DEATH PENALTY

Group 2

Members:
1. Alladin, Danica
2. Caballero, Billy June
3. De Vera, Laurie
4. Gatuslao, Valerie Gem
5. Grajo, Jobelle Jane
6. Greston, Melissa
7. Nillos, Franzeijan
 1
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y
BAYONA, Appellant.
G.R. No. 170236, 2006 August 31, En Banc

Facts

On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel, 11 year old son of Roberto Quiachon saw
him on top if his sister Rowena while they were covered with a blanket. His father’s
buttocks were moving up and down, and he could hear his sister crying. Because of his
fear of their father, he could not do anything. The following day, he told his mother’s
sister Carmelita Mateo about what he witnessed and together, they went to the police to
report what had transpired.

Rowena is a deaf-mute and was only 8 years old at that time. Through sign
language, she testified that her father had sexual intercourse with her and touched her
breast against her will. She wants her father to be punished for what he did to her.

Roberto testified that when he was invited to the barangay hall, he did not know
the reason for the invitation. He was shocked to learn that his daughter accused him for
raping her. He was taken to the Police station, thereafter to jail. The appellant denied
raping his daughter and alleged that Carmelita and Virginia, the sisters of his deceased
wife held a grudge against him because he abandoned his family and wasn’t able to
support them. Also even before the death of his wife, his son was already hostile to him
because he was closer to his daughters.

Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police General
Hospital Health Services testified that she received a letter request from the PNP Crime
Laboratory to conduct an examination on Rowena. The lab results were compatible with
the recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have happened a
day before the examination.

After considerations, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, rendered
its decision, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape.

Issue

Whether or not appellant is guilty of rape based on the evidence presented.

Ruling

Yes. On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, appellant Robert Quiachon, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor, against her will and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA, Appellant.

consent. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 finds appellant guilty of a
crime of qualified rape and is sentenced to suffer a maximum penalty of death.

The CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena recounting the bestial
act perpetrated by appellant on the latter were corroborated by physical evidence as
presented by Dr. Guialani in her medico-legal report. The CA believed that Rowena
could not possibly invent a charge so grave as rape against her father because “it is very
unlikely for any young woman in her right mind to fabricate a story of defloration
against her own father, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, and subject
herself to the trauma and scandal of public trial, put to shame not only herself but her
whole family as well unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the
wrong committed against her.” The victim’s testimony was simple, straightforward,
unshaken by rigid cross examination, and unflawed by inconsistency of contradiction. It
was further corroborated by the medico legal report and from this evidence; appellant’s
simple denial of charge against him must fail.

In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and in imposing the supreme penalty of
death upon him. In the Pre-Trial Order dated September 10, 2001, the prosecution and
the defense agreed on the following stipulation of facts:

1. The minority of the victim who is eight (8) years old;

2. That the accused is the father of the victim; and

3. The victim is a deaf-mute.

However, in view of effectively of Republic Act no. 9346 prohibiting the

imposition of death penalty, the penalty to be meted on the appellant shall be
reclusion perpetua in accordance with sec. 2 of the said act.
 2

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE
EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 104, respondents.
G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Facts

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of
rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon
him of the death penalty for the said crime. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were
denied. Meanwhile Congress changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, an act designating
death by lethal injection as the method of carrying out capital punishment.

Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection
against him under the grounds that;

1. It constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment;

2. being violative of due process;

3. violating the Philippines' obligations under international covenants;

4. an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress;

an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful

delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the
petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already
upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that
the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical,
safer and easier to apply; in addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 104, respondents

Issues

1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman

punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?

3. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Ruling

No 1st two. Yes to last. Petition denied.

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading

and inhuman punishment because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be
used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and
the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) its implementing rules
are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix
the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the
convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal
injection inherently cruel.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,

degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons- “punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.” Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by
lethal injection render said law “cruel, degrading or inhuman”? The Court believes
not. Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which “court”
will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification
of the death convict.

As petitioner already knows, the “court” which designates the date of execution is
the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the “judgment is
entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are
remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution.
Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification.
As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the
death sentence shall be carried out “not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen
(18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency
powers at all times.” Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 104, respondents

months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and
spiritual affairs.

Petitioner also contends that the infliction of “wanton pain” in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is
unsubstantiated.

First, Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection
required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the
drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in
the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged
and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.

Second, Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior
to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted
with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel
punishment.

Third, Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out
the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. “In a limited sense, anything is cruel
which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the
Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished.” The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.

2. Violation of international treaties? In countries which have not abolished the

death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in
accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not
contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried
out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. The punishment was
subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the “most serious crimes”. Included with
the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified
said document.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 104, respondents

3. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is

unconstitutional for being discriminatory. “Sec. 17. Suspension of the execution of
the death sentence. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman
within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant,
nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death
penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.” Petitioner
contends that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended,
without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 25 of R.A. No. 7659. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty
while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the
implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when
the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no
longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-
year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner’s view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination. Being an implementing rule, Section 17
must not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to
apply and implement.
 3

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NICANOR

SALOME, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 169077, August 31, 2006 En Banc

Facts

July 1997, Sally Idanan, thirteen years old at that time was sleeping with her
three year old brother when Nicanor Salome entered their house. She was awakened by
the latter who was poking a knife at the base of her neck. While holding the knife with
one hand, Salome undressed her threatening to kill her and her family if she would tell
anyone about the incident. After undressing her, he removed his shorts and underwear
and began to rape her. Fearful for her life and for her family’s safety, she did not inform
anyone of the incident. Although it entered her mind that she could be pregnant, she left
her province to work as a domestic helper in the house of SPO2 Constantino B. Saret in
West Crame, San Juan, Manila.

November 12, 1997, she undergoes pelvic ultrasound examination which confirms
her pregnancy. Upon this, she reported the rape incident to the police executed a sworn
statement and filed a complaint. A criminal complaint for rape was initiated before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pandan-Caramoran, Pandan, Catanduanes. Appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge during the arraignment.

Evidence for the criminal case consisted of Sally’s narration of the incident, and
the testimony of Ma. Luz T. Santos, Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, on the medico-legal report issued by Dr. Anthony
Joselito Llamas.

Appellant denied that he raped Sally and offered alibi as a defense. He claimed
that he went fishing together with his friends on three different days. Villarey and
Torralba corroborated the fact that they went fishing with appellant in July of 1997.
They claimed however that even though they go fishing together, after which they go
separate ways and wasn’t aware of the appellants activities after that.

On April 3, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of the
crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NICANOR SALOME, Accused-Appellant.

Issue

Whether or not Nicanor Salome is guilty of the crime of rape beyond reasonable
doubt.

Ruling

Yes. The accused Nicanor Salome is found guilty of the crime of rape beyond
reasonable doubt with the use of a deadly weapon and hereby committed the crime
inside the dwelling of the offended party. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death as defined and penalized under article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, to give monthly support in the sum of two thousand
pesos to the offspring of complainant Sally Idanan born April 11, 1998 and to indemnify
Sally in the sum of fifty thousand pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. In view of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without parole.
Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103.
 4

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y

PAHILANGA, Appellant
G.R. No. 171271, 31 August 2006

Facts
The accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, was employed as a family driver
by Atty. Evelyn Sua – Kho. One evening the accused drove Atty. Kho to her
condominium unit. After giving the bag to the housemaid, Marissa Hiso, the accused
went straight to the kitchen where he drank a glass of water. Together with Atty. Kho in
the condominium, were her daughter Issa and her nanny, Nellie Maglasang. Atty. Kho
emerged from the bedroom to talk to the accused after playing with her daughter.
Shortly thereafter, Marissa heard Atty. Kho screaming and saw the accused stabbing her
with a kitchen knife. She tried to stop him, but the accused continued to stab the victim.
Nellie also heard her employer screaming and called the Marcelino Sua, the
victim’s father. When the security guard and Marcelino arrived, they found the victim’s
bloodied and unmoving body then rushed her to the hospital but was not revived. She
sustained eighteen stab wounds some found in her chest which was considered fatal to
have caused her death.
The accused fled the scene using victim’s car and was arrested in Mindoro while
on his way to his home province. Prior to the commission of the crime, the accused
confided to Marian Aquino, secretary of the law firm where the victim works, and Atty.
Baguio, an associate of the firm, his grudges towards the victim and his plan to kill her.
The accused grudges were due to the victims insult against him like being scolded for
being late, and being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and other bad names, being
given spoiled food, that his meals were being measured, that he worked long hours of
the day and served many bosses.

