Thomas Aquinas and virtus essendi: Different Meanings?

Lawrence Dewan’s Probable Answer*

Liliana B. Irizar
Sergio Arboleda University

Introduction

In this paper I wish first of all to present a brief state of debate regarding three different
Thomistic approaches on Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of the virtus essendi. (Among these is
Dewan’s own view). After that, I shall inquire about this question: Would Fr Dewan accept the
view from which Thomas Aquinas gave virtus essendi different meanings?

I will divide my presentation in two parts. In the first part I will deal with the brief status
quaestionis on the meaning of virtus essendi in Thomas. In the second part I will discuss Fr Dewan’s
probable response.

1. Virtus essendi in Thomas Aquinas: three approaches

Relating to Thomas Aquinas’ conception of virtus essendi there are at least three main
approaches:

1.1. Virtus essendi is the same as actus essendi. This position is assumed by Étienne Gilson in
Virtus essendi, in: Medieval Studies 26 (1964) 1–11; WIPPEL, John: Metaphysical Themes in
Thomas Aquinas II, Vol. 2. Washington: CUA Press 2007, 151–193; FABRO, Cornelio:
Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin, Publications Universitaires de Louvain.
Éditions B. Nauwelaerts 1961, 650 pages;1 O’ROURKE, Fran: Virtus Essendi: Intensive
Being in Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas, Dionysius XV (1991) 31-80.

*
I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Stephen L. Brock for his decisive guidance in writing this article.
I also thank Professor Paul G. Horrigan whose comments have enriched this work.
1 Although Cornelio Fabro did not focus on this concrete issue, still, his intensive act of being doctrine (see, for

instance, op. cit, p. 195, 299 y ss) has served as the basis for further discussions on virtus essendi. See below n. 9.

1
1.2. Virtus essendi was used in different settings with different meanings by Saint Thomas.
This second position is assumed by the Belgian philosopher Carlos Steel in «Omnis corporis
potentia est finita» L'interprétation d'un principe aristotélicien: de Proclus á S. Thomas; in:,
BECKMANN, Jan P/ HONNEFELDER, Ludger/ SCHRIMPF, Gangolf/ WIELAND, Georg
(Eds.): Philosophie im Mittelalter: Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen. Meiner 2013, 220–222;
and TE VELDE, Rudi: Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. Leiden: Brill, 1995,
124, n. 13.

1.3. Virtus essendi is the very form. This is Fr Dewan’s approach. Despite the fact that Stephen
L. Brock has not extensively discussed the issue, he is one of the Thomists whom have
endorsed this view.2

Here are some quotations to illustrate the first view.

In Etienne Gilson’s «Virtus Essendi» we read:

Dans le langage de la traduction latine, que saint Thomas aura soin d’incorporer au sien, l’effet
en question est ipsius quod est esse virtutem; littéralement : la vertu de cela même qui est l’être. Il
semble donc que [p. 2] l’être même soit le virtus ou dunamis en question.3

Gilson seems to be inspired by Fr. L.-B. Geiger, O.P. In fact, he begins with a quotation from
him:
Aristotle contented himself… with proposing, above mobile beings some immobile and eternal
substances. St. Thomas deepens this way of looking [at things] by putting on display a sort of
growing intensity or perfection, in some way of a qualitative sort, of the actus essendi. A study of
his vocabulary in this respect would be most revelatory. The esse involves a virtus, a perfectio which
proceeds to grow just to the extent that one mounts in the scale of beings (an idea that would
doubtless have seemed unintelligible to Aristotle). [L. Dewan’s translation]4

2 BROCK, Stephen: The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas: A Sketch; Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books 2015. There,
in page 49, Brock writes: «Thomas, in fact, calls substantial form virtus essendi, strength to be» (In footnote 71 he
quotes SCG, I.20, § 174, and II. 30, § 1073; In De caelo, I, lect. 6, § 62 [5]); in the same argumentative line with this,
see Brock, S.L: Tomás de Aquino; PHILOSOHÍCA, Enciclopedia filosófica online,
http://www.philosophica.info/voces/aquino/Aquino.html).
This third view is shared by Federica Bergamino. Cf.: La necessità assoluta nell’essere creato in Tommaso d’Aquino. Sintesi
ragionata di Contra Gentiles II, c. 30, Acta Philosophica, 8(1999)1: 69-79, pp. 76–78 and n. 35.
3 Gilson, E., “Virtus essendi”, pp. 1-2-
4 L.-B. Geiger, o.p., Philosophie et spiritualité (Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 1963) I, p. 149. [Quoted by Fr. Dewan in “A

