G.R. No.
150194 March 6, 2007 as a violation of law, particularly of the
ROBERT TAYABAN et. Al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In 1988, Roberto Tayaban was the mayor of
Tinoc, Ifugao. He made a project proposal with
the Governor for a public market to be erected.
The same was approved and it was funded by the
Cordillera Executive Board. Pugong began
erecting the market but in 1989, Tayaban and
Tinoc’s councilors enforced a resolution to
demolish the structure being built on the ground
that the structure is not being erected in the
proper area as specified by Tayaban and that the
structure is a public nuisance and by virtue of
police power to protect general welfare.
Tayaban and some councilors then went to the
site and demolished the structure. Pugong sued
Tayaban et al for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Pugong also averred that
the resolution reviewing the said local public
development project that the council passed in
1989 was not posted in a conspicuous place as
required by Sections 56 and 59(a) of the 1991
LGC. Tayaban lost and he appealed contending
that he demolished the structure by virtue of PD
1096.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tayaban’s demolition of
the structure is a valid exercise of police power
by a LGU officer.
HELD: No. The SC is not impressed with
Tayaban’s contention that the subject demolition
is a valid exercise of police power. The exercise
of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of a common right. In the present
case, the acts of Tayaban have been established
provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
On the other hand though, as held by the OSG,
Sec 56 and 59 of the LGC of 1991 is not
applicable as said law was not yet passed in 1989
hence there was no need for Tayaban to post the
’89 resolution in a conspicuous place. Also,
Tayaban’s defense that he acted by virtue of LOI
19 and PD 1096 is a mere afterthought, nowhere
in the resolution was it said that they are going
to demolish because of these two laws but rather
only on the ground that the market being built is
in the wrong place. Further, Tayaban actually
never specified as to where he intended the
market to be built.
G.R. No. 177807 October 11, 2011
EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner, vs. CITY
GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
SERENO, J.:
FACTS: Gaycanco owns a property, of which he
was able to obtain a building permit for a two-
storey commercial building. The Quezon City
Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which
orders the construction of Arcades for
Commercial Buildings. Gancayco had been
successful in his petition to have his property,
already covered by the amended ordinance,
exempted from the ordinance.
MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to
Gancayco part of his property had to be
demolished, if he did not clear that part within
15 days, which Gancayco did not comply with,
and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall,
or “wing walls.” Gancayco then filed a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC. He sought the
declaration of nullity of the ordinance and
payment for damages. The RTC, however,
declared that the Ordinance was
unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. defendant that the smoke from the plant was
MMDA appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the very injurious to their health and comfort.
CA partly granted the appeal. Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee
to investigate and report upon the matters
ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of
contained in said complaints. The committee
Gancayco’s property can be constituted as a
reported that the complaints were well-founded.
public nuisance.
The defendant counsel then passed a resolution
HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the
which demands that the smokestacks of the said
Court of Appeals. The court decided that the
factory be elevated or else the factory operations
wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a
will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by
nuisance per se, as under Art. 694 of the Civil
filing for injunction.
Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as
any act, omission, establishment, business, Issue: Whether or not the resolution alone issued
condition or property, or anything else that (1) by the municipal council is sufficient to label and
injures of endangers the health or safety of the abate the supposed nuisance in this case?
others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
Held: In the present case it is certain that the ice
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It
(4) obstruct or interferes with the free passage
is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people,
of any public highway or street, or any body of
and conducive to their health and comfort. If it
water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of
be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its
property.
operation, that question cannot be determined
A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner
nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se are is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a
those which affect the immediate safety of judicial tribunal.
persons and property and may summarily be
It is said that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to
abated under the undefined law of necessity. As
build its smokestack higher if said stack is in fact
Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit
a nuisance, for the reason that the stack was built
to construct the building, it was implied that the
under authority granted by the defendant, and in
city engineer did not consider the building as
accordance with the prescribed requirements. If
such of a public nuisance, or a threat to the safety
the charter or license does not expressly subject
of persons and property.
the business or industry to the exercise of the
G.R. No. L-7012 March 26, 1913 police power by the State, it is conceded by the
great preponderance of authority that such a
THE ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE
reservation is implied to the extent that may be
COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, vs.THE
reasonably necessary for the public welfare.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952
TRENT, J.:
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs.
