FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT

Literature

Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to long term participation by country A into

country B. It usually involves participation in

management, joint-venture, transfer of technology and expertise. There are two types of

FDI: inward foreign direct investment

and outward foreign direct investment, resulting in a net FDI History

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a measure of foreign ownership of productive assets,

such as factories, mines and land.

Increasing foreign investment can be used as one measure of growing economic

globalization. Figure below shows net inflows

of foreign direct investment. The largest flows of foreign investment occur between the

industrialized countries (North America,

Western Europe and Japan). But flows to non-industrialized countries are increasing

sharply.
US International Direct Investment Flows:[1]

Period FDI Outflow FDI Inflows Net

1960-69 $ 42.18 bn $ 5.13 bn + $ 37.04 bn

1970-79 $ 122.72 bn $ 40.79 bn + $ 81.93 bn

1980-89 $ 206.27 bn $ 329.23 bn - $ 122.96 bn

1990-99 $ 950.47 bn $ 907.34 bn + $ 43.13 bn

2000-07 $ 1,629.05 bn $ 1,421.31 bn + $ 207.74 bn

Total $ 2,950.69 bn $ 2,703.81 bn + $ 246.88 bn

A foreign direct investor may be classified in any sector of the economy and could be any

one of the following:[citation

needed
  an individual;

 a group of related individuals;

 an incorporated or unincorporated entity;

 a public company or private company;

 a group of related enterprises;

 a government body;

 an estate (law), trust or other societal organisation; or

 any combination of the above.

The foreign direct investor may acquire 10% or more of the voting power of an enterprise

in an economy through any of the

following methods:
 by incorporating a wholly owned subsidiary or company

 by acquiring shares in an associated enterprise

 through a merger or an acquisition of an unrelated enterprise

 participating in an equity joint venture with another investor or enterprise

 Foreign direct investment incentives may take the following forms:citation

needed

 low corporate tax and income tax rates

 tax holidays

 other types of tax concessions

 preferential tariffs

 special economic zones

 EPZ - Export Processing Zones

Some countries have put restrictions on FDI in certain sectors. India, with its restriction

on FDI in the retail sector is an

example.In a country like India, the “walmartization” of the country could have

significant negative effects on the overall

economy by reducing the number of people employed in the retail sector (currently the

second largest employment sector

nationally) and depressing the income of people involved in the agriculture sector

(currently the largest employment sector

nationally).

Foreign direct investment in the United States

"Invest in America" is an initiative of the Commerce department and aimed to promote

the arrival of foreigners investors to the

country.
The “Invest in America” policy is focused on:

Facilitating investor queries.

Carrying out maneuvers to aid foreign investors.

Provide support both at local and state levels.

Address concerns related to the business environment by helping as an ombudsman in

Washington Dc for the international

venture community.

Offering policy guidelines and helping getting access to the legal system.

The United States is the world’s largest recipient of FDI. More than $325.3 billion in FDI

flowed into the United States in 2008,

which is a 37 percent increase from 2007. The $2.1 trillion stock of FDI in the United

States at the end of 2008 is the

equivalent of approximately 16 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).55

Benefits of FDI in America: In the last 6 years, over 4000 new projects and 630,000 new

jobs have been created by foreign

companies, resulting in close to $314 billion in investment.[citation needed] Unarguably,

US affiliates of foreign companies

have a history of paying higher wages than US corporations.[citation needed] Foreign

companies have in the past supported

an annual US payroll of $364 billion with an average annual compensation of $68,000

per employee: citation needed

Increased US exports through the use of multinational distribution networks. FDI has

resulted in 30% of jobs for Americans in

the manufacturing sector, which accounts for 12% of all manufacturing jobs in the US.[5]

Affiliates of foreign corporations spent more than $34 billions on research and

development in 2006 and continue to support

many national projects. Inward FDI has led to higher productivity through increased

capital, which in turn has led to high living

standards.

Foreign direct investment in China

FDI in China has been one of the major successes of the past 3 decades. [citation needed]

Starting from a baseline of less

than $19 billion just 20 years ago, FDI in China has grown to over $300 billion in the

first 10 years. China has continued its

massive growth and is the leader among all developing nations in terms of FDI. [citation

needed] Even though there was a

slight dip in FDI in 2009 as a result of the global slowdown, 2010 has again seen

investments increase. [citation needed] The

Chinese continue to steam roll with expectations of an economic growth of a 10% this

year.

