The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P.
MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the
mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child
in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and
care.
The Case
The Petition for Review[1] before the Court seeks to reverse and set
aside the August 28, 2002 Decision[2] and the December 11, 2002
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 69400.[4] The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P.
Miguel shall have custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he
reaches ten (10) years of age. Once the said child is beyond ten (10) years
of age, the Court allows him to choose which parent he prefers to live with
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones, shall help support the child,
shall have visitorial rights at least once a week, and may take the child out
upon the written consent of the mother.
Acting on the petitioners Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order, and
finding it to be without merit, the same is DENIED.[5]
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda
Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include
Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002
ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of
the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan
on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The
respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is
presently residing in Japan.
minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of
him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner
enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in
Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.
According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and
receiving monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.
On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel
came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that
they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to
bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They
promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the
petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as
promised by them.
The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at
Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the
latters mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there,
respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with
her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social
Welfare to locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts
were futile.
Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711.
However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte.
The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be
given to him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his
capability to support and educate him.
On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their Comment, in compliance with
the May 2, 2002 Resolution of this Court.
In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation
of the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the
Philippines and stated that she was the one who brought him here
pursuant to their agreement.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioners allegation that
respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who
took the child from the petitioner or the latters parents. She averred that
she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when
she returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and
consented.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the
petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato
Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction
of the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the petitioner
arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The
custody of the child, according to respondent Loreta P. Miguel was
entrusted to petitioners parents while they were both working in Japan.
She added that even before the custody of the child was given to the
petitioners parents, she has already been living separately from the
petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit
affair with another woman until his deportation.
She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese
national is for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying
temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to send
money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further stated that she
has no intention of staying permanently in Japan as she has been
returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she could.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be
given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and
Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA
awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother,
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that petitioner truly
loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble and expense he
had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless found
no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner,
however, was granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the ultimate
issue as follows: x x x [w]hether or not [he], as the natural father, may
be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of
the mother who is away.[7]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision should be
modified in regard to its erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right
over their minor child. He insists, however, that custody should be
awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period that
she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor,
such that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But
when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When
she is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he
adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her
Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001,[8] granting to her sister
temporary custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan,
where he is studying,[9] thus rendering petitioners argument moot. While
the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed
on July 30, 2002, an Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order, [10] alleging
therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so
the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied
the Motion for lack of merit.[11]
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines[12] explicitly provides that illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.[13]
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate
children were generally classified into two groups: (1) natural, whether
actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous
or illicit.[14] A natural child is one born outside a lawful wedlock of parents
who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other.[15] On the other hand, a spurious child is
one born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to
marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.[16]
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under
the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing
them.[17] If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by
the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both,
the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case,
parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.[18]
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children
have been eliminated in the Family Code.[19] Now, there are only two
classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted,
have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children
conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the
law itself gives them legitimate status.[20]
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: Children
conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity
of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be
considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent
marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, without any distinction
between natural and spurious.[21] The concept of natural child is important
only for purposes of legitimation.[22] Without the subsequent marriage, a
natural child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code)
child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were
suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both
acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant
to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of him.
David v. Court of Appeals[23] held that the recognition of an
illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to
give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to
the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows
that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over
the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate
child;[24] in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of
the adoptive parent.[25]
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother
of and having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have
custody of him.[26] She has the right to keep him in her company.[27] She
cannot be deprived of that right,[28] and she may not even renounce or
transfer it except in the cases authorized by law.[29]
 Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat
that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness
to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else. [30] In the past, the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or
abandonment,[31]unemployment, immorality,[32] habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as
the controlling factor,[33] we hold that the CA did not err in awarding care,
custody, and control of the child to Respondent Loreta. There is no
showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to
petitioner. In Silva v. Court of Appeals,[34] the Court sustained the visitorial
right of an illegitimate father over his children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their
children.[35] Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring
remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to
suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the
child.
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation in which the
parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either
by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living
separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that
petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that
portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to
live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner
to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing
the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to choose which parent to
live with is DELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales , J., on leave.
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
G.R. No. L-68374 June 18, 1985
HORACIO LUNA and LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON ROQUE A. TAMAYO, as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR Branch CXXXI1 Makati,
Metro Manila, MARIA LOURDES SANTOS, and SIXTO
SALUMBIDES, respondents.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent appellate court in
case CA-G. R. No. SP-01869, entitled: " Horacio Luna, et al., petitioners,
versus Hon. Roque A. Tamayo, etc., et al., respondents, " which affirmed
an order denying a motion to restrain the execution of a final judgment
rendered in a habeas corpus case.
The records of the case show that the herein private respondent Maria
Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who
is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is
married to her correspondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of
Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is
the subject of this child custody case.
It appears that two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley
Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a
childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her
with love and affection and brought her up as their very own. The couple
doted upon Shirley who called them "Mama" and "Papa". She calls her
natural parents "Mommy" and "Daddy." When Shirley reached the age of
four (4) years in 1979, she was enrolled at the Maryknoll College in
Quezon City, where she is now in Grade I I I.
A few months before September, 1980, her "Mama" and "Papa" decided
to take Shirley abroad and show her Disneyland and other places of
interest in America. Shirley looked forward to this trip and was excited
about it. However, when the petitioners asked for the respondents'
written consent to the child's application for a U.S. visa, the respondents
refused to give it, to the petitioners' surprise and chagrin Shirley was
utterly disappointed. As a result, the petitioners had to leave without
Shirley whom they left with the private respondents, upon the latter's
request. The petitioners, however, left instructions with their chauffeur to
take and fetch Shirley from Maryknoll College every school day.
When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the
respondents had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The
private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the
said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof, the
petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the private respondents to produce
the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. The case
was docketed in court as Spec. Proc. No. 9417, and after the filing of an
answer and due hearing, a decision was rendered on March 9, 1981,
declaring the petitioners entitled to the child's custody and forthwith
granted the writ prayed for.
The private respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals where the
case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-12212, and in a decision dated April
7, 1982, the appealed decision was reversed and set aside and another
entered, ordering the petitioners, among other things, to turn over Shirley
to the private respondents. The herein petitioners filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the decision but their motion was denied.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review of the decision of
the appellate court. The case was docketed herein as G.R. No. 60860 and
on November 10, 1982, this Court, in a minute resolution, denied the
petition for lack of merit.
Upon finality of the judgment, the case was remanded to the court of
origin and assigned to Regional Trial Court, NCJR Branch CXXXII Makati,
Metro Manila, presided over by respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo who,
thereafter, issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to
satisfy and enforce the resolution of the Supreme Court which affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The execution of the judgment was vigorously opposed by the petitioners
who filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order and to set aside
the writ of execution on the ground of supervening events and
circumstances, more particularly, the subsequent emotional, psychological,
and physiological condition of the child Shirley which make the
enforcement of the judgment sought to be executed unduly prejudicial,
unjust and unfair, and cause irreparable damage to the welfare and
interests of the child. By reason thereof, the respondent judge called a
conference among the parties and their counsels, and conducted hearings
on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and to set aside the writ of
execution. Shirley made manifest during the hearing that she would kill
herself or run away from home if she should ever be separated from her
Mama and Papa, the petitioners herein, and forced to stay with the
respondents. A portion of her testimony is quoted hereunder:
ATTY. CASTRO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Would you want to have with your daddy and mommy, referring to
Sixto Salumbides and Maria Lourdes Salumbides
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A Because they are cruel to me. They always spank me and they do not
love me. Whenever I am eating, they are not attending to me. It is up to
me whether I like the food or not.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, if you will be taken from your papa and mama (Luna spouses) and
given to your daddy and mommy (Salumbides spouses), what would you
do if you will do anything?
A I will either kill myself or I will escape. Even now they said they love me. I
don't believe them. I know they are not sincere. They are only saying that
to me. And I know those words were not coming from their hearts. If they
will get me from my papa and mama, they will be hurt because they know
that my papa and mama love me very much. 1
Dra. Cynthia Dulay Bruce, a child psychologist, affirmed her findings that
— emotional consideration of the transfer of custody of Shirley when it
... She (Shirley) has only grown more embittered, cautions, distrusting of
her biological parents. She threatens to kill herself or run away if given to
her biological parents. She claims she would be very unhappy with her
biological parents since they do not understand her needs are selfish to
her, and don't know how to care for her. Presently, she is very difficult to
encourage in seeing her biological parents in a different light. 2
and that —
... I reviewed with them (Salumbides spouse) that at the present time, to
get Shirley back in this emotionally charged transaction, would hinder
Shirley seeing them as truly loving and concerned parents. She would
more deeply distrust them if they uproot her from the home of the choice
of Mr. and Mrs. Luna. The biological parents wish to do what is also
helpful to Shirley. I discussed with both parties the recommendations of
placement and follow up. 3
But, the respondent judge denied the petitioners' motion to set aside the
writ of execution The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the order and when it was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order with the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, which was docketed therein as
CA-G.R. No. SP-01869, to stop altogether the execution of the decision of
the Court of Appeals rendered in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212. The petition was
duly heard, after which a decision was rendered on May 25, 1984,
dismissing the petition, Hence, the present recourse.
The issue is whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of
lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody
cases, should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the
child, to stay with her grandparents instead of her biological parents and
who had signified her intention Up kill herself or run away from home if
she should be separated from her grandparents and forced to live with her
biological parents.
It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is
returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter court is the
ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. The lower court cannot
vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it, for any other
purpose than execution; nor review it upon any matter decided on appeal
or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much
as has been demanded. However, it is also equally well-known that a stay
of execution of a final judgment may be authorized whenever it is
necessary to accomplish the ends of justice as when there had been a
change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution
inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy had never been
submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ
of execution has been improvidently issued; or that it is defective in
substance; or is issued against the wrong party; or that the judgement
debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been
issued without authority.
In the instant case, the petitioners claim that the child's manifestation to
the trial court that she would kill herself or run away from home if she
should be forced to live with the private respondents is a supervening
event that would justify the cancellation of the execution of the final
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212. The
respondents, upon the other hand, maintain that there are no
supervening developments and circumstances since these events are not
new as the Court of Appeals had taken into account the physiological and
reversed the decision of the trial court and gave to the private
respondents the custody of the child Shirley; and besides, the wishes and
desires of the child is no hindrance to the parents' right to her custody