Note on Thomas Aquinas and Virtus Essendi,” The Thomist, 75, (2011): pp. 637-51, p. 641, n. 11]:

2
 As we all know, Fr Dewan criticized Gilson concerning his reading of St. Thomas using
the expression “virtus essendi” in his paper “A Note on Thomas Aquinas and Virtus Essendi.”
There, Fr Dewan wrote:

My point here is that Gilson is reading “virtus essendi” as referring to the very act of being, rather
than to the form as principle of being: he is reading it as “the power of esse itself.” This relates to
his understanding of Thomas’s doctrine of being, as we shall see.5

Next, we have the terms coined by Cornelio Fabro: his intensive being notion and the
distinction between esse ut actus and esse in actu.6 As already noted above, even though he did not
explicitly address the subject, some of his followers, based on Fabro’s concepts, have concluded
that virtus essendi is the same as actus essendi.7

Aristote s’était contenté … de poser au-dessus des êtres mobiles, des substances immobiles et éternelles. Saint
Thomas approfondit cette manière de voir en mettant en évidence une sorte d’intensité croissante ou de
perfection, en quelque sorte qualitative, de l’actus essendi. Une étude de son vocabulaire, à cet égard, serait
des plus révélatrices. L’esse comporte un virtus, une perfectio qui va croissant à mesure qu’on s’élève dans
l’échelle des êtres (idée qui eût sans doute paru inintelligible à Aristote). [His italics]
There Fr Dewan writes:
“Already here I think of the doctrine of Metaph. 2, on the hierarchy of being and truth. The highest cause is
maximally a being, as Thomas concludes in the Fourth Way. This seems quite the right reading, and so Geiger’s
point is weakened. Aristotle would welcome the picture of being as rising in intensity as one mounts towards the
first cause. Geiger’s view of Aristotle’s doctrine as involving eternal and immobile substances lacking the aspect of
qualitative perfection is not true. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 2.1 (993b23-31) [Ross transl.]:
Now we do not know a truth without its cause; and a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other
things if in view of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well (e.g. fire is the hottest of things;
for it is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that that which causes derivative truths to be true is
most true. Hence the principles of eternal things must be always most true (for they are not merely
sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of
other things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth.
While it is Ross who uses the word ‘quality’ where Aristotle speaks of ‘to sunwnumon’, this seems correct. The
Latin on which Thomas comments has ‘univocatio’ which Thomas explains in In Metaph. 2.2 (292-294)”.
5 DEWAN, Lawrence O.P: A Note on Thomas Aquinas and Virtus Essendi, p. 644.
6 Fabro, C: Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin, p. 240.
7 See, Contat, A., “Esse, essentia, ordo. Verso una metafisica della partecipazione operative,” Espíritu LXI (2012)143:

9-71, pp. 45-48, downloaded from: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4101988 ; Mitchell, Jason A.,

L.C. “The Method of Resolutio and the Structure of the Five Ways,” Alpha Omega, 15 (2012)3: 339-380, pp 356-
358; L. Melahn, Esse as Virtus Essendi: the Dynamic“Expansion” of Actus Essendi, Measured by Essence, as the Ontological
Foundation of the Good, according to Saint Thomas Aquinas; Thesis for the Licentiate in Philosophy, Rome, 2014; and
some Spanish speaking philosophers as Ignacio Andereggen (La metafísica de Santo Tomás en la Exposición sobre el De
Divinis Nominibus de Dionisio Areopagita, Buenos Aires, EDUCA, 1989) and Martin ECHAVARRÍA, Martín (La cantidad
virtual [quantitas virtualis] según Tomás de Aquino; Logos. Anales del seminario de metafísica, 46 [2013]: 235-259).
Included in this first group are some philosophers who speak of potentia essendi to refer to form. This is the case of
Salles, Sergio de Souza, A `resolutio´ como itinerário metafísico de Santo Tomás de Aquino. A elevação da dynamis aristotélica a
`potentia essendi´ nas `Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei´. (Tese de Doutorado - Departamento de Filosofia, Pontifícia
Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2005: 329). Souza, by associating potentia essendi with form,
envisions potentia essendi as a passive power (cf. p. 215). Also MITCHELL, Jason A., L.C: The Method of Resolutio and the
Structure of the Five Ways, in: Alpha Omega, 15(2012)3: 339-380, pp. 256-258,
http://www.uprait.org/sb/index.php/ao/article/viewFile/798/582, and “From Aristotle’s Four Causes to

3
 John Wippel also emphasized the identity between the virtus essendi and the actus essendi.
He asserts: «At times Thomas refers to a “power of being”, a virtus essendi, or a potestas essendi that
he assigns to the act of being8». (He quotes SCG I.28; In Liber de causis, prop. 4; In de divinis
nominibus, c. V, lect. 1). A little later he says: «By these references to the “power” of being Thomas
appears to have in mind a fullness of being and of perfection which is found in the notion of
esse when it is simply considered in itself, and which is in fact fully realized onli in God, self-
subsisting esse. Other existents only participate in esse in limited fashion9».

