Kyle Zabala vs People

Case Digest GR 210670 Jan 26 2015

Facts:

Alas accused Zabala of theft. During the trial, Alas testified that he and Zabala were not only neighbors, but
kumpares as well, and would often invite the latter to drinking sessions inside his house. At times, he would also
call Zabala to repair his vehicle and allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash whenever spare parts
are to be bought for the repair of his vehicle. One day when he returned from work, he found that his P68k
which he kept in an envelope inside his closet was missing. There were only five persons living in the house that
time, he together with his parents, his 9-year old son, and his aunt.

Witness Pinon also testified that, being Zabala’s girlfriend, she were with him at the store which was near Alas’
house at that time. She saw Zabala climb the fence, scale and enter Alas house, and noticed that when he
returned, he had a bulge in his pocket. Day after that, they went to Greenhills, where Zabala bought two Nokia
phones worth about P8,500.

Issue 1: W/N the corpus delicti of the crime was established in this case

No. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that
it was lost by felonious taking.

First, nobody saw Zabala entered the room of Alas where the money was hidden. Pinon merely saw that Zabala
scaled the fence of Alas house and entered it. Second, all that Pinon saw was the bulge in Zabala’s pocket; her
testimony does not show that the bulge was the P68k which was supposedly stolen. These testimonies failed to
prove the fact that the P68k was lost and that Zabala unlawfully took it. Hence, the evidence presented was not
sufficient to prove the fact of the crime of theft.

Issue 2: W/N the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to prove Zabala’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt

No. The rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must exclude the possibility that some other
person committed the crime.

In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no
other person inside the house of Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of
Alas. They failed to prove that culpability could only belong to Zabala, and not to some other person. Hence,
Zabala must be acquitted in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt. ##

RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Rape through sexual assault, gender-free rape, homosexual rape, variance doctrine

FACTS:

On January 30, 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., XXX, then 10 years old, woke up as “he felt pain in his anus
and stomach and something inserted in his anus.” He saw that Ricalde, 31 years old, a distant relative and
textmate of XXX, “fondled his penis.” When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to
tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.

RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault. CA affirmed the
conviction but lowered the amount of damages.

ISSUES:

Whether or not XXX’s failure to categorically state that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a
penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice fatal.

Whether or not the absence of trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa disproves penile or
object penetration.

Whether or not the invocation of “variance doctrine” is proper.

Whether or not the slightest penetration into one’s anus constitutes rape through sexual assault.

HELD:

Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as “instrument or object rape,”
“gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is “the insertion of the
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or
anal orifice.”
First issue: NO

The Court held that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal
orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed. In People v. Soria, the
Court ruled that “We find it inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically identify the particular
instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
something was inserted into her vagina. To require “AAA” to identify the instrument or object that was
inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.”

Second issue: NO

Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or
any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not
negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive
testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human nature.

The Court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the
possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.

Third issue: NO

Variance doctrine

Variance doctrine is provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It states:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included
in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of
those constituting the latter.

In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during
trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through
sexual assault.

Fourth issue: YES

 XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted into his anus.” The slightest penetration
into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.

Long line of cases consider a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence
on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the
victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of
rape through sexual assault.

The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is
not important. Rape is an “assault on human dignity.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: Marital rape

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro
City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex
with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He
treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he
started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert
her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she
would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed
but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the
bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to
instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due
to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from
the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK
stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant
by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own
legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her.
As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do
that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges
as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up
her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause.
 The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are
either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are
simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution
for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital
right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the
accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and
wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.

G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014

PONENTE: Carpio

TOPIC: Qualified Theft

FACTS:

Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(WPESLAI). She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the
WPESLAI.

It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the
funds ofWPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to
 withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank
account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI
cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said to be
standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made
it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she
would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cahilig was guilty of qualified theft.

HELD:

YES. The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as
follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

All the elements are present in this case.

Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position.
Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme
to commit the theft.

Grave abuse of confidence, defined

Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, “must be the result of the relation
by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.”

Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves
“handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing” money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds
of the association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over
the money entrusted into her care.

However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into
authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that
Cahilig did not deny.
Criminal Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO LUSABIO, JR. G.R.
No. 186119, Oct. 27, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO LUSABIO, JR. G.R. No. 186119, Oct. 27, 2009
Criminal Case Digest / Digested Case

Murder

FACTS:
For the death of Edwin Labini on 12 June 2001, an information was filed on 14 September 2001 before
Branch 65 of the RTC of Bulan, Sorsogon, charging accused-appellant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., Tomasito de los
Santos and one John Doe with Murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-459.

The Information reads:

That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2001, at Barangay Biton, municipality of
Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill,
treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stabbed one Edwin Labini, who sustained mortal/fatal injuries that
caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

On 24 September 2001, based on a complaint of accused-appellant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., an information was
filed before the same court charging Tomasito de los Santos, alias Guapo, and Ronnie Dig, alias Tabong,
with Attempted Murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-464.

In Criminal Case No. 01-459 (Murder), the prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Doris Labini,
Dr. Irene V. Ella, Jose Labini and Elsie Gocoyo. In Criminal Case No. 01-464 (Attempted Murder), private
complainant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., Dr. Antonio Lopezand Ricardo Cabrera took the witness stand.

The RTC convicted Labini for murder. As to Tomasito de los Santos, the trial court ruled that he had no
participation whatsoever in the stabbing of Edwin Labini. The decision was questioned before the CA,
alleging insufficiency of evidence, and questioning the credibility of the deceased’s wife. The decision was
however affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Is the conviction for murder proper?

HELD:

Yes. Accused-appellant brands Doris Labini as a biased witness, thus unreliable, because she was the wife
of Edwin Labini. The fact that she was the wife of the victim did not necessarily make her a partial witness.
It is well-settled that mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair the witness’ credibility.
On the contrary, a witness’ relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more
credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse
somebody other than the real culprit.
In the case at bar, Doris Labini positively identified Pablo Lusabio, Jr. as the one who stabbed her husband.
Such declaration was corroborated by the testimony of Tomasito de los Santos that it was, indeed, Lusabio
who inflicted the stab wounds on Edwin Labini. Doris Labini was eight meters away from her husband
when the latter was stabbed by Lusabio. Aside from this, the crime scene was well-lighted, making it easy
for her to identify Lusabio as the perpetrator.

Finally, accused-appellant submits that if ever he committed a crime, he merely committed homicide. He
maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately and consciously adopted a particular
mode of attack in order to eliminate the risk to his person from any defense that Edwin Labini might offer.

The lower court was correct in appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime. There is treachery
when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him. It was clearly established that Edwin Labini, while talking to
Pablo Lusabio, Jr. face to face, was suddenly stabbed by the latter with a ten-inch bladed weapon for no
reason at all. The suddenness of the stabbing and the fact that Edwin Labini was unarmed gave him no
opportunity to defend himself. It is likewise apparent that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately
adopted his mode of attack, making sure that the victim would have no chance to defend himself by reason
of the surprise attack.

Title: Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

June 21, 2007

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code;
Stages of theft

Facts:

While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel
Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy
Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of
detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was
about to leave the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by
fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

Held:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present –
(1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking
be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court
held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is
immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already
committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts.
Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DOMINGO REYES, ALVIN ARNALDO AND JOSELITO FLORES G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009
Criminal Law Digested Case / Case Digest
Kidnapping for ransom

FACTS: The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at their poultry farm
in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the
farm, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and
dragged him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo
and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van.
Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then
blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape.

Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan.
Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew,
Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San
drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim,
Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male
companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent
the whole night.

On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua
Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to
appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua
Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5
million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated
place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for
appellant’s call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches,
Quezon CitY.Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered.

ISSUE: Are the appellants guilty of kidnapping?

RULING: After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, we
found no cogent reason to overturn the RTC’s ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
credible. Prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified appellants and their
cohorts as their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial.

Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their respective
testimonies were consistent with one another. They were steadfast in recounting their ordeal despite the
grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony with the documentary
evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their testimonies credible and
trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against
appellants.

Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was, nevertheless, shown that it took appellants
and their cohorts about 10 minutes before all members of the Yao family were blindfolded. During this
considerable length of time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to take a good look at the faces of
appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert narrated that their respective blindfolds
loosened several times, giving them the opportunity to have a glimpse at the faces of appellants and their
cohorts.

It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed as a result of the kidnapping. It
is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would point to appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers if
such were not true. A witness’ relationship to the victim of a crime makes his testimony more credible as it
would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family to accuse somebody
other than the real culprit. Relationship with a victim of a crime would deter a witness from indiscriminately
implicating anybody in the crime. His natural and usual interest would be to identify the real malefactor and
secure his conviction to obtain true justice for the death of a relative. Finally, we observed that the RTC and the
Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by appellants in the present case as the special complex
crime of kidnapping for ransom with double homicide since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during
the kidnapping.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NESTOR BAJADA, VICTOR CALISAY AND JOHN DOE G.R. No. 180507, November 20, 2008
Criminal Law Digested Case / Case Digest
Robbery with homicide

FACTS:

On December 22, 1999, around 11:30 p.m., while 81-year old Villamayor was at home with his 24 year-old live-in
partner, Anabelle Asaytono, they heard someone call for Villamayor asking for coffee. The caller introduced himself as
"Hector," Villamayor's grandson, but Asaytono recognized the voice as Bajada's. As Villamayor opened the door, the caller,
"Hector," pushed the door open with the barrel of a two-foot long gun. Asaytono recognized "Hector" as Bajada because of
his average physique, repulsive smell, the black bonnet which he often wore at work, the deep-set eyes, mouth, a lump on
his cheek, and the green shirt which was given to him by Villamayor. Asaytono likewise recognized one of the men as
Calisay, noting his hair cut, eye bags, and voice. Calisay wore a red handkerchief across his face and carried a 14-inch
knife in his right hand. The third unidentified man, John Doe, wore a bonnet and carried a 2 ½ foot long gun with a
magazine.

