WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA v.

EDGARDO ANGARA
GR No. 118295 (2 May 1997)
Panganiban, J. mlm

SUBJECT MATTER: Constitutional construction; Self-executing provisions

CASE SUMMARY:

DOCTRINE/S:
The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

FACTS:
The Philippines, through then Pres. FVR, is a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The President
saw the country’s membership to WTO as a means to improve Philippine access to foreign markets and as an opening for
new opportunities in the services sector

On April 15, 1994, DTI Sec. Rizalino Navarro, representing the Philippine Government, signed the Final Act (The Act that
promulgates the creation of WTO, and is the result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations) in Marakesh and
agreed on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines to:

a.) submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with
a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
b.) adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On Aug. 12, 1994, the members of the Senate received from the President a letter dated Aug.11, 1994 stating among
others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. VII
of the Constitution. However, on Aug. 13, 1994, the members of the Senate received another letter from the President
also dated Aug. 11, which stated among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the
WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services
are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. Art. VII of the Constitution.

On Dec. 4, 1994, the President certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled
“Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.” On Dec. 14, 1994, the Senate concurred with the
ratification by the President of the WTO Agreement. On Dec. 16, 1994, the President signed the Instrument of
Ratification.

To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President is composed of the Agreement Proper and “the associated
legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Sec. Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes
aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services.

On December 29, 1994, the petitioners (Senators Tañada & Coseteng), filed for a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus praying for the nullification of the ratification by the President with the concurrence of the Philippine Senate
of the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) with the contention among others, that
the WTO Agreement contravenes/violates the letter, spirit and intent of Sec. 19, Art. II & Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution which provides that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy and shall
promote the preferential use of Filipino labor. In particular, “the national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipino and local products which is
in the contravention with the “Filipino First Policy” posited by the Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE/S: (Other issues not pertaining to self-executing provisions not discussed here)
1. WON the principles and state policies enumerated in Art. II and some sections of Art. XII are self-executing
provisions and therefore should render the WTO Agreement null and void – NO
HOLDING/RATIO:
1. NO. The principles and state policies enumerated in Art. II and Art. XII are not self-executing provisions. By its very
title, Art. II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” These principles in Art. II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

Furthermore, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the
national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Art.
II and some sections of Art. XII are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments
to implement them. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive
and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language
of the ballot.

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced
from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making.” Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr., explained these reasons as that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right—a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Art II (15) of the Constitution—that is
or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the
trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. The legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory
policy, for at least two reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is
given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is where a specific violation
of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second par. of Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution.

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS this Court held that “Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.” However, as the constitutional provision itself
states, it is enforceable only in regard to “the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue
here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule,
there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in
the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.