TORTS AND DAMAGES

I. INTRODUCTION

​A. CONCEPT: CULPA AQUILIANA, QUASI-DELICT, TORTS

--------------KPD--------------

DEFINITION OF TORT IN COMMON LAW

st
1 definition
1. unlawful violation

​of a private right

​ ​ ot created by contract AND
n
2. which gives rise to an action for damages

nd
2 definition
1. an act or omission
2. producing injury to another
3. without any previous existing lawful relation
4. of which said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident

rd
3 definition
1. a private / civil wrong or injury
2. other than breach of contract
3. for w/c the court will provide a REMEDY
4. in the form of an action for damages

th
4 definition
1. violation
2. of a duty

​imposed by general law or otherwise

​upon all persons occupying the relation to each other
which is involved in a given transaction

Note: There must ALWAYS be a VIOLATION of SOME DUTY that must give rise by OPERATION OF LAW and not by mere agreement of the parties.

It may be:

1. a DIRECT INVASION of some LEGAL RIGHT of the individual

2. the INFRACTION of some PUBLIC DUTY by which SPECIAL DAMAGES accres to the individual
3. VIOLATION of some PRIVATE OBLIGATION by which SPECIAL DAMAGES accrues to the individual
KINDS OF TORT IN COMMON LAW

1. Intentional torts – includes conduct where the ACTOR

​DESIRES TO CAUSE THE CONSEQUENCES of his act or
BELIEVES the CONSEQUENCES are substantially CERTAIN TO RESULT FROM IT
Includes:
assault,
battery,
false imprisonment,
defamation,
invasion or privacy and
interference of property

​ ​ 2
KEYWORD: BAD-FI

2. Negligence – involves VOLUNTARY ACTS OR OMISSIONS which result in injury to others WITHOUT INTENDING TO CAUSE THE SAME;
The ACTOR FAILS TO EXERCISE DUE CARE in performing such acts or omissions

3. Strict liability in tort – the person is made LIABLE INDEPENDENT OF FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE upon submission of proof of certain facts
3 ELEMENTS OF TORT

1. Right and duty

2. Act or omission
3. Damage
Keyword: RAD

DEFINITION OF QUASI-DELICT
Art. 2176 – Whoever
by act or omission
causes damage to another
there being FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE
is obliged to PAY FOR THE DAMAGE DONE.
Such FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE
if there is NO PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTUAL RELATION between the parties
is called a QUASI-DELICT
and is governed by the provisions on Quasi-delicts (Art. 2176-2194; 19 provisions) of the Civil Code.

TORTS vs. QUASI-DELICT

TORTS QUASI-DELICT
Anglo-American in origin Roman in origin
Spanish-Philippine concept
Broader - Includes not only negligence but also Covers ONLY ACTS/OMISSION
intentional criminal acts (e.g. assault, battery, w/c cause DAMAGE TO ANOTHER
false imprisonment, deceit) because of FAULT/NEGLIGENCE
there being NO PRE-EXISTING
CONTRACTUAL RELATION
between the parties

This is called
NON-CONTRACTUAL NEGLIGENCE
The concept of tort came to our legal system The Code Commission rejected to use the term
after the Philippines became a colony of the Tort, which is broader, b/c in the general plan of
USA as a result of the Treaty of Paris signed on the Ph legal system, the INTENTIONAL AND
12/10/1898 MALICIOUS ACTS, with certain exceptions, are
governed by the PENAL CODE

WHAT ARE THE SOURCES OF THE LAW ON TORTS & DAMAGES

1. Chapter on Quasi-Delicts (Art. 2176-2194)

2. Chapter on Quasi-Contracts (Art. 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2150, 2151 and 2159)
3. Chapter on Human Relations (Art. 19-36)
4. Art. 1172-1174 (Art. 2178)
5. Art. 1723 (See Art. 2192)
6. Art. 309 (See Art. 2219[9])
7. Art. 1314 (Contractual Interference)
8. Family Code
9. Art. 100-103 of the RPC (See Art. 2177)
10. Title XVIII (Damages) Art 2195-2235
11. Chapter on Nuisance (Art. 694-707)
12. Chapter on Common Carriers (Art. 1755-1763)
13. Anti Sexual Harassment Act (RA 7877)
14. SC decisions
15. American law and jurisprudence
16. Opinion of legal authors
1. Padilla v. CA, L-39999, 129 SCRA 558 (1984) *stall
DOCTRINES:

1. Extinction of the criminal action does not carry with it that of the civil unless it proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise does not exist. In this
case, the fact from which the civil might arise exists (i.e., forcible opening and demolition of Vergara’s stall and loss of their goods) and this was not denied by the accused.

2. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action UNLESS the offended party:
a. WAIVES the civil action (waiver of civil action)
b. RESERVES the right to institute it SEPARATELY (reservation of the right to file a separate civil action)
c. INSTITUTES the CIVIL ACTION prior to the criminal action (prior institution of an independent civil action)
3. Article 29 of the Civil Code: "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon notion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that
the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A
judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did
not exist.

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal
proceedings where the accused was acquitted.

To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
 time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

FACTS:
One morning Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in Memorandum No. 32 of Mayor Roy Padilla, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question,
with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of
the store and had it cordoned with a rope,and after that it ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. The CFI of Camarines Norte convicted Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez et al of the crime
grave coercion and to pay damages.
The petitioners appealed to the CA and they were acquitted but ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
RULING:
No. The CA is correct in awarding actual damages to the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties.

In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the for​cible opening of the market stall, its
demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some
other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.

While appellants are entitled to acquittal, they nevertheless are civilly liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule
111, Sec. 3(c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss
of the properties contained therein exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action,
the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata
v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.

As early as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et al. 473 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of
civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasidelict. Either one of
these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused. However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or
crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides: "Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant"

Section 3(c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

"Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.- In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In
other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is NOT
extinguished:

1. by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
2. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and,

3. where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

Article 29 of the Civil Code, also provides that:

"When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon notion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.

"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declara​tion to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground."

More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution.

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings
where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant
efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire
records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

"On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force,
went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found
therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for safe​keeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to
do so.

"The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction ​ ​ ​ ​P 1,300.00

Value of furniture and equipment destroyed ​ ​ 300.00

Value of goods and equipment taken ​ ​ 8,000.00

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ P9,600.00​
"It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance
per se is untenable. This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, far-fetched to say
that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a
separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

"x x x if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and
will
(a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or, one based on quasidelict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence;
(b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and
(c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasidelict, or other independent civil actions.

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and
expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy
can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by
side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability
might arise did not exist.

A separate civil action may be warranted

1. where additional facts have to be established or

2. more evidence must be adduced or
3. where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case.

The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review
stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

2. Syquia v. CA, GR 98695 (January 27, 1993) *concrete vault for coffin
DOCTRINE: Negligence is the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds to the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. In the absence
of stipulation or provision of law to the contrary, the diligence required in the performance of the obligation shall be that of a good father of a family.
FACTS:
Juan Syquia authorized and instructed the Manila Memorial to inter the remains of his son Vicente Syquia. After about a month, preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot
also at the same cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground.
As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface, the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole, and they caused the opening of
the concrete vault and discovered that the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding, the coffin was entirely damaged by water, the entire lining of coffin, and the exposed parts of the deceased's
remains were damaged and soiled.
The Syquias filed a claim for damages against Manila Memorial due to unlawful and malicious breach by Manila Memorial of its obligation to deliver a defect-free vault designed to protect the remains of
the deceased and the coffin against the elements which resulted in the desecreation of deceased’s grave and in the alternative, because of Manila Memorial’s gross negligence conformably to Art. 2176 of
the NCC in failing to seal the concrete vault but the RTC dismissed the complaint stating that the act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away. CA affirmed
judgment of dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and the absence of fault or negligence
RULING:
None.
Naay pre-existing contract but walay negligence.
Had there been negligence, liable for breach of contract.
In this case, no negligence
There’s a reason for boring a hole to the vault.

“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x.” (Underscoring Ours).

In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care”[6] on
August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
“Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be used in the interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent provides that:
“Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the
Association.”[7]
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before the interment, and was on the same day, installed by private respondent’s employees in the grave
which was dug earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.

Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held out in the brochure it distributed that the “x x x lot may hold single or double internment (sic)
underground in sealed concrete vault.”[8] Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure
and damaged everything inside it.

We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be
waterproof. Private respondent’s witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term “sealed” meant “closed.”[9] On the other hand, the word “seal” is defined as “x x x any of various closures or
fastenings x x x that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.”[10] The meaning that has been given by private respondent to the word
conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear that “sealed” cannot be equated with “waterproof”. Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and leave
no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.[11] Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.

“When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the Deed of Sale (Exhibit “A”) and the attached Rules and Regulations (Exhibit “1”), it can be assumed that he has accepted defendant-
appellee’s undertaking to merely provide concrete vault. He can not now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be waterproofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are bound by the terms of their
contract, which is the law between them (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739). Where there is nothing in the contract which is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of the contract must be sustained (Phil. American Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda 175 SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a contracting party cannot
incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence, where the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the document itself, being constituted by the parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only
instrument of evidence in respect of that agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for the purpose of evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited
in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs. Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530).”[13]
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias. While this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring the hole on the
vault? It cannot be denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.

The law defines negligence as the “omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place.” [14] In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father
of a family.

The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act - boring of the hole - negate the allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment
Foreman, who said that:
“Q: It has been established in this particular case that a certain Vicente Juan Syquia was interred on July 25, 1978 at the Parañaque Cemetery of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please
tell the Hon. Court what or whether you have participation in connection with said internment (sic)?

A: A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our personnel dug a grave. After digging the next morning a vault was taken and placed in the grave and when the vault was placed on the
grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be
filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in and the earth, the earth would (sic) caved in and fill up the grave.”[15] (Underscoring ours)
Except for the foreman’s opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a heavy rainfall, from the above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no reason to award damages in favor of petitioners.

3. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, GR 97336, 217 SCRA (1993) *moral seduction
DOCTRINES:

1. Any person who wilfully causes loss and injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (Art. 21, NCC)
2. Breach of promise to marry is NOT actionable per se.
3. Moral seduction is actionable under Art. 21 of the NCC
4. Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.

5. The private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction
6. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction.

7. In an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh, a medical student studying in Dagupan City, courted and proposed to marry private respondent Marilou Gonzales, a virgin, 22 years old, single, Filipino and of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Private respondent accepted his love on the condition that they would get married, her parents approved of her living with him also on
such condition. Thereafter, petitioner started to maltreat her and threatened to kill her; he even forced he to get an abortion when she became pregnant. One day petitioner asked private respondent not to
live with him anymore as he is already married to someone living in Bacolod City; but he in fact only lived with the other woman and did not marry her.
Because of petitioner’s promise to marry her, private respondent resigned from her job, and her father a tricycle driver already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception, and
invited relatives and friends to the wedding.
Private respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for violation of their agreement to get married. RTC ruled in favor of private respondent and CA affirmed in toto RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry
RULING:
Yes, damages may be recovered not really because of his breach of promise to marry, but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he has in reality no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice her to accept him and obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art 21 because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
It was the petitioner’s fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry private respondent that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception of petitioner that made private respondent’s parents agree to their daughter’s living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage.

------

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
[22]
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
[23]
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
[24]
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction -- the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.

[25]
Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
"x x x we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant -- who was around
thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be -- when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant ‘surrendered herself’ to petitioner because, ‘overwhelmed by her love' for him, she 'wanted to bind' him 'by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.’"

[26]
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
"The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that --

‘To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer' (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

'On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has
been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit.' (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon -finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of
[27]
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint."

[28]
In his annotations on the Civil Code, Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge,
moral damages may be recovered:
"x x x if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept.
30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because
here mutual lust has intervened). x x x."
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding preparations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471)."

[29]
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is also of the same persuasion:
[30] [31]
"It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was
seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence,
but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances,
because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason."
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at
[32]
fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover
[33]
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing," for:
"x x x She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee ... (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN,
p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988).
[34]
And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner.”
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest
motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to
fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.

Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable
acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not
[35]
going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
"Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition or undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
[36]
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.”
[37]
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, We declared:
"Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in
the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

4. LRTA v. Navidad, GR 145804, 397 SCRA 75 (2003) *train passenger fell on the tracks b/c of an alleged fistfight with the guard
Facts:
After buying a token, Nicanor Navidad entered the LRT station. He was drunk and while standing on the platform, he got into an argument with the security guard, Junelito Escartin when the latter
approached him. It led to a fistfight and Navidad fell on the tracks and was struck and killed by a train driven by Rodolfo Roman. A complaint for damages was filed by the heirs of Navidad against
Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc., and Prudent Security Agency. The trial court found Escartin (guard) and Prudent (employer of the guard) jointly and severally liable while
the complaint against LRTA (common carrier) and Roman (driver) was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals absolved Prudent and held LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable and
replaced compensatory damages to nominal damages.
Issues:
1.) Whether the Court of Appeals is correct
2.) Whether nominal damages may co-exist with compensatory damages
Held:
1.) Yes. There was a breach contract by the LRTA due to its failure to observe high or extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier. Navidad is entitled to all the rights and protection under a
contractual relation after having paid the fare and entered the station. The duty of a common carrier to carry their passengers safely using utmost diligence with due regard for all circumstances obligates it
not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. Also, a carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger need not establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or its employees.
Once the fault of Escartin is established, Prudent would be liable on the presumption of its failure to observe diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

Quasi-delict In a Contract of Carriage

What to prove to make Negligence of employee Simple proof of injury

employer liable

What presumption will That the employer failed to That the CC failed to exercise
arise exercise due diligence in the extraordinary diligence in
selection and supervision of performing its obligations
his employees
Defense Employer exercised due Cannot use the same defense
diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee

2.) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. Nominal damages are awarded in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The award was deleted.

B. DISTINCTIONS

i. Culpa Aquiliana
ii. Culpa Contractual
iii. Culpa Criminal

DISTINCTIONS AMONG CULPA AQUILIANA, CULPA CONTRACTUAL AND CULPA CRIMINAL

CULPA CONTRACTUAL CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA CRIMINAL

Pre-existence of Pre-existing contractual No pre-existing No pre-existing

obligation obligation contractual obligation contractual obligation
 There’s a contract –
expressed or implied
Evidence Preponderance of Preponderance
of Crime must be proven
required evidence evidence beyond reasonable
doubt
Defense of a Not a proper and complete Proper defense of the Cannot be interposed
good father of a defense but this can employer
family in the MITIGATE LIABILITY FOR
If employee is
selection and DAMAGES
Insolvent or
supervision of
Incapable to pay the
employees
civil aspect or liability

The employer is
subsidiarily liable
What must be Existence of a contract Fault or negligence of Innocence of the
proven must be proven the defendant must be accused is presumed
proven until the contrary is
proven
If it is proven and it is also
proven that the contract
was not complied with, it is
presumed that the debtor
is at fault
Negligence Negligence is only Negligence is direct, Negligence is direct,
incidental to the substantive and substantive and
performance of an existing independent independent
obligation based on
contract

QUASI DELICT V. CULPA CONTRACTUAL

BASIS QUASI-DELICT CULPA CONTRACTUAL

Nature of negligence Negligence is direct, Negligence is merely
substantive and independent incidental to the performance
of the contractual obligation

There is a pre-existing
contract or obligation
Defense of a good father of Complete and proper defense Not a complete and proper
family insofar as PARENTS, defense in the selection and
GUARDIANS, EMPLOYERS supervision of the employees
are concerned
Presumption of negligence No presumption of There is presumption of
negligence negligence as long as it can
be proved that there was
breach of contract
The injured party must prove
the negligence of the
defendant The defendant must prove
that there was NO
NEGLIGENCE in the carrying
Otherwise, the complaint of
out of the terms of the
the injured party will be
contract
dismissed

QUASI-DELICT V. CRIME / DELICT

BASIS QUASI-DELICT DELICT / CRIME

Legal basis of liability Fault or negligence resulting in No crime unless there is a law
damage or injury to another punishing the act

Broader than crime

Criminal intent Not necessary for quasi-delict Necessary for criminal liability
to exist to exist

Fault or negligence without

intent will suffice
Nature of right violated Right violated is a private right Right violated is a public right

Quas-delict is a wrongful act Crime is a wrong against the

against a private individual State
Liability for damages Every quasi-delict will give rise Some crimes do not give rise to
to liability for damages liability for damages

e.g., contempt, illegal

possession of firearm
Proof needed Proof of the fault or negligence Guilty of the accused must be
requires only preponderance of proved beyond reasonable
evidence doubt
Sanction or penalty Reparation or indemnification of Punishment is either
the injury or damage imprisonment, fine or both

Sometimes other accessory

penalties are imposed

5. Calalas v. CA, GR 122039 (May 31, 2000) *jeep v. truck

2 civil actions – for breach of contract and for quasi-delict
CC was sued by injured passenger
Injured passenger is not bound by another civil action which ruled that the truck driver and owner was negligent
CC is liable because of breach of contract
Presumption of negligence
No res judicata because injured passenger was not a party to the other civil case involving the common carrier and the truck which caused damage to the CC and the issue in the two
actions are different
In the present case, the issue is whether the CC is liable on his contract of carriage and in the former case, the issue is whether the truck owner and driver were liable for quasi-delict to the
CC for the damages they caused to the CC

FACTS:
Sunga was a passenger in a jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. As the jeepney was filled, Sunga was given by the conductor a stool at the back of the vehicle. On the way to Sibulan, the jeepney
stopped to let a passenger off. Just as Sunga was giving way to the outgoing passenger, a truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the rear portion of the jeepney. Sunga sustained injuries.
Medical procedures were done. She was confined in the hospital. Her attending physician certified she would remain on a cast and walk in crutches for a period of three months. Sunga filed a complaint
for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint (Civil Case 3940) against Salva, the owner of the truck. RTC rendered judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas. holding that it was the driver of the truck who was responsible for the
accident. It took cognizance of Case No. 3940 filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney. On appeal to the CA, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
ISSUE:
WON Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case 3940
HELD:
No. Sunga was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply, and the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are different. The issue in Civil Case
No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual,
is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga.

Quasi-delict Contract of carriage

Basis of the action Negligence of tortfeaser Negligence in the performance

of a contractual obligation
What need to be proved Negligence or fault
1. Existence of the
contract
2. Fact that the obligor
failed to transport
his passenger safely
to his destination

Death or injury – raises the

presumption of fault or
negligence UNLESS they
observed extraordinary
diligence

The burden of proof is shifted

to the common carrier

6. Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil 607 *taxi v. carratela

criminal action filed against driver of taxi w/c collided with a carratela which overturned, killing its passenger
civil action was reserved
civil action was filed against owner of taxi and employer of taxi driver making him primarily and directly liable
taxi driver’s negligence is undisputed b/c he was driving in the wrong side of the road at high speed
no proof that employer of negligent taxi driver exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee
1 negligent act produces 2 kinds of civil liability – 1 arising from crime and 1 arising from quasi-delict
employer is subsidiarily liable for a crime committed by his employee while under Art. 2180 of the NCC, he is primarily and directly liable as employer for the negligence of his employee
which gives the presumption that the employee failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee
in this case, employer is held primarily and directly liable for quasi-delict as employer

Facts:
There was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate taxicab driven by Fontanilla and a carretela directed by Dimapilis. The carretela was over-turned, and a passenger, a 16-year old boy, Garcia,
experienced injuries from which he died. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and he was sentenced. The court in the criminal case granted the petition to reserve the civil action. Garcia and
Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, filed a civil action against Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and directly responsible
under culpa acquiliana of Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. It is undisputed that Fontanilla’s negligence was the cause of the accident, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road at
high speed, and there was no showing that Barredo exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, a defense to Article 2180 of the said Code. Barredo’s theory of defense is that Fontanilla’s
negligence being punished by the Revised Penal Code, his liability as employer is only subsidiary, but Fontanilla, was not sued for civil liability. Hence, Barredo claims that he cannot be held liable.
Issue:
Whether or not Barredo, as employer is civilly liable for the acts of Fontanilla, his employee.
Held:
Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a distinct legal institution under the Civil Code of the Philippines is completely separate and independent from a delict or crime under the Revised Penal Code. In this
jurisdiction, the same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability (subsidiary) arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines; or create an action for quasi-
delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the parties are free to choose which course to take. And in the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2)
liabilities of Barredo: First, a subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising from the latter’s criminal negligence under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and second, Barredo’s
primary and direct responsibility arising from his presumed negligence as an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As the plaintiffs are free to choose what remedy to take, they preferred the
second, which is within their rights. This is the more expedious and effective method of relief because Fontanilla was either in prison or just been released or had no property. Barredo was held liable for
damages.

7. Cangco v. MRR, 38 Phil 769 *watermelons

MRR negligent
Breach of contract
Cangco not guilty of contributory negligence b/c
He has the vigor and agility of a young man

FACTS:
Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroad company, and in coming daily by train to the company's
office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door, took his position
upon the steps of the coach.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and
extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad company
got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.
When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once
rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern,
especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. This row of sacks was
so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon
one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated.
He was then carried to another hospital where his second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses reached the sum of P790.25 in the form
of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his treatment.
August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing
in the CFI, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to
obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE:
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
RULING:
No. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly - the age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they constituted an
effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations. In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation
already existing.

---------------

Article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yields to proof of due care and
diligence in this respect.
"From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

"This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant is conclusively the negligence of the master."

The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the
liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and
the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.

On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a
contract, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of
his liability for the breach of his contract.

The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.

The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the source of the obligation upon
which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence—if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a
contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether
the breach of the contract is due to wilful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant
a recovery.

"As a general rule * * * it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the
contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove the
negligence." (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76].)

As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the
actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the
action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that persons acting through the medium of
agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to a watchmaker who contracts to repair it, and the
bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due
care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete
immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts of omission or commission on the part of their servants, as such juridical persons can of necessity only act
through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in the selection and direction of such servants.

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.

ANOTHER TOPIC

The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation
to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come
to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is
imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.

We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:

"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered
whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This
care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances,
to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)

Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. Rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff
at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have
desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.

As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being
able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, (1)
ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; (2) and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier
to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was
clear. (3) The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the
plaintiff; (4) for if it were by any possibility conceded that it had a right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them in that position gave rise to the duty to
light the premises adequately so that their presence would be revealed.

As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than
that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act—that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly—the age, sex,
and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule, are less capable
than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to
the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

II. QUASI-DELICT

A. ELEMENTS (Article 2176, CC)

Art. 2176
Whoever
by act or omission
causes damage or injury to another
there being fault or negligence
shall be obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the chapter on quasi-delict.
This article covers ALL WRONGFUL ACTS OR OMISSIONS
as long as they are NOT

1. constitutive of breach of contract AND

2. punishable as offenses.
i. Culpable act or negligence
ii. Damage to another
iii. Causal relation between culpable act or negligence and the damage to another

8. Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 *pony v. automobile

DOCTRINES:

1. The standard of conduct used in the Philippines is that of pater familias in Roman law or that what is referred to in Art. 1173 of the NCC in relation to Art. 2178 as a good father of a
family.

2. What should be determined in negligence cases is what is forseeable to a good father of a family.
3. A good father of a family is referred to as THE REASONABLE MAN, A MAN OF ORDINARY PRUDENCE, OR ORDINARY REASONABLE PRUDENT MAN.
4. Test of negligence: Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from the course or take precaution against its mischievous results, and failure to do so constitutes
negligence.

Facts:
Picart was riding a pony on Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La Union. He pulled his pony over the bridge’s railing on the right instead of left upon seeing the automobile rapidly approaching. The driver of
the automobile, however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the pony unfortunately the
pony being frightened when the automobile passed so close to them, jumped around and was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The pony and its rider
were thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions that caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. Picart
seeks to render the sum of Php31,000 as damages. CFI La Union absolved Smith.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant was negligent and if the concept of last clear chance is attributable to him? 

Held:
The defendant was guilty of negligence.
There was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant
exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The defendant Smith is negligent and liable under the doctrine of last clear chance although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge as the defendant
had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized that the negligence by the plaintiff could not have placed himself in a position of greater safety.
The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant who drove the automobile. It was his duty to bring the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons were on the bridge to
take the other side and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and
rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the law.
Under the circumstances, the doctrine of last clear chance applies which thus states: that the person who has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences, WITHOUT REFERENCE to the PRIOR NEGLIGENCE OF THE OTHER PARTY.

9. Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP Agustino Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587

FACTS:
Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey a tract of land to Geo. W. Daywalt. It was agreed that a deed will be executed as soon as the title to the land was
perfected and a Torrens Certificate be produced after all the court proceedings. The parties engaged in several contracts to this effect. The Torrens certificate was then issued to Teodorica Endencia, but in
the course of the proceedings, it was found out that the area of the tract enclosed in the boundaries and stated in the contract was different. Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole
tract to the purchaser, declaring that she never intended to sell that large area of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area.This led to litigation in which Daywalt won obtaining a decree for
specific performance; and Teodorica Endencia was ordered to convey the entire tract of land to Daywalt pursuant to their contract which was declared to be in full force and effect.
The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos is a religious corporation which was at that time also the owner of another estate on the same island adjacent to the land which Teodorica
Endencia had sold to Geo. W. Daywalt.
When the Torrens Certificate was finally issued in favor of Teodorica Endencia, she delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant corporation. As Teodorica still retained possession of said property, Father
Sanz entered into an arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant corporation were pastured upon said land during a certain period.Thus, Plaintiff Daywalt seeks to
recover from the defendant corporation a certain sum as damages for the use and occupation of the land in question by reason of the pasturing of cattle thereon during the period stated.
ISSUE:
Whether the Recoletos be held liable for wrongful interference.
RULING:
No. Damages assessed are sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the land during the whole time it was used.
The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermediates.
As already suggested, by advising Endencia not to perform the contract, the Recoletos could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract. Hence, in order to determine
the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from Endencia cannot be recovered from her: First, because there are
special damages which were not within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made; Second, these damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for
damages to Daywalt, neither can the Recoletos be held liable.

-----------

FACTS:
In the year 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W. Daywalt, a tract of land. It was agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as the title to
the land should be perfected by proceedings in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens certificate should be produced therefore in the name of Teodorica Endencia. A decree recognizing the right of
Teodorica as owner was entered in said court in August 1906, but the Torrens certificate was not issued until later. The stipulated price was fixed at P4,000, and the area of the land enclosed in the
boundaries defined in the contract was stated to be 452 hectares and a fraction.

Upon October 3, 1908, the parties entered into still another agreement, superseding the old, by which Teodorica Endencia agreed upon receiving the Torrens title to the land in question, to deliver the
same to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Manila, to be forwarded to the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco, where it was to be delivered to the plaintiff upon payment of a balance of P3,100.

The Torrens certificate was issued in 1909 to Teodorica Endencia, but in the course of the proceedings relative to the registration of the land, it was found by official survey that the area of the tract
inclosed in the boundaries stated in the contract was about 1.248 hectares of 452 hectares as stated in the contract. In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole
tract to the purchaser, asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area.

This attitude of hers led to litigation in which Daywalt finally succeeded, upon appeal to the Supreme Court, in obtaining a decree for specific performance; and Teodorica Endencia was ordered to convey
the entire tract of land to Daywalt pursuant to the contract of October 3, 1908, which contract was declared to be in full force and effect. This decree appears to have become finally effective in the early
part of the year 1914.1

The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation, with its domicile in the city of Manila. Said corporation was formerly the owner of a large tract of land, known as the San
Jose Estate, on the island of Mindoro, which was sold to the Government of the Philippine Islands in the year 1909. The same corporation was at this time also the owner of another estate on the same
island immediately adjacent to the land which Teodorica Endencia had sold to Geo. W. Daywalt; and for many years the Recoletos Fathers had maintained large herds of cattle on the farms referred to.
Their representative, charged with management of these farms, was father Isidoro Sanz, himself a members of the order.

Father Sanz had long been well acquainted with Teodorica Endencia and exerted over her an influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well as to the personal friendship which existed
between them. Teodorica appears to be a woman of little personal force, easily subject to influence, and upon all the important matters of business was accustomed to seek, and was given, the advice of
father Sanz and other members of his order with whom she came in contact.

Father Sanz was fully aware of the existence of the contract of 1902 by which Teodorica Endencia agreed to sell her land to the plaintiff as well as of the later important developments connected with the
history of that contract and the contract substituted successively for it; and in particular Father Sanz, as well as other members of the defendant corporation, knew of the existence of the contract of
October 3, 1908, which, as we have already seen finally fixed the rights of the parties to the property in question.

When the Torrens certificate was finally issued in 1909 in favor of Teodorica Endencia, she delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant corporation, and it was then taken to Manila where it remained in
the custody and under the control of P. Juan Labarga the procurador and chief official of the defendant corporation, until the deliver thereof to the plaintiff was made compulsory by reason of the decree of
the Supreme Court in 1914.
When the defendant corporation sold the San Jose Estate, it was necessary to bring the cattle off of that property; and, in the first half of 1909, some 2,368 head were removed to the estate of the
corporation immediately adjacent to the property which the plaintiff had purchased from Teodorica Endencia. As Teodorica still retained possession of said property, Father Sanz entered into an
arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant corporation were pastured upon said land during a period extending from June 1, 1909, to May 1, 1914.

Under the first cause stated in the complaint in the present action the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant corporation the sum of P24,000, as damages for the use and occupation of the land in
question by reason of the pasturing of cattle thereon during the period stated. The trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant corporation was liable for damages by reason of the use and
occupation of the premises in the manner stated; and fixed the amount to be recovered at P2,497. The plaintiff appealed and has assigned error to this part of the judgment of the court below, insisting that
damages should have been awarded in a much larger sum and at least to the full extent of P24,000, the amount claimed in the complaint.

In the second cause of action stated in the complaint the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant corporation the sum of P500,000, as damages, on the ground that said corporation, for its own selfish
purposes, unlawfully induced Teodorica Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery to the plaintiff of the Torrens title, and further,
maliciously and without reasonable cause, maintained her in her defense to the action of specific performance which was finally decided in favor of the plaintiff in this court. The cause of action here stated
is based on liability derived from the wrongful interference of the defendant in the performance of the contract between the plaintiff and Teodorica Endencia; and the large damages laid in the complaint
were, according to the proof submitted by the plaintiff, incurred as a result of a combination of circumstances of the following nature: In 1911, it appears, the plaintiff, as the owner of the land which he had
bought from Teodorica Endencia entered into a contract (Exhibit C) with S. B. Wakefield, of San Francisco, for the sale and disposal of said lands to a sugar growing and milling enterprise, the successful
launching of which depended on the ability of Daywalt to get possession of the land and the Torrens certificate of title. In order to accomplish this end, the plaintiff returned to the Philippine Islands,
communicated his arrangement to the defendant,, and made repeated efforts to secure the registered title for delivery in compliance with said agreement with Wakefield. Teodorica Endencia seems to
have yielded her consent to the consummation of her contract, but the Torrens title was then in the possession of Padre Juan Labarga in Manila, who refused to deliver the document. Teodorica also was
in the end contract with the plaintiff, with the result that the plaintiff was kept out of possession until the Wakefield project for the establishment of a large sugar growing and milling enterprise fell through.
In the light of what has happened in recent years in the sugar industry, we feel justified in saying that the project above referred to, if carried into effect, must inevitably have proved a great success.

The fact that its officials may have advised her not to carry the contract into effect would not constitute actionable interference with such contract. Father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in
good faith that the contract could not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was,
therefore, prompted by no mean or improper motive. We do not credit the idea that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry
privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff. Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in cases of interference
with contract relations. But upon the authorities it is enough if the wrong-doer, having knowledge of the existence of the contract relations, in bad faith sets about to break it up. Whether his motive is to
benefit himself or gratify his spite by working mischief to the employer is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not essential. Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential
ingredient in cases of interference with contract relations.

Upon the question as to what constitutes legal justification, a good illustration was put in the leading case. If a party enters into contract to go for another upon a journey to a remote and unhealthful
climate, and a third person, with a bona fide purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the step, no action will lie. But if the advice is not disinterested and the
persuasion is used for "the indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff," the intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract broken.

This brings us to the decision made by this court in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542). It there appeared that one Cuddy, the owner of a cinematographic film, let it under a rental contract to the
plaintiff Gilchrist for a specified period of time. In violation of the terms of this agreement, Cuddy proceeded to turn over the film also under a rental contract, to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga.
Gilchrist thereupon restored to the Court of First Instance and produced an injunction restraining the defendants from exhibiting the film in question in their theater during the period specified in the contract
of Cuddy with Gilchrist. Upon appeal to this court it was in effect held that the injunction was not improperly granted, although the defendants did not, at the time their contract was made, know the identity
of the plaintiff as the person holding the prior contract but did know of the existence of a contract in favor of someone. It was also said arguendo, that the defendants would have been liable in damages
under article 1902 of the Civil Code, if the action had been brought by the plaintiff to recover damages. The force of the opinion is, we think, somewhat weakened by the criticism contain in the concurring
opinion, where it is said that the question of breach of contract by inducement was not really involved in the case. Taking the decision upon the point which was rally decided, it is authority for the
proposition that one who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other person can be restrained from using that thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and better right.

Translated into terms applicable to the case at bar, the decision in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542), indicates that the defendant corporation, having notice of the sale of the land in question to
Daywalt, might have been enjoined by the latter from using the property for grazing its cattle thereon. That the defendant corporation is also liable in this action for the damage resulting to the plaintiff from
the wrongful use and occupation of the property has also been already determined. But it will be observed that in order to sustain this liability it is not necessary to resort to any subtle exegesis relative to
the liability of a stranger to a contract for unlawful interference in the performance thereof. It is enough that defendant use the property with notice that the plaintiff had a prior and better right.

We are of the opinion that neither the doctrine of Lumley vs. Gye [supra] nor the application made of it by this court in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542), affords any basis for the recovery of the
damages which the plaintiff is supposed to have suffered by reason of his inability to comply with the terms of the Wakefield contract.

Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, there is one proposition upon which all must agree.
This is, that the stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages
in excess of those that could be recovered against the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust. In the case at bar, as Teodorica Endencia was the party directly
bound by the contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract, can in no even exceed hers. This leads us
to consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in possession.

It should in the first place be noted that the liability of Teodorica Endencia for damages resulting from the breach of her contract with Daywalt was a proper subject for adjudication in the action for specific
performance which Daywalt instituted against her in 1909 and which was litigated by him to a successful conclusion in this court, but without obtaining any special adjudication with reference to damages.
Indemnification for damages resulting from the breach of a contract is a right inseparably annexed to every action for the fulfillment of the obligation (art. 1124, Civil Code); and its is clear that if damages
are not sought or recovered in the action to enforce performance they cannot be recovered in an independent action. As to Teodorica Endencia, therefore, it should be considered that the right of action to
recover damages for the breach of the contract in question was exhausted in the prior suit. However, her attorneys have not seen fit to interpose the defense of res judicata in her behalf; and as the
defendant corporation was not a party to that action, and such defense could not in any event be of any avail to it, we proceed to consider the question of the liability of Teodorica Endencia for damages
without refernce to this point.

The most that can be said with refernce to the conduct of Teodorica Endencia is that she refused to carry out a contract for the sale of certain land and resisted to the last an action for specific
performance in court. The result was that the plaintiff was prevented during a period of several years from exerting that control over the property which he was entitled to exert and was meanwhile unable
to dispose of the property advantageously. Now, what is the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of real property by the vender after the time has come for him to place the purchaser in
possession?

The damages ordinarily and normally recoverable against a vendor for failure to deliver land which he has contracted to deliver is the value of the use and occupation of the land for the time during which it
is wrongfully withheld. And of course where the purchaser has not paid the purchaser money, a deduction may be made in respect to the interest on the money which constitutes the purchase price.
Substantially the same rule holds with respect to the liability of a landlord who fails to put his tenant in possession pursuant to contract of lease. The measure of damages is the value of the leasehold
interest, or use and occupation, less the stipulated rent, where this has not been paid. The rule that the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of land is normally to be found in the value of use
and occupation is, we believe, one of the things that may be considered certain in the law (39 cyc., 1630; 24 Cyc., 1052 Sedgewick on Damages, Ninth ed., sec. 185.) — almost as wellsettled, indeed, as
the rule that the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of money is to be found in the interest.

Where the purchaser desires to protect himself, in the contingency of the failure of the vendor promptly to give possession, from the possibility of incurring other damages than such as the incident to the
normal value of the use and occupation, he should cause to be inserted in the contract a clause providing for stipulated amount to the paid upon failure of the vendor to give possession; and no case has
been called to our attention where, in the absence of such a stipulation, damages have been held to be recoverable by the purchaser in excess of the normal value of use and occupation.

The discussion contained in the opinion of the court in that case leads to the conclusion that the damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two sorts, namely, (1) the ordinary, natural,
and in a sense necessary damage; and (2) special damages.

Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of contract where the are no special circumstances to distinguish the case specially from other contracts. The consideration paid for an unperformed promise is
an instance of this sort of damage. In all such cases the damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would result from such a breach, "according to the usual course of things." In case
involving only ordinary damage no discussion is ever indulged as to whether that damage was contemplated or not. This is conclusively presumed from the immediateness and inevitableness of the
damage, and the recovery of such damage follows as a necessary legal consequence of the breach. Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties.

Special damage, on the other hand, is such as follows less directly from the breach than ordinary damage. It is only found in case where some external condition, apart from the actual terms to the
contract exists or intervenes, as it were, to give a turn to affairs and to increase damage in a way that the promisor, without actual notice of that external condition, could not reasonably be
expected to foresee. Concerning this sort of damage, Hadley vs. Baxendale (1854) [supra] lays down the definite and just rule that before such damage can be recovered the plaintiff must show that the
particular condition which made the damage a possible and likely consequence of the breach was known to the defendant at the time the contract was made.

In the preceding discussion we have considered the plaintiff's right chiefly against Teodorica Endencia; and what has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the damages laid under the
second cause of action in the complaint could not be recovered from her, first, because the damages in question are special damages which were not within contemplation of the parties when the contract
was made, and secondly, because said damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the plaintiff to recover such damages from the
defendant corporation, for, as already suggested, by advising Teodorica not to perform the contract, said corporation could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principle in the contract.

10. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155

Facts:
Rafael Carrascoso bought and was issued a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of defendant Air
France forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. Carrascoso refused and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. A commotion ensued which eventually led to Carrascoso reluctantly giving his "first class" seat in the plane.
Issue:
WON Carrascoso is entitled to damages and on what basis
Ruling:
Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was
already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply
incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of
public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
11. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542
Facts:
Cuddy, the owner of the film “Zigomar,” agreed to rent the film for 125 pesos to Gilchrist, a theater owner in Iloilo. Before the agreed date for delivery, Cuddy returned the payment of Gilchrist because he
entered into another contract with Espejo and Zaldarriago for a higher price of 350 pesos. Upon the application of Gilchrist, an ex-parte mandatory injunction was issued directing Cuddy to send the film to
Gilchrist and for Espejo and Zaldarriago to prohibit the showing of the film in their theater.
Issue:
WON Espejo and Zaldarriago are liable for tort interference even if they had no knowledge of the identity of one of the contracting parties?
Ruling:
Yes. Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage done. There is
nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article
is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered. The ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering with a contract
between others rests, is that the interference was malicious. In this case, Espejo and Zaldirriago’s motive for the interference was their desire to make profit and there is no malice beyond this desire.
However, this does not relieve them from the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing it’s breach.
Injuction was the proper remedy because Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits due to the inducement of Espejo and Zaldarriago to rent the film to them. The profits of the
Gilchrist depended upon the patronage of the public. Zigomar was the the feature film of his theather. This feature film is depended upon to secure a larger attendance. It is evident that the failure to
exhibit the feature film will reduce the receipts of the theater.