Upon entering the house, John Doe said, "There are many people in Calumpang who are angry at you because you
are a usurer engaged in 5-6, so give me PhP 100,000 right now." John Doe made Villamayor sit down but when the latter
refused, John Doe made him lie face down on the floor and kicked his back several times. Meanwhile, Bajada pointed his
gun at Asaytono and demanded for money. Asaytono denied having any money. She was then made to lie face down on the
ground and was kicked. John Doe asked from Villamayor the key to the cabinet which was a meter away from the latter.
Villamayor brought out a key from his pocket and handed it to Bajada. Asaytono, who was able to stand up, saw the three
accused unlock Villamayor's cabinet and took out its contents which consisted of documents and clothes. Accused-
appellants also opened the drawer and took jewelry valued at PhP 80,000 and the PhP 20,000 and USD 500 cash.

Thereafter, Bajada pushed Asaytono towards Villamayor, laying her head sideways on Villamayor's head. In this
position, Asaytono was able to see Calisay repeatedly stab Villamayor on the back. Calisay then stabbed Asaytono on her
left breast. Asaytono pretended to be dead as she lied on Villamayor who was still moving. The three men then hurriedly
left the house. Asaytono stood up and saw through the three men move towards the rice field. She noticed that
Villamayor's dog wagged its tail as it followed the three men, the way it did when accused-appellants would visit
Villamayor.

Dr. Marilou Cordon, the medico-legal officer, testified that Villamayor's death was caused by hypovolemic shock secondary
to stab wounds. She opined that the stab wounds may have been caused by a single bladed knife inflicted by one person.
She added that the stab which pierced the right lung may have caused his instantaneous death due to blood loss.

ISSUE:

Are the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide?

RULING:

In any case, Asaytono was able to sufficiently identify Bajada as one of the perpetrators to the
satisfaction of the trial court. Asaytono's familiarity with Bajada cannot be denied; she has known
Bajada and Calisay for more than a year prior to the incident. The two accused were also frequent
visitors at the victim's house. Hence, Asaytono was acquainted with Bajada's physical features. The
trial court found her testimony to be credible, frank, straightforward, and consistent throughout the
trial. We see no reason to disturb this finding since trial courts are in a unique position to observe the
demeanor of witnesses. The trial court's findings regarding the witness' credibility are accorded the
highest degree of respect.

Furthermore, Bajada could not ascribe any plausible ill motive against the witness. His accusation
against Asaytono that the latter was interested in inheriting from Villamayor is self-serving and
 uncorroborated. Even Bajada's own stepson, Calisay, stated that there was no prior misunderstanding
between him and Asaytono and that he did not know any reason why Asaytono would accuse them of
a crime. The letters allegedly written by an eyewitness who was afraid to testify in trial cannot be given
probative value. The letters accused Asaytono as one of the culprits–a defense which was already
dismissed by the courts a quo. There was no evidence to support such allegation. The said letters were
belatedly submitted, uncorroborated, and cannot be admitted in evidence

Bajada's alibi likewise deserves no merit. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the accused
was somewhere else at the time of the commission of the offense and that it was physically impossible
for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Bajada himself
admitted, however, that the travel time from Bayate, Liliw, Laguna to the crime scene is only 15
minutes by jeep. Hence, it was possible for him to be at the crime scene at or around the time the
offense was committed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs

PETRUS YAU a.k.a. “John” and “Ricky” and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. “Susan”,
Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 208170 August 20, 2014

PONENTE: Mendoza

TOPIC: Kidnapping for ransom

FACTS:

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private

complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United
States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota
taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall. While the said
taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received
a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone
conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a
moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also
being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what
transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag
and he was handcuffed and chained.
 When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was
wearing a red mask and introduced himself as “John” approached him and removed the plastic bag
from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom
and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned
with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With
these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for
the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was
kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he
was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars(US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.

During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to
communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with meals
almost five times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e.
beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.

Complainant was rescued when members of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
Task Force (PACER) intercepted the same taxi with plate number PVD 115 and
subsequently appellant led the team to his house where complainant was held captive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petrus and Susana Yau were guilty of kidnapping for ransom

HELD:

YES.

The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, are as follows:

1. Intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty;
2. Actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and

3. Motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for
the prosecution in the case at bench.

1. Petrus is a private individual.

2. Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious
while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant.

3. Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty.

4. Alastair was taken against his will.

5. Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the
release of the victim.

Petrus is a principal and Susana is an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom

It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susana participated in the
decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against her was the
testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who
accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.

Requisites for a person to be an accomplice

1. That there be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. That he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and

3. That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept
quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside
the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the
victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral
aid. It has been held that being present and giving moral support when a crime is
being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in the
crime committed. As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to
the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of support to
her husband.

People v. De Vera: where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will
be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

People vs Ranin
G.R. No. 173023
June 25, 2008

Facts:

Based on the antecedent facts culled from the records, in the morning of February 18, 1999, Lina de Castro, a lady guard detailed at
Palma Hall in the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman Campus, noticed appellant Ranin pacing the pathway. Appellant Ranin
intermittently glanced at a photo which he kept in his pocket while his three companions sat on a bench. Sensing that the four were
outsiders, de Castro asked them to leave.

Yet again, at around 3:30 p.m. the following day, de Castro saw appellant Ranin walking by the CASAA canteen as his companions
rested on a bench. De Castro accosted appellant Ranin and demanded that he leave. Without responding, the latter headed towards
the photocopying machine at the Arts and Sciences Building and then back. He did this routine four times while constantly checking
a photo hidden in his pocket.

Meanwhile, Nino Calinao was seated on a bench with other UP students. When appellant Ranin neared their bench, he suddenly
fired two successive shots at Calinao. The other students ran away as Calinao fell to the ground. While the latter was crawling on the
ground holding his stomach, appellant Ranin shot him a third time. Then, appellant Ranin fired a fourth time at the fallen body of
Calinao. De Castro tugged on appellant Ranin's shirt and told him, "Dodong, Dodong, tama na yan, patay na yang bata." Appellant
Ranin pointed the gun at her but put it down right away. After that, appellant Ranin and his companions fled.

On September 21, 1999, Resurreccion Ranin, Jr. y Jamali, Besmart Al-Baddar Lauppah y Umparah, Rizal Sarri Lamsani y Jamang
and Ommar Hadjula y Kainong were charged with murder in an Information which reads as follows:

On or about February 19, 1999, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while confederating, conniving, conspiring and mutually helping and aiding one another, with evident premeditation and
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength and employing means to weaken the defense of the victim, did then and there, with
criminal and malicious intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, shoot Nino Calinao with a .45 caliber pistol which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Issue:

(a) Whether appellant Ranin be punished of death penalty against the provision of RA No. 9346 on the prohibition of the imposition of
death penalty.

Held:

The Court likewise agrees with the trial court that treachery and evident premeditation attended the killing which qualified the offense
to murder. There is treachery when the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused without danger to his person. The essence of evident premeditation, for its part, is that the execution of the criminal act was
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment.

Evidently, Calinao was unaware of the impending danger as appellant Ranin suddenly fired two successive shots at him.

Now, as to the imposable penalty on appellant Ranin, we take into account the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, which was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006. The pertinent provisions of said law states that:

Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, R.A. No. 8177, otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty
Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.

Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed: (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended.

The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed with modification. In view of Rep. Act No. 9346
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, appellant Ranin is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without possibility of
parole. The award of actual damages is reduced to P42,000, while that of moral damages is also reduced to P50,000. The appellant
is further ordered to pay the heirs of Nino Calinao P75, 000 as civil indemnity and P25, 000 as exemplary damages. No
pronouncement as to costs.

NORBERTO CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 166441, 8 October 2014,FIRST DIVISION, (BERSAMIN,
J.) The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without
proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina. AAA and BBB were employed by
Norberto Cruz and his wife Belinda Cruz to help then in selling their plastic and glass wares in La Union. They
reached their destination at around 8 o’ clock in the evening. Later that morning, at around 1 o’ clock, AAA was
awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Bartolome was then mashing her breast and
touching her private parts. She came to realize that she was totally naked. She fought back and kicked
Bartolome twice. Thus, the latter was not able to pursue his lustful desires. A complaint for attempted rape was
filed against Bartolome. Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted rape. ISSUE: Did the acts of Bartolome in mashing her breast and touching her
private parts constitute attempted rape? RULING: No. Bartolome climbed on top of the naked victim, and was
already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches
and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his
intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her
being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or susceptible of double interpretation. Verily, his
felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with
her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also
be ultimate felony. The information charged that Bartolome “removed her panty and underwear and laid on top
of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast.” With such allegation of the information being
competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness,
not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent
to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he
was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness
and lust for her. UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the
showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female.
Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed

https://www.scribd.com/doc/313369528/Criminal-Case-Digest

People of the Philippines vs. Samson Berk Bayogan

G.R. No. 204896. December 7, 2016

Facts
Appellant and his co-accused Jeneto Serencio were charged before the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39 with
murder as follows:

That on or about 10:45 o'clock in the morning of December 16. 2007, in Poblacion East, Sual, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other with treachery
and with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, and shot Clarita Disu several times,
inflicting upon her several gunshot wounds which [caused] her instantaneous death, to at:he damage and prejudice of her
heirs.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA 7659 as amended.

During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Serencio remains at large. The prosecution presented
eyewitnesses Marbie S. Disu (Marbie) and Loreto Inocencio (Loreto), respectively the daughter and grandson of the victim.
Their testimonies established that in the morning of 16 December 2007, the victim Clarita Disu and her daughter Marbie were
tending their neighbourhood variety store in Sual, Pangasinan with Loreto, when two (2) men on board a motorcycle arrived.
One dismounted the vehicle and bought a cigarette from Marbie while the other stayed on the vehicle. The man who bought
the cigarette suddenly pulled a gun and pointed it to Clarita and shot her four ( 4) times. Marbie shouted for help and ran to
the fallen victim to help and embrace her. The assailant, who had been wearing a yellow t-shirt, then boarded the motorcycle
and headed east. Marbie noted the motorcycle plate number as AR 3273.

On 29 January 2008, police authorities invited Marbie and Loreto to the police station to identify whether the gunman had
been among those whom they arrested. Of three (3) persons in the prison cell, both Marbie and Loreto pointed to appellant.
Both also identified appellant in open court as the victim's assailant.

Appellant asserted that he had been away on a fishing boat off Pangasinan on the date and time of the incident. He also
countered that he had been arrested for alleged illegal possession of a gun. While he was in prison, Marbie came and was
allegedly apprised by the police that it was appellant who had killed her mother.

After trial, the RTC gave credence to the eyewitness accounts of Marbie and Loreto of appellant's liability in the killing of the
victim. On 19 July 2010, the RTC rendered the assailed decision finding the accused SAMSON BERK GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7659, qualified by treachery.

The Court of Appeals found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling. The appellate court also found
the eyewitness accounts credible, straightforward and reliable and upheld their positive identification of appellant as the
perpetrator.

Issue
Whether the accused is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling
Now before the Court for final review, we affirm appellant's conviction. Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that
findings of the trial co on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess
the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note his demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination.

That Judge Robert P. Fangayen was not the one who heard the evidence and had no opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses is of no moment so long as he based his ruling on the records before him the way appellate courts review the
evidence of the case raised on appeal. Absent any showing that the trial court's findings of facts were tainted with
arbitrariness or that it overlooked or misapplied some facts or circumstances of significance and value, or its calibration of
credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment.
In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements
must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing
was attended by treachery; and ( 4) that the killing is not infanticide or parricide.

Our review of the records convinces us that these elements were clearly met. The prosecution eyewitnesses positively
identified appellant as the person responsible for killing the victim through valid out-of-court and in-court identifications. The
Court finds no reason to disbelieve these credible and straightforward testimonies.

The prosecution ably established the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The shooting of the
unsuspecting victim was sudden and unexpected which effectively deprived her of the chance to defend herself or to repel
the aggression, insuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of
the victim.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 04573, finding Samson Berky Bayogan guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. L-8391
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Clarita Disu as follows: P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as temperate damages

He is FURTHER ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Richard A. Cambe Vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al./John Raymund De Asis Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Ronald John Lim Vs.
Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Janet Lim Napoles Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Mario L. Relampagos, et al. Vs.
Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines
 G.R. Nos. 212014-15/G.R. Nos. 212427-28/G.R. Nos. 212694-95/G.R. Nos. 213477-78/G.R. Nos. 213532-33/G.R. Nos.
213536-37/G.R. Nos. 218744-59. December 6, 2016

Facts
Before this Court are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A.
Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim
(Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order dated June 4, 2014 of the Office
of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along
with several others, for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 ( d) (1 ), (2), and
( 6) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195 (sixteen [16]
counts).

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced
from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PD.AF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of
P517,000,000.00.

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this case, Sen. Revilla -with the former
giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain
percentage of the PDAF. Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the
PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding Implemeting Agencies (IA) tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's
"commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO), the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release
of his PDAF, who in tum, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO. By this time, the initial advance
portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator. Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then
direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) -to prepare PDAF
documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of
the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his
staff, all for the approval of the legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the
legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.

Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the preparation of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. Thereafter, the
DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in tum, would
expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten
percent (10%) share in the project cost. Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank
accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled
NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof. Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's
staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting. Napoles would then decide how
much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas
were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's residence. Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and
her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and
similar documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not
since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects. Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help
of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00 to the JLN-controlled NGOs
and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.00.

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and Cambe's signatures in
the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board."; (c) his
involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal
acts and that conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated
March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any
money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found probable cause to
indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the
petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder,
considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; ( b) with the help of his co-accused,
who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired HI-gotten wealth through
their intricate modus operandi as described above; and ( c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, way
more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder..

Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend
proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal
complaints against him.

Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding
probable cause against him for the crimes charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly
disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman
cannot consider the whistle blowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the
res inter alias acta rule.

Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding
probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the
complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise contends that since she
is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Napoles's

Issues:
1. Whether the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal
complaints.
2. Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all petitioners are correct.

Rulings
1. No. The Court disagrees. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's
audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter.

2. Yes, there is probable cause against the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.
Probable Cause against Revilla.
The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the forefront are the
PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his
PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g.,
the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents -even those not actually
signed by Sen. Revilla -directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority
of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that "the
defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation. At its core, legislators -may it be through project lists, prior consultations or
program menus -have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations." It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen.
Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized
that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery) should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is
highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a
signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his
purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui,
(Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on
the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all evei;its, the Special Panel
members, after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF
documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets
of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were written by one and the same hands. Findings of fact by the Office
of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case.
The testimonies of the whistleblowers -which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman -are, in fact, the most
integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to
which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices ' of Sen. Revilla,
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile ), and Sen. Jinggoy: Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with
in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the
conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation -the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation -and in their
respective capacities, were individually tasked by to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions,
follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs'
accounts.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta were to apply during preliminary investigation, the
treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements.
"Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements
have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as
to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are
independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present controversy, considering
their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.

Probable Cause against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause against him. is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By
such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his
PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to
transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was personally
identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla.

In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles. For the same reasons above-
discussed, there should be 'no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistle blowers'
testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cambe at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no right to
be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits .of his co-respondents.

Probable Cause against Napoles.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and
disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind of the PDAF scam.

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the accounts of the IA
officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies
probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in
conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus
operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is
probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to,illegally
divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the government. That a private individual, such as Napoles,
could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public
officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are
public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said
officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy the act of one is
the act of all. In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the pillaging of Sen.
Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The findings of probable cause against all petitioners are
hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary
proceedings in these cases with deliberate dispatch.

People of the Philippines vs. Susan M. Tamaño and Jaffy B. Gulmatico

G.R. No. 208643. December 5, 2016

Facts
On July 30, 2004, appellants were charged with Violation of Section 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), Section 11 (Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Section 12 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drug Paraphernalia), Article II of R.A. No.
9165 in five (5) separate Informations. Upon arraignment on September 13, 2004, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the
respective charges against them.

The evidence of the prosecution may be summed up as follows: On July 22, 2004, P03 Gepaneca of the PDEA was informed
by a confidential agent that one alias "Susan Kana" was selling shabu in Brgy. Gustilo, Zone 6, Lapaz, Iloilo City. The
following day, P03 Gepaneca and the agent conducted a surveillance of the said area wherein the agent pointed to a woman
identified as "Susan Kana."

On July 27, 2004, after confirmation from the agent that that they could purchase shabu from "Susan Kana," a buy-bust team
was formed by P/Sr. Inspector Rapiz. Around 11 :30 in the morning, the team proceeded to the target area in Brgy. Gustilo.
After waiting for a while, appellants arrived. P03 Gepaneca was introduced by the agent to one Susan Kana who turned out
to be appellant Susan Tamafio. Then, P03 Gepaneca took the P500 buy-bust money and handed it to appellant Tamafio who,
in tum, told appellant Gulmatico to give a sachet of shabu to P03 Gepaneca. After appellant Gulmatico handed to P03
Gepaneca one (1) plastic sachet of shabu weighing 0.220 gram (Exhibits "J-1 "), the latter took off his cap as a signal that the
transaction was consummated. At that point, PO1 Aguenido immediately arrested and searched the persons of appellants.
The P500.00 bill (Exhibits "M-1 ") was recovered from the right hand of appellant Tamafio; and from her right pocket, a big
plastic sachet was recovered containing three (3) plastic sachets of suspected shabu with markings "Susan", "Merriam and
"Kelly" (Exhibits "J-2 ", "J-3 ", "J-4") with a total weight of 0.345 gram. Also, four (4) empty plastic sachets and two (2) pieces
of disposable lighters (Exhibits "P-1 " and "P-2 "), among others, were recovered from the bag of appellant Tamañio.