The plaintiff, upon authority granted by the
GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and
defendant, constructed an ice and cold storage
THE COURT OF APPEALS
plant in the city of Iloilo. Sometime after the
plant had been completed and was in operation, BENGZON, J.:
nearby residents made complaints to the
It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant
factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose
premises were installed two tanks full of water,
nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine.
While the factory compound was surrounded
with fence, the tanks themselves were not
provided with any kind of fence or top covers.
There was no guard assigned on the gate.
At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son,
Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while
playing with and in company of other boys of his
age entered the factory premises through the
gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and
while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of
the tank, only to be fished out later, already a
cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia
secondary to drowning."
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, took the view that the
petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive
nuisance is applicable in this case?
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that
“One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable
to a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that
the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location. In the case bar, the
tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine
thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for
Mario’s death.
G.R. No. 140487 April 2, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT,
respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: The Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa
Mangubat donated a parcel of land to the Bureau
of Public Schools, Zamboanga del Sur. In the
Deed of Donation, it was stated that the said
property should “be used exclusively and forever
for school purposes only.”
However, the appropriation for school building
could not be released since the government
required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare
parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, the
School Authorities entered into a Deed of
Exchange whereby the donated lot was
exchanged with the bigger lot.
Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school
buildings were constructed on the new school
site and the school building previously erected
on the donated lot was dismantled and
transferred to the new location.
RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared the
donation null and void on the grounds that the
donation was not properly accepted and the
condition imposed on the donation was violated.
ISSUE:Whether the donation is null and void due
to an alleged violation of the condition in the
donation.
HELD: The Supreme Court hold that there was a
valid acceptance of the donation. In the case at
bar, a school building was immediately
constructed after the donation was executed the
condition for the donation was not in any way
violated when the lot donated was exchanged
with another one. The purpose for the donation
remains the same, which is for the establishment
of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was
not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of
the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance
and enhancement of the purpose of the donation.
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the
donation was not in any way violated when the
lot donated was exchanged with another one.
The purpose for the donation remains the same,
which is for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or
affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a
much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for
the release of funds for the construction of
Bagong Lipunan school building which could not
be accommodated by the limited area of the
donated lot.
G.R. No. 146586 January 26, 2005
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and
SPORTS, petitioner, vs. JULIA DEL ROSARIO,
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, PACENCIA DEL
ROSARIO, and HEIRS OF SANTOS DEL
ROSARIO
CARPIO, J.:
Respondents alleged that they own a parcel of
land situated in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The Property
was registered in 1976 in the name of
respondents. Respondents alleged that the
Kaypombo Primary School Annex ("KPPS")
under DECS was occupying a portion of the
Property through respondents’ tolerance and
that of their predecessors-in-interest.
Respondents further alleged that KPPS refused
to vacate the premises despite their valid
demands to do so.
DECS countered that KPPS’s occupation of a
portion of the Property was with the express
consent and approval of respondents’ father, the
late Isaias Del Rosario. DECS claimed that
sometime in 1959 Isaias donated a portion of the
Property to the Municipality of Sta. Maria for
school site purposes. KPPS started occupying
the Donated Site in 1962. At present, KPPS caters
to the primary educational needs of
approximately 60 children between the ages of 6
and 8. Because of the donation, DECS now claims
ownership of the Donated Site.
On 7 July 1993, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing respondents’ complaint for
recovery of possession. The CA affirmed it.
Issue: Did PETITIONER FAIL TO PROVE THE
DUE EXECUTION OR EXISTENCE OF THE DEED
OF DONATION
Held: Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that
the donation of real property must be made in a
public instrument. Otherwise, the donation is
void. A deed of donation acknowledged before a
notary public is a public document. The notary
public shall certify that he knows the person
acknowledging the instrument and that such
person is the same person who executed the
instrument, acknowledging that the instrument
is his free act and deed. The acceptance may be
made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate instrument. An acceptance made in a
separate instrument must also be in a public
document. If the acceptance is in a separate
public instrument, the donor shall be notified in
writing of such fact. Both instruments must state
the fact of such notification.
