Layugan vs.

IAC; Torts- vicarious liability of owner of a truck

G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988
Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which
was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by
Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he
incurred and will incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was
amputated and that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he knows
his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was the
proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied
a part of the highway and he did not even put a warning sign.

Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi
Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff,
claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and
subrogation by virtue of their insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising
from death, bodily injuries and damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is only liable
for the amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature since no claim was made to it.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it is the petitioners
who were negligent since they did not exercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck is park
on the shoulder of the highway.
Issue: Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.
Ruling: Yes! The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the
petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene
lamp. The existence of this warning sings was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and further
stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it did not
function. Thus despite this warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by
Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In
the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the
negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew
his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is clear that the driver
did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the
road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could
have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the
private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and
the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to
destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial. The
private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough
inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it.

In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence
of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary
liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a
family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of
the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who
would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all.
There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of
his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe
operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as
employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.
Ponente: Kapunan

FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did
not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist
“botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage.
The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of
Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages.
The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the
anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the
anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.

The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the patient, the
surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and
the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the
surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and
severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the comatose
condition of Ramos.
HELD: Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.

RATIO: Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation,
where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present expert testimony to
prove that the attending physician was negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over her.
Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she
was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part
in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an
anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies
here]. The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the
day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence and
irresponsibility.

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain
of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was
late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.

The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the
one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees,
hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there which
is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in
the liability.

Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages
in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.

Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co.

(CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949)Reyes, JBL: In the afternoon of May 5, 1946while the plaintiff-
appellee and other companions were loading grass, an electric transmission wire, installed and
maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development Co., Inc., alongside the road suddenly
parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a
result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400volts of the wire. The electric charge coursed through his
body and caused extensive and serious multiple burns from skull to eyes, leaving the bone exposed in
some parts and causing intense pain and wounds that were not completely healed when the case was
tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after the incident. Defendant disclaimed such liability on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence.
The appellate court, in overruling this defense, held: “While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant,
that in case of non-contractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish that the proximate cause of injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized
principle that ‘where the thing that causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the
exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur
as if he having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care.’ And the burden of evidence is
shifted to him to establish that he had observed due diligence and care. This rule is known by the name
of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at
bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every night to be on the highway, and the electric wire
was under the sole control of the defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do
not part suddenly in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subject to unusual strain and stress
or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision, just as barrels do not ordinarily roll
out of the warehouse windows to injure passers-by, unless someone is negligent (which is admittedly not
present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in its
installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock “if there are any facts
inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove.”

Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448

Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted.
The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and
heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren,
the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove
negligence of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees.

Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the respondents.

Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct
which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all
its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred therein
and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the
fire started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It
is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The negligence of
the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not
happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages.

FF Cruz and co vs CA
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR, APPLIED; NEGLIGENCE NOT PRESUMED. —
The facts of the case call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of
operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint,
varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon. It must also be noted that negligence
or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. Even without applying
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city
ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.

3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; DEFICIENCY BETWEEN AMOUNT INDEMNIFIED BY INSURER AND THE AMOUNT
OF LOSS SUSTAINED MAY BE RECOVERED FROM PERSON CAUSING THE LOSS. — Private respondents have
been indemnified by their insurer in the amount of P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house and
its contents. Hence, the Court holds that in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the amount of
P35,000.00 should be deducted from the amount awarded as damages. Having been indemnified by their
insurer, private respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner.

The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the residence of
private respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric
Cruz, petitioner’s plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and private
respondents’ residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the early
morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner’s shop. Petitioner’s employees, who slept in the
shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private
respondents’ house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration
was never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the burned structures
negative for the presence of inflammable substances.

Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the contents
thereof.

On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner, praying for a
judgment in their favor awarding P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs. The Court of First Instance
held for private respondents

Facts: A fire broke up from the furniture shop of the petitioner in Caloocan city early September 6, 1974.
Prior to that, neighbor of the said shop requested that the petitioner should build a firewall but failed to
do so. The cause of the fire was never discovered. Private respondent got P35k from the insurance on
their house and contents thereof.

Issue: Whether or not the 35k be deducted from the damages thereof

Ruling Since P35k had already been claimed by the respondents, the court held that such amount should
be deducted from the award of damages in accordance with Art 2207 NCC

Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss,
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are entitled only to recover the deficiency
from the petitioner.

Whether or not the insurer should exercise the rights of the insured to which it had been subrogated lies
solely within the former's sound discretion. Since the insurer is not a party to the case, its identity is not
of record and no claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer has to claim his right to
reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured.

Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (GR No. L-21749, September 29, 1967)

Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp.
rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig
after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages.
Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity
to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.

Issue: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge
was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Held: There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as the
Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as
they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable,
"events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of
the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated,
as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed
by the swollen stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious
danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it
adopted turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages.

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998

FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the
Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino,
who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots’ Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the
safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with
the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the
particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2)
shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did
not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did
not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that
the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern” code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the
pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by
the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence
of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD: (1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He
becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing
anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is
compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel or to decline to act as pilot.
Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel but is deemed
merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities
where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory
pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain
exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a
body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and
thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office as a compulsory
pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a
pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters
over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held
to the highest possible degree of skill and care but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care
demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary
circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to
such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As the pilot,
he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.
(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for
the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal
of Capt. Kabankov’s testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as
master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful
vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts
of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to
the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the
pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the
vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not
the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are
liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own
negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a
compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel
or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those
in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and
the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her
negligent management or navigation.

DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN v. CA, GR No. 118231, 1996-07-05

Facts: Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City...
she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said Hospital. Mrs.
Villegas... submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient Dr. Batiquin... with the
assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy... and O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses Villegas...
after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child Plaintiff remained confined at the Hospital... during
which period of confinement she was regularly visited... by Dr. Batiquin. Soon after leaving the Hospital
Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish... consulted Dr. Batiquin
at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical
Certificate by Dr. Batiquin on October 31, 1988 . . . certifying to her physical fitness to return to her work
The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring When the pains become unbearable and she was rapidly
losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City Upon
examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus... which she suspected to be
either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which could be cancerous. A blood count showed
that Mrs. Villegas had [an] infection... inside her abdominal cavity. The result of all those examinations
impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to which the latter agreed.

When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian
cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece
of rubber materials on the right side of the uterus

This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a "rubber
glove"... this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries
The piece of rubber allegedly found near private respondent Flotilde Villegas' uterus was not presented
in court, and although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for
examination,[8] it was not mentioned in the... pathologist's Surgical Pathology Report. unluckily I don't
know where the rubber was. Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that when she confronted Dr. Kho regarding
the piece of rubber, "Dr. Kho answered that there was rubber indeed but that she threw it away."... the
trial court held in favor of the petitioners herein. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court The petitioners prefer the trial court's interpretation of the above testimony, i.e., that Dr. Kho's
knowledge of the piece of rubber was based on hearsay.

Issues: we find that the focal point of the instant appeal is the appreciation of Dr. Kho's testimony.

Ruling: The phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of
rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City
for examination by a... pathologist.
Although hearsay, Dr. Batiquin's claim was not objected to, and hence, the same is admissible[27] but it
carries no probative value.

Nevertheless, assuming otherwise, Dr. Batiquin's statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho found a
piece of rubber near private respondent Villegas' uterus. whether she threw it away or sent it to Cebu
City, we are not justified in distrusting her as to her recovery of a piece of... rubber from private
respondent Villegas' abdomen... he trial court failed to recognize that the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and
Sy were denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than
negative testimony.[33] Of course, as the petitioners... advocate, such positive testimony must come from
a credible source, which leads us to the second assigned error.

Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. Furthermore,
no... motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness
unimpaired.

her positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in private respondent Villegas' abdomen]
prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.

The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that
the accident was one which ordinary does... not happen in absence of negligence.

[a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the] alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact
that [the] accident happened provided [the] character of [the] accident and circumstances attending it...
reasonably to belief... absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused
injury is shown to have been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged wrongdoer... the
happening of an injury permits an... inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence
that [the] injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and
management of defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary course of things
would not... happen if reasonable care had been used. peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific
proof of negligence. not a rule of... substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence
on the party charged. It... merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof
and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. can be invoked when
and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not... readily available.

all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present... entire proceedings of the cesarean section
were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct
evidence... since aside from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no... other
operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to
reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section... petitioners, in this regard,
failed to overcome the presumption... of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

the vital role the medical profession plays in the lives of the people,[37] and State's compelling interest
to enact measures to protect the public from "the potentially deadly effects of... incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma."
Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her
profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in
the general,[40] and members of the medical profession,[41] in particular.

Cebu Shipyard v William G.R. No. 132607. May 5, 1999 J. Purisima

Facts: Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. repaired marine vessels while the Prudential is in the
non-life insurance business. William Lines, Inc., the owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo
vessel, which caught fire and sank. At the time of the incident, subject vessel was insured with Prudential
for P45M for hull and machinery. CSEW was insured for only Php 10 million for the shiprepairer’s liability
policy. They entered into a contract where negligence was the only factor that could make CSEW liable
for damages. Moreover, liability of CSEW was limited to only Php 1million for damages. The Hull Policy
included an “Additional Perils (INCHMAREE)” Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the
negligence of, among others, ship repairmen.

William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW for repairs. The officers and cabin crew stayed at the
ship while it was being repaired. After the vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and
sank, resulting to its total loss.

William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it was through the latter’s negligence that the ship caught
fire and sank. Prudential was impleaded as co-plaintiff after it had paid the value of insured items. It was
subrogated to 45 million, or the value it claimed to indemnify.

The trial court brought judgment against CSEW 45 million for the ship indemnity, 65 million for loss of
income, and more than 13 million in other damages. The CA affirmed the TC decision.

CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due to William’s hotworks on the said portion of the ship
which they didn’t ask CSEW permission for.

Prudential, on the other hand, blamed the negligence of the CSEW workers in the instance when they
didn’t mind rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-conditioning unit that was already burning.

Hence this MFR.

Issue:

1. WON CSEW had “management and supervisory control“ of the ship at the time the fire broke out

2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies against the crew

3. WON Prudential has the right of subrogation against its own insured

4. WON the provisions limiting CSEW’s liability for negligence to a maximum of Php 1 million are valid

Held: Yes. Yes. Yes. No. Petition denied.

Ratio:

1. The that factual findings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.
They are entitled to great weight and respect when the CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the
trial court.
The CA and the Cebu RTC are agreed that the fire which caused the total loss of subject M/V Manila City
was due to the negligence of the employees and workers of CSEW.

Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions
of fact cannot be entertained.

2. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence.

The facts and evidence reveal the presence of these conditions. First, the fire would not have happened
in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised.

Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and the CA and as shown by the
records, is CSEW, which had control over subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs.

What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers didn’t
exercise due diligence in the care of subject vessel. The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that
CSEW was really negligent even without applying such doctrine.

3. Petitioner contends that Prudential is not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of William Lines, Inc.,
theorizing that (1) the fire which gutted M/V Manila City was an excluded risk and (2) it is a co-assured
under the Marine Hull Insurance Policy. This was wrong. The one who caused the fire has already been
adjudicated by the courts as CSEW.

Upon proof of payment by Prudential to William Lines, Inc., the former was subrogated to the right of the
latter to indemnification from CSEW. As aptly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the law says:

Art. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss,
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

When Prudential paid the latter the total amount covered by its insurance policy, it was subrogated to the
right of the latter to recover the insured loss from the liable party, CSEW.

Petitioner theorizes further that there can be no right of subrogation as it is deemed a co-assured under
the subject insurance policy with reliance on Clause 20 of the Work Order which states:

20. The insurance on the vessel should be maintained by the customer and/or owner of the vessel during
the period the contract is in effect.

Clause 20 of the Work Order in question is clear in the sense that it requires William Lines to maintain
insurance on the vessel during the period of dry-docking or repair. However, the fact that CSEW benefits
from the said stipulation does not automatically make it as a co-assured of William Lines. The intention of
the parties to make each other a co-assured under an insurance policy is to be read from the insurance
contract or policy itself and not from any other contract or agreement because the insurance policy
denominates the beneficiaries of the insurance. The hull and machinery insurance procured by William
Lines, Inc. from Prudential named only “William Lines, Inc.” as the assured. There was no manifestation
of any intention of William Lines, Inc. to constitute CSEW as a co-assured under subject policy. The claim
of CSEW that it is a co-assured is unfounded.

Then too, in the Additional Perils Clause of the same Marine Insurance Policy, it is provided that this
insurance also covers loss of or damage to vessel directly caused by the negligence of charterers and
repairers who are not assured.

As correctly pointed out by respondent Prudential, if CSEW were deemed a co-assured under the policy,
it would nullify any claim of William Lines, Inc. from Prudential for any loss or damage caused by the
negligence of CSEW. Certainly, no shipowner would agree to make a shiprepairer a co-assured under such
insurance policy; otherwise, any claim for loss or damage under the policy would be invalidated.

4. Although in this jurisdiction, contracts of adhesion have been consistently upheld as valid per se; as
binding as an ordinary contract, the Court recognizes instances when reliance on such contracts cannot
be favored especially where the facts and circumstances warrant that subject stipulations be disregarded.
Thus, in ruling on the validity and applicability of the stipulation limiting the liability of CSEW for
negligence to P1M only, the facts and circumstances vis-a-vis the nature of the provision sought to be
enforced should be considered, bearing in mind the principles of equity and fair play.

It is worthy to note that M/V Manila City was insured with Prudential for P45M. Upon thorough
investigation by its hull surveyor, M/V Manila City was found to be beyond economical salvage and repair.
The evaluation of the average adjuster also reported a constructive total loss. The said claim of William
Lines, Inc., was then found to be valid and compensable such that Prudential paid the latter the total value
of its insurance claim. Furthermore, it was ascertained that the replacement cost of the vessel, amounts
to P55M.

Considering the circumstances, it would unfair to limit the liability of petitioner to One Million Pesos only.
To allow CSEW to limit its liability to P1M notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered by the
assured and paid for by Prudential amounted to P45M would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence
short of what is ordinarily required because, then, it would not be difficult for petitioner to escape liability
by the simple expedient of paying an amount very much lower than the actual damage suffered by
William.

D.M. Consunji vs. CA and Juego

TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego

CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249

FACTS: Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell
14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in
Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around
2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the
elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose
was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely
inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie
and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov.
25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was
rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits
she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD: The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel.

Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision
is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the
trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent
pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

VICENTE JOSEFA, Petitioner, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182705 July 18, 2014

FACTS: At around 1:45 p.m. on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a vehicular
accident along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden electricity post, 3
75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line attachments were damaged. Upon investigation, Meralco
discovered that it was a truck registered in Josefa's name that hit the electricity post. Meralco demanded
from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement cost of the electricity post and its attachments, but Josefa
refused to pay. Thus, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the truck driver, for damages before the
RTC of Pasig City.
In its complaint, Meralco alleged that (Bautista) Manoco's reckless driving resulted in damage to its
properties. It also imputed primary liability on Josefa for his alleged negligence in the selection and
supervision of Manoco. The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC held that
Meralco failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The RTC ruled that SPO2
Galang's account of the accident was merely hearsay since he did not personally witness the incident. It
also did not give probative value to the police blotter entry dated January 7, 1994 since the accident had
long occurred in 1991.

The CA reversed the RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred in disregarding the parties' stipulation at the
pre-trial that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also found that Bautista was Josefa's
employee when the accident occurred since Josefa did not specifically deny this material allegation in the
amended complaint. It likewise noted that the sheriff's return stated that Bautista was under Josefa's
employ until 1993. The CA concluded that the fact that the truck hit the electricity post was sufficient to
hold Josefa vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista was negligent in driving the truck. In the same
breath, the CA also stated that the employer's presumptive liability in quasi-delicts was anchored on
injuries caused by the employee's negligence. Even assuming that Bautista was not Josefa's employee, the
CA maintained that Josefa would still be liable for damages since the law presumes that the registered
owner has control of his vehicle and its driver at the time of the accident. It thus ordered Josefa to pay
Meralco. Josefa filed the present petition after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration.

Issue/s:

(1) Whether or not Bautista exercised due diligence in driving when the truck hit the electricity post;

(2) Whether or not Josefa was the employer of driver Bautista being the registered owner of the vehicle
making the former vicariously liable for the latter’s negligence under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil
Code;

(3) Whether Meralco is entitled to actual damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.
Held: (1) Bautista did not exercise due diligence. Bautista's negligence was the proximate cause of the
property damage caused to Meralco. Bautista is presumed to be negligent in driving the truck under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. This fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict. Thus, for a quasi-delict case to prosper,
the complainant must establish: (1) damages to the complainant; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of
the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. With respect to the third
element, the negligent act or omission must be the proximate cause of the injury.

Contrary to the CA's finding, the parties did not stipulate that the truck hit the electricity post. The pre-
trial order shows that the parties merely agreed that the truck "was involved in an accident on April 21,
1991. Nonetheless, Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between the truck and the
electricity post through Abio's testimony. Abio categorically stated during trial that he saw the truck hit
the electricity post. We find his first-hand account of the incident during the directexamination frank and
straightforward. Even without Abio's testimony, it does not escape this Court's attention that Josefa
judicially admitted in his motions and pleading that his truck hit the electricity post. These statements
constitute deliberate, clear and unequivocal admissions of the causation in fact between the truck and
the electricity post.

Contrary to the CA's opinion, the finding that it was the truck that hit the electricity post would not
immediately result in Josefa's liability. It is a basic rule that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act
or omission that creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations. In turn, the employee's
negligence established to be the proximate cause of the damage would give rise to the disputable
presumption that the employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of the erring employee.

The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in quasi-delict cases is that the defendant's negligence is
presumed. For this doctrine to apply, the complainant must show that: (1) the accident is of such character
as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. The present case satisfies
all the elements of res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and extraordinary for the truck to hit an electricity
post, an immovable and stationary object, unless Bautista, who had the exclusive management and
control of the truck, acted with fault or negligence.

We cannot also conclude that Meralco contributed to the injury since it safely and permanently installed
the electricity post beside the street. Thus, in Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., we imputed vicarious
responsibility to Luzon Stevedoring Corp. whose barge rammed the bridge, also an immovable and
stationary object.

(2) YES. Josefa is vicariously liable under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code because there is an
employer-employee relations between Bautista and Josefa, and Josefa failed to show that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista.

The finding that Bautista acted with negligence in driving the truck gives rise to the application of
paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the employer vicariously liable for damages caused
by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks.

In the present case, Josefa avoids the application of this provision by denying that Bautista was his
employee at the time of the incident. Josefa cannot evade his responsibility by mere denial of his
employment relations with Bautista in the absence of proof that his truck was used without
authorization or that it was stolen when the accident occurred. In quasi-delict cases, the registered
owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of law. The registered owner of
any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused while the vehicle was being driven on highways or streets.