Types of Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview

FDI or Foreign Direct Investment is any form of investment that earns interest in
enterprises which function outside of the

domestic territory of the investor.

FDIs require a business relationship between a parent company and its foreign subsidiary.

Foreign direct business

relationships give rise to multinational corporations. For an investment to be regarded as

an FDI, the parent firm needs to

have at least 10% of the ordinary shares of its foreign affiliates. The investing firm may

also qualify for an FDI if it owns

voting power in a business enterprise operating in a foreign country.

FDIs can be broadly classified into two types: outward FDIs and inward FDIs. This

classification is based on the types

of restrictions imposed, and the various prerequisites required for these investments.

An outward-bound FDI is backed by the government against all types of associated risks.

This form of FDI is subject to

tax incentives as well as disincentives of various forms. Risk coverage provided to the

domestic industries and subsidies

granted to the local firms stand in the way of outward FDIs, which are also known as

'direct investments abroad.'

Different economic factors encourage inward FDIs. These include interest loans, tax

breaks, grants, subsidies, and the

removal of restrictions and limitations. Factors detrimental to the growth of FDIs include

necessities of differential

performance and limitations related with ownership patterns.

Other categorizations of FDI exist as well. Vertical Foreign Direct Investment takes place

when a multinational

corporation owns some shares of a foreign enterprise, which supplies input for it or uses

the output produced by the

MNC.
Horizontal foreign direct investments happen when a multinational company carries out a

similar business operation in

different nations.

Foreign Direct Investment is guided by different motives. FDIs that are undertaken to

strengthen the existing market

structure or explore the opportunities of new markets can be called 'market-seeking FDIs.'

'Resource-seeking FDIs' are

aimed at factors of production which have more operational efficiency than those

available in the home country of the

investor.

Some foreign direct investments involve the transfer of strategic assets. FDI activities

may also be carried out to ensure

optimization of available opportunities and economies of scale. In this case, the foreign

direct investment is termed as

'efficiency-seeking.'
Introduction

Declaration. In the FDI Council, she led the governance task force from 2003 to 2004 and

became President-Elect in 2003 and President in 2005.

Maurice Kugler is a Colombian economist born in 1967. He received his Ph.D. in

Economics from UC Berkeley in 2000, as well as a M.Sc.(Econ) and a B.Sc. (Econ) both

from the London School of Economics. He was named in 2007 to the inaugural CIGI

Chair in International Public Policy by the Laurier School of Business and Economics. In

2008, CIGI, the Centre for International Governance Innovation, is jointly with

University of Waterloo and Wilfrid Laurier University launching the Balsillie School for

International Affairs, under the sponsorship of the entrepreneur and philanthropist Jim

Balsillie.In his work on spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI), Kugler has

shown that the presence of multinational corporation affiliates (MNC) can yield

technological opportunities for host country producers in upstream sectors, especially

when the MNC subsdiary is an exporter and the potential spillover recipient firm has

absorptive capacity to adopt new technology. When subsidiaries and local firms are

connected through the production chain, then FDI generates transmission of

technological knowhow as input suppliers are the recipients of information from their

clients.

A study on the link between labor migration and FDI shows them to be complementary

rather than substitutes as standard trade theory would suggest. In a neoclassical model,

for the capital-labor ratios to equalize, in the presence of factor mobility, either jobs flow
to workers in the form of capital inflows or workers flow to jobs in the form of migration,

in countries with relatively low capital-labor ratios. In this context, migration and FDI

would be substitutes. However, if migration leads to information flows about investment

opportunities in the origin country of workers entering the labor force in their destination

country, there can be a dynamic complementarity between migration and subsequent

FDI.

The shutdown of an FDI enterprise established for natural resources exploration

The recommendation in paragraph 383 of BPM5 is that "expenditures of direct

investment enterprises established for exploration of minerals and other natural resources

in an economy are treated as capital expenditures (fixed capital formation)." In addition,

the text stipulates that "if the exploration proves unsuccessful and results in a shutdown

of the enterprise, no further balance of payments entries are recorded. Rather, a negative

stock adjustment is made in the direct investment position of the direct investor in the

host economy, and an equal reduction is made in the liability position of that economy to

that of the direct investor. (Both adjustments fall under the heading other adjustments in

the international investment position.)" Paragraph 60 of the OECD Benchmark Definition

of Foreign Direct Investment (Benchmark) uses similar language.

