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G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely:
FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL
MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N.
ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano,
Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment
and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the
Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and
the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and
Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents)
filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by
petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the
respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent
Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the
petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as
against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of
summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and
matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed
by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because
there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.1
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their
motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the
issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting
for the trial proper.
In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the
15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On
July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on
July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late.5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.6
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the
Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their
notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final
order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were
well within the reglementary period for appeal. 7
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled
that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998
or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under
the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection
of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and
effectively renders the judgment final and executory.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This
was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
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In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe
the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES
WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO,
EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON.
ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF
TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE
COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY
27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12,
1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY
OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY
22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.9
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners
should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the
often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. 10 The period to appeal is fixed by both
statute and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for
appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x
xx
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where
a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to
it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or
it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.12
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the
February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their
copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice
of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the
start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal ¾ the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
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In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13
the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon
receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When
the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus
motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for
having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the
dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under
the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted
the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v.
Haldeman et al.14 where we again considered the order denying petitioner
Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the order
dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order
contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on
time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days fromnotice of judgment or final
order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal
period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead
opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.15 It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal,
had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of
denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the
Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of
the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this
rule in similar cases,16 premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of
an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error,
the judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed
by law.18
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the
adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice
of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for
new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the
period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that
in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.19
(emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30
days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations
of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’
etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal 21 and enhance the
efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of
this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices
of appeal,22 and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of
justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of
Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial
system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on
occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the
right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint
of technicalities.
In dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require
litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party
due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.
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In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy
appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations
that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities
were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and
effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases
where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear
need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the
courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the
full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.25
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing
appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 27 4328 and 45,29 the
Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. 30
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying
their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15
days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1,
1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of
cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and
the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a partyopts to file a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-
day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment (March
3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse
of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as
already discussed.34
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v.
IAC35 since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this
case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS,
respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal
filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private
respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in
the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for
payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee
but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral
Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an
overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of
Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over
the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in
the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported
to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence
submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an
employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996,
or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-
employee relationship between him and petitioner.4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned
decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence the
present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is
now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic
practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with
respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that
find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years
into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the
Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of
that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in
the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions
were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately,
to the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated
therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment for program and policy coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now,
Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the
decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has
since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for
appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last
amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the
Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of
the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of
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Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial
review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court,
the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now
fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously,
although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already
have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held
that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule
65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129
originally provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments
of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders
issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No.
7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments
of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials
or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless
extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower
appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9
of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:
 Page | 7
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and
replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to
conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to
paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now
provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial
agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose
and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of
the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action
limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction
and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications
of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically
referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would
necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not
lie from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally
construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals,
but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the
Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the
aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have
intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades
us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the
said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did
intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases
by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the
intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently
arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of
Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee
Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his
sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its
jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was
expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but
also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1
of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual
issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be
derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the "decisions and
interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme
Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the
 Page | 8
exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the
coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce
the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of
the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review
by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice
Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the
Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which
present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact
and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly
devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its
mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the
guarantor of the people's basic rights and additional task expressly
vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It
has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand
we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the
appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of
cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we
have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the
support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee
Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings
transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes
clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will still be
appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted.
This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this
was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was
passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on
third reading followed. 21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No.
1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court
earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto
and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial
review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them,
 Page | 9
however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special
civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and
the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert,
the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill
No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the
opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in
the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the
proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized,
that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to
the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the
evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings
of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed,
modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the
axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be
reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will
reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be
dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a
growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier
of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for
resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is
procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its
component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for
expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to
labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared
to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for
the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in
accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in
the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated
by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only
because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition
consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the
issue of whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction
over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it
 Page | 10
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the
consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections,1
this Court ruled in the negative because of the absence of any specific conferment
upon the COMELEC, either by the constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction
to issue such extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction or the legal power to hear
and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law, whether
the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since these two classes of jursdiction
are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred by law. One does not
flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state that in the
Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by
Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Although the Constitution
grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to
exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
unlike the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in
Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrines laid down in
Pimentel vs. COMELEC2 — that neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred
jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs — still finds application under the
1987 Constitution.
In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this Court
reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.
