Civil Procedure Case Reviewer B2015
Prof. Eleazar|Midterms|2012-2013
I. General Principles
Case Name
1 Fabian v. Desierto
2 Echegaray v. The
Secretary of Justice
3 Neypes v. CA (Bogs)
Fabian filed cases against Agustin, a government official, for
harassing her when she ended their relationship. The
Ombudsman exonerated Agustin from the charges. Fabian
appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45, in accordance with
Sec. 27 of RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides
that decisions of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court in accordance with Rule Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The SC struck down Sec. 27 as unconstitutional because it
expands the Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its consent,
contrary to Sec. 30, Art. VI, 1987 Const.
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the MTC. The MTC dismissed this on the ground
of prescription. Allegedly, 15 days after receipt of the copy of the
order of dismissal, an MR was filed. The MTC denied this MR but
the copy of dismissal was received 21 days later. 5 days after such
receipt, a notice of appeal was filed. The necessary appeal fees
1
were paid 7 days after filing of the notice of appeal. On the day
Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution was intended to give the Court
a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden
the Court.
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an
essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of
judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Art. 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
FRESH PERIOD RULE To standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh
period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and
Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
 after such payment, RTC denied the appeal, on the ground that it
was filed 8 days late. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the CA. They claimed that they had seasonably filed
their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run on the day they received the final
order of the MTC denying their MR. When they filed their notice
of appeal, only 5 days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. The CA dismissed the petition
and ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from the day they received the order dismissing their
complaint. According to the CA, the order was the “final order”
appealable under the Rules of Court. SC held that the order
dismissing the MR should be deemed as the final order.
Hence, the notice of appeal was filed within the reglemantary
period.
4 Poso v. Mijares Judge Mijares was found guilty of several violations of The Anti-
graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Judicial Code of Ethics. He
was dismissed from service. The Court practiced its equity
jurisdiction and called the criminal case which gave rise to this
administrative complaint to trial to determine the proper penalty
to be imposed on the accused.
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period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3
of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15
days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The
use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the
use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment
or within 15 days from notice of the “final order".
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it
within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided
in Rule 41, Section 3.
-A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without
due process does not exist in legal contemplation and cannot be
considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a
void judgment has no legality from its inception. It may be
attacked directly or collaterally and set aside as in the instant
case. To be sure, it has been said that probation is not a sentence
but is in effect a suspended sentence or an interlocutory
judgment, for which reason, it cannot be argued that courts are
barred from correcting manifest injustice in the improvident and
corrupt grant of probation. At any rate, and without tinge of
doubt, bare technical adherence to the letter of the law and
jurisprudence should not excuse the Court’s obligation in
settings attended by unusual circumstances to rectify evident
iniquity.
- Although the general rule is that this Court does not
review a trial court’s decision in an administrative proceeding
since its main concern therein is to determine the ethical
responsibilities of judicial conduct. Nonetheless, in the instant
case, it is the Court’s considered opinion that the principle is not
controlling. The situation calls for the exercise of equity
jurisdiction to the end that the COurt render complete justice to

5 Tamio v. Ticson RCAM leased its premises to Fernando who died and was
succeeded by Valentine who sought the help of Ticson financially
and assigned her rights over the property to the latter. Ticson
then rents out the property to Tamio for three months, and after
which Tamio refuses to vacate. Tamio found out that the property
belongs to RCAM and moves that the case of unlawful detainer
against him be dismissed because the lease contract between him
and Ticson was colored with fraud. The lower courts did not
agree, and declared the issue moot because Tamio now leased the
premises directly from RCAM. The issue left to settle was to
whom the payment of rentals should be made for the interim
period before Tamio went to RCAM directly. The court ruled that
it should be paid to RCAM.
6 Chamber of Real Estate Petitioner CREBA filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for
and Builders Association Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary
Inc. v. Secretary of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under
Agrarian Reform Rule 65, seeking to nullify and prohibit the Department of
Agrarian Reform from enforcing several administrative issuances
regulating land use conversion for having been issued by the Sec.
of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid
administrative issuances are allegedly illegal and
unconstitutional.
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.
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all affected parties. Equity as the complement of legal
jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts,
of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power
to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases,
are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.
Indeed, a court of equity which has taken jurisdiction and
cognizance of a cause for any purpose will ordinarily retain
jurisdiction for all purposes and award relief so as to accomplish
full justice between the party litigants, prevent future litigation
and make performance of the court’s decree perfectly safe to
those who may be compelled to obey it.
Unjust Enrichment
There is unjust enrichment when a) a person is unjustly
benefited and b) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another.
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by the Supreme Court
with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also
serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the judicial policy that it will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
 compelling

7 Go v. Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Negros Occidental
8 Yadno v. Anchales
Multi-Luck filed a case for collection of money from Looyuko for 3
dishonored checks issued by the latter. The Bacolod RTC ordered
Looyuko to pay Multi-Luck, and issued a writ of execution over
properties registered under Looyuko. Jimmy Go, alleging to be the
business partner and co-owner of Looyuko’s properties, asked for
a TRO and preliminary injunction to stop the execution of the
properties in the Pasig RTC. The Pasig RTC granted Go’s prayers
and issued a TRO against the orders of the Bacolod RTC. Case was
elevated to CA, which ruled that Pasig RTC had wrongfully
interfered with the judgments of a concurrent court. SC affirmed
CA.
Spouses Anchales filed with the then CFI, now RTC of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, a Complaint for ownership, delivery of possession,
damages with preliminary injunction and attachment against the
Spouses Yadno, Orani, and the Spouses Mat-an. RTC Urdaneta
ruled in favor of Spouses Anchales. Property of Orani was levied
and sold in public action to Anchales, the highest bidder. Spouses
Mat-an filed a case in RTC Baguio assailing the decision of RTC
Urdaneta. RTC Baguio dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
over the action. CA affirmed the dismissal. SC affirmed.
No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction. This of
non-interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of
a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or
vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. For example,
cases wherein an execution order has been issued, are still
pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still
proceedings in the suit. Since a particular court had already
acquired jurisdiction over the collection suit and rendered
judgment in relation thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts over its judgment,
including all incidents relative to the control and conduct of its
ministerial officers, namely the sheriffs.
The principle of judicial stability states that the judgment or
order of a court of competent jurisdiction, may not be interfered
with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple
reason that the power to open, modify or vacate the said
judgment or order is not only possessed by but is restricted to
the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or issued.
The long standing is that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction.

II. Jurisdiction

9 Locsin v. Nissan Lease
Phils.
Locsin was elected EVP/Treasurer of NCLPI for 13 years until he
was elected as Chairman of the Board of Directors. However, in
the next election of officers, Locsin was neither re-elected
Chairman nor reinstated to his previous position as
EVP/Treasurer. Hence, he filed an illegal dismissal case with the
Labor Arbiter. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction because Locsin is a corporate officer and not
an employee placing the case under the jurisdiction of RTC. Labor
4
In the context of the present case, the Labor Arbiter does not
have jurisdiction over the termination dispute, and should not be
allowed to continue to act on the case after the absence of
jurisdiction has become obvious.
Jurisdiction is the power to hear and rule on a case and is the
threshold element that must exist before any quasi-judicial
officer can act.
 Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss. CA reversed and granted
the motion to dismiss. SC affirmed CA ruling.
10 Civil Service Commission Herminigildo L. Andal is a Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan.
v. Andal However, based on the results of a fact-finding investigation, the
Civil Service Commission-NCR ( CSC-NCR) formally charged
respondent with dishonesty. The CSC-NCR rendered judgment
finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him
the penalty of dismissal from the service.
CSC argues that its judgment finding Andal guilty of dishonesty
and dismissing Andal is valid because it has disciplinary
jurisdiction to try and decide the administrative case against
court personnel.
11 Gustilo v. Gustilo Petitioner inherited land from her father but title remained with
her father’s company (now headed by her brother). Her brother
leased the land and she asked the lessee to surrender it to her.
The lessee refused so she filed an action for recovery of
possession. Respondent filed MTD, alleging that RTC had no
jurisdiction as the nature of the claim was intra-corporate. SC
held that it was not an intra-corporate dispute and RTC had
jurisdiction.
12 Merida Waterworks Merida Water District, a GOCC that operates the water utility
District v. Bacarro services in Merida, Leyte, conducted a public hearing for the
purpose of increasing the water rate. The LWUA confirmed its
proposed rates. Thereafter, Merida issued notices of
disconnection to consumers who refused to pay the water rate
increase. Respondents, consumers of Merida, filed a petition to
enjoin Merida from collecting payment of the water rate increase.
Merida filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging, among others, the lack
of cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The RTC and the CA both held that there was no need to exhaust
admin. remedies due to some circumstances. SC held that
respondents’ non-exhaustion of admin. remedies only renders the
action premature BUT does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
13 Pimentel v. Senate Sen. Lacson delivered a privileged speech on the Senate regarding
Committee as a Whole the P200M appropriation for the extension of a road in Paranaque
and another P200M for C-5 which refers to the same road. The
double insertion was linked to Sen. Villar who allegedly
influenced government projects in favor of his properties in the
area. Hence, Sen. Madrigal introduced a resolution ordering an
investigation about Sen. Villarto be undertaken by the Ethics
Committee and accusing him of using his power in relocating the
C-5 to deliberately pass through his properties. However, Villar
5
In previous cases, the Civil Service Commission recognized the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over court
personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. By virtue
of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges’ and court personnel’s administrative compliance with all
laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the of
separation of powers.
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It can be gleaned
from Mary Joy’s allegations in her complaint that her case is
principally one for recovery of possession.
The failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court. Non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies only renders the action premature, that the "claimed
cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination.”
The of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The
Court has ruled
x xx It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a particular case, which means thatthe matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such
that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technicalmatters or intricate
questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained
 refused to appear before the Ethics Committee so the Senate
agreed to conduct the investigation as a whole.
Due to a dispute on whether which rules should apply (the Rules
of the Ethics Committee or the Rules of the Senate Committee as a
Whole), several senators came to the SC. The Senate Committee as
a Whole (represented by Sen. PresEnrile) contended that the
senators, in coming to the SC, failed to observe the of primary
jurisdiction or prior resort.
14 Mendoza v. COMELEC This case originates from an election protest. Mendoza sues for
Certiorari with the SC against Pagdanganan and the COMELEC.
Mendoza and Pagdanganan were candidates for the governorship
of Bulacan. Mendoza was proclaimed the winning candidate and
he assumed his office. Pagdanganan filed an election protest.
Revision of the ballots took place, followed by the presentation of
evidence. The COMELEC then ordered the parties to submit their
memoranda, and after this, the case was submitted for resolution.
The COMELEC subsequently transferred the ballots to the SET
due to a case between Pimentel and Zubiri. Mendoza moved to
suspend the proceedings but the COMELEC denied this motion, as
well as his motion for reconsideration. Mendoza’s counsel sent a
letter to the SET Secretary, which was responded to with a
confirmation that there were further proceedings taking place.
Mendoza filed a special civil action for Certiorari with the SC. The
SC issued a status quo order against the COMELEC. Eventually, the
SC decided against Mendoza and lifted the order.
15 Lhuiller v. British Petitioner filed a complaint for damages with the Makati RTC
Airways against Respondent alleging the commission of tortious conduct
against her by its flight attendants. The incident occurred while
she was on the plane from London to Rome. Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, her action falling under the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention (Art. 28(1) mentions those places where the
plaintiff could bring suit in actions arising from international air
travel) and hence she should have filed the suit in the proper
courts of either London or Rome. Both the RTC and SC sustained
respondents’ motion to dismiss.
16 Machado v. Gatdula Machado and Gatdula had a dispute over their private properties.
COSLAP assumed jurisdiction and decided in favor of Gatdula.
Machado assailed COSLAP’s jurisdiction. The CA ruled that since
Machado participated in the COSLAP proceedings, he is stopped
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in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the properjurisdiction of the court. x
xx
The issues presented here do not require the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the Senate Committee as a
Whole fortheir resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are
purely legal questions which are within thecompetence and
jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the
Senate to resolve.
Rule of Adherence of Jurisdiction After the jurisdiction has been
acquired over the subject matter and parties, this jurisdiction is
considered as attached, and cannot be ousted by subsequent
events such as the temporary transfer of evidence and material
records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising its own
jurisdiction over another contest.
The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this
country. Since the Convention applies, then the jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action is governed by its provisions.
Where the matter is governed by the Convention, Jurisdiction in
the international sense must be established in accordance with
Art. 28(1), following which, the jurisdiction of a particular court
must be established pursuant to the applicable law (only after
the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will
the issue of venue be taken up).
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by
the parties’ action or conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer
jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by
law, exists. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the
 from assailing COSLAP’s jurisdiction. Machado appealed to the SC.
17 Figueroa v. People Figueroa was convicted by the RTC for violating BP 129, as
amended by RA 7691 even though the MTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. It was only upon appeal to the CA that
he questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over his case. The CA
considered this to be too late and upheld his conviction.
question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the
lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory
that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal,
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same ‘must exist as a
matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties
or by estoppel’ However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal,
to assume an inconsistent position – that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction in conferred by law, and does not depend upon the
will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.
The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases.

