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Leviste v. Alameda, et. al.

G.R. No. 182677


Aug. 3, 2010

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide for the death
of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed
an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-
examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter
issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and
directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for him.
Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial
court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on
to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide.
From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision
of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.

Held:

Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.
Borlongan vs Pena
G.R. No. 143591
May 5, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages and attorney’s
fees against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss, including several
documents as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the documents were falsified. He subsequently filed his Complaint-
Affidavit with the City Prosecutor.

The prosecutor found probable cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC. Warrants of arrest were issued
for the petitioners / accused. Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they
wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban. On the scheduled date for the arraignment,
despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for them. The accused
questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest. However, the trial court ruled that posting of bail constitutes a
waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite posting bail? YES

HELD:

The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal
Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment
is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections
thereto.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that
she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her
by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a
party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible.

Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the
same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving
their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their
plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court
a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising
the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to
avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest.
SALVADOR REBELLION, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175700
July 5, 2010
FACTS:
This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
(RA) No. 6425 (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended). An Information was filed
charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On July 27, 2000, the Mayor’s
Action Command (MAC) team of Mandaluyong witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to his
companion Clarito Yanson. Suspecting that that the substance was “shabu,” team members PO3 Garcia and PO3
Sotomayor alighted from their motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able to completely get hold of the
plastic sachet because of their arrival. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what petitioner was holding, the latter presented
three strips of aluminum foil which the former confiscated. There and then, petitioner and Clarito were apprehended
and brought to the CID for investigation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside
the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Petitioner
denied the charge against him. On appeal, petitioner insisted that his warrantless arrest was unlawful since he was
not committing any crime when he was arrested. On September 26, 2006, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC
with modification. The appellate court sustained the validity of the warrantless arrest of petitioner holding that the
latter was caught by the MAC team in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of giving to Clarito a plastic sachet
of shabu. Petitioner argues that since his arrest was illegal, the eventual search on his person was also unlawful.
Thus, the illicit items confiscated from him are inadmissible in evidence for being violative of his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether this is a legitimate instance of a warrantless arrest, i.e. under circumstances sufficient to engender
a reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed or had just been committed.
HELD:
The Court finds the petitoner guilty of the crime charged. Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks
merit. Nowhere in the records did the Court find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his
arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. In this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during
the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. Also, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made under any of the
following circumstances: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. There is sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was effected under Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto as he was then committing
a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting team.

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