Damnum Absque Injuria

12. Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, GR 18805 (August 14, 1967)

FACTS:
Maximo Kalaw is the general manager and board chairman of National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO). In 1947, he executed, for and in behalf of NACOCO, several contracts for the delivery of copra. In
the same year, four devastating typhoons visited the Philippines. As a result, coconut trees throughout the country suffered extensive damage and copra production decreased. When it became clear that
the contracts would be unprofitable, Kalaw submitted them to the board for approval. The board members unanimously approved the contracts. NACOCO partially performed the contracts. One buyer
sued for the undelivered copra. All the settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52. NACOCO filed an action for damages, charging Kalaw with negligence in entering into the contracts without prior approval of
the board of directors to the damage and prejudice of NACOCO.
ISSUE:
Whether Kalaw is liable for damages
HELD:
No. This is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting. Kalaw had authority to execute
the contracts without need of prior approval. Settled jurisprudence has it that where similar acts have been approved by the directors as a matter of general practice, custom, and policy, the general
manager may bind the company without formal authorization of the board of directors. In the case at bar, the practice of the corporation has been to allow its general manager to negotiate and execute
contracts in its copra trading activities for and in NACOCO's behalf without prior board approval. Long before the disputed contracts came into being, Kalaw contracted — by himself alone as general
manager — for forward sales of copra. These previous contracts were signed by Kalaw without prior authority from the board. Said contracts were known all along to the board members. Nothing was said
by them.
Kalaw could not have been an insurer of profits. He could not be expected to predict the coming of unpredictable typhoons. And even as typhoons supervened, Kalaw was not remiss in his duty. He asked
the Philippine National Bank to implement its commitment to extend a P400,000.00 loan. The bank did not release the loan. In the end, nothing came out of the negotiations with the bank. NACOCO
eventually faltered in its contractual obligations. Despite the typhoons, NACOCO was still able to deliver a little short of 50% of the tonnage required under the contracts. Indeed, were it not for the
typhoons, NACOCO could have, with ease, met its contractual obligations.

13. Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp., GR 83589 (March 13, 1991)

Facts:
Petitioner Ramon Farolan, then Acting Commissioner of Customs, and Guillermo Parayno, then Acting Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division, were sued in their official capacities as
officers in the government. They were sued by private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation, the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products technically
known as polypropylene film. The shipment imported was different from what was authorized by the Board of Investment(BOI) and by law and thus, petitioners withheld the release of the importation.
Respondent Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC and prayed for the unconditional release of the subject importation. The importation eventually was released prior to the
RTC decision. It also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, as prayed for, but there were no pronouncements as to
costs.
Solmac appealed to the CA as to the denial of the award of damages concerned. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision which held petitioners liable for damages, but upon a motion for
reconsideration, the CA issued its resolution modifying the award.
Issue:
Whether petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation.
Ruling:
Petitioner's defense of good faith premised on the excuse that they were awaiting the clarification of the Board of Investments on the matter is difficult to discredit. There is no clear and convincing proof as
to the showing of alleged bad faith on the part of the petitioners. They withheld the importation because of the report, made by the National Institute of Science and Technology, that the product imported
was prohibited. Even granting that petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release because the report received was a mistake, it is not actionable absent any clear showing that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith.

B. NO DOUBLE RECOVERY RULE (Article 2177, CC)

14. Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540

FACTS:
Joseph was a paying passenger in a cargo truck. The cargo truck tried to overtake a tricycle proceeding in the same direction. At the same time, a pick-up truck tried to overtake the cargo truck, thus the
cargo truck was forced to veer towards the shoulder of the road & rammed a mango tree in the process. Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. Joseph sued the owner of the cargo truck for
breach of the contract of carriage & the owner of the pick-up for quasi-delict for injuries he sustained. The owner of the pick-up paid Joseph the amount he was claiming thru a settlement agreement.
Joseph still wants to maintain the action vs. the truck owner claiming that he still has another cause of action vs. the latter, for breach of contract of carriage.
ISSUE:
Did the payment by the other respondents inure to the benefit of Perez, sanctioning the dismissal of the case
HELD:
Yes. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. A single act or omission may simultaneously be
violative of various rights, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. Notwithstanding the fact, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a
single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated. If only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at bar,
petitioner sustained only one injury on his person, vesting in him a single cause of action, although there are correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies
allowed. A recovery by petitioner under one remedy, as when he already recovered under the principle of quasi-delict, necessarily bars recovery under the other. This is the principle of the
proscription in the law against double recovery for the same act or omission under the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment. Moreover, since the respondents are solidarily liable to
petitioner, the full payment by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from liability resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including Perez

15. Bermudez, Sr. v. Herrera, 158 SCRA 168

FACTS:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which
caused his death.
A criminal case of homicide through reckless imprudence with “A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action” was filed against Domingo Patino. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a civil case against Domingo
Patino and the owner of the truck. The trial court dismissed the case finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969
constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. The Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied by the trial court hence this direct appeal on pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict.
HELD:
The appeal is meritorious. The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending
before the court, to file a separate civil action. The case cited by the RTC is inapplicable.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-
delict under Article 2176- 2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarity liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise
of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict.
The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt,
only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

16. Singson v. Bank of P.I., 23 SCRA 1117

FACTS:
Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him along with his co-defendant therein Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the plaintiff. Singson appealed but not
Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory. A writ of garnishment was served upon BPI — in which the Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-
Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned.
The clerk of the bank upon reading Singson's name in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendant, without further reading the body of said garnishment prepared a letter for the signature of
the President of the Bank informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits. Another letter was also prepared and signed by the President for the Special Sheriff.
Subsequently, Singson issued two checks in favor of B. M. Glass Service and in favor of Lega Corporation, drawn against BPI. Such checks were deposited with the Bank. Believing that Singson, the
drawer of the check, had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the Bank, the checks were dishonored and were refused payment.
In view thereof, plaintiff Singson wrote BPI claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. After verifying the information, the
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with BPI for a short time.
Singsong commenced the present action against BPI and its president for damages in consequence of the illegal freezing of his account. CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint upon the ground that
plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict. The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict, their relation with the
defendants being contractual in nature.
ISSUE:
WON plaintiffs can recover from the defendants
RULING:
YES.
SC has repeatedly held that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Thus, in
Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature ... the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort".
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized
the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, SC found that an award of nominal damages, in addition to attorney's fees, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.

17. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155

FACTS:
Carrascoso a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, PAL., issued to Carrascoso a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled in "first class”, but he was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the Air France
while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will.
ISSUE:
Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims therefore making Air France liable for damages.
RULING:
Yes. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Exemplary damages here are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts, the only condition is that defendant should have
"acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The manner of forcibly ejecting Carrascoso from his first class seat and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being
ejected from his seat in the presence of others and to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established fits into this legal precept.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort”. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one
attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.

18. Rafael Reyes Trucking v. People, GR 129029 (April 3, 2000).

FACTS:
The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation from the San Fernando, Pampanga
plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer driven by Romeo Tumol, a duly licensed driver.
The truck was driven by Dunca. Seated at the front right seat was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper. While the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road, it approached a
damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck’s right lane. These made the surface of the road uneven. Ferdinand Domingo, and Dunca saw the Nissan coming from the opposite
direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lane but because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels
and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca’s vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan. The Nissan was severely damaged and its two passengers. Francisco Dy, Jr.
one of the passengers, died instantly.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the offended parties, Rosario P. Dy and minor children made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the
accused arising from the offense charged and filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Dunca, based on quasi delict. The
trial court rendered a joint decision finding the accused Romeo Dunca Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence and ordered an award for
damages.
ISSUE:
May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver.
RULING:
NO. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the
same negligent act or omission of the accused. In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based
on quasi delict. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily
liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. When private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the
separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code.

III. NEGLIGENCE

A. CONCEPT

19. Jarco Marketing v. CA, GR 129792 (December 21, 1999)

See RA 9344
FACTS:
Private respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are parents of Zhieneth Aguilar, a six year olf girl who lost her life after being pinned down by a bulk of counters of Syvels Department Store, owned by
petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation.
Criselda and Zhieneth were at Syvel’s Department Store one afternoon. While Criselda was at the cashier signing her credit card slip, she heard a loud thud behind her. Criselda turned to see her
daughter crying and screaming as the latter was pinned by the department store’s counter. Zhieneth was rushed to the hospital immediately, she lost her speech a day after but eventually died 14 days
thereafter.
Private respondents demanded from the petitioner reimbursement for hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses they incurred. Petitioners refused to pay, so the private respondents filed
a complaint for damages with the RTC.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Jarco Marketing holding that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was Zhieneth’s clinging on to it and that Criselda’s negligence contributed to the accident.
The CA, however ruled in favor of private respondents Aguilar holding that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous, defective and unstable counter. The CA further declared that
Zhieneth, who was below 7 years old was incapable of negligence or other tort, more so because a child below 9 years old cannot be held liable for an intentional wrong.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to negligence
RULING:
The death of Zhieneth was not accidental but attributable to the negligence of petitioners for maintaining a defective counter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In our jurisdiction, a person under 9 years old is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment and is exempted from criminal liability. The rule, therefore, is that a child under 9
years old must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the counter was stable and
sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the
evidence[29]on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting
area and its base was not secured.
Criselda should also be absolved from any contributory negligence because it was reasonable and usual for her to momentarily released Zhieneth in order to sign her credit card slip.

Applicability of Articles 1172-1174.

20. Sarmiento v. Sun-Cabrido, GR 141258 (April 9, 2003).

Facts:
Dra. Virginia Lao requested Tomasa Sarmiento to find somebody to reset a pair of diamond earrings into two gold rings. With the pair of earrings, Tita Payag was sent by Sarmiento Dingding’s Jewelry
Shop, managed and owned by spouses Luis and Rose Cabrido, which accepted the job order for P 400. Tita Payag delivered to the shop one of the earrings. Ma. Lourdes (Marilou) Sun went on to
dismount the diamond from its original setting but asked their goldsmith, Zenon Santos to do it after she failed. With a pair of pliers, Santos removed the diamond but it got broken in the process. Petitioner
was forced to buy a replacement after the respondents refused to replace it. A complaint for damages was filed by the petitioner. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favour of the petitioner. The Regional
trial Court reversed the MTC’s decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether respondents are liable for damages
Held:
Yes. Santos acted negligently in dismounting the diamond from its original setting. Instead of using a miniature wire saw, he used a pair of pliers. The shop failed to observe the ordinary diligence required
by the circumstance. Prior to the dismounting, the diamond was to be in order; thus, its subsequent breakage in the hands of Santos could only have been caused by his negligence in using the wrong
equipment (Res ipsa liquitor). Obligations arising from contract have the force of law between the contracting parties, corollarily, those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
The respondents denied the employer-employee relationship with Santos and Marilou but it shows that Santos had been working for the shop for about 6 months, accepting job orders. The preponderance
of evidence supports the view that Marilou and Santos were employed at the shop in order to perform activities which were necessary or desirable in its business. Therefore, respondents are held liable
jointly and severally for actual damages and moral damages due to the gross negligence of their employees.

B. AS PROXIMATE CAUSE (Article 2179)

21. Taylor v. Manila Electric, 16 Phil 8

FACTS:
Taylor, 15 years of age, having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with Manuel, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, to visit Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. After leaving the power house where they looked for Mr. Murphy, they went to the place where the company dumped cinders and
ashes from its furnaces they found some twenty/thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground that approximately look like small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by
means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. The caps have a considerable explosive power. the boys picked some and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie,
less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches. David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. And it exploded. Jessie received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded.
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the injury to the three children?
HELD:
The negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received, cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause
of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted. Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. David was a cabin boy in a ship, later worked in his mechanical engineer father’s
office and after the accident he was employed as a mechanical draftsman. he was of more than average intelligence, more mature both mentally and physically than most boys aged 15. He well knew that
a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. The question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of
the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences. He was of age in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the
exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act.

22. Bataclan v. Medina, 109 Phil 185

Facts:
The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and
the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the
neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud
Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals forwarded the case
to the Supreme Court due to the amount involved.
Issue:
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers?
Ruling:
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We
also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding,
as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the
canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree.
Proximate cause as well-defined in American Jurisprudence is… ‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. And more expansively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result there from.
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not falter to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not
only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the approaching of the men with a lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),the rescuers had to
carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus
was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions abovereproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

23. Fernando v. CA, 208 SCRA 714

FACTS:
The septic tank in Agdao Public Market was due for re-emptying. Before the project could even begin, bidder Bertulano along with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto
Fernando and Jose Fajardo Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The investigation of the office the City Engineer provided that the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance neither from
it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.
Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They submit that the
public respondent’s gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.
The trial court dismissed the said petition. Petitioners then appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which rendered a decision ordering the defendant to pay the petitioners compensatory and moral
damages. Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals then granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant, thereby reversing its prior decision.
ISSUES:
Is the City of Davao guilty of negligence in the case at bar?
RULING:
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred
because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is
presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect.
Co., v. Phil. Motors Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do (emphasis Ours). The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence.
24. Urbano v. IAC, 157 SCRA 1
Facts:
At about 8:00 in the morning of October 23, 1980, Urbando went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier.
He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano drew his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo
hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said
leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier. Immediately thereafter, Javier was treated was treated by Dr. Meneses. Upon the
intervention of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two
accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Urbano made payments of P400 and P300 on separate occasions. At about 1:30 a.m. on November
14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Exconde found that the
Javier’s serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm, which could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18
p.m., Javier died in the hospital. Ubano then was charged with the crime of homicide. Ubano was found guilty as charged. IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano but raised the award of indemnity to the
heirs. A motion for new trial was filed based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain, which states: that on November 5, 1980, he saw Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some
companions. The motion was denied hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death, which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
Held:
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1980 which was the 22nd day
after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1980, he died from tetanus.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of
tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that
killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free
of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of homicide but was ordered to pay damages.

25. Bernal v. House and Tacloban Electric, 54 Phil 327

FACTS:
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to attend the procession of Holy Friday. After the procession, they passed along a public street named Gran
Capitan.
The daughter was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction which frightened the child that she turned to run, which resulted to her fall into the street gutter. At that time, there was hot water in the gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. The daughter’s face was found downward in the hot water. She was immediately taken to the provincial hospital. However, despite the physician’s efforts, the child died that same night.
A case was filed against the electric company. The electric company’s defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Capitan with the knowledge and consent of the
authorities and that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that the plaintiffs contributed to the death by their own fault and negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether the electric company is liable.
RULING:
Yes.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on that evening. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

26. Gabeto v. Araneta, 42 Phil 252.

Facts:
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata to go to a cockpit. As the carromata started towards the cockpit, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street and stopped the horse
claiming that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. At the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the
horse from the control of Araneta. This caused the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out to find the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb
and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle.
While he was doing so, the horse moved forward and accidentally pushed Julio Pagnaya over. Eventually, the carromata struck a police telephone box, causing it to crash and frighten the horse to such an
extent that it set out at full speed up the street.
Gayetano, having remained in the carromata, jumped and fell from the rig which caused him injuries from which he soon died.
Issue:
WON defendant Agaton Araneta’s action was the proximate cause of Gayetano’s death.
Ruling:
No. The mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner stated would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano; because it is admitted by Julio
Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle. The evidence is furthermore convincing to the effect that, after Julio Pagnaya alighted, the horse was
conducted to the curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed — same witnesses say several minutes — before the horse started on his career up the street.
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause
thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability
for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.

27. McKee v. IAC, 211 SCRA 517.

Facts:
A Ford Escort driven by Jose Koh was transversing to Angeles City. While on its way, 2 boys suddenly darted on the right side of the road. To avoid hitting the boys, Jose Koh swerved to the left lane ,
switching on the headlights as emergency signal. Before he could return to his lane , the car collided with a cargo truck driven by Galang and owned by Tayag and Manalo. Jose Koh and 2 of his
passengers died while 3 other passengers were injured. A civil action for damages based on quasi-delict was instituted against Tayag and Manalo as truck owners. The RTC judge dismissed the case but
the CA reversed the decision and held that the truck driver’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence caused the accident.
Issue:
WON the truck owners Tayag and Manalo are liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes, they are liable for damages because the negligent act of the truck driver was the proximate cause of the tragedy. The accident would not have occurred if the truck driver heeded the emergency
signals given by Jose to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back to its proper lane. Instead , it continued at full speed towards the car. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are
solidairy liable for their drivers negligence.

C. PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE

28. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397

FACTS:
Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student, and his brothers, Ruben and Eusebio, went to swim in the pools owned and operated by Metropolitan Water District (MWD) in Diliman, Quezon City.
Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be going to the locker room to drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him return. Later, Eusebio noticed someone at the bottom of the big pool and notified the
lifeguard in attendant, Manuel Abaño, who immediately dove into the water. The body was later identified as Dominador’s. He was attempted to be revived multiple times but of no avail. Mr. and Mrs. Ong
sought to recover from MWD, damages and funeral expenses for the death of their son. They contend that the negligence of Abaño is attributable to MWD.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of MWD and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages
HELD:
No. Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by
the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees (Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517) Mr. and Mrs. Ong have not
established by sufficient evidence the existence of fault or negligence on the part of MWD so as to render it liable for damages for the death of Dominador. The testimony of Ruben Ong and Hagad, Jr. as
to the alleged failure of the lifeguard Abaño to immediately respond to their call may be disregarded because they are belied by their written statements given by them in the police investigation conducted
three hours after the happening of the accident. As found by the trial court, nowhere in said statements do they state that the lifeguard was chatting with the security guard at the gate of the swimming pool
or was reading a comic magazine when the alarm was given for which reason he failed to immediately respond to the alarm. On the contrary, what Ruben particularly emphasized therein was that after the
lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately dived into the pool to retrieve the person under water who turned out to be his brother.

29. Lucas v. Tuano, GR 178763 (April 21, 2009)

Facts:
Complaining of a red right eye and swollen eyelid, petitioner Peter was referred to respondent Dr. Tuaño for an eye consult. Peter was already taking Maxitrol to address the problem in his eye. After
consultation, he was prescribed Spersacet-C and was told to return next week. The same eye had developed a viral infection and he was prescribed the steroid-based eye drop Maxitrol, which had a
warning for prolonged use. Peter's Eye worsened but Dr. Tuaño still continued to prescribe the steroid-based eye drop. On the morning of 13 December, 1988, Peter had no vision in his right eye. Upon
examination it was discovered that the tension in his right eye was above normal. Peter was prescribed Diamox and Normaglaucon instead. Upon seeing another ophthalmologist, Dr. Batungbacal, the
diagnosis was Glaucoma. After returning to Dr. Tuaño, and seeing that his eye's pressure was way above normal, he was told to continue the use of what was prescribed to him.
On 28 December 1988, Dr. Tuaño referred Peter to Dr. Agulto, a specialist in treating glaucoma. After Dr. Agulto's examination, Peter went to see Dr. Tuaño again and was prescribed Timolol B.I.D. but it
was out of stock, so Dr. Tuaño instructed Peter to continue using Diamox and Normoglaucon. Upon the prodding of his friends, Peter sought another opinion from Dr. Aquino who essentially told Peter that
his condition would require lifetime medication and follow-ups. On May 1990 and June 1991, Peter underwent to procedures to attemp to control the high pressure of his right eye.
Petitioner instituted a civil complaint for damages against Dr. Tuaño for the impairment of his vision and for the grief caused to him and his family. They sought pecuniary award for their supposed pain and

suffering, which were ultimately brought about by Dr. Tuaño's grossly negligent conduct in prescribing medicine. ​ ​ ​
In its decision, the RTC dismissed the civil case for insufficiency of evidence. The CA denied petitioners' recourse and affirmed the appealed RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether petitioners failed to prove their claim for damages
Ruling:
There is no causal connection between the said breach and the resulting injury sustained by the patient. Petitioners didn't establish before the trial court that the physician ignored the standard medical
procedure, prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of the competence and skills expected of him. Petitioners also failed to present any expert testimony to
establish that Dr. Tuaño failed in his duty to exercise a standard of care expected of a competent physician and that what was prescribed was the cause of the glaucoma. The burden of proof was upon
petitioners to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence showing a reasonable connection between the alleged breach of duty and the damage sustained.

D. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

i. Respondeat superior (Articles 1755-1756)

30. PAL v. CA 106 SCRA 391

Facts:
Mejia shipped thru Philippine Airlines, one unit of microwave oven from U.S.A. to Manila. Upon arrival in Manila, the front glass door of the oven was broken and the damage made it unserviceable. Mejia
made demands to PAL for the payment of the damaged microwave oven but PAL made no action. Hence, Mejia filed an action for damages against PAL. PAL answered that it only acted in good faith and
that it has always exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Mejia was engaged in catering and restaurant business. Hence, the oven was really important for
Mejia. PAL’s defense: plaintiffs claim was filed out of time under paragraph 12, a(1) of the Air Waybill which provides: (a) the person entitled to delivery must make a complaint to the carrier in writing in
case: (1) of visible damage to the goods, immediately after discovery of the damage and at the latest within 14 days from the receipt of the goods.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAL is liable for damages
RULING:
YES. It will be noted that petitioner never denied that the damage to the microwave oven was sustained while the same was in its custody. The possibility that said damage was due to causes beyond the
control of PAL has effectively been ruled out since the entire process in handling of the cargo - from the unloading thereof from the plane, the towing and transfer to the PAL warehouse, the transfer to the
Customs examination area, and its release thereafter to the shipper - was done almost exclusively by, and with the intervention or, at the very least, under the direct supervision of a responsible PAL
personnel. The very admissions of PAL, through Vicente Villaruz of its Import Section lead to the inevitable conclusion that whatever damage may have been sustained by the cargo is due to causes
attributable to PALs personnel or, at all events, under their responsibility.
Moreover, the trial court underscored the fact that petitioner was not able to overcome the statutory presumption of negligence in Article 1735 which, as a common carrier, it was laboring under in case of
loss, destruction or deterioration of goods, through proper showing of the exercise of extraordinary diligence. Neither did it prove that the damage to the microwave oven was because of any of the
excepting causes under Article 1734, all of the same Code. Inasmuch as the subject item was received in apparent good condition, no contrary notation or exception having been made on the air waybill
upon its acceptance for shipment, the fact that it was delivered with a broken glass door raises the presumption that PALs personnel were negligent in the carriage and handling of the cargo.[44]

Furthermore, there was glaringly no attempt what so ever on the part of petitioner to explain the cause of the damage to the oven. The unexplained cause of damage to private respondents cargo
constitutes gross carelessness or negligence which by itself justifies the present award of damages.[45] The equally unexplained and inordinate delay in acting on the claim upon referral thereof to the
claims officer, Atty. Paco, and the noncommittal responses to private respondents entreaties for settlement of her claim for damages belies petitioners pretension that there was no bad faith on its part.
This unprofessional indifference of PALs personnel despite full and actual knowledge of the damage to private respondents cargo, just to be exculpated from liability on pure technicality and bureaucratic
subterfuge, smacks of willful misconduct and insensitivity to a passengers plight tantamount to bad faith[46] and renders unquestionable petitioners liability for damages.

31. National Development v. CA, 164 SCRA 593.

FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari of the decision of the CA affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
NDC and MCP entered into a Memoramdum of Agreement on September 13, 1962 whereby defendant NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three ocean going vessels including one with the name
'Dona Nati' appointed defendant MCP as its agent to manage and operate said vessel for and in its behalf and account.
The vessel was loaded with several goods from Japan to Manila. En route to Manila the vessel Dofia Nati figured in a collision at 6:04 a.m. on April 15, 1964 at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel 'SS
Yasushima Maru' as a result of which 550 bales of aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton were lost and/or destroyed, of which 535 bales as damaged were landed and sold on the authority of the
General Average Surveyor for Yen 6,045,-500 and 15 bales were not landed and deemed lost.
The plaintiff had paid as insurer the total amount of P364,915.86 to the consignees or their successors-in-interest, for the said lost or damaged cargoes. Hence, plaintiff filed this complaint to recover said
amount from the defendants-NDC and MCP as owner and ship agent respectively, of the said 'Dofia Nati' vessel.
The insurer filed a civil case to recover the sum paid to the owner of the goods plus attorney’s fees of P10,000 against NDC and MCP. MCP filed a motion to dismiss contending that the action has
prescribed.
RTC rendered a decision ordering the defendants MCP and NDC to pay jointly and solidarity to DISC the sum of P364,915.86 plus the legal rate of interest to be computed from the filing of the complaint
on April 22, 1965, until fully paid and attorney's fees of P10,000.00. Likewise, in said decision, the trial court granted MCP's crossclaim against NDC. The same decision was affirmed by CA hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Which laws govern loss or destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters, and the extent of liability as well as the rules of prescription provided thereunder.
HELD:
Petition Denied.
This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC (1 50 SCRA 469-470 [1987]) where it was held under similar circumstance "that the law of the country to which
the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration" (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down that for
cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common
carrier shall be governed by the Code of commerce and by special laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provision of the Civil
Code.
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all circumstances of each case. Accordingly, under Article 1735 of the same Code, in all other than those mentioned is Article 1734 thereof,
the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negigently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.
It is well settled that both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done where both are impleaded (Philippine Shipping Co. v. Garcia Vergara, 96 Phil. 281 [1906]); that in
case of collision, both the owner and the agent are civilly responsible for the acts of the captain (Yueng Sheng Exchange and Trading Co. v. Urrutia & Co., supra citing Article 586 of the Code of
Commerce; Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Lopez Castelo, 42 Phil. 256, 262 [1921]); that while it is true that the liability of the naviero in the sense of charterer or agent, is not expressly provided in
Article 826 of the Code of Commerce, it is clearly deducible from the general doctrine of jurisprudence under the Civil Code but more specially as regards contractual obligations in Article 586 of the Code
of Commerce. Moreover, the Court held that both the owner and agent (Naviero) should be declared jointly and severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a
tortious act and did not arise from contract (Verzosa and Ruiz, Rementeria y Cia v. Lim, 45 Phil. 423 [1923]). Consequently, the agent, even though he may not be the owner of the vessel, is liable to the
shippers and owners of the cargo transported by it, for losses and damages occasioned to such cargo, without prejudice, however, to his rights against the owner of the ship, to the extent of the value of
the vessel, its equipment, and the freight (Behn Meyer Y Co. v. McMicking et al. 11 Phil. 276 [1908]).
Finally, on the issue of prescription, the trial court correctly found that the bills of lading issued allow trans-shipment of the cargo, which simply means that the date of arrival of the ship Dona Nati on April
18,1964 was merely tentative to give allowances for such contingencies that said vessel might not arrive on schedule at Manila and therefore, would necessitate the trans-shipment of cargo, resulting in
consequent delay of their arrival. In fact, because of the collision, the cargo which was supposed to arrive in Manila on April 18, 1964 arrived only on June 12, 13, 18, 20 and July 10, 13 and 15, 1964.
Hence, had the cargoes in question been saved, they could have arrived in Manila on the above-mentioned dates. Accordingly, the complaint in the instant case was filed on April 22, 1965, that is, long
before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the lost or damaged cargo "should have been delivered" in the light of Section 3, sub-paragraph (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

32. International Flavors v. Argos, GR 130362 (September 10, 2001)

FACTS:
Respondents Argos and Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc. (IFFI). Costa, a
Spaniard, was appointed managing director.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. On the same day, Costa issued a
Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and urged employees not to have further dealings with them.
Consequently, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel against Costa with the MTC of Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondents also filed a civil case for damages at the RTC of Pasig against Costa
and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer.
Herein petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC granted the motion to dismiss but later on granted respondents motion for reconsideration. While CA dismissed IFFI's petition. Hence, the
present petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents can sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel case
against petitioner's employee
RULING:
NO. Respondents' suit based on subsidiary liability of petitioner is premature.
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such
liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in
the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.
However, by invoking the principle of respondeat superior, respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold IFFI primarily liable for its employees’ defamatory statements. But respondents did not raise the
claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce the alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of
Costa, the accused in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely.

33. Castilex Industrial v. Vasquez, GR 132266 (December 21, 1999).

FACTS:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, the motorcycle of Vasquez and pick-up of Abad (manager of Castilex Industrial Corporation) collided with each other. Abad brought Vasquez to hospital. However
later on Vasquez died. An action for damages was commenced by parents of deceased Vasquez, against Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. The trial court ordered ABAD and CASTILEX
to pay jointly and solidarily Spouses Vasquez damages. CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that
the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former.
ISSUE:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
RULING:
It was not incumbent upon the petitioner Castilex to prove that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. It was enough for CASTILEX to deny
that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for
the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD did some
overtime work at the office. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident happened. The witness for the private respondents testified that at
the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman could not have been ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time. To
the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was way beyond the normal working hours, he already ended his
work; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to
petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD
in driving its vehicle. CASTILEX should be absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Abad.

ii. Violation of rules and statutes

a. traffic rules (Articles 2184-85)

34. Manuel v. CA, 227 SCRA 29.

FACTS:
Private respondents were passengers of a Scout Car owned by respondent Ramos with respondent Fernando Abcede, Sr. as the driver. The Scout car, which was then negotiating the zigzag road was hit
on its left side by a bus. The bus was owned by petitioner Emiliano Manuel. All its ten occupants, which included four children were injured, seven of the victims sustained serious physical injuries. The
private respondents filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict. After trial, the court rendered judgment against petitioners. In their appeal, petitioners contend that Fernando Abcede, Jr.,
was the one driving the Scout car and did not have a driver's license.
ISSUE:
Whether the traffic violation of Abcede, Jr. exempt Manuel from liability.
RULING:
NO. The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was not duly licensed, was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the accident, could not simply exempt petitioner's liability
because they were parties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane.
35. Mallari v. CA, G.R. No. 128607 (January 31, 2000).
FACTS:
Petitioners Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr. are the owner and driver, respectively, of passenger jeepney which collided head on with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corporation, driven by
Angeles. The collision happened when Mallari Jr. overtook two vehicles in front of it while negotiating a curve in the highway. The collision resulted to the injuries to passengers in the passenger jeepney,
one of the passengers, Israel Reyes, died. The widow of Reyes filed a complaint for damages against petitioners and respondent.
The trial court ruled that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the delivery van of bulletin. The CA ruled that the collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner
Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook the vehicles and that he has seen the delivery van approaching.
ISSUE:
Whether Mallari Jr. was negligent
RULING:
Mallari Jr. was negligent and both petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for damages to the widow of Israel Reyes.
In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at
5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway.
Petitioner’s act of overtaking was a clear violation of Sec 41 of RA 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a
passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed
by traffic rules.
The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeepney is also binding against its owner, petitioner Mallari Sr., who was engaged as a common carrier. In an action based on a contract of
carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for damages because there is a presumption of negligence
on the part of the common carrier.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that
it observed extraordinary diligence.

b. statutes and ordinances / administrative rules

36. Marinduque Iron v. Workmen’s Compensation, 99 Phil. 480

Facts:
On its way to their place of work, Pedro Mamador, together with other labourers of Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. Boarded a truck driven by Procopio Macunat, owned by the corporation. While trying
to overtake another truck, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of Mamador and injury to the others. In criminal case no. 1491, Macunat was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased. However, Macunat has paid nothing; thus, deceased’s wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque, as Macunat’s employer. The corporation claims that Mamador
violated its prohibition against laborers riding the haulage truck; thus, this notorious negligence, under the law, precludes recovery.
Issue:
Whether Marinduque is liable for compensation
Held:
Yes. Petitioner claims that this claim is barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law due to the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and an amicable
settlement was concluded between said heirs and Macunat. However, the case was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the
indemnity. Also, jurisprudence provides that criminal prosecution of the “other person” does not affect the liability of the employer. As to the amicable settlement, the widow waived only the offender’s
criminal prosecution and not all civil action for damages.
Mere riding on the haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. Also, there is practical unanimity that violation of a rule promulgated
by a Commission or Board is not negligence per se; but may be evidence of negligence. Getting or accepting a free ride on the company’s haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence because “no danger
or risk was apparent”.

37. Cipriano v. CA, 263 SCRA 711

Facts:
Elias Cipriano owns ES Cipriano Enterprises, engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles. Maclin Electronics bought a car to petitioners shop for rustproofing. Fire broke out at a nearby restaurant which
petitioner also owned. It destroyed both the shop and the restaurant including the car of Maclin. Maclin demanded reimbursement and Elias denied liability alleging that the fire was a fortuitous event.
Responded sued elias for damages and for the value of the vehicle alleging that the vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner citing the petitioner’s failure to register his
business with DTI under PD 1572 and to insure it was required in rules implementing the decree.
Issue:
Whether failure of Cipriano to insure his business which resulted to a violation of ordinance renders him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against.
Held:
Yes. Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v. Court of
Appeals. Petitioner's negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty
imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioners negligence in not insuring against the risk which was
the proximate cause of the loss.
P.D. No. 1572 requires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such registration or accreditation,
Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of
negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous event this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss.

38. F.F. Cruz & Co. v. CA, 164 SCRA 731

Facts:
Petitioner F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. is an owner of a furniture shop in Caloocan City which was adjacent to the residence of Mable family, herein private respondents. That around August 1971, private
respondent Gregorio Mable asked herein petitioner that a firewall be erected between the latter’s shop and their house. Such request was ignored. Regrettably, on September 6, 1974, a fire broke out in
the petitioner’s shop which ultimately spread into private respondents’ house. Both the house and the shop were ruined to the ground. As a consequence, the private respondent filed an action for
recovery of damages against the petitioner. After the trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents and ordered the petitioner to pay the damages for the loss of the formers’ house, furniture
and other valuables. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Lower Court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR is applicable in this case?
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. Under the Doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR: “Where the thing which cause the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.”
The facts of the case at hand clearly call the application of the abovementioned doctrine. In the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible materials may usually
be found thereon.
Furthermore, negligence or want of care on the part of the petitioner was not merely presumed; the latter’s failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinance would suffice to support findings
of negligence.

39. Sanitary Steam Laundry v. CA, 300 SCRA 20

FACTS:
A Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner and a Cimarron collided in Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite which caused the death of three persons and several injuries. The victims were the passengers of
the Cimarron, including its driver. It was filed in CFI of Rizal and got transferred to RTC of Makati which found the petitioners to be responsible for the accident and be held liable for damages. The CA
affirmed RTC’s decision in toto.
Petitioner’s contention is that upon driving back to its plant, along the said highway, a passenger jeepney suddenly stopped in front of it causing the petitioner to step onto the brakes which resulted for the
panel truck to swerve left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane and collided with the Cimarron. Petitioner argued that the driver of the Cimarron was also guilty of contributory negligence because
the driver was guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations at the time of the accident; thus, praying that petitioner’s liability be mitigated, if not extinguished. The petitioner stated that the Cimarron was
overloaded, the front seat was occupied by 4 adults, and with only one headlight on its right side; thus, the Cimarron was presumed to be negligent.
ISSUE:
WON the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence because of the presumption that it was negligent because of having violated some traffic rules and regulation.
RULING:
No. The SC finds no merit on the contention of the petitioner. It was not shown the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver in the contribution of the accident. The petitioner is burdened to prove the
causal effect of the collision and the violation of the traffic rules. He must show that it was the proximate cause that led into the accident. The petitioner’s allegations regarding the Cimarron’s violation like
travelling with only one headlight, thus, decreased visibility and the overloading and overcrowded in the front row resulted in the decreased maneuverability of the vehicle are mere allegations and are not
sufficient to discharge its burden in proving that such negligence was indeed contributory.
Its testimonies are in line with the private respondents. However, the SC finds it at the fault of the petitioner. If only he had enough distance between him and the jeepney, he had an ample time to step its
brakes just enough to avoid the collision between him the jeepney and avoiding to swerve to the opposite lane. Also, SC found out that the panel truck of the petitioner was over speeding and surpassed
the speed limit allowed for trucks in the Aguinaldo Highway. Thus, SC ruled in favor of the respondents and affirmed the decision of the CA but modified the awards given.

iii. Dangerous weapons and substances (Article 2188)

40. Araneta v. Arreglado, 104 Phil. 529

Facts:
On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated atop a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds along Dakota Street, in
the City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and during their conversation they twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and
enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly pulling from his pocket a Japanese Lugar pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the
same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw, and causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. Araneta was taken first to the school infirmary and later to the Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering
between life and death for three days. After some time he finally recovered, the gunshot wound left him with a degenerative injury to the jawbone and a scar in the lower portion of the face, where the
bullet had plowed through. The behavior of Benjamin was likewise affected, he becoming inhibited and morose after leaving the hospital. Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded
guilty; but in view of his youth, being only 14, the court suspended the hearings as prescribed by Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, and ordered him committed to the care of Mr. Deogracias Lerma,
under the supervision of the Commissioner of Social Welfare. Because Arreglado observed proper conduct and discipline while on probation, the court, upon recommendation of the Social Welfare
Administrator, finally discharged him on May 22, 1953, and quashed the criminal case. Thereafter, on October 13, 1954, an action was instituted by Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife,
and their son, Dario, to recover material, moral and exemplary damages. CFI found Juan Arreglado negligent in allowing his son to have access to the pistol and ordered them to pay P3,943.00 damages
and attorneys fees. Araneta’s appealed in view of the amount originally claimed (112,000)
Issue:
Whether petitioners are entitled to greater award for damages
Held:
Yes. We do not believe that plaintiffs-appellants should recover the cost of a plastic operation and surgical treatment in the United States, since their own experts asserted that the operation could be
competently performed here by local practitioners. Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of corrective measures to fully repair the damage; the pain suffered by the injured party; his feelings of
inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further considering that a repair, however skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to
the original state, we are of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should be increased to a total of P18, 000.

iv. Res ipsa loquitur

41. Africa v. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448.

FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the
hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo
Boquiren, who were the alleged owner of the station and the agent in charge of operation. Their negligence was attributed as the cause of the fire.
There was found a coca-cola cooler and a rack inside the premises, which according to information gathered in the neighbourhood, contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the gasoline
pumps and the underground tanks.
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine res ipsa loquitur applies to presume negligence and whether Caltex is liable.
RULING:
Yes, the doctrine res ipsa loquitur applies. Gasoline is a highly combustible material; extreme care must be taken for its storage and sale. However, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it
arises almost invariably from some act of man. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to
and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation as to its cause
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not
for another negligent omission on the part of defendants which is their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. "The intention of an
unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the
resulting injury."
Hence, Caltex is liable with Mateo Boquiren being considered as agent of the company.

