The Moral Life: Both as a Means and an End

Y. Karunadasa, Middle Way (Volume 69:1 p. 17) May 1994

Course of lectures given at the School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London, in 1983.
It is the view maintained by some modern scholars that Nibbana is
"beyond good and evil" and therefore that from an ethical point of view it is
amoral. This, in other words, means that, according to Buddhism, the moral
life is only a means to an end. The title of this paper shows that we do not
agree with this interpretation. Before we give our own reasons in support of
our interpretation, we propose to discuss here first, the theory of the Buddhist
moral life. It must also be mentioned that we do not intend here to discuss any
of the Buddhist moral precepts.
The early Buddhist teaching on the moral life is based on three
fundamental theories, namely Kammavada, Kiriyavada and Viriyavada [The
following discussion is based on the Pali Tipitika, in particular the
Samyuttanikaya, Vinaya, Anguttaranikaya and Dighanikaya].
The first, in a general sense, means the advocacy of the moral life, the
recognition of the distinction between morally good and bad acts, and thereby,
by implication, that they have good and bad results. It is best understood when
contrasted with the moral nihilism advocated by Ajita Kesakambili who lived
during the time of the Buddha. As recorded in the Samannaphala Sutta, his
opinion on the moral life is as follows: "There is neither fruit nor result of
good or evil deeds. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie,
mere idle talk when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on
the dissolution of the body are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are
not". His refusal to recognize that "there are in the world recluses and
Brahmins who have reached moral perfection" and his denial of Kammavada
altogether, shows that his was a general indictment against all religions.
 For what was common to all religions was Kammavada, which in its
general sense means the recognition of the moral order. It is also worth noting
here that Buddhism did not contest the claim made by other religious teachers
as advocates of Kammavada. What Buddhism contested was that their
Kammavada did not lead to Kiriyavada, that is the doctrine that recognizes the
efficacy of moral acts. This becomes clear, from the rejection, on the part of
Buddhism, of all forms of Kammavada based on the theory of external
causation (paramkata). This theory maintains that there is a principle external
to man - such as God, past kamma, destiny (niyati) and nature (svabhava),
which is the agent of the act (so karoti) and that man is the experiencer of its
result (anno patisamvedeti). It obliterates the causal connection between the
moral act and its effect and thereby it fails to explain the moral efficacy of
(moral) acts. This, in other words, means that it leads to akiriyavada. In the
context of akiriyavada, human effort (purisaviriya) and human endeavour
(purisatthama) have no role to play.
For if there is no connection between what one does and what one
experiences as a result of it, then one's own effort has no practical
significance. This, in other words, means that it does not lead to viriyavada,
the advocacy of human effort. It is against this background that the Buddhist
kammavada becomes significant.
If kammavada in its general sense means the advocacy of the moral life,
the term kamma has a more specific sense. In Buddhism, it is given an entirely
psychological interpretation to cetana, volition, intention or the motive. kamma
is threefold, as mental (mano-samcetana), vocal (vacisamcetana) and physical
(kaya- samcetana) [cf. Visuddhimagga]. This refers to how kamma expresses
itself. Otherwise, only cetana (volition) is kamma. For kamma is not identified
with the means of its manifestation. Hence it is stated: after having willed
(volition) one commits a moral act through the body speech or mind
(Cetayitva kammam karoti kayena vacaya manasa).
Cetana is not an agent, but a mental coefficient which arises by way of
dependent origination (paticcasamuppada). The egocentricity of volitional acts
which constitute what Buddhism calls kamma does not depend on the person
being necessarily aware of it. It is rooted in ignorance. The latent stage which
serves as a fertile background to cetana is called anusaya, [cf. reference article
on ethics, Encyclopaedia of Buddhism] i.e. mental dispositions in their
dormant stage. They get excited when the appropriate conditions arise.
In the Abhidhamma tradition, this stage when the latent tendencies get
excited is called pariyutthana. And their manifestations through vocal and
physical acts is called vitikkama. It is at this stage that an individual's
psychological dispositions have a direct influence, for good or bad, on the
society in which he lives.
