZ%200utlook%2011%20web2.pdf>.
35 It is important to note that as New Zealand allows dual citizenship, some people
travelling between Southeast Asia and New Zealand may be using another
passport and that others may be citizens by virtue of being born in New Zealand
regardless of their parents' citizenship or residency status (as was the case for
those born in New Zealand prior to 1 January 2006).
36 For further detail on New Zealand's full contribution to the Emergency, see
Mark Rolls, "Growing Apart: New Zealand and Malaysia", in Southeast Asia
and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations, edited by
Anthony Smith (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington Press, 2005), p.
212.
37 For details on New Zealand's contribution during the ¡Confrontasi , see Rolls,
"Growing Apart", op. cit., pp. 216-18.
38 New Zealand and the Vietnam War, New Zealand History Online , <http://www.
nzhistory.net.nz/war/vietnam-war> .
39 Robert Ayson, "Australia-New Zealand", in Australia as a Asia-Pacific Regional
Power: Friendship in Flux?, edited by Brendan Taylor (Oxford: Routledge, 2007),
p. 129.
40 Robert Ayson, "Interests, Values and New Zealand's Engagement with Asia",
Inaugural Professorial Lecture, Victoria University of Wellington, 19 July 2011,
<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Current%20Work/2011/Inaugural%20Lecture
%2019.07.11.pd£>, p. 5.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 6.
43 Terence O'Brien, New Zealand and ASEAN: Current and Future Outlook
(Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995),
p. 6.
272 Andrew Butcher
44 Ian Storey, Southea

(Abingdon, UK: Routle
45 The precise number
46 See Nicholas Tarling
Policy Since 1950 (Au
Foreign Affairs and T
Foreign Affairs and T
47 See Tarling, Interna
48 Storey, Southeast A
49 Ministry of Defence
of Defence, 2010), p. 18
defence-white-paper-fi
50 See Amitav Acharya
ASEAN and the Proble
2009), pp. 273-75.
51 Joseph Nye, "Soft P
educause.edu/ir/library/
52 Department of Labo
53 Ministry of Foreign
pp. 9-10.
54 Helen Clark, "Forewo
Plan at 50, op. cit., p.
55 Subsequently the Pl
membership grew to
withdrew in 1978), Cambodia, Laos, the United States; in 1952, Burma and
Nepal; in 1953, Indonesia; in 1954, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand; in
1957, Malaya; in 1962, South Korea and Bhutan; in 1963, Afghanistan and
the Maldives; in 1966, Iran and Singapore; in 1972, Fiji; in 1973, Papua New
Guinea; and in 1998, Mongolia. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The
Colombo Plan at 50, p. 5.
56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Colombo Plan at 50, op. cit., p. 5.
57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Colombo Plan at 50, op. cit., p. 5.
58 Interview with New Zealand's High Commissioner to Malaysia, His Excellency
David Pine, Kuala Lumpur, September 2011.
59 Tarling, International Students, op. cit., p. 9, my emphasis.
60 Ibid., p. 13.
61 Didham, Intersections: Southeast Asia and Diaspora Engagement, op. cit.,
p. 10.
62 Ministry of Defence, Defence White Paper 2010, op. cit., p. 30.
63 Charlotte Macdonald, Strong, Beautiful and Modern: National Fitness in Britain,
New Zealand, Australia and Canada (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2011),
p. 10.
64 Paul Spoonley and Catherine Taiapa, Sport and Cultural Diversity: Responding
to the Sports and Leisure Needs of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in
Auckland: A Report for the Auckland Regional Physical Activity and Sport
Strategy (Auckland: Massey University, 2009), p. 27.
65 Ibid., p. 28.
66 Andrew Butcher, "Rugby Diplomacy", The Interpreter: The Weblog of the Lowy
Institute for International Policy, 9 September 2011, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.
org/post/2011/09/09/Rugby-diplomacy.aspx>.
67 Tapu Misa, "Rugby - a sport with power to ignite and unite", New Zealand
Herald , 12 September 2011, <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.
cfin?c_id=466&objectid=10751077>.
68 Statistics New Zealand, "Myth 8: New Zealand has 3 million people and 60 million
sheep", 7 May 2007, <http://population.govt.nz/myth-busters/myth-8.aspx>.
69 For more see the website of New Zealand's newly formed Ministry of Primary
Industries <www.mpl.govt.nz>.
70 Tourism New Zealand, "China: Market Overview", 2011, <http://www.
tourismnewzealand.com/markets-and-stats/north-asia/china/>.
71 Ministry of Economic Development, "Chinese Tourists More Valuable than USA