18 Kukan International The RTC issued a writ of execution for a final judgment against
Corp. v. Hon. Reyes Kukan, Inc. against the property of Kukan International
Corporation (KIC), supposedly piercing the veil of corporate
fiction. The SC held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of KIC since it was not impleaded in the original suit.
Also, the principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is not
applicable in this case.
19 In re Letters of Estelito In June 1998, Philippine Airlines retrenched 5,000 employees.
Medoza The retrenchment was described as a “cost-cutting measure” by
PAL. The high court found in favor of FASAP in 2008, a decision
which PAL appealed in a motion for reconsideration (MR). This
was denied in October 2009. PAL filed for a second MR, which the
high court denied “with finality” on Sept. 7, 2011. Less than a
month later (Oct. 4, 2011), the Supreme Court en banc recalled its
Sept. 7 resolution, on the basis of four letters written by PAL’s
counsel. FASAP filed an MR, claiming among others that not only
The principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is applied to
determine an established liability of parties already impleaded,
not to confer jurisdiction.
Section 3, Rule 81 of the IRSC should be read as the general
rule applicable to the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge.
This general rule should, however, yield where the
inhibition occurs at the late stage of the case when a
decision or signed resolution is assailed through an MR. At
that point, when the situation calls for the review of the merits
of the decision or the signed resolution made by a ponente (or
writer of the assailed ruling), Section 3, Rule 8 no longer applies
and must yield to Section 7, Rule 22 of the IRSC which

1SEC.3.Effects of inhibition. - The consequences of an inhibition of a Member of the Court shall be governed by these rules
(a) Whenever a Member-in-Charge of a case in a Division inhibits himself for a just and valid reason, the case shall be returned to the Raffle Committee for re-raffling among the Members of the other two (2) Divisions of the
Court.

2SEC. 7.Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. - Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a
decision or of a signed resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a new
ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
7
 had there been no formal appeal by PAL, but it was also not even
asked by the high court to give its comments on the Mendoza
letters before it made its recall decision.
20 Gonzales v. Solid Cement Gonzales was illegally terminated by Solid Cement, as found by
Corp. the Labor Arbiter. An order for his reinstatement was issued and
he was reinstated by Solid Cement in the payroll. The NLRC
modified the decision of the LA by reducing the amount of
damages. Solid Cement appealed to the CA but was denied, which
rendered the judgment final and executory. Thereafter, Gonzales
asked for a writ of execution with benefits computed from the day
before his termination shall take effect. The LA issued a writ of
execution but the NLRC modified the said writ by including
certain monetary benefits. The CA reversed the NLRC and
reinstated the LA’s order (which did not include certain
monetary benefits).
21 SC v. Delgado This is an administrative complaint against Delgado, Madeja, and
Florendo, court personnel who are implicated in the removal of 3
pages of a copy of an Agenda of the 2nd Division which was
confidential in nature. After the initial investigation, the Office of
Administrative Services of the SC conducted a formal
investigation. The OAS then directed the respondents to submit
their respective written explanations. Thereafter, the OAS
submitted to the SC its recommendations finding the respondents
guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the dismissal of one
of the respondents and the suspension of the remaining 2
respondents. The SC modified the findings and recommendations
and dismissed from the service all 3 respondents for grave
misconduct.
22 In re Letter of Presiding Several CA Justices committed improprieties while handling a
Justice Conrado Vasquez high-profile case. Presiding Justice Vasquez of the CA sent a letter
to the SC for appropriate action.
8
contemplates a situation when the ponente is no longer
available, and calls for the referral of the case for raffle
among the remaining Members of the Division who acted on
the decision or on the signed resolution. This latter provision
should rightly apply as it gives those who intimately know the
facts and merits of the case, through their previous participation
and deliberations, the chance to take a look at the decision or
resolution produced with their participation.
In a Rule 45 petition, the question is not whether the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion but whether the CA
correctly determined the absence of grave abuse of discretion by
the quasi-judicial or judicial entity that promulgated the
decision. There is grave abuse of discretion when the ruling
entity used the wrong considerations and thereby acted outside
the contemplation of law.
Can the Supreme Court be a party to a case? In this case, the
Supreme Court was the complainant against the respondents-
employees of the SC. The case was entitled “Supreme Court,
Complainant verses Eddie V. Delgado, Utility Worker II, et al.”
(NOTE however that this is an ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
involving court personnel. The SC exercises control and
supervision over court personnel. So naturally, the SC would be a
party to admin cases like this.)
The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provide that
A motion for inhibition be resolved in writing with copies
furnished the members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the
Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court.

23 Lu v. Lu Ym 2008 Three consolidated petitions before the SC involving a sale of
Decision shares in LLDC. One of the parties raises for the first time in a
motion for reconsideration before the CA, the issue of incorrect
docket fees paid by the adverse party in the original complaint
before the RTC. SC issue cannot be raised because 1. case is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, 2. estoppel, and 3. good faith.
24 Lu v. Lu Ym 2008 A motion for reconsideration of the 2008 Decision of Lu vs. Lu Ym
Resolution Sr. SC sided with Lu Ym father and sons saying that the subject
matter of the complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation and
that since the exact amount for the docket fees wasn’t paid then
the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case.
25 Lu v. Lu Ym 2011 The objective of the complaint in this case was to declare as null
and void the issuance of 600,000 unsubscribed and unissued
shares in Ludo and Luym Development Corporation (LLDC) for a
price of 1/18 of their real value for being inequitable, having been
done inbreach of director’s fiduciary’s duty to stockholders, in
violation of the minority stockholders’ rights, and with unjust
enrichment. The complaint alleged the value of the shares as
Php1,087,055,105.The first decision said that this case was
incapable of pecuniary estimation. This was reversed in a motion
for reconsideration. The Court en banc handled the case and once
again reversed the decision, reinstating the original one, stating
that this case is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
9
Consultation and/or deliberation among the members of the
Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized
to act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action
shall, however, be reported to the Court en banc.
The CA en banc shall adopt uniform administrative measures,
procedures, and policies for the protection and preservation of
the integrity of the judicial processes.
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment
of the prescribed fees. However, there are instances when failure
to pay the correct docket fees is not fatal. These include when the
case is incapable of pecuniary estimation, when the party is in
good faith, when the mistake is made by the clerk of court. If
there is a deficiency, the same may instead be considered a lien
on the judgment that may thereafter be rendered.
The court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed fees
Vargas vs. Carminas the general rule is that lack of jurisdiction of
a court may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An
exception to the general rule is the presence of laches.
The resolution reversing the earlier decision found that the
action filed was capable of pecuniary estimation, saying that the
600,000 shares of stocks were properties in litigation. The Court
here said that David et al were not claiming that these are their
own shares. They do not interpose a claim of recovery over them
as well. The mention of the real value of the shares is merely
narrative or descriptive. Moreover, even the extent of damage or
injury, which the resolution mentioned as capable of pecuniary
estimation, was not explored, nor the value determined in the
resolution.
The complaint filed is one for declaration of nullity of share
issuance.As discussed in the first decision, the test in
determining whether thesubject matter of an action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation is by ascertaining the nature of the
principalaction or remedy sought.
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been
expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of
first instance, and no cogent reason appears, and none is here

26 Mijares v. Hon. Ranada Petitioners obtained a Final Judgment in their favor amounting to
$1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages, against the
Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos, for tortuous violations of
international law or human rights abuses that they suffered
during the Marcos Regime. They filed a Complaint with the Makati
RTC for enforcement of the Final Judgment, and the Marcos Estate
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct
filing fees. The Complaint was dismissed by the RTC Judge and
assessed the proper amount of filing fees as P472M, not P410,
which was the amount paid. The SC held that the petitioners paid
the proper amount of filing fees RTC Judge incorrectly applied the
law.
27 Chaves v. CA Chavez and Trillana entered in to a lease contract. Trillana filed a
complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain for
unauthorized repairs, the ouster of his personnel from the leased
premises and its unlawful taking. After conciliation proceedings,
they agreed to settle and such was embodied in their Kasunduan.
Later, Trillana alleged that Chavez violated the Kasunduan and
filed a case n the RTC for breach of contract. The RTC ruled in
favor of Trillana. The CA and SC affirmed.
28 Daichi Electronics Petitioner filed a claim for damages against the respondent before
Manufacturing v. the RTC. The cause of action was breach of their employment
Villarama contract. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter as it is within the jurisdiction of the labor
10
advanced by the parties, why an action for rescission (or
resolution) should be differentlytreated, a "rescission" being a
counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance". In both
cases,the court would certainly have to undertake an
investigation into facts that would justify one act orthe other. No
award for damages may be had in an action for rescission
without first conducting aninquiry into matters which would
justify the setting aside of a contract.
Based on Section 19(6), B.P. 129, the complaint for enforcement
of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation,
would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Indeed, an examination of the provision indicates that it can be
relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for
enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court
or office is vested jurisdiction over such complaint.
The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-
tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit (a)
by execution by the Punoeng Barangay which is quasi-judicial
and in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and
(b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. However,
the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission
under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of
rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself. The
use of the word “may” clearly makes the procedure provided in
the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely
optional in nature.
Although the Kasunduan executed by the parties before the
Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court, Chavez’ non-compliance paved the way for
the application of Art. 2041 under which Trillana may either
enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as
rescinded ane insist upon its original demand. Trillana chose the
latter option when he instituted the Civil Case.
The claim in the case at bar is based on the breach of
respondent’s contractual obligation to the petitioner’s damage
and prejudice. Such cause of action is within the realm of civil
law, and under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
 arbiter pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor Code. The SC ruled that
the cause of action is within the purview of civil law, hence,
regular courts have jurisdiction.
29 Yusen Air and Sea Yusen hired Villamor as branch manager in its Cebu Office. Later, It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
Service v. Villamor petitioner reclassified respondent’s position to that of Division upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of
Manager, which position respondent held until his resignation. whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim
Immediately after his resignation, respondent started working for asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a
Aspac International, a corporation engaged in the same line of result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction of a court be made to
business as that of Yusen.Yusen filed against Villamor a complaint depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or
for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of
restraining order.The trial court issued an order dismissing jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.
petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof on the ground that the action was for damages
arising from employer-employee relations. The SC disagreed,
stating that the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of
Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a
reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for
in that article. Since the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict
or tort, which has no reasonable causal connection with any of the
claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action is
with the regular courts.

30 COMELEC v. Judge COMELEC filed with RTC an information for an election offense,
Trinidad-Pe Aguirre punishable by imprisonment of not less than one year but not
more than six years. RTC claims it is the MTC that has jurisdiction.
31 Atlantic Erectors v. CA Herbal contracted Atlantic for the construction and completion of
its project, “The Herbal Cove.” In their agreement, Atlantic was to
complete and deliver the units to Herbal within 180 calendar
days. Atlantic agreed to pay liquidated damages equivalent to
1/10 of 1% of the contract price per calendar day of delay up to a
maximum of 10%. Atlantic asked for an extension in light of
several circumstances. Extension was granted but Atlantic still
reneged in its obligation. Herbal filed a case with the CIAC against
Atlantic for the liquidated damages, among others. CIAC granted
partial relief but omitted the award of liquidated damages
because of Herbal’s invalid termination of the contract. Upon
separate appeal, CA modified the CIAC decision awarding
liquidated damages to Herbal. On review on certiorari to the SC,
the SC ruled that liquidated damages and termination of the
While BP Blg. 129 lodges in MTCs, MeTCs and MCTCs jurisdiction
over criminal cases carrying a penalty of imprisonment of less
than one year but not exceeding six years, following Section 268
of the Omnibus Election Code, any criminal action or proceeding
which bears the same penalty, with the exception of the therein
mentioned two cases, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of RTCs.
Parties to a contract are allowed to stipulate on liquidated
damages to be paid in case of breach. It is attached to an
obligation to ensure performance with the ff. functions: (1) to
provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the
coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater
responsibility in the event of breach. As a precondition to an
award, there must be proof of the fact of delay in the
performance of the obligation. (See Arts. 2226-2228)

11
 contract are separate remedies entitled to Herbal. Atlantic must
bear the consequences of its actions when it failed to ask for
further extension (which must be in writing) after the original
extension expired.
32 Cruz v. Cruz Petitioner Sps Cruz bought a lot. They later found out that
portions of it were occupied by respondents. Within 1 year from
their demand to vacate, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery
of possession in the RTC. Court held that the proper remedy was
an action for unlawful detainer which should have been filed with
the MTC.
33 Bernardo v. Villegas The heirs of Eusebio Villegas allege that in the guise of using the
land as pasture, the trio have entered their lands and set up their
own houses after. The issue has been subject of a barangay
conciliation but the respondents Bernardo,Gaza, and Francisco
were earlier subject of an ejectment case which was later
dismissed for having been filed beyond the one year prescriptive
period had still refused to vacate. The heirs then filed a case of
accion publiciana in the RTC, to which the respondents alleged
the defense of lack of jurisdiction. Trial Court found that the suit
being accion publiciana falls under its jurisdiction. This was then
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, while the trio allege that the
heirs have failed to state the assessed value of the property in
dispute, and that they had actively raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction from the MTC to the RTC to present. Secondly, the trio
also allege that other heirs should have been included as
indispensable parties. However the CA found that the co-owners
of a property may bring an action for ejectment.
34 Quinagoran v. CA The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages
against VictorinoQuinagoran before the RTC for its refusal to
vacate the land he has occupied by mere tolerance of the heirs.
Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case because under RA 7691, the jurisdiction
of MTC, MeTC, and MTCC was expanded to include exclusive
original jurisdiction over civil actions when the assessed value of
the property does not exceed P20,000.00 outside Metro Manila
and P50,000.00 within Metro Manila. RTCdenied the Motion to
Dismiss and held that the present action, on the basis of the
allegation of the complaint, partakes of the nature of action
publiciana and jurisdiction over said action lies with the RTC
12
RA 7691 expanded MTC’s jurisdiction to include other
actions involving title to or possession of real property
(accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria) where the assessed
value of the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000,
for actions filed in Metro Manila).
Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action
involving possession of real property has been filed in the proper
court no longer depends solely on the type of action filed but also
on the assessed value of the property.
While the general rule is that jurisdiction of the court may be
questioned at any stage, estoppel sets in when a party
participates in all stages of a case before challenging the
jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or
repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its
jurisdiction just to secure affirmative relief or after losing, raise
it. The trio did not bring up the issue of the jurisdictional amount
in the MTC which would have led it to proceed with the case,
while in the RTC the pleading of the trio only said the honourable
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the
action.
The case has been discussed for 10 years, handled by 2 judges
and its records had to be reconstituted after a fire gutted the
court house. To raise the issue now after failing to obtain a
favourable relief is not a practice that the court should have a
countenance upon
The nature of the action and jurisdiction of courts are
determined by the allegations in the complaint.The nature of the
action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the
law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
therein. Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the
answer of the defendant or even upon agreement, waiver or
acquiescence of the parties.
 regardless of the value of the property. CA affirmed in toto. SC
reversed and dismissed the case for failure to allege the value of
the subject property.
35 Ruby Shelter Builders v. Petitioner filed an action for the declaration of nullity of deeds of
Formaran sales and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO). The Office of the Clerk of Court initially considered the
complaint as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and
computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according
to Sec. 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Tan
questions the assessment of docket fees for petitioner’s
complaint, alleging that said complaint involved real properties;
hence, the assessment of docket fees must be based on Sec. 7(a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
36 Orbe v. Gumarang Orbe filed a small claims case against LGM Silver Star Credit Corp.
They failed to reach an amicable settlement, and the case was
reassigned to Judge Gumarang. More than 2 months later, the case
was finally decided. Orbe then filed an an administrative case
against Judge Gumarang for violation of the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases which required the judge to decide on the case
5 days from receipt of order of reassignment. The Office of the
Court Administrator found Judge Gumarang guilty of Gross
Ignorance of the law, and fined him P5.000 for violating the Rule
of Procedure for Small Claims Cases. SC agrees with OCA.
37 Iniego v. Judge Purganan Defendant (herein petitioner) to an action based on QD filed a
Motion to Dismiss the action against him pending before the RTC
on the ground that such court has no jurisdiction over it. Private
respondent asserts otherwise. Respondent judge ruled in favor of
the latter, claiming that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the action. CA affirmed. SC affirmed insofar as jurisdiction
remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed
is P490,000
38 Sante v. Claravall Irene and Reynaldo Sante filed a motion to dismiss a complaint
for damages filed against them on the ground that it was under
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and not
13
-The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. Hence, the payment of
docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
-The dictum adhered to in this jurisdiction is that the nature of an
action is determined by the allegations in the body of the
pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.
However, the Court finds it necessary, in ascertaining the true
nature of petitioner’s complaint, to take into account significant
facts and circumstances beyond the Complaint of petitioner, facts
and circumstances which petitioner failed to state in its
Complaint but were disclosed in the preliminary proceedings
before the court a quo.
Section 22 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
clearly provided for the period within which judgment should be
rendered, to wit
Section 22. Failure of Settlement – If efforts at settlement fail, the
hearing shall proceed in an informal and expeditious manner
and be terminated within one (1) day. Either party may move in
writing to have another judge hear and decide the case. The
reassignment of the case shall be done in accordance with
existing issuances.
The referral by the original judge to the Executive Judge shall be
made within the same day the motion is filed and granted, and by
the Executive Judge to the designated judge within the same day
of the referral. The new judge shall hear and decide the case
within five (5) days from the receipt of the order of
reassignment.
Actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions based on
pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of
either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount
of (all kinds) damages claimed.
Administrative Circular No. 09-9419 states that the exclusion of
the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of
 under the RTC of Baguio. They were emphasizing that claim for
moral damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 in the original
complaint, is the main action. Claims for exemplary damages
being discretionary should not be included in the computation of
the jurisdictional amount.
III. Civil Procedure
a. Actions
39 Ballatan v. CA Petitioner Ballatan, Martinez, and Chong Chy Ling instituted
against respondents Go a civil case for recovery of possession
before the RTC Malabon, Branch 169. The Go' s filed their
"Answer with Third-Party Complaint" impleading as third-party
defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the Araneta Institute of
Agriculture (AIA) and Engineer Quedding.
The trial court decided in favor of Ballatan, Martinez, and Chong
Chy Ling. It dismissed the third-party complaint against Li Ching
Yao, AIA, and Quedding. Respondents Go appealed. The Court of
Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed
the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA but
reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose
Quedding.
Petitioners Ballatan, Martinez, and Chong Chy Ling question the
admission by respondent Court of Appeals of the third-party
complaint by respondents Go against the AIA, Jose Quedding and
Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint
should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals for lack
of jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs' failure (Go) to pay
the docket and filing fees before the trial court.
14
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of
the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.It is clear, based on the
allegations of the complaint that respondent’s main action is for
damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences
of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in
the complaint. Amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the
CA was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
case.
In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value
of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any. If the
complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing,
the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees
within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring
prescription.
Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but
the fees of certain related damages are not, the court, although
having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have
acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for
damages.
Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for
damages, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for
amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise
amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal
fee.
If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may
arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the
additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the
judgment award.
The same rule also applies to third-party claims and