However, some balance of payments compilers have argued that a stream of negative

reinvested earnings flows should be recorded in the current account of the host economy

over a number of years until the stock of fixed capital corresponding to the total

exploration expenditures of the direct investment enterprise has been fully amortised as

consumption of fixed capital, with corresponding entries recorded for the investing

economy. Such treatment would be consistent with the System of National Accounts 1993
recommends that the capitalized exploration costs should be amortized as consumption of

fixed capital over the average service lives of such exploration assets. According to that

argument, the direct investment enterprise continues to exist and the equity value remains

until it is fully amortized. Each year, the direct investment enterprise will have negative

reinvested earnings equivalent to the amortization of the exploration asset. If the

amortization approach is not adopted, there is an asymmetric treatment of unsuccessful

expenditures in natural resources exploration in the host economy's national balance

sheets, as such expenditures of "national" enterprises would be amortized whereas those

of direct investment enterprises would be written-off.

It is important to note that this last recommendation overturns the practice described in

the BOP Textbook, which excludes from the FDI data transactions between nonfinancial

FDI enterprises and affiliated SPEs with the sole purpose of financial intermediation. The

effect of the recommendation is that there will no longer be any difference in the

treatment of SPEs that have the sole purpose of financial intermediation and SPEs that

have the primary purpose of financial intermediation—the FDI data are to include both

(i) transactions between nonfinancial FDI enterprises and affiliated SPEs with the sole

purpose of financial intermediation, and (ii) transactions between nonfinancial FDI

enterprises and affiliated SPEs with the primary purpose of financial intermediation.

The Committee also agreed that, in light of concerns expressed by some members of the

OECD and ECB groups, the decision about the inclusion in the FDI data of financial

transactions between units that are not financial intermediaries and affiliated financial

SPEs abroad would be re-examined in the context of the next revision of the Balance of
Payments Manual. In the meantime, countries that exclude such transactions from the

direct investment data are encouraged to explain their practices and if possible to publish

memorandum items to facilitate international comparability.

Payments associated with the acquisition of a right to undertake a direct investment

In many developing or transition economies, the government requires the payment of a

fixed amount of money by direct investors for the right to undertake a direct investment

in the host economy. Often, but not always, these operating or concession rights are

related to the extraction of natural resources. In transition economies, compilers refer to

these payments as "bonuses". They are legal transactions and should not be associated

with poor governance. The issue was to determine whether or not such bonuses constitute

direct investment transactions and to recommend a common recording practice for such

transactions.

Data

VisionPLUS is a transaction processing software application from First Data

International (FDI). Originally developed by the Paysys Research and Development

Group, this application is mainly used for credit card transaction processing by

multinational banks and transaction processing companies. Banks use this application to

store and process credit card accounts and process transactions (Visa, Mastercard,

American Express, Europay, private label transactions). The rough estimate of number of

cards processed on different versions of this application software around the world is 350

million.

Modules
VisionPLUS is an account processing system. VisionPLUS consists of modules that work

together to manage a company’s credit processing environment. The main modules of

Visionplus include:

* Credit Management System (CMS) - account processing module

* Collections Tracking Analysis (CTA) - delinquent collections module

* Account Services Management (ASM) - customer services module

* Financial Authorisation System (FAS) - financial authorisations module

* Letters tracking System (LTS) - letter generation module

* Security Sub System (SSC) - user access control module

* Interchange Tracking System (ITS) - dispute tracking module

* Transaction Management System (TRAMS) - front-end processor

* Merchant BankCard System (MBS) - merchant acquiring system

* VisionPLUS Messaging eXchange (VMx) - XML messaging gateway to

VisionPLUS

* Hierarchy company system (HCS) – supports commercial card clients

* Loyalty Management System (LMS) - Managing of loyalty points based on

transactions done.

* Direct Payment Utility (DPU) – Tool for recurring and one-time payment,

which provides different payment options and allows for processing and managing

balance transfer.
Litrature review

DPU is now included as part of CMS-Latoo

Visionplus offers banks the flexibility to have their own features and functionalities. Out

of the above modules CMS plays an important part, as all account related activities are

posted in the CMS module.