On the other hand, POI Aguenido recovered from the right pocket of appellant Gulmatico twenty-four (24) sachets of
suspected shabu (Exhibits "K-2" to "K-25 ", "E-2-A ") with a total weight of 8.695 grams and two (2) small sachets of
suspected shabu (Exhibits "K-27" and "K-28"); and, from his plastic bag were recovered fifteen (15) empty plastic sachets,
one (1) plastic straw (Exhibits "L-1 ") and nine (9) sliced aluminum foils (Exhibits "T-1" to "T-9 "). The seized items were
brought to the police officers' office and were accordingly marked by SP03 Calaor and turned over to PDEA Exhibit Custodian
SP04 Gafate. The following day, SP03 Calaor took the same items to the Iloilo City Prosecution Office where they were all
inventoried. Thereafter, SP03 Calaor submitted some of the items, including the sachets of suspected shabu, to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. P/Insp. Ompoy, Forensic Chemical Officer, examined the sachets, and the contents turned
positive to the test for methampheatmine hydrochloride (shabu), while the plastic straw revealed traces of shabu, as stated in
Chemistry Report No. D-17304 (Exhibits "E" and "E-3 '').

On May 29, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellants of Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. On August 31, 2012, the CA affirmed the appellants' conviction.

Issues:
1. Whether the buy-bust operation conducted by the police was valid.
2. Whether the chain of custody rule was complied.

Rulings:
1. Yes. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu in this case, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved to sustain a conviction therefor: ( 1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the object and
consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the dangerous drugs seized as evidence. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer
went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the
former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.

The appellants who were caught in flagrante delicto were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the same
persons who sold one (I) plastic sachet containing 0.220 gram of white crystalline substance, later confirmed as shabu, for a
consideration of P500.00. The said plastic sachet of shabu was presented in court, which the prosecution identified to be the
same object sold by appellants. Likewise, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses established how the transaction with
appellants happened from the moment the informant introduced P03 Gepaneca, the poseur-buyer, to appellants, as someone
interested in buying their stuff, up to the time P03 Gepaneca handed to appellant Tamafio the P500.00 bill and, in turn,
appellant Gulmatico handed to him the plastic sachet of suspected shabu, thus, consummating the sale transaction between
them. SP03 Calaor caused the plastic sachet of suspected shabu be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The item
weighing 0.220 gram was tested positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), as evidenced by Chemistry
Report No. D-17304 prepared by P/Insp. Ompoy, the Forensic Chemical Officer. It must be noted that the defense admitted
the expertise of P/Insp. Ompoy who examined the drug specimens. Thus, the collective evidence presented during the trial
by the prosecution adequately established that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted. Appellants conspired and
confederated with each other to sell shabu. Appellant Tamafio received the P500 bill, while appellant Gulmatico handed the
shabu to the buyer. Their respective acts lead to no other conclusion except that they have a common design and purpose -to
sell shabu.

With respect to the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proved: (a) the accused
was in possession of dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was not authorized by law, and ( c) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs. We also conform to the lower courts' findings that all the
elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were adequately proven by the prosecution. When an accused is caught in
flagrante delicto in accordance with Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the police officers
are not only authorized, but are duty-bound, to arrest him even without a warrant.18 Thus, since appellants' arrest was legal,
the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful.

2. Yes. We find untenable the contention of appellants that since the provision of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 was not strictly complied with, the prosecution allegedly failed to prove the identity and integrity of the seized prohibited
drugs.

In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and, in sustaining a conviction therefor, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have
been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove
any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165 fails. In this regard, the aforesaid provisions outline the procedure
to be observed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs.

However, under the same proviso aforecited, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.

In the cases at bar, PO1 Aguenido immediately searched the persons of appellants. From the right pocket of appellant
Tamafio, a big plastic sachet was recovered containing three (3) plastic sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.345 gram.
On the other hand, PO I Aguenido recovered from the right pocket of appellant Gulmatico twenty-four (24) sachets of shabu
with a total weight of 8.695 grams and two (2) small sachets of shabu. The seized items were brought to the police officers'
office and were accordingly marked by SP03 Calaor and turned over to PDEA Exhibit Custodian SP04 Gafate. The following
day, SP03 Calaor took the same items to the Iloilo City Prosecution Office where they were all inventoried. Thereafter, SP03
Calaor submitted some of the items including the sachets of shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. P/Insp.
Ompoy, Forensic Chemical Officer, examined the sachets and the contents were positive to the test for methampheatmine
hydrochloride (shabu). During the trial of the cases, P03 Gepaneca, P/Sr. Inspector Rapiz, PO1 Aguenido, SP03 Calaor,
SP04 Gafate and P/Insp. Ompoy testified for the prosecution. They properly identified the Chemistry Repmi and the subject
specimens when presented in court. From the foregoing, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs had not been compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of
custody of the seized item from the time it was first discovered until it was brought to the court for examination.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CEB-
CR-H.C. No. 00762 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the fine imposed in Criminal Case No. 04-59520. For Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, JAFFY B. GULMATICO is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and ONE (I) DAY TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00).

Zenaida P. Maamo and Juliet O. Silor vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 201917. December 1, 2016

Facts
Petitioners herein were accused of Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents in a Letter-Complaint dated April
10, 2001 (Complaint) filed with the OMB detailing a series of acts allegedly committed by them. Petitioner Maamo filed a
Counter-Affidavit dated July 9, 2001, denying the allegations contained in the Complaint for being "false, imaginary,
capricious, baseless, and politically motivated.”
In its Resolution dated September 26, 2001, the OMB found probable cause against the Petitioners for Malversation through
Falsification of Public Documents and recommended the filing of the necessary informations against them with the SB. The
prosecution of the nine (9) criminal cases thereafter ensued.

In the questioned Decision, the SB convicted the Petitioners for the crime of Malversation through Falsification of
Public/Official Document under Criminal Case Nos. 27117, 27118, 27119 and 27124. Notably, the SB also concluded that
only one (1) crime was technically committed by the Petitioners under the principle of delito continuado, there being a plurality
of acts performed during a period of time and unity of intent and penal provision violated.

Thus, on July 5, 2012, Petitioners filed the instant Petition.

Issue: Whether the SB erred in finding petitioners guilty of the crime of Malversation through Falsification by feigning a
signature.

Ruling: We grant the Petition.

This Court has repeatedly adhered to the policy that when the guilt of the accused is not proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration must be granted as a matter of right. After judicious examination
of the records and the submissions of the parties, the Court rules in the negative.

Thus, to be found guilty of Malversation, the Prosecution has the burden to prove the following essential elements:
(a) The offender is a public officer;
(b) The offender has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
( c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which the offender is accountable; and
( d) The offender has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property. In sum, what is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor
was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so.
Here, while the records support the presence of the first three (3) elements, we find that the Prosecution was unable to
satisfactorily prove the fourth element.
In the first place, as correctly argued by the Petitioners, nowhere was the fact of demand shown in any of the documentary
exhibits or testimonies of the witnesses of the Prosecution. Such failure is underscored by the fact that the Prosecution itself
admitted in its Comment dated January 17, 2013 that no demand for the alleged malversed funds had been made.
Thus, considering that the Prosecution never established such material fact, the burden of evidence was never shifted to the
Petitioners to prove their innocence, there being no prima facie presumption of misappropriation under the facts obtaining.
Thus, following Estino, the Prosecution had the additional burden to prove Malversation by direct evidence, which, as stated
at the outset, it had failed to do.

Moreover, as argued by the Petitioners, the mere absence of a name in the Time Book and Payroll does not automatically
translate to the non-existence of the alleged worker. Contrary to the conclusions of the SB, there are other "logical
explanation[ s ]" for such omission, one of which is the explanation proffered by the Petitioners, i.e., that what was presented
during trial were the third original carbon copies on which the carbon paper did not work to copy those names listed on the
first page. Indeed, it is also entirely possible that the person responsible simply forgot to write down the name of the payee-
laborer even as he secured their signatures.

Certainly, the allegation that Petitioners hired "ghost employees" must be weighed against the fact that Time Book and
Payrolls were found to be in order. Meanwhile, defense witness Geraldine A. Juaton, who was also charged with the
verification of the completeness and regularity of the Payrolls, testified that there were no findings of irregularity regarding the
same.

In addition, the fact that the July 1-15, 1997 Time Book and Payroll was able to pass audit and that no Notice of Suspension
was issued by the Commission on Audit (COA) was an indication that said documents were in order. Indeed, if it were true
that there were blanks next to the signatures of the unnamed employees, such glaring deficiency surely would not have gone
unnoticed by the COA
As to the finding on the non-existence of a road directly connecting Barangay San Isidro and Barangay Gud-an, the Court
ruled that the fact that the road from Barangay Gud-an to Barangay San Isidro traverses through Barangay Calian was
confirmed by Conrado E. Encio and Engr. Alberto S. Causing, both witnesses for the Prosecution. Moreover, the Petitioners
presented Gaudencio P. Goltea, the Barangay Captain, who testified that the Municipality of Lilo-an indeed undertook the
maintenance of barangay roads. In any case, assuming without conceding that the defenses raised by the Petitioners were
not credible, such fact did not lessen the burden of the Prosecution to prove Malversation through Falsification through
competent and conclusive evidence. As already discussed above, the conviction of the Petitioners must not rest on the
weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for
proof required to establish the guilt of an accused.
All told, we cannot subscribe to the conclusion of the SB that the blanks next to the signatures are, by themselves alone,
enough to prove that Petitioners committed Malversation through Falsification by feigning the said signatures. This Court is
not prepared to deprive Petitioners of their liberty with finality simply on the basis of a superficial deficiency in Time Books
and Payrolls.

