People vs.

Fallones
Rape conviction even if the victim is already dead

Remedial Law; Evidence

Accused Fallones tried to discredit Amalia’s testimony as hearsay, doubtful, and unreliable. But,
although what Alice told Amalia may have been hearsay, the rest of the latter’s testimony, which
established both concomitant (Alice’s voice from within Fallones’ house, pleading that she was
hurting) and subsequent circumstance (Alice coming from behind Fallones as the latter opened the
door, her shorts bloodied), are admissible in evidence having been given from personal knowledge.
These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion,
without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration
is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated
to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity
for deliberation. For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur:
1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question
and it’s immediately attending circumstances.

In sum, the testimony of the witnesses, the physical evidence, the medico-legal finding, and the
psychologist’s report all establish that Fallones raped Alice. The defense offered no witness or
evidence of Fallones’ innocence other than his bare denial. Again, the Court will not disturb the RTC’s
findings and conclusion being the first-hand observer of the witnesses’ attitude and behavior during
trial. The defense counsel was unsuccessful in impeaching Amalia during cross-examination. In fine,
the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Alice is dead but, as Shakespeare wrote in his Sonnets—The Winter’s Tale, "the silence often of pure
innocence persuades when speaking fails.

Ejercito vs. COMELEC

Gov. Ejercito Disqualified for Overspending
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure – Certiorari
Special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an independent action that is
available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct simple
errors of judgment.
More importantly, it will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist.
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to lack of
jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law.
Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolution with grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition filed by San Luis against
Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for disqualification as well. Ejercito cannot feign
ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. The title of San Luis’ petition shows that the
case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the specific rule governing
the disqualification of candidates. Moreover, the averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Section 68 (a) and
(c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the grounds
for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position and provides, as penalty, that the candidate shall
be disqualified from continuing as such, or if he or she has been elected, from holding the office. A similar
tenor was expressed in the prayer in the petition filed by San Luis. An election offense has both criminal
and electoral aspects.
The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. The criminal aspect
of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election
offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether probable
cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing
and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the
disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a future public office.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral aspect of a
disqualification case.
The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal
infractions of the election laws” stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal
aspect of a disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior
determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation.
Estrada vs. Ombudsman
Estrada’s plea to junk the plunder and graft charges

Remedial Law; Evidence – Quantum of proof in PI

First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial
where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine
his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are
limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender
a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt
thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the
state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and
the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over
the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived
by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative
proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish
probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a
case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only
more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States,
from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be
proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally
adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on
hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence
excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application
of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence
required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial
evidence of guilt.
 Republic vs. Manalo
In a mixed marriage, the Filipino spouse can already file a divorce
decree

Civil Law; Marriage

A foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign spouse is also considered valid in the Philippines,
even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad."
Prior to the ruling, a divorce abroad is only considered valid in the Philippines when it is initiated by the
foreign spouse,
With the amended Family Code, Filipinos who obtain divorce in the country of their foreign spouse get to
remarry without fear of a bigamy suit. However, if the one who obtained the divorce was the Filipino
spouse, the state still did not recognize it divorce because of the absence of absolute divorce in the country.
With this ruling, the state now recognizes the divorce obtained by the Filipino, and couples of the same
circumstances of mixed-marriage will be considered not married to each other under Philippine law." The
Court remanded the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence as to the relevant laws of Japan
on divorce,"

Jimenez vs. Cañizares

Female impotency

Civil Law; Annulment of Marriage

The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of
the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter
did not answer the complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical
examination.

The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to
annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment
of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear
in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature
coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is
not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness
against herself." Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in
favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.