Oposa VS Factoran

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Citation:
Dante B. Gatmaytan, The Illusion of Intergenerational
Equity: Oposa v. Factoran as Pyrrhic Victory, 15 Geo.
Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 457 (2003)
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The Illusion of Intergenerational Equity:
Oposa v. Factoran as Pyrrhic Victory
DANTE B. GATMAYTAN*
CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................. 457

II. The Case ............................................... 460
A. The Trial Court Decision ................................ 460
B. The Supreme Court Decision ............................. 461
1. Did the Plaintiffs Have a Cause of Action? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
2. Were the Issues Raised Political Questions? ............. 464
3. Are TLAs Protected by the Non-Impairment Clause of the
Constitution? ..................................... 464
C. The Separate Opinion .................................. 465
III. Understanding Oposa................................... 466
A. Timber License Agreements Were Not Cancelled ............ 466
B. The Supreme Court Did Not Rule on Standing to Sue .......... 468
C. Philippine Rules on Standing Are Lenient .................... 472
1. Standing to Sue May Be Assumed ...................... 472
2. Lack of Standing May Be Waived ...................... 473
D. Intergenerational Equity Has No Practical Effect ............. 475
E. Intergenerational Equity Is Already Law in the Philippines ...... 476
1. The Constitution Was Intended to Protect the Rights of Future
Generations ...................................... 476
2. Statutes and Case Law .............................. 479
F. The Potential Uses of Oposa........................... 480
IV. Conclusion .... ........................................ 484
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most famous and celebrated cases in the history of the Philippine
Supreme Court is Oposa v. Factoran.' For almost a decade now, Oposa has
continued to earn praises as a significant decision in environmental protection.
The case was unorthodox even in its inception: children from all over the country
filed a case to compel the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
* Assistant Professor, University of the Philippines, College of Law. LL.B., University of the Philippines,
1991; M.S.E.L., Vermont Law School, 1995; LL.M., University of California, Los Angeles, 1996. I wish to
thank Ms. Claudette de la Cerna (LL.B., University of the Philippines, 2005, expected) for her research
assistance.
1. Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993); reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 173 (1994).
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:457
Natural Resources (DENR) to cancel all existing Timber License Agreements

(TLA) and to prevent him from renewing or processing any new applications.
The suit was based on the novel theory of "intergenerational justice" - the
children claimed that they represented not only their generation, but also
"generations yet unborn." 2
Oposa has attained what might be called celebrity status. It is cited as a
"significant," "innovative" case, "likely to become something of a landmark in
the jurisprudence of sustainable development."' 3 According to one author, the
Philippines Supreme Court "announced a powerful and influential exposition of
intergenerational rights in the context of environmental protection."4 Oposa is
virtually a staple of international environmental law scholarship,' which is rarely
2. Id. at 802.
3. Ben Boer, The Rise ofEnvironmental Law in theAsian Region, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1503, 1534-37 (1999).
4. Neil A.E Popovic, In Pursuitof EnvironmentalHuman Rights: Commentary on the Draft Declarationof
Principleson Human Rights and the Environment, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 513 (1996). Oposa was
also referred to as a seminal decision that implements the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development's
components on a right to a healthy and decent environment, and intergenerational equity and responsibility. See
Alfred Rest, PreliminaryEfforts in Implementing the Rio Targets, 55 ATENEO L.J. I, 10-11 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Sustainable Development, Myth or Reality?: A Survey of Sustainable
Development Under InternationalLaw and Sri Lankan Law, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 293 n.98
(2001); Dr. Ibibia Lucky Worika, Deprivation,Despoilationand Destitution: Whither Environment and Human
Rights in Nigeria'sNiger Delta?, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1,21 (2001); Peggy Rodgers Kalas, International
EnvironmentalDispute Resolution and the Needfor Access by Non-State Entities, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 191, 206 n.55; Janelle P. Eurick, The ConstitutionalRight to a Healthy Environment: Enforcing
Environmental Protection through State and Federal Constitutions, II INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 185, 200 (2001);
Carl Bruch, Wole Coker & Chris VanArsdale, ConstitutionalEnvironmentalLaw: Giving Force to Fundamental
PrinciplesIn Africa, 26 COLUM. J. EN'rvL. L. 131, 148 (2001); Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of
InternationalLaw?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 370 n.94 (2000); John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to
Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy Environmentas a Principleof CustomaryInternationalLaw,
25 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 283, 317-18 (2000); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Right of the Child to a Clean
Environment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 611, 618 (1999); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental Ethics and our Moral
Relationship to Future Generations: Future Rights and Present Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 249, 263 n.37
(1999); Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal ConstitutionalRight to a Healthy Environment in US and in
Our Posterity, 68 Miss. L.J. 565, 604-05 (1998); John C. Dembach, Sustainable Development as a Framework
for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 66 n.332 (1998); Nicholas A. Robinson, Comparative
EnvironmentalLaw Perspectives on Legal Regimes for Sustainable Development, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 247,
261 n.56 (1998); J. Martin Wagner & Neil A.E Popovic, Environmental Injustice on United States Bases in
Panama:InternationalLaw and the Right to Land FreeFrom Contaminationand Explosives, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
401, 493 (1998); Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in
InternationalLaw?, 10 GEO.INr'L EN VTL. L. REV. 309, 353 n. 174 (1998); Paul A. Barresi, Beyond Fairnessto
Future Generations: An IntragenerationalAlternative To Intergenerational Equity in the International
EnvironmentalArena, 11 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 59,82 (1997); Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under
the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of MultinationalCorporations,20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 335, 376 (1997); Ellen Hey, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Towards the Recognition of a New
Legally Relevant Relationship in InternationalLaw, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 61, 61 n.2 (1997); Neil AF.
Popovic, PursuingEnvironmental Justice with InternationalHuman Rights and State Constitutions, 15 STAN.
ENvmL. L.J. 338, 340 n.4 (1996); Christopher D. Stone, Locale and Legitimacy in InternationalEnvironmental
Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1279, 1281 n. 12 (1996); Mark Allan Gray, The InternationalCrime of Ecocide, 26 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 215,240 (1996); and James C. Wood, IntergenerationalEquity and Climate Change,8 GEO. INT'L
ENvmL. L. REV. 293, 324 (1996).
20031 OPOSA v. FACTORAN AS PYRRHIC VICTORY
critical of the case.6