It is important to remember here that Buddhism does not consider that
cetana which is kamma is the result of another (past) kamma.If it were, then
this would lead to kammic determinism, the doctrine referred to in the
Buddhist texts as sabbam pubbekatahetu (i.e. everything is due to the past
kamma).
Such a theory gives rise to the situation where the present kamma is
completely determined by the past kamma. This in turn precludes all
possibility for the exercise of individual effort (attakara). If Buddhism avoids
karmic determinism, it also avoids strict indeterminism, the theory which
maintains that everything happens due to befallen chance or due to fortuitous
circumstances (adhiccasamuppanna). It is by avoiding these two extremes that
Buddhism recognizes the possibility of human effort (attakara). Human effort
is not strictly determined or indetermined, but can serve as a factor in the
causal process. The very evident fact that we feel free to act and exercise our
effort (arambhadhatu) in many situations is cited as an example for the
possibility of human effort". Hence the Buddha says: "How can one walking
up and down with one's own effort say that there is no personal effort". The
importance attached to human effort is also shown by the use of a variety of
terms to designate it: attakara, purisakara, arambha-dhata, purisatthama,
purisa-viriya.
Let us now consider how Buddhism seeks to evaluate volitional acts
(kamma) as morally wholesome and morally unwholesome. This is done with
reference to two kinds of criteria. One is based on the Buddhist teaching on the
root-causes of what is morally wholesome (kusala) or otherwise (akusala).
According to Buddhism all that is morally unwholesome can be traced to three
root-causes. They are lobha (greed or covetousness), dosa (hate or malice) and
moha (confusion or delusion). These are the primary psychological
dispositions which manifest themselves in different forms. Conversely, their
opposites, namely alobha (non-greed), adosa (absence of hate or malice) and
amoha (absence of confusion or delusion) are the root causes to which all that
is morally wholesome can be traced. Any karmic/volitional act which is
motivated by the unwholesome roots is akusala, morally unwholesome.
Conversely, any karmic/volitional act which is motivated by their opposite
root-causes is kusala (morally wholesome).
The other criterion is based on objective factors in that it takes into
consideration the nature of the consequences a volitional act has, both on the
person who commits it and also on persons other than himself. This latter
criterion is mentioned in the Ambalatthika Rahulovada Sutta of the Majjhima
Nikaya. Here, the Buddha tells Rahula that just as a mirror is meant for
reflection, even so every volitional act should be committed after proper
reflection. The object of this reflection is the possible consequences which an
act brings about on oneself and on others. If a particular act brings about
harmful consequences to oneself (attabyabadhaya) or to others
(parabyabadhaya) or to both (attabyabadhaya caparabyabadhaya), it should
be evaluated as morally unwholesome. Conversely, any act which brings about
opposite (beneficial) consequences in a similar way is to be evaluated as
morally wholesome.
In the context of the Buddhist teaching on rebirth or the samsaric
dimension of the empiric individuality, these consequences should be
understood in a wider perspective, without limiting them to the immediate
present. In point of fact, all Buddhist teachings on morality should be
understood in the context of Samsara and Nibbana. For in the ultimate sense
what is morally wholesome is that which leads to Nibbana and conversely
what is morally unwholesome is that which leads away from it.
What we have discussed so far amounts to a brief resume of the
Buddhist theory of the moral life. Its actual practice is based on the Noble
Eightfold Path, the middle path that transcends the two extremes of sensual
gratification and self-mortification. Since this path is often defined as the path
that leads to Nibbana, this has given rise to a misconception that it is not
meant for the laymen who lead a worldly life. We would like to give three
reasons as to why this interpretation is not acceptable.
In the first place it must be noted here that all the Buddhist moral
teachings, whether they concern the clergy or the laity, are ultimately traceable
to the Noble Eightfold Path. It therefore follows that the Buddhist teachings
pertaining to happiness in this world (dhittadhamma-sukha) and well-being in
future existence (samparayahita) are all based on it. This means that it is the
repository of Buddhist ethics from which all other moral teachings emanate.