Literature review

The VisionPlus Software was introduced by Paysys International Inc. in 1996. In 2001,

FDI acquired Paysys and since then VisionPlus is an FDI product.

[edit]Versions

1983 CardPac was released by CCS. Its main market was the bankcard industry (Visa and

MasterCard transaction processing only).

1988 Vision21 was released for the private label card market by CCSI

1991 VisionPLUS for both private label and bankcard market by CCSI

1998 VisionPLUS 2.5 was released by Paysys

2000 VisionPLUS 8.0 was released by Paysys

2006 VisionPLUS 8.01 was released by First Data

2007 VisionPLUS 8.15 was released by First Data

2008 VisionPLUS 8.17 was released by First Data

The current version is 8.34.

A 1997 review of countries' practices for compiling data on foreign direct investment

(FDI) transactions indicated that the treatment of three types of FDI transactions cause

confusion among compilers:

 • Transactions with affiliated financial intermediaries

• Payments associated with the acquisition of a right to undertake a direct investment

• The shutdown of an FDI enterprise established for natural resources exploration

Methodology

Following consultations with the OECD and ECB groups, the Committee decided at its

October 2001 meeting that the recommended treatment of payments for the right to

undertake a direct investment is to be as follows:

• The contra-entry to the payment of a rent (bonus) by a non-resident investor to the

government authorities should be recorded under direct investment when there is a

clear intention to establish a direct investment enterprise (such as in the case of a

contractual arrangement between the investor and the government).

• The contra-entry to the payment of a rent by a non-resident enterprise, when no

direct investment enterprise is or will be established, should be recorded under

"income; investment income; other investment" until a "rent" sub-component of

income is included in the balance of payments manual. Rent would be paid by non-

resident enterprises when they make payments to exploit movable natural resources

such as in the case of tree cutting rights or fishing rights in a country's territorial

waters.

The New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) recorded that in the

1990s, regulatory and other reforms have been introduced by a number of governments to
make their economies more attractive to foreign investors. Today, these regulatory

conditions are on a par with those in other developing countries. For example, many more

countries now allow profits to be repatriated freely or offer tax incentives and similar

inducements to foreign investors. Many African countries have investment promotion

agencies (IPAs), to assist these investors. And yet, no FDI has come to Africa (in fact,

capital has flown out of Africa – see below). A former Minister of Finance of an African

country said: “We have removed our shirt and trousers to attract FDI; what more do they

expect us to do?”

As for South Africa that has rapidly liberalised its trade and investment regimes since

independence, capital has left the country rather than coming in. As the London

Economist, in a special survey of South Africa in 2001, recorded:

• And by the standards of other countries, South Africa has lured relatively little

foreign direct investment: $32 per head in 1994-99, compared with $106 for Brazil,

$252 for Argentina, $333 for Chile. At the same time, money has been leaving

South Africa: the $9.8 billion it invested abroad in 1994-99 exceeded the inward

flow by about $1.6 billion. … And its big companies, long confined by apartheid's

isolation, are now anxious to seek stock-exchange listings abroad. … So in the past

few years, Anglo American (mining), Billiton (mining), Old Mutual (insurance),

South African Breweries and Dimension Data (a hugely successful information-

technology company) have all sought primary listings elsewhere.

Results
he panel presentation titled “South-South FDI vs. North-South FDI: Southern

Perspectives” explored the hypothesis that South-South FDI differs from North-South

FDI in two main respects: (i) because the investing firms are less risk-averse given their

familiarity (in their home country) with similar operating environments to that of the

receiving country; and (ii) because the efficiency, technology, skill, product quality, etc.

'gaps' between investor and receiving country are smaller. IDRCproject participants in

the panel included Stephen Gelb (Edge Institute, South Africa), Nguyen Thang (Vietnam

Academy of Social Sciences), and Rajiv Kumar (Indian Council for Research on

International Economic Relations).

The session, chaired by David Kaplan of University of Cape Town, focused on two

questions: are southern firms more willing to invest in other developing countries, and do

they provide more potential for positive spillovers and benefits to host countries? Dr.