Issue
Whether or not accused Tubongbanua is guilty of the crime of murder qualified
by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking
advantage of superior strength and dwelling.

Ruling
Yes. Accused Tubongbanua was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling. It was established
by the prosecution witnesses the appellant’s state of mind and predisposition to avenge
the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses testified on appellant’s ill-plans
against his employer the day prior to the crime which is an evident of premeditation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA, Appellant.

The accused also took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the
criminal act. He killed Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder
weapon into her body several times, despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could
not have executed the dastardly act without employing physical superiority over the
victim. The fact that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home is an aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. The accused could have killed the victim elsewhere but he
decided to commit the crime at her home.
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should
be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.

Accordingly, R.A. No. 8177, otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal
Injection is hereby repealed. R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law
and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty
are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases.

We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the
amount of actual damages and exemplary damages.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with
modification and sentenced the accused to Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility of
parole.
 5
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995

Facts
On July 13, 1991, Maureen Hultman asked Jussi Olavi Leino to take her home at
Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman tagged along.
When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from
her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to
know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman
stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light colored Mitsubishi box-type
Lancer car, driven by the accused Claudio Teehankee Jr. came up from behind them and
stopped in the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car and approached them,
and asked: “Who are you? Show me your I.D.”. When Leino handed his Asian
Development Bank I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the wallet I.D. without
bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked the
accused: “Why are you bothering us?” Acused pushed Chapman, dugged into his shirt,
pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a
moment, and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk.
Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed the gun at him and
asked: “Do you want trouble:” Leino said “no” and took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she
became hysterical and started screaming for help. She shouted repeatedly, “Oh my God,
he’s got a gun. He’s goint to kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, the accused
was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen warning the latter to shut up.
Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt
to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be
hysterical and could not stay still. She strayed to the side of the accused’ car. Accused
tried to grab her but failed. Maureen circled around the accused’s car trying to put some
distance between them. The short chase lasted a minuter or two. Eventually, accused
caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino.
Maureen finally sat down beside Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two and faced them again
and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk but did
not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He
lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drives
away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at east 3 people
saw the incident.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-
appellant.

Issue
Whether or not Claudio Teehankee Jr. is guilty for murder of Roland Chapman
and for two frustrated murder of Jussi Leino and Maureen Hultman.

Ruling
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the
shooting of Roland JohnChapman. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum,and to pay the heirs of the said
deceased the following amounts: P50,000.00 as indemnity for the victim’s death; and
P1,000,000 as moral damages.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
following amounts: P50,000.00 as indemnity for the victim’s death; P2,350,461.83 as
actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000
as moral damages; and P2,000,000 for exemplary damages.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified
by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal as maximum,and to pay the said offended party the following
amounts: P30,000.00 as indemnity for his injuries;P118,369.84 and equivalent in
Philippine pesos of USD55,600.00, both actual damages;P1,000,000 as moral damages;
and P2,000,000 for exemplary damages.
In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1,000,000, or
a total of P3,000,000.00, for attorey’s fees and expenses of litigation and to pay the
costs in all three cases.
 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENE SANTOS, appellant.
G.R. 172322, 8 September 2006

Facts
On October 19, 2005, Rene Santos was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Macabebe, Pampanga with rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
rendering the judgment of the death penalty. He allegedly raped AAA, who’s 5 years old
that time.
AAA was brought to the Jose B. Lingad Memorial Regional Hospital in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where she was examined. The Medico Legal O.B. Gyne Report
indicated multiple superficial healed lacerations.
The victim, who was already six years old when she testified in court, positively
identified the appellant during the trial and testified on the affidavit she executed before
the police officers of xxx, Pampanga.
Rene Santos was convicted by the Regional Trial Court, which was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Upon his appeal to the Supreme Court, appellant
alleged that –
1. The trial court erred in not considering the defense of the accused that would
exculpate him from the crime of rape.
2. The trial court erred when it imposed upon the accused the maximum penalty
of death.

Rene tried to discredit the victim’s testimony through her action, he insists that it is
unnatural for the 6-year old victim to go to school the day following her supposedly
shocking experience. He also points out that "she was answering not as seriously as
one who has been sexually molested."