Secondly, that the laymen, too, were taken into consideration in defining the
Path-factors is shown by the definition given to samma ajiva, or Right
Livelihood. This is defined as abstention from trading in weaponry, slavery,
intoxicating drinks and poison, also as abstention from slaughtering and
killing. One objection that could be raised here is that some who have given up
the household life in order to practise the Higher Life (brahmacariya) could
also engage in this kind of activity. This objection could also be supported by
reference to some of the rules laid down in the Buddhist Vinaya. However, we
wish to submit that the likelihood is otherwise.
The third reason is the most important since it is based on direct textual
evidence. In the Magga Samyutta of the Samyuttanikaya the Buddha refers to
two kinds of path. One is miccha patipada (the wrong path) and other is
samma patipada (the right path), After defining the wrong path as the direct
opposite of the Noble Eightfold Path - the Buddha says: "Monks, I do not
uphold (na vannemi) the wrong path either for laymen or monks" (Gihino
caham bhikkhave pabbajitassa va micchapatipadam na vannemi). This clearly
shows that the Middle Path which, according to Buddhism is the Right Path is
meant for both laymen as well as monks.
What this means is that it could be followed on different levels or in
varying degrees of intensity. As a moral teaching it is the ideal that Buddhism
upholds for all - the laymen and the monks. The implication is that if the
Noble Eightfold Path cannot be followed fully, it is better to follow it as far as
possible. If the best thing is to realize the ideal, the next best thing is to be
nearer the ideal. This situation is, in fact, also true of all present-day social and
political ideals. Just because there are varying degrees of difference between
the ideal and the practice we do not propose to give up the ideal. The ideal is
an invitation to do the right thing and refrain from doing the wrong thing.
As a religious teacher who upholds the moral life, the Buddha defines his
position by the following words: "You yourselves should do what ought to be
done. The Tathagatas (only) show the way" (Tumhehi kiccamatappam;
akkhataro Tathagata) [Dhammapada]. Therefore the Buddhist moral
teachings may be described as descriptive rather than prescriptive. There are
no injunctions or commandments as to what ought to be done and what ought
not to be done. This also means that good and bad acts are neither rewarded
nor punished, but that they have their own consequences according to the
principles of moral causation.
However, saddha or faith in the Buddha and his Doctrine (Dhamma) is
necessary if the followers were to embark on the course of spiritual discipline
which culminates in Nibbana. Reference is made in the Buddhist text to two
kinds of saddha. One is called amulika saddha, i.e. baseless or blind faith. The
other is called akaravatisaddha, rational faith, i.e. faith or confidence arrived
at by examining reasonable evidence for any claim made. It is this latter kind
of faith that Buddhism emphasizes. In point of fact, excessive faith or devotion
to the Buddha could be an obstacle to spiritual progress as is seen from the
story of the Buddhist monk called Vakkali.
It, therefore, follows that those who have faith in the efficacy of the
Dhamma to elevate a person from a morally lower position to a morally higher
one come to consider the Buddha as a Moral Authority. Here by authority is
not meant to be a person who has authoritative power, but one who has
authoritative knowledge on the subject. Hence the followers of the Buddha,
both laymen and monks, consider him as the highest authority on all problems
relating to the moral life. Therefore they all have faith in the Buddha and the
Dhamma. There have been some attempts made to minimize the importance of
the role of faith in Buddhism. Textual evidence does not support such a
conclusion.
However, in presenting the Buddhist moral teachings the Buddha also
took into consideration the necessity of keeping to a minimum what may be
called the faith-factor. A moral teaching, if it is to be effective, should be
persuasive rather than coercive. In this connection he also took into
consideration that if not all, at least the intelligent members in the society
(vinnu purissa) have the ability to be rationally persuaded to make a proper
distinction between what is morally good and bad. For this purpose the
Buddha has laid down a set of guidelines which each individual could follow
when confronted by a moral problem.
One such guideline is the one called attupama or self-comparison. This
is an invitation to the individual to put himself in another individual's position.
If one does not like to be killed, it follows that the other person also does not
like to be killed. This is very well illustrated in the well-known Dhammapada
verse:
"All tremble at punishment, all fear death. . Comparing oneself to
another, let one refrain from killing another, let one refrain from
killing and tormenting others."