and UK Over Next Five Years" (Wellington: Ministry of Economic Development,
2011), <http.7/www.med.govt.nz/sectors-industries/tourism/news/chinese-tourists-
more-valuable-than-usa-and-uk-over-next-five-years>.
72 Robert Ayson, "Interests, Values and New Zealand's Engagement with Asia",
Inaugural Professorial Lecture, Victoria University of Wellington, 19 July 2011,
<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Current%20Work/2011/Inaugural%20Lecture
%2019.07.11.pdf>, p. 2.
73 W. Glen Croy, The Lord of the Rings , New Zealand and Tourísm: Image Ruilding
with Film, Department of Management Working Paper Series, 10/04, Monash
University, 2004, <http://www.linkbc.ca/torc/downsl/LordoftheRingsReport.
pdf>.
74 The New Zealand Treasury, New Zealand Economic and Financial Overview
2010 (Wellington: The Treasury, 2010), p. 27, <http://www.treasury.govt.nz/
economy/overview/2010/>.
75 Statistics New Zealand, "Screen Industry Survey 2010/11 Media Release", 2
April 2012, <http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/industry_sectors/film_and_
television/ScreenIndustrySurvey_MR10-l 1 .aspx>.
76 Malcolm Cook in Standing Together , op. cit., p. 5 notes that this phrase
"punching above its weight" is not unique to New Zealand. In Australia it is
"the most hackneyed and oft-used expression ... to describe our foreign policy
and our broader engagement with the world."
77 CSCAP New Zealand, "Projecting Our Voice - Major Power Relationships in
Asia, the Responses of Regional Organisations and the Implications for New
Zealand: The Report of a Study by CSCAP-New Zealand" (Wellington: Centre
for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2011), <http://www.
victoria.ac.nz/ css/docs/CSCAP% 20national% 20study/CSCAP% 20National% 20St
udy%20Sep%202011.pdf>.

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Students, Soldiers, Sports, Sheep and the Silver-Screen: New Zealand's Soft Power in

ASEAN and Southeast Asia

Students, Soldiers, Sports,

Although New Zealand is a small state in the South Pacific , it has a

Keywords: New Zealand, soft power, ASEAN.

Andrew Butcher is Director of Policy and Research at the Asia N

expressed in New Zealand's national anthem; contextual , in relation

Zealand's soft powe

Small ... but Strong

In 2011, New Zealand military personnel were deployed in seven

Nations Integrated Missions in Timor-Leste).13 However, as can be

New Zealand's 4.3

"Make Her Praises Heard Afar"

New Zealand's praises would have to be heard far indeed. A

in the way that Au

and Indians (historically from Fiji, though an increasing number

New Zealand's Engagement with Southeast Asia

"A Need to be Unsentimental": The Importance of Southeast Asia

of its soft power. On "soldiers", New Zealand contributed military

New Zealand's economic growth through its trade with Asia is

[i]ts Western founders were motivated to advance Asian development

The Colombo Plan still exists today as an economic and social

In a region [Asia] where military expenditure is increasing, New

Looking further back, New Zealand Herald columnist Tapu Misa,

Tourism is New Zealand's largest export earner and generates 10

in 1995. 73 The New

The narrative New Zealand presents to the world about what it

diture; it is also a country that is favoured by its migrants because of

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as a seminar in Singapore o

7 Statistics New Zealand, "Film Lights Up Screen Industry in 2011", Media

25 Yoichiro Sato, Lining up a Persuasive Friend: Japan's Expecta

27 Daljit Singh, ASEAN's Perspective of New Zealand's Place in Asia (Wellington:

44 Ian Storey, Southea

71 Ministry of Economic Development, "Chinese Tourists More Valuable than USA

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