42. Cebu Shipyard v. William Lines, G.R. 132607, 5 May 1999.

Facts:
William Lines, Inc. brought its vessel, M/V Manila City, to Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. (CSEW) in Lapulapu City for annual dry-docking and repair. The crew of the vessel, together with
other employees of William Lines Inc., remained in the vessel while it was undergoing dry-docking and repairs. After subject vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to
its loss.
The RTC ruled against CSEW and was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies against CSEW.
Ruling:
Yes. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence.
The facts and evidence on record reveal the concurrence of said conditions in the case under scrutiny. First, the fire that occurred and consumed M/V Manila City would not have happened in the ordinary
course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised. In other words, some negligence must have occurred. Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals and as shown by the records, is the herein petitioner, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc., which had control over subject vessel when it was docketed for annual repairs.

43. D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, 20 April 2001.
Facts:
th th
Jose Juego is a carpenter of D.M. Consunji Inc. While on board a platform and performing his work at the elevator of the 14 floor of the Renaissance Tower Builiding, Jose fell from the 14 floor causing
his death. The falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting lose of the pin which was merely inserted without a safety lock. Jose’s widow, Maria, filed a complaint for damages against DM
Consunji, which was granted by the RTC of Pasig. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.
Issue:
WON D.M Consunji is liable for damages
Ruling:
Yes. D.M, Consunji is liable for damages. The doctrine of re ipsa loquitor ( the thing speaks for itself) provides that the facts and circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
th
presumption that it was due to the negligence on the part of the defendant. In this case, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine are present. First, no worker is going to fall from the 14 floor while
performing work unless someone is negligent. Second, the instrumentality is under the control and management of D.M. Consunji. Lastly, there was no contributory negligence attributable to Jose. These
circumstances warrant a presumption or inference that the accident was due to the negligence of the company and since it was not able to overturn the presumption , DM Consunji is liable for damages.

44. NPC v. CA, G.R. No. 124378, 8 March 2005

FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) was mandated by Presidential Memorandum Order No. 398 to build the Agus River Dam at the mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur and to maintain the normal
maximum water level of Lake Lanao at 702 meters. Pursuant thereto, NPC built and operated the said dam in 1978. Private respondents owned fishponds sited along the Lake Lanao shore. When the
water level of Lake Lanao escalated, the lakeshore area was flooded and all the improvements were washed away. Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against NPC. They alleged that the
negligence of NPC’s employees assigned to operate the dam was the proximate cause of the damage caused to their properties and livelihood. NPC denied the allegations and contended that the water
level of Lake Lanao never went beyond 702 meters.
ISSUE:
Whether NPC is presumed to have been negligent in its duty of maintaining the water level at 702 meters
HELD:
Yes. An application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, comes to fore. Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. NPC adduced in evidence its company records to bear out its claim that the water level of the lake was, at no point in time,
higher than 702 meters. Both courts below held that the data contained in NPC’s records collapse in the face of the actual state of the affected areas. In the absence of any clear explanation on what other
factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water
level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters.

45. Perla Compania v. Sarangaya, G.R. No. 147746, 25 Oct. 2005

Facts:
Petitioner-corporation, through its branch manager Pascual, entered into a contract of lease with respondent spouses. After a three day trip to San Fernando, Pascual returned to the leased building and
decided to use the car he had left there. Upon revving the engine and hearing unusual sounds, he saw a small flame coming out of the engine. He turned the vehicle off and pushed it out of the garage
when suddenly fire spewed out and engulfed the garage. Pascual suffered burns on his face, legs and arms. The fire spread inside respondents' house and destroyed all their belongings. A criminal
complaint for Reckless imprudence resulting to damage in property was filed against petitioner Pascual. A civil complaint was also filed based on quasi-delict against petitioners alleging that Pascual acted
with gross negligence. During trial, respondents presented witnesses who testified that a few days before the incident, Pascual placed a container of gasoline, which he bought, in the rear compartment of
the car. Pascual insisted that the fire was purely an accident. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The Court of Appeals again ruled in favor of respondents.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the present case.
Ruling:
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Pascual's negligence is revealed by his failure to submit proof that he periodically checked his car, which is under his exclusive control, and that respondents had nothing to contribute to the incident.

46. Philam Insurance v. CA, GR 165413, February 22, 2012

Facts:
Four gensets from U.S.A. were ordered by Citibank. AHIC insured these gensets. The insurance policy provided that the claim may be paid in the Philippines by Philam Insurance the local settling agent of
AHIC. MIS (broker-forwarder) instructed to place the 13 ton genset at the top of Citibanks building. DMCI was the one who accepted the task of doing such. DMCI used a crane with a 20 ton loading
capacity. However, during the lifting process, both the cranes and the genset fell and got damaged. Citibank demanded from DMCI the full value of the damaged genset, including the insurance and freight
mounting. DMCI refused to pay alleging that it was an accident. Citibank then filed an insurance claim with Philam. Philam paid the claim and demanded reimbursement from DMCI. Since, DMCI refused
to pay, Philam filed a complaint
Issue:
Whether DMCI was negligent such as to warrant the petitioner’s claim
Ruling:
Philam life failed to establish DMCI negligence. Therefore, Philam’s petition is denied.
To be held liable, it must be established that DMCI was negligent and the negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage to the genset.

Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.It is a conduct that involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage; or, more fully, a conduct that falls below the standard
established by law for the protection of others against unreasonably great risk of harm.The test of negligence is as follows:
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Circumstances would show that the acts of the crane operator were rational and justified.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said
 v. Common carrier

47. Perena v. Zarate, GR 157917, August 29, 2012

FACTS:
In June 1996, Nicolas and Teresita Zarate enetered into a contract with Teodoro and Nanette Pereña to transport their (Zarate’s) son, Aaron Zarate, to and from school. The Pereñas were owners and
operator of a van being used for private school transport.
Sometime in August 22, 1996, the driver of the said private van, Clemente Alfaro, while the children were on board including Aaron, decided to take a short cut in order to avoid traffic. The usual short cut
was a railroad crossing of the Philippine National Railway (PNR).
Alfaro saw that the barandilla (the pole used to block vehicles crossing the railway) was up which means it was okay to cross. He then tried to overtake a bus. However, there was in fact an oncoming train
but Alfaro no longer saw the train as his view was already blocked by the bus he was trying to overtake. The bus was able to cross unscathed but the van’s rear end was hit. During the collision, Aaron,
was thrown off the van. His body hit the railroad tracks and his head was severed. He was only 15 years old.
It turns out that Alfaro was not able to hear the train honking from 50 meters away before the collision because the van’s stereo was playing loudly.
The Zarates sued PNR and the Pereñas. Alfaro escaped at large. Their cause of action against PNR was based on quasi-delict while their action against the Pereñas was based on breach of contract of
common carriage for failing to transport their son safely.
In their defense, the Pereñas invoked the defense that as private carriers they were not negligent in selecting Alfaro as their driver since they made sure that he had a driver’s license and that he was not
involved in any accident prior to being hired.
PNR raised the defense that the railroad crossing they placed there was not meant for railroad crossing.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates and awarded them damages for the loss of earning capacity of their dead son. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
The Pereñas appealed. They argued that the award was improper as Aaron was merely a high school student, hence, the award of such damages was merely speculative. They cited the case of People
vs Teehankee where the Supreme Court did not award damages for the loss of earning capacity despite the fact that the victim there was enrolled in a pilot school.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of due diligence of a good father by the Pereñas is untenable. Whether or not the award of damages for loss of income is proper.
HELD:
Yes on both Issues.
Defense of Due Diligence of a Good Father
This defense is not tenable in this case. The Pereñas are common carriers. They are not merely private carriers. (Prior to this case, the status of private transport for school services or school
buses is not well settled as to whether or not they are private or common carriers – but they were generally regarded as private carriers). Private transport for schools are common carriers.
The Pereñas were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over established roads by the method by which
the business was conducted; and (c) transporting students for a fee.
Despite catering to a limited clientèle, the Pereñas operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living
within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.
Being common carriers, what is specifically required from them by law is extraordinary diligence – a fact which they failed to prove in court and not merely ordinary diligence. Verily, their obligation as
common carriers did not cease upon their exercise of diligently choosing Alfaro as their employee.

Award of Damages for Aaron’s loss of earning capacity despite he being a high school student at the time of his death
The award is proper. Aaron was enrolled in a reputable school (Don Bosco). He was of normal health and was an able-bodied person. Further, the basis of the computation of his earning capacity was not
on what he would have become. It was based on the current minimum wage. The minimum wage was validly used because with his circumstances at the time of his death, it is most certain that had he
lived, he would at least be a minimum wage earner by the time he starts working. This is not being speculative at all.
The Teehankee case cannot be applied because it has different facts. There the petitioners verily assumed that the victim would become a pilot– hence, that made the assumption speculative. But in the
case of Aaron, there was no speculation as to what he might be – but whatever he’ll become, it is certain that he will at the least be earning minimum wage.

E. DEFENSES

i. Plaintiff’s negligence is proximate cause of injury

48. PLDT v. CA, G.R. 57079 (September 29, 1989).

FACTS:
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) for the injuries they sustained in the
evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the
accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries while the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
PLDT denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of respondent spouses. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with SC.
ISSUE:
WON PLDT may be held liable for damages
RULING:
NO.
The accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors,
and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence,
respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the
injury. Private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one
should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his
negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

49. Kim v. Phil. Aerial Taxi, 58 Phil. 838.

FACTS: Kim bought a passenger ticket for a flight to Iloilo in one of the defendant company's hydroplanes. The plane landed and taxied toward the beach until its pontoons struck bottom. When the plane
stopped the pilot observed that a banca was approaching rapidly on the right hand side of the plane, he arose signalled and shouted to the boatman to keep his banca at a distance from the plane. While
he was doing this, the plaintiff unfastened the straps around him and, not even waiting to put on his hat, climbed over the door to the lower wing, went down the ladder to the pontoon and walked along the
pontoon toward the revolving propeller. The propeller first grazed his forehead and, as he threw up his arm, it was caught by the revolving blades thereof and so injured that it had be amputated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant entity has complied with its contractual obligation to carry Teh Le Kim safe and sound to his destination.

RULING: The hydroplane, which carried the plaintiff, arrived at the Iloilo, as usual, with nothing more left to do but to take plaintiff safe and sound, ashore. In order to do this, it was necessary to wait for
the propeller to stop, turn the rear or tail end of the plane towards the shore, take the passengers out by the aforesaid rear or tail end thereof, place them in a banca and take them ashore. By sheer
common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby.
It is not difficult to understand that the Kim acted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to take him. Kim’s
negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident, the injury to his right arm and the subsequent amputation thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his own imprudence and not to the slightest
negligence attributable to the defendant entity or to its agents. Therefore, he alone should suffer the consequences of his act.

50. American Express v. Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, 14 Oct 2005

FACTS:
American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used to purchase goods at accredited merchants worldwide. Nilda, wife of respondent Noel, was issued an American
Express charge card. Respondent, together with his family went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watson’s Shop. While there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and
handed his American Express extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay for his purchases.
The store manager, informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent’s American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused
him embarrassment and humiliation. The card was placed in the Inspect Air warn Support System, a system utilized by petitioner as a protection against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a
card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner. According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that some other person in Hong Kong
attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of respondent’s card and that petitioner’s inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of respondent’s
extension card which exposed the latter to public. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court gravely erred in awarding damages to Cordero.
RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that petitioner can revoke respondent’s card without notice, as was done. The subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioner’s
representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioner’s representative to determine that respondent was indeed the true
holder. If at all, the cause of respondent’s humiliation was his refusal to talk to petitioner’s representative. It was thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that,
therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.

51. Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, GR 159132 (December 18, 2008)

FACTS:
Respondent Editha Ramolete was three months pregnant when she was brought to the hospital due to vaginal bleeding. Through the phone, petitioner Dr. Fe Cayao-Lasam advised the respondent to be
admitted. It was later revealed that the fetus has a weak cardiac pulse and that there was no fetal movement. Due to persistent vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised respondent to undergo a Dilation and
Curettage Procedure (D&C), respondent was later discharged.
Months later, respondent suffered vomiting and severe abdominal pains; it was discovered that there was a dead fetus in her womb. Respondent had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy because of
Months later, respondent suffered vomiting and severe abdominal pains; it was discovered that there was a dead fetus in her womb. Respondent had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy because of
her ruptured uterus; as a result, she has no more chance of bearing a child.
Respondent spouses Ramolete filed a complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the petitioner before the PRC. The Board of Medicine rendered a decision exonerating petitioner from
charges against her. On appeal, the PRC reversed the decision of the Board and revoked petitioner’s license to practice her profession.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Editha’s negligence was the proximate cause of her injury
RULING:
Petitioner is not guilty of medical malpractice. The injury of respondent was proximately caused by her own negligence. The defenses in an action for damages, are provided for under Article 2179 of the
Civil Code which states, “When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.”
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually
causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission
In the case at bar, respondent did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioner’s advice. Respondent omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the
injury. Had respondent returned, petitioner could have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine the former’s health condition and applied the corresponding treatment
which could have prevented the rupture of the uterus. The D&C procedure having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear that respondent’s omission was the
proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a contributory negligence on her part. Respondent cannot recover damages from the injury.

ii. Comparative v. Contributory Negligence (Article 2179)

Comparative Negligence

52. Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263

Facts:
The banana plants standing near the transmission line of Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire due to a storm with strong rain in the afternoon, which lasted until midnight. The
live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, the barrio captain saw the broken electric wire and warned the
people not to go near the wire. He also saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of Alcala Electric Plant and asked him to fix it but Baldomero said that he could not do it but he will look for the lineman to fix it.
Manuel P. Saynes, a 3 year old boy, was electrocuted and died after he got in contact with the broken wire. The broken wire was then fixed.
Issue:
Whether Teodoro Umali, as owner and manager of Alcala Electric Plant is guilty of negligence
Held:
Yes. Umali’s liability for injury caused by his employees’ negligence is well defined in Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer
because the latter is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the former. The employer may escape liability if he can prove that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employees.
The employees of Umali could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds, the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown because there were big and tall banana plants at
the place of the incident which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line. Also, Baldomero was negligent, he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from
approaching the live wire it posed a danger to life and property.
The parents’ negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury was due to the defendant’s lack of due care, the court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

53. Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 148 SCRA 353.

FACTS:
Leonardo was on his way home. He had taken “a shot or two” of liquor. Dionisio was driving his car and had just crossed the intersection not far from his home when his car headlights suddenly failed.
When he switched them on it was too late as he saw a dump truck owned by phoenix construction looming 2.5 meters away from his car and he smashed into it. He suffered injuries. The truck was parked
on the right side of the road and it was partly blocking oncoming traffic and was without any early warning devices. The truck was driven home by Carbonel its regular driver with the permission of Phoenix,
his employer. Dionisio sued for damages in CFI.
ISSUE:
WON Dionisio also had a hand in the injury caused to himself
HELD:
Yes. SC held that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident as he was driving faster than he should have been and worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the
intersection and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane, but the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful —
or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked. In other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the
one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, NCC).
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we believe
that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court shall be borne by private
respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's
fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.

54. PCI Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 121413, 29 Jan 2001.

Facts:
Plaintiff Ford issued a Citibank check amounting to P4,746,114.41 in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of manufacturer’s taxes. The check was deposited with defendant
IBAA (now PCIB), subsequently cleared the the Central Bank, and paid by Citibank to IBAA. The proceeds never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make a second payment. Defendant refused to
reimburse plaintiff, and so the latter filed a complaint. An investigation revealed that the check was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the general ledger accountant of Ford, and was replaced by a manager’s
check. Alleged members of a syndicate deposited the two manager’s checks with Pacific Banking Corporation. Ford filed a third party complaint against Rivera and PBC. The case against PBC was
dismissed. The case against Rivera was likewise dismissed because summons could not be served. The trial court held Citibank and PCIB jointly and severally liable to Ford, but the Court of Appeals only
held PCIB liable.
Ford drew two checks in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, amounting to P5,851,706.37 and P6,311,591.73. Both are crossed checks payable to payee’s account only. The checks never
reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make second payments. Plaintiff instituted an action for recovery against PCIB and Citibank.
On investigation of NBI, the modus operandi was discovered. Gorofredo Rivera made the checks but instead of delivering them to BIR, passed it to Castro, who was the manager of PCIB San Andres.
Castro opened a checking account in the name of a fictitious person “Reynaldo Reyes”. Castro deposited a worthless Bank of America check with the same amount as that issued by Ford. While being
routed to the Central Bank for clearing, the worthless check was replaced by the genuine one from Ford.

The trial court absolved PCIB and held Citibank liable, which decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of Ford
Ruling:
YES. The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his
superior and will defeat the superior's action against the third person, assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made. As well-
defined, proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause produces the injury and without the result would not have occurred. It shows
that while the employees of Ford commenced the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our interpretation, their actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to
the CIR. The degree of Ford's negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties. The mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payor's
confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does not entitle the bank to shift the loss to the
drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule likewise applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold
them in their possession.

55. Estacion v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, 27 Feb 2006

FACTS:
Noe Bernardo was a passenger of jeepney driven by Geminiano Quinquillera, owned by respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo, Noe hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The jeepney stopped by
the right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck, owned by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the
Fiera, the cargo truck smashed respondent Noe against the Fiera crushing his legs and feet which made him fall to the ground. Noe was brought to the Silliman University Medical Center where his lower
left leg was amputated. Noe, through his guardian Ad Litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint for damages arising from quasi delict against the registered owner of the
cargo truck and his driver Gerosano. And he prayed for actual damages, loss of income, moral and exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
Gerosano filed an answer denying the allegations in the complaint. They filed a third party complaint against respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, as owner and driver of the Fiera. The reckless
imprudence of the respondent driver was the proximate cause of the accident. Driver Gerosano was charged criminally for reckless imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries with damage to
property before the MCTC finding him guilty of the crime charged and was sentenced him and to pay the costs. RTC rendered its judgment in the civil case ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to
pay plaintiff, jointly or solidarily to the actual damages, moral damages, attorney’s fee and the litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA rendered the assailed decision which affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals erred in exonerating respondents Cecilia Bandoquillio and Geminiano Quinquillera.

RULING:
Yes. Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are liable for the negligent act of their driver. The judgment ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, as well as third party defendants Bandoquillo and Quinquillera,
to pay plaintiff, jointly and solidarily, the award of damages, should be mitigated in accordance with Article 2179 since there was contributory negligence on the part of respondent Noe.

Contributory Negligence

56. Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf, 7 Phil 359

Facts:
Rakes was a black man, who works as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf. One day, they were working in the company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars; each car carrying the opposite
Rakes was a black man, who works as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf. One day, they were working in the company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars; each car carrying the opposite
ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but ropes secured the rails.
The tracks where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the
cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it
to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500). Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their
workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should
be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.
Issue:
Whether the company is liable
Held:
Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track, as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in
continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars
when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. His disobedience to this order does not bar his recovery of damages, however the amount of
damages should be reduced.

57. Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 16 Phil. 8

FACTS:
This is an action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, 15 years of age, was the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
David and his friends, out of youthful curiosity, spent some time wandering about the company's premises. They walked across the open space in the neighborhood where the company dumped in the
cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of
dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick and carried them home. The boys then made a series of experiments with
the caps. They opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents.
An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all of them.
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal
by the surgeons.
ISSUE:
Whether defendant company is liable.
RULING:
No, the electric company is not liable. The negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not attributable to the negligence of the defendant and The Court was satisfied that plaintiffs’ action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate
cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. The defendant therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened had not the fulminating caps been left exposed, or if due care was exercised in keeping them in an appropriate place; However, it is equally clear
that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express
permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not deliberately cut open one of the caps
and applied a match to its contents. True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap,
and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.
Hence, where the Plaintiff contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.

58. PBCom v. CA, 269 SCRA 695

Facts:
Romeo Lipana, president and general manager of Rommel's Marketing Corporation, entrusted RMC funds to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing them to RMC’s account with PBC.
Yabut, however, deposited the funds to her husband’s account in the same bank. Irene would accomplish 2 copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her
husband as depositor and his current account number while the duplicate had the account number of her husband but no account name. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and
stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. Yabut would then make it appear through the duplicate
that the funds were deposited to RMC. This went on for a span of 1 year.
The RTC ruled against PBC and was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
WON RMC is guilty of contributory negligence.
Ruling:
Yes. It cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of
frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in
their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent.

59. Lambert v. Heirs of Castillon, GR 160709, 23 Feb 2006

Facts:
Ray Castillon together with his friend Sergio rode a motorcycle around Iligan City. After eating supper and drinking a bottle of beer, the continued to roam around the city at a high speed. A Tamaraw
jeepney driven by Gamot and owned by Lambert, made a sudden left turn and hit the motorcycle. Ray instantly died and Sergio suffered injuries. The heirs of Ray filed an action for damages against the
jeepney owber Lambert. The RTC granted the petition but reduced the amount of damages in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue:
WON Lamber is liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. The abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo Gamot , without first establishing his right of way , was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray. However, Ray was also guilty of
contributory negligence because he was driving at a high speed and he was not wearing a helmet. He also imbibed one or two bottles of beer. Art, 2179 provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff is
only contributory to the incident and the immediate and proximate cause of the injury is the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages but the court sha;; mitigate the damages to be
awarded. Hence, the heirs of Ray shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. The remaining 50% shall be born by them.

60. Estacion v. Bernardo, GR. 144723, 27 Feb 2006.

FACTS:
Respondent Noe Bernardo boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney. Since the Fiera was already full, he hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. When the Fiera stopped by the right shoulder
of the road to pick up passengers, an Isuzu cargo truck smashed Noe against the Fiera crushing his legs and feet. He was brought to a hospital where his lower leg was amputated. Noe filed a complaint
for damages arising from quasi delict against petitioner, Larry Estacion, as the registered owner of the cargo truck and the driver of the cargo truck, Gerosano. Petitioner contends that Noe’s act of
standing in the rear carrier of the Fiera is in itself negligence on his part.
ISSUE:
Whether Noe was guilty of contributory negligence
HELD:
Yes. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection. Noe’s act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It has been held
that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body. Noe’s act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his life and limb.
Turning now to the award of damages, since there was contributory negligence on Noe’s part, petitioner’s liability should be mitigated in accordance with Article 2179 of the Civil Code. The underlying
precept of the above article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his
own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.

61. PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, 2 Nov. 2006

Facts:
Rhonda Brunty together with her Filipino host Juan Garcia traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by Rodolfo Mercelita. By 2am, when they were approaching a railroad crossing
in Tarlac, Mercelita drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and collided with a train. Mercelita was instantly killed and the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries.
Brunty was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival while Garcia ended up in Makati Medical Center.
Rhonda's mother, Ethel, and Garcia filed a complaint for damages against the train company, PNR, before the RTC of Manila. They allege that the deaths and the physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were
the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Tarlac. They also averr that PNR failed to supervise its
employees. The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Aggrieved, PNR appealed the case to the CA. The appellate court affirmed the finding of the RTC as to the negligence of the PNR. It ruled that the alleged
safety measures installed by the PNR did not satisfy the well-settled safety standards in transportation. However, the CA did not agree with the RTC's findings on the contributory negligence of Mercelita
since he could not have foreseen the harm that owuld befall him and the passengers under the prevailing circumstances.
Issue:
Whether the driver of the Mercedes Benz, Mercelita, is guilty of contributory negligence.
Ruling:
The Court has holds PNR liable for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the
public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. However, Mercelita's act of driving at 70 km/hr and overtaking a vehicle
before reaching the track contributed to the collision. A causal link, althought not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury is established. It nevertheless does not negate
petitioner's liability.

​iii. Assumption of Risk (Article 1174)

62. Afialda v. Hisole, 85 Phil. 67
Facts:
Loreto Afialda (deceased) was employed by spouses Hisole as caretaker or their carabaos. While looking after the carabaos, Loreto was gored by a carabao. Such incident killed Loreto. Plaintiff seeks to
hold defendants liable under Article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads: The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should
escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. Lower court: that the owner is
only liable for damages caused to a stranger and that as to caretaker : only when the owner is negligent.
Issue:
Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable
Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable
Ruling:
Possessor or user was the caretaker. It was his job to prevent the animals from causing harm. It was part of the risks he voluntarily accepted. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The
petitioners should have brought an action in accordance with the WORKMAN’S COMPENSATION OR WHEN UNDER ARTICLE 1902 (quasi-delict) there must be a proof of negligence on the part of the
owner.

63. Transporto v. Mijares

See AQUINO, TORTS AND DAMAGES 242 (2001).
FACTS:
Antonio Transporto and Hernani Mijares are both employees of La Carlota Sugar Central. Sometime in December 23, 1956, another co-employee of them called the attention of the plaintiff about an
unusually big-sized firecracker in the table of Vicente Lim, their boss. The plaintiff approached the table and scared the children that he will ignite the firecracker. He boasted among his officemates that he
used to explode bigger-sized firecrackers and stated that one would not get hurt by the explosion thereof if it is held tightly. His companions laughed at him and the plaintiff appearing to be irked
challenged his companions to a bet. The defendant accepted the bet.
The two went outside and the plaintiff tied the firecracker to his hand and lighted it. Plaintiff won the bet but in return his right hand got injured. As a result, he was hospitalized for a few days and lost his
job after being hospitalized for an extended number of days.
After being discharged from the hospital, the plaintiff asked monetary help from the defendant and both agreed that the defendant will pay plaintiff the amount of P1,000; P500 of which was paid. The
defendant did not pay the remaining P500 so the plaintiff filed a case against the defendant. The RTC dismissed the case and the CA Affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether a person who a person who consented to the wrong committed against him can recover damages.
HELD:
SC upheld the CA.
The case should be governed by the doctrine of “volenti non fit injuria” (no wrong is done to him who consents. The facts and circumstances show that the plaintiff, freely and voluntarily, with full
knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk has impliedly agreed to get incur the injury. A plaintiff who brought injury upon himself cannot recover on the basis of the defendant’s negligence.

64. Ilocos Norte Electric v. CA, 179 SCRA 5

FACTS:
A strong typhoon buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the
deceased Isabel Lao Juan ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio and proceeded towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look
after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged.
Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which
was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked behind the deceased, when suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear
dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help,
Ernesto tried to go to the deceased but turned back shouting that the water was grounded. When the floodwater receded and the electric current had been cut off in Guerrero, the body of the deceased
was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the CFI. Petitioner, for his defense, advanced the theory that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by
electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.
Sought to be reversed in this petition is the decision of the respondent CA setting aside the judgment of CFI sentencing defendant to pay plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death
RULING:
YES. The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the
comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. The deceased, accompanied by Linda and Aida, were on their way to her grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We
punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held
that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of
another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a
place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

65. Co v. CA, 291 SCRA 111.

FACTS:
Petitioner entrusted his car to private respondent - which is engaged in the sale, distribution and repair of motor vehicles for job repair services and supply of parts. Private respondent undertook to return
the vehicle on July 21 fully serviced and supplied in accordance with the job contract. After petitioner paid in full the repair bill private respondent issued to him a gate pass for the release of the vehicle on
said date. But came the date for release it was not released so it was moved. When petitioner sought to reclaim his car he was told that it was carnapped while being road-tested. Having failed to recover
his car, petitioner filed a suit for damages against private respondent anchoring his claim on the latter’s alleged negligence. Private respondent countered that it has no liability because the car was lost
because of a fortuitous event, the car napping.
ISSUE:
Whether the repair shop can be held liable for the loss of the vehicle while the same is in its custody for repair or other job services.
HELD:
Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another’s rightful possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not
automatically give rise to a fortuitous event. It must be proved and established that the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and that neither the claimant nor the person alleged to
be negligent has any participation. The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it which in this case is the private respondent. However, other than the police
report, no other evidence was presented to the effect that the incident was not due to its fault. A police report does not suffice to establish the carnapping and that private respondent has no fault. It must
likewise be emphasized that pursuant to Articles 1174 and 1262 of the NCC, liability attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event if “the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk”.
Carnapping is a normal business risk for those engaged in the repair of motor vehicles.

iv. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

66. Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809

FACTS:
Picart, the plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback was not observing the rule of the road. The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, given the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely
up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left as he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left that being the proper side of the road and instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away, continued to approach directly
toward the horse. When he had gotten quite near, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse but in so doing the animal became frightened and was struck. The
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. CFI absolved defendant from liability hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant, was guilty of negligence.
RULING:
YES. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things
this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the
bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.

67. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 398.

FACTS:
Defendant Metropolitan Water District owns recreational pools and charges the public fees for the use of its pools. Plaintiff Mr. and Mrs. Ong are parents of 14 year old Dominador Ong who drowned in
one of the pools of the defendant.
Dominador and his two brothers were swimming in the shallow pool, but then he left to get a drink so his brothers left him and went to the deep pool. A bather reported that one person was swimming long
under the water, so the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Dominador’s lifeless body. The lifeguard tried to revive the boy, but to no avail. The death was due to asphyxia by submersion in

water. ​
The plaintiff spouses Ong brought an action for damages against the defendant alleging negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, and if not negligent, they had the last clear chance to
revive Dominador. The lower court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant is guilty of negligence and therefore liable
RULING:
The defendant is not guilty of negligence; it has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. It has been shown that the
swimming pools of the defendant are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid kit. The bottom of the pool was also painted with black colors so as to insure clear
visibility. The defendant had done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore the life of minor Ong.
Neither does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance find application in this case. The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool without any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard
responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life--- it is clear that there is no room for the application of the
Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault or negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.

68. PLDT v. CA, 178 SCRA 94

Facts:
Antonio and Gloria Esteban sustained injuries when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit
system. The Estebans alleged that Antonio failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and lack of warning light or signs. PLDT denies liability on the contention that
system. The Estebans alleged that Antonio failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and lack of warning light or signs. PLDT denies liability on the contention that
the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Estebans. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision but affirmed
it later after a second motion for reconsideration was filed by Estebans.
Issue:
Whether PLDT is liable

Held:
No. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. Antonio had not exercised the diligence required to avoid the
accident. His negligence was not only contributory but goes to be the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. He could have stopped the
vehicle the moment it struck the accident mound if the jeep did not run quite fast. The purpose of the presence of the warning signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of the excavations
but it could not have completely prevented the accident. Also, Estebans already knew of the presence of the excavations because they passed that street almost every day. Antonio has the last clear
chance or opportunity to avoid the accident. Therefore, it was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger; hence, he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

69. Raynera v. Hiceta, G.R. No. 120027 (April 21, 1999)

FACTS:
Petitioner Edna was the widow of Reynaldo and the mother and legal guardian of the minors Rianna and Reianne. Respondents Hiceta and Orpilla were the owner and driver, respectively, of a truck
involved in the accident. Reynaldo was on his way home riding a motorcycle. The truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The truck was loaded with two metal sheets extended
on both sides, there were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plate. The asphalt road was not well lighted. Reynaldo crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion
of the truck, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Lucelo rushed him to the hospital. Reynaldo was dead on arrival. At the time of his death,
Reynaldo was young and had substantial present and future earning potential as Manager in Suzuki Philippines. Petitioner heirs sued for damages against respondents owner and driver of the truck,
seeking recovery of damages for the death of Reynaldo caused by the negligent operation of the truck at nighttime on the highway, without tail lights.
ISSUE:
WON the owner and driver of the truck are liable for damages due to the accident.
HELD:
No. Reynaldo Rayneras bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from liability. Despite the absence of tail lights and
license plate, respondents truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the
cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136) respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel
plates, as the vehicles cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the
situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the
highway.

70. Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 148 SCRA 353.

FACTS:
Leonardo Dionisio, driving his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of alcohol. Crossing the intersection
of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked askew(partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near
the dump truck. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too
late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a consequence of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss
of two gold bridge dentures.- Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck. Phoenix and Carbone countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.- CFI: in favor of Dionisio - IAC:
affirmed TC but modified amounts
ISSUE:
WON last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages
RULING:
NO. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
The concept here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that
Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a
matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of
another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent,
even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a
plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed todo so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last
clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 CC - Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours?
We do no to believe so. Under A2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is
not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of
time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the
negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore
his employer)should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril
precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission, To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for
the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of
society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory
damages, loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount

v. Prescription (Article 1146)

71. Kramer v. CA, 178 SCRA 518

FACTS:
F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners, Kramer spouses, collided with M/V Asia Philippines owned by private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. Marjolea sank. After the mishap, the
captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI). BMI conducted an investigation to determine the proximate cause.
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V
Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the
second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
On MAY 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent in the RTC. The private respondent filed a motion seeking dismissal on the ground of prescription. He
argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the
petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the
Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. The Trial Court denied the motion. The CA reversed the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
WON the action prescribed.
RULING:
Yes. An action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The prescriptive period must be
counted from the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The
aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an
action for damages.

72. Spouses Santos v. Pizardo, G.R. No. 151452, 29 Jul 2005

Facts:
On April, 1994, Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit
bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van's driver and three of its passengers, and caused physical injuries to five of the van’s passengers.
On December 17, 1998, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment but there was no pronouncement of civil liability in light of the reservation to file a separate civil action.
On October 20, 2000, nearly two years after the decision, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
The respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription.
Issue: 

Has the action prescribed?
Held:
No. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for
them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

73. De Guzman v. Toyota Cubao, G.R. No. 141480, 29 Nov. 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Guzman purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux. Petitioner made a downpayment and leaving a balance which was payable in 36 months with interest. The vehicle was
then delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a
heavy rain and after only 12,000 kilometers of use. Although it was previously driven through a heavy rain, it didn't pass through flooded streets high enough to stop sturdy and resistant vehicles. Besides,
vehicles of this class are advertised as being capable of being driven on flooded areas or rugged terrain. Petitioner claimed that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied
warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty.
Thus, Petitioner filed a complaint for damages. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground that under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, the petitioner's cause of action had prescribed as the case
was filed more than six months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered.
ISSUE:
Whether the action has already prescribed.
RULING:
Yes, the action has already prescribed. Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for
Yes, the action has already prescribed. Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for
damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner's complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of
an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for
breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. Since
petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his cause of action had become time-
barred. Consequently, even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No. 7394, the same should still be dismissed since the prescriptive period for implied warranty, which is one year, had
likewise lapsed.

vi. Force Majeur / Fortuitous Event (Article 1174)

74. Gotesco Investment Corp. v. Chatto, 210 SCRA 18.

Facts:
Gloria E. Chatto and her daughter, Lina Chatto went to watch a movie at Superama I theater which was owned by Gotesco Investment Corp. They were not able to find seats because of the many people
patronizing the movie. Hardly ten minutes after entering, the ceiling collapsed. The Chattos managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling and get treatment from the nearby FEU Hospital. The two underwent
several treatments thereafter from UST Hospital and Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. Defendant claimed that the collapse was due to force majeure.
The RTC held Gotesco liable and was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
WON the incident was due to force majeure.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could
not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a
cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to
construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.
Bouvier defines negligence as “Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care
reasonably to have been expected.”
As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty
of negligence.

75. Servando v. Phil. Steam, 117 SCRA 832

Facts:
Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded their cargoes consisting of rice , papers, toys and general merchandise on board the vessel of Philippine Steam Navigation Co. Upon arrival in Negros
Occidental , the cargoes were stored in the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. On the same day, the warehouse was razed by fire of unknown origin. Uy Bico and Servando filed an action for
damages. The CFI of Negros Occidental ordered Philippine Steam to pay damages.
Issue:
WON Philippine Steam is liable for damages even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event.
Ruling:
No. The Bill of Lading contains a stipulation that the carrier shall not be liable for loss due to force majeure and fire. Art. 1174 also provides that no person shall be responsible for events which could not
be foreseen or whicj though foreseen were inevitable. Thus where the fortuitous event is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss , the obligor is exempt from liablility for non performance. Philippine
Steam did not incur any delay in the performance of its obligation and it was not also negligent in the performance of his duties as a common carrier. Thus it can validly raise the defense that the loss was
due to a fortuitous event exempting it from any liability

76. Yobido v. CA, 281 SCRA 1.

FACTS:
Spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children boarded a Yobido Liner bus bound for Davao City. Along the way, the left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three feet
from the road and struck a tree. Tito Tumboy died. Leny and her children filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio
Yobido, its driver. The defendants tried to establish that the accident was due to a fortuitous event. The driver affirmed that the left front tire that exploded was a brand new Goodyear tire that he mounted
on the bus five days before the incident.
ISSUE:
Whether the explosion of a newly installed tire of a passenger vehicle is a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from liability for the death of a passenger
HELD:
No. As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion
of human agency from the cause of injury or loss. Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire is not a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact
that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used is of a brand name
noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five day’s use. It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is
not a caso fortuito. Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. A common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury
resulting from the accident. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any
conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident. Thus, having failed to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence, petitioners are liable for damages.

vii. Diligence (Article 2180, last paragraph)

77. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 398.

Facts:
Dominador Ong, a 14- year old highschool student and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio went to defendant's swimming pools. Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an
adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, his brothers went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool they were in before. Lifeguard Manuel Abaño was informed that
somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time/ Immediately, Abaño jumped into the pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador. The boy couldn't be revived because he was
already dead.
Plaintiffs spouses seek to recover from the defendant the sum of P50,000 as damages, P5,000 as funeral expenses, and P11,000 as attorney's fees for the death of their son Dominador in one of the
swimming pools operated by defendant. The trial court found that the action of the plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Platiniffs took the case on appeal
directly to the SC because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.
Issue:
Whether Dominador's death can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and or its employees
Ruling:
There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. There was no failure on
the part of the lifeguard to immediately respond to the call for help and Dominador was immediately given manual artificial respiration after he was placed at the edge of the pool. The nurse arrived soon
after and was followed by the sanitary inspector who brought with him an oxygen resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with
camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for
Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining the body he found him to be already dead. The foregoing shows that they had done everything possible
under the circumstances.

78. Dulay v. CA, G.R. No. 108017 (April 3, 1995).

Facts:
A fight occurred at the “Big Bang sa Alabang where Atty. Dulay was shot and killed by the security guard on duty. Hence, Maria the wife of Atty. Dulay filed an action for damages against Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co. and/or Superguard Corp. The action was dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. Consequently, a criminal case was filed against the security guard. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Petitioners further contend
that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. The petitioners then filed a petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether or not the security companies are liable.
Ruling:
The petitioners were able to sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the respondents. Hence, the lower court was wrong when it dismissed the case. The question whether the security
agencies failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; will be answered after the trial on merits (this was not discussed in the case). The petition for review was granted by the Supreme
Court.