The SC do not find reversible error in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
government can expropriate at any time the
Donated Site, paying just compensation to
respondents.
G.R. No. 198636 October 8, 2014
ESPERANZA C. CARINAN, Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES GAVINO CUETO and CARMELITA
CUETO
REYES, J.:
The respondents alleged that sometime in May
1986, Esperanza and her husband, Jose Carinan,
acquired from one Roberto Ventura the rights
over a parcel of land under the name of the GSIS.
Esperanza and Jose were to assume the payment
of the applicable monthly amortizations for the
subject land to the GSIS.
The respondents alleged that Esperanza and
Jazer undertook to execute a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the respondents subject to the
condition that they would be given the first
option to buy it back within three years by
reimbursing the expenses incurred by the
respondents on the property.
Sometime in 2006, the respondents demanded
from Esperanza and Jazer the fulfillment of their
commitment to transfer the subject property to
the respondents’ names. When Esperanza and
Jazer failed to comply despite efforts for an
amicable settlement, the respondents filed with
the RTC a complaint for specific performance
with damages. The trial court decided in favor of
respondents which the CA affirmed.
Issue: Was there a valid donation?
Held: A donation must comply with the
mandatory formal requirements set forth by law
for its validity. When the subject of donation is
purchase money, Article 748 of the NCC is
applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money
as well as its acceptance should be in writing.
Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-
compliance with the formal requisites prescribed
by law.
Although the Court affirms the trial and appellate
courts' ruling that, first, there was no donation in
this case and, second, the respondents are
entitled to a return of the amounts which they
spent for the subject property, it still cannot
sustain the respondents' plea for Esperanza's full
conveyance of the subject property. To impose
the property's transfer to the respondents'
names would totally disregard Esperanza's
interest and the payments which she made for
the property's purchase.
[G.R. No. L-4225. August 25, 1952.]
LORENZA CONCEPCION, ET AL., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. EMILIA CONCEPCION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Facts: On November 18, 1947, the donor
Manuela Concepcion died. Plaintiffs-appellees
instituted a special with the Court of First
Instance for the summary settlement of the
estate of their aunt, the donor. The donee Emilia
Concepcion filed opposition to the petition for
summary settlement claiming that the six parcels
subject of the donation belonged to her.
The Court in said special proceedings without
deciding the title and right of possession to the
six parcels claimed by Emilia, merely ordered the
partition of the estate of Manuela Concepcion
among all her heirs who are besides the six
petitioners, Emilia Concepcion and her four
brothers. In her answer Emilia claimed title to
said properties by reason of the donation and
submitted a copy of the deed of donation. After
trial, the lower court found that the donation was
one mortis causa.
Issue: Whether the deed of donation is inter
vivos or mortis causa?
Held: The donor or rather the person who
drafted the deed, in using the phrase "mortis
causa" and in providing that the donation should
take effect only after the donor’s death simply
meant that the possession and enjoyment of the
fruits of the properties donated should take
effect only after the donor’s death and not
before, although this intention is rendered even
dubious due to the fact that in one paragraph of
the donation, she stated that she had reserved
what was sufficient and necessary for her
maintenance which may mean that all the
properties donated were deemed transferred to
the donee immediately after the donation had
been accepted.
Presuming that the donor Manuela and the
donee Emilia knew the law, the fact that they not
only agreed to the acceptance but regarded said
acceptance necessary argues for their
understanding and intention that the donation
was inter vivos.
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his
heirs, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FROILAN and
LEONILA BRANOCO
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva sued respondents,
spouses in the Regional Trial to recover a parcel
of land in Leyte and collect damages. Petitioner
claimed ownership over the Property through
purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere, who,
in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia
Rodrigo in August 1970. Petitioner declared the
Property in his name for tax purposes soon after
acquiring it.
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed
ownership over the Property through purchase
in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom
Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The
two-page deed of donation, signed at the bottom
by the parties and two witnesses. The trial court
ruled for petitioner. The CA granted
respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial
court’s ruling.
Issue: whether petitioner’s title over the
Property is superior to respondents?