40 Heirs of Late Reinoso Sr. Torts case Complaint for damages was filed because of the
v. CA collision of a jeepney and a truck that resulted to the death of
Reinoso, a passenger of the jeepney. The court held the truck
driver and its owner liable. The court relaxed the rule on
nonpayment of docket fees in order to promote the
administration of justice.
41 Fedman Development v. Under a contract to sell, Agcaoili has rights over Unit 411 of FDC’s
Agcaoili Fedman Suites in Makati. When the aircon units in the 4 th floor
broke down and FDC failed to repair them, Agcaoili did not pay
his dues. This prompted FDC to cancel the contract and cut off
411’s electric supply. Agcaoili sued FDC for damages but the
parties entered into a compromise agreement. FDC did not fulfil
its obligations under the agreement so Agcaoili filed the present
suit for damages. FDC claims that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
because Agcaoili failed to pay the prescribed docket fees, and the
HLURB is the agency that has proper jurisdiction over the matter.
SC held that the RTC had jurisdiction due to estoppel BUT Agcaoili
must pay the deficiency in the payment of docket fees.
42 Ruby Shelter Builders v. Ruby Shelter filed a complaint denominated as a complaint for the
Formaran declaration of nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. In the
complaint, Ruby Shelter did not mention that the deeds were
already registered and TCTs were issued in favor of the
defendants. In filing such complaint, the case was considered by
the clerk of the RTC as an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The defendant, who is the creditor of Ruby Shelter,
filed an Omnibus Motion questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC
for non-paymnet of the proper docket fees by the plaintiff. The
15
other similar pleadings.
- There is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so
that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute
their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to
secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective
of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of
justice.
- It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment ofjustice. They were
conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice.Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courtshave always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that, on the balance,technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if theapplication of the Rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the
power ofthe Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular
case from its operation.
The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the
filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest
jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the
plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk
of court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial
court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the
payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment.
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee."
In order to resolve the issue of the correct amount of docket fees
is paid, it is necessary to determine the true nature of the
complaint. The nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the body of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather
than by its title or heading. It may be necessary to take into
account significant facts and circumstances beyond the
 RTC and the CA ruled contrary to the RTC clerk of court and
required Ruby Shelter to pay additional docket fees. This
prompted Ruby Shelter to file a petition for certiorari before the
SC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
mandating additional docket fees. The SC ruled against Ruby
Shelter and required the payment of docket fees saying that
although the complaint is denominated as an action for nullity, it
is in reality an action in rem for which additional docket fees must
be paid.
43 Montaner v. Shari’a Liling Disangcopan and her daughter filed a complaint for judicial
District Court partition with the Shari’a District Court, as to the estate of an
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. The (alleged) first family Answered with
a Motion to Dismiss. The Shari’a Court dismissed the complaint.
Liling filed a Motion for Recon. The first family Opposed. The
Shari’a Court denied the opposition, and eventually reconsidered
its first order of dismissal, allowing Liling and her daughter to
adduce further evidence. The court eventually ordered the
continuation of the trial. Luisa et al. Petitioned with the SC, for
Certiorari and Prohibition. The SC denied the petition.
44 Proton Pilipinas v. Proton failed to pay its obligation, hence BNP filed a complaint
Banque Nacional de against them. Proton contended that the RTC could not acquire
Paris jurisdiction over the case because BNP did not pay the correct
filing fees, as the clerk of court made an error in
computation/assessment. The SC ruled that the case is not
automatically dismissed due to the error of the clerk of court,
especially since BNP demonstrated its willingness to pay the
docket fees. Clerk of court ordered to reassess and determine to
the proper docket fees to be paid by BNP.
45 RE Query of Mr. Roger C. Good Shepherd, a charitable organization, wants to avail of the
Prioreschi Re Exemption provisions under the Rules of Court that exempt indigent people
from Legal and Filing from paying legal and filing fees by reason of their poverty. It
Fees of the Good gives as a reason that it works for indigents, so the options
Shepherd Foundation, granted to indigents should also be extended to it.
Inc.
16
complaint to determine its nature.
Definition of Civil action a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong (Sec. 3a, Rule 1, ROC)
Definition of Special proceeding a party seeks to establish a
status, right, or a particular fact (Sec. 3c, Rule 1, ROC)
Civil actions versus special proceedings unlike a civil action
which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no
definite adverse party (see definitions.)
While in Manchester Dev’t Corp. v. CA, the Court held that the
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of prescribed docket fees, said ruling was clarified in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion when the Court held that, in
the former, there was clearly an effort to defraud the
government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas
in the latter, the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide
by paying the additional fees as required. While the payment of
the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause
the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive/reglementary period, more so when the
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules
prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees
were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
(also, see *** on 2nd page)
The options granted to indigents under the Rules of Court, in
pursuance to the constitutional guarantee of free access to
courts, do not extend to corporations, even though charitable.
Good Shepherd, being a corporation, is not exempt from the
payment of legal and filing fees.
 b. Cause of Action
46 Far East Bank and Trust Ang obtained a loan from Far East Bank, secured by a mortgage
Co. v. Spouses Plaza over the lot of the Spouses Plaza. He obtained other loans
subsequently. When he failed to pay, the Bank commenced
foreclosure proceedings. Spouses Plaza offered to pay the first
loan. The Bank refused. Spouses Plaza sued for the release of the
mortgage. The Bank moved to dismiss for non-payment of docket
fees based on the estimated value of the real property involved,
alleging that the suit was a real action. The SC said it was a
personal one.
47 Brgy. San Roque v. This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the order
Pastor of RTC-Cebu in which it dismissed a complaint for eminent
domain. Petitioner also challenges the order of RTC-Cebu denying
reconsideration. Petitioner Brgy. San Roque originally filed a
Complaint for Eminent Domain before MTC-Talisay, Cebu. The
MTC dismissed the complaint citing lack of jurisdiction. Case
reached RTC-Cebu which dismissed the same. The RTC reasoned
that the value of the property would determine whether the case
should be filed before MTC or RTC. The petitioner filed a petition
for review on certiorari assailing the order of RTC. The SC held
that the case should be heard by the RTC because the action
involves the determination of compliance of the government with
the requisites for taking private property. The action is not
capable of pecuniary estimation.
48 Umale v. Canoga Park Respondent filed two civil cases for unlawful detainer against
Development petitioner, which was dismissed at the level of the RTC on the
ground of litis pendentia. The first unlawful detainer case was
grounded on violations of the contract while the second was filed
on the ground of expiration of lease contract.
17
An action to compel the mortgagee to accept payment and for
the consequent cancellation of a real estate mortgage is a
personal action if the mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage
and the mortgagor is in possession of the premises since neither
the mortgagor's title to nor possession of the property is in
question.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The
rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides
the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other
factors which the law has deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest
courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the
Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901)
Litis Pendentia
a. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia
refers to a situation where two actions are pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of
them becomes unnecessary and vexatious
b. Requisites
i. Identity of the parties in the two actions
ii. Substantial identity in the cause of action and in the
reliefs sought by the parties
Identity between the two actions should be such that any
judgment may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party

c. Parties to Civil Action
49 Navarro v. Escobido Karen Go, doing business under the name Kargo Enterprises, a
sole proprietorship, files 2 complaints with a prayer for a writ of
replevin against Navarro for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under
lease agreements executed by Navarro and Glenn Go (husband of
Karen) as manager of Kargo Enterprises. Navarro alleged as
special affirmative defense that the complaints stated no cause of
action since Karen was not a party to the lease agreements. The
RTC held that Karen should have included her husband in the
complaint based on Sec. 4, Rule 3, ROC. The RTC ordered Karen to
file a motion for inclusion of Glenn as co-plaintiff. The SC affirmed.
50 Arcelona v. CA The Arcelonas are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond. Tandoc
leased the property from the co-owners. Tandoc in turn
appointed Farnacio as caretakes-tenant. Upon expiration of the
lease, Farnacio did not want to surrender possession of the
fishpond and filed a civil case. However he fails to implead all the
co-owners. SC failure to implead co-owners is fatal to the case.
51 Carandang v. De Guzman De Guzman paid for the shares of stock of Spouses Carandang. De
Guzman asked for payment but Spouses Carandang refused to pay
the amount contending they didn’t owe De Guzman anything
because a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between De
Guzman and the Carandangs wherein De Guzman promised to
pay for the stock subscriptions of the Carandangs without cost in
consideration for Carandang’s technical expertise, his newly
purchased equipment and his skill in radio/communication
equipment. De Guzman filed a complaint seeking to recover the
total amount and damages.
TC ruled in favor of De Guzman and CA affirmed TC. On appeal,
Carandangs contend the case should be dismissed for failure to
state of action because De Guzman’s wife, an alleged
indispensable party, was not included as a party plaintiff. SC held
that de Guzman’s wife is not an indispensable party.As such she
need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the
suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto.
18
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Real party-in-interest – the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit
Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a
natural person nor a juridical person as defined by Art. 44 of the
CC. Thus, pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 3, Kargo Enterprises cannot be
a party to a civil action. The complaint should have been filed in
the name of the owner; the descriptive words “doing business
as______” may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily
done. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen is the
party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment
in the case.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Indispensable parties are parties-in-interest without whom
there can be no final determination of an action.
- REAL PARTY IN INTEREST the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit
INDISPENSABLE PARTY a party in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action
NECESSARY PARTY not indispensable but who ought to
be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded
as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action
- Other than the indispensable and necessary parties,
there is a third set of parties
PRO-FORMA PARTIES Those who are required to be
joined as co-parties in suits by or against another party
as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or
procedural rule.
- Pro-forma parties can either be indispensible, necessary
or neither indispensible or necessary