79. Go v. IAC, 197 SCRA 22.

FACTS:
Floverto Jazmin is US citizen that regularly receives his pension from US government while residing in the Philippines. In January 1975, Jazmin failed to receive one his checks so he asked for a
replacement from the US Government and the same was replaced.
Agustin Go, in his capacity as branch manager of the then Solidbank (which later became the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation) in Baguio City, allowed a person named "Floverto Jazmin" to open
Savings Account No. BG 5206 by depositing two (2) U. S. treasury checks Nos. 5-449-076 and 5-448-890 in the respective amounts of $1810.00 and $913.40 1 equivalent to the total amount of P
20,565.69, both payable to the order of Floverto Jasmin of Maranilla St., Mangatarem, Pangasinan and drawn on the First National City Bank, Manila.
The savings account was opened in the ordinary course of business. After failing to get a response from the drawee, Go allowed the depositor to withdraw the money. After several weeks, Go was
informed by the drawee bank that there were alterations with the check that was deposited. Go, then asked the help of the PC to locate Floverto Jazmin and the latter was investigated. It was later
determined that Floverto Jazmin was not the one who withdrew the money.
On September 24, 1976, Jazmin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II at Lingayen a complaint against Agustin Y. Go and the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation for
moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P90,000 plus attorney's fees of P5,000.
In its decision of March 27, 1978 6 the lower court found that Go was negligent in failing to exercise "more care, caution and vigilance" in accepting the checks for deposit and encashment. It noted that
the checks were payable to the order of Floverto Jasmin, Maranilla St., Mangatarem, Pangasinan and not to Floverto Jazmin, Maravilla St., Mangatarem, Pangasinan and that the differences in name and
address should have put Go on guard. It held that more care should have been exercised by Go in the encashment of the U.S. treasury checks as there was no time limit for returning them for clearing
unlike in ordinary checks wherein a two to three-week limit is allowed. CA affirmed the decision but disallowed the award of moral and exemplary damages and granted nominal damages instead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Go was negligent and should be held liable for damages.
HELD:
Decision of the CA is affirmed. Although this Court has consistently held that there should be no penalty on the right to litigate and that error alone in the filing of a case be it before the courts or the proper
Decision of the CA is affirmed. Although this Court has consistently held that there should be no penalty on the right to litigate and that error alone in the filing of a case be it before the courts or the proper
police authorities, is not a ground for moral damages, 9 we hold that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, private respondent is entitled to an award of damages.
Indeed, it would be unjust to overlook the fact that petitioners' negligence was the root of all the inconvenience and embarrassment experienced by the private respondent albeit they happened after the
filing of the complaint with the constabulary authorities. Petitioner Go's negligence in fact led to the swindling of his employer. Had Go exercised the diligence expected of him as a bank officer and
employee, he would have noticed the glaring disparity between the payee's name and address on the treasury checks involved and the name and address of the depositor appearing in the bank's records.
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages

have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. 10 As Go's negligence was the root cause of the complained inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment, Go is liable to
private respondents for damages.
Anent petitioner bank's claim that it is not "co-equally liable" with Go for damages, under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks." Pursuant to this provision, the bank is responsible for the acts of its employee unless there is proof that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. 11 Hence, the burden of proof lies upon the bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in view of its own failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to
prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees.

​viii. Mistake & Waiver

80. Gatchalian v. Delim, 203 SCRA 126
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's "Thames" mini bus. On the way, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.
Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital for medical treatment.
While the injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner
P12.00 for her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which
stated, among other things:
xxx xxx xxx
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of
the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the CFI an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that
when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus. CA reversed
the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages. Hence, the present Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by petitioner
RULING:
NO.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe
any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier.
For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured
passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence
to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

81. Theis v. CA, 268 SCRA 167.

FACTS:
Private respondent is the owner of three adjacent parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City. In a survey conducted in 1985, parcel no. 3, where the two-storey house stands, was erroneously indicated to be
covered not by TCT No. 15684 but by TCT No. 15515, while the two idle lands (parcel nos. 1 and 2) were mistakenly surveyed to be located on parcel no. 4 instead (which was not owned by private
respondent). Unaware of the mistake of the survey, private respondent sold parcel no. 4 to petitioners. When petitioners went to Tagaytay to look over the vacant lots, they discovered that parcel no. 4 was
owned by another person. To remedy the mistake, private respondent offered parcel nos. 1 and 2, as these were precisely the lots which private respondent owned and intended to sell. However
petitioners refused so private respondent make another offer, this time, the return of an amount double the price paid by petitioners but the latter still refused. Private respondent was then compelled to file
an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of the properties subject thereof. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent on the ground of mistake and annulled said
contract of sale after finding that there was indeed a mistake in the identification of the parcels of land intended to be the subject matter of said sale. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, the latter
however affirmed RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4.
RULING:
Yes. Clearly, there was honest mistake on the part of private respondent in the sale of Parcel No. 4 to plaintiffs for it is quite impossible for said private respondent to sell the lot in question as the same is
not owned by it. The good faith of the private respondent is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the petitioners or to reimburse them
with twice the amount paid. Art. 1390 of the NCC provides: The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: x x x (2) Those
where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. x x x. mistake is the belief of existence of some circumstances, fact or event which in reality does not exist.

82. YHT Realty v. CA, G.R. No. 126780 (17 Feb 2005)
FACTS:
McLoughlin is an Australian businessman who used to stay at the Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984. He met Brunhilda Tan who befriended him. Tan convinced Mcloughlin to
transfer to the Tropicana from the Sheraton where afterwards he stayed during his trips. When McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana, he rented a safety deposit box as his usual
practice. The box required two keys, the guest had one and one from the management. He placed US $10,000 in one envelope and US$5,000 in another, AU$10,000 in another envelope. He then took
from the box the envelope with US$5,000 and the one with AU$10,000 to go to Hong Kong for a short visit. When he arrived in HK, the envelope with US$5,000 only contained US$3,000, but he thought it
was just bad accounting.
After returning to Manila, he checked out of the Tropicana and left for Australia. When he arrived he discovered that the envelope with US$10,000 was short of US$5,000. He went back to the Philippines
and asked Lainez who had custody of the management key if some money was missing or returned to her, to which the latter answered there was none. He again registered at the Tropicana and rented a
safety deposit box. He placed an envelope containing US$15,000, another of AU$10,000. After some time, he opened his safety deposit box and noticed that US$2,000 and AU$4,500 was missing from
the envelopes. He immediately confronted Lainez who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to McLoughlin. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and
confronted her.
Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlin’s key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lainez and Lopez, the manager. McLoughlin Lopez and Tan sign a promissory note
for him for the loss. However, Lopez refused liability on behalf of the hotel, reasoning that McLoughlin signed an Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box which disclaims any liability of the hotel for
things put inside the box.
ISSUE:
Whether there was gross negligence on the part of the innkeepers.
RULING:
YES. Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the management when the loss took place. They even admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate
occasions in opening McLoughlin’s safety deposit box. The management contends that McLoughlin made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him most of the time.
The evidence on record is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the management as his wife. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant such conclusion.
They should have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan.
Art 2180, par (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Given the fact that the loss of McLoughlin’s money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicana’s employees both the employees and YHT, as owner of Tropicana, should be held solidarily
liable pursuant to Art 2193.

ix. Emergency or sudden peril doctrine

F. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

83. Gula v. Dianala, 132 SCRA 245

FACTS:
The wife of plaintiff Ismael Gula, Esperanza Gula was run over by a truck driven by defendant Pedro Dianala and owned by co-defendant Ponciano Rejon. So a criminal complaint against defendant
Dianala was filed with no reservation to file a separate civil action. The court acquitted defendant Dianala for seriously doubting the veracity of the two principal witness’ testimonies, hence the court has no
other alternative than to acquit him of the present charge.
Years later, plaintiff’s heirs sued defendant for damages based on quasi-delict. Defendant contended that the damages claimed have been waived abandoned and extinguished and that the action is
barred by prior judgment. Plaintiffs, on the other hand argued that the civil liability of defendant based on his tortious acts is different and distinct from his civil liability based on criminal negligence.
The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of lack of cause of action and that it was barred by prior judgment. The CA forwarded the case to the SC because it involves pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the suit for damages may prosper
RULING:
The suit for damages may prosper. Since the cause of action of plaintiff Gula is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might ariuse did not exist.
Article 31 of the Civil Code thus finds full application and there is no reason why plaintiffs-appellants' suit for damages may not prosper. Article 31 provides, “when the civil action is based on an obligation
not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
There was also no need for the plaintiffs to have filed a reservation for a separate civil action inasmuch as the civil action contemplated in the case at bar is not derived from the criminal liability but one
based on culpa aquiliana.

84. San Ildefonso Lines v. CA, 289 SCRA 568

Facts:
A collision of a Toyota Lite Ace Van driven by Annie V. Jao and a passenger bus of San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (SILI) occurred which totally wrecked the van and injuring Ms. Jao and her 2 passengers.
Eduardo Javier, driver of the bus, was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries in a criminal case filed with Regional Trial Court. Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against SILI with RTC, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured as well as other damages. A
manifestation and motion to suspend civil proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against Javier and the failure of PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in said
manifestation and motion to suspend civil proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against Javier and the failure of PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in said
criminal action was filed PISC and Javier but it was denied by the RTC and CA.
Issues:
1.) Whether an independent civil action based on quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code can be filed if no reservation was made in said criminal case
2.) Whether a subrogee can maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right was made
Held:
1.) No. Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of the independent civil actions provided under Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court can be instituted, and thereafter have a continuous
determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. Without such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted.
2.) No. As subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, it is not exempt from reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of
Javier. PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao; thus, it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which the latter ought to follow.
Therefore, the manifestation and motion to suspend civil proceeding filed by petitioners is granted.

IV. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY

A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY (ARTICLES 2180-2182, CC)

i. Parents & guardians

ii. Owners & managers of enterprises

85. Pestano v. Sumayang, G.R. No. 139875, 4 Dec 2000.

FACTS:
At 2pm Sumayang was riding a motorcycle with Romagos along the national highway. upon a junction, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by Pestao and owned by Metro Cebu Corp, which had tried
to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. Both Sumayang and Romagos were rushed to the hospital in, where Sumayang was pronounced dead on
arrival. Romagos succumbed to his injuries the day after.
Heirs of Sumayang sued for damages against Pestao, as driver of the passenger bus that rammed the deceased’s motorcycle, Metro Cebu, as owner and operator of the said bus, and Perla Compania de
Seguros, as insurer of Metro Cebu.
ISSUE:
WON Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation is Vicariously liable?
HELD:
Yes. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an
employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the
employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
The CA said that allowing Pestao to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of its employees. The
negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestao was able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu
was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law.

86. Real v. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, 26 Jan 2007



Facts:
Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of the Philippine Womens University (PWU). Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters
fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU. A fire broke out at petitioners Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area, including respondents stall. An
investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and
tank installed at petitioners stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondents demand.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipment, as well as the
selection and supervision of her employees; that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls. Petitioner denied liability on the grounds that the fire was a
fortuitous event and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees. The MeTC rendered its decision in favor of the respondent. The RTC affirmed the Decision of the
MeTC but increased the amount of temperate damages awarded to the respondent from P50,000.00 to P80,000.00. The CA issued its Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the herein petitioner could be held liable for damages as a result of the fire that razed not only her own food kiosk but also the adjacent foodstalls at the Food Center premises of the Philippine
Womens University, including that of the respondent?
Ruling:
YES. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also
failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her
cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent.

87. Castilex Industrial v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 132266, 21 Dec. 1999.

FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of
traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad was a production manager of
Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794 which Abad drove car out of a parking lot. Instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he went
against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St..
The motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to Vasquez. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later
to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other
incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
ISSUES:
W/N Castilex may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
RULING:
No. The fifth paragraph of article 2180 states Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry. In order for this paragraph to apply, it must be shown that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. Here it was not sufficiently
proven that such was the case.
Jurisprudence provides that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the
scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.
Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an
employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. Traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of
his services to his employer.
Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of
his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle.
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some
incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally
kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.

iii. Employers

88. Carticiano v. Nuval, G.R. No. 138054, 28 Sept 2000.

Facts:
Zacarias Carticiano was driving the car of his father (Rosendo Carticiano) on his way to home to Imus Cavite. At the same time, Darwin was driving an owner-type jeepney owned by his employer Mario
Nuval. When the two vehicles were about to pass one another, Darwin veered his jeep to his left causing a head-on collision with Rosendo's car. Darwin fled the scene. Zacarias suffered injuries that
required operation and therapy. Nuval offered compensation for the injuries caused, but plaintiffs refused to accept the amount. Plaintiffs then filed a criminal case against driver Darwin and a civil suit
against Nuval for damages. Plaintiffs alleged that the proximate cause of the accident is Darwin’s recklessness in driving Nuval's jeep. They also alleged that Nuval did not exercise due diligence in the
supervision of his employee; that defendants should he held liable for damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendants were ordered to pay damages. On appeal, CA affirmed the
decision insofar as Darwin was concerned but reversed as it pertained to Nuval. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision in Nuval's case.
Issue:
Whether Nuval can be held liable for the negligence of Darwin.
Held:
Yes, Nuval failed to prove that Darwin was no longer his employee and that the latter store the keys to the vehicle. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for damages
caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in the case at bar showed that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given him as driver
when the collision occurred. Hence, the trial court was correct in ordering that Nuval was solidarily liable with Darwin for all the damages to which the petitioners were entitled.

89. L.G. Foods v. Pagapong-Agraviador, G.R. No. 158995, 26 Sept. 2006

FACTS:
Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiesta van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the
accident. An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded,
the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.
In the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the
required due diligence.
The defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under the provision of Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. They contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal
Penal Code. They contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal
action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled. Hence, there was a lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of LG Foods is correct and thus, they are not liable.
RULING:
No. The complaint did not aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed
against him nor his insolvency. The complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. However, it is clear from the allegations
of the complaint that quasi-delict was their cause of action against the petitioners. Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies which the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the
possibility of arising indirectly from the crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his pleading or complaint, and not with the defendant
who cannot ask for the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action or lack of it based on the defendants perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee. Hence, LG Foods’s contention is not correct and they are held liable.

Medical negligence/malpractice

90. Ramos v. CA, GR 124354, 29 Dec 1999 (D), 11 April 2002 (R)
Facts:
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was referred to Dr. Hosaka for an operation to remove a stone from her gallbladder at De Los Santos Medical Center. Dr. Hosaka recommended Dr. Gutierrez to be their
anesthesiologist. Ramos requested that her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, be allowed to accompany her in the operating room.
Ramos was prepped early for the operation which was scheduled at 9:00am but Dr. Hosaka arrived at 12:10pm. At about 12:15 pm, Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez complaining that it was difficult to intubate the
patient and noticed bluish discoloration of Ramos’ nail beds. Another doctor was called to intubate the patient and several medical interventions were implemented to treat the patient’s condition.
Ramos stayed in the ICU for a month and was released four months later. She had been in comatose since the operation until her death.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ramos but the decision was reversed by the CA.
The SC, in its 1999 decision, applying the control test, held that an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their consultants and, therefore, DLSMC is solidarily liable with Dr.
Hosaka.
Issue:
WON DLSMC is an employer of Dr. Hosaka and therefore, solidarily liable.
Ruling:
No. There is no employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.
There is no showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered by the latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant and his patient
is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the second
concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient.
Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her
treatment.

91. Flores v. Pineda, GR 158996 (November 14, 2008)

Facts:
Teresita Pineda consulted Dr. Flores because she was experiencing general body weakness , loss of appetite , frequent urination , thirst and on and off vaginal bleeding. On her follow-up check up , Dr.
Flores suspected that Teresita may be suffering from diabetes. The following week, she was admitted to the hospital and Dr. Flores ordered for an on-call D&C to be performed by his wife Dr. Felicisima
Flores. Prior to the operation , the laboratory results are not yet complete. The day after the operation, the complete lab results came in and confirmed that Teresita is suffering from Diabetes Mellittus Type
II. Medication came in too late as Teresita was already confined in the ICU and died 6 days later. The family instituted an action for damages against Spouses Flores. The RTC ruled in their favor and
granted the award of damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue:
WON Spouses Flores are liable for medical negligence.

Ruling: ​
Yes. Medical Negligence is a wrong committed by a medical professional that has caused bodily harm to or death of a patient. There are 4 elements involved namely ; duty , breach , injury and proximate
cause. In this case, Dr. Flores already suspected that Teresita might be suffering from diabetes during her follow-up check up. A reasonably prudent health care provider would know that diabetes and its
complication were foreseeable harm that should have been taken into consideration rather than doing the D&c to ascertain the cause of vaginal bleeding. D&C was merely an elective procedure, not an
emergency case. Also, there is no record that insulin was administered prior and during the operation. Spouses Flores failed , as medical professionals , to comply with their duty to observe the standard
of care to be given to diabetic patients undergoing surgery. This breach of duty was the proximate cause of Teresita’s death making the spouses liable for damages.

92. Professional Services v. Natividad, G.R. Nos. 126297; 31 Jan 2007 (D), 11 Feb 2008 (R1); and 2 Feb 2010 (R2, en banc)
FACTS:
Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) was held solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for the injuries suffered by Natividad when Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes neglected to remove from her
body two gauzes which were used in the surgery they performed on her. On appeal, the CA absolved Dr. Fuentes but affirmed the liability of Dr. Ampil and PSI, subject to the right of PSI to claim
reimbursement from Dr. Ampil. On petition for review, the SC affirmed the CA decision. The SC premised the direct liability of PSI to the Aganas on the following: (1) For the purposes of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their consultants; and (2) PSI created the public impression that Dr. Ampil was its agent by
accrediting Dr. Ampil and advertising his qualifications. Thus, under the doctrine of apparent authority, PSI was liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.
ISSUE:
Whether PSI is liable to the Aganas
HELD:
Yes. PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital.
While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine,[32] in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of its business of facilitating medical and surgical
treatment.[33] Within that reality, three legal relationships crisscross: (1) between the hospital and the doctor practicing within its premises; (2) between the hospital and the patient being treated or
examined within its premises and (3) between the patient and the doctor. The exact nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent of the liability of the hospital for the negligence of the
doctor.
Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176[34] in relation to Article 2180[35] of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior. Even
when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article
1431[36] and Article 1869[37] of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority.[38] Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its
own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation.[39]
This Court still employs the control test to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between hospital and doctor. In Calamba Medical Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.[40] it held:
Under the "control test", an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the
physician is to accomplish his task.
xx xx xx
As priorly stated, private respondents maintained specific work-schedules, as determined by petitioner through its medical director, which consisted of 24-hour shifts totaling forty-eight
hours each week and which were strictly to be observed under pain of administrative sanctions.
That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from the undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the operating room, or any department or ward for
that matter, respondents' work is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of petitioner or its medical director, no
operations can be undertaken in those areas. For control test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee, it being
enough that it has the right to wield the power. (emphasis supplied)
Even in its December 29, 1999 decision[41] and April 11, 2002 resolution[42] in Ramos, the Court found the control test decisive.
In the present case, it appears to have escaped the Court's attention that both the RTC and the CA found no employment relationship between PSI and Dr. Ampil, and that the Aganas did not question
such finding. In its March 17, 1993 decision, the RTC found that defendant doctors were not employees of PSI in its hospital, they being merely consultants without any employer-employee relationship
and in the capacity of independent contractors.[43] The Aganas never questioned such finding.
PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes appealed[44] from the RTC decision but only on the issues of negligence, agency and corporate liability. In its September 6, 1996 decision, the CA mistakenly referred to
PSI and Dr. Ampil as employer-employee, but it was clear in its discussion on the matter that it viewed their relationship as one of mere apparent agency.[45]
The Aganas appealed from the CA decision, but only to question the exoneration of Dr. Fuentes.[46] PSI also appealed from the CA decision, and it was then that the issue of employment, though long
settled, was unwittingly resurrected.
In fine, as there was no dispute over the RTC finding that PSI and Dr. Ampil had no employer-employee relationship, such finding became final and conclusive even to this Court.[47] There was no reason
for PSI to have raised it as an issue in its petition. Thus, whatever discussion on the matter that may have ensued was purely academic.
Nonetheless, to allay the anxiety of the intervenors, the Court holds that, in this particular instance, the concurrent finding of the RTC and the CA that PSI was not the employer of Dr. Ampil is correct.
Control as a determinative factor in testing the employer-employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which the hospital could be held vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence
cases is a requisite fact to be established by preponderance of evidence. Here, there was insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the means and the
details of the specific process by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the treatment of Natividad.Consequently, PSI cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under the principle of
respondeat superior.

There is, however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out to the patient (Natividad)[48] that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two factors that determine apparent authority: first,
the hospital's implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's agent; and second, the patients reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.[49]
Enrique testified that on April 2, 1984, he consulted Dr. Ampil regarding the condition of his wife; that after the meeting and as advised by Dr. Ampil, he asked [his] wife to go to Medical City to be
examined by [Dr. Ampil]; and that the next day, April 3, he told his daughter to take her mother to Dr. Ampil.[50] This timeline indicates that it was Enrique who actually made the decision on whom
Natividad should consult and where, and that the latter merely acceded to it. It explains the testimony of Natividad that she consulted Dr. Ampil at the instigation of her daughter.[51]
Moreover, when asked what impelled him to choose Dr. Ampil, Enrique testified:
Atty. Agcaoili: On that particular occasion, April 2, 1984, what was your reason for choosing Dr. Ampil to contact with in connection with your wife's illness?

A. First, before that, I have known him to be a specialist on that part of the body as a surgeon, second, I have known him to be a staff member of the Medical City which is a prominent and
known hospital. And third, because he is a neighbor, I expect more than the usual medical service to be given to us, than his ordinary patients.[52] (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the decision made by Enrique for Natividad to consult Dr. Ampil was significantly influenced by the impression that Dr. Ampil was a staff member of Medical City General Hospital, and that said
hospital was well known and prominent. Enrique looked upon Dr. Ampil not as independent of but as integrally related to Medical City.
PSI's acts tended to confirm and reinforce, rather than negate, Enrique's view. It is of record that PSI required a consent for hospital care[53] to be signed preparatory to the surgery of Natividad. The form
reads:
reads:
Permission is hereby given to the medical, nursing and laboratory staff of the Medical City General Hospital to perform such diagnostic procedures and to administer such medications and
treatments as may be deemed necessary or advisable by the physicians of this hospital for and during the confinement of xxx. (emphasis supplied)
By such statement, PSI virtually reinforced the public impression that Dr. Ampil was a physician of its hospital, rather than one independently practicing in it; that the medications and treatments he
prescribed were necessary and desirable; and that the hospital staff was prepared to carry them out.
PSI pointed out in its memorandum that Dr. Ampil's hospital affiliation was not the exclusive basis of the Aganas decision to have Natividad treated in Medical City GeneralHospital, meaning that, had Dr.
Ampil been affiliated with another hospital, he would still have been chosen by the Aganas as Natividad's surgeon.[54]
The Court cannot speculate on what could have been behind the Aganas decision but would rather adhere strictly to the fact that, under the circumstances at that time, Enriquedecided to consult Dr. Ampil
for he believed him to be a staff member of a prominent and known hospital. After his meeting with Dr. Ampil, Enrique advised his wife Natividad to go to the Medical City General Hospital to be examined
by said doctor, and the hospital acted in a way that fortified Enrique's belief.
This Court must therefore maintain the ruling that PSI is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil as its ostensible agent.

Moving on to the next issue, the Court notes that PSI made the following admission in its Motion for Reconsideration:
51. Clearly, not being an agent or employee of petitioner PSI, PSI [sic] is not liable for Dr. Ampil's acts during the operation. Considering further that Dr. Ampil was personally engaged as a
doctor by Mrs. Agana, it is incumbent upon Dr. Ampil, as Captain of the Ship, and as the Agana's doctor to advise her on what to do with her situation vis-a-vis the two missing gauzes. In
addition to noting the missing gauzes, regular check-ups were made and no signs of complications were exhibited during her stay at the hospital, which could have alerted
petitioner PSI's hospital to render and provide post-operation services to and tread on Dr. Ampil's role as the doctor of Mrs. Agana. The absence of negligence of PSI from the
patient's admission up to her discharge is borne by the finding of facts in this case. Likewise evident therefrom is the absence of any complaint from Mrs. Agana after her
discharge from the hospital which had she brought to the hospital's attention, could have alerted petitioner PSI to act accordingly and bring the matter to Dr. Ampil's attention. But
this was not the case. Ms. Agana complained ONLY to Drs. Ampil and Fuentes, not the hospital. How then could PSI possibly do something to fix the negligence committed by Dr.
Ampil when it was not informed about it at all.[55] (emphasis supplied)
PSI reiterated its admission when it stated that had Natividad Agana informed the hospital of her discomfort and pain, the hospital would have been obliged to act on it.[56]
The significance of the foregoing statements is critical.
First, they constitute judicial admission by PSI that while it had no power to control the means or method by which Dr. Ampil conducted the surgery on Natividad Agana, it had the power to review or
cause the review of what may have irregularly transpired within its walls strictly for the purpose of determining whether some form of negligence may have attended any procedure done inside its
premises, with the ultimate end of protecting its patients.
Second, it is a judicial admission that, by virtue of the nature of its business as well as its prominence[57] in the hospital industry, it assumed a duty to tread on the captain of the ship role of any doctor
rendering services within its premises for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the patients availing themselves of its services and facilities.
Third, by such admission, PSI defined the standards of its corporate conduct under the circumstances of this case, specifically: (a) that it had a corporate duty to Natividad even after her operation to
ensure her safety as a patient; (b) that its corporate duty was not limited to having its nursing staff note or record the two missing gauzes and (c) that its corporate duty extended to determining Dr. Ampil's
role in it, bringing the matter to his attention, and correcting his negligence.
And finally, by such admission, PSI barred itself from arguing in its second motion for reconsideration that the concept of corporate responsibility was not yet in existence at the time Natividad underwent
treatment;[58] and that if it had any corporate responsibility, the same was limited to reporting the missing gauzes and did not include taking an active step in fixing the negligence committed.[59] An
admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and is conclusive as to him, and all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should
be ignored, whether or not objection is interposed by a party.[60]
Given the standard of conduct that PSI defined for itself, the next relevant inquiry is whether the hospital measured up to it.
PSI excuses itself from fulfilling its corporate duty on the ground that Dr. Ampil assumed the personal responsibility of informing Natividad about the two missing gauzes.[61] Dr. Ricardo Jocson, who was
part of the group of doctors that attended to Natividad, testified that toward the end of the surgery, their group talked about the missing gauzes but Dr. Ampil assured them that he would personally notify
the patient about it.[62] Furthermore, PSI claimed that there was no reason for it to act on the report on the two missing gauzes because Natividad Agana showed no signs of complications. She did not
even inform the hospital about her discomfort.[63]
The excuses proffered by PSI are totally unacceptable.
To begin with, PSI could not simply wave off the problem and nonchalantly delegate to Dr. Ampil the duty to review what transpired during the operation. The purpose of such review would have been to
pinpoint when, how and by whom two surgical gauzes were mislaid so that necessary remedial measures could be taken to avert any jeopardy to Natividads recovery. Certainly, PSI could not have
expected that purpose to be achieved by merely hoping that the person likely to have mislaid the gauzes might be able to retrace his own steps. By its own standard of corporate conduct, PSI's duty to
initiate the review was non-delegable.
While Dr. Ampil may have had the primary responsibility of notifying Natividad about the missing gauzes, PSI imposed upon itself the separate and independent responsibility of initiating the inquiry into
the missing gauzes. The purpose of the first would have been to apprise Natividad of what transpired during her surgery, while the purpose of the second would have been to pinpoint any lapse in
procedure that led to the gauze count discrepancy, so as to prevent a recurrence thereof and to determine corrective measures that would ensure the safety of Natividad. That Dr. Ampil negligently failed
to notify Natividad did not release PSI from its self-imposed separate responsibility.
Corollary to its non-delegable undertaking to review potential incidents of negligence committed within its premises, PSI had the duty to take notice of medical records prepared by its own staff and
submitted to its custody, especially when these bear earmarks of a surgery gone awry. Thus, the record taken during the operation of Natividad which reported a gauze count discrepancy should
have given PSI sufficient reason to initiate a review. It should not have waited for Natividad to complain.
As it happened, PSI took no heed of the record of operation and consequently did not initiate a review of what transpired during Natividads operation. Rather, it shirked its responsibility and passed it on to
others to Dr. Ampil whom it expected to inform Natividad, and to Natividad herself to complain before it took any meaningful step. By its inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own standard of hospital
care. It committed corporate negligence.
It should be borne in mind that the corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is different from the medical negligence attributed to Dr. Ampil. The duties of the hospital are distinct from those of the doctor-
consultant practicing within its premises in relation to the patient; hence, the failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise to a direct liability to the Aganas distinct from that of Dr.
Ampil.
All this notwithstanding, we make it clear that PSIs hospital liability based on ostensible agency and corporate negligence applies only to this case, pro hac vice. It is not intended to set a
precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals liable for every form of negligence of their doctors-consultants under any and all circumstances. The ruling is unique to this
case, for the liability of PSI arose from an implied agency with Dr. Ampil and an admitted corporate duty to Natividad.[64]
Other circumstances peculiar to this case warrant this ruling,[65] not the least of which being that the agony wrought upon the Aganas has gone on for 26 long years, with Natividad coming to the end of
her days racked in pain and agony. Such wretchedness could have been avoided had PSI simply done what was logical: heed the report of a guaze count discrepancy, initiate a review of what went wrong
and take corrective measures to ensure the safety of Nativad. Rather, for 26 years, PSI hemmed and hawed at every turn, disowning any such responsibility to its patient. Meanwhile, the options left to the
Aganas have all but dwindled, for the status of Dr. Ampil can no longer be ascertained.[66]

93. Li v. Soliman, GR 165279 (June 07, 2011, en banc)

Facts:
On July 7, 1993, respondents’ 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that
Angelica was suffering from a high-grade cancer of the bone. On august 18,1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. She died on September 1, 1993. Respondents brought the cadaver to the PNP crim
laboratory at camp crame for a post-mortem examination. The report issued by the institution was different from the certificate of death issued by SLMC as to cause of death.
Respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard for Angelica's safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of chemotherapy
drugs which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelica's untimely demise. Respondent's claim that they were assured that Angelica would recover with a 95% chance and were assured that
the side effects were only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness. Respondent's claimed that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its side
effects.
The trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and emplyed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs.
The CA concurred with the trial court's finding that there was no negligence committed but found that petitioner failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known side effects of chemotherapy. She

was found negligent. Petitioner assails the CA in finding her guilty of negligence in not explaining all the possible side effects, she emphasized that she was not negligent in the procedures.
Issue:
Whether petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose the side effects
Ruling:
Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s parents. One thing to
consider is that of the nature of the disease itself. Each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician. Also as a
physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening illness.

94. Aquino v. Heirs of Calayag, GR 158461 (August 22, 2012)

Facts:
Raymunda was the wife of Rodrigo Calayag. Raymunda was pregnant and when she experienced bleeding and labor pains Rodrigo brought her to St. Michael’s Clinic. Dr. Unite told them that she has to
have a caesarean section and must be transferred to SHH. SHH was operated and owned by Dr. Reyes. There, Dr. Unite delivered a stillborn 8 month old baby. Few minutes after giving birth, the
operating team noticed that Raymunda had become cyanotic (turning blue or purple). Suddenly, her vital signs were gone but after a few minutes the team was able to revive her. Raymunda was in
comatose. Hence, they sought the Dr. Farinas’ opinion. Dr. Farinas found out that Raymunda suffered a cardiac arrest during the operation. Raymunda was moved to MCM where a neurologist examined
her. The neurologist, Dr. Libarnes found her to in vegetative state (absence of responsiveness and awareness). Dr. Unite removed the stitches of Raymunda’s surgical wound. Later that day, the wound
split open causing her intestines to jut out. Raymunda never regained consciousness. Hence, Rodrigo brought her home since the doctors could no longer do anything to improve her condition. Rodrigo
then filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Unite, Aquino and Reyes. Rodrigo claimed that Dr. Unite and Aquino failed to exercise the diligence required for operating on Raymunda. As for Dr. Reyes,
that he was negligent in supervising the wor of Dr. Unite and Aquino. RTC: The three doctors are liable. CA: Affirmed
Issues:

1. Whether or not Dr. Unite and Dr. Aquino acted negligently in handling Raymunda’s operation, resulting in her death.
2. Whether or not Dr. Reyes is liable, as the hospital owner, for the negligence of Dr. Unite and Dr. Aquino.
Ruling:
The cause of action against the doctors in these cases is commonly known as medical malpractice. It is a form of negligence which consists in the physician or surgeon's failure to apply to his practice that
degree of care and skill that the profession generally and ordinarily employs under similar conditions and circumstances.
In these cases, the court always seeks guidance from expert testimonies.
To prove that there is medical malpractice the plaintiff must establish the following:

(a) Duty; (b) breach; (c) injury; and (4)proximate causation.

The evidence should show that the physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
physician or surgeon would not have done; and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.
According to Dr. Libarnes(neurologist) an anesthetic accident during Raymunda’s caesarean section causes a cardiorespiratory arrest that deprived her brain of oxygen. The damage could have been
averted if the doctors immediately detected and resuscitated her on time.
Dr. Aquino gave Raymunda a high spinal anesthesia instead of a low or mid-spinal anaesthesia.
The record on the operation shows that the attending doctors did not know that Raymunda had a cardiac-arrest. Such act itself is already considered malpractice.
No evidence has been presented that raymunda suffered her fate because of defective hospital facilities or poor staff support of surgeons. Hence, Dr. Reyes cannot be held to be liable.
Nor would the doctrine of ostensible agency or doctrine of apparent authority make Dr. Reyes liable to Raymunda's heirs for her death. Two factors must be present under this doctrine: 1) the hospital
acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the person claimed to be negligent was its agent or employee; and 2) the patient relied on such belief.
Therefore, Dr. Aquino and Unite are liable for damages.
 ​See Nogales v. Capitol Medical, G.R. No. 142625, 19 Dec 2006

​iv. State
v. Teachers/heads of establishments

See liability of drivers and owners/employers under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 10586 or An Act Penalizing Persons Driving under the Influence of Alcohol, Dangerous Drugs and other Similar
Substances

B. PRIMARY LIABILITY (ARTICLES 2183-2193)

​i. Possessors/Users of animals (Article 2183)

​
ii. Owners of motor vehicles (Article 2184)

95. Mallari v. CA, G.R. No. 128607 (January 31, 2000).

FACTS:
The passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co- petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corp. along the National
Highway in Bataan.
The van of respondent BULLETIN was coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the
highway. The points of collision were the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN.
The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died.
Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and its insurer the N.V. Netherlands
Insurance Company.
The RTC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by
Felix Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. The RTC ordered the BULLETIN and Angeles to pay Claudia G. Reyes, jointly and severally and dismissed
the cases against the petitioners. The CA reversed the decision and instead ordered Petitioners to pay Claudia G Reyes.
ISSUE:
W/N CA erred in finding Mallari Jr. negligent and holding him liable.
HELD:
NO. CA is correct. The Petitioners testimony proves that in fact they were negligent in driving the jeepney.
CA correctly found, based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities which were not disputed by petitioners, that the collision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle
in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. The proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he
cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching, or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the
left-hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.
Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment
of damages sought by the passenger. Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
of its employees.
SC denied the Petition and affirmed the CA decision.

iii. Manufacturers & Processors (Article 2187)

96. Coca-Cola Bottlers v. CA, G.R. No. 110295 (October 18, 1993).
FACTS:
Herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner with the RTC alleging that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale of
soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; that some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft
drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles; that when she went over her stock of softdrinks, she discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances in the
contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; that she brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of DOH for examination and she
was subsequently informed that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" that as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely
plummeted and not long after that she had to lose shop; and that she became jobless and destitute.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint which was granted by the trial court. CA annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case. Hence, this
present petition.
Petitioner insists that the primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict — for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or wrongful
conduct on its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising
from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts.
ISSUE:
WON RTC correctly dismissed the complaint of private respondent
RULING:
NO.
CA's conclusion that the cause of action is found on quasi-delict is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and
negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the
parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under
the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

iv. Municipal corporations (Article 2189)

97. City of Manila v. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267

FACTS:
In Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, Teotico waits for a jeepney to take him down town. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few
steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, he sustained injuries. Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against
the City of Manila, its mayor, et al however the case was dismissed. On appeal by plaintiff, CA affirmed RTC, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages.
Hence, this appeal by City of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable.
RULING:
Yes the City of Manila is liable. Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. In order for the liability to attach it is not necessary that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street
or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila.

98. Jimenez v. City of Manila, 150 SCRA 510

FACTS:
Plaintiff Jimenez together with his neighbors went to Sta. Ana public market. At the time, the market was flooded with knee-deep rainwater. Jimenez stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be
seen because of the flood causing a rusty nail inside the uncovered opening to pierce the left leg of Jimenez. After being assisted home, he felt ill and developed fever and despite medicine, his left leg
swelled with great pain. He was rushed to the Hospital and was confined for 20 days. His injury prevented him from attending to his business. As a result he hired the services of Valdez to supervise his
business. Jimenez sued for damages against the City of Manila and the AIC under whose administration the public market had been placed by virtue of a Management Contract. The Trial court dismissed
the complaint but was reversed by the appellate court upon appeal. The appellate court ordered AIC to pay Jimenez actual, and moral damages.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether appellate court erred in not ruling that the City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with AIC.
RULING:
YES. Art. 2189 of the Civil code, Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, and
other public works under their control or supervision. And in the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana market despite the contract with AIC, remained under the control of the City. The contract
itself is clear that the City of Manila retains supervision and control over the said market. The city of Manila is therefore liable for damages under Art. 2189 and as tortfeasor under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code.

99. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382.

FACTS:
Petitioner Florentina Guilatco fell into a manhole located on the sidewalk of Perez Blvd., a road under the control and supervision of respondent City of Dagupan. Petitioner fractured her leg and had to be
hospitalized, operated on and confined for 16 days. She thereafter filed a civil action for the recovery of damages against the respondent city.
Respondent contended that it is not its city, but the Ministry of Public Highways that has control and supervision over such road, hence no liability should attach to it.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner Guilatco. The CA however ruled in favor of the respondent city on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that the city had control and supervision
over Perez Blvd.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent City of Dagupan has control and supervision over Perez Blvd.
RULING:
Respondent City of Dagupan has control and supervision of Perez Blvd and therefore cannot be excused from liability.
The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians form the defective condition of roads is expressed in Article 2189 of the Civil Code which provides: “Provinces,
cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works under their control or supervision.”
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or streey.
In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the
other hand, Article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from “defective streets, public buildings and other public works.”

100. Q.C. Gov’t v. Dacara, GR 150304 (June 15, 2005).

Facts:
Upon hitting into a pile of earth or street diggings, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government, Fulgencio Dacara, Jr.’s car turned turtle and suffered extensive damage. Also, Dacara Jr.
Allegedly sustained bodilyinjuries. Fulgencio Dacara, Sr. filed a complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon after the indemnification sought from the city government, yielded
negative results. Defendants claim that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid the accident and contended that the fault is with the driver. The RTC
ruled against defendants. The CA agreed with RTC’s finding that petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.
Issues:
1.) Whether Quezon City government was negligent
2.) Whether Quezon City government is liable for moral and exemplary damages
Held:
1.) Yes. That the negligence of the Quezon City government was the proximate cause of the accident was discussed in the lower court. Also, it is a factual issue that this court cannot pass upon, absent
any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgement by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. The unanimity of the RTC and CA’s ascertainment of the fact
that Quezon City government’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars this court from supplanting their findings and substituting it. The lower court found based on the policeman’s report
that no signs were found at the scene.
2.) No for moral damages, yes for exemplary damages. The following are the requisites to award moral damages: an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, a culpable act or omission factually
established, a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury, and the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. No other evidence was
presented was presented to prove Dacara Jr.’s bare assertion of physical injury; thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages. It was ruled by lower courts that Quezon
City government committed gross negligence due to its failure to show the modicum of responsibility; thus, it is liable for exemplary damages.