The same idea is more poignantly expressed in the Sammyuttanikaya:
"What is not pleasant and delightful to me is not pleasant and
delightful to the other person either. How could I inflict upon another
that which is not pleasant and delightful to me. Having reflected in
this manner, he, on his own part refrains from killing and encourages
others, too, to refrain from killing."
The basic idea behind this moral precept is that all living beings, whether they
are human or otherwise, are led by the pleasure-principle (sukhakama) and
therefore recoil from pain (Sabbe satta sukhakama dukkhapatikkula)". If the
human beings, as observed in the Vasettha Sutta, differ biologically (jatimaya)
from all other species of living beings, yet what is common to all is the fact
that they like to be happy, they do not like to be unhappy.
A second guideline for moral action is the one based on what is called
the three-fold adhipateyya or the three kinds of dominant influence. This
requires the necessity of examining the moral quality of an act from three
different points of view. The first, called attadhipateyya, invites the individual
to examine whether the act he is going to commit results in self-blame or
repentance. This is a clear reference to what may be called conscience
although a word corresponding to it does not seem to occur in the early
Buddhist texts. This is a case of allowing oneself to be controlled by oneself.
The second, called lokadhipatiyya, requires the individual to examine
whether such and such acts will be approved or disapproved by the intelligent
people. This is a case of allowing oneself to be controlled by public opinion.
However, the Buddhist idea of public opinion does not correspond to how we
understand it today, i.e. as the opinion of the majority. According to Buddhism
what matters is neither the opinion of the majority nor that of the minority, but
the opinion of those who really know - the term used is vinnu purisa. This is
the yardstick that should be adopted when we are confronted with what others
say. Hence what is morally approvable is referred to a vinnuppasattha and
conversely what is morally reprehensible is called vinnugarahita. The third
point of view from which our acts are to be examined is called
dhammadhipatiyya, i.e. whether they conform to the Moral Norm. This
threefold examination is thus intended as a check from refraining from doing
what is morally unwholesome and also as an incentive to do what is morally
wholesome.
A third guideline is based on a rational appeal to a reasonably intelligent
person's moral sense - if this term is permissible. In the Kalama Sutta, it is
recorded that the people of Kalama complained to the Buddha that they were at
a loss to discriminate what is morally good and bad, because they were
confronted with a variety of contradictory opinions on this matter. Then the
Buddha put this question to them: "Now what think you, Kalamas, when greed
(for example) arises within a man, does it arise to his profit or to his loss?"
When the Kalamas admitted that it conduces to one's own loss, the Buddha
continued: "Now, Ka1amas, does not this man, thus become greedy, being
overcome by greed and losing control of his mind - does he not kill a living
creature, take what is not given, go after another's wife, tell lies and induce
others, too, to commit deeds that would conduce to disadvantage and
unhappiness for a long time?" This same observation was made in respect of
malice (dosa) and delusion (confusion). A similar argument, with the opposite
effect, is repeated in respect of the absence of greed, malice and delusion. It
was through this rational appeal to Kalamas' moral sense that the Buddha was
able to convince them of the undesirability of what is morally reprehensible
and of the desirability of what is morally rewarding. As P. D. Premasiri
observes, the Kalama Sutta "is philosophically significant in that it draws
attention to the possibility of independent inquiry into moral questions."
The next question that we propose to take up is the relative position which
Buddhism assigns to our own good and the good of others. How is the
distinction between egoism and altruism maintained? The Buddhist answer to
this question is very well illustrated in a classification of individuals into four
groups. The first individual is he who does not strive either for his own well-
being (attahita) or for the well-being of others (parahita). The second
individual is he who pursues the well-being of others but fails to pursue his
own well-being. The third individual is he who strives for his own well-being
and not for the well-being of others. The fourth individual is he who strives
for his own well-being as well as for the well-being of others. The most
important thing that must not be overlooked here is that in this classification,
the words "pursuit of well-being" mean the pursuit of moral well- being, and
not any other kind of well-being. We should bear this in mind if we are to
draw the correct conclusion as to how Buddhism draws the line between one's
own good and the good of others.
This classification of the four kinds of individuals is done in an
ascending order of excellence. Therefore, the fourth individual is judged to be
the best. An examination of the classification should also show the great
importance attached to one's own moral well-being. This is very clear from the
fact that the third individual who pursues his own moral well-being is superior
to the second person who pursues the moral well being of others while
neglecting his own moral well-being. This same idea is implied by the fact that
the fourth individual is judged to be the best. If the fourth individual is held
out as the best this means that, although he pursues the moral well-being of
others, he also pursues his own moral well-being.
Why does Buddhism attatch more importance to one's own moral well-
being? Does this mean that the early Buddhist morality is individualistic, that
it considers self-interest more important than altruism? In fact, this is one
accusation levelled against what is derogatorily called Hinayana, the Lowly or
Inferior Vehicle (not Small Vehicle as is usually translated) by the Mahayana.
This kind of assessment of early Buddhist moral teachings is not lacking in
modern writings on Buddhism, either. The question we raised need not lead to
any kind of unwarranted speculation. For the answer to it is provided by
Buddhism itself.
The Buddhist answer to this question is; that one who is lacking in
morality cannot make others morally good. In illustrating this situation it is
observed that a person who is stuck in mud cannot pull out another who is also
stuck in mud. The lesson to be drawn is that a person who is stuck in the mud
of moral depravity cannot save another who is also in the same predicament.
Before one seeks to eliminate another's moral depravity , one must first
eliminate it from oneself. This reminds us of the well-known saying: Example
is better than precept.
It is also maintained that the benefits of moral cultivation are reciprocal.
When a person eliminates from his mind such unwholesome mental
dispositions as greed, malice and delusion, they will not manifest themselves
in practical form in relation to others. Thus moral cultivation has not only an
individual dimension but a social dimension as well. This is the significance of
the Buddha's saying: "Monks, one who takes care of oneself, takes care of
others. And one who takes care of others, takes care of oneself."
If Buddhism attaches more importance to an individual's own moral
well-being, from this it should not be concluded that a person who has attained
moral perfection remains indifferent to society. On the contrary he addresses
himself to the pursuit of others' moral well-being. This is clearly shown not
only by the life led by the Buddha, but also by the lives led by the Arahants as
recorded in the Pali texts. It is best illustrated by the Buddha's admonition to
the first sixty Arahants to go forth and preach the doctrine of emancipation
"for the benefit, well- being and happiness of the many".
Now let us take the question which we raised at the very beginning of
this lecture. Is the Buddhist moral life only a means to an end which, in other
words, means, is nibbana, from an ethical point of view, amoral? One of the
first scholars who came out with the view that the Buddhist moral life is only a
means to an end is S. Tachibana. In his 'Ethics of Buddhism' he says that both
according to the Upanishads and early Buddhism, the highest spiritual
attainment transcends all moral distinctions. Hence he maintains that "when
one attains nibbana, one has reached the mental condition where there is no
consciousness of moral, aesthetical or logical distinction. The relative ideas,
therefore, of good and evil, pleasure and pain, agreeableness and
disagreeableness, right and wrong are all annihilated to him [S Tachibana:
Ethics of Buddhism, Colombo, 1943 (reprinted), pp 37 ff.]. This conclusion is
based on the authority of several canonical instances where it is asserted that
one who has attained Nibbana transcends both punna and papa, i.e. what is
morally good and bad. Tachibana's interpretation has been endorsed by a
number of scholars since then.
 As far as we are aware the first to contest this interpretation, which
remained unchallenged since the publication of Tachibana's book in 1925, is P.
D. Premasiri in his reference article to the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism on
Buddhist Ethics. In his opinion why this conclusion is wrong is that it fails to
take notice of another pair of ethically evaluative terms, namely kusala and
akusala. This means that early Buddhism uses two pairs of terms -or ethical
evaluation: One is punna and papa, and the other is kusala and akusala. Papa
and akusala seem to mean the same thing, i.e. what is morally bad or
unwholesome. However the same is not true of punna andkusala. Textual
evidence suggests that there is a qualitative difference between them.
The term punna appears to become significant only in the context of
samsara. Thus acts of punna are always described as those which have a
tendency to promote one's well-being and happiness in future births in
samsara. It is often stated that those who accumulate punna would be born in
heavenly existences. As the Dhammapada says, one who has done acts of
punna delights both here and hereafter. (Katapunno ubhayattha nandati) . That
acts of punna do not lead to Nibbana is clearly shown by what the Bodhisattva
tells Mara: "I do not see any purpose even in an iota of punna (anumattena
punnena attho mayham na vijjati)[Suttanipata].
Kusala, on the other hand, represents a higher level of what is morally
good. It appears to have been used to refer to such acts which have an opposite
effect, i.e., rather than prolonging the samsara process, they lead towards the
attainment of Nibbana. Buddhist texts therefore omit the term punna and use
the term kusala in analysing the conditions that conduce to the attainment of
Nibbana. Thus, although punna and kusala mean what is morally good, there
is this distinction to be noted: Acts of punna are those that ensure well being in
samsara. Acts of kusala are those which lead towards Nibbana. From this
distinction it does not follow that acts of punnaare discouraged. It is certainly
better than papa and akusala. As Nathan Katz rightly observes, punna could
be defined as the habituating ground of kusala, because it prepares the
necessary background for the emergence of kusala.
We may then conclude that, according to Buddhism, what is morally
good has two levels. One is represented by punna and the other by kusala.
Both have significance in the context of the Buddhist doctrine of karma,
because both operate within the sphere of karma.In this connection it must
also be noted here that Nibbana is described as Kammanirodha, i.e. as the
cessation of karma. Then the question that arises here is this: if acts of kusala
prepare the way to Nibbana, what exactly is the position of kusala when
Nibbana is attained? P. D. Premasiri seems to have overlooked this problem as
he does not discuss the position of kusala in relation to the definition of
Nibbana as the cessation of karma.
What should be clarified here is that since Nibbana transcends karma
there cannot be in Nibbana acts of kusala- kamma. However, there is evidence
to suggest that at this level kusala begins to operate at a higher level, a level
that transcends the operation of karma.This explains why one who has attained
Nibbana is described as sampanna- kusala (endowed with kusala qualities),
parama-kusala (has reached the culmination in what is kusala). He is the one
who has reached perfection (paramippatta) in noble virtue (ariya-sila), in
noble concentration (ariyasamadhi), in noble wisdom (ariyapanna) and in
noble emancipation (ariya-vimutti).
Accordingly, one who has attained Nibbana is also defined as one who is
endowed with ten kusala qualities (dasangehi kusala-dhammehi
samannagata). What is most significant to notice here is that among these ten
kusala qualities eight are identical with the eight factors of the Noble Eightfold
Path. The other two are Right Emancipation (sammavimutti) and Right
Knowledge and Insight (Samma nanadassana). This suggests that the latter
two factors are what result from the practice of the eight wholesome qualities
of the Noble Eightfold Path. The fact that the eighth Path Factors are included
among the ten kusala qualities of one who has attained Nibbana shows that to
follow the Path means to become the Path, to absorb it internally. Therefore
the Noble Eightfold Path should not be understood in the sense of a path that
leads to a building. The Noble Eightfold Path is itself Nibbana, when to this is
added the two additional factors called Right Emancipation and Right
Knowledge and Vision. The attainment of Nibbana is due to the perfect
practice of the eight Path Factors which result in the emergence of two
additional factors, i.e. Right Emancipation and Right Knowledge and Vision.
Thus, according to Buddhism, the means as well as the end coincide.
The foregoing observations should show that Nibbana is not an ideal
which transcends all kusala qualities. It is in fact the very culmination, the
highest perfection (parama-kusala) of all those qualities which Buddhism
assesses as wholesome. The fact that one who has attained Nibbana is
described as sabbakusaladhamma-samannagata clearly shows that he is
endowed with all kusala qualities. The fact that he is also described as sabba-
akusala-dhamma- pahina shows that he is free from all akusala or
unwholesome qualities. Thus our conclusion is that Nibbana cannot be
described as amoral in the sense that it "goes beyond both good and evil." If it
does transcend anything it is what we call evil, and not what is good.
Therefore Nibbana should be understood as an out-and-out ethical ideal.
Those who maintain that Nibbana is beyond good and evil sometimes hint at
the Theravada Abhidhamma as providing a clue for such a conclusion. That
this is also due to a misreading of the texts is clear from what the
Abhidhamma has to say on this matter. It must first be mentioned here that the
ethical terminology of the Abhidhamma is somewhat different from that of the
Pali suttas. For in the former, the pair of terms punna and papa is not retained,
only the pair of terms kusala and akusala is used. The latter two terms refer to
karmically qualifiable wholesome and unwholesome volitional acts [cf.
Dhammasanghani]. Now, since Nibbana transcends both kusala-kamma and
akusala-kamma, the consciousness of one who has attained Nibbana is
described as neither kusala nor akusala. In order to refer to this particular
consciousness and also to the consciousness which arises as a result of karma
(= vipaka) a new term is coined. It is called abyakata, that is that which
cannot be determined either as good or bad from the point of view of karma.
This then means that the result of karma, which is vipaka as well as
Nibbanic consciousness, are neutral. Apparently, the use of the term neutral
suggests that Nibbana is beyond good and evil.
Such a conclusion does not arise if the term neutral is understood in relation to
its proper context.
Here neutral means neutral in relation to kusala-kamma and akusala-
kamma. This is another way of saying that Nibbana transcends the operation of
karma altogether. This is precisely what early Buddhism has to say on this
matter. Now, since the consciousness of one who has attained Nibbana is
neither kusala nor akusala, i.e. from the point of view of karma, the
Abhidhamma has coined another term to designate it. It is called kiriya-citta. It
is very likely that this term is coined in order to distinguish the Nibbanic
consciousness from the consciousness that arises as a result of karma
(=vipaka-citta); because, as mentioned above, both are abyakata (neutral).
What must be emphasized here is that although the kiriya-citta is neutral
from the point of view of karma, it is not neutral from an ethical point of view.
This is because as in early Buddhism, the Abhidhamma, too, recognizes a
higher order of morality which transcends karma.It is precisely for this reason
that the kiriya-citta is also defined as one of the sobhana-cittas
[Abhidhammatthasangaha]. Sobhana-citta means beautiful consciousness. For,
according to the Abhidhamma, what is morally good is also morally beautiful.
From what we have observed so far, it should become clear that,
according to early Buddhist texts, what is good has three levels. One level is
represented by the term punna. It refers to those self-motivated good acts
which ensure a better position in samsara. The other level is represented by
the term kusala. It refers to those good acts which tend towards the realization
of Nibbana. Both levels operate within the sphere of the operation of karma. If
both punna and kusala are judged to be good, it is purely on the basis of
karma. The third level of what is good is also called kusala, but in a different
sense. It is kusala in this second sense that operates in Nibbana. Since Nibbana
is described as the complete cessation of karma, it logically follows that
Nibbana transcends the first two levels of what is good, because they operate
within the sphere of karma. It therefore follows that, in Nibbana, the kusala
operates transcending the sphere of karma.
How does this third level of what is good operate in Nibbana? This is
the next question that must be clarified here. The answer to this question is
found in the definition of Nibbana as the cessation of greed (ragakkhaya),
hatred or malice (dosakkhaya) and confusion or delusion (mohakkhaya). This
shows that one who had attained Nibbana is no more conditioned by these
three factors, which are defined as the root-causes of all that is morally
unwholesome. They are also defined as pamanakarana. Pamanakarana means
that which sets limits to our freedom. When we are overcome by them we do
not get a clear and total vision into the nature of reality. What we get instead is
a blurred and twisted vision, coloured by our own prejudices. One who has
attained Nibbana has transcended all such limiting and conditioning factors.
Hence the Arahant is described as simatiga, i.e. one who has gone beyond all
boundaries, boundaries that bind the total vision. Accordingly the Arahant is
said to lead a life with a mind transcending all boundaries(vimariyadikata-
cetasa-viharati). This freedom from all boundaries comes with the
decomposition of the self-notion. When the self-notion and the egocentricity
are no more, the mind becomes universal. Thus the Buddhist ideal of
emancipation coincides with the Buddhist ideal of universalism. This also
implies that the idea of universalism is a barren notion if it is not grounded on
moral perfection. When it is maintained that the acts of one who has attained
Nibbana are not conditioned by greed, malice and delusion, this means that
they are free and spontaneous acts. They are free from self-interest, free from
self-motivation, free from self-expectation and free from any kind of self-
identification. This is because realization of Nibbana means the complete
elimination of all self-centred motives and ego-centric impulses. Such acts are
not without interest, but free from self-interest. Renunciation means not
renunciation of activity but renunciation of self-centred activity.