Issue
1. Is Rene Santos guilty of Rape?
2. Did the trial court erred when it imposed upon the accused the maximum
penalty of death?

Ruling
1. Yes, the credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important
aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during the
direct and cross-examination by counsel. It is likewise well established that the
testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so, if she is a 5-
year-old child as in this case. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENE SANTOS, appellant.

been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the
humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so
testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence
of proof of ill motive.
Rene tried to discredit the victim’s testimony through her action, claiming the
uncharacteristic behaviour of the latter that, according to him, should be traumatized
after undergoing "the onslaught of sexual molestation." He insists that it is unnatural for
the 6-year old victim to go to school the day following her supposedly shocking
experience. He also points out that "she was answering not as seriously as one who has
been sexually molested."
There is no standard form of behavior that can be expected of rape victims after
they have been defiled because people react differently to emotional stress. Nobody can
tell how a victim of sexual aggression is supposed to act or behave after her ordeal.
Certainly, it is difficult to predict in every instance how a person – especially a 6-year
old child, as in this case – would react to a traumatic experience. In fact, the Court has
not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after her
ravishment.

2. No, He correctly meted the penalty of death because rape committed against a
"child below seven (7) years old" is a dastardly and repulsive crime which merits no less
than the imposition of capital punishment under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code. That AAA was only five years old when she was ravished is clear from her birth
certificate.
However, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled "An Act Prohibiting
The Imposition Of The Death Penalty In The Philippines," the penalty that should be
meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court affirms the award of P75, 000.00
as civil indemnity and P25, 000.00 as exemplary damages; and increases the Court of
Appeals' award of moral damages from P50, 000.00 to P75, 000.00.
 7
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX BARTOLOME,
accused-appellant.
G.R No. 129054, Sept. 29, 1998

Facts
This is an automatic review of the decision rendered by Branch 19 of the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City in C.C No. 95-118 imposing upon accused-appellant Alex
Bartolome the supreme penalty of death for raping his daughter.
Herein appellant Alex Bartolome was charged with the crime of rape on the basis
of a complaint filed by Elena Gorra Bartolome, allegedly committed as follows:

 On March 9, 1995, at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, at Zone 2,

Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, Alex Bartolome who is my own father, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with complaint-victim, ELENA BARTOLOME Y GORRA,
accused forcing himself sexually a 16 year old minor against her will.

 Elena Gorra Bartolome is the daughter of Alex Bartolome and Alma

Gorra.

 She was born on July 31, 1978 in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City and is the
fourth child of the spouses Bartolome.

 Elena lived in Patag until she was ten (10) years old when the whole
family left for Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte where complainants mother,
Alma Gorra, worked as a cook for a Cuban national. While they were in
Davao, Alex Bartolome left his family and returned to Cagayan de Oro.

 Later, Alex Bartolome returned to them in Davao and reconciled with

her mother.

 However, after her mother became pregnant, appellant again left them
and went back to Cagayan de Oro. Soon he developed the habit of
traveling to and from Davao and Cagayan de Oro every now and then.

 On October 30, 1993, when Elena was fourteen (14) years old, appellant
went back to Davao. At that time, Elena was six (6) months pregnant
with her child (by) her boyfriend, Jockery Polo.

 Then, her mother suggested to Elena that she had better go with her
father to Cagayan de Oro City where she could give birth and at the same
time visit her grandmother (alex mother).

 Elena agreed to her mother’s proposition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX BARTOLOME, accused-appellant.

 On the night of November 2, 1993, Elena asked her grandmother where

she could sleep. Her grandmother answered that she would sleep with
her in her room together with Elena’s cousins. But Alex Bartolome
protested and told Elena to sleep instead with him since she was
pregnant and her cousins might hit her belly. Besides, appellant added,
he was alone in his room.

 Elenas grandmother prodded her to just sleep with appellant, lest the
latter would go wild. Since appellant was her father, Elena slept beside
him in the latter’s room. It was then nine o’clock in the evening more or
less.