See Section 24 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160)

v. Building proprietors (Article 2190-2191, 2193)

101. Deroy v. CA, 157 SCRA 757

Facts:
A firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents, injuring the respondents and killing Marissa Bernal.
Respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop because it was close to the weakened wall but they failed to do so. RTC found petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarded
damages to respondents.
Issue:
Are the petitioners liable for the damages resulting from the collapse of the firewall?
Held:
Yes. under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack
of necessary repairs. In this case the petitioners are the owners of the building which collapsed. The wall was weakened and yet there were no repairs undertaken by the petitioners or any other measure
to prevent collapse. Hence, they are liable.

vi. Engineers/Architects/Contractors (Articles 2192 & 1723)

C. SOLIDARY LIABILITY (ARTICLE 2194)

102. Lanuzo v. Ping, 100 SCRA 205 


Facts:
In the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, he
rammed into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred
that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly income of P300.00. Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against Sy Bon
Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. The defendants moved to dismiss which was denied by the lower court.The trial Court rendered a default judgment in
plaintiff's favor. Upon elevation by the defendants, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this instance on pure questions of law.
Issue:
Whether appellants can be held jointly and solidarity liable for damages.
Ruling:
YES. For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the
negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.
What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision (Article 2180, Civil Code) is that the employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer, likewise,
responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary.
But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the
offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.

103. Gelisan v. Alday, 154 SCRA 388

FACTS:
Gelisan is the owner of a freight truck. He entered into a contract with Roberto Espiritu under which Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer
provided the loads shall not exceed 200 sacks and it was agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him. The truck was taken by a
driver of Espiritu on the day the loss of the goods occurred. Benito Alday is the trucking operator who had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corp. to its Warehouse in Mandaluyong. He
then met Espiritu at the gate and the latter offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper for a consideration. The offer was accepted by Alday and he instructed his checker to let Espiritu haul the
fertilizer. The fertilizer was delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary way bill receipts; Espiritu, however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong.
Alday was compelled to pay the value of the bags of fertilizer to Atlas Fertilizer Corp. He then filed an action for the recovery of damages suffered by him thru the criminal acts committed against him.
ISSUE:
Whether Gelisan shall be held liable for the acts of Espiritu.
RULING:
Yes. The registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. The
claim of the petitioner that he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained because the lease
contract had not been approved by the Public Service Commission.

104. Philippine Rabbit v. IAC, 189 SCRA 158

Facts:
Catalina Pascua and her companions boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Mangune and Carreon and driven by Manalo bound for Pangasinan. While on the road, the right wheel of the jeepney was
detached, so it was running in unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the break and the jeepney eventually stopped but it invaded and blocked the opposite lane of the road. Meanwhile, Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by delos Reyes bumped the jeepney from behind as a result three passengers died while the others sustained physical injuries. A criminal complaint for multiple
homicide against the two drives were filed. However, the Court dismissed the case of delos Reyes for lack of probable cause. Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Not having
appealed, he served his sentence. Complaints for recovery were filed by the heir of Pascua. In all cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes were all impleaded as
defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. Filriters was also impleaded. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based
their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent. The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having contracted to
ensure and answer for the obligations of defendants Mangune and Carreon for damages due their passengers, this Court renders judgment against the said defendants Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co.,
jointly and severally with said defendants (Mangune and Carreon) to pay the plaintiffs. On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendant, Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and
Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by finding delos Reyes
negligent. Another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua, ordering the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos
negligent. Another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua, ordering the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos
Reyes to pay the former jointly and severally damages in amounts awarded
Issue:
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
Held:
Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence,
and (3) the substantial factor test concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.
We reiterate that "the principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence
We find that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by
2
evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with
Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of
carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of
his
In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the
carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision
of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.

105. PNCC v. CA, G.R. 159270, 22 Aug 2005.

FACTS:
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national
bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to enter and pass through the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX). PASUDECO furnished the PNCC with a copy of the Memorandum of Agreement.
One day, Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing, Inc., was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65
kilometers per hour. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered
sugarcane. Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC. They alleged that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for
motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up
emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of such spillage; and that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of
the injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car. The court declared PASUDECO and PNCC jointly and solidarily liable.
ISSUE:
Whether PASUDECO and PCC are indeed solidarily liable.
RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed
even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the
highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning. Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the
maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties. Thus, with
PASUDECOs and the petitioners successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.

106. Chan v. Iglesia ni Cristo, G.R. No. 160283, 14 Oct 2005

Facts:
Chan owned a gasoline station which supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. Thus, he hired Dioscoro “Ely” Yoro to construct the same. As the diggings were made,
Iglesia ni Cristo informed Chan that the diggings traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to them and that it affected the chapel’s foundation. Thus they filed against Chan a case to which
the RTC held that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The trial court adjudged Chan and Yoro
solidarily liable to Iglesia ni Cristo to which Chan appealed claiming that based on the MOA between Yoro and Chan, Yoro would bear any damage incurred during the digging.
Issue:
WON Chan is solidarily liable with Yoro.
Ruling:
Yes. The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when
the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit.

107. People v. Yao, GR 208170, August 20, 2014

Facts:
Alastair Olingsawan , an American lawyer and businessman hailed a taxicab from Makati Shangrila Hotel. The taxi was driven by Petrus Yao. While traveling , Alastair became groggy and lost
consciousness. He woke up handcuffed and chained in the house of Petrus and his wife Susana. Petrus demanded a ransom money of 600,000 dollars for the release of Alastair. After 22 days of captivity
, Alastair was rescued by the PNP. Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. The RTC convicted Petrus as principal of the crime and Susana
as an accomplice. Both of them are ordered to pay jointly and severally actual, moral and exemplary damages to Alastair. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue:
WON Petrus and Susana are solidarily liable for the payment of damages
Ruling:
No. Jurisprudence provides that the difference in the nature and degree in participation between the principal and the accomplice must be taken into account in determining their liabilities. The entire
amount of civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liablilty, respective responsibilities and actual participation.
Petrus , as principal should be liable for the 2/3 of the total amount of the damages and Susana should pay the remaining 1/3.

108. People v. Montesclaros [607 Phil. 296, 329 (2009).

FACTS:
Ida and her 13-year-old daughter, ABC, rented a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. One afternoon, Ida and Tampus were drinking beer in the house. They forced ABC to drink beer
and after consuming three and a half glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy. While lying on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed
to have sexual intercourse with her. Ida agreed. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep. When she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled
down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her vagina. When her
mother arrived home, she kept on crying but Ida ignored her. ABC filed a Complaint against Tampus and Ida. The trial court convicted Tampus of rape as principal while appellant Ida was found guilty as
an accomplice. Both were ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party the sum of P50,000.
ISSUE:
Whether Ida should be solidarily liable for the civil indemnity considering that she is only an accomplice
HELD:
No. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the
accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus
could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article
110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they
are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different classes.

D. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS

Exceptionally, liability is created even where there may have been no fault or
negligence.

i. Possessors/Users of animals (Article 2183)

109. Vestil v. IAC, 179 SCRA 47

Facts:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital. She was
discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
Months later the Uys sued for damages alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as possessors of the dog that eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog
belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. The CFI of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint.
The CA found the Vestils responsible under Art. 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog since they were in possession of the house and the dog.
Issue:
Whether the Vestils are responsible for the damage caused by the dog.
Ruling:
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. The dog itself remained in the house even
after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred.
Article 2183 of the Civil Code provides that: "The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage."

​ii. Manufacturers & Processors (Art. 2187)

 iii. Head of Family (Art. 2193)

V. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS)

A. ABUSE OF RIGHT (ARTICLE 19)

110. Velayo v. Shell 100 Phil 168

Facts:
Cali is corporation and its fuel needs are being satisfied by Shell. According to Shell, Cali still has an unpaid balance of 175 thousand pesos. Cali informally convened a lunch meeting with all its creditors,
there it was announced that CALI was in the state of insolvency and had to stop operation. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for accounts.
They agreed that no case should be filed yet as they are still trying to create a plan on how to pay their creditors. Cali also added that in case a suit is filed against it, it will submit itself to voluntary
insolvency proceedings. The creditors were not able to have an understanding as to the preference. Hence, a working committee was formed on this matter. The working committee is also tasked to
supervise the supervision of the properties of CALI. Fitzgerald (Credit Manager of Shell) was appointed as one of the members of the committee. Shell effected a credit transfer against CALI to American
Corporation Shell Oil Company. The American Corporation then filed a case against CALI in California for the collection of the assigned credit attaching CALI’s C-54 airplane. Upon knowledge of such,
the National Airports Corp. also filed a case and CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. Velayo was then appointed as the assignee in the proceedings. Velayo then instituted a case against Shell to
restrain Shell from prosecuting in California. Velayo petition was denied by the court. Hence, he confined his action to the recovery of damages against shell. Which the court also dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not Shell was taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane.
Ruling:
Shell upon learning that it cannot obtain the full amount of the credit owed by CALI, it made an assignment to its sister American corporation. There are damaging effects of said assignment.
The telegraphic transfer at the back of CALI perceptive act of Shell to be able to collect all of its credit. The transfer of credit will only be justified it Mr. Fitzgerald if he was not part of the working committee
and informed the others during the meeting that he had no authority to bind his principal.
Shell took advantage of its knowledge that an insolvency proceeding will be instituted by CALI in case the creditors will not be able to come up with an agreement. It also had known the probability that no
agreement will be reached, hence it made the transfer for its own good.

Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. (NCC)
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (NCC)
“A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability
for damages arises from a wilful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.”
Sec. 37. Embezzlement, etc. — If any person, before the assignment is made, having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to believe that insolvency
proceedings are about to be commenced, embezzles or disposes of any of the moneys, goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the assignee for
double the value of the property so embezzled or disposed of, to be recovered for the benefit of the insolvent's estate. (Insolvency Law)
Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in badfaith and with betrayal of confidence.
Wherefore, Shell must pay CALI double the amount of CALI’s airplane at the time Shell’s credit is transferred to its sister corporation in U.S.A

B. CONTRARY TO LAW AND MORALS (ARTICLES 20 AND 21)

111. Hermosissima v. CA, 109 Phil. 628

FACTS:
Complainant is a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, dated petitioner Francisco Hermosisima who was almost 10 years younger than her. They were considered as engaged although
he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter when one evening, after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V Escano to which he was
then attached as apprentice pilot.
In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child Chris Hermosisima was born on July 17, 1954.
Subsequently however, petitioner married Romanita Perez and did not fulfill his promise of marriage to the Petitioner.
Soledad then filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, as well as for support of said child and moral damages from breach of promise to marry.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter but denied having ever promised to marry complainant.
ISSUES:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry.
Whether or not petitioner is morally guilty of seduction.
HELD:
Breach of promise to marry is not actionable.
• It is the clear and manifest intent of Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry.
Petitioner is not guilty of seduction
• The “seduction” contemplated in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code as one of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is the crime punished as such in Articles 337 & 338 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The provision in the RTC contemplates a situation where a woman, who was an insurance agent and former high school teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10 years older than the man,
“overwhelmed by her love” for the man, had intimate relations with him, because she “wanted to bind” him “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy,” it cannot be
said that he is morally guilty of seduction.

112. Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377

FACTS:
The present case stemmed from the filing before SC of a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Valentino Legaspi by petitioner Erlinda Ponce.
At the time of the filing of the disbarment proceedings, petitioner Ponce, together with her husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). While, forty eight
48% of L'NOR's stocks was owned by the spouses Edward and Norma Porter.
According to the complaint while respondent is the legal counsel of the aforecited corporation, there occurred certain fraudulent manipulations, anomalous management and prejudicial operations by
certain officers of said corporation, namely: Edward and Norma Porter and Zenaida Manaloto, Director, who caused great damage and prejudice; that said spouses Porter, together with Manaloto,
facilitated, assisted and aided by herein respondent Legaspi, incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc.,, which they control with stockholdings and whose line of business is in direct competition with
L'NOR; that YRASPORT likewise availed of and used the office space, equipment, personnel, funds, other physical facilities, and goodwill of L'NOR while competing at the same time against and causing
the latter great damage and irreparable injury; that in view of the aforesaid illegal manipulations, illicit schemes, palpable frauds and estafa committed by the spouses Porter with Manaloto, Ponce
requested respondent Legaspi to take and pursue appropriate local steps and seasonable actions in order to protect the paramount interest of L'NOR of which he is the legal counsel by retainer, but the
latter, without any valid excuse whatsoever, refused to do so, although he is still collecting his monthly retainer; that on account of the refusal, complainant was forced to retain the services of another
counsel and that, in opposition to the same, respondent Legaspi appeared as legal counsel and attorney of Edward Porter and his confederates; that in the Criminal Case filed against Edward Porter for
Estafa, respondent Legaspi likewise appeared as counsel for Porter despite the fact that he is the legal counsel of L'NOR which is the prejudiced party and for whose benefit the criminal case was really
being prosecuted.
SC issued a resolution dismissing the disbarment complaint against Legaspi. Thereafter, Atty. Legaspi filed before the CFI a complaint for damages against the petitioner. The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff Atty. Legaspi and against the defendant Ponce. CA affirmed the lower court's judgment. Hence, the present action before SC.
ISSUE:
WON Ponce may be held liable for damages arising from malicious mischief
RULING:
NO.
An action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is anchored on the provisions of Article 21, 2217 and 2219 [8] of the New Civil Code. In order, however, for the malicious prosecution suit to
prosper, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing
the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a
legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. SC declared that petitioner had probable cause in filing the administrative case against Atty. Legaspi. Whether or not the petitioner's
perception of these facts and circumstances is actually correct is irrelevant, the only issue being whether or not the petitioner had probable cause in filing the complaint
The petitioner, at the time of her filing of the administrative complaint against the respondent, held substantial stockholdings in L'NOR. She believed that L'NOR was defrauded by its President/General
Manager, Edward Porter, and filed a complaint for estafa against the latter. Porter was convicted by the trial court but, upon appeal, was acquitted by the appellate court. It is of no moment now that Porter
was acquitted. Apparently, at that time, petitioner Ponce saw a conflict of interest situation. To her mind, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR,
the interest of which he was duty bound to protect by virtue of the retainer contract, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice.
Furthermore, Atty. Legaspi did not deny that he aided the Porters in facilitating the incorporation of YRASPORT and that he himself was its corporate secretary. Since the petitioner, however, was of the
honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make
payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights,
it is damnum absque injuria.

C. UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ARTICLES 22 & 23)

113. Pecson v. CA, 244 SCRA 407

FACTS:
Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction to Nepomuceno who in
turn sold it to the spouses Nuguid. Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint, but as to the private respondents' claim that the sale included the
apartment building, it held that the issue concerning it was not a subject of the litigation and there was no legal basis for its contention. Both parties then appealed to CA which affirmed in toto the trial
court’s decision. Entry of judgment was then made. Private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building. The trial court ruled that the
movant shall reimburse plaintiff the construction cost as a builder in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the current market value of the improvements made in the building which should be made the basis of reimbursement to the builder in good faith so as it is in consonance with the
precepts of unjust enrichment
RULING:
RULING:
This Court had long ago stated that to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way that neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him we must adjust the
rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A
contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently,
the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be
paid by the landowner.

114. Security Bank v. CA, 249 SCRA 206

FACTS:
Ferrer was contracted by the SBTC to construct a bldg. in Davao. The contract provided that it be finished within 200 working days. The bldg. was finished upon the stipulated time but additional
expenses were incurred which were made known to SBTC and timely demands for the payment of the increased cost were done by Ferrer to SBTC. The latter only recommended that the verified cost is
200,000.00 which is less than the amount reported by Ferrer. SBTC contend that in the contract, should there be any increase in the expenses, the “owner shall equitably make the appropriate adjustment
on mutual agreement of both parties.” Ferrer filed for damages and the trial court ruled in his favor, the defendants were ordered to pay. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether SBTC is liable for damages and payment of the additional expenses.
RULING:
YES. Art. 22 states that, “Every person who through an act or performance by another or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.” It is not denied that private respondent incurred additional expenses in constructing petitioner’s bldg. due to a drastic and unexpected in construction cost. Hence, to
allow petitioner to acquire the constructed bldg. at a price far below its actual cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of Ferrer, such cannot be allowed by law.

D. JUDICIAL VIGILANCE (ARTICLE 24)

115. Cruz v. NLRC, 203 SCRA 286

FACTS:
Petitioner Clarita Cruz went to Kuwait pursuant to an employment contract. Although a high school graduate, she agreed to work as a domestic helper in consideration of an attractive salary and vacation
leave benefits she could not expect to earn in this country. After completing her 2 year engagement, she was back home in the Philippines.
She filed a complaint against EMS Manpower and Placement Services and its foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya, for underpayment of her salary and non-payment of her vacation leave. She also
claimed that she was over charged for her placement fee. She alleged that her foreign employer treated her as a slave and even beat her. In its answer, the private respondent raised the defense of
settlement as evidence by the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complainant.
On the basis of the affidavit, POEA dismissed the complaint. NLRC affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has waived her right to her salary by virtue of the quitclaim
RULING:
NO, the petitioner did not waive her right to her salary by virtue of the quitclaim.
The court is convinced that the petitioner was not fully aware of the import and consequences of the Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it, allegedly with the assistance of counsel. Except for the
disputable presumptions invoked by the private respondent, such assistance has not been established against the petitioner's allegation that the "Attorney" Alvarado who supposedly counseled her was
not even a lawyer. Indeed, even assuming that such assistance had been duly given, there is still the question of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view of the gross disparity between the amount of
the settlement and the petitioner's original claim. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner would agree to waive her total claim of P88,840.00 for the unseemly settlement of only P2,400.00. And even if she
did, the waiver would still be null and void as violative of public policy.
This decision demonstrates the tenderness of the court toward the worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is especially
necessary because of the inconveniences and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for a better life in a foreign land away from their loved ones and their own government.

E. THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE (ARTICLE 25)

F. DISRESPECT FOR PERSON (ARTICLE 26)

116. Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355

Facts:
Without the knowledge of her parents, Vicenta Escaño secretly married Pastor Tencahvez which was celebrated before a Catholic chaplain. Upon learning of the secret marriage, spouses Escaño sought
priestly advice and a re-celebration of the marriage to validate it was suggested. The re-celebration of marriage did not occur upon learning that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Their
relationship went sour and Vicenta left for United States where she filed a verified complaint for divorce on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character”. Two months after, a decree of
divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court. She married an American and acquired American citizenship. A case for legal separation was initiated by Tenchavez alleging that Vicenta’s parents
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining him and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage. He also
asked for one million pesos in damages.
Issue:
Whether Tenchavez is entitled to damages
Held:
Yes. Appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes. The Court awarded P
25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees.
Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. Her refusal to perform her
wifely duties and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity.
The desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages.

G. DERELICTION OF DUTY (ARTICLE 27)

117. Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042

Facts:
Petitioners are elected officials of a municipal council, respondent is the elected mayor of the municipality. During the regular session of the municipal council on June 1, the Mayor was absent. The six
councilors-petitioners were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and went on to do business. This same practice happened again. When the mayor came
back he refused to act upon the minutes of the meeting and declared the sessions null and void. Petitioners made demands for payment of their payroll repeatedly. Mayor refused to affix his signature to
the payrolls. Councilor Exequiel Golez testified against the Mayor. RTC held that the sessions were valid and legal.
Issue:
WON an award of moral damage to appellee councilor Golez is proper.
Held:
Yes. considering that Golez was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty. Article 27 provides as follows: 'Any person suffering material or
moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

H. UNFAIR COMPETITION (ARTICLE 28)

118. Willaware v. Jesichris Mfg, GR 195549, September 03, 2014

Facts:
Jesichris Manufacuring Company (Jesichris) claims in its complaint for damages for unfair competition that it is a company involved in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products.
Willaware Products Corporation, on the other hand is engaged in the manufacture of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal, has an office with physical proximity to its office, and in view of the fact
that some of its employees had transferred to it, Jesichris discovered that Willaware had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and
colours as Jesichris manufactures and distributes, but at a lower price.. It thus prayed for damages in terms of unrealised profits in the amount of P2Million. Willaware, in its defense, denied all the
allegations in the complaint except as to the proximity of their office to that of Jesichris, and that some of its employees transferred to Willaware. As an affirmative defense, Willaware posits that there was
no unfair competition as the plastic products were mere reproductions of the original parts which merely conform to their original designs and specifications.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favour of Jesichris. It ruled that Willaware clearly invaded the right of Jesichris by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. It
enjoined Willaware from continuing its activity, and awarded damages in favor of Jesichris. On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed with modification that RTC decision.
Willaware is now before the Supreme Court assailing the RTC and CA decisions.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
YES. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to
good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.9
Here, both characteristics are present.
In the case at bar, the petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that under the
circumstances, in order for respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the same
products to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined.

119. Manila Oriental v. NLU, 91 Phil. 28

FACTS:
The United Employees Welfare Association, a union duly registered in the Department of Labor and with members among the employees of the petitioner, entered into an agreement of working conditions
with the petitioner pursuant to a settlement concluded in a case of the Court of Industrial Relations. The said agreement was to last for one year. Thirty-six of the thirty-seven members of the said United
Employees Welfare Association tendered their resignations from the same union and joined the local chapter of the respondent National Labor Union. There is no evidence that these resignations were
made with the approval of petitioner. The president of the respondent union sent a letter to petitioner containing seven demands allegedly on behalf of the members of its local chapter who are employed
made with the approval of petitioner. The president of the respondent union sent a letter to petitioner containing seven demands allegedly on behalf of the members of its local chapter who are employed
by the petitioner, to which the latter, through its counsel, answered with another letter stating among other things that the laborers on whose behalf the letter has been written were already affiliated with
the United Employees Welfare Association. The respondent union reiterated its demands. In reply, counsel for petitioner sent a letter stating that petitioner could not recognize the alleged local chapter of
the respondent union until and after the agreement of May 4, 1950, entered into by the same employees concerned and petitioner is declared null and void by the Court of Industrial Relations. On August
28, 1950, the members of the respondent union struck. On August 31, 1950, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations to declare the strike illegal. On Sept. 8, 1950, the court, through its
presiding judge, denied the petitioner’s prayer to declare the strike illegal. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Industrial Relations but the said motion was denied.
ISSUE:
WON the order of the Court of Industrial Relations is null or void.
RULING:
YES. The record shows that the local chapter of the respondent union is composed entirely, except one, of members who made up the total membership of the United Employees Welfare Association, a
registered union in the petitioner’s company. To be exact, thirty-six of the thirty-seven members of said association tendered their resignations and joined the local chapter of the respondent union without
first securing the approval of their resignations. The new Union then sought to present a seven-point demand of the very same employees to petitioner, which in many respects differs from their previous
demand. It is evident that the purpose of their transfer is merely to disregard and circumvent the contract entered into between the same employees and the petitioner on May 4, 1950, knowing full well
that that contract was effective for one year, and was entered into with the sanction of the Court of Industrial Relations. If this move were allowed the result would be a subversion of a contract freely
entered into without any valid and justifiable reason. Such act cannot be sanctioned in law or in equity as it is in derogation of the principle underlying the freedom of contract and the good faith that should
exist in contractual relations. A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of settling labor disputes. That is why it is given personality and recognition in concluding collective
bargaining agreements.

120. Spinner v. Hesslein, 54 Phil. 224

Facts:
E. Spinner & Co. is a copartnership with head offices in England and India, represented in the Philippines by Wise & Co., a domestic corporation. Defendant is a corporation organized under the Philippine
laws, a subsidiary of Neuss Hesslein & Co., Inc., of NY USA, for whom it acts as selling agent in the Philippines. E. Spinner & Co., has long been engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile fabrics,
including khaki cloth. Plaintiff began exporting khaki to the Philippines. Among the brands of khaki was the grade “Wigan”. All of the different grades of khaki were marketed by the plaintiff under a common
trade-mark duly registered in the Philippines. Plaintiff learned in 1924 that defendant, was selling a brand of khaki in the Philippines with the word “Wigan”.
Issue:
Whether the conduct of the defendant would amount to unfair competition.
Held:
Yes. As stated in section 7 of Act No. 666, a person is guilty of unfair competition who "in selling his goods shall give them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either in the
wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods
offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual manufacturer or dealer," etc.
The representation that the khaki sold by the defendant is of the kind known to the trade as "Wigan" directly tends to deceive the purchaser and, therefore, constitutes unfair competition as against the
plaintiff.
It is no doubt true that the adoption of the word "Wigan" by the defendant does not deceive merchants or tailors buying from the defendant. But the person most to be considered in this connection is the
consumer, and when the word "Wigan" is found upon a bolt of khaki, the ultimate buyer, or consumer, would naturally be led to suppose that the goods sold under this name is the goods sold by the
plaintiff.

I. VIOLATION OF CIVIL/POLITICAL RIGHT (ARTICLE 32)

121. Lim v. Ponce de Leon , 66 SCRA 299

FACTS:
Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya a Motor Launch named San Rafael. One year later, Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan with corresponding information
for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha alleging that the motor launch was forcibly taken away from him. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the
motor launch was in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balacbac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.
Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the
court from taking custody of the same. Accordingly, on July 6, 1962 upon the order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balacbac, Palawan,
seized the motor launch from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the CFI of Palawan a complaint for damages against defendants-appellees
Fiscal Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent.
ISSUE:
Whether defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages; and under Article 2219, moral damages may be recovered for Illegal Search. A person whose constitutional rights
have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefore. Since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch
without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure. Defendant-appellees are civilly liable. To be liable under Article 32, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.

122. MHP Garments v. CA, 236 SCRA 227

Facts:
MHP Garments was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute Boy Scout uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias and was also given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." MHP Garments received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and
Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. De Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments, together with some Constabulary men, then went to
respondent’s stores and without any warrant, seized the boy and girl scouts uniforms. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items.
The respondents paid De Guzman P3,100.00 for the charges to be dropped. The complaint was eventually dismissed and an order to return the seized items was given. However, not all items were
returned which prompted private respondents to file for damages. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents and was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
Issue:
WON MHP Garments is liable.
Ruling:
Yes. We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of
private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms
that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression as joint tortfeasors.
Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.

123. ABS-CBN v. CA, 301 SCRA 572

Facts:
ABSCBN and VIVA executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby VIVA gave ABS an exclusive right to exhibit Viva Films and the right of first refusal to the next 24 films for the TV telecast. Viva
submitted a list of the films but ABS rejected the package. During a lunch meeting between the representatives of both companies , another offer was made by Viva which ABS promised to study and
make a counter offer. The counter offer was rejected by Viva. Viva subsequently signed a letter of agreement with RBS granting it exclusive rights to air Viva films. ABS filed before the RTC a complaint for
specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injuction alleging that there was a perfected contract during the lunch meeting. The writ was granted but was later dissolved after RBS posted
bond. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals , the petition was dismissed. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of RBS and VIVA and ruled that there was no perfected agreement. It ordered ABS to pay
damages to RBS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue:
WON ABSCBN is liable for damages.
Ruling:
No. The claim of RBS against ABS is not based on contract , quasi-contract , delict of quasi-delict. It is based on the filing of the complaint knowing ABS has no cause of action against RBS. Hence, the
claim for damages can only be based on Art. 19 , 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. Abuse of right under these articles require malice or bad faith.
In this case , there is no adequate proof that ABS was inspired by malice or bad faith in filing the complaint for specific performance. It was honestly convinced of the merits of its case after it had
undergone serious negotiations with formal submission of a draft contract. If damages resulted form a persons exercise of a right , without malice or bad faith , it is damnun absque injuria.

124. Bricktown v. CA, 239 SCRA 126

FACTS:
Petitioner Bricktown Development Corporation executed two Contracts to Sell in favor of respondent Amor Tierra Development Corporation covering 96 residential lots. The contracts provided that the
total price shall be paid in installments and should the purchaser fail to pay when due any of the installments, the owner shall grant the purchaser a 60-day grace period within which to pay the amount/s
due, and should the purchaser still fail to pay the due amount/s within the 60-day grace period, the purchaser shall have the right to ex-parte cancel or rescind the contract, provided however, that the
actual cancellation or rescission shall take effect only after the lapse of 30 days from the date of receipt by the purchaser of the notice of cancellation of the contract.
Respondent corporation was able to pay the first installment partially. In the meanwhile, the parties continued to negotiate for a possible modification of their agreement, although nothing conclusive would
appear to have ultimately been arrived at. For continued failure to pay the second installment due, petitioner corporation sent private respondent a Notice of Cancellation of Contract. After 1 year and 11
months, private respondent demanded the refund of its various payments to petitioner corporation. The demand, not having been heeded, private respondent commenced an action. The court declared
the contracts rescinded and ordered petitioner corporation to return to the private respondent the amount it had paid to petitioner corporation. The CA affirmed in toto the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the amounts already remitted by respondent corporation under said contracts were rightly forfeited by petitioner corporation
HELD:
No. While petitioner corporation still acted within its legal right to declare the contracts to sell rescinded or cancelled, it would be unconscionable to likewise sanction the forfeiture by petitioner corporation
of payments made to it by respondent corporation. There is reasonable ground to believe that because of the negotiations between the parties, coupled with the fact that the respondent corporation never
took actual possession of the properties and the petitioner corporation did not also dispose of the same during the pendency of said negotiations, the respondent corporation was led to believe that the
parties may ultimately enter into another agreement in place of the "contracts to sell." The relationship between parties in any contract must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair
dealing. Petitioner corporation did fall well behind that standard. There was, evidently, no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent corporation in suspending payments. On the contrary, the petitioner
corporation not only contributed, but had consented to the delay or suspension of payments. It did not give the respondent corporation a categorical answer that their counter-proposals will not materialize.

125. Newsweek v. IAC, 142 SCRA 141

Facts:
Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental and several individual sugar planters, filed a civil case in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of all
sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of their reporters. The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel against them by the publication of an article in
their weekly news magazine. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts
intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility
of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a
of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss ruling that on its face, it is a valid cause of action; and whether the printed article sued upon is actionable or not is a matter of evidence. Respondent appellate
court affirmed the trial court's orders.
Issue:
Whether private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action
Ruling:
The court agrees with petitioner in that there is a failure to state a cause of action. It is essential in a libel suit for the victim to be identifiable. There is no ground of action unless it is shown that the readers
can identify the personality of the individual defamed. It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
Even though private respondents filed a class suit in representation of all the sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental, the case at bar is not a class suit. We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs
has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

126. MVRS Publication v. Islamic Da’wah, 396 SCRA 210

Facts:
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. is a local federation of Muslim religious organizations and muslim individuals. Islamic Da’wah filed a complaint for damages in behalf of their Muslim
members nationwide (class suit) against MVRS. This was due to an article published by MVRS that Muslims do not eat animals especially pigs and that they are treating these animals as sacred and
gods. The complaint alleged that the libellous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims. That the article was published out of sheer ignorance. MVRS contended that the article was merely an
expression of belief or opinion. Trial court dismissed the case. Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether MVRS should be liable for damages.
Ruling:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. However, the fact that the language is
offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a
class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.
In the case at bar, there was no identifiable person who was injured by the article. Hence, the plaintiffs have no individual cause of action, therefore, it cannot file a class suit.
There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together,
the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander the one being, in general, written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and
good name. This is a relational interest since it involves the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff. (Justice Puno)
An “Emotional distress” tort action is personal in nature. It is founded on personal attacks to an individual. Such, is not applicable in this case since no individual was indentified in the article.
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:
(a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
(b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and,
(d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in civilized society.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock,
fright, horror, and chagrin.
"Severe emotional distress," refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including
posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.
The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an
element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.
An element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the
named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing
on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Therefore the petition is dismissed

127. Silahis Int’l Hotel v. Soluta, G.R. No. 163087 (February 20, 2006)
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. The latter received several reports of illegal activities within the hotels
premises. He asked the security to conduct surveillance. Sometime in January 11, 1988, entered the union office located at the hotel basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay)
who was apprised about the suspected illegal activities, and searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic bag under a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of
marijuana. Panlilio thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.
Criminal cases were filed against the employees of Silahis but the RTC dismissed the case citing the marijuana leaves are not admissible in evidence, coupled by the suspicious circumstance of its
confiscation.
Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the Manila RTC a Complaint 12 against petitioners et al. including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and Atty. Eduardo
Tutaan who assisted in the prosecution of the case against them, for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search.
The Manila RTC rendered a decision dated June 2, 1994, holding the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva jointly and severally liable for damages as a result of malicious prosecution and illegal search
of the union office.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision. It found herein petitioners et al. civilly liable for damages for violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right
against illegal search, not for malicious prosecution, set aside the award of actual damages to respondent union, and reduced the award of actual damages to individual respondents to P50,000
ISSUE:
Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights?
HELD:
Yes. The Petition is denied. Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides: ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or
not, must be guarded against. The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection
of individual rights. 25 It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

128. RCPI v. Verchez, G.R. No. 164349 (January 31, 2006)

FACTS:
Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace immediately hid to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida who was residing at Quezon City reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital."
The telegram was delivered to Zenaida only 25 days later. Editha’s husband Alfonso demanded an explanation from the manager of RCPI who replied that the delivery was not immediately effected due to
the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI.
Then, Editha died. Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the RTC of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
WON RCPI may be held liable for damages
RULING:
YES.
For RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
xxxx
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the
"filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts
mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
The award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order.

129. PEA v. Ganac-Chu, G.R. No. 145291, 21 Sept. 2005

FACTS:
Respondent alleged that she is the owner of a parcel of land. According to respondent, without notice and due process, petitioner entered her property and bulldozed the land, destroying her black pepper
plantation, causing damage to her operations and depriving her of her means of livelihood. RTC adjudged jointly and severally liable petitioners to pay respondent damages. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed
to the CA. The appellate court, however, sustained the partial judgment of the trial court and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a valid basis for the award of damages in favor of respondent.
RULING:
Being aware of the existence of pepper trees on the lot under controversy and knowing that respondent is the one in possession thereof; petitioner should have notified her before they bulldozed the
same. Their claim that the area in question belongs to PEA even if true is no excuse to bulldoze it summarily knowing fully well that there were improvements or crops standing thereon. Petitioners
evidently took the law into their hands. They should have acted with caution and prudence before trespassing on others property. Even squatters are entitled to due process and cannot just be evicted by
the owner without resorting to the court of law. There is no question that respondent is entitled to damages. Her demand for damages can be anchored on the abuse of rights principle. The law provides
that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. The exercise of ones rights is not
without limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised.
VI. INTERFERENCE IN CONTRACTUAL RELATION (ARTICLE 1314)

130. Yu v. CA, GR 86683 (January 21, 1993).

FACTS:
Philip Yu, Petitioner, the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair wallcovering products in the Philippines, cried foul when his former dealer of the same goods, herein private respondent, purchased
the merchandise from the House of Mayfair in England through FNF Trading in West Germany and sold said merchandise in the Philippines. Philip Yu, the petitioner has had an exclusive sales agency
agreement with the House of Mayfair since 1987 to promote and procure orders for Mayfair wallcovering products from customers in the Philippines. Even as petitioner was such exclusive distributor,
private respondent, which was then petitioner's dealer, imported the same goods via the FNF Trading which eventually sold the merchandise in the domestic market. A suit for injunction was filed by YU
before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed at Manila, petitioner pressed the idea that he was practically by-passed and that private respondent acted in concert with
the FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that the goods ordered by the trading firm were intended for shipment to Nigeria although they were actually shipped to and sold in the Philippines.
Private respondent professed ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of petitioner. Even then, private respondent responded by asserting that petitioner's understanding with Mayfair is binding only
between the parties thereto. RTC denied the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendant from selling the goods it has ordered from the FNF Trading of Germany. In
its decision the court stated that the terms and conditions of the agreement between the plaintiff (Philip YU) and The House of Mayfair of England for the exclusive distributorship by the plaintiff of the
latter's goods, appertain only to them and that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Philip Yu filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the CA
reacted in the same nonchalant fashion. According to the appellate court, petitioner was not able to demonstrate the unequivocal right which he sought to protect and that private respondent is a complete
stranger vis-a-vis the covenant between petitioner and Mayfair.
ISSUE:
Did respondent appellate court correctly agree with the lower court in disallowing the writ solicited by herein petitioner?
RULING:
No. According to the SC, injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury
is irreparable. The injury is irreparable where it is continuous and repeated since from its constant and frequent recurrence, no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor by petitioner insofar as his
goodwill and business reputation as sole distributor are concerned. Furthermore, the CA overlooked that the House of Mayfair in England was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the FNF
Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a party to renege on
or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom.

131. So Ping Bun v. CA, GR 120554 (September 21, 1999)

FACTS:
Respondent corporation Tek Hua Enterprises is the lessee of the premises of Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc (DCCSI) in binondo, but the same premises was occupied by petitioner So Ping Bun for his own
business, Trendsetter Marketing. Respondent corporation demanded petitioner to vacate the premises but the latter refuse contending that it executed a contract of lease with DCCSI.
Respondent corporation pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts between the petitioner and DCCSI and claimed damages. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent corporation, annulled the
contracts and order petitioners to pay damages. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract
RULING:
One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if

a. the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with
b. the invasion is substantial
c. the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion
d. the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules.
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the
other of his private property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract.
The elements of tort interference are:

1) Existence of a valid contract

2) Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract
3) Interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.
The elements of tort interference are present in the case at bar; it is clear that petitioner asked DCCSI to lease the warehouse to the former’s enterprise at the expense of the respondent corporation,
depriving the latter of its property right. Though petitioner took interest in the property of the respondent corporation and benefited from it, there is no proof imputing malice on the petitioner; thus,
precluding damages. However, petitioner is not relieved from legal liabilities for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.

132. Lagon v. CA, GR 119107 (March 18, 2005)

Facts:
Parcels of land were purchased by Jose V. Lagon from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi. Menandro V. Lapuz claimed that he entered into a lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi covering the said
parcels of land wherein it was agreed that Lapuz will put up commercial buildings to be leased to new tenants. The rent due to Sepi will be paid from the rent paid by the tenants. The lease contract ended
but it was allegedly renewed. Upon death of Sepi, Lapuz started remitting his rent to the court appointed administrator of Sepi’s estate. Lapuz was told to stop collecting rentals from tenants of the
buildings. He then discovered that Lagon, representing himself as the new owner, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. An action for damages was filed by Lapuz, alleging that Lagoninduced the
heirs of Sepi to sell to him the property, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. Lagon denied the allegation and said that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the obligations of Sepi. Also,
he denied interfering with the leasehold rights of Lapuz as there was no lease contract covering the property upon his personal investigation and inquiry. The RTC ruled in favor of Lapu. The CA affirmed
RTC’s decision with modification.
Issue:
Whether Lagon was guilty of tortuous interference
Held:
No. To constitute tortuous interference, it must proven that (a) A valid contract exist; (b) knowledge on the part of third person of the existence of contract; (c) interference by third person was without legal
justification. The 2nd and 3rd elements are absent in the case at bar. Lagon conducted his personal investigation and inquiry and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious
man probe deeper and watch out for conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire property’s title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of Lapuz. There was no record of it in the
registry of property. There was no malice or bad faith on the part of Lagon. The decision of the heirs to sell the property was completely of their own volition and Lagon did nothing to influence their
decision.

133. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542

Facts:
The defendants induced the owner of a film to break his contract of lease with a theater owner and lease the film to them, with the purpose of exhibiting it in another theater in the same city. As the profits
of the lessee depended upon the patronage of the public and hence the task of estimating his damages with accuracy is difficult if not impossible.
Issue:
Does intereference with lawful contracts by strangers thereto give rise to an action for damages in favor of the injured person?
Held:
Yes, the law does not require that the responsible person shall have known the identity of the injured person. There is nothing in section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure which indicates, that before an
injunction may issue restraining the wrongful interference with contracts by strangers, the strangers must know the identity of both parties.

134. Daywalt vs. Corporacion Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587 [1919] 


FACTS:
In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W. Daywalt, a tract of land upon the issuance of a title to the land and a Torrens certificate. It was found
by official survey that the area of the tract was about 1.248 hectares instead of 452 hectares. In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to the purchaser,
asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area.
The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation whose representative, Father Isidro Sanz had long been well acquainted with Teodorica Endencia and exerted over her
an influence and ascendancy. As Teodorica still retained possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant
corporation were pastured upon said land.
Litigation prospered due to Endencia’s change of mind and refusal to comply with her agreement with Daywalt despite order of the court for specific performance.
Issue:
whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt?
Held:
No, it is not liable. The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensivelyliable in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party in whose behalf
heintermediates. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need toconsider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from Endenciacannot be
recovered from her, first, because these are special damages w/c were not w/in thecontemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damages are tooremote to be the subject
of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt,neither can the Recoletos be held liable. As already suggested, by advising Endencia not toperform the contract, the Recoletos could in no
event render itself more extensively liable thanthe principal in the contract.

135. Tayag v. Lacson, GR 134971 (March 25, 2004).

FACTS:
In March 1996 a group of farmer-tenants on three parcels of land owned by the Lacsons assigned to petitioner Tayag their rights as tenants/tillers for p50/sqm. The said amount would be payable “when
the legal impediments to the sale of the property to the petitioner no longer existed.” Tayag would have exclusive rights to purchase the property if and when the Lacsons agreed to sell the property. Tayag
gave varied sums of money to the farmers as partial payments, and the farmers issued receipts. Sometime later Tayag discovered that the farmers changed their minds and would be selling their rights to
the Lacsons instead, prompting Tayag to pray for Injunction against the farmers and Lacson. In their defense, the Lacsons claimed that they did not induce the farmers to violate their contracts with Tayag,
and that since the farmers were merely tenants, they had no right to enter into any transactions involving Lacson properties without the owners’ consent.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid option contract between Tayag and the farmers by virtue of the deeds of assignment.
RULING:
No. In this case the defendants-tenants-subtenants, under the deeds of assignment, granted to the petitioner not only an option but the exclusive right to buy the landholding. But the grantors were merely
the defendants-tenants, and not the respondents, the registered owners of the property. Not being the registered owners of the property, the defendants-tenants could not legally grant to the petitioner the
option to buy the property.

VII. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME (RULES OF COURT)

A. REMEDIES

i. Civil action with criminal action (Rule 111[1], ROC)

ii. Separate civil action (Rule 111 [2a])

iii. Independent civil action (Arts. 30 & 31, CC; R111[3], ROC)

136. Cruz v. CA, GR 122445 (November 18, 1997)

Facts:
On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital in San Pablo Laguna. Prior to March 22 Lydia was
examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma” in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. At the clinic, Rowena noticed that it was untidy and the window and the
floor were dusty. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena convinced her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, before the operation, Rowena asked the petitioner if the
operation could be postponed but she was told that Lydia must be operated as scheduled. During operation the petitioner requested Rowena et al to buy Tagamet ampules and followed by another
request to buy blood for Lydia. Which the respondents complied. Lydia, who was attached to an oxygen tank was gasping for breath. Apparently the supply run out. Lydia was given a fresh supply of
oxygen which the relatives obtained from San Pablo District Hospital. But at about 10PM she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She had to be transfered to the San Pablo District Hospital
so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. This transfer was without the prior consent of Rowena et al. Upon the arrival in the Hospital she was reoparated and the attending
physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and
possibly dead Thus, on March 24, Lydia was pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the
antecedent cause.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Held:
Supreme Court found the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. One of the elements of
reckless imprudence is (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.
From a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations..
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic and the lack of provisions; no proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the
absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence.
For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties.
Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper.

137. DMPI Employees v. Velez, GR 129282 (November 29, 2001).

FACTS:
An estafa case was filed against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Villegas a certain amount. Villegas entrusted this amount to Mandawe, who is an employee of DMPI-ECCI,
for deposit.
Then, Villegas filed a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner
sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following grounds: 1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and 2) that the complaint failed to contain a
certification against forum shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the civil case but after a Motion for Reconsideration by Villegas, the case was reinstated.
ISSUE:
Whether the Civil Case could proceed independently of the Criminal Case for Estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.
RULING:
Yes. As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding
penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.” This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and
indemnification of consequential damages. The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted. Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it.

138. Casupanan v. Laroya, GR 145391 (August 26, 2002).

Facts:
Laroya and Casupanan got into a vehicular accident. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan while Casupanan, together with Capitulo, the owner of the vehicle, filed a civil case against Laroya.
The civil case was filed while the criminal case was at its preliminary investigation stage and thus Laroya filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. The MCTC granted the motion which
led to Casupanan filing a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy
should have been an appeal.
Issue:
WON the accused in a criminal case can file an independent civil action against the complainant.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by
the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect
that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-
delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal
action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts,
and equal protection of the law.

139. Cerezo v. Tuazon, GR 141538 (March 23, 2004).

Facts:
A Country Bus Lines passenger bus driven by Foronda and owned by Mrs. Cerezo collided with a tricycle driven by Tuazon. The tricyle was damaged and Tuazon suffered serious physical injuries as a
result of the incident. Tuazon filed a criminial case against Foronda and a civil action for damages against spouses Cerezo as owners of the bus. The RTC held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for damages.
The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Mrs. Cerezo filed a petition for relief of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
WON the court has jurisdiction when Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal case.
Ruling:
Yes, the basis of the present action is quasi-delict under the Civil Code , not delict under the Revised Penal Code. Thus , reservation to institute a separate civil action is not required. The same negligent
act may produce civil liability under delict or may give rise to an action for quasi-delict. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed
independently from the criminal action. Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on quasi-delict. Mrs. Cerezo , as employer of Foronda, is solidarily liable for damages because it is presumed
that she failed to exercise due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees.

140. Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, GR 155531-34 (July 29, 2005).

FACTS:
Separate informations were separately filed against petitioner Mary Ann Rodriguez for violation of B.P. 22 and for estafa. The RTC allowed the appearance of a private prosecutor in the estafa cases.
Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal case pending for violation of B.P. 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the pending criminal case for
estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether a private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the proceedings of the estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of the
checks involved which is also subject matter of the pending B.P. 22 cases
HELD:
Yes. A civil action in a B.P. 22 case is not a bar to a civil action in an estafa case. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil
liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil
remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise from a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it. At the present stage, no judgment on the
civil liability has been rendered in either criminal case. There is as yet no call for the offended party to elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered barred from others available to her.

141. Santos v. Pizardo, GR 151452 (August 29, 2005)

Facts:
Dionisio Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries in connection with a vehicle collision. Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of
the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of
civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman Rondaris pursuant to their reservation. Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of
improper service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate personality
of Viron Transit from its officers. Petitioners contend that the right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in 10 years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. It has barely
been 2 years since the conviction.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. According to them, the action is based on a quasi-delict and prescribes four years from the accrual of the cause of action. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA which dismissed the same for error in the choice of mode of appeal. Petitioners implore the SC to exempt the case from the rigid operation of the rules since they insist that the liability sought
to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi-delict. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of
judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether the action is based on a quasi-delict
Ruling:
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its

decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability. ​ ​ ​ ​
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are
consistent with petitioners’ claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not
necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict
under the Civil Code.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them
by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

142. Hyatt Industrial v. Asia Dynamic, GR 163597 (July 29, 2005)

Facts:
Hyatt filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation. According to Hyatt, Asia Dyanamic purchased from the former various electrical conduits and fitting worth
more than 1 million pesos. Asia Dynamic issued several checks as payment but all were dishonored by the bank. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the civil action
was deemed included in the criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) previously filed by petitioner against the officers of respondent corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits the filing of a separate civil action in B.P. 22 cases; and (3) respondent was guilty of forum shopping and unjust enrichment. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss in its order dated December 10, 2001. It ruled that since the act complained of arose from the alleged non-payment of the petitioner of its contractual debt, and not the issuance of checks with
insufficient funds, in accordance with Article 31 of the Civil Code, the civil action could proceed independently of the criminal actions. Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct.
Ruling:
It appears that prior to the filing of the present case, Hyatt had already filed a separate criminal action for violation of BP 22 against Asia Dynamic. Upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22,
the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The reservation to file a separate civil action is
no longer needed. The court denied the petition.

143. Safeguard Security v. Tangco, G.R. No. 165732, 14 Dec. 2006

FACTS:
On 3 November 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch in Quezon City to renew her time deposit. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with
corresponding permit to carry the same outside of her residence, approached Pajarillo, security guard of Ecology Bank to deposit the firearm for safekeeping, suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his
service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Evangeline’s husband, Lauro, together with his six minor children filed with the RTC of QC a criminal case against Pajarillo, where they likewise reserved their right to file a separate civil action on the said
criminal case. Pajarillo was subsequently convicted of homicide in 19 January 2000 by the RTC and the CA upheld the decision with modification on the penalty on 31 July 2000.
On 14 January 1998, respondents filed with the RTC of Marikina City a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard Security Agency Inc. for failing to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. The respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The RTC of Marikina rendered judgment in favor of Lauro Tangco et. al. ordering Pajarillo and Safeguard Security agency Inc. jointly and severally, to pay:

a. ₱157,430.00 as actual damages;

b. ₱50,000 as death indemnity;
c. ₱1million pesos as moral damages;
d. ₱300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs of suit.
The RTC ruled that Pajarillo did not act in self-defense; giving no weight to his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the incident given that Pajarillo had not made any such
reports to the head office and the police authorities. Pajarillo should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care in ascertaining the matter instead of shooting her instantly. The RTC likewise
found Safeguard to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo since there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father by simply showing that it required its
guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision as contemplated under the law. It includes the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
The CA modified that decision of the RTC saying that Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is only subsidiarily liable. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed and denied by the CA, hence this
petition.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline

2. Whether or not Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
HELD:

1. Yes, Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline as upheld by both the RTC and CA in separate decisions. The SC affirms these decisions since based on the evidence presented,
Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claims that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously which Pajarillo mistook as a bank robbery which led him to
draw his service firearm and shot Evangeline.

2. Yes, Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to the respondents. The nature of the respondents’ cause of action is determined in the complaint
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. In the complaint, the respondents are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their indirect responsibility for the injury caused by
Pajarillo’s act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176. Thus, the civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo but one based on culpa
aquiliana or quasi delict which is a separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by Pajarillo and is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his
employee by operation of law. The Court agrees with the RTC’s finding that Safeguard had exercised diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since records show that he underwent psychological
and neuropsychiatric evaluation, pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances. However, Safeguard was not diligent in providing trainings, classroom
instructions and continuous evaluation of the security guard’s performance. Thus, the SC affirms with modification that the civil liability of Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is solidary and primary
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

144. Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, GR 147703 (April 14, 2004).
FACTS:
Accused Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The trial court further ruled
that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Simultaneously, petitioner filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court to which CA gave due course. CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil
action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
becomes conclusive and enforceable. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employer's subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
WON an employer may appeal independently of the accused
RULING:
NO.
The 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary
civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of
his flight, then the former's subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.

B. EFFECTS

i. Acquittal/dismissal (Art. 29, CC; R111 [2b] & 120 [2], ROC)
ii. Extinction of civil liability (Rule 111[2b], ROC)
145. Manantan v. CA, GR 107125 (January 29, 2001), 350 SCRA 387.
FACTS: Manantan is the driver of an automobile who drove and operated the same while along the Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, he sideswipe a passenger jeep causing or resulting to the death
of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said jeepney. An information charging Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed and on arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The trial court acquitted Manantan. Private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court's judgment and prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and to ordered to
pay indemnity and damages. The appellate court decided in favor of Nicolas spouses. Hence, this present case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not court err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability
RULING:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in
Rule 111 of the RoC. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. Petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty.
Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.

146. Sanchez v. FEBTC, GR 155309 (November 15, 2005).

FACTS:
Kai Chin is the director and representative of Chemical Bank. Its subsidiary, Chemical International Finance Limited is an investor in Far East Bank and Trust Co. To represent CIFL, Chin was made a
director and senior VP of FEBTC and Josephine Sanchez is Chin’s secretary. FEBTC says that Sanchez made unauthorized withdrawals from the account of CIFL in FEBTC using forged/falsified
applications for cashier’s checks that would be deposited into her account and, once credited, would be withdrawn by Sanchez to be misappropriated, for her personal benefit to the damage of FEBTC.
FEBTC had to reimburse the CIFL account with P3, 787,530.86. Sanchez denied the forgeries, asserting that the deposit into her account was with the authority and under the instructions of Chin and that
she withdrew the money but turned the same over to Chin. Chin then denied giving Sanchez authority, saying that she signed the documents but he did not rebut the alleged turnover of the proceeds. RTC
Found Chin gave Sanchez authority to transact matters concerning the CIFL account And Denied Motion for Reconsideration by FEBTC. RTC said that the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt but
that she wasn’t the author of the frauds perpetrated thus there is no civil liability against her.
The CA Granted FEBTC appeal, and stated that the Acquittal doesn’t preclude recovery of civil indemnity based on quasi-delict because the outcome is inconsequential to adjudge civil liability from the
same act that could also be a quasi-delict. Furthermore, Sanchez was acquitted on reasonable doubt from the insufficiency of the evidence to establish her as having perpetrated the crime and not the
nonexistence of the crime where civil liability could arise. While forgery couldn’t be proven, the CA faulted Sanchez for failure to turn over the proceeds to FEBTC, an actionable fraud, and thus ordered
her to pay actual damages for the checks in her name and account.
ISSUE:
What is the civil liability of Sanchez, if any, in light of her acquittal?
RULING:
None. Because Sanchez was found not to have committed the crime imputed, her acquittal extinguished the action for civil liability. There was no evidence on record that the money never turned over to
Kai Chan. Sanchez consistently claimed that she acted with authority, that even if deposited in her account, she withdrew and turned value over the Chin. Records don’t show that she ever appropriated
the money for her personal gain. Kai Chin didn’t rebut the statement as to turnover. Records show that Kai Chin did in fact give Sanchez authority. The issue of forgery wasn’t successfully proven. Under
RULE 111, SEC. 2(B) of the Rules of Court, A finding in a final judgment that the fact from which civil liability may arise does not exist carries with it the extinction of the civil liability.

147. Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, 25 Jan 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Manliclic was the driver of a bus owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. The bus collided with a jeep where the owner respondent Calaunan was riding. Respondent thereafter filed a criminal
case against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries. Respondent also filed an action for damages based on quasi delict.
Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on the ground that he did not commit such crime. However, in the civil case, he was made to pay damages to respondent. Petitioner argued that no negligence
can be attributed against him in the civil action since he was already acquitted in the criminal case. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may still be charged with negligence despite being acquitted in the criminal case for reckless imprudence on the ground that he was not the author of the crime
RULING:
The petitioner may still be charged with negligence despite being acquitted in the criminal case. Although the rule is that acquittal on the ground that the accused did not commit the crime extinguishes the
civil liability, this is only applicable to civil liability arising from delict.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with an individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between (1) the civil
liability arising from a crime and (2) the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
The acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the
basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of, said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto.
In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the
delict complained of. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not
the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

C. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (Art. 36, CC; R111, Sec. 6, ROC)

148. Quiambao v. Osorio, GR L-48157 (March 16, 1988)

Facts:
Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza claims that they were the legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. by virtue of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor
by the Land Tenure Administration (now the Department of Agrarian Reform) and Ricardo Quiambao by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, surreptitiously entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof,
placed bamboo posts and began the construction of a house thereon. A complaint for forcible entry was filed by respondents praying for a writ of preliminary injunction and ejectment of petitioner from the
lot. As a ground for dismissing the case and an affirmative defense, petitioner contend that an administrative case is pending before the Office of Land Authority between the same parties involving the
same piece of land. In the said administrative case, petitioner disputed respondents’ right of possession for their default in the installment payments for the purchase of the lot. He asserted that his
administrative case was determinative of private respondents' right to eject petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a judicial action until after its termination. The MTC
denied the motion to dismiss. The CFI denied the petition for certiorari prayed by Land Authority on it urgent motion for leave to intervene finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior
possession and the motion was denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether prejudicial question exist which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case
Held:
Technically, no prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The actions involved in the case at bar
being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. However, due to the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings,
stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case, the Court advised the lower
court to hold in abeyance the ejectment case pending the administrative case.

149. Yap v. Paras, GR 101236 (January 30, 1992).

Facts:
Yap was the sister of Paras. According to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, Paras sold the same property to
Saya-ang. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang. On the same date, she filed a
complaint for the nullification of the said sale. After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras. Before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu
proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that there is a prejudicial question which must be ventilated in a proper civil court
Issue:
Can the judge hold the civil action as prejudicial question to the criminal action?
Held:
No. A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused
In the Ras case quoted by the judge, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the defense in the civil case — forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale — had to be
threshed out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and
no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action
would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. Therefore he cannot suspend the criminal proceedings because of the existence of the civil action. The Criminal Case is
ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.

150. Tamin v. CA, GR 97477 (May 8, 1992).

FACTS:
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga
del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should
vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money
is allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are personally liable for damages to the private respondents for the abatement of public nuisance.
Ruling:
NO. The petitioners misread the appellate court's decision. The records show that the private respondents prayed for, in their petition for certiorari filed with the appellate court, among others:
It is likewise, prayed that respondents be ordered to pay jointly and severally the value of the house illegally demolished in the amount of P1,000.00 00, attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs, . . .
In response to this prayer, however, the appellate court stated: We do not, however, have jurisdiction over petitioners' claim for damages. This must be pursued in an appropriate action instituted in the
Regional Trial Court.
Moreover, the dispositive portion of the decision does not mention any personal liability for damages against the petitioners. The apprehension of the petitioners lacks factual basis.
151. Spouses Lee-Yu v. PCIB, GR 14790 (17 March 2006)
FACTS: Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine
Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan. As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties. Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale and its corresponding schedule.
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City and after two months before the expiration of the redemption
period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of
Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ
of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
RULING:
SC held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the
two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other.

152. Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, GR 138509 (July 31, 2000).

Facts:
Respondent contracted marriage with Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled or nullified, he again contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbel-Bobis. He also
allegedly contracted a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Information for bigamy was filed against respondent. Subsequently, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking
the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Held:
No. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry.
The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a
matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided
all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage.
Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that,
without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

D. SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY (Arts. 102-103, RPC; Art. 106-109 Labor Code)

i. Concept and requisites

ii. Diligence is not a defense

153. Carpio v. Doroja, 180 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered
from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months. An information for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez. The court held Ramirez guilty. A writ of execution was duly served upon the accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied due to
the insolvency. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. It was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the
decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for
reconsideration of the said order was denied for the reason that complainant failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court and its decision has become final and executory and the
trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
RULING:
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent. The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies
all these requirements. In an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a
separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes
incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to
the employee's insolvency. Thus, the Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private
respondent.

154. Bantoto v. Bobis, 18 SCRA 690

Facts:
A jeepney, owned by Crispin Vallejo, through the negligence of the driver, Salvador Bobis, struck a the 3 year old daughter of Vicente Bantoto which eventually caused her death. Bobis was charged with
homicide through reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty. Bantoto sought to have Vallejo solidarily liable for damages with Bobis, to which Vallejo moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action; that his liability was only subsidiary; that the action was barred by prior judgment; and that the liability had been satisfied. RTC overruled Vallejo’s objection.
Issue:
WON Vallejo is liable.
Ruling:
Yes. The master's liability, under the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes committed by his servants and employees in the discharge of their duties, is not predicated upon the insolvency of the latter.
Such insolvency is required only when the liability of the master is being made effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of judgment against the master. The subsidiary character of the
employer's responsibility merely imports that the latter's property is not be seized without first exhausting that of the servant. And by analogy to a regular guarantor (who is the prototype of persons
subsidiarily responsible), the master may not demand prior exhaustion of the servant's (principal obligor's) properties if he cannot "point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine
territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt"

155. Yonaha v. CA, 255 SCRA 397

Facts:
A Toyota Tamaraw driven by Elmer Ovano bumped and hit Hector Caete which caused the latter’s death. A criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against Ovano. The
RTC found him guilty beyong reasonable doubt and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment and pay damages to the heirs of Caete. A Writ of Execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary
award. However Ovano was unable to pay the monetary obligation. The trial court issued a Writ of Subsidiary Execution against Yonaha as employer of Ovano without notice of hearing or notice of the
case. Yonaha appealed to the Court of Appeals which was denied.
Issue:
WON Yonaha is subsidiary liable for damages.
Ruling:
The subsidiary liability of an employer under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires 1.)The existence of an employer-employee relationship ; 2.) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry
; 3.) that employee is adjudged guilty of a wrongful act committed in the discharge of his duties ; 4.) the employee is insolvent. Execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course.
Due process must be given to the employer , to determine and resolve , in a hearing set for the purpose , the legal applicability and propriety of the employers liability. The case must be remanded to the
trial court so that Yonaha will be given the right to a hearing.

VIII. DAMAGES

A. CONCEPT/KINDS OF DAMAGES (ARTICLE 2197)

Article 2197. Damages may be:

(1) Actual or compensatory;

(2) Moral;

(3) Nominal;

(4) Temperate or moderate;

(5) Liquidated; or

(6) Exemplary or corrective.

156. Ong v. CA, G.R. No. 117103, 301 SCRA 387 (1999).
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Renato and Francia Ong boarded an Inland bus which was bumped from the rear by another bus owned and operated by Philtranco. As a result, petitioners sustained injuries. They
filed an action for damages against Philtranco and Inland. In their Complaint, they alleged that they suffered injuries preventing Francia from operating a sari-sari store where she derived a daily income of
P200; and Renato from continuing his work as an overseas contract worker (pipe welder) with a monthly salary of $690. They stated that they incurred P10,000 as medical and miscellaneous expenses.
They also claimed moral damages of P500,000 each, exemplary and corrective damages of P500,000 each, and compensatory damages of P500,000 each plus 35% thereof as attorney’s fees.
The trial court absolved Inland from any liability and ordered Philtranco to pay the petitioners P10,000 as actual damages for medical and miscellaneous expenses; P50,000 as compensatory damages for
the diminution of the use of the right arm of petitioner-wife; P48,000 as unrealized profit or income; P50,000 as moral damages. The CA ruled that Philtranco should be absolved from liability. It reduced
the liability of Inland for medical and miscellaneous expenses, as the evidence on record showed that the petitioners spent only P3,977. It disallowed the award for unearned income because Francia’s
testimony that the use of her right arm was diminished and that she lost income was self-serving. It also reduced the amount of moral damages to P30,000.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the court correctly disallowed the P50,000 awarded to Francia for the diminution of the use of her right arm
2. Whether the court correctly disallowed the P48,000 representing unrealized income
3. Whether the court correctly reduced the award for actual and miscellaneous expenses from P10,000 to P3,977.
4. Whether the court correctly reduced the award of P50,000 moral damages to P30,000
HELD:

1. Yes. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. However, physical injury, like loss or diminution of use of an arm
or a limb, is not a pecuniary loss. Indeed, it is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation. Thus, the usual practice is to award moral damages for physical injuries sustained.

2. Yes. In some instances, the Court awards the cost of medical procedures to restore the injured person to his or her former condition. However, this award necessitates expert testimony on the cost of
possible restorative medical procedure. Petitioner failed to present evidence regarding the feasibility or practicability and the cost of a restorative medical operation on her arm. Thus, there is no basis
to grant her P48,000 for such expense.

3. Yes. Although actual damages include indemnification for profits which the injured party failed to obtain (lucro cesante or lucrum cesans), the rule requires that said person produce the best evidence
of which his case is susceptible. The bare and unsubstantiated assertion of Francia that she usually earned P200 a day from her market stall is not the best evidence to prove her claim of unrealized
income for the eight-month period that her arm was in plaster cast. Her testimony that it was their lessor who filed their income tax returns and obtained business licenses for them does not justify her
failure to present more credible evidence of her income. Furthermore, after her ten-day confinement at the hospital, she could have returned to her work at the public market despite the plaster cast
on her right arm, since she claimed to have two nieces as helpers.

4. No, insofar as Francia is concerned. In the case at bar, it was sufficiently shown during the trial that Francia’s right arm could not function in a normal manner and that, as a result, she suffered mental
anguish and anxiety. Thus, an increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, from P30,000 to P50,000, appears to be reasonable and justified. Renato also suffered mental anxiety and anguish
from the accident. Thus, he should be separately awarded P30,000 as moral damages.

B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RECOVERY

157. Air France v. CA, 171 SCRA 399

Facts:
Private respondent Narciso Morales thru his representative, Ms. Janet Tolentino, purchased an airline ticket from Aspac Management Corporation, petitioner's General Sales Agent in Makati. The ticket
covered several cities. While in New York, U.S.A., private respondent obtained three medical certificates attesting to his ear infection which required medical treatment. After flying three times and arriving
at Copenhagen, he asked petitioner's office to shorten his trip by removing some of the cities in the itinerary. As a matter of procedure, confirmation of petitioner's office had to be secured before the route
could be shortened. Since there was no immediate reply, respondent flew to Hamburg where he was informed of petitioner's negative reply. Even after reiterating the need to have a shorter route, the
request was denied. Respondent, therfore, had to buy an entirely new set of tickets, paying in German marks for the homeward route.

​ Upon arrival in Manila, respondent sent a letter-complaint to Air France and filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages. The CFI found Air France in bad faith for violation of
the contract of carriage and an award of moral and exemplary damages in addition to actual damages was deemed proper. On appeal, the CA, only modified the damages. Petitioner questions the factual
findings of respondent court.
Issue:
Whether there is a breach of contract
Ruling:
Petitioner refutes this conclusion, claiming that the original ticket was discounted and non-endorsable on certain segments of the flight. A recurring ear infection was pleaded as reason necessitating
urgent return to Manila. Assuming arguendo a worsening pain or discomfort, private respondent appears to have still proceeded to four (4) other cities covering a period of at least six (6) days and leaving
open his date of departure from Hongkong to Manila.10 And, even if he claimed to have undergone medical examination upon arrival in Manila, no medical certificate was presented. He failed to even
remember his date of arrival in Manila. With a claim for a large amount of damages, the Court finds it unsual for respondent, a lawyer, to easily forget vital information to substantiate his plea. It is also
essential before an award of damages that the claimant must satisfactorily prove during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts
Air France Manila acted upon the advise of ASPAC in denying private respondent's request. There was no evident bad faith when it followed the advise not to authorize rerouting. At worst, the situation
can be considered a case of inadvertence on the part of ASPAC in not explaining the non-endorsable character of the ticket. Of importance, however, is the fact that private respondent is a lawyer, and the
restriction box 16 clearly indicated the non-endorsable character of the ticket.

158. Dichoso v. CA, 192 SCRA 169

Facts:
• Spouses Gaspar and Maria Beldad owned a 16 hectar parcel of land.
• When Gaspar died, his ½ protion of the land was divided into three among; Vivencia, Asuncion and Custadia.
• This is in accordance to the extrajudicial settlement.
• Vivencia sold a portion of his lot to Ernesto, who have been in actual possession of the lot.
• Asuncion sold to Ramos her share of the land, but in the deed, the lot sold by Asuncion is bigger than what she actually owns.
• Teodolfo Ramos took possession of the land upon its purchase.
• Dichoso on the otherhand claims that the disputed land is inside his property.
• There was an allegation that Teodoro seized the produce of the said land together with Constabulary soldiers. The cavans were owned by Dischoso’s tenant.
• Then, Dichoso also took away 6 cavans of rice from Teodolfoo’s land
• Teodolfo filed an action for quieting of title over the disputed land.
• The court decided in favour of Teodolfo.
Issue:
Whether or not the court was correct that Ramos is the owner of the disputed land.
Ruling:
It was found out that Vivencia ceded 1 hectare of land in favour of Asuncion. However, what was covered in the original certificate of title in accordance with the extrajudicial settlement agreement insofar
as Vivencia’s share, remains the same.
The area being claimed by Teodolfo went beyond the irrigation ditch. This is contrary to the technical description in the deed of sale in favour of Teodolfo.
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.
It is undisputed that the land in question yields an average of twenty (20) sacks of palay per planting and that it is planted to palay twice a year. Teodolfo's share of the harvest is only one-third (1/3). In
view of his dispossession from 1964 and the fact that Dischoso tenant has vacated the land that same year, Dischoso cannot allege that his tenant is entitled to his two-thirds (2/3) share.
159. PAL v. Miano, 242 SCRA 235
FACTS:
On August 31, 1988, private respondent took petitioner's flight PR 722, Mabuhay Class, bound for Frankfurt, Germany with an immediate onward connecting flight via Lufthansa flight LH 1452 to Vienna,
Austria.
At the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, he checked-in one brown suitcase weighing twenty (20) kilograms but did not declare a higher valuation. He claimed that his suitcase contained money,
documents, one Nikkon camera with zoom lens, suits, sweaters, shirts, pants, shoes, and other accessories.
Upon private respondent's arrival at Vienna via Lufthansa flight LH 1452, his checked-in baggage was missing. He reported the matter to the Lufthansa authorities. After three (3) hours of waiting in vain,
he proceeded to Piestany, Czechoslovakia. Eleven (11) days after or on September 11, 1988, his suitcase was delivered to him in his hotel in Piestany, Czechoslovakia. He claimed that because of the
delay in the delivery of his suitcase, he was forced to borrow money to buy some clothes, to pay $200.00 for the transportation of his baggage from Vienna to Piestany, and lost his Nikkon camera.
In November 1988, private respondent wrote to petitioner a letter demanding: (1) P10,000.00 cost of allegedly lost Nikkon camera; (2) $200.00 for alleged cost of transporting luggage from Vienna to
Piestany; and (3) P100,000.00 as damages. In its reply, petitioner informed private respondent that his letter was forwarded to its legal department for investigation. Private respondent felt his demand
letter was left unheeded. He instituted an action for Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 89-3496 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioner contested the complaint. It disclaimed any liability on
the ground that there was neither a report of mishandled baggage on flight PR 722 nor a tracer telex received from its Vienna Station. It, however, contended that if at all liable its obligation is limited by the
Warsaw Convention rate. Petitioner filed a Third-Party Complaint against Lufthansa German Airlines imputing the mishandling of private respondent's baggage, but was dismissed for its failure to
Warsaw Convention rate. Petitioner filed a Third-Party Complaint against Lufthansa German Airlines imputing the mishandling of private respondent's baggage, but was dismissed for its failure to
prosecute. In its decision, the trial court observed that petitioner's actuation was not attended by bad faith. Nevertheless, it awarded private respondent moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
hence this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages?
HOLDING & RATION DECIDENDI
YES. In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through same motive of interest
or ill will.
The trial court erred in awarding moral damages to private respondent. The established facts show that petitioner's late delivery of the baggage for eleven (11) days was not attended by ill will or bad faith.
In fact, it immediately coordinated with its Central Baggage Services to trace private respondent's suitcase and succeeded in finding it. At the hearing, petitioner's Manager for Administration of Airport
Services Department Miguel Ebio testified that their records disclosed that Manila, the originating station, did not receive any tracer telex. A tracer telex, an airline lingo, is an action of any station that the
airlines operate from whom a passenger may complain or have not received his baggage upon his arrival. It was reasonable to presume that the handling of the baggage was normal and regular. Upon
inquiry from their Frankfurt Station, it was however discovered that the interline tag of private respondent's baggage was accidentally taken off. According to Mr. Ebio, it was customary for destination
stations to hold a tagless baggage until properly identified. The tracer telex, which contained information on the baggage, is matched with the tagless luggage for identification. Without the tracer telex, the
color and the type of baggage are used as basis for the matching, thus, the delay.
We can neither sustain the award of exemplary damages. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner.
The award of attorney's fees must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to stand on. The fact that private respondent was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce his claim did not
justify the award of attorney's fees. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Petitioner is willing to pay the just claim of $200.00 as a result of the delay in the transportation of the luggage in accord with the Warsaw Convention. Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be
deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.

160. DBP v. CA, 284 SCRA 14

FACTS:
Lydia Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement from the Government. She obtained loans from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and as security, she executed two Deeds of
Assignment of her Leasehold Rights. However, Cuba failed to pay her loan. So, without foreclosure proceedings, whether judicial or extra-judicial, DBP appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the
fishpond. Thereafter, DBP executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in favor of Cuba but she failed to pay the amortizations. The conditional sale was rescinded and DBP took
possession of her Leasehold Rights.
Afterwards, DBP held a public bidding to dispose of the property which defendant Agripina Caperal was the highest bidder. DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of Caperal and she
was awarded a Fishpond Lease Agreement by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. Consequently, Cuba a complaint filed against DBP and Caperal with the RTC which sought, among others, the
declaration of nullity of DBP's appropriation of CUBA's leasehold rights over the fishpond and the recovery of damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.
As to damages, the trial court found out that the representatives of DBP ejected CUBA and her caretakers not only from the fishpond area but also from the adjoining big house; and that when CUBA's son
and caretaker went there, they found the said house unoccupied and destroyed and CUBA's personal belongings, machineries, equipment, tools, and other articles used in fishpond operation which were
kept in the house were missing. The missing items were valued at about P550,000. It further found that when CUBA and her men were ejected by DBP for the first time, CUBA had stocked the fishpond
with 250,000 pieces of bangus fish (milkfish), all of which died because the DBP representatives prevented CUBA's men from feeding the fish.
DBP assails the award of damages in favor of CUBA.
ISSUE:
WON Cuba is entitled to damages
RULING:
YES, but only moral and exemplary damages and not actual damages.
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount
of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts
which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
SC held that the alleged loss of personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence of
those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP, there was not inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a project which sometimes, if not
most often, is left to the care of other persons. Neither was a single receipt or record of acquisition presented.
Curiously, in her complaint dated May 1985, CUBA included losses of property as among the damages resulting from DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in September 1985 when her son
and a caretaker went to the fishpond and the adjoining house that she came to know of the alleged loss of several articles. Such claim for losses of property, having been made before knowledge of the
alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The alleged loss could have been a mere afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages.
With regard to the award representing the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus which died when DBP took possession of the fishpond, the same was not called for. Such loss was not duly
proved; besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until after the filing of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring to the attention of DBP the alleged loss.
The award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient basis.
In view, however, of DBP's act of appropriating CUBA's leasehold rights which was contrary to law and public policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry of Agriculture and Natural
Resources that it had foreclosed the mortgage, an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is in order conformably with Article 2219(10), in relation to Article 21, of the Civil Code. Exemplary or
corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. There being an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also
recoverable.

C. ACTUAL DAMAGES (ARTICLES 2199-2203; 2207, 2209)

Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred
to as actual or compensatory damages.

Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)

Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)

Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that
such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.

Article 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover
the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)

i. damnum emergens/lucrum cessans

ii. disability
iii. indemnity for death
iv. interest
v. Attorney’s Fees (Article 2208)

Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

161. PNOC Shipping v. CA, 358 Phil. 38 (1998).

161. PNOC Shipping v. CA, 358 Phil. 38 (1998).
FACTS: While the fishing boat "M/V MARIA EFIGENIA" owned by defendant was navigating in the vicinity of Batangas, on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker
"Petroparcel" causing the former to sink. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation and rendered a decision finding the cause of the accident to be the reckless and imprudent manner in
which Doruelo navigated the LSCO "Petroparcel" and declared the latter vessel at fault. LSCO "Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated by PNOC-STC and likewise Capt. Doruelo is still in their
employ. Defendant suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets, boat equipments and cargoes, which went down with the ship when it sank. After trial, the lower court ruled against PNOC-STC
and ordered to pay to defendant the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual damages is properly awarded.
RULING:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be
capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. The claimant is duty-bound
to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages as well as hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. Hence the awarded actual damages to private respondent in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases
therefor is not proper. However, considering the fact that: technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and this case has dragged on for almost
two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million in favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.

162. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, GR 189871, 13 August 2013

FACTS:
Dario Nacar filed a labor case against Gallery Frames and its owner Felipe Bordey, Jr. Nacar alleged that he was dismissed without cause by Gallery Frames on January 24, 1997. On October 15, 1998,
the Labor Arbiter (LA) found Gallery Frames guilty of illegal dismissal hence the Arbiter awarded Nacar P158, 919.92 in damages consisting of backwages and separation pay. Gallery Frames appealed all

the way to the Supreme Court (SC). The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the decision became final on May 27, 2002. After the finality of the SC decision, Nacar filed a motion
before the LA for recomputation as he alleged that his backwages should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal (January 24, 1997) until the finality of the SC decision (May 27, 2002) with
interest. The LA denied the motion as he ruled that the reckoning point of the computation should only be from the time Nacar was illegally dismissed (January 24, 1997) until the decision of the LA
(October 15, 1998). The LA reasoned that the said date should be the reckoning point because Nacar did not appeal hence as to him, that decision became final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter is correct.
RULING:
No. There are two parts of a decision when it comes to illegal dismissal cases (referring to cases where the dismissed employee wins, or loses but wins on appeal). The first part is the ruling that the
employee was illegally dismissed. This is immediately final even if the employer appeals – but will be reversed if employer wins on appeal. The second part is the ruling on the award of backwages and/or
separation pay. For backwages, it will be computed from the date of illegal dismissal until the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. But if the employer appeals, then the end date shall be extended until
the day when the appellate court’s decision shall become final. Hence, as a consequence, the liability of the employer, if he loses on appeal, will increase – this is just but a risk that the employer cannot
avoid when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter’s decision. This is also in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code.
Anent the issue of award of interest in the form of actual or compensatory damages, the Supreme Court ruled that the old case of Eastern Shipping Lines vs. CA is already modified by the promulgation of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Resolution No. 796 which lowered the legal rate of interest from 12% to 6%.

163. Francisco v. Co, GR. 151339 (January 31, 2006)

FACTS:

​Respondent Cos filed a complaint for accion publiciana against the heirs of one Pastora Baetiong, the registered owner of the subject parcel of land. Petitioner Francisco is the daughter of the
deceased. The parties entered into a compromise agreement acknowledging the heirs of Baetiong as the owner of the land and stating that the heirs would lease to the respondents a portion of the land
for a period of 15 years, including the portion the respondents were already occupying.

​5 years after, the heirs filed a motion for proper enforcement of compromise agreement when it was found out that the respondents were occupying a portion larger than that agreed upon. The
RTC granted the motion. The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling because the compromise was already terminated and executed. Moreover, the CA held that the heirs were precluded by laches from making
their claim because they were silent for almost 5 years.