This interest, however, is actually generated only in the international arena and
not in the Philippines. Antonio Oposa, Jr., the Counsel for the petitioners in the
case, acknowledged as much when he presented his assessment of impact of the
case:
Although hardly known in the country's legal community, the case has been the
subject of extensive citation, analysis, and comment in international law
circles. Perhaps because it is the first case decided by the highest court of a
country which discussed and implemented what had heretofore been a rhetori-
cal call for responsibility to future generations for the world's natural resources.
Furthermore, it brings to the fore - in the personal voice of our children - the
imminent likelihood that our generation's wanton use of the earth's resources
will inevitably adversely impact our children's generation and generations yet
unborn.7
The incongruent reception of Oposa may be due to the fact that the interna-
tional legal community misunderstands the case. In contrast to this dominant
interpretation, this Article will show that Oposa adds barely anything new either
to Philippine jurisprudence or to the cause of environmental protection, and that
it has faded from the practice of law because it does not strengthen the legal
arsenal for environmental protection. In this Article, I wish to show that Oposa is
overrated for several reasons.
First, Oposa, for all the praise it has earned, did not affect government conduct
in the protection of the environment. The Supreme Court did not order the
cancellation of the TLAs, but ordered the case to be remanded for trial. Because
the petitioners did not pursue the case after it was remanded, no TLA was
cancelled.
Second, while many point to the case as one that recognizes standing to sue for
future generations, 8 the Court's statement to that effect is obiter dictum -
therefore, not binding as precedent. Only a few correctly point out that the case
recognizes a cause of action for environmental protection. 9
6. For a rare critical look at the case, see Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable Development and Unsustainable
Arguments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 19, 27-28 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone
eds., 1999).
7. Antonio A. Oposa, Jr., The Power to Protect the Environment, at http://www.oposa.com/oposa-family/
environment2.htm (Aug. 30, 1997) (excerpts of a paper presented before the LAWASIA Conference in Manila).
8. See Ted Allen, Note, The PhilippineChildren'sCase: Recognizing Legal Standingfor Future Generations,
6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 713 (1994); see also Matthew Tuchband, The Systemic Environmental
Externalities of Free Trade: A Callfor Wiser Trade Decisionmaking, 83 GEO. L.J. 2099, 2106 n.34 (1995); J.
William Futrell, Efforts to Improve Environmental Programs:NGOs, C990 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 299, 331-32 (1995);
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformationof InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 19
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 241,291 n.196 (1995).
9. See Richard Desgangne, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human
Rights, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 263, n.7 (1995); David A. Wirth, The Rio Declarationon Environment and
Development: Two Steps Forwardand One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 652, n.51 (1995).
Third, even if "standing" had been an issue before the Supreme Court,
Philippine case law has always adopted a liberal approach to questions pertaining
to standing to sue. The Supreme Court, by relying on case law, could have either
assumed the existence of the children's standing to sue or waived the requirement
completely.
Fourth, the use of "intergenerational equity" - invoking the rights of future
generations - while intellectually titillating, is ultimately useless in the resolution
of the case. The Philippine Supreme Court would have decided Oposa exactly the
same way had the children filed the case solely on their own behalf. In cases
involving the protection of the environment, the distinction between present and
future generations is inconsequential - we cannot protect the rights of future
generations without protecting the rights of the present.
Fifth, the protection of the rights of future generations was already inscribed in
Philippine law and jurisprudence even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and the promulgation of Oposa.
Finally, I want to show that despite these shortcomings, Oposa should
ultimately be celebrated, not because of the Supreme Court's remarks about
intergenerational responsibility and standing to sue for future generations, but
because it held that the constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is an actionable right that is superior to the Bill of Rights.
Oposa remains a potential tool, although its possible uses seem to elude
advocates of environmental protection.
II. THE CASE

A. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION
Oposa v. Factoranwas a taxpayers' class suit originally filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City. The petitioners were minors represented and joined
by their parents and the Philippine Environmental Network, Inc., a non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of concerted action geared for the protec-
tion of the environment and natural resources. The children claimed that they
were "entitled to the full benefit, use, and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests."' As such, they prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, his agents, representatives, and other persons acting on his behalf to
cancel all existing timber license agreements" in the country and to desist from
10. Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, 796 (1993).

II. Pres. Decree No. 705 (1975), § 3(ee) defines a timber license agreement thus:
License agreement is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within any
forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the
government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the same in
accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement.
2003] OPOSA V. FACTORAN AS PYRRHIC VICTORY
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or approving new timber license

agreements. 12
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that (a) the
plaintiffs had no cause of action against him; and (b) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs was a political question that should be addressed to the legislative or
executive branch of the Government.
The trial court granted the motion and held that:
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that the plaintiffs
have but the noblest of all intentions, it [sic] fell short of alleging, with
sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec.
1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In
fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its [sic] complaint against the
herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not
be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred
principle of 'Separation of Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
3
Government. '
The trial court added that to grant the relief prayed for would amount to an
"impairment of contracts," in the belief that TLAs are contracts, which are
protected under the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. 4
The children then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court asking
it to set aside the trial court's order dismissing the case.' 5 In essence, the petition
raised three issues before the Supreme Court: (a) whether the plaintiffs had a
cause of action; (b) whether the issue involved a political question over which the
Supreme Court could not assume jurisdiction; and (c) whether a timber license
agreement is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitu-
tion.
B. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Before the Supreme Court addressed these issues, it decided to "focus on some
procedural matters,"' 16 despite the fact that the respondents "did not take issue
with this matter."' 7 Nevertheless, the Court stated that the children's case
12. Oposa, 224 SCRA at 797.

13. Id. at 803-04.
14. PHIL. CONST. art. III, § 10 (1987).
15. Oposa, 224 SCRAat 800-01.
16. Id. at 802.
17. Id.
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW (Vol. 15:457
satisfied the requisites of a valid class suit under the Rules of Court.' 8
The Court then proceeded to discuss a "special and novel"' 9 element of the
suit: the plaintiffs' assertion that they represented their generation, as well as
generations yet unborn.
The Court accommodated this position, stating:
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personal-
ity to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, consid-
ers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. 2 °
The Supreme Court said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology also
created an obligation for every person to preserve the environment. It is this
obligation that is the basis of any citizen's standing to sue.
In short, the Supreme Court said that the petitioners' suit was a valid class suit,
and that the petitioners had standing to sue for themselves and future generations,
although the petitioners' case raised neither issue. Only then did the Court
"proceed to the merits of the petition. 21
1. Did The Plaintiffs Have a Cause of Action?
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court and stated that the
complaint focused on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The
18. Phil. R. Civ. P. 3, § 12 (1997). The Court said that:

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable,
if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests.
Oposa, 224 SCRA at 802.
20. Id. at 802-03.
21. Id. at 803.
Constitution provides that "[t]he State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. ' 2 2 The Court explained that while this provision is found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, and not the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the advancement
of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.2 3
The Court went on to explain that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The
right implies the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. 24
The Court further observed that provisions of Executive Order No. 192, series
of 1987, (creating the DENR) 25 and the Administrative Code of 1987 declare it to
be the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, manage-
ment, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest. 26 Both laws, said the
Court, set these objectives, which provide the basis of policy formulation. 27 It
also pointed out that decrees issued prior to the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, such as the Philippine Environmental Policy 28 and the Philippine
Environment Code, 29 already paid attention to the environmental rights of
present and future generations. 3 °
After a reading of these laws, the Court concluded that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty to protect and advance said
right. It found that a denial or violation of that right by the party who has the
22. PiIL. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1987).

23. Oposa, 224 SCRA at 804-05.
24. Id. at 805.
25. Section 3 of the Executive Order in part provides:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development
and use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well ....
Exec. Order No. 192, s. 1987, § 3.
26. See Exec. Order No. 292, s. 1987, § 3.
28. Pres. Decree No. 1151 (1977).
29. Pres. Decree No. 1152 (1977).
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
of action.3 1
2. Were the Issues Raised Political Questions?

The Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the trial court's finding that the
issue in this case involved a political question, which would have been beyond
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It said: "Policy formulation or determina-
tion by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in
issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-ii-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation., 32 The Court also pointed out
that even if the matter were a political question, judicial power has been
expanded under the 1987 Constitution to include:
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess 33of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Citing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court pointed out that the present Constitu-
tion expands judicial review to cover "political questions. 34
3. Are TLAs Protected by the Non-Impairment Clause of the Constitution?

The Court also said that the timber license agreements were not contracts
within the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, but were
only licenses that could be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare. 35 It further pointed out that even if TLAs were
considered contracts, the due process clause could not be invoked because the
case did "not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. 3 6 The Court went on to
say that even if a law mandated the cancellation of timber license agreements, it
would be justified as a police power measure.37
31. Citing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court defined a cause of action as "an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
Oposa, 224 SCRA at 808.
32. ld. at 809.
33. Id. (quoting PHIL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1987)).
34. Id. at 810.
35. Id. at 812; PHIL. CONsT. art. III, § 10 (1987) (providing that "[n]o law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed").
37. Id. at 812-13.
2003] OPOSA v FACTORAN AS PYRRHIC VICTORY
The Supreme Court set aside the order of the trial court granting Secretary
Factoran's motion to dismiss. The Court remanded the case for trial, stating that
"[t]he petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as3 defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements." 8
C. THE SEPARATE OPINION
Ten justices concurred with the majority decision written by Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr.,3 9 and three justices took no part in the deliberations.4a In a separate
opinion, Justice Florentino Feliciano maintained that Oposa was one of the most
important cases decided by the Court in the last few years 4 ' and that the
principles laid down in the decision were "likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environ-
ment ....,42 Nevertheless, he took issue with the majority on several points.
The gist of his opinion was that neither the petitioners nor the Court had
identified a right upon which the petitioners could base their claim. In his view,
the constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology may
be fundamental, but it is not specific.43 According to Justice Feliciano, all the
laws cited by the Court to show the existence of a cause of action, such as
Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, the Administrative Code, and the
Philippine Environmental Policy, "all appear to be formulations of policy, as
general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Sections 16... and 15 .... "44
On the other hand, he pointed out, the Philippine Environment Code was
merely "a compendious collection of more 'specific environment management
policies' and 'environment quality standards' .. . . [N]either petitioners nor the
Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the... Code
which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to
enforce.",45 He added that the Code does not "appear to contemplate action on the
part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code," as
it only identifies the government agencies charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with air, water, land use, and
natural resources management.4 6 In his view, such a specific right might exist in

39. The majority consisted of Associate Justices Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grifio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and Quiason.
40. Those justices taking no part in this case were Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Puno and
Vitug.
41. Oposa, 224 SCRA at 814 (Feliciano J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 815.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis in original).
Philippine law, and the plaintiffs should have been afforded an opportunity to
identify it, rather than being denied such an opportunity by the trial court granting
defendant's motion to dismiss.4
Furthermore, Justice Feliciano pointed out that the Court's approach - combining the
substantive standards of the Constitution with the remedy sought by the children
(petition for certiorari) - would hurl the Supreme Court into social and economic
policy-making. He warned that the Court is not prepared to undertake this task
because of its lack of special technical competence, experience, and professional
qualification in the area of environmental protection and management.48
He also concurred in the result of the decision, but added that "[tihe doctrines
set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to
closer examination. 4 9 Justice Feliciano's opinion was prompted by an attempt to
clarify to himself, "what the Court appear[ed] to be saying." 5 °
Apart from his disagreement regarding the legal basis for the children's
petition, Justice Feliciano raised two questions that the Supreme Court had
created by its decision: First, since the Court seemed to be recognizing a
beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, it is unclear
whether such a right of action "may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental
agency concerned must be shown."'', The Court failed to discuss, he pointed out,
whether there must be an exhaustion of all administrative remedies before a case
may be filed in court for redress of one's environmental rights. Second, since the
Court remanded the case to the trial court with an order to implead the holders of
52
TLAs, what then were the holders to litigate about?
I understand the Separate Opinion to be a polite reminder to the rest of the
Court that the ruling they were promulgating could not be easily implemented.
But how exactly would Oposa play out in environmental litigation? As I attempt
to show here, Oposa barely creased the legal landscape, raising questions as to
why it generates excitement elsewhere in the world but remains obscure in the
Philippines. We must, therefore, exert effort to understand what exactly the Court said.
III. UNDERSTANDING OPOSA
A. TIMBER LICENSE AGREEMENTS WERE NOT CANCELLED
It should be stressed that the children wanted the Secretary of the DENR to
cancel all TLAs and to desist from processing new applications. My review of
47. Id. at 817.

48. Id. at 818.
49. Id.
50. ld. at 814.
51. Id. at 815.
52. Id. at 818.
2003] OPOSA v. FACTORAN AS PYRRHIC VICTORY
Oposa shows that the Supreme Court did not order the cancellation of existing
TLAs or issue an order to the DENR to desist from renewing or processing any
applications. The case revolved around a procedural question: whether the case
was properly dismissed by the regional trial court for petitioners' failure to
establish a cause of action. To quote, the Court held:
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
53
the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
The Court remanded the case to the trial court and ordered the plaintiffs to
implead all holders of TLAs as indispensable parties in such further proceedings.
The Supreme Court's decision, therefore, was merely an initial step toward the
resolution of the case. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to
dismiss the case because the children had a cause of action, the issues raised were
not "political questions," and TLAs were not contracts under the contracts clause
of the Constitution.
As Justice Feliciano pointed out, however, it is not even clear what would have
been litigated in the lower court. Even if we knew what they would have litigated,
the magnitude of the work required to implead all TLA holders cannot be
overstated because this would entail bringing dozens of defendants to court. One
might even wonder why persons holding TLAs should be impleaded. If, the
Court stated, TLAs are only licenses that could be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare, then the Secretary should be allowed
to cancel them without impairing their due process rights.
In any case, the children did not pursue the case after it was remanded to the
trial court. No TLA was ever cancelled pursuant to the Court's ruling in Oposa.
Commercial logging continues in the Philippines, and there is nothing that will
prevent the DENR from renewing or processing applications for TLAs. Neither
the Supreme Court nor the trial court ordered the Secretary to desist from do-
ing so.
Put simply, the children initially wanted to stop the practice of issuing TLAs
because it impaired their right to a balanced ecology. Since the practice contin-
ues, it is difficult to see how Oposa can be construed as a victory for the
environment.
The most recent data from the DENR's Forest Management Bureau show that
as of December 31, 2001, there are still eighteen active TLAs all over the
Philippines, covering 813,949 hectares of forestland. There are also two inactive
TLAs covering 96,066 hectares, and another eleven suspended TLAs covering
53. Id.
at 814.
another 432,958 hectares. 54 Technically, a total of 1,342,962 hectares of forest-

land are still covered by TLAs. There is nothing to show that the Philippine
environment has improved.5 5
It might be argued that this is still a significant drop in the number of TLAs
issued by the DENR,5 6 but there is no evidence that this reduction is a
consequence of the Court's decision in Oposa. In fact, when Fulgencio Factoran
served as the Secretary of the DENR, from 1987 to 1992, he did not want to issue
any new TLAs and also sought the cancellation of TLAs of companies that failed
to comply with government regulations.5 7 The reduction in the number of TLAs,
therefore, was among the thrusts of Factoran's turn at the helm of the DENR even
before Oposa was decided.
B. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON STANDING TO SUE
As I pointed out at the beginning of this Article, Oposa is often cited for the
Court's alleged recognition of the rights of future generations. Strangely, the
Supreme Court never made a ruling on this issue, although it did make a ruling on
the existence of the children's cause of action. Thus, everything the Court said
about standing to sue for future generations is obiter dictum.
Perhaps international interest in Oposa may be explained by the fact that
"standing to sue" is a huge obstacle for environmental protection advocates in
some jurisdictions. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has tightened the rules
on standing by requiring strict compliance with the "case or controversy"
requirement of the Constitution. To be accorded standing, first and foremost,
there must be alleged (and ultimately proven) an "injury in fact" - a harm
suffered by the plaintiff that is "concrete" and "actual or imminent," and not
merely "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Second, there must be causation - a
fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of
conduct of the defendant. And third, there must be redressability - the likelihood
that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury.5 8
In contrast, the rules on standing in the Philippines are less stringent. As I will
54. Status Report of imber License Agreements (TLAs) as of December 31, 2001, Forest Management
Bureau, Phil. Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources 33-34 (2001).
55. The state of the Philippine environment cannot be adequately discussed here, but for an overview of the
problems, see Danilo C. Israel, The Questfor a Better Environment: Past Experiences and Future Challenges,
at 2 (Phil. Inst. for Dev. Stud., Discussion Paper Series No. 2002-14 (Nov. 2002)).
56. There were 75 TLAs still in force in 1990. See Therese Desiree Perez, Philippine Forests:A Case of
Disappearance,3 PHIL. NAT. RES. L.J. 18,23 (1990). One can only imagine the amount of evidence that must be
adduced against each TLA holder. As of June 1996, 34 TLAs covering 1,515,033 hectares remain in effect. See
ENVTL. MGMT.M BUREAU, PHIL. ENVTL. QuALrrY REP., 1990-1995 at 321 (1996).
57. Marites Dafiguilan Vitug, Forest Policy and National Policy, in FOREST POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE
PHILIPPINES: THE DYNAMICS OF PARTICIPATORY CONSERVATION 11, 16 (Peter Utting ed., 2000).
58. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992).
20031 OPOSA V. FACTORAN AS PYRRHIC VICTORY
illustrate below, standing in Philippine litigation may either be assumed to exist