Finally, here is a quotation from O’Rourke’s Virtus Essendi: Intensive Being in Pseudo-
Dionysius and Aquinas:

But it is not so much this phraseology which inspires his [Thomas’s] appreciation of being as
intensive, virtual perfection, (he does not give any special consideration to the passage in
his Commentary), as the teaching of Dionysius on the central role of being which suggests to
Aquinas the nature of being as perfective, dynamic actuality and intensive plenitude: the power
of being which is the comprehensive, energizing principle of all perfection.10

Regarding the second perspective, we have Carlos Steel’s view. He is one of the authors
for whom Thomas could have been not sufficiently precise about the expression virtus essendi.
Although Carlos Steel thinks that for Saint Thomas the virtus essendi is the very form, he says that
in some places Thomas uses this term as a synonym of perfection, not of potentia esendi. Thus,
Aquinas himself “could lead to confusion” about the meaning of virtus essendi because he did not
distinguish between divine virtus essendi (that is, intensity of being which is just as divine actus
essendi) and form in caused things which is potentia ad esse. He should have been clearer in

Aquinas’ Ultimate Causes of Being: Modern Interpretations,” Alpha Omega, XVI (2013) 3: 399-414, p. 412,
http://www.uprait.org/sb/index.php/ao/article/viewFile/942/697. According to Mitchell, while virtus essendi «is
the actuating capacity enclosed in esse itself», potentia essendi «is the capacity of being that constitutes the essence and
is delimited by the form». (“The Method of Resolutio…, pp. 356sq). It would seem Mitchell is seeing the potency
of form (potentia essendi) as a passive potency as well. Both authors are speaking on the background of Fabro’s
conception of being. Also L. Melahn, op. cit., “following Fabro” terms “the active principle esse ut actus and the
passive principle, potentia essendi.” (p. 62).
In the framework of the present paper I cannot enter into Fr. Dewan’s interesting discussions about Thomas
Aquinas’ view of the potency of form that is a potency towards esse and not at all a potency towards non-esse. (Cf.
DEWAN, L., O.P: Saint Thomas and Form as Something Divine, p. 32 W.; IRIZAR, Liliana/Dewan, L., O.P:Conversations
with Fr. Dewan: Central Metaphysical Topics with Lawrence Dewan, O.P. Bogotá : Fondo de Publicaciones de la
Universidad Sergio Arboleda 2105, p. 33; St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause, ch. 9 of Form
and Being, Washington D.C: CUA Press 2006, pp. 172sq
8 WIPPEL, J: Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II, p. 173.
9 Ibid. p. 174.
10 O’Rourke, F., Virtus essendi…, p. 50 [my bold letters].

4
distinguishing that in them the potentia ad esse determines its virtus essendi (its intensity of esse), but
he used here virtus essendi as a synonym of potentia ad esse.

In the case of God, there is no potentia ad esse: here virtus essendi and actus essendi are perfectly
identical. However, in the case of created beings, the potentia formae ad esse determines the virtus
essendi (genit. sub.), the degree of perfection (or ‘intensity’) of being of which they are capable.
Unfortunately, Thomas leads to confusion because he also uses the expression virtus essendi (genit.
objec.) as equivalent to potentia ad esse.11

This point of view is seconded by the Dutch philosopher Rudi te Velde.12

2. Fr Dewan’s probable view

Lastly Fr Dewan’s approach. Thus, in order to understand this view we need to grasp Thomas
Aquinas’s formula «forma dat esse». It is well known how Fr Dewan remarked the role of form as
a formal cause of esse, and how he argued, especially against Gilson, that the notion of virtus
essendi pertains properly to form just by reaffirming that: «… the doctrine of virtus essendi is part
of the doctrine that esse per se consequitur ad formam,13 i.e. that form, just because of what it is, is the
principle of the act of being14».

Therefore, about the first view he concludes that:

... the notion of virtus essendi is seen by Thomas as something pertaining properly to form as such.
What I object to most in the Gilson presentation is his obscuring of Thomas’s doctrine that form
is the principle of esse.15

Certainly, this subject takes us to difficult territory. It concerns the role of essence in
caused things and, consequently, the form-esse kinship. This is not the place to discuss Lawrence
Dewan’s extensive analysis on this indissociable kinship -in Fr. Dewan’s own words. I only wish to

11 STEEL, Carlos: Omnis corporis potentia est finita» L'interprétation d'un principe aristotélicien: de Proclus á S.
Thomas; in: BECKMANN, Jan P/ HONNEFELDER, Ludger/ SCHRIMPF, Gangolf/ WIELAND, Georg
(Eds.): Philosophie im Mittelalter: Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen. Meiner 2013, 222: «Dans le cas de Dieu, il
n’y aucune potentia ad esse: ici la virtus essendi et l’actus essendi sont perfaitament identiques. Mais dans le cas des êtres
créés, la potentia formae ad esse détermine la virtus essendi (genit. sub.), le dégrée de perfection (ou ‘intensité’) d’être dont
ils sont capables. Malheureusement , Thomas donne lieu á confusion, parce qu’il utilise l’ expression virtus essendi
(genit. objec.) aussi comme équivalent de la potentia ad esse». [My translation].
12 TE VELDE, R: Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. Leiden: Brill 1995, p. 124, n. 13.
13 Cf. SCG 2.55 (para. 3, Pera 1299).
14 DEWAN, L: A Note on Thomas Aquinas and Virtus Essendi, p. 639. There Fr Dewan refers to his «St. Thomas, Form,

and Incorruptiblity» ch. 10 of Form and Being, Washington, D.C: CUA Press 2006.
15 DEWAN, L: A Note on Thomas Aquinas and Virtus Essendi, p. 651

5
question if he would accept the second view. In other words, I wish to inquire if Lawrence
Dewan would agree to argue that Thomas used the expression virtus essendi, at least, in two
different ways: as a synonym of form, on the one hand and as a synonym of actus essendi, on the
other hand. I suspect that the answer is no. In order to support my point, I shall provide some
conceptual keys which will be useful to facilitate grasping what I think could have been Fr
Dewan’s approach:

1. In the places where he discusses the subject he plainly reads «virtus essendi» as referring to
the form as principle of being and, as far as I know, he never made this distinction.16

2. He emphatically remarked that for Saint Thomas essence is truly found in God. Fr. Dewan
very much liked to quote that passage from De ente et essentia. The text runs as follows:

... But because “ens” is said absolutely and primarily of substances, and posteriorly and in a
somewhat qualified sense of accidents, thus it is that essentia also properly and truly is in
substances, but in accidents it is in a certain measure and in a qualified sense. But of
substances, some are simple and some are composite, and in both there is essentia; but in
the simple in a truer and more noble degree [ueriori et nobiliori modo], inasmuch as they also
have more noble esse; for they are the cause of those which are composite, at least [this is
true of] the first simple substance which is God.17

In this line, once he told me18 that:

Another thing that I am trying to combat is the Gilson idea that “essence” means something
found only in creatures. That is why I stress the text from SCG 4.11:

... those things which in creatures are divided are unqualifiedly one in God: thus, for
example, in the creature essence and being [esse] are other; and in some [creatures] that which

16 Fr. Dewan has explicitly dealt with the matter in: “A Note on Thomas Aquinas and Virtus Essendi;” St. Thomas
and Form as Something Divine in Things, Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press 2007 [The Aquinas Lecture,
no. 71], and Gilson and the actus essendi (revised version of 1999 publication, International Journal of Philosophy 1 [2002] pp.
65-99).
17 Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, c. 1 (ed. Leonine, lines 53-63): “Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur de

substantiis et per posterius et quasi secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod essentia proprie et vere est in
substantiis, sed in accidentibus est quodammodo et secundum quid. Substantiarum vero quaedam sunt simplices et
quaedam compositae, et in utrisque est essentia, sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod etiam
esse nobilius habent. Sunt enim causa eorum quae composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima simplex, quae Deus
est.” (Fr. Dewan’s translation and emphasis]. In keeping with this line, Fr. Dewan criticized Gilson’s interpretation
that there is not essence in God. [See Dewan, L., “E. Gilson and the actus essendi”].
18 Irizar, L./Dewan, L : Conversations with Fr. Dewan, pp. 43sq.