​
Petitioner Francisco late filed a complaint for forcible entry against the respondent Cos. Respondent in turn contended that petitioner is already barred by res judicata. The trial court ruled in
favor of petitioner holding that there was no res judicata. The CA however, reversed the decision ruling that there was res judicata; therefore holding petitioner liable for P30,000 moral damages, P20,000
exemplary damages and P20,000 attorney’s fees due to malicious prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether the award of damages was proper
RULING:
The award of damages was not proper.
The court wont uphold the award of moral damages because bad faith of the petitioner had not been preponderantly established in this case. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence, but imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. Bad faith should be established by clear and convincing evidence since the law always presumed
good faith.
Neither should exemplary damages be awarded. The plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or actual damages before the court may consider the question of whether
exemplary damages should be awarded. For the court to award exemplary damage, it must be shown that the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Furthermore, exemplary
damages are allowed in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.

164. Marikina Autoline v. People, GR. 152040 (March 31, 2006).

Facts:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment while Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus. Suelto, its employee was
assigned as the regular driver of the bus. While driving the passenger bus, it suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon. The court ordered
Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineer’s Office, to inspect the damaged terrace, upon request of Valdellon. He recommended that since the structural members
made of concrete had been displaced, the terrace would have to be demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability of the building." Valdellon demanded payment
of P148,440.00, to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused. A criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property against Suelto was filed by Valdellon. Also, a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages was filed by Valdellon.
Issue:
Whether Suelto is guilty of the crime charged
Held:
Yes. Respondent People of the Philippines was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of
private respondent’s apartment. Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case and when he testified
in the trial court. Petitioners were burdened to prove that the damage was not due to Suelto’s fault. They failed to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted on an emergency. It is quite reasonable to
conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney. He could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he
noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less severe. By his own admission, Suelto
violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right; thus, he is presumed to be negligent under Article 2185 of the Civil Code.

165. Magbanua v. Junsay, G.R. No. 132659, 12 Feb. 2007

Facts:
Rosemarie Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in the residence of Pilar Junsay was charged as a co-accused with the crime of Robbery by making a hole on the lower portion of the kitchen’s door of
the house of Junsay, where the accused gained entrance robbed Valuables. Only petitioner Rosemarie was tried. Her co-accused, Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo, remain at large. The evidence
for accused [herein petitioner Rosemarie] more particularly the Medical Certificate and the testimony of the attending physician as well as the Decision of the NAPOLCOM finding the investigating officers
guilty has clearly establish (sic) the fact that accused was physically maltreated by the investigating officers in an attempt to force her to confess her participation in the robbery. RTC acquits Rosemarie.
7
Rosemarie, filed with the RTC, a Complaint for Damages against Respondent Pilar who was the employer of petitioner Rosemarie, and respondents Ibarra and Juanito who are members of the police
10
force. The Complaint, maintained that Rosemarie suffered physical pain and mental torture due to the filing of the false criminal charge against her. They sought moral and exemplary damages, including
11
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, as well as loss of earnings and expenses incurred in connection with Rosemarie’s defense in Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery. They similarly prayed for payment
of the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the instant case.
ISSUE:
Was there Malicious Prosecution which justifies payment of damages and attorney’s fees?
Held:
No. Malicious prosecution requires sinister design on the part of respondents to vex or humiliate Rosemarie and there is no proof of such fact. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to one,
who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings. At the risk of redundancy, we stress that the proscription against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate must not be violated.
Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The actuations of
respondents Ibarra and Juanito are not impelled by legal malice. Their commencement of the action against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused was pursuant to their duties as police officers. The
same was made subsequent to the report of respondent Pilar of the commission of the crime, and the investigation on the person of petitioner Rosemarie. Even then, mistakes committed by a public
officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith, which was not established in the case at bar. There is no Malicious
prosecution and payment of damages and attorney’s fees is unjustified.

166. Interest: Agner v. BPI Family Savings, GR 182963, (June 03, 2013) 

BSP Circular No. 799 series of 2013 

Facts:
Spouses Agner obtained a 800k loan from CITIMOTORS. Spouse executed a promissory not with chattel mortgage over a Mitsubishi vehicle in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract stated that the spouse
would make a monthly payment of 17k and that 65 interest per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each installment. The PN also stated that in case of failure to pay, the entire amount shall be due
and payable without need of prior notice or demand.
Citimotors assigned all its interests in the PN to ABN AMRO BANK, which assigned the same to BPI FAMILY.
Spouses defaulted in payment. Hence, BPI sent a demand letter to petitioners, declaring the entire obligation as due and demandable, and requiring them to pay 570k or surrender of the mortgaged
vehicle. As the demand was ignored, BPI filed an action for replevin and damages before the Manila RTC. A writ of Replevin was issued; however, the vehicle is not seized. The RTC and CA ruled for BPI.
Issue:
Whether the defendant is liable to the alternative prayer for sum of money
Ruling:
YES. The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars the exercise of the others. This limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal
property with option to buy by virtue of Art. 1485. The condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Art. 1485 was fulfilled in this
case by the filing by petitioner of the complaint for replevin to recover possession of movable property.
The vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners
The vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners
were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative
prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.

167. City Trust v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 141011 (July 19, 2001)
FACTS:
Isagani C. Villanueva opened a savings account and a current account with Citytrust Banking Corporation with an automatic transfer arrangement.VILLANUEVA deposited some money in his savings
account with the Bank's Branch in Makati. Realizing that he had run out of blank checks, VILLANUEVA requested a new checkbook. He then filled up a checkbook requisition slip with the obligatory
particulars, except for his current account number which he could not remember. He expressed his predicament to a lady customer service representative of the BANK, who in turn assured him that she
could supply the information from the BANKs account records. After signing the requisition slip, he gave it to her.Pia Rempillo, another customer service representative of the BANK, saw VILLANUEVAs
checkbook requisition slip. She took it and proceeded to check the BANKs checkbook registerPia Rempillo, another customer service representative of the BANK, saw VILLANUEVAs checkbook
requisition slip. She took it and proceeded to check the BANKs checkbook register. When VILLANUEVA received from the BANK his requested checkbook, he immediately signed Check No. 396701
bearing the amount of P50,000 payable to the order of Kingly Commodities Traders and Multi Resources, Inc.VILLANUEVA thereafter delivered the check to Helen Chu, his investment consultant at Kingly
Commodities, with his express instruction to use said check in placing a trading order at Kingly Commodities future trading business. Two days later, VILLANUEVA received a call from Helen Chu,
informing him that she had already placed a trading order in his behalf and delivered the check to Kingly Commodities. The check was deposited with the China Banking Corporation. The next day, he
deposited P31,600 in cash to his savings account to cover the full amount of the check he issued. His deposits in both accounts totalled P51,304.91.
However, on 23 June 1986, VILLANUEVAs Check No. 396701 was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and disparity in the signature. VILLANUEVA called Kingly Commodities and explained that
there was a mistake, on the same day, VILLANUEVA called up the BANKs Legaspi Village Branch Operations Manager, Maritess Gamboa, and inquired about the dishonor of his well-funded check. On 26
June 1986 at about 4:00 p.m., VILLANUEVA learned that his check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.He then proceeded to the BANKs Legaspi Village Branch Office, together with his
investment consultant and his trading partner, to personally inquire into the matter. They were met by Marilou Genuino, the BANKs Branch Manager. There he complained that his trading order was
rejected because of the dishonor of the check ,that day. After making the necessary investigation, Genuino related to VILLANUEVA that the reason for the dishonor of the check was that the account
number assigned to his new checkbook was the account number of another depositor also named Isagani Villanueva but with a different middle initial.
To resolve the matter, Genuino promised to send to Kingly Commodities a managers check for P50,000 before 5:30 p.m., the deadline given to VILLANUEVA. Thereafter Villanueva sent a letter to the
BANK addressed to the President, Jose Facundo, demanding indemnification for alleged losses and damages suffered by him as a result of the dishonor of his well-funded check. The trial court
conceded, however, that the BANK was negligent when it failed to supply VILLANUEVAs correct account number despite its promise to do so; but its negligence was merely contributory, which would have
reduced the damages recoverable by VILLANUEVA. VILLANUEVA appealed to the Court of Appeals, and claimed that the BANK was guilty of gross or culpable negligence amounting to bad faith when its
customer service representative furnished an erroneous account number. He further contended that the same was the proximate cause of the repeated dishonor of his check. He should, therefore, be
entitled to an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. However the appellate court affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Villanueva is entitled to his claim for damages.
RULING:
NO. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. [21] Although incapable
of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. [22] Thus, case law establishes the requisites for the award of
moral damages, viz: (1) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. [23]
It is beyond cavil that VILLANUEVA had sufficient funds for the check. Had his account number been correct, the check would not have been dishonored. Hence, we can say that VILLANUEVAs injury
arose from the dishonor of his well-funded check. We have already ruled that the dishonor of the check does not entitle him to compensatory damages. But, could the dishonor result in his alleged
intolerable physical inconvenience and discomfort, extreme humiliation, indignities, etc, which he had borne before his peers, trading partners and officers of Kingly Commodities? True, we find that under
the circumstances of this case, VILLANUEVA might have suffered some form of inconvenience and discomfort as a result of the dishonor of his check. However, the same could not have been so grave or
intolerable as he attempts to portray or impress upon us.

168. Spouses Ong v. CA, G.R. No. 117103 (January 21, 1999)
Facts:

1. Petitioners boarded Inland bus.

2. About 3:50 AM, when Inland bus slowed down to avoid a stalled cargo truck in it was bumped from the rear by another bus, owned and operated by Philtranco.
3. Petitioners suffered injuries. They were brought to the hospital and were confined there for 9 days.
4. Petitioners filed an action for damages against Philtranco and Inland for unearned income due to injuries sustained. They also claimed moral damages of P500,000 each, exemplary and
corrective damages of P500,000 each, and compensatory damages of P500,000 each plus 35% thereof as attorneys fees.

5. According to the trial court, the proximate cause of the accident was the bumping from behind by the Philtranco bus. It was held liable based on culpa aquiliana.
6. The RTC awarded the following:
10,000 for actual damages
50,000 as compensatory damages
48,000 as unrealized income
50,000 as moral damages
and attorneys fees

7. On appeal, however, the liability of Inland for medical and miscellaneous expenses was reduced, as the evidence on record showed that petitioners spent only P3,977. Deemed self-serving was
Francias testimony that the use of her right arm was diminished and that she lost income. Thus, the award for unearned income was disallowed and the amount of moral damages was reduced
to P30,000.
Issue:
Whether the reduction in the amounts of damages awarded was proper.
Held: Protesting the deletion of the award for Francia's unrealized income, petitioners contend that Francia's injuries and her oral testimony adequately support their claim. The Court disagrees. Although
actual damages include indemnification for profits which the injured party failed to obtain, the rule requires that said person produce the "best evidence of which his case is susceptible. The petitioners
failed to do so, as she could have returned to work despite the plaster in her arm.
The fundamental principle of the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of contract or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation, commensurate with the
loss sustained as a consequence of the defendant’s acts. Hence, actual pecuniary compensation is the general rule, except where the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.
Actual damages pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven.

Damages cannot be presumed. The award thereof must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and
nonsubstantial proof. Article 2199 of the Civil Code expressly mandates that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered
by him as he has duly proved.
The lack of basis for such award was patent as the record show, that petitioners have jointly spent the sum of P3,977.00.
Damages, after all, are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to present evidence regarding the feasibility or practicability and the cost of a restorative medical operation on her arm. Thus, there is no basis to grant her P48,000 for
such expense.

169. Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 124354 (December 29, 1999)

FACTS:
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after seeking professional medical help, was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). She was referred to Dr. Hosaka, a
surgeon, who agreed to perform the operation on her. Dr. Hosaka recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez, as anesthesiologist. Petitioner Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day before
the scheduled operation. Dr. Gutierrez informed Cruz that the operation might be delayed due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. When Dr. Hosaka arrived, Cruz was still in the operating room. While she
held the hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez utter: “ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.” Cruz noticed
a bluish discoloration of Erlindas nailbeds on her left hand. Cruz went out of the operating room to express her concern to petitioner Rogelio that Erlindas operation was not going well. Cruz quickly rushed
back to the operating room and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. Then in the afternoon, she saw Erlinda being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The doctors explained to
petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. She was released from the hospital only four months later. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in
comatose condition until she died. Petitioners filed a civil case for damages against private respondents. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the private respondents were negligent which caused the death of Ramos and thus, they are liable for damages.
RULING:
Yes, All of the private respondents were negligent and are solidarily liable for damages.
The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. The instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka. Private respondents were not able to disprove the
presumption of negligence and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because
he was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the
one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there
which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.

170. Industrial Insurance Co. v. Bondad, GR 136722 (April 12, 2000)

Facts:
While heading to Makati, the D.M. Transit Bus driven by Eduardo Diaz hit Bondad’s jeepney which was on full stop due to a flat tire. Due to the impact, the bus swerved to the left and collided with Grace
Morales’ car. Grace Morales and petitioner Industrial Insurance Co. sued DM Transit Corporation and Pablo and Ligorio Bondad for damages. IIC claimed that it paid Grace Morales for the damages to her
insured car. The Bondads denied responsibility and, in their Counterclaim, contended that petitioner had acted in bad faith in impleading them and that, contrary to its allegation, no prior demand had been
made upon them. The RTC exculpated the Bondads and ordered petitioner to pay them actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but reduced
the awarded damages.
Issue:
Issue:
WON the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees is proper.
Ruling:
Yes. Attorney's fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect one's interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission on
the part of the party from whom it is sought.
In this case, the records show that petitioner's suit against respondents was manifestly unjustified. In the first place, the contact between the vehicles of respondents and of Morales was completely due to
the impact of the onrushing bus.
In impleading respondents, petitioner clearly acted in wanton disregard of facts that were as obvious then as they are now. To repeat, even a cursory examination of the police investigation report and
other pertinent data at the time would show that there was no reason to implead respondents. The carelessness and lack of diligence of petitioner destroy its claim of good faith. Accordingly, the award of
attorney's fees should be sustained.
In the same vein, we affirm the award of moral damages. To sustain this award, it must be shown that (1) the claimant suffered injury, and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Likewise, we affirm the award of exemplary damages because petitioner's conduct needlessly dragged innocent bystanders into an unfounded litigation.

171. Pestano v. Spouses Sumayang, G.R. No. 139875 (Dec 4, 2000)

Facts:
Amanias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle with his friend Manuel Romagos when they were hit by a passenger bus driven by Gregorio Pestao and owned by Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation. Both
Amanias and Manuel died as a result of the incident. The heirs of Sumayag filed a civil action for damages against Pestao and Metro Cebu. The RTC ruled in their favor and ordered Pestao and Metro
Cebu to pay the heirs 30,000 pesos for death indemnity and other monetary award. The Court of Appeals modified the decision and raised the death indemnity to 50,000 pesos.
Issue:
WON the increase of the death indemnity was proper.
Ruling:
Yes. The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged at 3000 pesos based on Art. 2206 of the Civil Code. However, the amount has been gradually increased through the years
because of the declining value of our currency. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at 50,000 pesos.

172. Perena v. Zarate, GR 157917 (August 29, 2012)

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Teodoro and Nanette Pereña (Pereñas) were engaged in the business of transporting students. They employed Alfaro as the driver of their van. Respondent spouses Nicolas and
Teresita Zarate (Zarates) contracted the Pereñas to transport their son, Aaron, to and from Don Bosco in Makati. On the way to Don Bosco, a train hit the rear end of the van and the impact threw the
students in the rear, including Aaron, out of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, which dragged his body and severed his head, instantaneously killing him. The Zarates commenced an action for
damages against Alfaro, the Pereñas and PNR. The RTC ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay the Zarates P2,109,071 for the loss of earning capacity. The CA upheld the award for the loss
of Aaron’s earning capacity. The Pereñas submit that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity was speculative and unfounded.
ISSUE:
Was the indemnity for loss of Aaron’s earning capacity proper?
HELD:
Yes. Our law states that the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased shall be the liability of the guilty party in favor of the heirs of the deceased, and shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court "unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death.” Accordingly, the Court holds in favor of the
indemnification for Aaron’s loss of earning capacity despite him having been unemployed, because compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of time or earnings but for loss of the deceased’s
power or ability to earn money. The fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings should not be taken against his parents and in favor of the defendants whose negligence not only cost Aaron his
life and his right to work and earn money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence and his services as well.
The CA and the RTC were not speculating that Aaron would be some highly-paid professional, like a pilot, an engineer, a physician, or a lawyer. Instead, the computation of Aaron’s earning capacity was
premised on him being a lowly minimum wage earner despite his being then enrolled at a prestigious high school, a fact that would have likely ensured his success in his later years in life and at work.

D. MORAL DAMAGES (ARTICLES 2217-2220)

Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

Article 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be considered.

Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

173. Villanueva v. Salvador, GR. 139436 (January 25, 2006)

Facts: on December 20, 1991, respondents, the spouses Alejo Salvador and Virginia Salvador secured a loan from petitioner Ever Pawnshop, managed by co-petitioner Enrico Villanueva. On January 23,
1992, the Salvadors took out a second loan. The first pawnshop ticket indicated April 10, 1992 as the last day to redeem the jewelries pawned while the 2nd ticket fell on May 22, 1992.
The Salvadors failed to redeem the jewelry, but on June 1, 1992, their son paid the amount against the first loan partially. A new pawnshop ticket was given due to this. Ever Pawnshop agreed to the
extension of the maturity date to June 30, 1992, provided the Salvadors pay 20% of their second loan obligation on or before June 4, 1992. If they failed, the items would be auctioned as scheduled. On
July 1, 1992, the salvadors wanted to renew the second loan by tendering the 20% of the amount due thereon, only to be informed that the pledged jewelry had already been auctioned as scheduled on
June 4, 1992. A month after, Mrs. Salvador attempted to redeem the jewelry items pledged for the first loan, as renewed, but all she got in response were unclear information as to their whereabouts. On
August 7, 1992, Mr. Salvador tendered payment of the amount due on both loans, with a demand for the return of the jewelry thus pledged. Ever Pawnshop, however, refused to accept the tender.
On August 11, 1992, the Salvadors filed a complaint for damages against Villanueva and Ever Pawnshop arising from the sale without notice of the two sets of jewelry pledged as security of both loans.
Defendants averred that they reminded the Salvadors of the maturity dates and redemption period of their loans. They also alleged that there was the publication on June 4, 1992 in the Manila Bulletin.
The RTC ruled that the jewelry covered by the renewed first and second loans were sold without the necessary notice. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issues:

1) Whether valid notice of the sale was effected

2) Whether the award of moral damages was erroneous
Ruling:
1) Petitioner only caused publication of the auction in one newspaper and on the very day of the scheduled auction sale itself, instead of a week preceeding the sale as prescribed by Section 15 of P.D.

114. It defeats the purpose of the notice, which is to inform the pawner beforehand that a sale is to occur. ​
2) Moral damages cannot arise from simple negligence. While proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary to justify an award of moral damages, the amount of indemnity being left to the sound discretion of the
court, it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily proves the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant’s wrongful act or omission. This is so
because moral damages, albeit incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. There is thus merit on
petitioners’ assertion that proof of moral suffering must precede a moral damage award.
While there need not be a showing that the defendant acted in a wanton or malevolent manner, as this is a requirement for an award of exemplary damages, there must still be proof of fraudulent action or
bad faith for a claim for moral damages to succeed. Then, too, moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when bad faith supervenes and is proven
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or
interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of the fraud.16 And to the person claiming moral damages rests the onus of proving by convincing evidence the existence of bad faith, for good faith is
presumed

174. Morris vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 428 (2001).

Facts:

• Morris and Whittier had a series of business meetings with Japanese businessmen in Japan.
 • Staats Travel Service booked them as first class passengers.
• When they reached to the counter in the airport, they noticed that their papers were not being processed.
• There they found out that there were no seats available.
• Morris called Staats, Staats then confirmed their booking.
• The petitioners returned to the counter but the persons in-charge only ignored them.
• Petitioners went to the supervisor’s desk to check the flight manifest, they saw their names on top of the list of first class section had been crossed out.
• The supervisor said that he can no longer anything.
• Petitioners checked in at 3:10 and their flight was 3:50
• According to the Airline’s employee that the economy class was overbooked. Then the petitioners arrived 40 minutes before the flight and that the flight manifest was already closed. Since there
was overbooking, some passengers were upgraded to first class.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to damages.
Ruling:
In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Moral damages
are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when bad faith had been proven. However, the same damages may be recovered when breach of contract of carriage results in the death of a
passenger.
The award of exemplary damages has likewise no factual basis. It is a requisite that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner--circumstances which
are absent in this case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite element of compensatory damages was not present.
The rule is that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where (a) the mishap results in the death of a passenger and (b) it is proved that the
carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death does not result.
The petitioners arrived late, hence, the Airline employees were not in bad faith nor there was fraud.
They were denied to board the plane because they failed to check in on time.
Hence, they are not entitled to damages.

175. Francisco vs. Ferrer, Jr., 353 SCRA 261 (2001).

FACTS:
Mrs. Rebecca Lo and her daughter Annette Ferrer ordered a 3-layered cake from Fountainhead Bakeshop. It was agreed that the wedding cake shall be delivered at 5:00 in the afternoon on December
14, 1992 at the Cebu Country Club, Cebu City.
Plaintiffs made their full payment. • At 7:00 in the evening, the wedding cake has not arrived. Plaintiffs made a follow-up call and were informed that it was probably late because of the traffic.
At 8:00, plaintiffs were informed that no wedding cake will be delivered because the order slip got lost. They were then compelled to buy the only available cake at the Cebu Country Club which was a
sans rival.
At 10:00, a 2-layered wedding cake arrived. Plaintiffs declined to accept it.
Defendant Erlinda Francisco sent a letter of apology accompanied with a P5,000.00 check which was declined by plaintiffs. 2 weeks after the wedding, Francisco called Mrs. Lo and apologized. • Plaintiffs
filed an action for breach of contract with damages.
TC decided in favor of plaintiffs, directing defendant to pay the cost of the wedding cake, MORAL DAMAGES, attorney’s fees and the cost of litigation. • CA modified the award by increasing the MORAL
DAMAGES to P250,000.00 and awarding EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P100,000.00.

ISSUES:
W/N the CA erred in affirming the TC’s award of MORAL DAMAGES and increasing the amount from P30,000.00 to P250,000.00. W/N the CA was justified in awarding in addition to moral damages,
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P100,000.00. Petitioner- CA and TC erred in awarding moral damages because moral damages are recoverable in breach of contract cases only where the breach was
palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES. CA erred in awarding MORAL DAMAGES.
Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides: “To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.” • In
culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless
nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. Mere allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are insufficient to warrant an
award for moral damages.
An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second,
there must be culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219” of the Civil Code. • When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the
result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court judge or appellate court justices. • In this case, we find no such fraud or bad faith.
CA also erred in awarding EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
To warrant the award of exemplary damages, [t]he wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless or malevolent manner. • The requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimant’s right to them has been established; (2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to
the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
NOMINAL DAMAGES awarded.
The facts show that when confronted with their failure to deliver on the wedding day, petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake
could be delivered because the order slip got lost. For such prevarication, petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customer’s anxiety and
need of the hour. • Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where
there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.
Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered.
Petition granted. CA reversed. Petitioner order to pay the cost of the wedding cake, nominal damages of P10,000.00, attorney’s fees and the costs of litigation.

176. Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical, GR 141994, 17 Jan 2005.

FACTS:
Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Rima and Alegre. It is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI). In the morning of 14 and 15
December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC) and
its administrators.
Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre.
The trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court ordered said defendants to pay plaintiff Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College
of Medicine, jointly and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 moral damages, plus P30,000.00 reimbursement of attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
CA affirmed the trial court's judgment with modification holding Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. Hence, FBNI filed this petition.
FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a corporation.
ISSUE:
WON AMEC is entitled to moral damages
RULING:
YES.
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental
anguish or moral shock.
Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of
defamation and claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation
of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous
per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

177. Montinola v. PAL, GR 198656, 8 September 2014

FACTS:
Montinola was employed as a flight attendant of PAL. Montinola and other flight crew members were subjected to custom searches in Honolulu USA. PAL, found Montinola guilty of Violations of the
company’s Code of Discipline and Government Regulation. She was meted with suspension for one year without pay. Montinola brought the matter before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter found her
suspension illegal, finding that PAL never presented evidence that showed Montinola as the one responsible for any of the illegally taken airline items. The Labor Arbiter ordered Montinola’s reinstatement
with back wages, moral damages and exemplary damages, which was affirmed by NLRC and CA however, the CA modified the award in that the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees to private respondent are deleted.
ISSUE:
Whether Montinola’s illegal suspension entitled her to an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
RULING:
Montinola is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. She is also entitled to attorney’s fees. Illegally suspended employees, similar to illegally dismissed employees, are entitled to moral damages when
their suspension was attended by bad faith or fraud, oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. PAL’s actions in implicating Montinola and penalizing her
for no clear reason show bad faith. PAL’s denial of her request to clarify the charges against her shows its intent to do a wrongful act for moral obliquity. If it were acting in good faith, it would have
gathered more evidence from its contact in Honolulu or from other employees before it started pointing fingers.
178. Meyr Enterprises v. Cordero, GR 197336, September 03, 2014
FACTS:
Plaintiff Meyr Enterprises Corporation filed a Complaint for Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against Rolando Cordero. Meyr is the owner of a parcel of land and
alleged that defendant Cordero constructed a dike in front of his land causing damages.
Cordero averred that the construction of the dike began through the authority of the Local Government. He added that the alleged are lies because the dike does not encroach on the plaintiff’s land.
Cordero argued that under no circumstances will plaintiff suffer any damage or injury therefrom. Defendant Cordero that the property caretaker of the plaintiff hired several workers and clandestinely
quarried the white sand and finger gravel along the shore of their land. As a result, the Sangguniang Bayan of Guinsiliban, Camiguin approved Resolution No. 44 informing Mr. Paul Rodriguez to stop
quarrying finger gravel.
Cordero averred that in order to restore the damage caused by the quarrying, he sought assistance from the local government in constructing a dike. He contended that the construction thereof should be
charged to the plaintiff, as it is the proximate cause of the damage. He postulated that plaintiff filed the baseless suit against him because Meyr wanted to acquire his land. He likewise prayed for moral
damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint of the plaintiff. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s Decision with the CA, but the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision.
RULING:
The term ‘malicious prosecution’ has been defined as ‘an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and
without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. Plaintiff’s actions were filed with the intention to vex, humiliate, and annoy the
defendant-appellee. The alleged wrongdoing of defendant-appellee was a product of mere speculations and conjectures, which are unsubstantiated by fact, law and equity. Its baseless accusations,
extremely prejudiced the defendant causing the latter to suffer moral damages.
Such act is also contrary to the conduct of a person who must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
More importantly, a person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.

179. Olivarez Realty v. Castillo, GR 196251, July 09, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner Olivarez Realty Corporation and respondent Benjamin Castillo executed a deed of conditional sale over a parcel of land owned by the latter and also claimed by the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). The parties agreed that the price shall be paid in installments, that petitioner shall file an action against the PTA and pay disturbance compensation to tenants of the property and that respondent
shall be responsible for clearing the tenants.
Petitioner however failed to fulfill his end of the agreement; neither paying sufficient down payment, commencing an action against the PTA nor paying the disturbance compensation. Respondent
therefore filed an action to rescind the contracts and a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and ruled in favor of the respondent. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner corporation is liable for damages
RULING:
Petitioner Olivarez Realty Corporation is liable for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Respondent Castillo is entitled to moral damages because of the evident bad faith exhibited by petitioner in dealing with him. He suffered much prejudice due to the failure of petitioner to pay him the
balance of purchase price which he expected to use for his needs which caused him wounded feelings, sorrow, mental anxiety and sleepless nights. More than 6 years had elapsed and petitioner illegally
and unfairly failed and refused to pay their legal obligations to respondent, unjustly taking advantage of a poor uneducated man like the respondent causing much sorrow and financial difficulties.
Respondent is also entitled to P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent to other parties to a contract to religiously comply with their prestations under the contract. In contracts,
exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Considering that petitioner refused to satisfy respondent’s plainly valid, just, and demandable claim, the award of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees is in order.

180. Mendoza v. Gomez, GR 160110, June 18, 2014

Facts:
A collision between an Isuzu Truck and a Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus) occurred which caused an extensive damage to the Isuzu truck and physical injuries to Antenojenes Perez, driver of
the truck as well as the helpers. The truck is owned by Leonora J. Gomez while the bus is registered under the name of Elvira Lim and driven by Mariano C. Mendoza. According to PO1 Rosales, the bus,
while traversing the opposite lane, intruded on the lane occupied by the truck. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez who
had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-called "kabit system." Respondents then impleaded both Lim and Enriquez. The RTC found Mendoza liable
for direct personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and it also found Lim vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the same Code. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision with modification.
Issues:
1.) Whether Mendoza was negligent
2.) Whether Lim is vicariously liable
Held:
1.) Yes. As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was negligent in driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane
intended for the Isuzu truck. Having encroached on the opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly in violation of traffic laws. Article2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendoza’s violation of traffic laws was the
proximate cause of the harm. The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu truck was in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been flagged down by a security guard. The
mishap occurred when the Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast speed as shown by the impact of the collision, and going in the opposite direction as that of the Isuzu truck, encroached on the lane rightfully
occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused the latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and considerably damaging the Isuzu truck.
2.) Yes. Jurisprudence provides that the registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. Also,
the Court ruled that in so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of
such owner. Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds
primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right
to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

181. Arco Pulp & Paper v. Lim, GR 206806, June 25, 2014
FACTS:
Dan T. Lim does business of supplying raw materials, under the name Quality Paper and Plastic Products. he delivered scrap papers to Arco Pulp and Paper Company, Inc. The parties agreed that Arco
Pulp and Paper would either pay Dan T. Lim the value of the raw materials or deliver to him their finished products of equivalent value. When he delivered the raw materials, Arco Pulp and Paper issued a
post-dated check that was later dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. On the same day, Arco Pulp and Paper and a certain Eric Sy executed a memorandum of agreement where Arco
Pulp and Paper bound themselves to deliver their finished products to Megapack Container Corporation, owned by Eric Sy, for his account. According to the memorandum, the raw materials would be
supplied by Dan T. Lim, through his company, Quality Paper and Plastic Products. Lim sent a letter to Arco Pulp and Paper demanding payment of the amount, but no payment was made to him. Lim filed
a complaint for collection of sum of money with prayer for attachment with the Regional Trial Court. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ordering Arco Pulp and Paper to jointly and severally pay Dan
T. Lim the amount he demanded with interest at 12% per annum from the time of demand; moral damages; exemplary damages; and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Whether moral damages can be awarded
RULING:
Yes.
Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract where the breach is due to fraud or bad faith,
Further, the following requisites must be proven for the recovery of moral damages:
An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1)first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second,
there must be culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Here, the injury suffered by respondent is the loss of money from his business. This has remained unpaid since 2007.
This injury undoubtedly was caused by petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s act of refusing to pay its obligations. When the obligation became due and demandable, Arco Pulp and Paper not only issued an
unfunded check but also entered into a contract with a third person in an effort to evade its liability. This proves the third requirement. As to the fourth requisite, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that
instances where moral damages may be awarded, but Article 2219, is not an exhaustive list of the instances where moral damages may be recovered since it only specifies, among others, Article 21.
When a party reneges on his or her obligations arising from contracts in bad faith, the act is not only contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy; it is also a violation of Article 1159. Breaches of
contract become the basis of moral damages, not only under Article 2220, but also under Articles 19 and 20 in relation to Article 1159. Moral damages, however, are not recoverable on the mere breach of
the contract. Article 2220 requires that the breach be done fraudulently or in bad faith. Since a finding of bad faith is generally premised on the intent of the doer, it requires an examination of the
circumstances in each case. When petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper issued a check in partial payment of its obligation to respondent, it was presumably with the knowledge that it was being drawn against a
closed account. Worse, it attempted to shift their obligations to a third person without the consent of respondent. Petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s actions clearly show "a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Moral damages may, therefore, be awarded.



182. Expertravel & Tours v. CA, G.R. No. 130030 (June 25, 1999). 

Facts:
October 7, 1987: Exper travel & Tours, Inc. issued to Ricardo Lo 4 round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong with hotel accommodations and transfers for P39,677.20
Failing to pay the amount due, Expert filed a complaint for recovery plus damages
CA affirmed RTC: Lo remitted the Monte de Piedad Check for P42,175.20 to Expert's chairperson Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega who in turn issued City Trust Check of P50,000
Issue:
Whether moral damages for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result to physical injury be awarded to Lo
HELD:
NO.
An award of moral damages would necessitate certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2)
second, there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth,
the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 in culpa contractual or breach of contract:moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was
guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical
injuries
By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code
moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict and contracts when breached by tort
(a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort. In culpa criminal moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of
physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages The
term "analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law
Excludes clearly unfounded civil suit

183. Francisco v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 142029 (February 28, 2001).

183. Francisco v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 142029 (February 28, 2001).
FACTS:
Mrs. Rebecca Lo and her daughter Annette Ferrer ordered a 3-layered cake from Fountainhead Bakeshop. It was agreed that the wedding cake shall be delivered at 5:00 in the afternoon on December
14, 1992 at the Cebu Country Club, Cebu City. Plaintiffs made their full payment.At 7:00 in the evening, the wedding cake had still not arrived yet. Plaintiffs made a follow-up call and were informed that it
was probably late because of the traffic. At 8:00, plaintiffs were informed that no wedding cake will be delivered because the order slip got lost. They were then compelled to buy the only available cake at
the Cebu Country Club which was a sans-rival cake. At 10:00, a 2-layered wedding cake arrived. Plaintiffs declined to accept it. Defendant Erlinda Francisco sent a letter of apology accompanied with a
P5,000.00 check which was declined by plaintiffs. 2 weeks after the wedding, Francisco called Mrs. Lo and apologized. Plaintiffs filed an action for breach of contract with damages. TC decided in favor of
plaintiffs, directing defendant to pay the cost of the wedding cake, MORAL DAMAGES, attorney’s fees and the cost of litigation. CA modified the award by increasing the MORAL DAMAGES to
P250,000.00 and awarding EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P100,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an award of nominal damage would be proper in the case at bar.
RULING:
Yes. The facts show that when confronted with their failure to deliver on the wedding day the wedding cake ordered and paid for, petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed
because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got lost. For such prevarication, petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or
inattention to their customer's anxiety and need of the hour.
"Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a
breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.'" Nominal damages may be awarded "to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered."

184. Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 124354 (December 29, 1999).

Facts:

1. Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman and was as normal as any other woman except that she had occasional pains caused by gallstones.
2. She was advised to undergo a surgery to remove the gallstones. Diagnostic tests revealed that she was fit to undergo surgery.
3. They hired Dr. Osaka to conduct the surgery at DLSMC.
4. Upon the request of Rogelio (husband), Dr. Osaka assured them that he would find a good anesthesiologist.
5. During the operation, Dr. Osaka arrived at the hospital late, Dr. Guttierez, the anesthesiologist, started to intubate Erlinda when Herminda (sister in law) heard her say that intubating Erlinda is
complicated and quite difficult.

6. Another anesthesiologist was summoned, Dr. Caldron, who successfully intubated Erlina. The patient’s nails became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position.
7. After the operation Erlinda had gone to coma and suffered brain damage.
Issue:
Whether the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the comatose condition of Ramos.
Held:
Yes. Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition.

Here, the Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence
and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because
he was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the
one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there
which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
It must be remembered that she was neurologically sound and fit prior to the surgery. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!
The Supreme Court recognized that the husband and the children, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patients illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned
their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long-term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. The familys moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real
one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.

185. Industrial Insurance Co. v. Bondad, GR 136722 (April 12, 2000).

FACTS:
There is an incident which involved three vehicles: a Galant Sigma car driven by Grace Ladaw Morales, a packed passenger jeepney originally driven by Ligorio Bondad, and a DM Transit Bus driven by
Eduardo Mendoza. According to the Police Report, the bus was along South Expressway going towards Makati. Upon reaching a certain point, the bus bumped the rear left side portion of Bondad’s
jeepney which was then at stop position due to flat tire. Due to severe impact caused by the bus it swerved to the left and collided with the right side portion of another vehicle Morales’s car which was
travelling in the same direction taking the innermost lane. The car was dragged to the left side and hit the concrete wall. All vehicles incurred damages and injuries were sustained by the occupants of the
jeepney and passengers of the bus. Victims were brought to the hospital for treatment.
In the RTC, the insurance company and the driver of the car filed a complaint for damages against the bus company and the owner and driver of the jeepney. Bondad answered that their vehicle was on
stop because of flat tire. It was the bus which hit the car. It averred that the insurance company acted in bad faith in impleading them. RTC ordered the insurance company to pay moral damages which
was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the award of Moral Damages to the jeepney driver/owner is proper.
RULING:
Yes. No person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith. Absence of good faith in the present case is shown by the fact that
petitioner clearly has no cause of action against respondents but it recklessly filed suit anyway and wantonly pursued pointless appeals, thereby causing the latter to spend valuable time, money and effort
in unnecessarily defending themselves, incurring damages in the process.
In impleading respondents, petitioner clearly acted in wanton disregard of facts that were as obvious then as they are now. To repeat, even a cursory examination of the police investigation report and
other pertinent data at the time would show that there was no reason to implead respondents. The carelessness and lack of diligence of petitioner destroy its claim of good faith. Accordingly, the award of
attorneys fees and moral damages should be sustained.

186. Calalas v. CA, G.R. No. 122039 (May 31, 2000).

Facts:
Eliza Sunga rode a jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was full, Sunga was given an extension seat, a wooden stool at the rear end of the jeepney. While at a stop
to let a passenger off, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the jeepney causing severe injuries to Sunga. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third party complaint against Salva. The RTC, taking cognizance of another case filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, rendered judgment
against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage and ordered Calalas to pay
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Issue:
WON the award of moral damages is excessive and without basis in law.
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in
which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.

187. Cocoland Dev’t v. NLRC, GR 98458 (July 17, 1996), 328 Phil. 351.
Facts:
Jeremias Magno was employed by Cocoland as field supervisor. Sometime in 1989 , Cocoland came to know that Magno was rendering professional services to outside parties without its consent and
disclosing the company’s trade secrets to small farm owners. As a result , Magno was terminated for loss of trust and confidence. Magno filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in his favor and ordered Cocoland to pay separation pay , backwages , moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees . The NLRC affirmed the decision.
Issue:
WON the grant of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
Ruling:
No. The fact that Magno was wrongfully dismissed by Cocoland without valid cause does not automatically mean Cocoland is liable for moral and exemplary damages. Additional facts must be pleaded
and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages. It must be proved that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud or was oppressive to labor or done in a manner contrary to morals , good
customs or public policy and that social humiliation , wounded feelings and grave anxiety resulted therefrom. Magno failed to adduce evidence to show that Cocoland acted in bad faith or in a wanton or
fraudulent manner in dismissing him.

