Hazard Identification

 What are the hazards?

 What can go wrong?
 What are the chances?
 What are the consequences?

Reference:
Chapter 10 (10.3), 11 (11.3 excluding minimal cut
set) Daniel A Crowl, Joseph F. Louvar; Chemical
Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications
(3rd edition) Prentice Hall, 2011
 Process Safety Assessment
 Qualitative
◦ Hazard identification: identification of Hazards and taking
measures to minimize the negative consequences of
hazards.
 Quantitative
◦ Risk assessment: determination of the events that can
produce an accident, the probability of those events and
the consequences-known as quantitative risk analysis
(QRA).
◦ QRA expresses the risk in numbers and asks for
modifications in process/plants/operations/emergency
responses that reduces the risk to a lower acceptable
number.
Hazard identification and Risk assessment can be
performed independently or carried out together
 Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment Procedure
System description

Hazard identification

Scenario identification

Accident probability Accident consequences

Risk determination

Modify
no 1. process or plant
Risk and/or hazard 2. process operation
acceptance 3 emergency response
4 other
yes

Build and/or operate

system
Hazard Identification Methodologies
Factors Affecting Selection of Methods
Classical Limitations of Hazard
Evaluation Studies
Hazards and Operability (HAZOP)
Studies
Documents: PFD, P&ID, Plant Layout
 Begin with a detailed flow sheet and break the flow sheet in to
a number of process units
 Choose a study node (Vessel, line etc.)
 Pick a process parameter: flow, level, T, P, concentration, pH,
viscosity , reaction etc
 Apply a guide word to suggest possible deviation
 If the deviation is applicable determine possible causes and note
any protective system
 Evaluate the consequences
 Recommend action
 Record all information
HAZOP Table

Study node:
Para Guide Possible Possible Existing Required actions/
meter word causes consequences safeguards recommendations
(deviation)
 Example of HAZOP Matrix
Guide
word
No Low High Part of Also Other than Reverse

Process-
variable
No Low High Missing Wrong Reverse
Flow flow flow flow ingredients Impurities material flow

Low High Low High - -

Level Empty interface interface
level level

Open to Low High - - -

Pressure atmosphere pressure pressure Vacuum

Temperature Low High - - - Auto

Freezing temp. temp. refrigeration

No Poor Excessive Irregular- Foaming - Phase

Agitation mixing mixing
agitation mixing separation

No Slow "Runaway Partial Side Wrong Decom-

Reaction reaction
reaction reaction reaction" reaction reaction position

Utility External External - - Start-up -

Other Shutdown
failure leak rupture
Maintenance
Example: DAP Process
HAZOP Analysis Worksheet-
Worksheet-I
HAZOP Analysis Worksheet-
Worksheet-II
DAP Plant, Anowara Chittagong
Sulfuric Acid Day tank (500Mt) Sulfuric Acid Mother tank (5000 MT)

Granulator Reactor
 Example: Cooling
 Consider the reactor system shown in Figure 10-8. The
reaction is exothermic, so a cooling system is provided to
remove the excess energy of reaction. In the event that
the cooling function is lost, the temperature of the
reactor would increase. This would lead to an increase in
reaction rate, leading to additional energy release. The
result would be a runaway reaction with pressures
exceeding the bursting pressure of the reactor vessel. The
temperature within the reactor is measured and is used
to control the cooling water flowrate by a valve.
 Perform a HAZOP study on this unit to improve the
safety of the process. Use as study nodes the cooling coil
(process parameters: flow and temperature) and the
stirrer (process parameter: agitation).
Example: Cooling
HAZOP Analysis Worksheet-
Worksheet-I
Examples
 Storage Tanks
◦ Parameters: Level ,Temperature, Pressure
◦ Action: Relief valve (to flare), earthing
 Distillation column
◦ Parameters: Level ,Temperature, Pressure
◦ Action: Relief valve (to flare)
 Volatile solvent heating system
 A heat exchanger is used to heat
flammable, volatile solvents, as
shown in Figure 10-15. The
temperature of the outlet stream
is measured by a thermocouple,
and a controller valve manipulates
the amount of steam to the heat
exchanger to achieve the desired
set point temperature.
◦ Identify the study nodes of the
process
◦ Perform a HAZOP study on the
intention "hot solvent from heat
exchanger." Recommend possible
modifications to improve the safety
of the process.
HAZOP
 Study nodes: volatile solvent outlet from
heat exchanger
 Recommendations
◦ Relief valve connected to flare
Risk Assessment
 Risk assessment includes
◦ Incident identification: describes how an
accident occurs and analyses probabilities
◦ Consequence analysis: describes the expected
damage, including loss of life, damage to
environment or capital euipment and days
outage
Fault Trees Method
 Fault trees are a deductive method for
identifying ways in which hazards can lead
to accidents.
 It started with a well-defined accident, or
top event, and works backward toward
the various scenario that can cause the
accident
Example: Chemical Reactor with an
Alarm
Fault Trees