since the right of the parents to the custody of their children paramount.
We find merit in the petitioner. The manifestation of the child Shirley that
she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away
from the herein petitioners and forced to live with the private
respondents, made during the hearings on the petitioners' motion to set
aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her letters to the members of
the Court dated September 19, 1984 4 and January 2, 1985, 5 and during
the hearing of the case before this Court, is a circumstance that would
make the execution of the judgment rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not
illegal. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated
override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent
choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer
conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development. 6 The
Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to
threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome
family life that will provide her with love, care and understanding, male.
guidance and counseling. and moral and material security. 7 But what if
the threat is for real.?
The facts are as follows.
Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her
biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley
has grown more embitered cautious and dismissing of her biological Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC,
parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would
be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As
requested by her, let us not destroy her future. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby GRANTED and the writ
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
prayed for issued, setting aside the judgment of the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-01869, and restraining the diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
respondent judge and/or his successors from enforcing the judgment condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212. entitled:
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
"Horacio Luna and Liberty Hizon-Luna, petitioners-appellees, versus Maria
Lourdes Santos and Sixto Salumbides, respondents-appellants." The hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound
decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 of the Court of First Instance of where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
Rizal granting the herein petitioners custody of the child Shirley
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
Salumbides should be maintained. Without costs. SO ORDERED.
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur. alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
CIVIL REGISTRY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676 The petition was published in a newspaper of general
Petitioner,
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous
Present:
places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
in his behalf.
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
Promulgated:
Respondent. University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon
September 12, 2008
issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her
body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
DECISION normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that
QUISUMBING, J.: this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her
mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would
be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision
dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs
prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to
the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the
granting of his petition. It was medically proven that
petitioners body produces male hormones, and first
his body as well as his action and feelings are that of
a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified
as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to
make the following corrections in the birth
[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of
the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from
Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from
female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners
school records, voters registry, baptismal certificate,
and other pertinent records are hereby amended to
conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH;
AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in
ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to
change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff,
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not implead the
local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is
fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three
(3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents
claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local
Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the
Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of
the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his
birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, [10] and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his
name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the
City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of
name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on
his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona
fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
 (b) The cause for which the change of the
petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is
sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a
date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before
the hearing at least once a week for three (3)
successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court
shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not
be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor
within four (4) months after the last publication of
the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at
the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open
court on the date fixed in the order that such order
has been published as directed and that the
allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if
proper and reasonable cause appears for changing
the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name
be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders
rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city
where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court
of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file
his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which
the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon
the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3,
Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is
an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case
can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified
of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short
of the requirements of the rules. [13] The corresponding petition should
also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who
may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules
of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to
promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that
there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished
a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
 The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections
in entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It
is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article
407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the
early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually
has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy.
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to
apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According
to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of
a gonochoristicspecies whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to
conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of
modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with
ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified
to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly,
an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is
almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by
taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should
not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some
middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals
who are neither truly male nor truly female.[25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as
a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female,
then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
 Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed
male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
and the phenotypic features of a male. his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the
unique circumstances in this case.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is

biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court

classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial

reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the

sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents

body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name

preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents

development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in

at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change

respondent, is fixed. of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision

not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,

with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like
taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of SO ORDERED.
a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken
its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate
on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality
and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the
Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in
order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows
this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent
is an incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid
and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being
a male.