E. NOMINAL DAMAGES (ARTICLES 2221-2223)

Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.

Article 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and
assigns.
188. China Airlines v. CA, GR 129988 (14 July 2003), 406 SCRA 113.
FACTS:
Morelia Travel Agency booked private respondents’ flight with China Airlines Ltd. (CAL). On discovering that Morelia charged higher rates than American Express Travel Service Philippines (Amexco),
private respondents dropped the services of Morelia. Instead, they engaged the services of Amexco. Private respondent Lao gave to Amexco the booking reference number that CAL had previously
issued to Morelia. Amexco used the booking reference number in confirming the reservations of private respondents. CAL confirmed the booking. Amexco then issued to private respondents the confirmed
tickets for the flight. On the same day, CAL called up Morelia to reconfirm the reservations of private respondents. Morelia cancelled the reservations of private respondents.
Private respondents were at the airport to board their flight but a CAL personnel prevented them from boarding the plane because their names were not in the passengers’ manifest. CAL cancelled the
reservations when Morelia revoked the booking it had made for private respondents. Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against CAL and Amexco. The RTC and CA did not award actual
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether actual damages should be awarded
HELD:
No. Private respondents are not entitled to an award of actual damages because they did not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. The Supreme Court, however, awarded nominal damages to each
of the private respondents. When plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an award of actual damages, the court may award nominal damages. The court may award nominal
damages purely to vindicate a right of a plaintiff which defendant has violated and not to indemnify any loss the plaintiff has suffered. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising
from any source enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, or in any case where there is an invasion of any property right.
Undeniably, private respondents suffered some form of injury. CAL confirmed the reservations of private respondents carelessly. Private respondents relied on this confirmation. Private respondents went
through the trouble of going to the airport at the appointed time expecting that they would be able to board the flight. To their consternation, CAL personnel prevented them from boarding because Morelia
cancelled their reservations.

189. Mercury Drug v. Serrano, GR 160509 (March 10, 2006).

Facts:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation employed respondent Zenaida G. Serrano as one of Mercury Recto-Soler Branch's pharmacy assistants. Petitioner alleged that Serrano was pocketing money from
the payment of a customer and was confronted, to which she wrote a resignation letter. Her resignation was not accepted. Instead, mercury issued a notice on 11 January 2002 requesting Serrano to
appear before the Investigation Committee. She was found guilty of dishonesty.
Mercury sent Serrano a letter dated 18 March 1992 terminating her employment effective 19 March 1992. On 25 March 1992, Serrano filed with the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a
complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and non-payment of benefits against Mercury. She claims that after serving other customers, the customer whose payment she pocketed could no
longer be found. Since she was busy, she claimed she forgot about the payment.
The Labor Arbiter rendered the decision finding illegal the dismissal of Serrano. That the allegations against her were fabricated and that she was framed. Furthermore, Mercury suffered no loss because
Serrano did not take any property belonging to Mercury. The Labor Arbiter stressed that there was no basis to presume that Serrano had no more intention of remitting the P120 paid by the customer, for
in fact Serrano did remit the amount to the cashier. The Labor Arbiter also held that Mercury did not observe due process in dismissing Serrano. Mercury did not give Serrano ample opportunity to be
heard and defend herself before she was dismissed.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint of Serrano for lack of merit. Serrano went to the Court of Appeals for relief. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
NLRC and upheld the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals found that the evidence against Serrano were insubstantial and unreliable to find her guilty of pocketing the P120 payment. The
Court of Appeals also ruled that Mercury denied Serrano of due process before terminating her. While Mercury gave Serrano a notice of termination, it did not give any written notice informing Serrano of
the specific charge against her.
Issues:
1) Whether there was sufficient ground for the termination of the employment
2) Whether Serrano was denied of due process when she was terminated
Ruling:
1) The petition is partly meritorious. Serrano’s act of pocketing the payment and handing it to the cashier only after the customer returned to the branch gave Mercury reasonable ground to believe, if not
entertain the moral conviction, that Serrano is guilty of dishonesty. This made her unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on her by Mercury. Further, the evidence for the qualified theft charge,
establishing probable cause after the preliminary investigation, constitutes just cause for Serrano’s termination based on loss of trust and confidence.
2) In this case, Mercury failed to satisfy the two-notice requirement. Mercury admits it did not issue the first notice. However, Mercury argues that if the purpose of the first notice was achieved despite the
absence of the first notice, and the employee was given a chance to air his side before his termination, there is due process. Mercury’s violation of Serrano’s right to statutory due process warrants the
payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Accordingly, the
Court deems the amount of P30,000 sufficient as nominal damages.

190. Locsin v. Hizon, GR 204369, September 17, 2014

Facts:

• Enriquita Locsin was the registered owner of a lot at Don Antonio Heights Subdivision.
• She filed an ejectment case against Billy Aceron.
• Aceron was able to comply with his part of the compromise agreement but Locsin was unaware of such when she went to USA.
• Locsin continued to pay the real property taxes of the subject property.
• Locsin lost the copy of the TCT of the subject lot and she was able to obtain a new one.
• When she asked her lawyer to check the status of the lot, she found out that the new TCT was cancelled by Bolos and was able to secure a new one.
• Bolos then sold it to Bernardo, which was titled under Carlos’ name.
• Bernardo then filed a motion for issuance of the Writ of execution for the enforcement of the compromise agreement.
• And that the property was occupied and up for sale.
• Locsin asked Carlos to return the lot since her signature in the deed of sale was a forgery.
• Carlos said that they will come up with a win-win situation, however Carlos has already sold it to his sister and brother-in-law (Spouses Guevara)
• Spouses Guevara then mortgaged it with DCC to obtain a loan.
• Locsin then filed an action for reconveyance and cancellation of the TCT obtained by the Guevaras.
• RTC: Dimissed the case
• CA: Locsin cannot recover the lot.
Issue:
Whether or not Locsin is entitled to the land in dispute.
Ruling:
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price atthe time of the purchase or
before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.
According to the Mirror Doctrine Every person dealing with registered land may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued and is not obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. The following are the exceptions:
1. The party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.
2. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
Carlos is not an innocent purchaser for value. Bernardo was Carlos’ agent. Bernardo negotiated with Bolos. Hence, the principal is chargeable and bound by the knowledge of or notice to, his agent.
Bernardo knew about Locsin and the Compromise agreement.
The Spouses Guevara are not innocent purchasers. They were not able to present adequate evidence for such.
Locsin is entitled to nominal danages. nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of
any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. that petitioner was unduly deprived of her ownership rights
overthe property, and was compelled to litigate for its recovery, for almost ten (10) years.
The amount of damages to be awarded shall be determined by the court depending upon the relevant circumstances. Considering the length of time that Locsin was deprived of her property she is entitled
to P75,000.00 as nominal damages.

191. Deoferio v. Intel Technology, GR 202996, June 18, 2014

FACTS:
Planintiff Marlo Deoferio was an employee of Intel. He was assigned to the US for two years but was not able to complete his assignment. He was repatriated to the Philippines after being hospitalized and
diagnosed to suffer from depression and hallucinations.
Deoferio underwent a series of medical and psychiatric treatment and everything was paid for by Intel. Later on, Deoferio was diagnosed to have schizophrenia. After several consultations, Dr. Lee issued
a psychiatric report dated January 17,2006 concluding and stating that Deoferio’s psychotic symptoms are not curable within a period of six months and "will negatively affect his work and social relation
with his co-worker[s]." Pursuant to these findings, Intel issued Deoferio a notice of termination on March 10, 2006.
Plaintiff failed an illegal dismissal case contending that he was not properly notified and Intel violated his statutory right to procedural due process. The respondent argued that the dismissal was based on
the findings of the psychiatrist and that continued employment of the plaintiff would be detrimental to its operation. The respondents further asserted that the twin-notice requirement in dismissals does not
apply to terminations under Article 284 of the Labor Code.
LA found in favor of the respondent. NLRC also affirmed the LA. CA affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUES:
ISSUES:
Whether the twin-notice requirement in dismissals applies to terminations due to disease
Whether Deoferio is entitled to nominal damages for violation of his right to statutory procedural due proces
Whether the respondents are solidarily liable to Deoferio for nominal damages.
Whether Deoferio is entitled to salary differential, backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
HOLDING AND RATIO DECIDENDI:
Petition is partly meritorious.
Intel had an authorized cause to dismiss Deoferio from employment. Concomitant to the employer’s right to freely select and engage an employee is the employer’s right to discharge the employee for just
and/or authorized causes. To validly effect terminations of employment, the discharge must be for a valid cause in the manner required by law. In the current case, we agree with the CA that Dr. Lee’s
psychiatric report substantially proves that Deoferio was suffering from schizophrenia, that his disease was not curable within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment, and that his
continued employment would be prejudicial to his mental health. This conclusion is further substantiated by the unusual and bizarre acts that Deoferio committed while at Intel’s employ.
The Labor Code and its IRR are silent on the procedural due process required in terminations due to disease. Despite the seeming gap in the law, Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the IRR expressly states
that the employee should be afforded procedural due process in all cases of dismissals.

Intel’s violation of Deoferio’s right to statutory procedural due process warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. With respect to Article 284 of the Labor Code, terminations due
to disease do not entail any wrongdoing on the part of the employee. It also does not purely involve the employer’s willful and voluntary exercise of management prerogative – a function associated with
the employer's inherent right to control and effectively manage its enterprise. Rather, terminations due to disease are occasioned by matters generally beyond the worker and the employer's control.
In fixing the amount of nominal damages whose determination is addressed to our sound discretion, the Court should take into account several factors surrounding the case, such as: (1) the employer’s
financial, medical, and/or moral assistance to the sick employee; (2) the flexibility and leeway that the employer allowed the sick employee in performing his duties while attending to his medical needs; (3)
the employer’s grant of other termination benefits in favor of the employee; and (4) whether there was a bona fide attempt on the part of the employer to comply with the twin-notice requirement as
opposed to giving no notice at all.
Intel shall be solely liable to Deoferio for the satisfaction of nominal damages. Wentling, as a corporate officer, cannot be held liable for acts done in his official capacity because a corporation, by legal
fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and members. There is also no ground for piercing the veil of corporate fiction because Wentling acted in good faith and
merely relied on Dr. Lee’s psychiatric report in carrying out the dismissal.
Deoferio's claim for salary differential is already barred by prescription. Under Article 291 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within three years
from the time the cause of action accrued. In the current case, more than four years have elapsed from the pre-termination of his assignment to the United States until the filing of his complaint against the
respondents.

192. Cojuangco v. CA. GR 119398 (July 2, 1999)

FACTS:
Petitioner Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first,
second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms.
Petitioner sent letters of demand to the private respondents for the collection of the prizes due him. And private respondents consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Thus, a case was filed before the RTC of Manila.
The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman, Respondent Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of
petitioner. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. It thus ordered the PCSO and
Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Carrascoso may be held liable to pay damages to petitioner
RULING:
YES, but only nominal damages.
SC did not believe that bad faith characterized the questioned acts of respondent Carrascoso. The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts
done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. The trial court's award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted, as ruled by
the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, SC agrees with the petitioner and the trial court that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 (6) of the Civil Code. Under this article, it is not necessary that the public
officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
one's duties.
SC held that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal
basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of
any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the
prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not
for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded. The amount of such damages is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken into account.
SC ordered private respondent Carrascoso Jr. to pay petitioner Cojuangco nominal damages in the amount of P50,000.

193. Industrial Timber v. Ababon, GR 164518 (January 25, 2006).

FACTS:
Industrial Plywood Group Corporation (IPGC) is the owner of a plywood plant, leased to Industrial Timber Corporation (ITC) for a period of five years. Thereafter, ITC commenced operation of the plywood
plant and hired 387 workers. ITC notified DOLE and its workers that it will undergo a "no plant operation" due to lack of raw materials and will resume only after it can secure logs for milling. Meanwhile,
IPGC notified ITC of the expiration of the lease contract and its intention not to renew the same. ITC notified the DOLE and its workers of the plant’s shutdown due to the non-renewal of anti-pollution
permit that expired. This prompted Ababon, et al. to file a complaint against ITC and IPGC for illegal dismissal and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether Ababon, et al. are entitled to separation pay, backwages, and other monetary awards.
RULING:
In these consolidated cases, we find that ITC’s closure or cessation of business was done in good faith and for valid reasons and that it was due to causes beyond its control, the conclusion is inevitable
that said closure is valid. The records reveal that the decision to permanently close business operations was arrived at after a suspension of operation for several months precipitated by lack of raw
materials used for milling operations, the expiration of the anti-pollution permit, and the termination of the lease contract with IPGC over the plywood plant. Consequently, Ababon, et al. could not have
been illegally dismissed to be entitled to full backwages. However, they are entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In light of the factual circumstances of the cases at bar, we deem it wise and reasonable to award P50,000.00 to each employee as nominal damages.

F. TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES (ARTICLES 2224-2225)

Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.

Article 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.

194. Victory Liner v. Gammad, GR 159636 (November 25, 2004).

FACTS:
Marie Grace Gammad was a passenger of petitioner’s bus when it fell on a ravine, which resulted to her death. Hence, heirs of the deceased Marie Grace filed a case for damages against Victory Liner,
Inc. for breach of contract of carriage. Rosalito Gammad, husband of deceased, completed his testimony and was scheduled for cross-examination. However, counsel of petitioner failed to appear even
after a reschedule, and thus the court deemed the petitioner to have waived cross-examination. The petitioner’s counsel also failed to appear at the presentation of evidence. The court already deemed
the case submitted for resolution when it received belatedly the telegram of petitioner’s counsel requesting for postponement.
ISSUE:
Is the award of damages proper?
RULING:
Yes, nevertheless the award of damages should be modified. Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206, holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger
liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2) indemnity for loss of earning capacity, and (3) moral damages.
In the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled to indemnity for the death of Marie Grace which under current jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.00.
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceased’s earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in the
amount of P500, 000.00 should be awarded to respondents. Under Article 2224, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.

195. Premiere Dev’t Bank v. CA, GR 159352 (April 14, 2004).

FACTS:
Panacor, a new company, acquired an exclusive distributorship of Colgate Palmolive products which required an initial inventory level of P7.5M. Panacor applied for a P4.1M loan with petitioner Premiere
Development bank but was rejected; the latter however suggested that Panacor’s affiliate Arizona should apply instead and thereafter make the proceeds available to Panacor since Arizona was already
an existing client. Arizona was granted a P6.1M loan secured by a real estate mortgage against a parcel of land. Since only P2.7M of the P6.1M was given to Panacor, Panacor negotiated a take-out loan
with Iba Finance Corporation in the sum of P10M. Of the P10M, P7.5M will be used to will be released to take out the loan from Premiere Bank while P2.5M will be used by Panacor.
Iba Finance informed Premiere Development of the take out loan and requested the release of the TCT of the land mortgaged. Premiere however refused to release the documents explaining that full
payment of all outstanding loan obligations was required. Panacor and Arizona thereafter executed a promissory note of P7.5M in favor of Premiere to settle the outstanding loan, but Premiere did not yet
release the TCT. Without the TCT, Iba Finance cannot release the loan to Panacor.
Panacor was not able to generate the required capital, so the exclusive distributorship agreement with Colgate was eventually terminated. As a result, Panacor and Arizona filed a complaint in the RTC for
specific performance and damages against Premiere Bank.
The RTC ruled in favor of Panacor and ordered Premiere to pay actual damages of P4.5M plus legal interest, exemplary damages of P1M, attorney’s fees of P100k and costs of suit. The CA affirmed the
RTC ruling but reduced the award of exemplary damages to P500k.
ISSUE:
Whether the award of damages was proper
RULING:
The award of P4.5M actual damages is not proper but the sum of P200K as temperate damages is reasonable.
The award of actual damages is not proper because the amount was solely based on the testimony of Panacor’s vice president, without support from independent evidence. Damages cannot be
presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts that form basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. In determining actual damages, the court
cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.
cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.
Even if not recoverable as compensatory damages, Panacor may still be awarded damages in the concept of temperate or moderate damages. When the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but the amount cannot be proved with certainty from the nature of the case, temperate damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the
case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.
The wrongful acts of Premier Banks adversely affected the commercial credit of Panacor, and greatly contributed to, if not decisively caused the premature stoppage of its business and the consequent
loss of business opportunity. Since the losses are not susceptible to pecuniary estimation, temperate damages may be awarded.
Article 2216 of the Civil Code provides that no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. The assessment of such
damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the Court, according to the circumstances of each case.

196. Josefa v. Meralco, GR 182705, July 18, 2014

Facts:
A dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a vehicular accident. As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden electricity post, 3 75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line attachments were damaged.
Upon investigation, Meralco discovered that it was a truck registered in Josefa's name that hit the electricity post. Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement cost of the electricity
post and its attachments, but Josefa refused to pay. Thus, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the truck driver, for damages before the RTC. In its complaint, Meralco alleged that (Bautista) Manoco's
reckless driving resulted in damage to its properties. It also imputed primary liability on Josefa for his alleged negligence in the selection and supervision of Manoco. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. The RTC held that Meralco failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The RTC ruled that SPO2 Galang's account of the accident was merely hearsay
since he did not personally witness the incident. It also did not give probative value to the police blotter entry dated January 7, 1994 since the accident had long occurred in 1991. The CA reversed the
RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred in disregarding the parties' stipulation at the pre-trial that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also found that Bautista was Josefa's employee when
the accident occurred since Josefa did not specifically deny this material allegation in the amended complaint. It likewise noted that the sheriff's return stated that Bautista was under Josefa's employ until
1993. The CA concluded that the fact that the truck hit the electricity post was sufficient to hold Josefa vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista was negligent in driving the truck. In the same
breath, the CA also stated that the employer's presumptive liability in quasi-delicts was anchored on injuries caused by the employee's negligence. Even assuming that Bautista was not Josefa's
employee, the CA maintained that Josefa would still be liable for damages since the law presumes that the registered owner has control of his vehicle and its driver at the time of the accident. It thus
ordered Josefa to pay Meralco. Josefa filed the present petition after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration.
Issues:

1.) Whether Bautista exercised due diligence in driving when the truck hit the electricity post
2.) Whether Josefa is vicariously liable for Bautista's negligence under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Held:
1.) No. Bautista's negligence was the proximate cause of the property damage caused to Meralco. Bautista is presumed to be negligent in driving the truck under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. This fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict.
2.) Yes. Paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the employer vicariously liable for damages caused by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks shall be applied. In quasi-
delict cases, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of law. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused while the vehicle was being driven on highways or streets. Also, Josefa failed to show that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bautista.

197. Adriano v. Lasala, GR 197842, October 09, 2013

FACTS:
In order to protect and secure its premises against illegal acts directed at unit owners, officers and personnel, petitioner entered into a security service contract with respondents for a period of one year.
respondents received a letter signed by petitioner, the building administrator, reminding them of their non-compliance with the security services agreement, among which were the failure to assign security
guards with the required height and educational attainment, and the failure to provide the agreed service vehicle. Respondents dutifully complied, yet they received another letter and showed up in another
meeting where Adriano requested from respondents the payment of P18,000.00, of which P5,000 would be given to petitioner Emmanuel Santos, the LT300 President; P3,000.00 to Captain Perez; and
the rest to Adriano himself. These payments were requested in return for acting as the bridge in resolving the issues. The respondents came across, but the petitioners demanded another equivalent
amount in another meeting in November. Thereafter, a series of correspondence between the parties took place, with the petitioners constantly reiterating respondents’ alleged violations of the service
contract. In the last letter, they added another grievance – non- payment of the minimum wage. In an attempt to finally settle the issues, respondents sought audience before the LT300 Board but to no
avail. The Board, without giving respondents an opportunity to explain, terminated the contract as voted upon in another meeting. respondents filed a complaint for damages alleging that LT300 and
Adriano illegally terminated their services.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioners are liable for Temperate damages.
Held:
YES. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, when pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered.
Temperate damages maybe allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss.
Indisputably, respondents in this case suffered pecuniary loss because of the untimely termination of their services for no cause at all. As there is no proof capable of ascertaining the actual loss, the CA
rightfully awarded temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. The Court finds the amount of P200,000.00 by way of temperate damages as just and reasonable.

G. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES (ARTICLES 2226-2228) 


Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.

Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.

Article 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of
damages, and not the stipulation.

198. Azcuna v. CA, GR 116665 (March 20, 1996) 


Facts:
Under a one (1) year lease contract commencing on July 1, 1992 and ending on June 30, 1993 but renewable upon agreement, herein petitioner Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied three (3) units (C, E and
F) of the building owned by private respondent Barcelonas family. Came expiration date of the lease without an agreed renewal thereof and coupled by petitioners failure to surrender the leased units
despite private respondents demands, private respondent filed before the Municipal Trial Court an ejectment case against petitioner. Judgment of that inferior court, affirmed in its entirety by the Regional
Trial Court and herein public respondent Court of Appeals on subsequent appeals taken by petitioner, favored private respondent. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Ernesto E. Barcelona,
ordering the defendant Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr to pay 25,000.00 monthly as rental, P3,000.00 per day, by way of damages for his failure to turn over peacefully the three units, sum of P5,000.00 by way
of attorneys fees; and the cost of this suit.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the municipal trial courts award of P3,000.00 per day as damages
Ruling:
NO. Petitioners reliance on such doctrine that the only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real
property and that other damages must be claimed in an ordinary action is misplaced, inasmuch as the Felesilda, Shoemart and Hualam cases dealt with additional damages and charges other than
liquidated damages, defined as x x x those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof. Here, the municipal trial court, in making the P3,000.00 per day award, was
merely enforcing what was stipulated upon in black and white by private respondent-lessor and petitioner-lessee appearing in paragraph 10 of the lease contract which reads:
That after the termination of the lease, the LESSEE shall peaceably deliver to the LESSOR the leased premises vacant and unencumbered and in good tenantable conditions minus the ordinary wear and
tear. In case the LESSEEs failure or inability to do so, LESSOR has the right to charge the LESSEE P1,000.00 per day as damages without prejudice to other remedies which LESSOR is entitled in the
premise. (Italics supplied)
This is clearly an agreement for liquidated damages - entitling private respondent to claim a stipulated amount by way of damages (correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were three [3] units being
leased by petitioner) over and above other damages still legally due him, i.e., the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the property as provided for in Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The
freedom of the contracting parties to make stipulations in their contract provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is so settled, and the Court finds nothing
immoral or illegal with the indemnity/ penalty clause of the lease contract (paragraph 10) which does not appear to have been forced upon or fraudulently foisted on petitioner. Petitioner cannot now evade
further liability for liquidated damages, for after entering into such an agreement, petitioner cannot thereafter turn his back on his word with a plea that on him was inflicted a penalty shocking to the
conscience and impressed with iniquity as to call for the relief sought on the part of a judicial tribunal.

199. Radiowealth Finance v. Del Rosario, GR 138739 (July 6, 2000).

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note for P138,948 without need of notice or
demand, in instalments of P11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months leaving the period for the instalments blank. Upon default, the late payment, 2.5% penalty charge per month shall be added to
each unpaid installment from due date thereof until fully paid. Radiowealth filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. During the trial, Jasmer
Famatico, the credit and collection officer of Radiowealth, presented in evidence the Spouses’ check payments, the demand letter dated July 12, 1991, Spouses’ customer’s ledger card, another demand
letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of these pieces of documentary evidence, which had
merely been endorsed to him. Spouses filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action, and the RTC Dismissed for Radiowealth’s failure to substantiate the claims, the evidence it had
presented being merely hearsay. But the CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the obligation is due and demandable
RULING:
Yes. The act of leaving blank the due date of the first installment did NOT necessarily mean that the debtors were allowed to pay as and when they could. While the specific date on which each
installment would be due was left blank, the Note clearly provided that each installment should be payable each month. It also provided for an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, both of which
showed the intention of the parties that the installments should be paid at a definite date. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month after the date of the Note because the check
representing their first installment bounced.
Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be imposed for being unconscionable. Such damages should also be deemed included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty. Furthermore, we hold that
petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees, but only in a sum equal to 10 percent of the amount due which we deem reasonable under the proven facts.

H. EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES (ARTICLES 2229-2234)

Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.

Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages
may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Article 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void.

200. Makabali v. CA, GR L-46877 (January 22, 1988).

Facts:

1. Makabali, the petitioner, had just graduated from Med School was given a trip to Hongkong as a graduation gift.
2. The petitioners met with the private respondent Baron Travel Corporation to inquire about their Hongkong Package offering.

3. petitioners were assured that they would be going with a group of thirteen [13] other travelers to be led by a tour guide and a representative of private respondent, Mr. Arsenio Rosal would see
them off at the Manila International Airport to give them final instructions. Petitioners were also promised that they would be lodged at the President Hotel in Hongkong

4. These promises and representations convinced the petitioners to purchase the Hongkong package tour offered by private respondent.
5. On departure, however, they met neither the respondent nor the representative.
6. Inside the plane, they met Mr. Arsenio Rosal who, to their embarrassment, protested that he was not a tour guide but a business executive and who was going to Hongkong as a paying
passenger.

7. In Hongkong nobody met petitioners at the airport. And they had also learned from Presidential Hotel that it had no accomodations for them. Much to their embarrassment, they had to join
another tour group and had to pay for all expenses.

8. They claimed they had restless and sleepless nights caused by great worry that their limited budget may not be enough for hotel bills, this coupled with public humiliation and mental anguish.
9. They filed action for moral and exemplary damages, amounting to 30,000 and 6,000 respectively.
10. CFI rendered judgment in their favor but awarded 500 for moral and exemplary damages.
11. On appeal, CA increased the award to 5,000 as moral and exemplary damages.
12. Unsatisfied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in awarding the petitioners the pitiful sum of 5,000 as moral and exemplary damages.
Held:
To begin with, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. Article 2217 of
the Civil Code recognizes that moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be
5
recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded
According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent acted in wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These pronouncements lay the basis and justification for this Court to award petitioners moral
and exemplary damages.
The amount of P5,000.00 is minimal compared to the sufferings and embarrassment of petitioners who left Manila with high spirits and excitement hoping to enjoy their first trip to a foreign land only to be
met with uncertainties and humiliations.
SC increased the amount of moral and exemplary damages to 35,000.

201. People v. Catubig, GR 137842 (August 23, 2001).

FACTS:
Danilo Catubig y Horio, was charged with the crime of rape. When arraigned, accused Catubig, represented by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged; forthwith, trial ensued. The
accused denied the accusation against him. He claimed that the rape charge was brought about only because of the ill-will between him and his wife and daughter Dannilyn, on the other hand, following a
quarrel. On Nov 27, 1997, he asseverated, he had fought with his wife, hitting her and his daughter. His wife then threatened him that it was the last time that she would allow him to harm her and that he
would regret what he did. True to her foreboding, the next day, he was arrested and a complaint for rape was filed against him. The Court held accused Danilo Catubig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and to pay private
complainant Dannilyn Catubig the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether exemplary damages should be awarded.
RULING:
Yes. As to the award of damages, the trial court has correctly awarded P50,000.00 moral damages, an award that rests on the jural foundation that the crime of rape necessarily brings with it shame,
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation to the offended party. In addition, the offended party deserves to receive the amount of P50,000.00 civil indemnity, the
equivalent of compensatory damages, and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
Under Article 2229 of the NCC, Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime serves to increase the penalty (the criminal liability aspect), as well as to justify an award of exemplary or corrective damages
(the civil liability aspect), moored on the greater perversity of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony such as may be shown by (1) the motivating power itself, (2) the place of commission,
(3) the means and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5) the personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party or both. There are various types of aggravating circumstances, among them, the
ordinary and the qualifying. Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

202. Trans-Asia v. CA, GR 118126 (March 4, 1996).

Facts:
Atty. Renato Arroyo, bought tickets from Trans-Asia for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de Oro City from Cebu City. As he was boarding the vessel, he noticed that repairs were being
made on the engine. The vessel departed late with only one engine running. After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island. After half an hour of stillness, some passengers
demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City for they were no longer willing to continue their voyage to, Cagayan de Oro City. The captain acceded and headed back to Cebu. There, Atty.
Arroyo and other passengers were given ten minutes to disembark. Thereafter, the vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Atty. Arroyo boarded M/V Asia Japan the next day for its voyage to Cagayan
de Oro. He then filed a complaint for damages against Trans-Asia based on breach of contract and tort.
The RTC ruled that the action was only for breach of contract and dismissed the case holding that there is no fraud, negligence, or malice on the part of Trans-Asia. The CA reversed the trial court's
decision and awarded moral exemplary damages, holding that in sailing to Cagayan de Oro City with only one engine and with full knowledge of the true condition of the vessel, acted in bad faith.
Issue:
WON the award of exemplary damages is proper.
Ruling:
Yes. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In contracts and quasi-contracts,
exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. It cannot, however, be considered as a matter of right; the court having to
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. Before the court may consider an award for exemplary damages, the plaintiff must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages; but it is not necessary that he prove the monetary value thereof.
In allowing its unseaworthy M/V Asia Thailand to leave the port of origin and undertake the contracted voyage, with full awareness that it was exposed to perils of the sea, it deliberately disregarded its
solemn duty to exercise extraordinary diligence and obviously acted with bad faith and in a wanton and reckless manner.

203. Q.C. Gov’t v. Dacara, GR 150304 (June 15, 2005).

Facts:
Fulgencio Dacara Jr. was driving his father’s Toyota Corolla when he rammed into a pile of earth found at Matahimik Street, Quezon City. The area is being repaire by the city government. As a result ,
Dacara Jr. sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage. Fulgencio Dacara Sr. filed for and inbehalf of his minor son, a complaint for damages against the Quezon City Government
for its failure to exercise due care and diligence by not installing preventive warning devices. The RTC granted actual compensatory , moral and exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision.
Issue:
WON the award of exemplary damages is proper.
Ruling:
Yes. In cases of quasi-delicts , exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons pr
property. In this case, the city government failed to show the modicum of responsibility and care expected of them by their constituents. The facts show a complete disregard of the Quezon City
government of any adverse consequences of their failure to install even a single warning device. The streets were also dimly lit making the need for adequate precautionary measures even greater. By
carrying on the road diggings without any warning or barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Because of this gross negligence, the award of exemplary damage is
carrying on the road diggings without any warning or barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Because of this gross negligence, the award of exemplary damage is
justified.

204. Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 124354 (December 29, 1999).

FACTS:
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was scheduled for cholecystectomy operation on June 17, 1985 at 9 A.M. Dr. Hosaka, the surgeon arrived 3 hours late. Dr. Gutierriez, the anesthesiologist, improperly intubated
Erlinda causing Erlinda’s stomach to bloat and her nail beds to become bluish. Erlinda was then placed in a Trendelenburg position – a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower
than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient’s brain. Erlinda was taken to the Intensive Care Unit. Dr. Hosaka informed Rogelio 2 days later that something
went wrong during the intubation. Since the day she was operated, she had been in comatose condition. She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for 4-5 minutes.
Petitioners filed a case for damages against private respondents Dr. Hosaka, Dr Gutierriez and Delos Santos Medical Center. The court ordered the respondents to pay jointly and severally the petitioners
actual, moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether exemplary damages can be awarded
HELD:
Yes. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. The Supreme Court, in this case, awarded, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 each.

I. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES (ARTICLES 1192, 2203-2204, 2214-2215)

Article 1192. In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If it cannot be determined which of the parties first
violated the contract, the same shall be deemed extinguished, and each shall bear his own damages. (n)

Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.

Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.

Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances
other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.

205. Malaysian Airlines v. CA, 156 SCRA 321

Facts:
Beginning 1979 private respondent was recruited by petitioner as a pilot for two years because of his training and experience from Philippine Airlines. On April 12, 1981, the plane he was driving landed at
Bintulo Airport, and all the tires burst, which caused alarm but no injuries. He was found negligent by the investigating board and dismissed by the petitioner. Private respondent sought relief from the
malaysian courts but no avail. He brought the suit in the regional trial court of manila but petitioner moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. The case then proceeded to trial on the
merits. After hearing, it was held that the private respondent was not guilty of negligence and that the accident was due not to his violation of the MAS manual of instructions but to a defect in the rigging of
the brake control valve and the failure of the ground crew to properly maintain the aircraft. The court also found that the petitioner had acted in bad faith in persuading the private respondent into signing
the renewal of the contract submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the Malaysian courts and that his dismissal was prompted by a letter-complaint signed by Filipino and Indonesian pilots, including
himself, protesting their discrimination in pay and benefits by MAS. On appeal, the respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether private respondent was guilty of negligence
Ruling:
The court affirmed the factual findings of the respondent court and the lower court, there being no sufficient showing that the said courts committed reversible error in reaching such conclusions. The court,
however, did not agree with the award of damages for being out of hand. The respondent court affirmed the original award of damages in the staggering amount of more than P8,000,000.00. It is only fair
that it be lowered to a realistic and judicious level that will, in our view, be just to both the petitioner and the private respondent.
The complaint prayed for payment of unpaid salaries from July 1981 to July 1982 which corresponds to the periods of the renewed contract. On the basis of his monthly salary of Malaysian $4,025.00, or
P33,568.50 (at the current Central Bank conversion rate of P8.34 for every Malaysian $1.00), Ms total unearned salaries will be P402,822.00. To this should be added the amount of P123,098.40 as
allowance for the same period of one year at the rate of $1,230.00 per month plus P80,000.00, representing his expenses in transferring his family to the Philippines, amounting to an aggregate sum of
P605,920.40 in actual damages. The moral and exemplary damages, while concededly due, are reduced to P500,000.00 and the attorney's fees to the fixed sum of P25,000.00. All the other awards are
disauthorized.

206. Bricktown v. Amor Tierra, 239 SCRA 126

Facts:

• Bricktown represented by its president Velarde, executed 2 contracts to sell in favour of Amor Tierra Develpment Corporation.
• It pertains to 96 residential lots sold to Amor Tierra.
• However, Amor Tierra was not able to pay its obligations on the agreed dates.
• It only paid more than one million pesos compared to the total selling price of more than 21 million.
• Bricktown then sent Amor Tierra a notice of cancellation of contract for the latter continuous failure to pay.
• Several months later, Amor Tierra demanded the refund of its payments to Bricktown plus interest.
• RTC: Declared the contract to have been rescinded and ordered Bricktown to refund the payments made by Amor Tierra plus interest.
• CA: Affirmed
Issue:
Whether the amounts already remitted by Amor Tierra were rightly forfeited by Bricktown.
Ruling:
It will be unconscionable to sanction Bricktown. It is not equitable to impose interest from the time of the judicial demand, for, Amor Tierra should not be allowed to totally free itself from its own breach.
The contract was validly rescinded and Bricktown must refund the amount of P1,334,443.21 plus 12% interest per annum to commence only upon the finality of the decision.

207. Lim v. CA, GR 125817 (January 16, 2002).

FACTS:
Respondent purchased a jeepney but did not transfer the registration to his name and continued to use the franchise of the former owner under the kabit system. Sometime in 1990, the passenger
jeepney collided with a truck owned by Abelardo Lim. The latter took responsibility of the accident and paid for the damages sustained by the passengers of the jeepney.
Abelardo Lim also offered to compensate the private respondent but the latter did not accept the offer because he wants something bigger. For the meantime, the respondent left the car idle while waiting
for the settlement of the case.
Respondent filed a claim for damages against the Petitioner. In his answer Lim denied liability by contending that he exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees. He further
asserted that as the jeepney was registered in Vallartas name, it was Vallarta and not private respondent who was the real party in interest. For his part, petitioner Gunnaban averred that the accident was
a fortuitous event which was beyond. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Gonzales and ordered Lim to pay P236,000 to restore his jeepney to its original condition. The CA sustained the
decision of the RTC.
According to petitioners, to recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real party in interest and to countenance his claim for damages is utterly subversive of public policy. Petitioners further
contend that inasmuch as the passenger jeepney was purchased by private respondent for only P30,000.00, an award of P236,000.00 is inconceivably large and would amount to unjust enrichment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Kabit System bars the person who actual owns the vehicle from recovering damages.
HOLDING AND RATIO DECIDENDI:
The kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the
kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy
therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved. In light of the foregoing, it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage
caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on his business.

In awarding damages for tortuous injury, it becomes the sole design of the courts to provide for adequate compensation by putting the plaintiff in the same financial position he was in prior to the tort. It is a
fundamental principle in the law on damages that a defendant cannot be held liable in damages for more than the actual loss which he has inflicted and that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than the just
and adequate compensation for the injury suffered. His recovery is, in the absence of circumstances giving rise to an allowance of punitive damages, limited to a fair compensation for the harm done. The
law will not put him in a position better than where he should be in had not the wrong happened.
Petitioners are at best reminded that indemnification for damages comprehends not only the value of the loss suffered but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. In other words,
indemnification for damages is not limited to damnum emergens or actual loss but extends to lucrum cessans or the amount of profit lost.

One last word. We have observed that private respondent left his passenger jeepney by the roadside at the mercy of the elements. Article 2203 of the Civil Code exhorts parties suffering from loss or
injury to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. However, in the case at hand Petitioner did not provide evidence as to
how much would have been saved if the respondent took care of the vehicle.

208. Sanitary Laundry v. CA, GR 119092 (December 10, 1998)

FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several others. The
accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was the driver. The Regional Trial Court of Makati found petitioner's driver
to be responsible for the vehicular accident and accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorney’s fees. Its decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Hence, this petition for review with the SC.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents are entitled to damages
RULING:
YES. But SC modified the award of damages.
SC found no reversible error committed in the award of actual damages to private respondents. The actual damages claimed by private respondents were duly supported by receipts and appear to have
been really incurred. As to the moral damages awarded, SC found them to be reasonable and necessary in view of the circumstances of this case. The award of to the heirs of Jason Bernabe as death
indemnity is likewise in accordance with law.
However, the award of P100,000 to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy, denominated in the decision of the trial court as moral damages and unearned income cannot be upheld. The heirs were already
included among those awarded moral damages. Marilyn Salunoy was ordered to be paid P10,000, Jack Salunoy, P10,000, and their mother Nenita Salunoy, P20,000, as moral damages. The amount of
P100,000 was presumably awarded primarily for loss of earning capacity but even then the amount must be modified. In accordance with our cases on this question, the formula for determining the life
expectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be determined by applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46 years of age at the time of his death, as stated in
his death certificate, then his life expectancy was 22.6 years, or up to 68 years old.
Next, his net earnings must be computed. At the time of his death, Dalmacio Salunoy was earning more than P900.00 a month as bookkeeper at the PMCI so that his annual gross earnings was about
P11,000.00. From this amount, about 50% should be deducted as reasonable and necessary living expenses because it seems his wife occasionally finds work and thus helps in the household expenses.
Based on the foregoing, his net earning capacity was P124,300.00 computed as follows:
net earning life
capacity (x) = expectancy x [Gross annual income less reasonable & necessary living expenses]
x = [2 (80-46)] x [P11,000 - P5,500]

​ 3
= 22.6 x 5,500
= P124,300.00
In addition, the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should be paid P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
The decision of the CA was MODIFIED by SC in the sense that the award of P100,000.00 denominated for moral damages and unearned income was deleted, and in lieu thereof the amount of
P124,300.00 for loss of earning capacity and the further amount of P50,000.00 for death indemnity are awarded to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy.