In-N-Out Burger, Inc.

v Schwani Inc
G.R. No. 179127, December 24, 2008
Topic: Verification by counsel
Petitioner: IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC.
Respondents: SEHWANI, INCORPORATED AND/OR BENITA'S FRITES, INC.

Doctrine: The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations
of the petition has been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and non-compliance therewith
does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional
requirement.

FACTS

IN-N-OUT Burger is a business incorporated under the laws of the US. It is engaged in
restaurant business but has never operated in the Philippines. Sehwani is a corporation in the
Philippines. The petitioner filed a complaint against Sehwani for unfair competition and
cancellation of trademark registration. Petitioner averred that it is the owner of the trade name
IN-N-OUT which is clearly identical to the trademark that Sehwani was using to operate its
restaurant business in the Philippines. The IPO Director General ruled that petitioner was
entitled to an award for the damages it suffered by reason of respondents' acts of unfair
competition. Sehwani elevated the case to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the IPO
Director General. Petitioner then filed this petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
Respondents pointed out that the Secretary's Certificate executed by Arnold M. Wensinger,
stating that petitioner had authorized the lawyers of Villaraza and Angangco to represent it in
the present Petition and to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping,
among other acts, was not properly notarized. Respondents aver that the said Secretary's
Certificate cannot properly authorize Atty. Barranda to sign the Verification/Certification on
behalf of petitioner because the notary public Rachel A. Blake failed to state that: (1) petitioner's
Corporate Secretary, Mr. Wensinger, was known to her; (2) he was the same person who
acknowledged the instrument; and (3) he acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed,
as required under Section 2 of Act No. 2103 and Landingin v. Republic of the Philippines.
Hence, it should result in the dismissal of the said Petition.

ISSUE
Whether the verification in the petition is defective and should therefore result in the dismissal of
the case

RULING

NO. A Secretary's Certificate, as that executed by petitioner in favor of the lawyers of the
Angangco and Villaraza law office, only requires a jurat. A jurat is that part of an affidavit in
which the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the
executor. Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed
and sworn to before the notary public. In contrast, an acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent ofifcer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary
that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act
and deed.

In addition, even assuming that the Secretary's Certificate was flawed, Atty. Barranda may still
sign the Verification attached to the Petition at bar. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the
affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records. The party itself need not sign the veri􀀾cation. A
party's representative, lawyer or any other person who personally knows the truth of the facts
alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. Atty. Barranda, as petitioner's counsel, was in
the position to verify the truth and correctness of the allegations of the present Petition. Hence,
the Verification signed by Atty. Barranda substantially complies with the formal requirements for
such.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, promulgated on 18
July 2006, is REVERSED. The Decision of the IPO Director General, dated 23 December 2005,
is hereby REINSTATED IN PART, with the modification that the amount of exemplary damages
awarded be reduced to P250,000.00.

Philippine Stock Exchange v Manila Banking Corp.

G.R. No. 147778. July 23, 2008
Topic: Substantial requirements of pleadings; Ultimate facts only
Petitioner: PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. and the MEMBERS OF ITS
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
Respondents: THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION and the SECURITIES
INVESTIGATION CLEARING DEPARTMENT HEARING PANEL consisting of the Hon. Hearing
Officers ENRIQUE L. FLORES, JR., ALBERTO P. ATAS, and YSOBEL S. YASAY-MURILLO

Doctrine: The complaint should contain a concise statement of ultimate facts. Ultimate facts
refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon which rest the existence of the cause
of action. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which
establish the material elements.

FACTS

The Manila Banking Corporation (TMBC) acquired Manila Stock Exchange (MSE) Seat No. 97
from Recio. TMBC requested to be registered as owner of Seat No. 97, but MSE refused.
TMBC was given a certificate of acknowledgement only. Thereafter, the PSEI was incorporated
which unified the MSE and the Makati Stock Exchange. A certificate of membership to Recio
was issued as Member No. 29. TMBC believed that MSE No. 97 became PSE No. 29, so they
sought to be recorded as the owner. However, PSEI refused. TMBC then filed a petition for
Mandamus with Claim of Damages before the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). On
the other hand, PSEI filed a motion to dismiss the action. SEC denied the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners then filed a petition with the CA asking to order the dismissal of the Mandamus
petition. However, CA sustained the decision of SEC. Petitioners brought the case before the
SC, asking to nullifying the decision of the CA and to order the dismissal of the case.

ISSUE
Whether the petition for Mandamus should have been dismiss by the SEC?

RULING
NO. The SICD Hearing Panel requires a more in-depth and thorough determination of issues
raised before it. The allegations in the mandamus petition sufficiently stated a cause of action
against the petitioners. Verily, the complaint should contain a concise statement of ultimate
facts. Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon which rest the
existence of the cause of action. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or
particulars of evidence which establish the material elements.
The allegations would suffice to constitute a cause of action against petitioners. That petitioners
have a valid defense is another matter. At any rate, matters such as the propriety of the refusal
of TMBC's membership to PSE and veracity of the assertion that MSE Seat No. 97 is separate
and distinct from PSE Seat No. 29, among others, are best ventilated during trial. They require
evidentiary proof and support that can be better threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits.
These matters, indeed, would not yet go into the question of the absence of a cause of action as
a ground to dismiss.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.