52 Bulawan v. Aquende Bulawan obtained a favorable decision from the RTC and CA. The
decision became final, and a writ of execution was issued to
compel Aquende to surrender his title to the property so that it
can be nullified and a new one issued in favor of Bulawan.
Aquende filed a 3rd party complaint against the writ of execution,
which was denied by RTC and CA. He then filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA, which was granted. This
petition was filed by Bulawan to set aside the CA decision. The SC
said that Aquende was an indispensible party, hence the earlier
case was nullified on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
53 Sepulveda Jr. v. Pelaez Atty. Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. for the recovery of possession and ownership of his
undivided share of several parcels of land. RTC and CA decided in
favor of Pelaez, but the SC ordered the case dismissed for the
failure of Pelaez to implead the ff. indispensable parties in his
complaint his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago
Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City
of Danao.
54 Moldes v. Villanueva The spouses Mollet owned three parcels of land. Their heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudcal Settlement with Quitclaim where
the Villanuevas waived their shares in favor of other heirs. After
20 years, the Villanuevas wanted to nullify the deed, saying that it
was obtained through fraud, and that the Moldeses were not heirs
19
Neither indispensible nor Non-joinder is not a ground
necessary for dismissal (section 11 rule
3)
Indispensable Dismissal would be proper
Necessary Dismissal is not warranted
(section 9 rule 3 applies)
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable
parties as parties in interest without whom nofinal
determination can be had of an action. An indispensable party is
one whose interest will be affected bythe court’s action in the
litigation. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as
defendants.
In Arcelona v CA The general rule with reference to the making
of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all
necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions,their
presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.
It is precisely "when anindispensable party is not before the
court (that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of
anindispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, notonly as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
In NHA v Evangelista It will be the height of inequity to allow
respondent’s title to be nullified without being given the
opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible
ownershipof the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that noperson shall be
deprived of property without due process of law.
The presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua
non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should
be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to implead all the
indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
All heirs of the deceased are indispensable parties to the
respondents' action to nullify the deed and the partition of the
subject property among the signatories therein. Sec. 7, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court provides for the compulsory joinder of
indispensable parties.
 of the spouses Mollet. The RTC ruled in favor of the Villanuevas.
CA affirmed. SC dismissed the case on the ground that the other
heirs were not made parties to the suit.
55 Seno v. Mangubat The trial court ordered the inclusion of Andres and Bienvenido as
parties to the case in addition to the original defendants Marcos
and spouses Luzame. The case was dismissed as regards Andres
and Bienvenido on the ground of prescription. The said dismissal
became a ground for the dismissal of the case as regards the other
parties. The court held that A and B are merely proper, not
indispensable parties, hence, the case can proceed against the
other defendants even without them.
56 Ang v. Ang Theodore and Nancy Anggranted Atty. Aceron a special power of
attorney for the purpose of filing an action against Alan and
EmAng for a collection of a sum of money. Since Theodore and
Nancy Ang resided in the United States, Atty. Aceron, on the basis
of the power attorney, and the fact that he lived in Q.C., filed the
action in the RTC of Q.C. Alan and EmAng moved to have it
dismissed on the basis of improper venue. RTC denied the motion
20
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. A
party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but also an interest of such nature that a final
decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving
the controversy in such a condition that its final determination
may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He
is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination
between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable.
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the
court cannot attain finalityThe responsibility of impleading all
the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.
(Commissioner Andrea Domingo v. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer)
The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of
indispensable and necessary parties is a complete determination
of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves
but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the
judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where
there is want of indispensable parties. (Metropolitan Bank v. Hon.
Floro Alejo)
Indispensable parties must always be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them.
Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8, in order to
adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid multiplicity of suits.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.
Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to
adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far
separable that a final decree can be made in their absence
without affecting them.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material
 to dismiss, saying that as the duly-appointed representative, Atty.
Aceron may file the action at the place where he resides, following
Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. The CA dismissed the complaint,
saying that the fact that Atty. Aceron was the attorney-in-fact was
not vital in determining the proper venue, since he was not the
real party in interest in the case. The SC affirmed.
57 Pantranco North Express Gicale’s jeepney figured in an accident with Pantranco’s bus.
v. Standard Insurance Standard Insurance paid for a portion of the cost of repair while
Gicale shouldered the rest. Both demanded reimbursement from
Pantranco but the latter refused to pay. A complaint for sum of
money was filed with the RTC. Pantranco questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case. The RTC ruled in behalf of
Gicale and Standard Insurance, holding Pantranco liable to both.
The SC affirmed the ruling and resolution of the CA.
58 Ablaza v. Republic Petitioner is assailing the validity of the marriage of his late
brother, claiming that is was void for being celebrated without a
license. The marriage was celebrated under the old Civil Code. He
claims that as the surviving heir of his brother, he should have
one-half of his properties. The lower courts dismissed his action
as he was not a proper party. The Court ruled that since the
marriage was celebrated under the old Code, AM 02-11-10-SC
which provides that only parties to the marriage can assail its
validity, does not apply. However, he must implead the wife and
daughter of his late brother as they are indispensable parties to
the case.
59 Relucio v. Lopez This came to the SC as a petition for certiorari to determine
whether or not Relsucios’s inclusion in the case as a party-
21
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who,
by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
Permissive joinder of parties requies that (a) the right to relief
arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b)
there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs and
defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by
the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained
whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first
Joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the
convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
-The plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefitted
by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party in interest. The only party who can
file an action must have “proper interest.” This means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the judgment in
the case, not just mere curiosity. When the plaintiff is not the real
party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.
- When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action
should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but
even as to those present.
- Section 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder
nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Under the same rule, such amendment to implead an
indispensable party may be made on motion of any party or on
the trial court's own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just.
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered
thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved. In order to
 defendant and the subsequent denial of her motion to dismiss is
proper. Lopez here alleges that Relucio, being the cohabiting
partner of her now deceased husband, should be included in the
proceedings wherein she prays to be made as the sole administratix
of her husband’s estate. Relucio on the other hand claim that she is
not a real party in interest because there is no relief that can be had
by her inclusion in the suit.
60 Re Request of heirs of On January 4, 1988 a complaint for damages amounting to more
the passengers of the than 1.5 billion pesos was filed in the name and behalf of the
Dona Paz to set aside the relatives or heirs of the victims of "the worst sea disaster in
order dated January 4, history" the sinking of the vessel Doña Paz caused by its collision
1988 of Judge with another vessel. The complaint was characterized as a class
Chingcuangco suit. Together with the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a "MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE CASE AS PAUPER LITIGANT” to be exempted
from filing fee. SC held it is not a class suit because there is no
single cause of action belonging to all plaintiffs. They are also not
entitled to file the case as pauper litigant unless there is a
showing that each have no means to litigate.
61 Borlongan v. After having filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition
Buenaventura for review on certiorari and paid the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees. Petitioner Borlongan passed away. His counsel
subsequently filed a petition with notice to the Court of his
client’s death.
d. Venue
62 General Milling Corp. v. TirsoUytengsu III, Kathleen Uytengsu-Tan and Barbara Uytengsu-
Uytengsu Tan instituted a civil case to the possession of duplicate original
copies of OCT’s against General Milling. The latter filed a motion
to dismiss, alleging that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over
the issue because the complainants failed to allege the assessed
value of the lands, the OCT’s of which were being demanded. TC
denied motion to dismiss. CA and SC affirm.
63 Hyatt Elevators and According to Hyatt’s Articles of Incorporation, its residence is in
Escalators Corp. v. Makati. However, in making its complaint for unfair trade
Goldstar Elevators Phils. practices and damages Goldstar (also based in Makati), it filed
22
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather
than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. A real party in interest is one
who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit."
In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in
Special Proceedings M-3630. If petitioner is not a real party in
interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable
party is one without whom there can be no final determination of
an action.
In class suits and joinder of parties, similar essential factors exist
i.e., the same transaction or series of transactions is involved;
and common questions of fact or law are at issue.
What makes the situation a proper case for a class suit is the
circumstance that there is only one right or cause of action
pertaining or belonging in common to many persons, not
separately or severally to distinct individuals.
The other factor that serves to distinguish the rule on class suits
from that of permissive joinder of parties is, of course, the
numerousness of parties involved in the former. The rule is that
for a class suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia that the
parties be so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring
them all before the court.
The settled rule is that attorney-client relationship is terminated
upon the client’s death. A dead client has no personality and
cannot be represented by an attorney.
The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, and cannot be dependent on the
defenses of the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss.
When the subject matter of a suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction.
For practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense
a resident of the place where its principal office is located as
stated in the articles of incorporation. Since the principal place of
 with a trial court in Mandaluyong. This is a case of improper business of a corporation determines its residence or domicile,
venue. then the place indicated in its articles of incorporation becomes
controlling in determining the venue for this case.

64 Golden Arches Golden Arches (GA) terminated its lease contract wit St. Francis Venue, in essence, concerns a rule of procedure. In personal
Development v. St. Sq. Holdings Inc. Action for breach of contract and damages was actions, it is fixed for the greatest possible convenience of the
Francis Square filed by St. Francis Sq. before the RTC of Mandaluyong. GA filed a plaintiff and his witnesses, and to promote the ends of justice. St.
motion to dismiss stating that Mandaluyong had no jurisdiction Francis Sq’s purpose in filing the complaint in Mandaluyong
over the case, complaint should have been filed in Makati where where it holds its principal office is obviously for its convenience
SFS principally resides. and for orderly administration of justice.
65 Ang v. Ang Alan and Em Ang obtained a loan of US$300,000.00 from If the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint
Theodore and Nancy Ang. Because Alan and Em failed to pay their in such case may only be filed in the court of the place where the
outstanding debt of US$719,671.23, inclusive of the 10% annual defendant resides.
interest, despite repeated demands by Theodore and Nancy, the
latter, filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with the
RTC of Quezon City against the former. Since Theodore and Nancy
were residing in Los Angeles, California, they had to execute
respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor of Attorney Eldrige
Aceron for the purpose of filing said action in court. Alan and Em
moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed on the grounds of
improper venue and prescription. Insisting that the venue of the
action was improperly laid, they asserted that the complaint
against them may only be filed in the court of the place where
either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they
reside in Bacolod City while Theodore and Nancy reside in Los
Angeles, California, USA. Thus, they maintain, the filing of the
complaint against them in the RTC of Quezon City was improper.
Theodore and Nancy, however, insist that Atty. Aceron, being
their attorney-in-fact, is deemed a real party in interest and can
prosecute the same before the RTC. The said complaint for
collection of sum of money may be filed in the court of the place
where Atty. Aceron resides, which is the RTC of Quezon City.
66 Villanueva v. Judge Ejectment case was brought against the lessee of a property - The rule in section 1(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court that
Mosqueda located in Manila. The suit was filed in Bulacan. The defendant "forcible entry and detainer actions regarding realproperty shall
filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC Masantol, Bulacan be brought in the municipality or city in which the subject matter
has no jurisdiction over the case. The SC ruled that the case was thereof is situated" does notrefer to the jurisdiction over the
filed in the proper court saying that by written agreement of the subject matter but only to the place where the ejectment suit
parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred may bebrought.
from one province to another. - Section 3 of Rule 4 provides that "by written agreement of the
parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred
from one province to another". In this case, such an agreement
was formalized between the lessor and the lessee. The
agreement is valid, binding and enforceable.

23
67 Union Bank of the Union Bank filed an ejectment suit against Maunlad Homes, Inc in A stipulation in a contract providing for a venue for ejectment
Philippines v. Maunlad MeTC of Makati, pursuant to the venue stipulation in their actions other than that stated in the Rules of Court is valid.
Homes contract; MeTC ruled proper action was accion reivindicatoria
over which it had no jurisdiction; RTC affirmed and ruled that
proper venue was Malolos, Bulacan; SC ruled MeTC had
jurisdiction and Makati was the proper venue
68 Unimasters In the Dealership Agreement between KUBOTA and As long as the stipulation does not set forth qualifying or
Conglomeration Inc. v. UNIMASTERS, a provision stipulates that “All suits arising out of restrictive words to indicate that the agreed place alone and
this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper courts of QC”. none other is the venue of the action, the parties do not lose the
Unimasters filed an action against Kubota in the RTC of Tacloban option of choosing the venue. Absence of qualifying or restrictive
City. In the hearing for injunction, Kubota’s counsel participated words, venue stipulations in a contract should be considered
with the express reservation that it was not waiving its motion to merely as agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue
dismiss [on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to improper to the specified place.
venue]. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and held that the
proper venue would either be Tacloban or QC. The CA reversed
and interpreted the stipulation as limiting the venue to QC. The
SC, applying the Polytrade , held that the stipulation is merely
permissive and does not limit the venue to QC.

e. Uniformity of Rules

69 Lucas v. Judge Fabros Gloria Lucas is the defendant in an ejectment case. The judge who
presides over the case is Judge Amelia Fabros. Fabros dismissed
the case for failure of the plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the
preliminary conference. Upon the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, Fabros reversed the dismissal and revived the
case against Lucas.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
BUT this rule applies only where the judgment sought to be
reconsidered is one rendered on the merits.

Because of this reversal, Lucas charged Judge Fabros with Gross

Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion.

70 Jalique v. Dandan The Petitioners Sps. Jalique filed a Complaint for unlawful
detainer against the Respondents, 9 couples and 4 widows, before
the Pasig MeTC. This was due to the termination of their lease
agreement and the Respondents’ refusal to vacate despite
demands. The Respondents did not file an Answer, instead, they
filed a Joint Counter Affidavit. The Sps. Jalique filed a Motion for
Judgment The MeTC decided in favor of the Sps. Jalique. The RTC
affirmed in toto. The CA annulled the RTC decision and ordered a
remand of the case to the MeTC. The SC affirmed the CA decision.
A pleading must be deemed sufficient if
a. it fairly appraises the adverse party of the
claims or contentions therein stated and does
not mislead him, or
b. from the allegations therein, taken together, the
matters required to be averred may be
gathered.

f. Pleadings
24
71 Spouses Mendiola v. CA When Pacific defaulted in its obligations, Shell extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage, wherein petitioners were not able to
participate. Since there was still a deficiency, Shell commenced a
suit to recover the same in the Manila RTC. However, petitioner
commenced an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure in the
Makati RTC. Manila RTC ruled in favor of Shell. Despite this
decision becoming final and executory, the Makati RTC still
resolved the Makati case and ruled in favor of petitioner. The SC
held that the Makati case should have been dismissed on the
ground of res judicata.
72 Banco De Oro v. CA Locsins sued BDO for specific performance and to desist from
foreclosing the former’s properties. BDO filed an answer w/
compulsory counterclaim. 8 months later, BDO filed a suit in
another court for collection of a sum of money from Locsins
which the CA considered as a compulsory counterclaim which
should have been set-up in the 1st court.
25
A counterclaim is compulsory if
(a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim;
(b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
(c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its
amount and nature, except that in an original action before the
RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless
of the amount.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory
(a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the
counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?
Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the
logical relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and
that in the counterclaim. Such relationship exists
-when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by
the parties and the court;
-when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal
issues; or
-when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy
between the parties.
If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is
compulsory.
The counterclaim must be existing at the time of filing the
answer, though not at the commencement of the action for under
Section 3 of the former Rule 10, the counterclaim or cross-claim
which a party may aver in his answer must be one which he may
have “at the time” against the opposing party. That phrase can
only have reference to the time of the answer. Certainly a
premature counterclaim cannot be set up in the answer. This
construction is not only explicit from the language of the
aforecited provisions but also serves to harmonize the aforecited