For the reasons above-stated, the instant Petition should be granted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the evidence insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, Petitioners
are hereby ACQUITTED.

People of the Philippines vs. Dr. David A. Sobrepeña, Sr., et al.

G.R. No. 204063. December 5, 2016

Facts
Respondents are officers and employees of Union College of Laguna, an educational institution in Santa Cruz, Laguna. They
were charged in several informations for allegedly committing Estafa and Large Scale Illegal Recruitment before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. By reason thereof, respondents were incarcerated. Invoking the provisions of
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and in their belief that the evidence of
their guilt is not strong, respondents filed a Petition for Bail.

In opposition to the Petition, the prosecution presented Adelfo Carandang who testified that:
x xx [S]ometime in June 2008, he saw an advertisement with the phrase "Work, Earn and Live in Canada" printed on a
tarpaulin placed on the walls of Union College. Thereafter .. after consulting with his wife, he visited the said institution and
inquired about the said advertisement. He met private-respondent Deobela Fortes who introduced herself as the Director for
Career and Placement of Union College. The latter told him that Union College is engaged in Careers and Enhancement
Progran1 and it is offering; seminars, trainings and workshops and that through its Canadian partner known as Jnfoskills
Learning Incorporated of British Columbia (INFOSKILLS) it is offering high-quality certification classes endorsed by the British
Columbia Ministry of Health and Tourism, Worksafe British Columbia and the Canadian Red Cross. INFOSKILLS is delivery
partner of British Columbia Ministry of Health and Tourism, Canadian Red Cross, Construction Safety Network, Enforrn and it
is the training agency of Worksafe British Columbia. Also, he was informed that GDX Visa and Immigration Incorporated of
British Columbia will be providing work and immigration assessment program for all participants. Fortes allegedly assured
him that the graduates of the program will be hired as restaurant host, hostess, food and beverage service banquet server
and a host of other jobs in food and beverage industry in Canada with a monthly fee of 1,500.00 Canadian Dollars; that he
can soon become an immigrant of Canada and be able to bring his family with him after becoming such; that the program is
on a first come first served basis. Thus, enticed with this promise of a bright future, he immediately paid the fees and enrolled
himself for the first batch. These include the $2,500 USD for visa and placement fees plus Php15,000.00 for English
Language Proficiency (ELP) fee. Carandang also testified that the other private-respondents were also very much active in
luring him to join the program. In fact, Dr. Dabao and Dr. David Sobrepeña told him to wait for his employment contract. But
none was forthcoming, hence the filing of Estafa and Large Scale Illegal Recruitment cases against the herein petitioners.

Upon cross-examination, Carandang testified that he is a college graduate, having finished Bachelor of Science in Marketing
and Commerce. He confirmed that he knew Union College to be a school in Santa Cruz for a long time and that its officers
and employees never had cases for illegal recruitment. He further attested that in the particular flyer that he got the actual
statement was not quoted in full. The complete statement in the flyer being that: "INVEST IN YOUR FUTURE GET THE
SKILLS YOU NEED TO WORK EARN AND LIVE IN CANADA." xx x

With respect to the registration form that he signed, Carandang admitted that although in his judicial affidavit he stated that
the $2,500 USD he paid was for visa processing fees or job placement fees, however, the registration form that he actually
signed does not contain words of such import. In fact, the $2,500 USD, as stated in the registration form was for the courses
in entry level in food and hospitality which he admitted to have actually attended under the tutelage of two Canadian
instructors who served as their professors. Furthermore, Carandang testified on cross that while he mentioned in his judicial
affidavit that the alleged victims paid 12 Million pesos, such conclusion is his mere estimate and he has no personal
knowledge of the actual amount.

RTC Ruling
The RTC denied the Petition to Bail finding that there is evident proof against all the accused. This Court holds that the
evidence of guilt for all the accused is STRONG.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2010.
CA Ruling
The CA was convinced that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the assailed Orders. According to the CA, there is doubt as to whether there is strong evidence against
respondents for the charge of estafa or large scale illegal recruitment; that the evidence available on record merely showed
that Union College provided the venue and the English language training course; that the trial court failed to appreciate the
fact that the prosecution purposely took out of context the statement appearing in the flyer i.e., "INVEST IN YOUR FUTURE
GET THE SKILLS YOU NEED TO WORK, EARN, AND LIVE IN CANADA"; that there were no statements to the effect that
Union College is acting as a job placement agency; that there is no direct evidence to show that Carandang was illegally
enticed by respondents to enroll at Union College; that there is no direct evidence showing that respondents overtly
represented that they have the power to send the trainees abroad for employment; and finally, there is no evidence that
respondents are flight risk.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied per Resolution dated October 3, 2012. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari for the reversal and setting aside of the January 31, 2012 CA Decision and its October 3, 2012
Resolution and likewise prayed that the impugned Orders of the RTC be reinstated.

Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error when it nullified and set aside the Orders of the RTC.

SC Ruling
We rule in favor of the petitioner. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also states that no person charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal action.

Thus from the above-cited provisions and in cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge. The judge is under
legal obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence
of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties. xxx xxx On such hearing, the Court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
examination and cross-examination."
In the present case, the CA gave due course to the Petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
denying bail to respondents. The CA held that based on the evidence thus far presented by the prosecution in the bail
hearing, the evidence of guilt is not strong against Union College particularly its employees and officers with respect to the
charges filed against them.
From a perspective of the CA Decision, the issue therein resolved is not so much on the bail application but already on the
merits of the case. The matters dealt therein involved the evaluation of evidence which is not within the jurisdiction of the CA
to resolve in a Petition for Certiorari. The findings and assessment of the trial court during the bail hearing were only a
preliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecution's evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether respondents
are entitled to be released on bail during the pendency of the trial.
We would like to stress that "a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It does not include correction of the trial court's
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon. It does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the
parties and to weigh the probative value thereof"

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.

People of the Philippines vs. Christopher Elizalde y Sumagdon and Allan Placente y Busio
G.R. No. 210434. December 5, 2016

Facts
On June, 2005, an Information was filed against accused Arcel Lucban y Lindero, Allan Dela Pefia, Alden Diaz, alias Erwin,
charging chem with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide as defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accusatory portion of said Information reads:
That on or about 6:30 in the evening of June 17, 2003 on Dr. A. Santos St., Sucat Road, Paranaque City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding and abetting
one another, with the use of firearms, employing force, threat, and intimidation did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously take, carry away, kidnap and deprive Letty Tan y Co of her liberty against her will by shoving her inside a red
Toyota Lite Ace van with plate number ULK 341 at gunpoint and thereafter transferred her to a Mazda XLT jitney bearing plate
number CRV-299 where said victim was later found with gunshot wounds which caused her death engaging in armed
encounter with police operatives in Tarlac City. The abduction of Letty Tan y Co was for the purpose of extorting ransom from
her family as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her release amounting to Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Letty Tan y Co in whatever amount may be awarded them
under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Contrary to law.

Only appellants Elizalde and Placente as well as Dela Pena were arrested while the rest remain at-large. Upon arraignment,
they all pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, during trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the
victim's husband, Antonio Tan, an eyewitness, Mario Ramos, and several police officers.
Antonio testified that at around 6:30 p.m. on June 17, 2003, while he was closing their concrete products store, Nysan
Concrete Products, along Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Sucat, Parafiaque City, Letty went inside their vehicle that was parked at the
right side of the road facing their store. Suddenly, a red Toyota Lite Ace van with plate number ULK 341 arrived. He then saw
about seven (7) armed men alight therefrom, three (3) of which pointed their guns at him and told him not to move, while two
(2) of the other four (4) dragged Letty into their van. Thereafter, they sped away. Antonio immediately called his children and
his brother, Nick. Through Antonio's cellular phone, they would bargain with the kidnappers, telling them that they did not
have the amount, to which the kidnappers replied that they will not see Letty again without it. At noon of the next day, the
PACER team informed Antonio and his family about a shootout in Tarlac where three (3) persons were killed. They proceeded
to the Tarlac Provincial Hall where they saw Letty's lifeless body with a gunshot below her chin. Antonio identified the other
bodies as those who kidnapped his wife and later learned that the others, appellants included, were able to escape.
Sometime in April 2004, however, Antonio saw a news report on TV which showed a picture of a wounded person involved in
a shooting incident in Navotas. He instantly recognized said person as appellant Elizalde and called a PACER agent to inform
him thereof. Consequently, together with the PACER team, he went to V. Luna Hospital where Elizalde was confined and
identified him as one of the men who dragged his wife into the red van.

A few years after, when appellant Placente was arrested in 2007, Antonio identified him as one of the armed persons who
poked a gun at him while the others dragged his wife. This was through the cartographic sketches that the PACER team drew
at the time of the incident.

Appellant Elizalde denied the charges against him, claiming that he did not know Antonio, Letty or any of his co-accused.
According to him, he went to Manila for the first time on April 15, 2003 from Samar, where he was working in a bakery, to look
for his mother. He lived with his cousin in Sta. Cruz, Manila. On the day of the alleged kidnapping on June 17, 2003, Elizalde
testified that he was in Blumentritt, Manila, selling boiled peanuts in a pushcart from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Afterwards, he
went straight home for fear of getting lost, being in Manila for the first time.