6
 subsists in its own essence is also other than its essence or nature: for this man is neither
his own humanity nor his being [esse]; but God is his essence and his being.
And though these in God are one in the truest way, nevertheless in God there is WHATEVER
PERTAINS TO THE INTELLIGIBLE ROLE [ratio] of the subsisting thing, or of the essence, or

of the being [esse]; for it belongs to him not to be in another, inasmuch as he is subsisting;
to be a what [esse quid], inasmuch as he is essence; and being in act [esse in actu], by
reason of being itself [ipsius esse].19

He added:

What is special in creatures is not that they have an essence and an act of being, but that
these two must be distinct, and that the essence or form must be potential relative to the
act of being.20

3. In defending God’s essence Fr. Dewan also stressed very much this formula, viz., that
esse is the most formal of all.21 According to him, this principle shows form as perfection:
divine esse is the first in the order of forms.22 Form, by itself, means infinitude, perfection:

While in created things the form and the act of being are really distinct but inseparable
from each other, the act of being is presented by St. Thomas as “most formal.” That
this is not a mere manner of speaking can be seen from the way it figures in the argument
for divine essential infinity in the ST 1. There the point is first made that there is an
infinity which pertains to form as such, an infinity standing on the side of perfection, in
contrast to the infinity pertaining to matter and imperfection. The form meant is thus
the familiar item contrasted with matter. It is in direct argumentative line with this that
esse is presented as most formal, and God, as esse subsistens, is concluded to as infinite and
perfect.23

If esse is the most formal of all that is why «esse is “that by which something is”,
understanding the ‘quo’ in a purely formal way. The pure ablative, i.e. the word ‘quo’ all by

19 SCG 4.11 (ed. Pera #3472-3473).

20 Irizar, L. and Dewan, L., Conversations with Fr. Dewan, p. 46.
21 Cf. ST 1.7.1: “Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium est ipsum esse…;”
22 Cf. Dewan, L., St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things, p. 46-47: “It will be a help for us at this point to

call attention to the doctrine of the act of being as ‘most formal’ in things, a view that confirms the placing of both
the creaturely act of being and the creaturely form in a continuity with the divine act of being as first in the order
of forms.” [My emphasis].
23 Cf. ST 1.7.1. Dewan, L., O.P., Saint Thomas and Form as Something Divine…, p. 47.

7
 itself, expresses the role of esse24». Esse is «…. that which has the role of “received”
relative to all else, and in no way that to which esse belongs25». Thus, Fr. Dewan, just
commenting STh 1.4.1.ad 3 notes that:

Obviously St. Thomas is teaching us and encouraging us to consider the act of being as
most actual in the line which we already see in the forms of things, something in the
formal order transcending other forms.26

4. This too will become clearer in the examination of the places where he accepts Thomas
takes virtus essendi as referring to the actus essendi. There he underlines that in those
passages «it is esse as the divine essence that is being considered!» Fr. Dewan writes:

What gives a colour of truth to the Gilson approach, seeing “virtus essendi” as identical
with the act of being of the thing, is the fact that St. Thomas applies the doctrine to the
divine act of being. Thus, in ST 1.4.2, teaching that in God are all the perfections of all
things, the extremely important second argument in the body of the article runs:
... as has been said above, God is being itself subsisting, from which it is necessary that
he contain in himself the entire perfection of being. For it is evident that, if
something hot does not have the entire perfection of heat, this is because heat is
not participated according to the perfection of its nature; but if heat were subsisting
by itself, there could not be lacking to it any of the power of heat [de virtute caloris.]
Hence, since God is being subsisting just by itself, nothing of the perfection of being
can be lacking to him. But the perfections of all things pertain to the perfection of
being: for it is according to this that any things are perfect, viz. that they have being
in some measure [aliquo modo esse habent]. Hence, it follows that the perfection of no
thing is lacking to God....27

24 DEWAN, L: Capreolus, saint Thomas et l’être, in Jean Capreolus et son temps 1380-1444 Colloque de Rodez , (special number, #1
of Mémoire dominicaine, Paris: 1997 Cerf, pp. 77-86). The colloquium took place Sept. 2-4, 1994, p. 8.
25 Ibid. p. 10. Fr. Dewan is paraphrasing ST 1.4.1.ad 3. There, in the note 119, about esse as the most formal, he

observes: “… in 1.8.1 it is repeated, arguing for God’s presence in things: Esse autem est illud quod est magis
intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra
dictis patet. [Being is that which is most intrinsic to any thing whatsoever, and what is most deeply within, since it
is formal with respect to all items that are in a thing, as was said earlier.]
26 DEWAN, L., O.P: Saint Thomas and Form as Something Divine…, p. 48. [Emphasis mine].
27 STh 1.4.2 :

Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens, ex quo oportet
quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. Manifestum est enim quod, si aliquod calidum non
habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem,
sed si calor esset per se subsistens, non posset ei aliquid deesse de virtute caloris. Unde, cum Deus sit
ipsum esse subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent

8
And Fr Dewan adds:

I would underline that here it is the act of being, the esse, that is being compared to such
natures as heat and whiteness.28 I.e. here it is being given the role of form, and indeed
what is most formal of all. I.e. it is esse as the divine essence that is being considered.29

Fr Dewan’s earlier paper suggests the same interpretation.30 There he wrote: «(In ST 1.4.2
Thomas says that) since God is the subsistent act of being, he is comparable to such natures as
whiteness or heat, which if they were pure, would have all the power of the nature.31 God
must contain all the power of being, all the perfections of being; and this means all the
perfections of all things32».