73 Philtranco Service Paras filed a case for damages against Inland, the owner of the
Enterprises v. Paras bus that he was riding which was involved in an accident with a
bus of Philtranco. Philtranco and its driver were impleaded as
Third Party defendants in the case by Inland, which alleges that
the negligent operation of the bus owned by Philtranco was the
proximate cause of the accident.
74 Samala v. Judge Victor The third-party defendants argued that they cannot be held liable
since the principal defendants were absolved in an action for
breach of contract of carriage. They contend that their liability
only arises when the principal defendants are adjudged liable.
The SC found such argument unmeritorious.
75 CDCP v. Cuenca ULTRA applied for a surety bond (Pho 600,000) from MALAYAN
to guarantee its credits, indebtedness, obligations, and liabilities
to GOODYEAR. To protect MALAYAN’s interest, ULTRA, Edilberto
Cuenca, and Rodolfo Cuenca, executed an Indemnity Agreement in
favor of MALAYAN. ULTRA defaulted on its obligation to
GOODYEAR. MALAYAN paid GOODYEAR Php 600,000, the amount
owed to GOODYEAR. MALAYAN asked UTLRA for the
reimbursement of the amount paid to GOODYEAR. ULTRA was
able to remit to MALAYAN the amount of Php 150,000. MALAYAN
filed an action for collection against ULTRA, Edilberto, and
Rodolfo. Rodolfo filed a third-party complaint against PNCC,
which is a major stockholder of the share of PNCC. Rodolfo
alleged that PNCC had assumed all liabilities arising from the
guarantees made by its officers. RTC and CA both held ULTRA and
PNCC liable but both courts also absolved the Edilberto Cuenca
and Rodolfo Cuenca. MALAYAN did not appeal the decision of CA
as regards the Cuencas. The Supreme Court absolved CDCP from
26
sections of Rule 10, with section 4 of the same rule which
provides that “a counterclaim . . . which either matured or was
acquired by a party after serving his pleading may, with the
permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by
supplemental pleading before judgment. Thus a party who fails
to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence of the
plaintiff’s suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said
party files his answer is not thereby barred from interposing
such claim in a future litigation.
The requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the party
to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the action; secondly,
that the claim against the third-party defendant must belong to
the original defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original
defendant against the third-party defendant must be based upon
the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant; and, fourthly,
the defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party
defendant the liability asserted against him by the original
plaintiff.
person not a party to an action may be impleaded by the
defendant either (a) on an allegation of liability to the latter; (b)
on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff; or (c) both (a)
and (b). It is not indispensable that the defendant be first
adjudged liable to plaintiff before the third-party defendant may
be held liable to the plaintiff, as precisely, the theory of
defendant is that it is the third party defendant who is directly
liable to plaintiff.
The third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a
“third party” who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed
complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with
leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff
to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of the plaintiff’s claim.
When leave to file the third-party complaint is properly granted,
the Court renders in effect two judgments in the same case, one
on the plaintiff’s complaint and the other on the third-party
complaint. When he finds favorably on both complaints, he
renders judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff
against defendant and renders another judgment on the third-
party complaint in favor of defendant as third-party plaintiff,
ordering the third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant
whatever amount said defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff in the
 liability but maintained ULTRA’s liability.
76 Bon-Mar Realty v. De Guzman borrowed money from the Siochis and executed a
Spouses De Guzman deed of sale over a property, which the Court declared to be an
equitable mortgage (1st case). Bon-Mar Realty, to whom the
disputed lot was sold after several sales, intervened in the case
but the Court denied this motion for intervention because Bon-
Mar’s right over the property was merely inchoate. In another
case (2nd case), the Court declared that Bon-Mar is entitled to the
lot as owner. De Guzman filed a writ of possession in relation to
the 1st case and asked that the documents be transferred to his
name. Bon-Mar filed an opposition and an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim.
77 Vda. De Formoso v. PNB The Formosos and Malcaba filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the CA, assailing the orders of the RTC. Only
Malcaba signed the certification against forum shopping. The CA
dismissed the petition since all petitioners must sign said
certification. The petitioners assail the CA dismissal. The SC
affirmed.
27
case. Failure of any of said parties in such a case to appeal the
judgment as against him makes such judgment final and executory
Bon-Mar’s intervention is necessary in order to put an end to the
first case because if it were established that Bon-Mar obtained its
title from the De Guzmans, then there is nothing left to execute.
To warrant intervention, two requisites must concur: a) the
movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation and b)
intervention must not unduly prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the parties nor should the claim of the intervenor be
capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The
interest, which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must
involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment.
The relevant rules are in Sec. 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. In this regard, Oldarico Traveno v. Bobongan
Banana Growers, citing Altres v. Empleo, reiterating the
jurisprudential pronouncements respecting non-compliance
with the requirements on, or submission of defective,
verification and certification against forum shopping
1. A distinction must be made between non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission
of defective verification, and non-compliance with
the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if
the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3. Verification is deemed substantially complied with
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct.
4. As to certification against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless

78 BPI v. CA BPI filed a complaint to collect a sum of money against FU and
Linda. The complaint’s verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping were signed by Asis and Ong on behalf of BPI. However,
no Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution was attached to
evidence Asis’ and Ong’s authority to file the complaint on behalf
of BPI. This certification/resolution is prescribed by the rules. FU
and Linda files a motion to dismiss on this ground. SC Motion to
Dismiss is proper, RTC and CA decision affirmed.
79 Santos v. CA Santos, Arce and Pastrana were dismissed by Pepsi because of
redundancy. They peacefully left their positions. Subsequently,
they found out that Pepsi created new position with substantially
the same duties as their former positions. They filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal.
LA and NLRC dismissed the complaint. They filed a special civil
action for certiorari w CA. CA dismissed it outright because the
verification and certification of forum shopping was executed by
the counsel of the three and not by them personally. SC affirmed
CA.
80 Norris v. Parentela Petitioner Norris filed a case, praying that the SC relax the rules
with regard to pleading in order for the case to be decided on the
merits. Petitioner’s title to her land was declared null and void by
the RTC, and in her appeal to the CA, it was denied because she
failed to indicate the date when her counsel received the decision
assailed, preventing the CA from determining whether it was filed
out of time. Also, the decision was a mere photocopy. SC said that
28
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
"substantial compliance" or presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons."
5. The certification against forum shopping must be
signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped
as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest
and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification
against forum shopping substantially complies with
the Rule.
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a
certificate of non-forum shopping are requirements that are
basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. The
rule for the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping,
proper in form and substance, remains to be a strict and
mandatory rule; any liberal application has to be justified by
ample and sufficient reasons that maintain the integrity of, and
do not detract from, the mandatory character of the rule.
- In general, there is substantial compliance in the
verification if the same is executed by an attorney
because it is presumed that the facts alleged by him are
true to his knowledge and belief.
This rule does not apply to certification against forum shopping.
S3 r46 of 1997 rules of civ procedure requires that the
certification must be made by the petitioner himself and not by
counsel since it is petitioner who is in the best position to know
whether he has previously commenced any similar action
involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency.
Procedural rules should not be ignored, specially in this case
where the petitioner Norris had all the opportunity to have the
case determined on the merits but lost several times due to
procedural incompetence.
Complaints and other initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and
agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
 rules will not be relaxed, and that pursuant to Adm Circ 04-94,
she should have attached a certification of non-forum shopping.
Also, she failed to put a notice of hearing directed to all the
parties, and lastly, she failed to indicate the dates, which
prevented the court from finding out if the petition was filed out
of time, which in fact it was.
81 Green Asia Construction Green Asia Construction executed a real estate mortgage to
v. CA secure a loan they obtained from PCI Leasing. They failed to pay
the loan on maturity and the mortgage was foreclosed
extrajudicially. As PCI was the highest bidder at the foreclosure
sale, they filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession,
which was granted. Green Asia contended that PCI's petition is
not proper in form and substance because the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by PCI or its
duly authorized representative. The Court held that the petition is
not defective in form, as a certification on non-forum shopping is
required only in a complaint or petition which is an initiatory
pleading, and the writ of possession filed was a motion (not an
initiatory pleading).
82 Parents-Teachers Assoc. Spouses Ilagan owned SMCA. They obtained a load from the
of St. Matthew Christian bank, secured by a mortgage over the land where the school was
Academy v. Metrobank built. The spouses defaulted and an extrajudicial foreclosure was
made. The Bank was the highest bidder. The Bank filed an Ex-
Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession. The certificate
of non-forum shopping that was attached to the petition was
signed by the branch manager only. The petition was granted and
a writ of possession was issued. The PTA of SMCA composed of
teachers and several parents of students of the school assail the
validity of the writ of possession, saying that the lack of authority
to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping rendered the
petition worthless and should be deemed non-existent. The Court
held that it is but an insignificant lapse and is not even needed in
the petition because it is not an initiatory pleading but a mere
motion.
83 Asian Contruction and In Highett’s case for collection of money against Asian, the former
Development Corp. v. presented charge invoices of the purchase price which Asian
Mendoza allegedly failed to pay. Asian and Highett disagree on whether or
not such document is actionable. SC ruled that the document is
not actionable.
29
be accompanied by suchcertification. Section 1 of the circular
also includes in its enumeration of initiatory pleadings a petition
where the party asserts his claim for relief.
Notice addressed to the clerk of court and not to the parties does
not suffice.
Petitioner did not attach a true copy of the orders, and she also
did not show the material dates when her Atty-in-fact received a
copy of the order, preventing the CA from determining whether
the petition was filed on time.
* A certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading.
* An original action is not necessary to acquire possession in
favor of the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property. The right to possession is based simply on the
purchaser’s ownership of the property. Thus, the mere filing of
an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession would
suffice. No verification and certification on non-forum shopping
need be attached to the motion at all.
A certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. What
distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its
form or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose.
The purpose of a motion is not to initiate litigation but to bring
up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the motion
is filed (Green Asia Construction v. CA).
Even if the application for the writ of possession was
denominated as a “petition,” it was in substance merely a motion.
Any insignificant lapse in the certificate of non-forum shopping
did not render the writ irregular.
Charge Invoices are not actionable documents per se as these
“only provide details on the alleged transactions.” These
documents need not be attached to or stated in the complaint as
these are evidentiary in nature.
84 Pascua v. Florendo The Pascuas filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages
against the Castros. Instead of filing an answer, the latter filed a
motion to dismiss. The Trial Court declared them in default,
allowing the Pascuas to present evidence ex-parte. Despite the
presentation of evidence, the TC found that the action had already
prescribed. The Pascuas elevated the petition to the SC,
contending that, as petitioners, they are entitled to the relief
prayed for since the Castros had defaulted. The SC denied such
petition, stating that a party is not automatically granted the relief
prayed for just because the other party defaulted.
85 Gajudo v. Traders Royal Chua obtained a loan from Traders secured by a real estate
Bank mortgage over a parcel of land owned in common with Gajudos.
Loan was not paid. Traders commenced extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings. After several delays, trial proceeded. A fire
destroyed the records and the complaint had to be re-filed with
new defendants (property was sold after the fire occurred).
Traders failed to file their answer and trial proceeded ex parte.
RTC ruled for Petitioners, but CA reversed said ruling.
86 Lina v. CA
Northern Motors filed a case for sum of money against Lina. Lina
filed a motion for extension to file his responsive pleading 2 days
before the expiration of the reglementary period. The trial court
held Lina in default. The CA and SC affirmed.
30
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has
ascertained that the evidence offered and the facts proven
by the presenting party. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to
require presentation of evidence if everytime the other party is
declared in default, a decision would automatically be rendered
in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the
tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules nor is
it sanctioned by the due process clause.
Between Sec. 3, Rule 9 and Sec. 1, Rule 133 of the RoC, there is no
incompatibility that would preclude the application of either one
of them.
One-year period of redemption provided in Act No. 3135, as
amended is only directory and can be extended by agreement of
the parties. However, to convert legal redemption to
conventional redemption, the ff requisites must concur 1)
voluntary agreement of the parties to extend the period; and 2)
debtor’s commitment to pay the redemption price on a fixed
date.
Paragraph (d), Sec. 3, Rule 9 of RoC provides that a judgment
against a party in default “shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.” Damages to be awarded must be proved convincingly,
in accordance with the quantum of evidence required in civil
cases.
- The granting of additional time within which to file an
answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court.
- Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a
defendant in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) are
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default
on the ground that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and
that he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when
the defendant discovered the default, but before the
same has become final and executory, he may file a