or may be waived completely under certain circumstances. In the latter case, one
does not need standing to litigate.
"Standing" and "cause of action" are two different concepts that are governed
by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. Standing to sue revolves around the
question of who the proper parties are in a suit. The "proper party" requirement is
satisfied if it is alleged that petitioners and intervenors have sustained or are in
danger of sustaining immediate injury resulting from the acts or measures
complained of.59 One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate
and substantial in the controversy has standing to sue. A party must show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision, so as to warrant an invocation of the court's
jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on his
behalf. 60 The Rules of Court provide:
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every6 action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. 1
In contrast, the Rules of Court define a "cause of action" as "the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another.",62 For a cause of action to
exist, there must be: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff, by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the
defendant to respect, or not to violate, such right; and (c) an act or omission on
the part of said defendant constituting a violation63of the plaintiff's right or a
breach of the defendant's obligation to the plaintiff.
Secretary Factoran never challenged petitioners' standing to sue. In his motion
to dismiss, he did not allege that the parties had no legal interest in the case or that
they were not the proper parties to the suit. Rather, he alleged that petitioners had
not identified a specific right that he had allegedly impaired, so as to entitle the
children to relief from the courts. The defendant, in short, merely questioned the
existence of a cause of action.
Even the Supreme Court was aware of this. In the introductory portions of its
decision, the Court explained that the case "touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to 'prevent the misappropriation or
59. Phil. Ass'n. of Service Exps., Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 98472, Aug. 19, 1993 (citing Ass'n. of Small
Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Sec'y of Agrarian Reforms, G.R. No. 78742 and companion cases, July 14,
1989; 175 SCRA 343, 364).
60. Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Ctr. v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 115381, Dec. 2, 1994.
61. Phil. R. Civ. P. 3, § 2 (1997).
62. Id. at 2, § 2 (1997).
63. Rava Dev. Corp. v. Ct. App., G.R. No. 96825, 211 SCRA 144, 153 (1992); Heirs of Ildefonso Cosolluela,
Sr., Inc. v. Rico Gen. Ins. Corp, G.R. No. 84628, 179 SCRA 511,517 (1989).
470 THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:457
impairment' of Philippine rainforests and 'arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the

country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.' ,,64 In
fact, the Court's entire discussion of standing to sue was preceded 65
by an
admission that the respondents "did not take issue with this matter.,
The distinction between standing to sue and cause of action is also emphasized
by the fact that the Court resolved both questions on different grounds. The
children had standing because they had an obligation "to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come."6 6 They had a cause of action because the
DENR had a duty to protect and advance their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the Secretary of the DENR had allegedly violated this right with the
continued issuance of TLAs. 67 The violation of this right gave rise to a cause of
action.68
Had Oposa implicated standing, then the decision would have been significant.
Oposa broadens earlier rulings on who are "proper parties" in a suit. In Philippine
law, the real party in interest has been restricted to:
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. 69
Oposa overruled the more restrictive ruling of the Supreme Court in Lozada v.
Commission on Elections.7 ° In that case, the Court denied a petition to review a
decision of the Commission on Elections, which had refused to call an election to
fill vacancies in the Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature). The Court held
that:
Petitioners' standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind
alleged here, which is held in common by all members of the public because of
the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all citizens.
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a
dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial
resolution. When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone
normally does not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction ....
64. See Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, 796 (1993) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 802.
66. Id. at 803.
67. Id. at 808.
68. Id.
69. Gan Hock v. Ct. App., G.R. No. L-60848, May 20, 1991, 197 SCRA 223, 230 (1991). See also Sustiguer
v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 29341, 176 SCRA 579, 587 (1989).
70. G.R. No. L-59068, 120 SCRA 337, 340 (1983).
Even his plea as a voter is predicated on an interest held in common by all

members of the public and does not demonstrate any injury specially directed
to him in particular.7'
Oposa recognized standing in the broadest possible sense by including even

those who are not yet born - even future citizens who are not persons under
Philippine law. 72 But the Supreme Court did not have to discuss "standing"
because it was never raised as an issue.
The pronouncement on standing is obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter
that was not raised expressly by the petitioner, and therefore, it was not a
prerequisite in disposing of the case. 7 3 In other cases, the Supreme Court has
ruled that a remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a
cause, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the
court, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause,
is obiter dictum, lacks the force of an adjudication, and is not to be regarded as
such.74 Obiter dicta are opinions "entirely unnecessary for the decision of the
case" and thus "are not binding as precedent. '75 Of course, the Philippine
Supreme Court has also held that dictum is generally not binding as authority or
precedent within the stare decisis rule but may be followed if sufficiently
But uni
persuasive. 76Bu until that happens, Oposa's rule on standing has no binding
effect on any Philippine court. 77
71. Id. at 341-42.

72. See Rep. Act No. 386 (1949), art. 40.
73. Delta Motors Corp. v. Ct. App., G.R. No. 121075, July 24, 1997.
74. City of Manila v. Entote, G.R. No. L-24776, June 28, 1974.
75. Equatorial Realty Dev., Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 16063, Nov. 21, 1996, citing Black's Law
Dictionary, 6th edition, 1990; see also Morales v. Paredes, 55 Phil. 565 (1930); Reagan v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. L-26379, Dec. 27, 1969; Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Comm'n, G.R.
No. 120043, July 24, 1996.
76. Lee v. Ct. App. and De Simeon, G.R. No. L-28126, Nov. 28, 1975.
77. Curiously, even members of the Supreme Court suggest that Oposa did in fact rule on the children's
standing to sue. See Flerida Ruth P. Romero, The Role of the Judiciaryin Promotingthe Rule of Law in the Area
of Environmental Protection, in THE COURT SYSTEMs J. 94, 96 (Special Edition, Apr. 1999) (Justice Romero
said, "we recognized the concept of intergenerationalresponsibility by ruling that petitioner children can file a
class suit for themselves, for others of their generation, and for succeeding generations, to preserve the country's
rainforests."). Chief Justice Hilario Davide himself recently said:
In fact, in a frequently cited case, Oposa et al. vs. Secretary Factoran,(G.R. No. 101083, 30 July
1993) 1 even sustained the standing of minors to bring suit, not only in their behalf, but also in behalf
of generations yet unborn, to shield the country's dwindling natural resources from farther degrada-
tion. I believe it is far more preferable to allow an issue of urgency of transcendental importance to be
argued before and passed upon by the courts than to leave aggrieved parties with the feeling of
helplessness born out of a strict and unrelenting application of traditional, if not outmoded, concepts
of standing and personality.
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., The JudicialResponse To Terrorism:National Venues, Speech delivered at the 10th
International Judicial Conference in Strasbourg, May 23-24, 2002, at http://www.coe.int/ttelcommunication-
and.research/press/events/5.-ministerial conferences/2002/2002-05_international-judicial-conference_-
Even if standing to sue for future generations becomes standard legal doctrine,
it will not necessarily lead to the protection of the environment. The courts will still
have to rule on whether the challenged acts - in this case, the issuance of TLAs -
impair the right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The petitioners in Oposa
wanted the cancellation of TLAs and a ban on any further processing of TLA
applications. If the case had been pursued in the regional trial court, the only way
that the children could have prevailed was by convincing the court that the
practice of issuing TLAs violates their constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology. I doubt that the courts would enjoin certain economic activity
simply because the environment is somehow impaired, and I suspect that they
would be at a loss to determine what standard to use before any such action can
prevail. In fact, a defendant in such a case might remind the courts that Article XII of
the Constitution provides for the exploitation of the country's natural resources.
C. PHILIPPINE RULES ON STANDING ARE LENIENT
Even if "standing" had been an issue, Philippine case law is consistent in

holding that in similar cases standing may either be assumed or entirely waived
by courts.
1. Standing to Sue May Be Assumed

Perhaps the respondent did not take issue with the question of standing because
it would have been difficult if not impossible to defend such an assertion. Indeed,
under the facts of Oposa, the issue of standing could have been simply assumed
by the Supreme Court.
It will be recalled that the Court concluded that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology "is as clear as the DENR's duty. .. to protect and advance the
said right.",78 The constitutional provision recognized a right and imposed a duty.
The petitioners, therefore, could have filed a special civil action for mandamus to
restrain the defendant from further parceling out what is left of the Philippine
forests. There are cases in the Philippines that recognize a citizen's interest and
personality to procure the enforcement of a public duty and to bring an action to
compel the performance of that duty.79 In Tanada v. Tuvera, a case filed to compel
publication of Presidential Decrees issued by then-President Ferdinand Marcos,
the Court held:
[W]hile the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only on those cases where he has some private or particular
_strasbourg/panell-hilariogdavidejr.asp. These remarks notwithstanding, the fact remains that "standing"

was not an issue in Oposa no matter how many times one reads the case.
79. Garcia v. Bd. of Inv., G.R. No. 88637, 177 SCRA 374, 383-84 (1989).
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of

that which he holds with the public at large," and that "it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mitchell v. Boardmen, 79 M.E., 469 J.]," nevertheless, "when the question is
one of a public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., § 431]." ' 80
Further, the Court said:

Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were
not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive
of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for the respondents in this case.81
In another case, the Court explained, "[w]hen a mandamus proceeding in-

volves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general "public" which possesses the right."8 2
The situation in Tanada was mirrored in Oposa. The petitioners in Oposa
sought the enforcement of a public right recognized by the Constitution - the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology - and the performance of a public duty
on the part of the DENR. Likewise, the Solicitor General entered his appearance
for the government. The petitioners were all Filipino citizens and part of the
general public. The facts of Oposa, therefore, fit precisely into these established
rules, and as such the petitioners could have filed a special civil action for
mandamus and cleared the "standing requirement" with ease.
2. Lack of Standing May Be Waived
The Philippine Supreme Court adheres to a liberal policy with regards to locus
standi. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,the Court said, "[a] party's standing...
is a procedural technicality which the Court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. 83 Standing may be
brushed aside when the "transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
80. G.R. No. 63915, 136 SCRA 27 (1985).

81. Id. at 37.
82. Legaspi v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, 536 (1987).
83. Kilosbayan Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110, 134 (1994).
technicalities of procedure." 84 In taxpayers' suits, such as Oposa, the Court "is

not devoid of discretion as to whether or not [the issue of standing] should be
entertained." 5
The cases reiterating the Court's leniency are legion.8 6 In Kapatiranng mga
Naglilingkod sa PamahalaangPilipinas,Inc. v. Tan, the Court once more stated
that:
Objections to taxpayers' suits for lack of sufficient personality, standing or
interest are, in the main, procedural matters. Considering the importance to the
public of the cases at bar ... this Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.8 7
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, the Court said:
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the case
before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors
because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. [Ex Parte Levitt, 303
US 633]. And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it
is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitu-
tional questions raised.88
Again, in Kilosbayan, the Court pointed out that ordinary citizens and
taxpayers have already been allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by the President, "although they were invoking only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public." 89 It added:
In line with this liberal policy, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and
even associations of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed
to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality
84. Id. citing Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-282 1, Mar. 4, 1949.
85. Id. citing Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).
86. See PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Sec'y, 194
SCRA 317(1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA221(1991); Osmefia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100308, July
30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Carpio v. Executive Sec'y, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Ass'n, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965); Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Laurel v.
Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797 (1990); Garcia v. Bd. of Inv., 177 SCRA 374 (1989) and
191 SCRA 288 (1990); Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991); Garcia v. Executive Sec'y, 211 SCRA 219
(1992); De Guia v. COMELEC, 208 SCRA 420 (1992); Pasay Law and Consciousness Union, Inc. v. Cuneta,
101 SCRA 662 (1980).
87. 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988); see also Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corp., 197 SCRA 52, 60
(1991).
88. G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, 79777, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
89. Citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, Aug. 26, 1949; Araneta v. Angeles, G.R. No. L-2756;
Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas, G.R. No. L-3054; Guerrero v. Comm'r of Customs, G.R. No. L-3055;
Baredo v. Comm'n on Elections, G.R. No. L-3056, 84 Phil. 968 (1949).
or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government

agencies or instrumentalities. 90
In essence, under Philippine law the Supreme Court does not dismiss a case
simply because the parties do not have standing to sue. It may completely
disregard the rule on standing, "even when there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right to judicial review," 9 1 and it may entertain a suit "which does
not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is in-
volved. ' 9 2
Thus, even if standing had been the central issue in Oposa, the Supreme Court
could have similarly waived the technicality. In the Court's own words, the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology "concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation. 9 3 The Supreme Court has ruled that the regulation of
rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings, 94 gambling, 9 5 and rate-fixing
in violation of the Public Service Act 96 are all of transcendental importance
sufficient to disregard the procedural requirement of standing. It is difficult to
imagine how anything could be more transcendental than the preservation of the
human species. Given the magnitude of the issues raised in Oposa, the Court
could have waived the "standing" requirement.
D. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY HAS NO PRACTICAL EFFECT
Others might claim that even if the weight of the case law suggests that the
Court would have waived the standing requirement, the fact is that all these
decisions refer to present but not future generations. But would this have
mattered? Ajudicial declaration on "intergenerational equity" does not serve any
practical purpose. At most, "standing to sue for future generations" is quaint or
intellectually stimulating. However, there was no need to invoke the rights of
future generations because the present generation can always file a case to enjoin
any action that impairs its right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
If Oposa was designed to stop the practice of issuing TLAs, then any person
could have simply filed the case on her own behalf and the result would have
been the same: the petitioner would still have had a cause of action and standing
to sue. The issues raised would still have been recognizable by the Supreme
Court. TLAs would still be beyond the protection of the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court would have granted the petition and
90. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110, 137 (1994).