In addition, appellant Placente next testified and also denied knowing any of his co-accused as well as the accusations
against him. According to Placente, he came to Manila in 1982 from Samar. On the alleged day and time of the kidnapping,
he was merely working, driving a tricycle owned by his neighbor on his way to the market in Pasig City. His job normally ends
at 8:00 p.m., and on that day, he claimed that he did not go anywhere other than his daily route. Thereafter, he parked the
tricycle in front of his neighbor's house and returned the key, as he normally did. In August 2003, he began driving a taxi. In
2005, however, he went back to Samar with his pregnant wife and his son so that his wife can give birth there. He worked as
a laborer and a farmer until he was arrested on May 9, 2007.

On March 4, 2011, the RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide. The RTC gave credence not only to the fact that the prosecution witnesses testified in a positive,
categorical, unequivocal and straightforward manner, but also to the inherent weakness of appellants' defenses of denial and
alibi. Aside from this, the trial court further noted that the appellants' defense of denial was not even corroborated by any
credible witness.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the R TC Decision, but reduced the moral damages to Pl00,000.00. In this regard, the CA agreed
with the RTC as to the existence of conspiracy among appellants and their cohorts. Their community of criminal design could
be inferred from their arrival at Antonio's store already armed with weapons, Placente and companions pointing their guns at
Antonio, while Elizalde and companions dragged Letty into their van. Moreover, they demanded P20M for Letty's freedom
which never materialized as she was killed during captivity by the kidnappers before evading arrest.
Issues:
1. Whether the prosecution's witnesses' are credible.
2. Whether the appellants' defenses of alibi and denial prosper.
3. Whether Antonio's positive identification of Elizalde should be given credence due to the fact that Antonio
only recognized Elizalde on television.
4. Whether the failure of the police officers to inform appellants of their constitutional rights is fatal.

Rulings
1. Yes. The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a
witness is conclusive, binding, and entitled to great weight, unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through
oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling, as affirmed by the
appellate court, finding the prosecution witnesses' testimonies credible. According to the lower courts, the prosecution
witnesses testified in a categorical and straightforward manner, positively identifying appellants as part of the group who
kidnapped the victim. Particularly, Antonio unmistakably and convincingly narrated, in detail, the series of events that
transpired on the day of the incident from the moment he saw appellants alight from their red van, who thereafter split up into
two (2) groups, one, pointing guns at him, and the other, dragging his wife to their van, up until the time when they
successfully boarded said vehicle before speeding away.
In n addition, such testimony was duly corroborated and further strengthened by other prosecution witnesses, such as P/Insp.
Nelmida, who was personally engaged in the shootout and whose buttocks were even shot by appellant Elizalde, as well as
Mario Ramos, who personally saw appellants alight from the jeepney where he eventually saw the lifeless body of the victim.
The Court cannot, therefore, tum a blind eye to the probative value of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
consistent with each other, given in the absence of any showing of ill motive.
2. No. As noted by the trial court, the appellants' defenses of alibi and denial were not even corroborated by any credible
witness. Well settled is the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. It is only axiomatic that positive testimony
prevails over negative testimony. In the instant case, it seems as if appellants urge Us to accept -hook, line, and sinker -their
self-serving statements that Elizalde was merely selling peanuts while Placente was simply driving his neighbor's tricycle
without even attempting to corroborate the same with any supporting evidence. As aptly pointed out by the RTC, Elizalde's
cousin or Placente's neighbor could have been presented to substantiate their stories. Regrettably, appellants failed to
convince.
3. Yes. Antonio actually identified Elizalde as his wife's abductor twice prior to confirming his identity in the hospital. The day
after the incident, Antonio recognized Elizalde from four ( 4) cartographic sketches based on the descriptions given by
Antonio. Thus, appellants' claim that there was no cartographic sketch of Elizalde made after the crime has no basis.
Thereafter, Antonio again recognized Elizalde on television prompting him to immediately call the PACER agents. Verily, the
Court cannot give credence to appellants' assertion that Elizalde' s identification at the hospital was marked by
suggestiveness for as clearly narrated, it was Antonio who first recognized Elizalde on television and who instantly contacted
the PACER agents, not the other way around.

With respect to the contention that Antonio's testimony contains inconsistencies, the Court agrees with the appellate court
when it ruled that the so-called inconsistencies are inconsequential for they merely refer to minor details which actually serve
to strengthen rather than weaken his credibility as they erase suspicion of being rehearsed. This is so because what really
prevails is the consistency of the testimonies of the witnesses in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of
the appellants.

4. No. As for the alleged nullity of the proceedings due to the absence of any showing that the police officers informed
appellants of their constitutional rights, the Court sustains the CA' s ruling that even assuming said failure to inform, the same
is immaterial considering that no admission or confession was elicited from them. As previously discussed, their guilt was
established by the strength of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the findings of the trial court, as positively affirmed by the appellate court, insofar
as the existence of conspiracy is concerned. Accordingly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be
presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests. As aptly held by the CA, the community of criminal design by the appellants and their cohorts is evident as they
each played a role in the commission of the crime. While appellant Placente and companions pointed their guns at Antonio,
Elizalde and companions simultaneously dragged Letty into their van. Thereafter, they demanded ransom money as a
condition for her release, which, however, never materialized due to a shootout that sadly led to her death. Consequently,
therefore, appellants are equally liable for the crime charged herein.
On this score, the Court finds no reason to disturb the rulings of the lower courts for they aptly convicted appellants with the
special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. Accordingly, the Court affirms the lower court's imposition of
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, which should have been death, had it not been for the passage
of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines" prohibiting the
imposition thereof.

There is, however, a need to modify the amounts of damages awarded. Verily, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,45 the
amount of damages are increased to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages, and that an
interest be imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,

WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.

G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: right to be informed of their offenses, disguise, res gestae, treachery

FACTS:

On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of
the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and
lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.

An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity and
separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted and frustrated murder of Sigma
Rho fraternity members.

RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The case against Guerrero was ordered
archived by the court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when the information
against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution
presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
2. Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that accused-
appellants were sufficiently identified.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge
against him to enable him to prepare his defense. The argument of appellants that the information
filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them holds no water. The Court found no merit on the appellants’ arguments that
the prosecution should not have included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise”
in the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were
wearing masks or that their masks fell off.

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such

It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to
that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused
to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance.

What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment
of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with,
they tried to conceal their identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is
the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even
if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that the accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the prosecution. It was
held that the trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses
for the prosecution to be credible. Slight inconsistencies in their statements were immaterial
considering the swiftness of the incident.

Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in
this case

According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were
all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after
the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in
time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had
their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.

When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who
witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former
become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the
incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.

Accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder, and there was treachery in the
commission of the crime

The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they would be
reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.

The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way
they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also
happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to
help them until after the incident.

The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even
to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN

GR No. 204441 June 8, 2016

TOPIC: Section 5 of RA 9165, chain of custody

PONENTE: Perez
 FACTS:

The prosecution’s witness IO1 de la Cerna narrated that they conducted a buy-bustoperation, with him
acting as poseur buyer.

The accused arrived and he was introduced to him by their CI After he was introduced, the accused
handed to him the marijuana wrapped in a magazine paper. After the accused gave him the marijuana.
he inspected it if to verify if it was indeed marijuana and after confirming it, he made a “miss-call”
signal to their team leader who was inside the vehicle which was parked about 10 to 15
meters away from them. He then immediately announced that he is a PDEA agent and he informed the
accused of the latter’s violation.

He further testified that he did not prepare the buy bust money in the amount of P1,000.00 and that
when he met the accused, he had no P 1,000. 00 with him and that he arrested the accused when the
latter showed him the marijuana. He then informed the accused of his rights and when the other
members arrived, he conducted an inventory right at the place. Then, they proceeded to the Office
where he made the markings “RDC”.

After trial, RTC convicted the accused just for illegal possession of dangerous drugs because two
elements of illegal sale were missing – the consideration and payment. CA, however, convicted the
accused for illegal sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.

HELD: NO.

The Court held that no sale was consummated as the consideration, much less its receipt by accused-
appellant, were not established.

Elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs

1. The identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration

2. The delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it

What is material is a proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

In People v. Dasigan, February 4, 2015, where the marked money was shown to therein accused-
appellant but was not actually given to her as she was immediately arrested when the shabu was
handed over to the poseur-buyer, the Court acquitted said accused-appellant of the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.

People v. Hong Yen E, January 9, 2013, the Court held therein that it is material in illegal sale
of dangerous drugs that the sale actually took place, and what consummates the buy-bust transaction
is the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in tum, the seller’s receipt of the marked money.
While the parties may have agreed on the selling price of the shabu and delivery of payment was
intended, these do not prove consummated sale. Receipt of the marked money, whether done before
delivery of the drugs or after, is required.

Complete picture of buy-bust operation not established

The Court held that no information was presented by the prosecution on the prior negotiation between
the confidential informant and accused-appellant. Moreover, the testimony of IO1 de la Cerna failed
to show any kind of confirmation of the alleged prior negotiation. Thus, there is no proof of the offer to
purchase dangerous drugs, as well as the promise of the consideration.

Prosecution failed to establish the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti of the
offense charged.

The chain of custody of the seized alleged marijuana was not sufficiently established, thereby casting
doubt on the identity and integrity of the supposed evidence.

The Court considered the fact that the seized item was not placed in a plastic container and sealed
upon confiscation. In People v. Habana, the Court held that “if the substance is not in a plastic
container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. x x x If the sealing of the seized substance
has not been made, the prosecution would have to present every police officer, messenger, laboratory
technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one’s possession
has been. Each of them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered
with or substituted while in his care.”

In the case at bar, as the seized substance was not sealed, the prosecution should have presented all the
officers who handled said evidence from the time it left the person of the accused to the time it was
presented in open court. The prosecution did not.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MARLON ABETONG y ENDRADO, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 209785 June 4, 2014

TOPIC: Section 5 of RA 9165, chain of custody, testimony of keyholder of evidence locker, discrepancy
in weight of substance

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

FACTS:

According to the prosecution, on August 22, 2003, PO3 Perez received an information that a certain
“Cano” was selling drugs in his house at Bacolod City. Inspector Lorilla then called a briefing for a buy-
bust operation where PO3 Perez as designated as the poseur-buyer. Two (2) P50 bills were prepared as
marked money.

Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Perez and the asset knocked on the door and were greeted by
accused Abetong, who asked the purpose of the visit. PO3 Perez answered that he wanted to buy P100
 worth of shabu. The two were ushered in by accused-appellant and once inside, PO3 Perez saw three
persons sitting around a table, passing to one another a tooter and allegedly engaged in a pot session.
The three were identified as Bayotas, Relos and Berturan. PO3 Perez then drew two PhP 50 bills
marked “WCP” and handed them over to accused-appellant who in turn gave him a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance from his right pocket.

After receiving the plastic sachet, PO3 Perez introduced himself as a police officer and signalled his
back-up to effect the arrest of the four individuals. The suspects attempted to flee but their plans were
foiled by the timely arrival of the other policemen. They were then brought to the police station where
their arrest and the list of the items confiscated from them were entered in the police blotter. From
their arrest until the items seized were transmitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, the pieces of evidence were allegedly under PO3 Perez’s custody. In his testimony, PO3
Perez stated that he kept the items inside the evidence locker in the Drug Enforcement Unit Office, to
which only Inspector Lorilla has a key.

On August 25, 2013, PO3 Perez brought the sachet containing crystalline substance and the tooter to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. Inspector Ompoy received the items and performed the
necessary examinations. She testified that the white crystalline substance in the plastic sachet tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.04 gram while the tooter
tested negative for any prohibited drug.

RTC found accused-appellant guilty of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. CA affirmed said decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the
drug evidence.
2. Whether or not presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the police officers has
been overturned.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the drug
evidence.

Jurisprudence indeed instructs that failure to observe strictly Section 21 of RA 9165 can be excused as
long as (1) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers and (2) non-compliance was attended by justifiable grounds. However, the
prosecution in this case was unsuccessful in showing that there was no opportunity for tampering,
contamination, substitution, nor alteration of the specimens submitted. On the contrary, there is a
dearth of evidence to show that the evidence presented was well preserved. The prosecution likewise
failed to offer any justification on why the afore-quoted provision was not complied with.

Testimony of keyholder of evidence locker vital

In the case at bar, the failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to the prosecution’s case. To recall,
only PO3 Perez and Inspector Ompoy testified against accused-appellant. During his testimony, PO3
Perez admitted that he put the confiscated item in the evidence locker on August 22, 2003 for
safekeeping and subsequently brought them to Inspector Ompoy at the crime laboratory on August 25,
2003. During this three-day interval, the items were allegedly kept inside the evidence locker to which
only Inspector Lorilla has the key.

It is evident from this sequence of events that during the interim, Inspector Lorilla constructively
acquired custody over the seized items. As the lone key holder and consequentially a link in the
chain, Inspector Lorilla’s testimony became indispensable in proving the guilt of accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. Only he could have testified that from August 22 to 25, 2003 no one else
obtained the key from him for purposes of removing the items from their receptacle. Only he could
have enlightened the courts on what safety mechanisms have been installed in order to preserve the
integrity of the evidence acquired while inside the locker. Absent his testimony, therefore, it cannot be
plausibly claimed that the chain of custody has sufficiently been established. To be sure, PO3 Perez did
not even testify that he was assigned to safeguard the evidence locker for the said duration; only that
he was the one who put it in and three days later took them out of the locker room before bringing
them to the crime laboratory.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that, in this case, the prosecution cannot skirt the issue of the broken chain
of custody by relying on the presumption of regularity. This presumption, it must be stressed, is not
conclusive. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption
unavailable. The presumption, in other words, obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that
the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the
law. But where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case,
an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course.

Discrepancy in the weight of substance in Information and Chemistry Report fatal

A perusal of the Information filed against accused-appellant and Inspector Ompoy’s chemistry report
reveals a glaring inconsistency in this case. In the Information, the subject plastic sachet contains 0.02
gram of shabu. However, in the Chemistry Report, the specimen stated weighs 0.04 gram.

The Court held that this discrepancy in the weight of the substance is fatal to the case of the
prosecution. It automatically casts doubt as to the identity of the item seized and of the one tested as it
erases any assurance that the evidence being offered is indeed the same as the one recovered during
the buy-bust operation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN SONJACO

GR No. 196962 June 8, 2016

TOPIC: Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, mere possession constitutes animus possidendi

PONENTE: Perez

FACTS:

Based on information received on 6 August 2005, that appellant and a certain alias Kenkoy were
engaged in illegal drug trade in Barangay Olympia, Makati City, P/Supt. Valerio formed a buy-bust
team composed of POI Marmonejo, POI Mendoza, POI Randy Santos and SP03 Luisito Puno and two
 (2) other anti-drug agents Eduardo Monteza and Herminia Facundo. After a surveillance of the area
and coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) were made, P/Supt. Valerio
briefed the team. POI Marmonejo was designated as poseur-buyer and two (2) pieces of Pl00 bills
marked with the initials “MMV” were provided for the operation.

At five o’clock in the afternoon of that day, PO1 Marmonejo and the police asset, on board a tricycle
driven by PO1 Mendoza, proceeded to the target area. The other members of the buy-bust team
positioned themselves nearby. The police asset called appellant and told her that PO1 Marmonejo
wanted to buy shabu. Appellant asked POI Marmonejo how much, to which he replied, “katorse lang”
or P200.00 worth of shabu. Appellant then took out from her pocket two (2) transparent plastic
sachets containing a white crystalline substance, one of which she handed to POI Marmonejo
in exchange for two Pl00 bills. Appellant pocketed the other plastic sachet.

Upon consummation of the transaction, POI Marmonejo revealed that he was a police officer. He
immediately apprehended appellant, apprised her of her constitutional rights and asked her to empty
her pockets. POI Marmonejo recovered money in the amount of P540.00, a mobile phone, and three
(3) other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. POI Marmonejo marked the sachet
sold to him as “BONG” while the three (3) other sachets as “JOAN,” “JOAN l,” and JOAN 2.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.

HELD: YES.

Elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs

1. Proof that the transaction or sale took place

2. The presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires the
consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. The crime is already consummated once the police officer has gone through the operation as
a buyer whose offer was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the
former.

In this case, accused was apprehended, indicted and convicted by way of a valid buy-bust operation.

Elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs

1. The accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be a prohibited or

a regulated drug
2. Such possession is not authorized by law

3. The accused freely and consciously possessed said drug

Mere possession of drugs constitutes animus possidendi

The Court held that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory
 explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence to explain the absence of animus possidendi
rests upon the accused, and this, in the case at bar, the appellant failed to do.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN

GR No. 204441 June 8, 2016

TOPIC: Section 5 of RA 9165, chain of custody

PONENTE: Perez

FACTS:

The prosecution’s witness IO1 de la Cerna narrated that they conducted a buy-bustoperation, with him
acting as poseur buyer.

The accused arrived and he was introduced to him by their CI After he was introduced, the accused
handed to him the marijuana wrapped in a magazine paper. After the accused gave him the marijuana.
he inspected it if to verify if it was indeed marijuana and after confirming it, he made a “miss-call”
signal to their team leader who was inside the vehicle which was parked about 10 to 15
meters away from them. He then immediately announced that he is a PDEA agent and he informed the
accused of the latter’s violation.

He further testified that he did not prepare the buy bust money in the amount of P1,000.00 and that
when he met the accused, he had no P 1,000. 00 with him and that he arrested the accused when the
latter showed him the marijuana. He then informed the accused of his rights and when the other
members arrived, he conducted an inventory right at the place. Then, they proceeded to the Office
where he made the markings “RDC”.

After trial, RTC convicted the accused just for illegal possession of dangerous drugs because two
elements of illegal sale were missing – the consideration and payment. CA, however, convicted the
accused for illegal sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.

HELD: NO.

The Court held that no sale was consummated as the consideration, much less its receipt by accused-
appellant, were not established.

Elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs

1. The identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration

2. The delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it
What is material is a proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

In People v. Dasigan, February 4, 2015, where the marked money was shown to therein accused-
appellant but was not actually given to her as she was immediately arrested when the shabu was
handed over to the poseur-buyer, the Court acquitted said accused-appellant of the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.

People v. Hong Yen E, January 9, 2013, the Court held therein that it is material in illegal sale
of dangerous drugs that the sale actually took place, and what consummates the buy-bust transaction
is the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in tum, the seller’s receipt of the marked money.
While the parties may have agreed on the selling price of the shabu and delivery of payment was
intended, these do not prove consummated sale. Receipt of the marked money, whether done before
delivery of the drugs or after, is required.

Complete picture of buy-bust operation not established

The Court held that no information was presented by the prosecution on the prior negotiation between
the confidential informant and accused-appellant. Moreover, the testimony of IO1 de la Cerna failed
to show any kind of confirmation of the alleged prior negotiation. Thus, there is no proof of the offer to
purchase dangerous drugs, as well as the promise of the consideration.

Prosecution failed to establish the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti of the
offense charged.

The chain of custody of the seized alleged marijuana was not sufficiently established, thereby casting
doubt on the identity and integrity of the supposed evidence.

The Court considered the fact that the seized item was not placed in a plastic container and sealed
upon confiscation. In People v. Habana, the Court held that “if the substance is not in a plastic
container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. x x x If the sealing of the seized substance
has not been made, the prosecution would have to present every police officer, messenger, laboratory
technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one’s possession
has been. Each of them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered
with or substituted while in his care.”

In the case at bar, as the seized substance was not sealed, the prosecution should have presented all the
officers who handled said evidence from the time it left the person of the accused to the time it was
presented in open court. The prosecution did not.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.

CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 188066 October 22, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: Oppression (administrative) and Sec. 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019 or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act”

FACTS:

Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo
City. She was charged with Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of RA No. 3019 or the
“Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” by Tuares for allegedly withholding her salary for the month of
June 2002.

The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her
failure to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while the other
teachers received their salaries for the same month. The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was
“singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on
June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Caberoy is guilty of Oppression and violation of Sec. 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019.

HELD:

NO. Caberoy was charged with oppression and violation of RA 3019, however, the
Ombudsman, found Caberoy guilty only of Oppression. Thus, the Court need not discussed the
violation of RA 3019.

Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by

a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. To be held
administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be substantial evidence
presented proving the complainant’s allegations. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself when
it found and held that petitioner was guilty of “oppression” for not paying the private respondent her
June 2002 salary, because as a matter of fact she has been paid albeit delayed. Such payment is clearly
and indubitably established from the table where it was shown that private respondent received on
July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in the amounts of P4,613.80 and P4,612.00, respectively.
 There was delay in the payment of salary because “it is a well-known fact that in the
government service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved
before one can collect his salary.”

RODOLFO BELBIS JR. AND ALBERTO BRUCALES VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 181052; 14 November 2012

PONENTE: Peralta

SUBJECT: Homicide

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution:

Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. On
the night of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00 p.m., Veronica
Dacir, Jose’s live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose was
and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy
(petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was brought
to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was confined for 6 days. Jose was brought back to the hospital
on January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys had inflamed due to infection. He died the
next day.

Version of the Defense:

Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in engaged in a
conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their way
home, they heard Jose’s whistle go off as the latter was following them. Rodolfo asked Jose what is the
matter and the latter replied, “What about?” Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo, but the
latter was able to evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Rodolfo and
Jose grappled for the bolo while Alberto was merely shouting at them to stop. Rodolfo eventually got
hold of the bolo but he suffered a wound in his hand so Alberto took him to the hospital.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would
warrant his acquittal

HELD:
 No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done the deed
to defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense
to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and
convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.

The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the victim ceased when petitioner
Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of the same
weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by a person
claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be
averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In the present
case, four stab wounds to the back of the victim are not necessary to prevent the alleged continuous
unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already without a weapon.

Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the death of the victim is not
controlling since what really needs to be proven in a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause
of his death. It can be concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without the stab wounds, the victim
could not have been afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused
his death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. The petitioners are found guilty of
homicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN SORIA

G.R. No. 179031 ; 14 November 2012

PONENTE: Del Castillo

SUBJECT:Rape

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution:

The victim, AAA, is the daughter of the accused. On February 26, 2000, AAA and her siblings enjoyed
the spaghetti their father brought home for merienda. After eating, AAA went to the bedroom to rest.
Thereafter, appellant also entered the room and positioned himself on top of AAA, took off her clothes
and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and
thus told her father that it was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up,
and left the room. The whole incident was witnessed by AAA’s brother, BBB. The pain persisted until
AAA’s vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a hospital for
treatment. Her mother was also immediately informed of her ordeal. AAA was taken into
the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

Version of the Defense:

Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of AAA’s alleged rape but denied
committing the same. Instead, he claimed that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by
his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man residing in their community. According
to appellant, he could not have molested AAA because he treated her well. In fact, he was the only one
sending his children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom comes home.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would
warrant his acquittal

HELD:

Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the
central element and it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, rape under
paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The
perpetrator commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual intercourse but It is evident
from the testimony of AAA that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s penis which touched
her labia and entered her organ. AAA stated that she only knew that it was the “bird” of her father
which was inserted into her vagina after being told by her brother BBB. Clearly, AAA has no personal
knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which touched her labia and inserted into her vagina. Hence, it
would be erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of
AAA’s brother, BBB, which declaration was hearsay due to BBB’s failure to testify.

The court however found it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the particular
instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
something was inserted into her vagina. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established
that appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over
“AAA” which substituted for violence and intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped
AAA by sexual assault.

It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter AAA to file the
charges publicly expose the dishonor of the family unless the rape was indeed committed.

Accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by sexual assault and is also
ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity and damages.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. DELA TORRE-YADAO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 162144-54 ; 13 November 2012

PONENTE: Del Abad

FACTS:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police’s Anti-
Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then
headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang along CommonwealthAvenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes
of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-
out between the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved. On review, however, the Office of the
Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers involved
before the Sandiganbayan. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered
the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack

of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution
witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.

The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition
on the ground of double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try the case. It
was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against
Lacson and other police officials for lack of probable cause.On March 3, 2004 the prosecution filed the
present special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions on
the ground of lack of probable cause

HELD:

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the
motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest,
and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The general rule of course is that the
judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to
conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the
prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent
statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not
unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those
affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the
witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. The SC held that the evidence on record
clearly fails to establishprobable cause against the respondents.

The prosecution The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action
outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the
trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable
cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case
of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is the situation
here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they
should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

G.R. No. 189817, October 3, 2012

Ponente: Leonardo – De Castro

Facts:

Version of the Prosecution: Appellants were convicted for violation of Sec. 5, Art 11 of R.A. No. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for illegal sale
of Dangerous drugs. The prosecution presented PO2 Catuday as a witness a member of the PNP- Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force with functions to conduct buy-bust and surveillance
operations. He was on duty when a female informant alias Inday went to the station to give info about
the illegal drug activities of one Alias Reyna. A team was the immediately formed by Lt. Bartolazo to
conduct a buy bust operation against Reyna. Buy bust ensued, from there PO2 Catuday introduced
himself as a police officer. Llanita and Buar tried to escape but they were immediately apprehended,
and were apprised of their constitutional rights. Specimens were forwarded to crime laboratory for
examination, and the result yielded to a positive result for shabu.

Version of the Defense: Llanita testified that she was with her live in partner Buar in their house
located at Daang Hari, Taguig City when a member of unknown persons introduced themselves as
police officers and unlawfully barged in to their home and entered without search warrant. They also
vehemently denied the ownership over the shabu.

Despite 3 informations were filed against them, and was found them guilty.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appelants despite the fact that the prosecution failed to
overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence and for failure to establish a cautious and
unbroken chain of custody of evidence.

Ruling:
 No. Because what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. He commission of illegal sale merely
requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives
the drug from the seller. As long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose
offer was accepted by appellantfollowed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, then the
crime is already consummated. Examinations of the testimony of PO2 Catuday reveals that the
elements of illegal sale are present to attain the conviction of Llanati and Buar. In this case the
prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral certainty. And for the
proper chain of custody it was also clearly proven that there was a cautious chain of it.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDGARDO LUPAC

G.R. No. 182230 ; 19 September 2012

PONENTE: Bersamin

SUBJECT: Rape

FACTS:

On 21 March 1999, AAA was home alone with her uncle, the accused. At 1:30PM, he told the accused
that she would take a nap but she did not lock the door. When she woke up at 2:30PM, she was
shocked to discover that she was naked waist down. She felt soreness in her body and pain in her
genitals. The accused was standing inside the room wearing only his underwear and apologizing that
he did not intend to do “that” to her. She escaped from the house and immediately told the incident to
a neighbor. During trial, the accused denied the charges against him and claimed that during the
incident, he was sleeping in his own house and not at the house of the victim. The RTC convictedthe
accused for Statutory Rape pursuant to Par. 1(d) of 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper

2. Whether or not the absence of credible direct evidence of his having carnalknowledge with the
victim, being asleep during the incident, creates a reasonable doubt

HELD:

 Notes
 Established
 Absences
 Asleep
 Back Pain
 Bali Underwear
1. No, the prosecution was not able to effectively establish the victim’s minority under 12 years
because of the non-submission of AAA’s birth certificate, such fact being essential in qualifying the
offense to statutory rape. However, the accused is still liable for simple rape, the essence of rape
being carnal knowledge with a female against her will or without her consent. The victim couldn’t give
her consent because she was asleep at that time.

2. No. Direct evidence was not the only means of proving rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence would also be the reliable means to do so, provided that (a) there was more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived were proved; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances was such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
What was essential was that the unbroken chain of the established circumstances led to no other
logical conclusion except the appellant’s guilt.