In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the
affirmative view of the issue, citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29
July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg.
697, which reads:
Sec. 50. Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involving election
cases.
The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. He contends that while the COMELEC's position is inherently
compelling, it deserves scant consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria
and the nature and purpose of B. P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the
Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a temporary statute
which self-destructed after such election.
The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and
undisputed.
In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private
respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the
municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the
winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in
Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the
petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and
rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares
the protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected
Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local
election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes
more than that of the protestee's votes.
Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private
respondent on 1 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by
filing her notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution
pending appeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.
On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution
pending appeal. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued.
Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order
of execution and the sheriff held in abeyance the implementation of the writ. This
motion was denied on 5 August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for
certiorari to annul the aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion for
 Page | 11
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The petition was docketed as
SPR No. 1-94.
On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the
petition.4 The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is
[sic] has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and
therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is
hereby GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of Execution issued on
August 4, 1994 LIFTED.
Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position
.as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending
resolution of the appeal before this Commission in the case of
Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94.
In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the
respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such
jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was
not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is
not exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election. It
further reasoned out that in the performance of its judicial functions, the
COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction. It
ratiocinated as follows:
It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs, then the Commission has
jurisdiction.
Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.
B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO
GOVERN THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG
PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL
REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate, political party
or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission.
The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear
and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamusinvolving election cases.(Emphasis supplied).
We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has
been repealed. We have come to the conclusion that it has not been
repealed. The repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881, December 3, 1985), provides:
Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. — Presidential Decree No. 1296
otherwise known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is
hereby repealed. All other election Laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code is hereby repealed, except Presidential
Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the
election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions
IX and XII. (Emphasis supplied).
B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
Besides, in the cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case, the
Supreme Court itself said, reiterating previous cases, that implied repeal of
statutes is frowned upon, thus:
Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the
grant of original jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial
body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases: Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or
repeal, whether expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No.
1752. It is common place Learning that implied repeal are not
favored in Law and are not casually to be assumed. The first effort
of a court must always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of
one statute with those of another so as to give sensible effect to
 Page | 12
both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974);
Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National
Power Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs.
Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377·(1965). Only when
there is clear inconsistency and conflict between the provisions of
two (2) statutes, may a court hold that the provisions later in point
of time have impliedly repealed the earlier ones" that (Philippine
American Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine American
Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and
Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs. Ranada, Jr.,
No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25).
It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after
the Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of
Section 1 (Title and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known
and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall
govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be
held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives
thereafter as provided by the Constitution.
While that may be true with most of its provisions which were
applicable only for the particular election (like election and
campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.) most if not all of the
remaining provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is
not lost to the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for
other purposes."
But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the
Commission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our
election laws. It should be mentioned that the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6638 which governed the local elections of
January 18, 1988, as to the number of councilors in specified cities
(Sec. 3) and the number of Sangguniang members in different
provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still applicable up to this day. In
fact, it became one of the important controlling provision which
governed the May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of Republic Act
No. 6636 which are not inconsistent with the present election laws
did not self-destruct, why should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697?
Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides
that "any city or municipal judge, who includes or excludes any
voter without any legal basis in inclusion and exclusion
proceedings, shall be guilty of an election offense," although this
provision is found in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134
supposedly with limited application as the enabling act for the
elections for Members of Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other
purposes.
Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to
the Commission on Elections because the Pimentel case said
there was none, to fill a void in the law, and avoid an incongruous
situation.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but
in its relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be
construed as to "harmonized it with the pre-existing body of laws."
Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be
reconciled. . . . (Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO Standard
Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113).
xxx xxx xxx
The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts
provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter and that in the absence of any
express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be
deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in the
prior statutes." (Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153,
November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).
The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial
functions to take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted
by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no more appellate
jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court, Justice
de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting opinion that
under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
election cases should properly be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of
the Commission on Elections, not from lower courts.
It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388,
September 2, 1971) because the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
then had appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by the lower courts.
In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the
 Page | 13
lower courts because after reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy
cases, the Supreme Court said:
In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against a regional trial court in an
election contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals or in this
Court being the only courts given such original jurisdiction under
the Constitution and the Law. (Emphasis supplied).
While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the
Constitution and the law, it is most logical for the Commission whenever it
performs judicial functions to have the authority to issue these prerogative
writs. . . .
...
In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case
of Antonio Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco
promulgated on July 29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en banc had
occasion to rule on the question of whether or not the Commission has the
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari in election cases.
The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law which grants the
Commission, the exclusive authority to issue special writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in election cases, and there are also Supreme
Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare that the Commission has no
such authority precisely because; according to the decisions, there is no
law granting such authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the
existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs. Pambansa Blg. 697.
As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec.
50 of BP Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881, December 3, 1985). Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited
Supreme Court decisions where it was declared that, indeed, the
Commission has no jurisdiction to issue special writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not
been repealed.
As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the
Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess, of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government
(Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).
Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power
and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is
vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. 5
It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's
order of execution pending appeal and the writ of execution because
[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12,
1994 the court a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early
as July 8, 1994, it had already acknowledged through its order issued on
that date, the perfection of the appeal of petitioner as in fact it ordered the
elevation of the records of the case to this Honorable Commission. 6
Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.
In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to
comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing is challenged
resolution.
As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the
petition by invoking the very arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in
its challenged the resolution and the dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uy
cases.
In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent
COMELEC postulates that it issued the said resolution after it had taken
cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the RTC
decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, thus:
it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to
employ means necessary to carry into effect the powers
conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Revised
 Page | 14
Rules of Court) and verily, there was no need for any
statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed, in annulling the
Order of Execution of the Regional Trial Court, public
respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in
this regard was necessary to preserve the subject of the
appeal and to maintain the statusquo of the parties
pending the final outcome of its review of the correctness
of the appealed decision. 7
It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over
the cases unlike in the instant case where the trial court had already given due
course to the appeal and elevated the records of the case to the COMELEC which
had taken cognizance of the appeal.
This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.
The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the
Solicitor General is unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed
resolution and is not supported by the facts. The challenged resolution involves a
case which the COMELEC docketed as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94).
Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the special relief cases are petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal
from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the challenged resolution; docketed as
EAC No. 108-94.8 Clearly then, the COMELEC had recognized and taken
cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the RTC decision (EAC
No. 108-94), and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-
94. The two cases were not consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need
no further elaboration. Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter
case, it cannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the former,
the ordinary appeal. This erroneous contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor
General notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its resolution now
in question paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in
the Garcia and Uy cases.
As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory
conferment to it of such jurisdiction.
The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697
expressly granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that
the said law was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the regular
Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of
sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in view of
the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang
Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted with the twin issues of whether said
B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of
the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of the sectoral
representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election
Code.
The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P.
Blg. 697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent
selection of sectoral representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the last
paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:
Sec. 50. Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election
cases. (Emphasis supplied).
it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific
period of time. Taken in the context of the conspicuous absence of such
jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it seems quite
obvious that the grant was intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate the
seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out
in the dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said case.
But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The
repealing clause of the latter reads as follows:
Sec. 282. Repealing clause. — Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise
known as The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All
other election laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg.
20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of
Regions IX and XII.
The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been
said:
 Page | 15
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent
enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must
either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some
instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in
conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the
legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be
deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act
to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does
not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of
the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical
verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a
repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal
to inconsistent acts.13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in
the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are
omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or
code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14
By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that
the Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to
replace them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a
reservation that all prior election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any
provisions of the Code shall remain in force. That sentence predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on existing and
prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the case, the presumption
against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeals
apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws
so that, if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is
to express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning
the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing
law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in
the terms of the new and the old laws.15
This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph
of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter, It found none.
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon
the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases, We now hold that the last
paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election
cases.
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review
the substance of the challenged resolution.
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in
granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ
of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent
received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed
within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for
execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129,
which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of
Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed
perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal, 17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4
July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal
fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the
elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the
appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the
motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the
perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could
have been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal. 19
Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set
aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and
writ of execution issued by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9
February 1995 of the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita
Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncemnt as to costs.
SO ORDERED.