Cayetano vs Monsod
Its aim, according to
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does
not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the
chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least
ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held
various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What
constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances.
The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business
counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of
this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work
will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
Ulep vs Legal Clinic
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales.
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford
the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The
Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal
Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter
how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
“specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists
in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law.
These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence
in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that
besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The
Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether
such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
 HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice
is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-
offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are 2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with office address at 22
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine
jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute Magsaysay Drive,Olongapo City. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case
his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the RTC, Makati City,
the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage,
bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate.
Such is highly reprehensible. Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant averred

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client,
propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of
advertisement: Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list his counsel in the cases.

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

Maniago vs De dios Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against

her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed
penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon receipt
by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in
of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a
the practice of law despite having been suspended by the Court.
Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a
she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.
Japanese national, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73,
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter

Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and

orderingrespondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the complainant to file a supplemental

for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable, affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of Atty. De Dios and the

respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to the court particular courts where respondent appeared as counsel in the following cases: (1)

order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-

on account of Judge Farrales letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some 6153.

municipalities in Zambales, which gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet

allowed to resume her practice of law and that her notarial commission for the years In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in

2007 and 2008 is revoked. Acting on the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on the vernacular, which reads:

April 23, 2007 in this wise:
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios)
Respondents Urgent Motion for Clarification dated 14 March 2007
praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6)
months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17
November 2001 onwards as proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves
to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six (6)
month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on
17 November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated
30 January 2002.
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant
2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear
si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang
Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,]
Olongapo City.
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang]
mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong October 10, 2005, nakasaad
din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch
73, Regional Trial Court ofOlongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-
6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong September 26,
2005 at hanggang ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified
Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the Session ng Subic Municipal Trial
Court na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case
No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon
Pullido noong December 14, 2001.

Maniago, during which she allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in 5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty.
de Dios, x x x -
any way prohibited from practice. The complaint, she added, was baseless and
5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de
malicious, and should be dismissed outright. Dios noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley
Pagaduan vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case
No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de
Dios isang (1) araw pa lamang mula
 magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g]
May 16, 2001. The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios
noong May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus was the OBCs reply to an inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator
Dr. Ma. Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr.
Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0- regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.[1] Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting
2001. Ito ay dalawang (2) araw mula
magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios of the suspension order was not automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court
noong May 16, 2001.
in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and
5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang
(a) affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista
noong May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales
by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at
(c) isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et
C. Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag
notaryo na ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na al., which states:
ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May
16, 2001.
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands
6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang
until he would have satisfactorily shown his compliance with the
patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa aking personal na
Courts resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby
kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na
extend for more than six months. The lifting of a lawyers
nilabag ni Atty. de Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni
suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa
the Courts decision, and an order from the Court lifting the
na may petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de
suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order to
Dios na nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.
enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession.[2]

A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s)
no new matters raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that the opinion of
of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of
Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12
the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the
February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this
practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation,
Honorable Court.According to her, the resolution should be the final nail to the coffin of
and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the
this case.
order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Courts
alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943,
consideration.
where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the

required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid
confusion and conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC recommended that the
Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law.
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere
privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme
Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.[3] Whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his
clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme
Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.[4] However, as much as the Court will not
hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a
lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession
unreasonably.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following
guidelines be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer
from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice
of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory
upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a
Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that
he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the
period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the
IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by
him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondents compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under
oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as
may be warranted.
Letter of Arevalo
Facts:
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of
IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to,
and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He
maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in
the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one’s
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
Issue:
whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law
Ruling:
The supreme court held that the payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one’s membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is
engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed
the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In
such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation
to pay dues could have been discontinued.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA Case Digest
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA
G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May
27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner
contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is
in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent
cases “ does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual
practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination
can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time
he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation
and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice
of law.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto,
or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the
patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law
and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts
and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the
transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical
and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to
a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men,
which is not the case.
VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. MARIANO
Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson
Pineda. Aurora proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of
properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved by the trial court
and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated
but they still billed petitioner additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson
refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to
a total of P2M.
Issues:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?
Held:
A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident
of the main action. RTC has jurisdiction.
The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value
of the properties awarded to Vinson. What respondents were demanding was
additional payment for service rendered in the same case.
The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was
governed by quantum meruit.
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to
avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be
avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by
respondents. It was an act of unconscionable greed!
In re Cunanan As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for
1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down
FACTS: was based under the following reasons:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations
from 1946 up to and including 1955.” 1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the
bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that
this was very close to the end of World War II;
Section 1 provided the following passing marks: 2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on
the petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to
1946-1951………………70% determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in
excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on
1952 …………………….71% who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes
1953……………………..72% to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953.
Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the
bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to
1954……………………..73% alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

1955……………………..74% In re Edillon

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced
in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946
to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account
of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws
are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee
to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membershipis merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of
the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it
is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program –
the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable
as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of
its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all
members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC
said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree
could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised
to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch.
Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s
reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the
use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of
practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication
as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

Sycip

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on
May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of
their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that
no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a
professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the
partners who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held: