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Constitutional Law 1

The general rule is that provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future
legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already
been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. (Genuino Vs. De Lima April 17, 2018)

Provisions of Article 2 and other provisions of the Constitution are not Self- Executing

In Tañada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987
Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before
they can be implemented.

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x x These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review,
and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, the Supreme Court declared that Sections 11,
12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are
not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article
XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from
other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in
the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. (Genuino Vs. De Lima April 17,
2018)

But the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is self-executing even if it’s found in Section 16 of
Article 2 of the Constitution

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by
the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.(Oposa Vs. Factoran July 30, 1993)

Archipelagic Doctrine, concept

Archipelagic Doctrine states that all waters, around between and connecting different islands belonging to
the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, are necessary appurtences of its land
territory, forming an integral part of the national or inland waters, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the
Philippines. It is found in the second sentence of Article 1 of the 1987 constitution.

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Philippines still claims sovereignty and jurisdiction over Sabah in North Borneo

Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of
Sabah.

Section 2 of RA 5446 provides: “The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial
sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and sovereignty” (Magallona Vs. Ermita, August 16, 2011)

The Doctrine of Restrictive State Immunity is now the prevailing rule. When the government enters
into a contract, a distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the
sovereign state (jure imperii) from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts (jure gestionis)

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without
its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality
of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in
western Europe. (U.S Vs. Ruiz, See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209
[1984].)

Academic freedom to choose who should teach pursuant to reasonable standards carries with it
the freedom to remove who did not meet the standards set for teaching

It is settled that an employer has the right to dismiss its erring employees as a measure of self-protection
against acts inimical to its interest. 76 With respect to schools, this right must be seen in light of their
recognized prerogative to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers. The exercise of that prerogative
is pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution for schools to provide quality education 77 and its recognition
of their academic freedom to choose who should teach pursuant to reasonable standards. 78 We find those
standards to be present in this case.

Therefore, respondent college cannot be faulted for finding the performance of petitioners inimical to its
interest as a school after the cited infractions. As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, petitioners were
teachers who handled in their classrooms women and men at an impressionable age, not mere inanimate
and repeatable objects as in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, teachers stand as role models for living
out basic values, which include respect for authority. 79 Because of the failure of petitioners to live up to
that standard, this Court finds that their dismissal was for a valid cause. (Fallarme Vs. San Juan De Dios,
September 14, 2016)

Enrolled Bill prevails, except as to maters which, under the Constitution, must be entered in the
Legislative Journal (2017 Bar)

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires
it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of
House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed
by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but

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only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also
declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that
error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
(Astroga Vs. Villegas, April 30, 1974)

Since there was no appropriation for the purchase of the subject textbooks, the respondent COA
had reason to deny the money claim as Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law."

Aside from these inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies, there was also no appropriation for the
purchase of the subject textbooks as the SARO in the amount of P63,638,750.00, upon which petitioner
DPI anchors its claim, pertains to the payment of personal services or salaries of the teachers, not for the
purchase of textbooks.

Anent petitioner DPI's claim that there were funds available for the procurement of the subject textbooks
but the funds were inadvertently reverted to the National Treasury because the said amount was twice
obligated under Personal Service, this has been addressed by the Assistant Commissioner Gloria S.
Cornejo of the LGS in the Memorandum dated April 29, 2008, to wit:

a. There are no records to show that the funds were available when DECS-ARMM entered
into contract with [petitioner DPI] because SARO No. B-98-03383 dated October 10, 1998
was released by DBM for payment of salaries and compensation benefits of 490 positions
for Teacher I, but without the corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation thus the allotment
obligated became a prior year's accounts payable of the Department;

b. The DBM issued two (2) Notices of Cash Allocation (NCA) for the SARO cited in (a) above.
NCA No. 091427 dated May 5, 1999 was transferred to DECS-ARMM under ADA No. 99-
7-049 for payment of salaries, while NCA No. 091094 dated April 22, 1999 was reverted to
the Bureau of Treasury on December 31, 1999. As stated by the DepEd Secretary, only
one accounts payable was recorded in the OSEC books chargeable against the SARO to
cover payment of personal services only.(Daraga Press Vs. COA, June 15, 2016)

5 reasons why the Pork Barrel System was voided

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In
the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates.

1. insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment


authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of
powers;

2. insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine and insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended
by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public
funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

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3. insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process,
denied the President the power to veto items;

4. insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in
the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability; and

5. insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely
local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine
local autonomy ; (Belgica Vs. Ochoa, November 19, 2013)

Cross-border augmentations from savings are prohibited by the Constitution(Bar 2017)

By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has
delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from
crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call
such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations. (Araullo Vs. Aquino, July 1,
2014)

The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status
of the items as unalloted or unreleased. This does not amount to the generation of “savings” for
the purpose of applying the power of augmentation under Article 6, Section 25(5) of the
Constitution. (Bar 2017)

Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been an allotment or authorization to
incur obligations and disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued either an ABM (for those
not needing clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and consequently an NCA, NCAA or
CDC, as the case may be. Appropriations remain unreleased, for instance, because of noncompliance with
documentary requirements (like the Special Budget Request), or simply because of the unavailability of
funds. But the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to which they were allocated under the
GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo, unreleased appropriations refer to
appropriations with allotments but without disbursement authority.

For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of
savings, would seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had
not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis-à-vis the PAPs for which Congress had
allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an allotment
and NCA for such vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may already
constitute savings for that agency under the second instance.

Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings"
in the GAA, that is, as "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any
obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the three enumerated
instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately
declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed. This signified that
the DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.
(Araullo Vs. Aquino, July 1, 2014)

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The mere calling upon the Senate to look into possible violations of section 5 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt practice law is not considered to be in aid of legislation

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the
petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of
that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants
therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since
the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto,
the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been
acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the
respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan
would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial
tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the
possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be
discounted. The SBRC’s probe and inquiry into the same justiciable controversy already before the
Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much
earlier set in. (Bengzon Vs. SBRC, November 20, 1991)

But the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial
body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy
to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation.

Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The Court notes
that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical
scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign
securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for
remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity. (Standard
Chartered Bank Vs. Senate Committee on banks, December 27, 2007)

The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the


Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared unconstitutional for being violative of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, null and void.

Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by
the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the
exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein,
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and

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functions on said officials.[30] Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any
compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her
designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.(Funa Vs. Ermita, February 11, 2010)

The designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity
with his position as the Acting Solicitor General for being unconstitutional and violative of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution thus, null and void.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit
were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment
during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided

duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference
to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held
by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether It was of no
moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra,
plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this
regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration
of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and permanent or
temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.30 To construe differently is to
"open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in
the Executive Department and of limitations on the President’s power of appointment in the guise of
temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-
charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations."

Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the
primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices
are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an
incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as the
Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for
being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution. (Funa Vs. Agra, February 19, 2013)

The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held
without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the concerned official's office.

To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held
without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It
refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred
by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain
office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary
of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports
Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority. (Civil Liberies Union Vs. Executive Secretary, February 22,
1991)

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The President’s act through the issuance of a Letter of Instruction (LOI) ordering the PNP and the
Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression is
actually an exercise of his “Calling Out power” under the Constitution.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups,
kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila. We do not doubt the veracity of the
Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes
judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities,
and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering
all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power. (IBP Vs. Zamora, August 15, 2000)

The President’s martial law power and to suspend the privilege of Habeas Corpus are justiciable
controversies while his calling out power is a political question which is outside the province of the
Courts unless there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Chief Executive

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must
be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required
in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of
the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis,
then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity
of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to
the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature
not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call
out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao,
where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the
necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription
for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order
every time it is exercised.

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Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in
order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the
exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be
accorded respect from this Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, violent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings
and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila...[35] We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents
assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice
of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other
public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these
facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and
in the exercise of this constitutional power. (IBP Vs. Zamora, August 15, 2000)

The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution refers
to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers.

Section 18, Article VII provides that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding, filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" refers to any action
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the
Chief Executive's emergency powers. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be
resolved by the Court. A certiorari petition under Rule 65 is not the proper mode of review. The Court is
limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e.,
whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient
for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The parameters for
determining the sufficiency of factual basis are: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it;
the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that
there is actual rebellion or invasion. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4,2017)

Pardon results in removing the person’s disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain the post of the person granted as assistant city treasurer, the
person granted of pardon must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities
referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by
reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately
whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment. (Monsanto Vs. Factoran, February 9, 1989)

Former President Arroyo’s grant of pardon to former President Joseph Estrada is absolute. The
third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

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Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the
pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage
and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering
the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the
reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." 40 Whereas clauses do not form part
of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. 41 In this
case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC Commissioner Maria Gracia
Padaca’s separate concurring opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in SPA
No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the essence of the legal effect of preambular paragraphs/whereas
clauses, viz:

The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January 2010 Resolution did not conclude upon.
Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal raised the same argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause" or
preambular paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states that "Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office." On this contention, the undersigned reiterates
the ruling of the Commission that the 3rd preambular paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect
on the absolute nature of the pardon extended by former President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This
ruling is consistent with the traditional and customary usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case of
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of preambular paragraphs
or whereas clauses on statutes.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek
a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself.
Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission
is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. (Emphasis supplied.)

Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo’s silence on former President Estrada’s decision to
run for President in the May 2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of the political party of
former President Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her
intention to restore him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office. (Risos-Vidal Vs. COMELEC,
January 21, 2015)

Prohibition on midnight appointments does not extend to members of the members of the Judiciary

Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article
are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular,

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Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon
the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the
President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. (De Castro v. Judicial And Bar Council, March 17,
2010)

The Chief Executive does not have disciplinary authority over the Ombudsman

Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 vesting disciplinary authority on the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is, thus, unconstitutional. Subjecting the Deputy
Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true
for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. (Gonzales III v. Ochoa; Barreras Sulit v. Ochoa, Feb.26,
2014)

The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down in Section 17, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the "power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." Such "executive control", however, is not
absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding
degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be
effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate
procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this
Court’s rulemaking power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the
procedure in all courts.

A petition for Certiorari is an appropriate action to undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions

the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section
1 of Article of the Constitution which states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

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settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the expanded concept of Judicial Review, supra, to set right and
undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the
challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate
cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the
republican system of checks and balances.

Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become more
alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power
in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief Executive’s spending power.
(Araullo Vs. Aquino, July 1, 2014; Jardeleza Vs. Sereno, August 19, 2014)

The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed
by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches, thus is considered to be a political
question

In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to
waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our
country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would
mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that “the
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible
to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has
his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. (Vinuya VS. Executive Secretary, April 28,
2010)

The practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

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The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government
– to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house
in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. (Chavez Vs. JBC, April 16, 2013)

The designation of the Civil Service Commission Chairman in an ex officio capacity, as Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF is null and void

Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general
rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment
in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position.

As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government
corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the Department of Labor,
respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President.47 The corporate
powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing Boards,
members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the control
of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.

In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of
the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is
only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any
office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose
existence is without any legal or constitutional basis. (Funa Vs. CSC, November 25, 2014)

The 1-year bar rule in impeachment cases reckons from the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice. (Bar 2017)

The impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it
by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is
the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. (Gutierrez Vs. Committee on Justice)

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Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it has been held that "[a]liens, whether
individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are
also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.

In the case at bench, Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with his own funds the subject
lot; hence, Mike was its real purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing that if the deed of sale
at all proclaimed that she (Taina) was the purchaser or buyer of the subject property and this subject
property was placed under her name, it was simply because she and Mike wanted to skirt or circumvent
the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from acquiring or purchasing lands in
the Philippines. Indeed, both the CA and the RTC exposed and laid bare Taina's posturing and pretense
for what these really are: that in the transaction in question, she was a mere dummy, a spurious stand-in,
for her erstwhile common-law husband, who was not a Filipino then, and never attempted to become a
naturalized Filipino citizen thereafter.(Manigque-Stone Vs. Cattleya Land, September 5, 2016)

A dully registered Cooperatives is not liable to pay the assessed deficiency withholding taxes on
interest from the savings and time deposits of its members, as well as the delinquency interest of
20% per annum.

BIR Ruling No. 551-88 clearly states, without any qualification, that since interest from any Philippine
currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes are paid by banks,
cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time
deposits of their members. This interpretation was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] dated October
5, 2006, which was issued by Assistant Commissioner James H. Roldan upon the request of the
cooperatives for a confirmatory ruling on several issues, among which is the alleged exemption of interest
income on members deposit (over and above the share capital holdings) from the 20% final withholding
tax. (Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative Vs. CIRJanuary 22, 2010)

Constitutional Law 2

Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes
entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.

When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the
just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Even under Sec. 4,
Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just
compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to
depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is
the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. (City of Ilo-Ilo Vs. Contreras- Besana, (February 12,
2010)

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Statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just
compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining
the amount thereof.

Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly
emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and
that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as
to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

This ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Lubinao, National Power Corporation v. Tuazon and National Power
Corporation v. Saludares and continues to be the controlling doctrine. Notably, in all these cases, Napocor
likewise argued that it is liable to pay the property owners for the easement of right-of-way only and not the
full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. But we uniformly held in those cases that
since the high-tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the
property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense
them for the full market value of their property. (NAPOCOR Vs. Spouses Zabala and Baylon, January 30,
2013)

An ordinance banning aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all
agricultural entities in Davao City violates the equal protection clause as it the same is not based
on a valid classification

A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve. In the
process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is drastically
underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end
because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law. The claim that aerial spraying produces more
aerial drift cannot likewise be sustained in view of the petitioners' failure to substantiate the same.

The respondents have refuted this claim, and have maintained that on the contrary, manual spraying
produces more drift than aerial treatment. As such, the decision of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted
with arbitrariness. Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be
"overinclusive" because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a
wider range of individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law.

It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the
substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The
respondents admit that they aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and
other substances. The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides
and regardless of the agricultural activity being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently
bears no relation to the purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which
the ordinance seeks to address. The burden now will become more onerous to various entities, including
the respondents and even others with no connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of the ordinance.
(Mosqueda Vs. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters (August 16, 2016)

State may regulate the posting of commercial ads on vehicles

A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation on the


ownership of the vehicle per se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not
have any relation to its operation as a PUV. On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial

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advertisements on windows of buses, because it hinders police authorities from seeing whether the
passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate. It has a direct relation to
the operation of the vehicle as a PUV, i.e., the safety of the passengers. (1UTAK v. COMELEC, April 14,
2015,).

Public Assembly Act (B.P 880) is a mere content-neutral restriction which does not require the use
of the clear and present danger test

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v.
Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies.

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based
because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and
entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for
redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Bayan Vs. Ermita, April 25, 2006)

COMELEC’s act in utilizing the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad from the
list of qualified contenders in the Party List Elections constitutes a violation of the non-
establishment clause enshrined in the Constitution

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for
is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad from the
list of qualified contenders in the Party List Elections.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects. (Ang Ladlad Vs. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)

“Facial Challenge”, also known as “First Amendment Challenge” has been expanded to include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge,
is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S.

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has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application
of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant
with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine
if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient
that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
(Imbong Vs Ochoa, April 8, 2014)

The following provisions of the RH Law were declared by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his
or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or
shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;

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7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
(Imbong Vs Ochoa, April 8, 2014)

OCA Circular No. 49-2003 issued by the Supreme Court is not a “restriction” on the right to travel
but is merely a regulation”, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel,
before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from
doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.

True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution.1âwphi1 However, the exercise of such right is
not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided
that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided
by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of
administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely
regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on
leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is
to govern or direct according to rule.

To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application
for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the
Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on his
Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to
Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.7

For traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, the respondent is guilty of violation
of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, violation of
Supreme Court directives and circular is considered a less serious charge and, therefore, punishable by
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. (OCA vs. Judge Macarine,
July 18, 2012)

A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct.

In 2004, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that where a government agencys computer use policy
prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that
employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems
and technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and
contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer
was admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard
drive was first remotely examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor received
complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages
throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the
prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy
disks were taken and examined.

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A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured by the police
department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well as the subsequent
warrantless searches was held as valid under the OConnor ruling that a public employer can investigate
work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception and
scope. Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions
into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise
find no merit in his contention that OConnor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does
not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioners
computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield
incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of
such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. (Pollo Vs. David, October 18, 2011)

A letter admitting shortage of dollars in the collection in a bank is not an uncounseled confession.

The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the
assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section 26, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court that is admissible against her. Such rule provides that the act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. An admission, if voluntary, is
admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with
the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the admission does not. (US v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578). By virtue of
its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter. The
letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified
theft. Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused
acknowledging guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein. (People v.
Cristobal, March 30, 2011).

When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing
must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused. The application for
bail should not out rightly be granted by the judge even if the Prosecutor did not object to such
application.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail
applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from
the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume
that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the
guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon
the prosecutor."

Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to conduct a hearing despite the prosecution's refusal
to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.

The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties
of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in

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connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member
of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution,
on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong
enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural
due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of
the application for bail.

Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the
Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.

Cost-recovery mechanics imposed by ERC does not violate the non-impairment clause. The
measure is a valid exercise of police power, an inherent power which is superior to the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution,

The regulation of rates imposed to public utilities such as electricity distributors is an exercise of the State’s
police power, like the order to refund over-recoveries charged to their customers. When private property is
used for a public purpose and is affected by public interest, it ceases to be jurisprivati only and becomes
subject to regulation.

As the state agency charged with the regulation of electric cooperatives, ERC is mandated to protect public
interest by directing NEECO to refund over-charges it made to its consumers. Moreover, the computation
made by the ERC to determine the cap was a mechanism purely for cost recovery and should not be
income-generating. Nor can the cost-recovery mechanism imposed be deemed an impairment of the
contracts entered into by NEECO prior to the enactment of RA 7832 since all private contracts must yield
to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare (Nueva Ecija Electric
Coop., Inc (NEECOI) v. ERC, February 3, 2016).

Failure to inform the accused of his right to counsel upon arrest does not automatically result in
the acquittal of the accused

The presentation of the marked money is immaterial in this case since the crime of illegal delivery of a
dangerous drug can be committed even without consideration or payment. The positive testimony of SPO1
Acosta that appellant was informed of his constitutional rights upon arrest also prevails over the
uncorroborated and self-serving testimony to the contrary of the latter. Even assuming that appellant was
not informed of his right to counsel upon arrest, the same will not result in his acquittal since the rule is that
such an infraction renders inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation.26 Here, appellant did not confess or admit the charge against him and even raised the
defenses of denial and alibi. His guilt was established by the testimonies of the police officers. (People of
the Philippines Vs. Alfredo Reyes y Santos, February 18, 2015)

Citizenship

Foundlings are considered natural-born citizens of the country in which the foundling is found

Petitioner's evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus
sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness;
twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as
citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally

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accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country
in which the foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly
refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted.
Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued
only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings
were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own
making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a
member of the community of nations. (Poe-Llamanzares Vs. COMELEC. March 8, 2016)

Administrative Law

The power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory

It is already well-settled that "the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability
is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory." As we have explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, the fact "that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with the order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action under Section
15(3) of RA No. 6770; is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's 'recommendation' is not merely advisory
in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.(Fajardo Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, August
23, 2012)

Election Law

A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character. On the other hand, annulment


proceedings before the COMELEC are not summary in character; petitioner had every opportunity
to ventilate his case and substantiate his allegations before the Commission.

It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law
that pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation.
The Board of Canvassers (BOC) will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the
face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished.

Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation controversy, Section 20 of
RA 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs are contested before the BOC. Compliance
with this procedure is mandatory, so as to permit the BOC to resolve the objections as quickly as possible.
After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the uncontested returns, it shall suspend
the canvass. Any party adversely affected by the ruling has 48 hours to file a Notice of Appeal; the appeal

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shall be filed within five days. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the BOC will make its report to the
COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases where the ERs appear to have
been tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC shall examine the other copies of the questioned
returns and, if the other copies are likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, or otherwise spurious, after
having given notice to all candidates and satisfied itself that the integrity of the ballot box and of the ballots
therein have been duly preserved, shall order a recount of the votes cast, prepare a new return which shall
be used by the BOC as basis for the canvass, and direct the proclamation of the winner accordingly. (Sao
Jr. Vs. COMELEC, February 3, 2010)

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary
act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for
an elective position.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the
very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMER

ICA and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America."

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of
his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American
citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was
not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US
passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. (Casan
Maquiling Vs. COMELEC, April 16, 2013)

Law on Public Officers

The power of a court to issue provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to
issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction
into effect. The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction,
is exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of
the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or
fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or
denied.

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others,
the current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the
reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided.

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A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures
availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents
in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear
that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or
threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status
quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action
in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit. In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a
case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin
an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making
authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under
the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province
of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed
the means of implementing an existing right since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the
applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending
litigation. (Conchita CarpioMorales v. CA, et al November 10, 2015)

Condonation doctrine is without basis under the Constitution and law.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the other legal provisions now leads to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases. To begin with, the concept of public office is a
public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under
the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to
a second term of office, or even another elective post.

Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction,
liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil. 920, 937 [1991], to apply
to administrative offenses (Conchita CarpioMorales v. CA, et al November 10, 2015)

Reorganization must be done in good faith.

It is a well-established rule that a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general
rule, the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the
bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of
good faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of
an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a
reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. (Gayatano v. CSC, June 27, 1992).

Consequently, before a demotion may be effected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the rules
on bona fide abolition of public office is essential. (Bautista v. CSC, et al., July 22, 2010).

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Public International Law

What is sovereign immunity?

The result of independence, territorial supremacy, and equality. A state shall enjoy immunity from the
exercise of jurisdiction by another state, except when it has given its consent or submitted voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the state concerned. A state enjoys immunity in respect of itself and its property, from the
jurisdiction of the courts of another state subject to the provisions of the present Convention [UN Convention
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2004].

What is the rule on use of force in international relations?

All United Nations Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations [Article 2(4), UN Charter].

What is the rule on self-defense in international relations?

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security [Article 51,
UN Charter].

What are the privileges and immunities of a diplomatic agent?

1. The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or
detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent
any attack on his person, freedom or dignity [Article 29, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(VCDR)]. 2. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection
as the premises of the mission. 3. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of
article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability [Article 30, VCDR]. 4. A diplomatic agent shall
enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its
civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: a. A real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for
the purposes of the mission; b. An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved
as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; c.
An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State outside his official functions. 5. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a
witness. 6. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the cases
coming under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this article, and provided that the measures
concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence. 7. The immunity
of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction
of the sending State.

What is a jus cogens norm or peremptory norm of international law, and what is the status of a
treaty provision which conflicts with such a norm?

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international
law peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international

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community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character [Article 53, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties]

What is the right of legation in International Law? (Bar 2017)

Also known as the right of diplomatic intercourse, the right of legation refers to the right of the State to send
and receive diplomatic missions, which enables States to carry on friendly intercourse.

What is extradition? The principles of dual criminality and specialty?

The practice of extradition enables one state to hand over to another state suspected or convicted criminals
who have fled to the territory of the former. It is based upon bilateral treaty law and does not exist as an
obligation upon states in customary law. It is usual to derive from existing treaties on the subject certain
general principles, for example that of double criminality, i.e. that the crime involved should be a crime in
both states concerned, and that of specialty, i.e. a person surrendered may be tried and punished only for
the offence for which extradition had been sought and granted [Shaw, International Law].

Who are stateless persons?

For the purpose of this Convention, the term “stateless person” means a person who is not considered as
a national by any State under the operation of its law (Article 1(1), 1954 Convention Relating to the Status
of Stateless Persons).

What are the elements before one may be considered as a refugee?

1. The person is Outside the country of his nationality, or in the case of Stateless persons, outside the
country of habitual residence; 2. The person lacks National protection; 3. The person fears Persecution in
his own country. The second element makes a refugee a Stateless person. Only a person who is granted
asylum by another State can apply for refugee status; thus the refugee treaties imply the principle of asylum.

Who are considered participants in a war?

Under international law, there are two classifications of participants in a war. These are combatants and
noncombatants. Combatants are those who engage directly in the hostilities, while Non-combatants are
those who do not engage directly in the hostilities, such as women and children.

Who are combatants?

Combatants are those individuals who are legally entitled to take part in hostilities. These include: 1.
Regular Forces (RF) – members of the armed forces except those not actively engaged in combat. These
are the army, navy, and air force. Non-combatant members of the armed forces include: chaplains, army
services and medical personnel. 2. Irregular Forces (IF) – also known as franctireurs consist of militia and
voluntary corps. These are members of organized resistance groups, such as the guerrillas. They are
treated as lawful combatants provided that they are: a. Being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; b. Wearing a fixed distinctive sign or some type of uniform; c Carrying arms openly; and d.
Obeying the laws and customs of war. 2. Non-privileged Combatants (NPC) – individuals who take up arms
or commit hostile acts against the enemy without belonging to the armed forces or forming part of the
irregular forces. If captured, they are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war. 3. Citizens who rise in a
“levee en masse” – The inhabitants of unoccupied territory who, on approach of the enemy, spontaneously
take arms to resist the invading troops without having time to organize themselves, provided only that they:

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a. Carry arms openly; and b. Observe the laws and customs of war. 4. The officers and crew members of
merchant vessels who forcibly resist attack.

Define the principle of postliminium.

The principle of postlminium provides for the revival or reversion to the old laws and sovereignty of territory
which has been under belligerent occupation once control of the belligerent occupant is lost over the
territory affected.

Define the principle of uti possidetis.

The principle of uti possidetis allows retention of property or territory in the belligerent’s actual possession
at the time of the cessation of hostilities

Define Jus ad bellum (Law on the use of force)

It seeks to limit resort to force between States. States must refrain from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of another state (Art. 2, par. 4, UN Charter). Exceptions
to this principle are provided in case of selfdefense or following a decision adopted by the UN Security
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Status Quo Ante Bellum Each of the belligerents is
entitled to the territory and property which it had possession of at the commencement of the war.

Who are stateless persons?

For the purpose of this Convention, the term “stateless person” means a person who is not considered as
a national by any State under the operation of its law (Article 1(1), 1954 Convention Relating to the Status
of Stateless Persons).

What is the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)?

According to Art. 36 of the ICJ Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and
conventions in force. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court.

Define a treaty under international law.

Under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty means an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

Define innocent passage.

Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b)
any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information to the

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prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State; (d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the
defence or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; (f) the
launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; (g) the loading or unloading of any commodity,
currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the
coastal State; (h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; (i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; (k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of
communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; (l) any other activity not having a
direct bearing on passage.

What are the two elements of customary international law?

International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements:
the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is
a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
[Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697 (2016)]

What is the precautionary principle?

The Precautionary Principle is provided under Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. It states that in order to
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious damage, lack of full scientific certainly shall not be used as
a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.

What is the Polluter Pays Principle?

The Polluter Pays Principle means that the party responsible for producing the pollutants must bear
responsibility for shouldering the costs of the damage done to the environment.

The Rome Statute accords the International Criminal Court jurisdiction over which crimes?

The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the
following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of
aggression. [Rome Statute, Art. 5]

What laws apply in cases before the ICC?

In the first place, the Rome Statute applies. In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and
the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of
armed conflict shall apply. Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.

Explain the Doctrine of Command Responsibility (Bar 2017)

Under Article 28 of the Rome Statute, a military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces
under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where: 1. That military commander

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HO No. 1

or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 2. That military commander or person failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

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