Before we conclude this lecture, we would like to draw your attention to
another important aspect of the Buddhist moral life, that is from the point of
view of Nibbana experience. This refers to the fact that, according to
Buddhism, moral perfection should be accompanied by knowledge and must
also be based on knowledge. If they do not go together moral perfection loses
its very foundation. To put it briefly, this means that a person who is morally
perfect but is not aware of his moral perfection is not morally perfect. This
may appear rather paradoxical, nevertheless from the Buddhist point of view it
is the case.
This situation is very well illustrated in the Samanamandika Sutta of the
Majjhimanikaya which records the theory of moral perfection as advocated by
a religious teacher of the Buddha's day, called Uggahamana. As recorded here
his definition of a morally perfect person is a follows:
"A person who does not do an evil act with his body, speaks no evil
speech, intends no evil intention, leads no evil livelihood is - to that
 extent - morally perfect".
Apparently this seems to be how the Buddha himself teaches moral perfection.
However, the fact that it comes to be criticized by the Buddha shows that this
definition of moral perfection is not acceptable to Buddhism. In criticizing it
the Buddha makes these observations:
"According to this view of moral perfection, even a young baby-
boy, lying on its back, would be morally perfect. A young baby-boy,
lying on its back, does not think of his own body. How then could he
do an evil deed with his body, except for a little kicking about. He
does not think of his own voice. How then could he utter an evil
speech, except for a little crying? He does not think about his own
intention. How then could he intend an evil intention, except for a
little excitement? He does not think of his own mode of livelihood.
How then could he lead an evil mode of livelihood, except for taking
his mother's milk?"
This criticism is based on the observation that the naive innocence of a
baby-boy, lying on his back, is not based on knowledge and is not
accompanied by awareness. It is not something that is deliberately and
consciously cultivated. In the same way, moral perfection devoid of the
knowledge factor is not moral perfection. This same idea is repeated in a
different form elsewhere as follows:
"Just as a man whose hands and feet are cut off knows that his
hands and feet are cut off, even so one who is morally perfect,
whether he is walking or standing still or asleep or awake, in him
there is constant and perpetual presence of knowledge to the effect
that all mental defilements are destroyed by him."
The Buddhist moral life is not based on a theory which states that either
the sense-organs or corresponding sense- objects are in themselves an obstacle
to mental culture. If two oxen, one white and the other black - so runs the
argument - are tied by a yoke, it is not correct to say that the black ox is a
bond for the white ox or vice-versa. For it is the yoke that constitutes the bond,
it is that which unites them both. In the same way, what stands as an obstacle
to mental culture are neither the sense organs nor the sense objects, but
craving or attachment. If it were otherwise, then one would have to rule out
the very possibility of the practice of the moral life (Brahmacariya). More or
less the same idea is reflected in the Indriyabhavana sutta where the Buddha
questions a disciple of Parasariya as to how his Master teaches moral culture.
In reply the latter says that the senses are to be trained to the extent when they
fail to fulfill their respective functions: The eye does not see forms; the ear
does not hear sounds. Then the Buddha rejoins that this kind of mental culture
leads to the conclusion that the blind and the deaf have their senses best
cultivated . The clear implication is that mental culture is not to be associated
with the suppression of the senses. They should be cultivated to see things as
they truly are (Yathabhuta).
The following quotation from E.M. Hare's translation of the
Anguttaranikaya [Gradual Sayings, Vol III, p. 291, Pali Text Society]
eloquently expresses the Buddhist attitude as well as the Buddhist solution to
the problem of man's ensnarement by his own passionate desires:
In passionate purpose lies man's sense-desire
The world's gay glitters are not sense-desires
In passionate purpose lies man's sense-desire
The world's gay glitters as they are abide
But wise men hold desire therefore in cheek.