Gelb noted that analysis of inward FDI inflows (investment coming into a country by

foreign firms) in Kenya, Uganda and South Africa does not support an affirmative

response to either question. Similarly, Dr. Thang’s analysis of inward FDI inflows into

Vietnam does not provide clear evidence on the technology spillover advantages,

although familiarity with the region and with the culture seem to have played a vital role

in shaping the FDI landscape in Vietnam.

The session featured preliminary results of the following IDRC supported projects:

1) Foreign Direct Investment Behaviour in Low and Middle Income Countries, and

2) South-South Links: Third World Multinationals and Development in South Africa,

East Africa and India (for an overview on the work of these projects, click on the links

above).

The panel was held on June 10 in Cape Town as part of the Annual Bank Conference on

Development Economics (ABCDE). The ABCDE conference as a whole was on the

overarching theme of “People, Politics & Globalization” and combined plenary sessions

with over 20 parallel sessions on a wide range of topics.

Conclusion

The reigning orthodoxy in neo-liberal economics

The reigning orthodoxy in neo-liberal economics on FDI boils down to five canonical

“truths”:

• FDI is necessary for the development of the Third World.

• Without FDI there will be no growth.

• FDI brings inter alia efficient management of resources, technology, a culture of

competition, and access to global markets.

• Nobody is forcing the South to seek FDI; the governments themselves want it.

• The private sector is the engine of growth; hence countries in the South must deregulate

their economies, and privatise state assets as fast as possible.

More than 90% of literature, and third world government policies, are dominated by this

view. In a brief paper, it is not necessary to repeat the arguments. The principal argument,

simply stated, is the following: Aid and loans in the 1960s and 70s created “aid

dependency” and the debt crisis in the 1980s and 90s. FDI is the best source of

development finance, on the grounds, among other, that it is self-liquidating since foreign
investors have to show profits for the host country as well as for themselves; and it does

not lead to debt overhang.

b) FDI is neither good nor bad; it all depends on how you deal with it

A more qualified proposition is made (e.g. in the Oxfam Briefing paper) that “properly

regulated” FDI can bring growth, jobs, technology, skills, market a

ccess and development; that its negative effects must be balanced with its good effects; or

that FDI must be "sequenced", or be subject to some kind of Tobin Tax. FDI is neither

good nor bad; it all depends on how you deal with it. This view is now becoming popular

in many circles, including some reformed neo-liberal economists, especially after the

East Asian and Argentina crises of 1997 – 2001.

c) Aid Created Debt Crisis; FDI Will Create An Even Greater Crisis Of

Development

More recent empirical evidence suggests a completely different picture. Analysts like

David Woodard argue that if aid created the debt crisis, FDI will create an even greater

crisis of development, looming not in too distant future. This view challenges both the

reigning neo-liberal orthodoxy, and the above stated more qualified perspective. The

view is further explored below in the next section.

d) FDI is Not a Development Tool at all; it is a Response to Systemic Crisis of the

Developed Countries
A more radical alternative view is presented in a separate SEATINI Fact Sheet (What is

FDI? ). It argues that FDI, essentially, is a tool (one among many) in the economic

arsenal of the developed industrialised countries in their overall strategy to control the

resources and markets of the South. This control is necessary in order for Western

corporations to counter against the downward pressure that is continually exerted by

workers on Corporate profitability. FDI is a means to resolve the West’s own systemic

contradictions. Contrary to its claim, it is not a means to assist the developing countries.

However, FDI is well marketed by the West through “development” literature and

through institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and even the UNCTAD.

2. Does FDI Bring Development ? The Experience of Mexico, East Asia and

Argentina

Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Argentina are among the

countries often cited by the World Bank, the IMF and mainstream economists as model

countries that opened their doors to free trade and free flow of capital on the assumption

that these would bring development to them. What has been their experience?

In 1995, Mexico faced a payments crisis, and there was a run on the banks. The economy

took a downward spin, and the middle classes took the brunt of the crisis. As for the

“distressed” American banks, they were baled out by the US Treasury. The “tequila

factor” reverberated disconcertingly for several months in the region. Since 1995, Mexico

liberalised further its trade and investment regimes. It is now facing massive

deindustrialisation and joblessness.