Held: The SC finds respondents’ title superior,
and thus, affirm the CA. Petitioner brings to the
Court’s attention facts which, according to him,
support his theory that Rodrigo never passed
ownership over the Property to Rodriguez,
namely, that Rodriguez registered the Deed and
paid taxes on the Property only in 1982 and
Rodriguez obtained from Vere in 1981 a waiver
of the latter’s "right of ownership" over the
Property. None of these facts detract from our
conclusion that under the text of the Deed and
based on the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo
and Rodriguez, the latter, already in possession
of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted,
obtained naked title over it upon the Deed’s
execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax
payment is required to perfect donations.
On the relevance of the waiver agreement, suffice
it to say that Vere had nothing to waive to
Rodriguez, having obtained no title from
Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguez’s motivation
in obtaining the waiver, that document, legally a
scrap of paper, added nothing to the title
Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under the
Deed.
G.R. No. 125888 August 13, 1998
SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et. Al.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In 1979, Aurora Montinola executed a deed
entitled “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in favor
of her three grandchildren Catalino Valderrama,
Judy Valderrama, and Jesus Valderrama. The
deed however provided that that the donation
shall be effective only 10 years after Montinola’s
death. In 1980, the original title of the parcel of
land subject of the donation was cancelled and a
new title was given to the Valderramas.
Montinola however retained the original title
and she continued to perform acts of ownership
over the parcel of land.
In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation
because of acts of ingratitude committed against
her by the Valderramas; that the Valderramas
defamed her; that she overheard the
Valderramas plotting against her life. In 1990,
she petitioned to have her title be reinstated and
her grandchildren’s title be cancelled. She said
that the donation is actually a donation mortis
causa and that the same is void because the
formalities of a will were not complied with. In
the same year, she sold her property to spouses
Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.
The Valderramas opposed the petition. In 1993,
while the case was still pending, Montinola died.
The petition was continued by the spouses Sicad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the “Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos” is actually a donation mortis causa.
HELD: Yes, the deed is a donation mortis causa.
Montinola not only reserved for herself all the
fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but
what is even more important, specially provided
that without the knowledge and consent of the
Montinola, the donated properties could not be
disposed of in any way, thereby denying to the
transferees the most essential attribute of
ownership, the power to dispose of the
properties. A donation which purports to be one
inter vivos but withholds from the done (in this
case the Valderramas) the right to dispose of the
donated property during the donor’s lifetime is
in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis
causa “the right of disposition is not transferred
to the donee while the donor is still alive. The
donation is therefore void because the
formalities of a will, which is essentially a
donation mortis causa, were not complied with.
[G.R. No. 106755. February 1, 2002]
APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS et. Al.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS: On December 17, 1975, Basilisa
Comerciante, mother of petitioner and one of
respondents, furnished a Deed of Donation to
donate her house and lot to her four children,
provided that the funeral expenses will be
deducted from the total value of the lot before it
is to be divided among the children. The children
signed to the same deed in acceptance to the
donation. That same day, they also signed into a
notarized document stating that the property
and the document pertaining to the same will be
under the custody of the original owner for as
long as she lives.
On February 6, 1979, Comerciante executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale over the same house and
lot in favor of the petitioner, prompting the
respondents to file an action against the
petitioner for the annulment of the deed of sale
on September 21, 1983. The lower court ruled in
favor of the respondent (petitioner herein), but
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation was
intervivos.
Held: we find and so hold that in the case at bar
the donation is inter vivos. The express
irrevocability of the same (hindi na mababawi) is
the distinctive standard that identifies that
document as a donation inter vivos. The other
provisions therein which seemingly make the
donation mortis causa do not go against the
irrevocable character of the subject donation.
According to the petitioner, the provisions which
state that the same will only take effect upon the
death of the donor and that there is a prohibition
to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same,
are proofs that the donation is mortis causa.
The Court disagrees. The said provisions should
be harmonized with its express irrevocability. In
Bonsato where the donation per the deed of
donation would also take effect upon the death
of the donor with reservation for the donor to
enjoy the fruits of the land, the Court held that
the said statements only mean that after the
donors death, the donation will take effect so as
to make the donees the absolute owners of the
donated property, free from all liens and
encumbrances; for it must be remembered that
the donor reserved for himself a share of the
fruits of the land donated.