There are other instances where Thomas provides arguments concerning God as having
the whole power of being. See, for example, SCG 1.28.33

ad perfectionem essendi, secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent. Unde
sequitur quod nullius rei perfectio Deo desit. Et hanc etiam rationem tangit Dionysius, cap. V de div. Nom.,
dicens quod Deus non quodammodo est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte totum in seipso
uniformiter esse praeaccipit, et postea subdit quod ipse est esse subsistentibus.
28 Cf. SCG 1.28 [Pera 260].
29 DEWAN, L: A note on Thomas Aquinas and Virtus Essendi, p. 651. [Emphasis mine].
30
DEWAN, L: Thomas Aquinas and Being as a Nature, Acta Philosophica 12 (2003): 123-135; an earlier edition of this
paper was read at the Gifford Conference on Natural Theology held in Aberdeen, Scotland in May, 2000.
31 There, in a footnote, Fr Dewan comments: «On the notion of perfection as pertaining to the quantity of power

[quantitas virtutis] proper to a nature, cf. In Metaph. 5.18 (1038), commenting on Aristotle at 5.16 (1021b20-23). Cf.
also STh 1.76.8 (462a8-13), where Thomas speaks of the sorts of “totality” which pertain properly to form and
essence. As Thomas recalls, In Metaph. 5.18 (1033): ‘The “perfect’ and the ‘whole either are the same thing or signify
almost the same thing, as is said in Physics 3 (c. 6; 207a12-15; Thomas, In Polit. 3.11 [Maggiolo #385])».
32 DEWAN, L: Thomas Aquinas and Being as a Nature, p. 126. [Fr Dewan’s emphasis].
33 SCG 1.28: «[1] Although the things that exist and live are more perfect than the things that merely exist,

nevertheless, God, Who is not other than His being, is a universally perfect being. And I call universally perfect that
to which the excellence of no genus is lacking. [2] Every excellence in any given thing belongs to it according to its
being. For man would have no excellence as a result of his wisdom unless through it he were wise. So, too, with the
other excellences. Hence, the mode of a thing’s excellence is according to the mode of its being. For a thing is said
to be more or less excellent according as its being is limited to a certain greater or lesser mode of excellence.
Therefore, if there is something to which the whole power of being belongs, it can lack no excellence that is proper
to some thing. But for a thing that is its own being it is proper to be according to the whole power of being. For
example, if there were a separately existing whiteness, it could not lack any of the power of whiteness. For a given
white thing lacks something of the power of whiteness through a defect in the receiver of the whiteness, which
receives it according to its mode and perhaps not according to the whole power of whiteness. God, therefore, Who
is His being, as we have proved above, has being according to the whole power of being itself. Hence, He cannot
lack any excellence that belongs to any given thing.» (Transl. by Anton C. Pegis
(http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm). «Licet autem ea quae sunt et vivunt, perfectiora sint quam ea
quae tantum sunt, Deus tamen qui non est aliud quam suum esse, est universaliter ens perfectum. Et dico
universaliter perfectum, cui non deest alicuius generis nobilitas. Omnis enim nobilitas cuiuscumque rei est sibi
secundum suum esse: nulla enim nobilitas esset homini ex sua sapientia nisi per eam sapiens esset, et sic de aliis. Sic
ergo secundum modum quo habet esse, est suus modus in nobilitate: nam res secundum quod suum esse contrahitur
ad aliquem specialem modum nobilitatis maiorem vel minorem, dicitur esse secundum hoc nobilior vel minus
nobilis. Igitur si aliquid est cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitatum deesse potest quae alicui rei

9
 Having in mind these premises, a line of argument like this may be valid:

1. According to Fr Dewan virtus essendi is something pertaining to form: it is power of

being, strength to be.34 It might be said that the power of form is the power of a nature, the nature
of very being35 such as this nature36 is received in each created form. Thus, creatures have this
power in a limited way: that way which flows from their own forms (in them, their natures «are
not that very being itself [hoc ipsum esse] which they have…»37, being is something which they
receive from God). That is, caused forms, in receiving and appropriating being, are power or
capacity to be because, thank them, nature of being can be performed in a particular manner.
Thomas just names them special forms.38

In my opinion, the following passage of Dewan’s S. Thomas and Form as Something Divine
in Things ratifies what I have just said:

Should we be confused? Does it seem that “esse” signifies an aspect of the very essence of things
after all? No, rather we are invited to see special forms as belonging, in a diminished way, to the

conveniat. Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem: sicut, si esset aliqua
albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis deesse posset; nam alicui albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu
recipientis albedinem, quae eam secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis.
Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsius esse. Non potest
ergo carere aliqua nobilitate quae alicui rei conveniat». We find akin arguments in STh 1.4.2 ; In De div. Nom. 5 l. 1,
and De malo, q. 16 a. 9 ad 5.
34 As he insisted, created forms are «as measures of creaturely participation in the divine nature» (Cf. STh 1.14.6), and

«This portioning out of being is seen in the form in its role of self-maintenance. This is the “power” of the form,
the power to be, virtus essendi». DEWAN, L:Saint Thomas and Form as Something Divine..., p. 44sq.
35 In fact, Thomas speaks of «the nature of entity». Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences 2.1.1.1 (ed.

Mandonnet: «... This is apparent ... from the very nature of things [ex ipsa rerum natura]. For there is found in all
things the nature of entity [natura entitatis], in some [as] more noble [magis nobilis], and in some less [minus]; in such
fashion, nevertheless, that the natures of the very things themselves are not that very being itself [hoc ipsum esse]
which they have: otherwise being [esse] would be [part] of the notion of every quiddity whatsoever, which is false,
since the quiddity of anything whatsoever can be understood even when one is not understanding concerning it that
it is». And Fr. Dewan comments: «Thomas here uses “entitas”, “entity”, abstractly, just as one would use a word
such as “whiteness”; and in speaking of “the nature of entity” which each thing has, he is signifying its very act of
being [hoc ipsum esse]. What interests me is the language of “nature” here, inasmuch as it is applied to the esse of
things, esse taken as having a common ratio, a common intelligibility, even though only analogically common, i.e.
according to more and less nobility». DEWAN, L., O.P: Thomas Aquinas and Being as a Nature, p. 125.
36 Here nature is used as a synonym of essence: cf. EE, c. 1 (Leonine lines 36-52) and STh 1.60.1.
37 Sent. 2.1.1.1.
38 Cf. De pot. 3.5: «… later philosophers began to consider in some measure substantial forms; nevertheless they did

not arrive at the knowledge of the universals [universalium], but their entire focus was on special forms [formas speciales].
And so they posited some efficient causes, but nevertheless not such as would confer esse on things universally [non
tamen quae universaliter rebus esse conferrent], but such as would bring matter to this or that form [ad hanc vel ad illam
formam]…» Fr. Dewan sees the use of the «special forms» vocabulary contrasted with «universal being» as clearly
belonging to the doctrine of esse as most formal. (Cf. DEWAN, L., O.P: Saint Thomas and Form as Something Divine in
Things, p. 50).

10
 domain of existence. That is why, at the very beginning of this essay, I presented as my “beacon
text”39 on form its role as the intrinsic active principle of preservation of existence.40

By contrast, in God, his nature is just being: the nature of God is to be.41 Therefore, it is
in God where form is manifested in its all splendor, in its all power. As Fr. Dewan says:

The act of being, subsisting in God, is treated as a nature, and, like all natures, it is a self-diffusing
source. It is through this line, further, that the divine being [esse] turns out to be unqualifiedly
infinite: it has most of all what characterizes form as form.42

2. Hence, in caused things this power is manifested in a specific perfection (that of a special form):
that perfection which is proper of the nature of the thing itself. In a horse, its form, its virtus
essendi, is the power to be according to the specific perfection of a horse. Horses appropriate their
being through their form. They do not possess being with the whole power of being, but according
to their specific virtus essendi. (Otherwise there would be only one caused being). In the case of
God, as his form is identical with his being, he is according to the total power of being. This is
because his form is not a particular form (which limits his being) but the fullness of being.
Accordingly, it is understandable that Thomas Aquinas say that in God esse is with the whole of
potentia essendi and applies the expression virtus essendi to the divine esse. He does it in analogous
sense as he uses it regarding to creatures just because here esse has the role of a form. In fact,
here esse is compared to a nature (such as of heat or whiteness), and being is the most formal
indeed.43

Therefore,44 both in God and caused things, form is the strength (=power) of being.
Nonetheless, in God his form is not a capacity but is plenitude of being: his form is such that it

39 Dewan is referring to STh1-2.85.6.

40 DEWAN, L: Saint Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things, p. 51. [My italics].
41 In the knowledge that «there can only be one such being, one being which is a subsisting act of being»: DEWAN,

L., O.P: Thomas Aquinas and Being as a Nature, p.127. As Dewan says, «The likeness of creatures to God is a case of
having in common the SAME FORM, but not according to the same ratio, if by “sameness of ratio” one means the
sort of community of form one finds in members of the same species, or even members of the same genus. Here
the difference involved in unity of form is even more extreme than in the case of mere generic communication of
form. And the example of this sameness of form is the community as to esse». DEWAN, L., O.P: Thomas Aquinas and
Being as a Nature, pp. 128sq. (Fr. Dewan is referring to STh 1.4.1.ad.3 on the way in which creatures can be said to
be like God). [Dewan’s emphasis].
42 DEWAN, L., O.P: Thomas Aquinas and Being as a Nature, p. 126.
43 See De potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9; Summa theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3; q. 7, a. 1; q. 8, a. 1.
44 I am indebted to Professor Stephen L. Brock for suggesting the main idea of this paragraph to me.

11
allows itself to «appropriate» his45 entire being. (We should not forget that in caused things form
is virtus essendi indeed but is also a receptive potency of being which does not belong to it by its
nature). In other words, what is (specific) disposition for, appropriation of, esse (comunne), in God is plain
and simple identity (between his form and his esse). In contrast, this power is in creatures a
particular way of appropriation (of esse) and consequently a particular perfection too. Thus, in God
his virtus essendi (identical with his esse) is plenitude of being, plenitude of perfection: plenitude
which does not involve only esse but the all perfections of things.46

Therefore, it can be said that such as esse and form are applied to God and creatures
analogically,47 in the same way virtus essendi. In fact, Fr. Dewan, manifesting his concerns about
Gilson’s view of form and being relationship, wrote: «A wholesome view of the actus essendi keeps
in view its analogical unity…48» and quoting De ente et essentia c. 1 once again, he concluded saying
that: «Esse and essence are in a parallel hierarchy49».

Conclusion

My aim was to present probable Fr. Dewan’s view on the approach according to which
Thomas Aquinas gave two meanings to the expression virtus essendi. I have tried to prove that
there are no enough grounds for holding that Fr Dewan would have accepted this view. What is
more, I have wanted to show that his key Metaphysical formula, forma dat esse, and the battle that

45 Cf. Brock, S. L: Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on Esse: Thomas Aquinas and the «De hebdomadibus»; in: Nova et Vetera,
English Edition, 5(2007)3: 465–494: «The divine essence, then, must not be conceived as identical with esse itself.
It is indeed identical with its own esse, the esse that is divine; and in this it is unique, since no other subsistent has an
essence that is identical with its own esse. But the reality of the divine esse is not “circumscribed” according to the
ratio of esse». (p. 483)
46 Cf. Idem: «In other words, the divine esse cannot be conceived as the merely separate version of esse commune. The

nature or essence of the divine esse is “beyond” the essence of esse itself. Esse itself “participates” in the divinity in
the sense of being a partial likeness of it. This of course does not mean that it is a part of the divinity, or that it has
a part of the divinity’s ratio. Neither the divinity nor its ratio has any parts. It means that esse resembles God
imperfectly. We can perhaps see this if we consider the fact that esse does not have a monopoly on resemblance to
Him. Other created perfections also display God’s power and reflect his nature. Granted, they do so only insofar
as they exist. In the creaturely representations of God, esse is once again what is most formal. But it is not the whole
picture».
47
Cf. DEWAN, L., O.P: Thomas Aquinas and Being as a Nature, p. 126, n. 13: «Again, we should note that form is one
of those things which is found according to priority and posteriority. “Form”, like “act”, is said analogically of diverse
things. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De immortalitate animae, ad 17 [in KENNEDY, Leonard: A New Disputed Question of St. Thomas
Aquinas on the Immortality of the Soul, in: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 45 (1978), pp. 205-208
(introduction) and 209-223 (text); at p. 222]: «… forma et actus et huiusmodi sunt de hiis que analogice predicantur de
diversis».
48
DEWAN, L., O.P: Gilson and the actus essendi, p. 97.
49 Ibid., p. 98.

12
he waged, almost on his own, to return to form its central role in Metaphysics, encourage saying
that Dewan would have rejected this new split of the core of being.

13