 Later, while Elena was lying down, the right side of her body facing the
wall, she noticed that a hand was placed on top of her breast then slipped
down towards her vagina. Knowing that it was appellants hand and kept
on kicking her feet but appellant punched her on the left side of her
hip. After which, appellant took off his briefs and removed Elena’s
underwear and ordered Elena to move closer to him. Appellant
thereupon placed himself at the back of Elena, inserted his penis to her
vagina and had sexual intercourse with her. After the sexual intercourse,
appellant wiped his penis with the towel placed around his neck and
went downstairs to drink water.

 Elena was left in the room crying. From that time on, appellant raped his
daughter every week with an interval of two (2) days for each rape. The
same continued until 15 or 16 days before Elena delivered her child on
January 23, 1994. Despite the foregoing fact however, Elena did not tell
her grandmother of her ordeal because of appellant’s threat to kill her
and kick her belly.
 After Elena had given birth to her child, appellant again raped her

 Elena was then inside her grandmothers room lying down on bed with
only a napkin on her vagina because her organ was still bleeding because
of her delivery. Appellant removed the napkin and went on top of Elena
and had sexual intercourse with her.

 Elena asked appellant why he was doing it to her when she was his
daughter. He replied to just shut up since he was missing her
mother. Elena at that time suffered tremendous pain as she had just
given birth to her child.

 On March 9, 1995, between 9:00 to 10:00 in the evening, appellant again

wanted to have sex with Elena while they were inside his room.

 Appellant pushed Elena’s child, as a result of which her elbow hit the
child who then cried.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX BARTOLOME, accused-appellant.

 Elena then hit the lock of the trunk (cavan) waking up her grandmother
who asked what was happening.

 Appellant pretended to wake Elena up and scolded her for not attending
to her child.

 Appellant then went down and got a pipe and hit Elena at her left hip.

 Afterwards, appellant got a piece of cloth, lowered his brief down to his
knees and removed Elena’s underwear.

 He then stretched Elena’s legs, bent his body and licked her vagina for
about three or four times.

 Apellant then rode on top of Elena, inserted his penis into her vagina,
and made push and pull movements as he panted.

 When he was about to have an orgasm, he pulled out his organ and
discharged his seminal fluid on the base of Elenas vagina.

 After that, appellant got the piece of cloth and wiped Elena's vagina as
well as his organ. Appellant then gave the cloth to Elena and instructed
her to wipe her vagina with it so that she would not get pregnant .

 After the above mentioned incident, Elena thought of going back to

Davao and so she went to see her aunt from Iligan City, Annie
Mangandato, who was in Patag to ask (for) money for her fare.

 Her aunt, who was not aware of her predicament, told appellant about
Elenas plan.

 Appellant then confronted Elena why she was angry with him when
appellant was not the first one to deflower her.

 Further, appellant threatened Elena that he would beat and hang

her when her aunt got back to Iligan.

 Finally, in the morning of March 10, 1995, Elena finally decided to tell
her aunt who was about to go home to Iligan that she was being raped by
her own father.

 As suggested by her aunt, Elena went to the barangay captain of Patag

and reported that appellant sexually molested her.

 Later, Elena went to the police station in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City
and also reported the rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX BARTOLOME, accused-appellant.

 She was then advised by the attending police woman to proceed to the
provincial hospital for medical examination.

Issue
Whether or not the Appellant committed rape against the latter?

Ruling
 Yes, the accused Alex Bartolome committed the crime of rape against her own
daughter Elena.

 For the fact that he admitted having had sexual intercourse with his own
daughter.

 He also claims that they were living together as husband and wife and their
sexual encounters are all consensual, it is an affront to Filipino values and an
assault on the intelligence; it offends sensibilities. The story could only be
concocted by a morally corrupt and mentally depraved sex maniac.

 Even if there was absence of force, the apparent submission of herein victims
does not indicate consent.

 She had been repeatedly abused by her father for more than a hundred times.

 On the occasion of all those rapes, appellant inflicted upon her bodily injuries
and continuously threatened to kill her.

 Considering the strength and the moral ascendancy of her father, the victim
obviously knew that any opposition or resistance on her part would be futile.

 Also, the fact that the victim did not resist appellant by struggling or shouting for
help does not rule out force and intimidation. The threat alone coming from
her father, a person who wielded such moral ascendancy, was enough
to render her incapable of resisting or asking for help.

 A father who can readily admit with ease the fact that he had sexual intercourse
with his minor daughter for more than 100 times is no longer a man and is not
even fit to be called a beast.