91. BAYAN v. Executive Sec'y, 342 SCRA 449,481 (2001).
92. Integrated Bar of the Phil. v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81, 101 (2001).
94. Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).
95. Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Teofisto Guingona Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994.
96. Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 115381, Dec. 23, 1994.
remanded the case for trial on the merits all the same. In short, petitioners still
would have won their Supreme Court case and would have landed right back in
the regional trial court where the case started, even without invoking the rights of
future generations. Does the Supreme Court's pronouncement on standing to sue
for future generations really make any difference?
E. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY IS ALREADY LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES
It cannot even be said that, at the very least, intergenerational equity is now
part of Philippine law because of Oposa. The Court's "recognition" of the rights
of future generations is not novel. It was already law even before this case was
decided. Many Philippine laws already mandate the conservation of the country's
resources for the benefit of future generations. The Constitution, statutes, and
case law together mandate the use of natural resources without impairing the
needs of future generations. This was the law even before Oposa. Would a
judicial declaration on intergenerational equity carry more weight than those
repeatedly made by the legislature?
1. The Constitution Was Intended to Protect the Rights of Future Generations

The constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
new; it has no parallel in the previous constitutions of the Philippines. The
original proposal for the constitutional provision was worded thus:
Section 18. The State recognizes the human right to a healthy environment and
the singular demand of nature to follow its own rhythm and harmony. The State
shall therefore maintain ecological balance even as it harnesses our natural
97
resources for the common good and the sustenance of future generations.
Significantly, the framers intended to incorporate the concept of intergenera-

tional equity into the fundamental law of the land. The deletion of the reference to
"future generations" is not significant because the Commission agreed that the
provision comprehends future generations, as the following exchange shows:
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready now for the final formulation?
MR. AZCUNA. May I read it once more, Madam President: "THE STATE
SHALL PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AND
THEIR POSTERITY TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY IN
ACCORD WITH THE RHYTHM AND HARMONY OF NATURE."
97. Proposed Res. No. 537, RESOLUTION TO INCORPORATE IN THE NEW CONSTrrUTION AN ARTICLE ON THE
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, 4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUIONAL COMMISSION [hereinafter RECORD] 579 (1986).
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, may I suggest the deletion of "POSTER-

ITY" for the sake of economy of words, because I think Commissioner Padilla
is right. What we pass here is for now and the future.
MR. AZCUNA. "THE PEOPLE" means the present and future generations; we
agree.
98
MR. ROMULO. Yes.
From this exchange alone, it is clear that the provision already mandates the
protection of the rights of future generations.
The Records of the Constitutional Commission reveal, however, that the
introduction of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology into the Constitution
was met with some skepticism. There was an attempt to simply combine this
provision with another on the right to health. Commissioner Blas Ople crushed
the attempt to fuse the two provisions. He said:
To be sure, we ought to have a strong and powerful statement in the Declaration
of Principles concerning the ecology in terms of its impact on health, but also
for other equally humane and noble purposes and having in mind the danger of
the exhaustion of resources. In the case of forests, this can mean eternal
flooding .... 99
There were also observations made to the effect that the entire provision is in
fact "within the inherent power of the State under its police power,"' "o or that the
new formulation contains "beautiful words, but they have no substantial mean-
ing."'' It was proposed that the poetry be eliminated in favor of simpler prose.
98. 4 RECORD 915-16. All emphases in the records of the Constitutional Commission are in the original.
99. 4 RECORD 907.
100. 4 RECORD 914.
101. 4 RECORD 914. Commissioner Padilla opined that the provision did not serve any purpose:
MR. PADILLA. If we were writing a poem, that phrase "rhythm and harmony" may have some place,
but not in a Constitution, and much less in the Declaration of Principles. Madam President, in fact,
this Section 17 is within the inherent power of the State under its police power. In fact, the Civil Code
has provisions on nuisances under Article 6, line 4, which provides that a nuisance is any act,
commission, establishment, business, condition or property or anything else which: (1)injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway
or street or any body of water; and (5) hinders or impairs the use of property ....
So if we must be prevailed upon to include a provision in the Declaration of Principles, to which I
do not exactly concur, let us make it simple, similar to what was suggested by Commissioner Suarez.
Or if we want to preserve some of the wordings of the Committee report, let us just simply say: 'THE
STATE RECOGNIZES THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT AND TO
ECOLOGICAL BALANCE OF NATURE" or adopt what Commissioner Suarez suggested because it
is not necessary to say "FOR THIS AND FUTURE GENERATIONS" or "FOR NOW AND
POSTERITY." It is understood that whatever we do here is intended for the general welfare of all the
peoples now and tomorrow ....
Again, Ople objected and emphasized that the provision was meant to be more
than rhetoric:
I believe this is far from being meaningless or a hollow statement. It conveys a
powerful sense of the very real problems that we face. Having violated the
rhythm and harmony of nature with the rape of our forests and lakes, we have to
take seriously the admonition of many experts that if nothing drastic is done by
the government 2and the people in 50 years, we can be a desert [sic], Madam
10
President ....
The discussion that followed, however, suggests that the Commission intended
to promote more government action against persons engaged in environmentally
destructive acts, rather than action against the government. To quote further:
MR. VILLACORTA. Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution? Air, water, and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, Madam President. The right to a healthful environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and
therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance.
MR. VILLACORTA. Correspondingly, does this mean that under this section
there will be protection provided to human communities surrounding airports,
military bases, and factories?
MR. AZCUNA. There may be insofar as such mentioned matters contribute to
harming the environment or the quality of the human environment.
MR. VILLACORTA. In other words, it is protection not only to the life and
limb of these human communities but to their psychological welfare as well.
MR. ASCUNA. Insofar as it related to causes from the environment such as

noise, for example, which is considered as a form of pollution.0 3
This may be
controlled or regulatedunder this provision, Madam President.'
Interestingly, it would seem that the framers intended that by enshrining the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, the government would be saddled with
the responsibility of protecting the right by regulating the use of resources and
sanctioning violations. Fortunately, the Court did not construe the provision to
also preclude actions against government agents. It would indeed be foolish to
believe that damage to the environment cannot be initiated by the government, or
that the fundamental law of the land was designed to protect government agents
And so, I am against the new formulation, especially when it mentions "THE SINGULAR
DEMAND OF NATURE FOR RHYTHM AND HARMONY." These may be beautiful words, but
they have no substantial meaning.
102. 4 RECORD 914.

103. 4 RECORD 913 (emphasis added).
from legal reprisals for destroying the environment. If the right can be enforced
against any private person, there is no reason why such a right is not also
enforceable against the government.
2. Statutes and Case Law
Concern for the environmental rights of "future generations" is not new under
Philippine law - many laws, some of which were passed prior to the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, recognize this right.' ° 4 The laws need not be discussed
separately here, but they do illustrate one thing: it is not a pronouncement of
intergenerational equity - whether by the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch - that compels people to preserve the environment for future generations.
Both the constitutional and statutory mandates to protect the rights of future
generations need to be enforced. Oposa, therefore, merely adds judicial imprima-
tur to what is already increasingly commonplace in Philippine legislation.
Nor is Oposa the first time that the Supreme Court stressed the importance of
Article II, Section 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court linked the
provision with the interests of future generations in Ysmael, Jr & Co., Inc. v.
Deputy Executive Secretary:
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet
the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to
ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check
further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is
expected of the government in view of the0 5clear constitutional command to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, 1
Thus, three years before Oposa was decided, the Supreme Court already had
interpreted the constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology to be a constitutional command for government to check the denudation
of forestlands.
In the meantime, Oposaremains largely ignored. In the last decade, Oposa was
cited with significance only once. In Taio v. Socrates, the Supreme Court upheld
the power of the local government units to enact laws to protect the environment
pursuant to the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC). 10 6 The Court pointed out that the LGC seeks "to give flesh and blood to
104. See Rep. Act No. 826 (1952); Pres. Decree No. 330 (1972); Pres. Decree No. 389 (1974); Pres. Decree
No. 705 (1975); Pres. Decree No. 1151 (1977); Pres. Decree No. 1152 (1977); Pres. Decree No. 1160 (1977);
Pres. Decree No. 1305 (1978); Pres. Decree No. 1559 (1978); Exec. Order No. 192 (1987); Exec. Order No. 277
(1987); Exec. Order No. 292 (1987); Rep. Act No. 7394 (1992); Rep. Act No. 7586 (1992); Rep. Act No. 7611
(1992).
105. Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Sec'y, G.R. No. 79538, Oct. 18, 1990.
106. See Tafio v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997).
480 THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:457
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology."10 7 Moreover, the
general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community."10' 8 Oposa was not
even necessary in that case, because there were sufficient legal bases for the
challenged ordinances under the LGC. The Court mentioned Oposa only to point
out that there is a state policy on the protection of the environment.
Tario is even more significant than Oposa because it gives local governments a
concrete avenue for the protection of the environment. Furthermore, advocates of
environmental protection may lobby their local governments for such ordinances.
In either case, the outcome is clear. The same cannot be said of Oposa.
F. THE POTENTIAL USES OF OPOSA
I am not, of course, in any way suggesting that we disregard the environ-