Then came the 1997/8 East Asian crisis. In the 1990s the Thai government had liberalised

capital flows partly as a result of pressure from the IMF. Much of the funds came through

the banking system on short call (ranging from overnight calls to six months duration),

and were lent long to the private sector enterprises. The collaterals offered by the private

sector turned out to be extremely questionable in terms of value because they were

largely based on inflated property prices. So when the crunch came following a

speculative run on the Baht in August 1997, the foreign investors panicked and started

withdrawing their funds from Thailand; so the banks began calling back their loans, and

of course the private sector could not pay them. They defaulted. In trying to shore up the

Baht, the central bank depleted most of the country’s reserves. In the follow-up many of

the banks were liquidated, or consolidated, and the state decided to take over the burden

of repaying the loans. In other words, private debts were transformed into public debts.

Soon the Thai crisis rippled across to Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Korea.

According to the Economist,

For much of the region, the crisis destroyed wealth on a massive scale and sent absolute

poverty shooting up. In the banking system alone, corporate loans equivalent to around

half of one year's GDP went bad - a destruction of savings on a scale more usually

associated with a full-scale war. (The Economist, February 8 2003)

David Woodward, an erstwhile technical adviser to the British Executive Director at the

IMF and the World Bank, studied the Mexican and Asian crises in some depth and drew

the general conclusion that FDI has a tendency towards precipitating a crisis.

Financial crisis such as those of Mexico in 1994 and East Asia in 1997, like the 1980s
debt crisis, arise because of capital inflows are insufficient to cover current account

deficits. When this is reached, capital inflows fell sharply, compounding the problem....

(However) vulnerability to financial crisis is primarily associated with large current

account deficits, the associated accumulation of foreign exchange liabilities (which in

turn add to the deficits), and a resulting acute dependence on foreign capital to finance

the deficits.

The truth about FDI is that, like drug addiction, it creates dependency – the more FDI a

developing country secures, the more it needs to service it and keep the system going.

Woodward writes:

Simplistically, FDI flows may be seen as equivalent to borrowing at an interest rate of

16-18% p.a. for developing countries as a whole, and 24-30% in sub-Saharan Africa, so

that net outward resource transfers can only be avoided by allowing inward FDI stocks to

grow at this rate. This implies a rapid expansion relative to the ability to meet the foreign

exchange costs.

Drawing from the experience of Malaysia, Woodward reckons that when the FDI stocks

(as opposed to flow) in a developing country reaches 48% of GDP (which in many

African countries it has), then it is in the crisis zone. Indeed, “…the danger point for

other developing countries may be significantly below 48%”

Woodward, at the time of his study, had not considered the case of Argentina, which it

turns out, proves his point. Argentina has long been modelled by the IMF/WB experts as

the paragon of the Washington Consensus, an exemplary country that had abolished trade
barriers, had opened itself up to the free inflow and outflow of capital, had tied its

currency to the US dollar (the Currency Board Automatic Adjustment Mechanism), had

privatised practically everything, from banks to malls, to attract FDI. In December 2001

the “model” collapsed like a pack of cards. The country simply disintegrated in a morass

of economic, social and political chaos following the default on $155 billion of debt - the

largest in history.

If the developing countries do not take heed of the evidence before their very eyes, and

their leaders continue to peddle the idea that somehow FDI will get their countries out of

the poverty trap, then one of two conclusions follow. Either they are persuaded by the

incessant misinformation by Bretton Woods institutions and neo-liberal economists

among their own ranks, or they are too desperate, and cannot think of any alternative way

out of their poverty trap.

3. The Truth About FDI in Africa

There is an argument that Africa has “fallen behind” other countries because it does not

have conditions adequate to attract FDI.

The truth is that Africa has done more to oblige overseas investors than almost any other

continent, and yet investments have gone to other continents. In Africa, it has gone

primarily to countries like Angola - because of its oil and in spite of over three decades of

instability. Nothing has come to those countries, such as Zambia, that have almost fully

liberalised their investment regimes – far more than say China or India.

References
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CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 39 (4):1785-1803.

^ Sridhar, V., and Vijay Prashad. 2007. Wal-Mart with Indian Characteristics.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 39 (4):1785-1803.

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^ Foreign Direct Investment Facts and Myths Retrieved on 2010-03-10

^ Benefits of FDI The International Trade Administration. Retrieved on 2010-03-10

^ Foreign direct investment in China jumps 32% CBC Canada. Retrieved on 2010-

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Appendix

1. Litrature

2. Introduction

3. Literature Review

4. Data

5. Methodology

6. Conclusion

7. References