 As we have ruled in People vs. Melivo, "The man who violates his own progeny
commits an act which runs against known biologic, legal and moral laws. Even
some of the most primitive beasts protect their offspring with a fierceness which
costs their own lives. By inflicting the primitive, bestial act of incestuous lust on
his own blood, appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society”.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX BARTOLOME, accused-appellant.

 The imposable penalty for the crime committed. Under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 the death
penalty shall be imposed if the crime of' rape is committed where "the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree. or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.

 The ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty
should be imposed in the case at bar.

 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with

the MODIFICATION that appellant Alex Bartolome is ordered to indemnify the
offended party in the increased amount of P75,000.00 as civil liability ex
delicto and to pay the additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
 8
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CARMELITO
LAURENTE CAPWA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 174058, December 27, 2007

Facts

On the evening of September 4, 1998, while everyone else was sleeping, appellant
entered his childrens room and came to where his eldest daughter, AAA,[3] was
sleeping. He then started to touch the different parts of AAAs body and placed himself
on top of her. He removed AAAs underwear, opened the zipper of his shorts, placed his
penis inside her vagina, and repeatedly made pumping motions. AAA could not protest
because accused-appellant was carrying a bladed weapon. AAA was only 15 years old
then.

On September 11, 1998, AAA left their house and did not return anymore. AAA
went to her auntie BBBs house and told her that she was raped by accused-appellant.
BBB then accompanied AAA to the Department of Social Welfare and Development
Office in Claver, Surigao del Norte

On September 29, 1998, AAA, assisted by a social worker, lodged a complaint

against appellant before the police. Thereafter, she was medically examined at the
CARAGA Regional Hospital. The medical findings revealed that AAA’s hymen not intact
but has no fresh or sign of recent lacerations and slightly contused minor lips at 4 and 8
o’clock positions.

Carmelito's defense was denial. He claimed that AAA accused him of raping her
only because he scolded and threatened to kill her for refusing to end her relationship
with her boyfriend. Consequently, an Information for attempted rape was filed.[8]
However, before arraignment, the prosecution filed an Amended Information for
consummated qualified rape.

On May 10, 2006, the CA affirmed the May 21, 2001 RTC Decision. The appellate
court observed that accused-appellant questioned the amendment of the information for
the first time during his appeal.

In dismissing accused-appellants arguments, the CA ruled that he failed to

seasonably raise his objection to the amendment. It held that his silence at the time the
amendment was made is deemed consent to such amendment.

Moreover, in affirming the guilt of accused-appellant, the CA gave credence to the

victim’s testimony. It disregarded the discrepancy between the victims Sinumpaang
Salaysay and testimony in court, and emphasized that statements made in court are
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CARMELITO LAURENTE CAPWA,
Accused-Appellant.

preferred over affidavits made ex parte. Also, it found that the victim’s allegation of rape
was supported by the medical evidence.

Issues

1. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the prosecution had
proven beyond reasonable doubt guilt for rape, whether attempted or consummated.

2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty on
considering the prosecutions failure to prove the minority of the complainant.

Ruling

1. No. Usually, to sustain a conviction for rape, there must be proof of the penetration of
the female organ. In this case, the conviction of accused-appellant was anchored mainly
on the testimony of the minor victim, AAA. Accused-appellant, however, questions
AAA's credibility, alleging that there was significant discrepancy between her
Sinumpaang Salaysay, where she said that she was harassed; and her testimony in court,
where she said that she was raped.

As correctly observed by the CA, the inaccuracy in AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay may be
attributed to the inadequacy of the investigators language, and not on her alleged lack of
honesty. Moreover, AAAs testimony in court clearly proved that accused-appellant had
sexually abused her. It must be stressed that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to
testimony given in court, the affidavits being invariably incomplete and oftentimes
inaccurate due to partial suggestions or want of specific inquiries.