mental rights of future generations. The present generation could deplete
resources, often with irreversible consequences - by depleting higher quality
resources, leading to higher real prices of resources for future generations; by
consuming potentially valuable resources; and by exhausting resources,
resulting in the narrowing of the range of available natural resources." °9
Philippine law already protects against these outcomes by mandating protec-
tion of the rights of future generations, and Oposa adds nothing to the
constitutional and legislative mandates. What then does Oposa contribute to
environmental protection?
There is reason enough to celebrate Oposa. Unfortunately, environmental
rights advocates have focused their attention on the decision's colorful dictum
and have altogether ignored the pronouncements that make it a genuine landmark
decision. The decision is important because Article II, Section 16 of the
Constitution is no longer merely a policy declaration, but an actionable right; it
no longer requires enabling legislation to be invoked by an aggrieved party. Of
course, Oposa fails to clarify if this right may be invoked immediately, or
whether a petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies available.
Nevertheless, environmental rights advocates should be exploring this opening,
rather than dwelling on a non-binding judicial declaration on standing to sue for
future generations.
Oposa breaks new ground insofar as it holds that the constitutional provi-
sion on the right to a balanced environment is an actionable right, even absent
any further legislation. The importance of Oposa, thus, is not so much its
107. Rep. Act No. 7160, § 16 (1991).

108. Rep. Act No. 7160, § 5(c) (1991).
109. Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environmentfor Future Generations: A Proposalfor a "Republican"
Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 444,450-51 (1996).
20031 OPOSA V. FACTORAN AS PYRRHIC VICTORY
pronouncement on standing. Rather, as one author pointed out, Oposa is a

statement to the effect that:
the right to a sound environment is a self-executory constitutional policy.
By itself, independent of specific statutory rights, this right is actionable.
And it is actionable against the DENR Secretary who is tasked with
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development,
0
utilization, and conservation of the country's
natural resources."
This statement is groundbreaking in that constitutional authorities in the
Philippines have always believed otherwise. The Principles and State Policies of
the Constitution are the political creed of the nation, which sets out the
fundamental obligations of the government. "It is incumbent upon the people to
demand fulfillment of these governmental duties through the exercise of the right
of suffrage."" 1 These principles may aid the courts in their determination of the
validity of statutes or executive acts in justiciable cases,' " 2 but Joaquin Bernas
maintains that they were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are, rather, directives addressed to the
executive and to the legislative branches of the government. If there was a failure
on their part to heed the directives, the people's remedy would be political and
not judicial." t3 State Policies and Principles under Article H of the Constitution
and the separate Social Justice and Human Rights provisions under Article XIII
of the Constitution are mere policy declarations1 1 and
4
generally require enabling
legislation before they can be invoked in courts.
The task at hand now seems to be to test the potential of this decision. Oposa
need not be confined to forest protection. It may be invoked to prevent other
110. Antonio G.M. La Vina, The Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology: The Odyssey of a Constitu-
tional Policy, 6 PHIL. NAT. RES. L.J. 3, 10 (1994).
111. VICENTE SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS, 118-19 (1962).
112. Id.
113. 2 JOAQUIN BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 2 (1988).
114. See Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp., G.R. No. 91649, May 14,1991,197 SCRA 52,
68 (art. XIII, § 13, among others, "are merely statement of principles and policies. As such they are basically not
self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.");
Tolentino v. Sec'y of Fin., G.R. No. 115455, Aug. 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630,685, (art. XIII, § 1, among others,
"are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights."). The one
exception seems to be Section 3 of Article XIII, which the Court cites to support employees' right to security of
tenure. See Lopez v. Javier, G.R. No. 102874, Jan. 22, 1996, 252 SCRA 68, 76. The fact that Article XIII lays
down principles and p6licies does not diminish its importance. As the Supreme Court explained in Aris (Phil.)
Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Comm'n, G.R. No. 90501, Aug. 5, 1991, Article XIII establishes the strong
foundations of a truly just and humane society. This Article addresses itself to specified areas of concern - labor,
agrarian and natural resources reform, urban land reform and housing, health, working women, and people's
organizations and reaches out to the underprivileged sector of society, for which reason the President of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, former Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Munoz-Palma, aptly
describes this Article as the "heart of the new Charter."
forms of environmental degradation. Mining activities," 15 the change of land use