87 Arquero v. CA Rebecca Arquero held the two positions concurrently, one as
Principal of the Palawan National High School and the other as
OIC of the Palawan Integrated National High Schools (PINS)
which she inherited from her predecessor. When another OIC was
placed for PINS, she refused to surrender her position there and
contested the new appointment via a quo warranto proceeding
claiming that the DECS order was an intrusion in her office. The
RTC sided with her after declaring the respondents in default. The
CA reversed. She contests the reversal stating that the procedure
undertaken by respondents to appeal to the CA was improper
after being held in default. The Court affirmed the CA and outlined
the remedies of a party after having been declared in default.
88 Hernandez v. Agoncillo
Verwin, driver of Hector’s delivery van, negligently backed
against a Honda City model owned and driven by Agoncillo.
Repeated demands of Agoncillo were unheeded so she filed a case
against Hernandez and Verwin demanding for actual damages,
moral damages and attorney’s fees. Case prosper only against
Hernandez because summons was not served to Verwin. At the
MeTC level, Hernandez asked for an extension period, but was
denied. Nevertheless, he was able to filed his Answer before he
was declared in default. His answer was not admitted by MeTC
and Agoncillo presented her evidence ex parte and a decision was
rendered in favour of Agocillo on the basis of such evidence. RTC
and CA affirmed. SC affirmed
31
motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;
and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him
as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to
set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2,
Rule 41)
“It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses
his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to
present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the
judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter
alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in
kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is
contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from
seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the
basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court of Appeals.
A defendant declared in default retains the right to appeal from
the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of
a motion to set aside the order of default except that he does not
regain his right to adduce evidence.[42]The appellate court, in
turn, can review the assailed decision and is not precluded from
reversing the same based solely on the evidence submitted by the
plaintiff.”
Sablas vs. Sablas (2007) Where the Answer is filed beyond the
reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in
default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay
the case and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff, the Answer
should be admitted.
It must be emphasized, however, that it is not mandatory on the
part of the trial court to admit an Answer which is belatedly filed
where the defendant is not yet declared in default. Settled is the
rule that it is within the discretion of the trial court to permit
the filing of an answer even beyond the reglementary period,
provided that there is justification for the belated action and
there is no showing that the defendant intended to delay the case
89 Benguet Electric Coop v. Respondent Cosalan filed a complaint with the NLRC against
NLRC Beneco and its Board members, challenging the legality of the
Board resolution which ordered his suspension and termination
from the service and demanding payment of his salaries and
allowances. The LA ruled in favor of Cosalan and held both
Beneco and the Board members solidary liable for his backwages.
NLRC modified LA by holding Beneco to be solely liable for
Cosalan’s backwages.
90 City of Dumaguete v. The City of Dumaguete filed an application for Original
Philippine Ports Registration of Title with the RTC for a piece of land. The Rep. of
Authority the Phils (thru the Dir. Of Land), and Phil. Ports Authorityfiled a
Motion to Dismiss the application, alleging that the land was part
of the public domain, and hence, could not be registered by
Dumaguete. Dumaguete filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was initially dismissed for non-compliance with Secs. 4, 5, and 6
of Rule 15, and Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which
requires a written explanation of why personal service of the
Motion was not served to the opposing party. Initially, the MR was
not considered as filed because of these violations, but the RTC
set aside its original order of dismissal and resolved to have a full-
blown trial in the interests of justice. PPA appealed this to the CA.
CA found that the RTC erred in reconsidering its dismissal of the
case and continuing with the trial. SC disagrees with the CA and
rules for the continuation of the hearing.
91 Swagman Hotels and Swagman Hotels obtained a loan from Christian evidenced by
Travel v. CA three promissory notes. Subsequently, Christian informed
Swagman Hotels that it was terminating the loans since the latter
only paid 6% annual interest instead of the 15% as agreed in the
promissory note. Christian filed a complaint for the sum of
money. Swagman, in its Answer, alleged that Christian had no
cause of action since the promissory notes were not yet due and
demandable. In the course of the hearing and after the hearing,
the trial court ruled that the first two promissory notes were
already due and demandable by that time, and ordered Swagman
to pay the amount of the checks plus 6% annual interest.
92 Dela Cruz v. Concepcion Concepcion paid 2M pursuant to a contract to sell with the
spousesdela Cruz. Before she issued the replacement check for
500k for the last check that bounced, she told the spouses that the
computation of her accountant revealed that her unpaid
obligations including interests and penalties was only P200K.
Spouses agreed and said “if 200k is the correct balance, it is okay
with us”. Because there was allegedly no payment the spouses
filed a case for sum of money with damages. RTC and CA ruled in
Concepcion’s favor considering evidence of receipt presented that
32
The transmission through a private carrier or a letter-
forwarder—instead of the Philippine Post Office—is not a
recognized mode of filing pleadings. The established rule is that
the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding
agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in
court, and that in such case, the date of actual receipt by the
court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is
deemed the date of filing of that pleading.
Section 11 of Rule 13 gives the court the discretion to consider a
pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or
filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made
as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The
exercise of discretion must necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins
with the clause “whenever practicable.” If the offices of
opposing counsel are separated by a considerable
distance(In this case, Visayas and Luzon), personal service of
pleadings and motions by one upon the other is clearly not
practicable and a written explanation as to why personal
service was not done would only be superfluous.
A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be
cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading
alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the
case is pending.
The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of
action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the
complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts
Section 1, Rule 9 of the ROC states that “defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived”. Hence, Concepcion should have been barred
from raising the defense of payment of the unpaid P200K.
However, Section 5, Rule 10 of the ROC allows the amendment to
conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When the
receipt was formally offered as evidence, petitioners did not
manifest their objection to the admissibility of said
document on the ground that payment was not an issue.
 she already paid the P200K.
g. Summons
93 Philamlife v. Breva Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint for damages and
reimbursement of insurance premiums against petitioner
Philamlife with the RTC of Davao City.
Summons together with the complaint, was served upon the
Philamlife's Davao regional office, and was received by its
employee.
Philamlife filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of
summons. The summons was improperly served upon its
employee in its regional office at Davao City; said employee was
not among those named in Section 11,Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be
properly made.
Morales filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that summons and
other court processes could also be served at its principal office at
the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, through the
president or any of its officers authorized to receive summons.
The RTC and CA denied the motion to dismiss.
94 Atiko Trans Inc. and
Cheng Lie v. Prudential Oriental shipped electrolytic tinplates through Cheng Lie but
Guarantee and when the shipment arrived at the Philippines it was found out
Assurance some of the inplates were damaged, crumpled and dented on the
edges.Prudential filed the case to recover what they paid to the
insured. MeTC ruled that it acquired jurisdiction which theRTC
33
Apparently, petitioners only denied receipt of said payment
and assailed the authority of Losloso to receive payment.
Since there was an implied consent on the part of
petitioners to try the issue of payment, even if no motion
was filed and no amendment of the pleading has been
ordered, the RTC cannot be faulted for admitting Concepcios
testimonial and documentary evidence to prove payment.
On the motion to dismiss A case should not be dismissed simply
because an original summons was wrongfully served.
On the alias service of summons Where the defendant has already
been served summons on the original complaint, the amended
complaint may be served upon him without need of another
summons. Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly
served on the defendant, new summons for the amended
complaint must be served on him.
Furthermore, it is not pertinent whatever the summons is
designated as so long as it has adequately served its purpose---to
make certain that the corporation would promptly and properly
receive notice of the filing of an action against it. What is
essential is that the summons complies with the requirements
under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the
defendant together with the prevailing complaint.
- True, when the defendant is a domestic corporation, service of
summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
- However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by
 and CA affirmed. SC held that the court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Atiko BUT not over Cheng Lie.
95 Samartino v. Raon In complaint for ejectment, summons was served on Samartino’s
brother as he was then in rehab. However, officer’s return failed
to show why personal service could not be made. Despite
certification from NBI-TRC, MTC declared him in default and
ruled in favor of Raon. RTC affirmed. Petitioner filed petition for
relief from judgment with RTC which was dismissed, then
petition for certiorari with CA, also dismissed. SC ruled there was
no valid substituted service of summons, therefore MTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
96 Asiavest Limited v. CA Asiavest filed a complaint against Herras for the payment of the
amounts awarded to it by a Hong Kong Court judgement. Asiavest
points out the presumption in favor of the validity of foreign
judgements. On the other hand, Herras argues, through the
testimonies of his witnesses, that there was no service of
summons upon him, and consequently, the HK court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person. SC held that since Heras was
not a resident of HK and the action against him was one in
personam, summons should have been personally served on him
in HK. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was
therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court
jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court
judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines
for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
97 Manotoc v. CA
The plaintiff Trajano obtained a judgment from the US Court
where Imeewas held liable for the death of his father. To enforce
this judgment against Imee, he filed a complaint for Filing,
Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment.
Based on the complaint, the trial court issued a Summons which
3
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
34
defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to
the court’s jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 143 of
the Rules of Court.
- Where service of summons upon the defendant principal is
coursed thru its co-defendant agent, and the latter happens to be
a domestic corporation, the rules on service of summons upon a
domestic private juridical entity must be strictly complied with.
Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction
over the person of both defendants. And insofar as the principal
is concerned, such jurisdictional flaw cannot be cured by the
agent’s subsequent voluntary appearance.
It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for
actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a
substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court, personal service of summons within the state is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of
service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the
country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and
decide the case against him.
[the is very long so I outlined it for the purposes of reviewing]
Requirements for a Substituted Service
1. Impossibility of prompt personal service
a. “Reasonable time” = so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent
and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done,
 was received by Imee’s caretaker in her condo unit in Pasig. She
was eventually declared in default. A week after, her counsel filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
Imee due to the “invalid substituted service of summons.” Both
the RTC and CA rejected the Motion to Dismiss. But the SC
reversed and granted such motion. In deciding the case, the court
discussed the important of summons and the requisites for
substituted service of summons. [see ]
(These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the
Return of Summons.)
98 Pascual v. Pascual Constantino filed a complaint for Specific Performance against
Lourdes. The Process Server tried to serve summons upon
Lourdes 3 times. The 1st was on May 20, 2002. Lourdes was not
home, nor did the domestic worker accept the summons. The
Process Server returned the next day but Lourdes was still not
home. Finally, on May 29, the Process Server returned w/
Barangay officials but again Lourdes was not home (despite the
presence of her car outside the house.) On August 14, 2002, the
Process Server reported that a substituted service was effected.
The RTC later declared Lourdes in default. Constantino was
35
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss,
if any, to the other party.
b. Reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal
service in order to demonstrate impossibility of
prompt service = 15 to 30 days.
c. Reasonable time for the plaintiff = not more than 7
days
d. “Several attempts” = at least 3 tries, preferably on at
least two different dates.
2. Specific Details in the Return
a. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service
b. Reasons behind the failure
c. The inquiries made to locate the defendant
d. The name/s of the occupants of the alleged
residence or house of defendant
e. All other acts done, though futile, to serve the
summons
3. A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
a. Attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old)
b. Must know how to read and understand English
c. Must have the “relation of confidence” to the
defendant
(These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.)
4. A Competent Person in Charge
a. Must be the one managing the office or business of
defendant, such as the president or manager
b. Must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction
1) In a case where the action is in personam and the
defendant resides in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be done by personal or substituted
service.
2) Acquisition of jurisdiction is done by valid service of
summons or defendant’s voluntary appearance.
3) Personal service of summons should and always be the
first option. It is only when the summons cannot be
served w/in a reasonable time that the process server
 allowed to file evidence ex-parte. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of Constantino. A Certificate of Finality and Entry of
Judgment were issued, as well as a Writ of Execution. Lourdes
filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 w/ the CA. The CA
decided in favor of Lourdes. The SC denied Constantino’s Petition
and affirmed the CA’s decision.
99 Republic v. Domingo Domingo filed a complaint against the DPWH Region III due to
the latter’s failure pay the rentals for the lease of his equipment
for a government project. Summons was served upon the DPWH
Region III through its clerk. The RTC then declared DPWH in
default and ruled in favor of Domingo. Republic averred that
because summons was not served upon the OSG, the RTC failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the Republic, hence all the proceedings
before it were void. The SC agreed with the Republic.
h. Motions
100 Jehan Shipping Corp v. Jehan sued NFA and won in the RTC. NFA filed an MR and
NFA Supplemental MR without a notice of hearing directed to the
parties as required by Sec. 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The MR was
dismissed based on such lack of notice of hearing. NFA filed a
notice of appeal but was denied because the MR did not toll the
period of appeal and the decision became final.
36
can resort to substituted service.
4) Requirements for a valid substituted service
Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service, Specific
Details in the Return, A Person of Suitable Age and
Discretion, and a Competent Person in Charge.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the
action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through
coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by
the court, or through the defendant’s voluntary
appearance/submission to the court.
Sec. 13, Rule 14 Service upon public corporations. – When the
defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected
on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or
municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected
on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the
law or the court may direct.
Jurisprudence further instructs that when a suit is directed
against an unincorporated government agency, which, because it
is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own,
the suit is against the agency’s principal, i.e., the State.
It is the duty of Domingo as plaintiff to implead all the necessary
or indispensable parties for the complete determination of the
action. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to name and implead
the proper defendant, the Republic, and cause the service of
summons to be made upon the officer mandated by law, the OSG.
General Rule is a motion without a notice of hearing is
considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
Exception is as provided in this case when the purpose of a
notice of hearing was served. The test is the presence of the
opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the
motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon
which it is based.

