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Thayer Consultancy Background Brief

ABN # 65 648 097 123


Vietnam in the Middle – U.S.
FONOP, China’s DF-26, U.S.
China Trade Talks
January 11, 2019

We seek your assessment of several possibly inter-related developments.


Q1) What is your assessment of the statement by a Vietnamese spokesperson about
the recently concluded U.S. freedom of navigation patrol in the Paracel islands? Is it
common for Vietnam to make such statements when there are actual ships involved
rather than just reaffirming commitments to freedom of navigation in sit down
meetings with U.S. officials and others?
ANSWER: In 2012 Vietnam amended its Law of the Sea of Vietnam and dropped the
requirement for prior notification by foreign vessels when they entered waters over
which Vietnam has sovereign jurisdictions. Foreign vessels were requested not
required to give advance notification for safety reasons.
Vietnam has routinely supported U.S. freedom of navigation operational patrols in the
South China Sea as long as they contribute to regional peace and security. Vietnam
does issues statements to the passage of individual ships particularly when China
criticizes their transit through Chinese claimed waters. In this particular case the USS
McCampbell sailed through waters near the Paracels that Vietnam claims.
Q2) How do you evaluate Beijing’s response with the DF- deployment? How will that
play out?
ANSWER: The operational deployment of the Dong Feng-26 26 (the so-called ‘carrier
killer’ ballistic missile) has long been anticipated. It is yet another demonstration that
China is building up an integrated system of weapons primarily but not exclusively
aimed at U.S. warships. This is a major component of what the Pentagon characterises
as an anti-access area denial policy within the firs island chain,
Q3) The announcement of the deployment of the DF-26 took place during/on the
heals of China-U.S. trade talks. Any explanation?
ANSWER: China has tried to keep the trade talks separate from military rivalry with
the United States but this is becoming increasingly difficult as the U.S. has stepped up
it naval and strategic bomber presence patrols over the South China Sea and naval
transits in the Taiwan Straits. China is pursuing the long game to assert sea dominance
over the South China Sea. It also needs to restrict damage to its economy caused by
Trump's tariffs.
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It is doubtful that the timing of the operational deployment of the DF-26 was a
coincidence. It was made in advance of the visit of the U.S. Navy Chief of Operations.
Q4) Overall, was the statement by Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs an example of
Vietnam taking a more “pro-US” stance as US-China tensions rise? What is your
assessment of this incident and what does it say to you in that regard?
ANSWER: Vietnam continues to pursue equidistance in its relations with the major
powers.
Vietnam's relations with China at present are arguably the best they have been since
the 2014 standoff over China's deployment of the HYSY 981 in Vietnam's Exclusive
Economic Zone. This does not preclude Vietnam from making statements for the
record supporting U.S. freedom of navigation patrols that contribute to regional
security.
A recent survey of 1008 Southeast Asian security stakeholders by the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore shows Vietnam was an outlier in giving a
generally positive evaluation of the U.S. role in the region.
Any shift towards the U.S. is to encourage it to maintain a presence in the South China
Sea to balance China. Keeping the Trump Administration on side has the ulterior
motive of getting it to lift its tariffs of Vietnamese steel exports and to remove its
designation of Vietnam as a non-market economy.
U.S.-Vietnam relations hit a speed bump in the third quarter of 2018. What has still to
be explained is why at last year's Defence Policy dialogue with the U.S. Vietnam
cancelled fifteen joint military air, sea and land activities that had been negotiated for
months.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam in the Middle – U.S. FONOP, China’s
DF-26, U.S. China Trade Talks,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 11,
2019. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove
yourself from the mailing list type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

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