1. Are searches at checkpoints valid? Discuss.

Yes. Bear in mind that the SUPREME COURT has ruled in Valmonte vs. De Villa 178 SCRA 211 (1989) that
checkpoints are valid PROVIDED THAT neither the vehicle must be searched or its occupant subjected to a body
search. Nevertheless, only a VISUAL SEARCH from OUTSIDE the vehicle may be done.
However if you take public transportation or commute, please be aware that in the infamous case of People
vs. Mikhail Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 410 (1991), a mere "suspicious bag" was upheld as probable cause to conduct a
search of pssangers inside a bus, in which case the drugs found during such search were upheld to be admissible as
evidence.
The Rule is: The PNP manning the check point are limited only to a VISUAL SEARCH. They are not authorized
to open your trunk, compartment, or bags (unless you are stupid enough to consent voluntarily). If they make
motions to search your person (body), open your glove compartment or trunk, NEVER VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO OPEN
ANYTHING OR ALLOW THEM TO SEARCH YOU. ALWAYS OBJECT.
If the police insist on searching against your will, then the search will be rendered ILLEGAL and can be
questioned later, and may be the basis for RETURN or your things, if taken.If you think that you are being subject to
an illegal search, discreetly take a video or pictures of the incident with your cell phone camera. This will be VITAL
EVIDENCE later on, should you decide to question the search. Also insist on getting the NAMES of the officers, their
unit, and their team leader. This is needed later on for IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES should there be a legal
proceeding. Only ILLEGAL items in PLAIN VIEW can be seized. LEGITIMATE ITEMS cannot be not seized.

2. Should live media coverage of court proceedings be allowed?

No. Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant’s right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be
restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
ACCORDINGLY, in order to protect the parties’ right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to prohibit
live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be
limited and restricted as above indicated." (COURT EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 22, 1991.

3. Is solicitation for the construction of a church covered by PD 1564 punishable if done without the necessary permit
for solicitation from the DSWD?

Yes, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1564 of 1978 (Amending Act. No. 4075 Otherwise known as
Solicitation Permit Law) Section 2. “Any person, corporation, organization or association desiring to solicit or
receive contributions for charitable and public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of
the Department”.
Philippines fundraising regulation goes back at least to the 1970s. The Solicitation Permit Law (1978), from
the Marcos era, required fundraisers to obtain a permit to “solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public
welfare purposes” from the then-Department of Social Services and Development, along with reporting requirements
as defined by the Department. Violations were punishable by a prison term and/or fine.
More recent regulations on public solicitations adopted in 2007 and gazetted in 200835 (and which amended
2003 regulations on the subject)36 expanded the role of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in
regulating fundraising and charitable solicitation, bringing virtually all non-governmental, public, education,
professional and other organizations within their scope, including foreign fundraisers (IV(1)(2)).

Cases:
1. Corona vs. UHPAP, 283 Scra 31, Dec. 12, 1997(G.R. No. 111953)
Facts: On July 15, 1992, then PPA General Manager Dayan issued PPA-AO 04-92, whose avowed policy was to
“instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage
services.” This was implemented by providing therein that “all existing regular appointments which have been
previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and that
“all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of 1 year from
date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance.”
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through
Capt. Compas, questioned the said PPA-AO before the DOTC but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Garcia
that “the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of
Directors as its governing body.”
On December 23, 1992, the Office of the President (OP) issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of said PPA-AO. In its answer, the PPA countered that said PPA-AO was issued in the exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as
amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve
the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92
applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was
merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it “to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct
of pilots in any port district.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents’ right to exercise the right to
due process of law?

HELD: After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is
convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right against deprivation of property
without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the matter was
finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade.
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the
administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due
process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with
the requirements of notice and hearing.

2. Lumiqued vs. Exevea (G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997)

FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform – Cordillera Autonomous
Region (DAR-CAR) until President Ramos dismissed him from that position. The dismissal was the aftermath of 3
complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of
Discipline of the DAR. The first charged, Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents.
Second, private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, and
the third, Lumiqued Was charged with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous
complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The
committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so
the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. Later, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration,
alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing.

ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative
inquiry?

HELD: In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s
side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is
more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of
due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover,
this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured
whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
In Nera v. Auditor General,[40] the Court said:

“x x x. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by
such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that
he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”