101 City of Dumaguete v. The Philippine Ports Authority submitted an Opposition to the
PPA Motion for Reconsideration submitted by the City of Dumaguete,
alleging that the said MR is invalid due to its non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, resulting from its failure
to attach to the MR a written explanation why it did not resort to
personal service of the said MR. PPA now alleges that the MR had
no legal effect, and that it did not interrupt the reglementary
period to appeal.
102 Delos Reyes v. Ramnani Ramnani won in a civil case. After the issuance of the writ of
execution, the property subject of the litigation was sold to her as
the highest bidder. She was issued the certificate of sale. Years
later, the certificate was annotated at the back of the title. She
then filed a motion for the issuance of a final certificate of sale.
Delos Reyes opposed that there was no notice of hearing attached
to the motion. The RTC, the CA, and the SC ruled that the notice
was not needed, since Ramnani was entitled to the certificate as a
matter of right.
i. Dismissal of Actions
103 Stronghold STRONGWORLD, through the two members of its Board of
Construction v. Perello Directors, filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages
against BANK OF COMMERCE, FIRST PEOPLE’S BANK,
FRANCISCO, and LIZARDA. In its complaint, it was alleged that
37
The RTC gave Jehan 10 days within which to comment on NFAs
MR. Jehan filed its Opposition to the Motion. In its 14-page
opposition, it not only pointed out that the Motion was defective
for not containing a notice of hearing and should then be
dismissed; it also ventilated its substantial arguments against the
merits of the Motion and of the Supplemental MR. In this case,
the RTC set the MR and the Supplemental MR for hearing on
during which Jehan’s counsel appeared. In other cases, the Court
has held that lack of notice is cured when, after learning that a
motion has that defect, the trial court promptly resets a hearing
with due notice to all the parties.
Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Whenever personal
service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of
time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.
Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may
resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied
by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was
not practicable to begin with.
A motion that does not comply with this requirement presents
no question which merits the attention of the court. It would be
as if no motion for reconsideration was filed. However, where a
rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be relaxed.
While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for
hearing under Section 4, Rule 15, excepted from this rule are non-
litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the
court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party.
Dismissal based on grounds other than those specified in
paragraphs (f), (b), and (i) of Section 1, Rule 16, are without
prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the same
action; A dismissal based on the ground that the Complaint
 Francisco and Lizarda, as employees of the bank, deposited the
amount of checks in their personal savings account, without the
knowledge of STRONGWORLD. A series of dismissal and
reinstatement of the Complaint occurred in the Regional Trial
Court, until it was finally dismissed. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the complaint on the ground that STRONGWORLD
utilized the wrong mode of appeal. The Supreme Court declared
that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it dismissed
STRONGWORLD’s complaint.
104 Pinga v. Heirs of Respondent Santiago filed a case for forcible entry against
German Santiago petitioner Pinga alleging that Pinga and Saavedra entered their
coco lands and cut bamboo trees and harvested the fruits of trees
therein. On the other hand, Petitioner Pinga alleged that his father
was the owner of the land and has been in possession thereof
since 1930. Petitioner, in turn, filed a counterclaim for
respondents’ forcible re-entry in the properties and the
irresponsibleand reckless filing of the case, they be awarded
various types of damages instead in amounts
totaling P2,100,000 plus costs of suit.
j. Pre-Trial
k. Intervention
105 Virra Mall Tenants Ortigas& Company sued VMGA, alleging that it had a better right
Assoc. v. Virra Mall to the insurance proceeds collected by the latter. VMTA filed a
Greenhills complaint in intervention, alleging that it was the real beneficiary
of the insurance proceeds and sought reimbursement for the
expenses it incurred when it repaired the mall (subject matter of
the insurance contract) allegedly on orders of Ortigas. VMGA
moved to dismiss the complaint in intervention. The RTC denied
the motion. The CA reversed and dismissed the complaint in
intervention. The SC reversed the CA and held that VMTA’s
complaint in intervention is proper.
1.
38
states no cause of action cannot be said to be a dismissal with
prejudice.
Under the old rule, the dismissal of the complaint under Sec. 2,
Rule 17 would also lead to the dismissal of the counterclaim. As
for Sec. 3, Rule 17, the old rule also states that it shall be
dismissed if it is a compulsory counterclaim. The rationale for
the policy is that, with the dismissal of the complaint, the
counterclaim would have no more leg to stand on. However,
this has been abandoned with the Revised Rules of Court
where the counterclaim can no longer be dismissed under
both Sec. 2 and Sec. 3 of Rule 17 unless it is anchored on the
violation of the defendant’s right because of the plaintiff’s
filing of the present complaint.
The applicable rule is Sec. 1, Rule 19; This provision is explained
in Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight
A. Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be
permitted by the court when applicant shows facts
which satisfy the requirements of the statute
authorizing intervention
B. What qualifies a person to intervene is
1. His possession of a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both;
2. Or where he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in custody of the court or an officer thereof
C. As regards legal interest
1. Such interest must be of a direct and immediate
character so that intervenor will either gain or lose

106 Pinlac v. CA This is a case for quieting of title. The Republic filed a motion for
intervention and a Petition-in-intervention when the petitioners’
MR was already pending before the SC. SC Petition of the Republic
is partially meritorious.
l. Calendar of Cases and Computation of Period
m. Subpoena
n. Modes of Discovery
107 Agustin v. CA Arnel is denying that he is the father of Martin. Martin and his
mom (Fe) filed a motion to order all of them to undergo DNA
testing. Arnel opposed the motion claiming that DNA testing is
not a recognized means to prove paternity in the Philppines and
that DNA testing would violate his right to privacy and self-
incrimination. TC and CA granted the motion and ordered the
parties to undergo DNA paternity testing.
SC affirmed TC and CA. This was the first case where the
admissibility of DNA testing as a means of determining paternity
was the focal issue of the controversy.
108 Herrera v. Alba Herrera is compelled by the RTC to take a DNA analysis to
determine if he is the father of respondent Alba. CA affirmed.
Herrera now questions the admissibility of DNA analysis as
39
by the direct legal operation of the judgment
2. Interest must be actual and material, a concern
which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or
sentimental desire
3. It must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and
remote, conjectural, consequential, or collateral
D. However, notwithstanding the presence of legal interest,
permission to intervene is subject to the sound
discretion of the court
2. The exercise of which is limited by considering
“whether or not the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties and whether or not the intervenor’s
rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is
intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the
Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of
judgment by the TC. In one case, intervention was allowed even
when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was
already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
this is under Physical and Mental examination of persons
DNA testing is a recognized means of proving paternity in the
Philippines. It is not considered as a violation of a person’s right
to privacy and self-incrimination.
DNA analysis is now considered valid evidence.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore,
 evidence to prove paternity in our jurisdiction. SC discussed what
DNA analysis is and how is it applicable to our jurisdiction.
o. Trial
109 Yu v. Basilio Magno Two complaints were instituted separately before the RTC of
Construction Tacloban City, and were raffled to Branch 6 and Branch 8.
Decisions in both cases were penned by the presiding Judge of
Branch 6. SC held that the consolidation of the cases was proper,
first, because there appeared to have been a previous agreement
to either transfer or consolidate the 2 cases, second because the
parties did not move for a reconsideration of the two decisions
nor did they call the attention of Judge on the absence of an order
for consolidation of the two cases, and third, the cases involve
simple cases of collection of sums of money between identical
parties, and the issues of fact, the evidence and witnesses are the
same.
p. Demurrer to Evidence
40
courts should consider, among other things, the following data
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards
and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In a paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of
these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is
possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was
inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile
is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in
his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the
man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is
excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not
excluded as the father.
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried
together where they arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely
or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court
has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a joint
trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the parties.
Consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification
of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties
and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a
desirable end to be achieved, within the context of the present
state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and
state finances are limited.