to industrial or commercial purposes,' 16 quarrying operations, 1 7 and the emis-
sion of toxic medical wastes" 8 are only some of the environmental problems
facing the country today.
Oposa also might be used to address the forced displacement of communities
caused by infrastructure and development projects. Small landowners have been
literally bulldozed out of their lands to make way for export processing zones." 9
Thousands of families are under the threat of displacement because of the
construction of government projects such as commercial 120 and sports com- 25
23 24
22
plexes,' 2 1 cement plants, 1 dams,' geothermal plants, 1 mining operations, 1
and the commercial development of land.' 2 6 All these activities necessarily
threaten the environment. May Oposa be used to stop any of these activities?
May a citizen, invoking the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, ask the courts to stop the issuance of all Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreements (FTAAs) under the Mining Act of 1995? May a citizen
challenge all land use conversions as a violation of this right? Again, such relief
might run against the constitutional provisions on the exploitation of natural
resources. It is highly unlikely that the courts will sanction suits that seek blanket
prohibitions against the issuance of natural resources access instruments such as
TLAs or FTAAs. The courts may, instead, find it necessary to fashion a standard
under which the challenged action may be declared unconstitutional.
Oposa might be potent for another reason. In 2000, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 8975 to "ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation and
completion of government infrastructure projects to avoid unnecessary increase
in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs and to immediately enjoy the
115. See Chay Florentino-Hofilena, Searching for Gold in B'laan Country, in PATRIMONY: 6 CASE STUDIES
ON LOCAL POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES 98 (Shiela S. Coronel, ed., 1996).
116. See Carlito Pablo & Cathy Caltares, Farmers Protest Expulsion from Ejercito Land, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Sept. 15, 1998.
117. See Carlito Pablo, Govt Asks Quarry Finns to Shut Down, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Sept. 15, 1998. See
also Babes Montana, Turning Mountains into Deserts, PHIL, J., Sept. 25, 1998; Babes Montana, DisasterLooms
at Quarry Site, PHIL. J., Sept. 26, 1998.
118. See Joel San Juan, MMDA to Inspect Again 40 Hospitals on Waste Disposal,TODAY, Sept. 23, 1998.
119. See Shiela S. Coronel, The Killing Fields of Commerce, in Boss: 5 CASE STUDIES OF LOCAL POLITICS IN
THE PHILIPPINES 3 (Jose F. Lacaba, ed., 1995).
120. See Atienza Backs Bilibid Project, TODAY, Aug. 11, 1998; Bong Cabagbag, Venders Sue Baguio
Officials, TODAY, Dec. 4, 1997.
121. See Erap, Jinggoy Asked to Stop Demolitions, TODAY, Apr. 24, 1998.
122. See J.Vicente, Deny Agno an ECC -Farmers,TODAY, June 25, 1998.
123. See Maurice Malanes, InternationalAction Against Dams Held, TODAY, Mar. 16, 1998.
124. See Malou Talosig, Leyte to Host Biggest GeothermalPlants, TODAY, Feb. 7, 1998.
125. See Maurice Malanes, Bontoc Folk to Govt: Stop Miners, or Else, TODAY, Aug. 18, 1998 at 4; Jaime
Espina, Negros Solon Vows to Fight Mining, Urges Strengthening of Antimining Opposition, TODAY, Aug. 18,
1998; Nereo C. Lujan, Coal Mining Exacts Heavy Toll on Island, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 21, 1998.
126. See Ric Puod, Agrarian Reform Farm Threatened,TODAY, Sept. 3, 1997.
social and economic benefits therefrom."' 127 While seemingly noble in its
objectives, the law may become an agent of environmental degradation because it
bars courts from temporarily stopping these projects pending litigation. The law
provides:
SECTION 3. Prohibitionon the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions and PreliminaryMandatory Injunctions. - No court,
except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, prelimi-
nary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel
the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or
location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of
any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary
for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted
by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those
claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project.
This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency
involving a constitutionalissue, such that unless a temporaryrestrainingorder
is issued, grave injustice and irreparableinjury will arise.The applicant shall
file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in
favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was
not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and
void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract
127. Rep. Act No. 8975, § 1 (2000). Section 2 of the law provides the following definitions:
(a) "National government projects" shall refer to all current and future national government
infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-
owned and -controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related
and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and
materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair
and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
(b) "Service contracts" shall refer to infrastructure contracts entered into by any department, office
or agency of the national government with private entities and nongovernment organizations for
services related or incidental to the functions and operations of the department, office or agency
concerned.
to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without
prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws. I 8
This law could pose a problem for environmental protection advocates because
courts are enjoined from temporarily halting government projects that could be
impairing the environment. Because Oposa established the right to environment
as a constitutional right that may be immediately invoked, it could be argued that
environmental protection falls under the exemption of the law - "extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise."' 129 Proponents of
environmental protection may invoke Oposa as falling within the exemption of
Republic Act No. 8975.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have hoped to explain why Oposa excites environmental
advocates everywhere except in the Philippines. The answer is simple: we have
misunderstood what the Philippine Supreme Court actually said in the case. Even
in the Philippines, Oposa did not inspire litigation to protect the environment and
the Supreme Court's environmental docket remains sparse.1 30 No one in the
Philippines would say that the environment has improved in the last ten years,
13
despite the enactment of a spate of new environment-related laws. '
To summarize, no TLA has ever been cancelled pursuant to the Court's ruling
in Oposa and the DENR may issue TLAs so long as there are forests to fell. At the
last count, 1.3 million hectares of Philippine forestland are still covered by these
instruments.
The Court's spectacular pronouncement that the children had standing to sue
even on behalf of those generations not yet born is merely dictum. In fact, the
Court could have assumed the existence of standing, because the petitioners were
seeking the enforcement of a public right and the performance of a public duty.
The Court could also have waived the issue of standing entirely because of the
magnitude of the issues that were raised. Worse, the pronouncement on standing
to sue for future generations is useless, because the same results could have been
achieved had the petitioners filed the case to protect only their own right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Moreover, the protection of the rights of future
128. Id. § 3 (emphasis added).

129. Id.
130. For a summary of the Supreme Court's decisions on the environment, see Romero, supra note 77, at
94-101.
131. See, e.g., Philippine Plant Variety Protection Act of 2002, Rep. Act No. 9168 (2002); Wildlife Resources
Conservation and Protection Act, Rep. Act No. 9147 (2001); National Caves and Cave Resources Management
and Protection Act, Rep. Act No. 9072 (2001); Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, Rep. Act No.
9003 (2000); Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999, Rep. Act No. 8749 (1999); Animal Welfare Act of 1998, Rep.
Act No. 8485 (1998).
generations is already mandated by the Constitution and several Philippine laws.

The Philippine Supreme Court did not craft anything new but merely reiterated
the directives of the Constitution and Congress.
Yet Oposa should be celebrated for another reason: the Court's ruling that the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful environment is a specific,
self-executory, and actionable right, superior to the Bill of Rights. This part of the
case has been overlooked and should be exploited by environmental protection
advocates to further their cause. Indeed, without any concrete results from
Oposa, the case has been reduced to what the counsel for petitioners was hoping
to avoid: another "rhetorical132
call for responsibility to future generations for the
world's natural resources."
132. Oposa, Jr., supra note 7.

Oposa VS Factoran

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I. Introduction ............................................. 457

Natural Resources (DENR) to cancel all existing Timber License Agreements

critical of the case.6

II. THE CASE

10. Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, 796 (1993).

receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or approving new timber license

B. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

12. Oposa, 224 SCRA at 797.

1. Did The Plaintiffs Have a Cause of Action?

18. Phil. R. Civ. P. 3, § 12 (1997). The Court said that:

22. PiIL. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1987).

2. Were the Issues Raised Political Questions?

3. Are TLAs Protected by the Non-Impairment Clause of the Constitution?

C. THE SEPARATE OPINION

38. Oposa, 224 SCRA at 814.

III. UNDERSTANDING OPOSA

A. TIMBER LICENSE AGREEMENTS WERE NOT CANCELLED

47. Id. at 817.

another 432,958 hectares. 54 Technically, a total of 1,342,962 hectares of forest-

B. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON STANDING TO SUE

illustrate below, standing in Philippine litigation may either be assumed to exist

impairment' of Philippine rainforests and 'arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the

Even his plea as a voter is predicated on an interest held in common by all

Oposa recognized standing in the broadest possible sense by including even

71. Id. at 341-42.

C. PHILIPPINE RULES ON STANDING ARE LENIENT

Even if "standing" had been an issue, Philippine case law is consistent in

1. Standing to Sue May Be Assumed

_strasbourg/panell-hilariogdavidejr.asp. These remarks notwithstanding, the fact remains that "standing"

interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of

Further, the Court said:

In another case, the Court explained, "[w]hen a mandamus proceeding in-

2. Lack of Standing May Be Waived

80. G.R. No. 63915, 136 SCRA 27 (1985).

technicalities of procedure." 84 In taxpayers' suits, such as Oposa, the Court "is

In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government

D. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY HAS NO PRACTICAL EFFECT

90. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110, 137 (1994).

E. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY IS ALREADY LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. The Constitution Was Intended to Protect the Rights of Future Generations

Significantly, the framers intended to incorporate the concept of intergenera-

MR. ROMULO. Madam President, may I suggest the deletion of "POSTER-

MR. ASCUNA. Insofar as it related to causes from the environment such as

102. 4 RECORD 914.

2. Statutes and Case Law

F. THE POTENTIAL USES OF OPOSA

I am not, of course, in any way suggesting that we disregard the environ-

107. Rep. Act No. 7160, § 16 (1991).

pronouncement on standing. Rather, as one author pointed out, Oposa is a

forms of environmental degradation. Mining activities," 15 the change of land use

128. Id. § 3 (emphasis added).

generations is already mandated by the Constitution and several Philippine laws.

132. Oposa, Jr., supra note 7.

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