2. No. The RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
minority. Accused-appellant failed to controvert the proofs presented establishing AAA's
minority at the time of the rape. However, in view of the effectivity of Republic Act No.
9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, the
death penalty is now reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
 9

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLAVIANO PUDA Y

GARAPEA alias "FLAVIO PUDA", accused-appellant.
G.R. No. L-33841, October 31, 1984

Facts

In the early morning of December 19, 1959 defendant Flaviano Puda climbed
over the fence of the house of Luis Ching Kiat Biak located at 557 Tomas Claudia Street,
Parañaque, Rizal, then once over the fence he clambered to the awning (media agua) of
the back part of the ground floor of the house and from there, he went up to the second
story, removed the wooden moldings which held in place the glass plates thereby
causing an opening to be made; that thereafter he removed his rubber shoes and went
thru the opening and gained entrance into the bedroom of Ching Tian Un, son of the
owner of the house who was then sleeping alone in said bedroom at the time; that after
having gained entry into the bedroom, defendant stabbed twice the sleeping Ching Tian
Un with a dagger causing the death of the latter.

The confession of the accused, which showed that the accused had been earlier
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal for having stolen P100.00 from the
father of the victim and for which reason he was dismissed as houseboy and that
because of this and of the fact that he had not been treated well by the deceased he went
to the victim's house in the night of December 19, 1959 with the intention to kill the
deceased. Thus, on November 21, 1960, the trial court found the accused guilty of
murder with two aggravating circumstances and sentenced him to the supreme penalty
of death.

Unfortunately because of negligence of some court personnel the records of the

case were not forwarded by the court a quo to this Court for automatic review.

Eleven years after his conviction, the accused wrote a letter to this Court
inquiring about the status of his case. We inquired through a letter addressed to the
Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, about the veracity of the
allegations of the letter of the accused and received a reply informing us that due to the
inadvertence of the then clerk in charge of criminal cases of Branch II, the records of
this case were placed in the archives sometime in 1960 instead of being forwarded to us.
Hence, it was only then that the entire records were elevated to this Court.

The accused raised an alleged error that in any event, accused should not be
meted with the supreme penalty of death by this Honorable Supreme Court as he has
fully paid his dues to society for having suffered enough in staying in death row for more
than twenty (20) years.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLAVIANO PUDA Y GARAPEA alias "FLAVIO
PUDA", accused-appellant.

Issue

Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder with two aggravating

circumstances and should be sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.

Ruling

The Court is convinced that the crime committed was murder. Treachery and
evident premeditation were both present in the commission of the crime. The records of
the case clearly establish the fact that the accused after having served for eleven months
as a houseboy of the victim's family was dismissed because he stole money from his
employers and for which he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Because of this and the fact that he was not treated well by the deceased, he decided to
seek revenge and did so in the early morning of December 19, 1959.

The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the crime committed was murder
qualified by treachery and that evident premeditation dwelling and unlawful entry were
also present.

The Court, however, agrees with the accused's contention that the penalty
should not be imposed on him since he has been for detained and continues to be in the
death row about 24 years now since as stated earlier, it took eleven years after his trial
and conviction before the records of this case were discovered and transmitted to this
Court for automatic review. For lack of the needed votes, the penalty of death is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATION that the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua and the
indemnity for the heirs of the victim increased to THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS.

In view of the long period of time during which the accused-appellant has been in
Death Row this case is referred to the Board of Pardons and Parole for a thorough study
of all aspects of the case, including the accused conduct while in prison, with the end in
view of recommending executive clemency if warranted by the facts.
 10

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NELSON ABON Y

NOVIDO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 169245, February 15, 2008

Facts

An information for qualified rape was filed against Nelson Abon for the alleged
rape of his own 13-year old daughter on or about last week of May 1995 in Pangasinan.

When arraigned, Abon pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial,
he interposed the defense of denial and alibi and averred that he was working in
Binangonan, Rizal when the alleged rape happened. He further stated that the victim
filed the case against him for the reason that he used to whip her very hard on the
buttocks with a piece of wood.

On June 23, 1998, The RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan found him guilty of the
crime charged and was sentenced to death. Due to the penalty imposed, the case was
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review. However, in accordance with the
ruling in People v. Mateo, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for
immediate review.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, but it modified the
award for damages. It upheld the credibility of the victim. It also observed that Abon
failed to show any inconsistency in the victim’s testimony, and neither did he prove any
ill-motive which would prompt her to concoct her incest rape story. The appellate court
dismissed accused-appellants defenses of denial and alibi as these were not supported
by trustworthy evidence. Hence, this automatic review by the Supreme Court of CA’s
decision.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court.

Ruling

No. An appeal is undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a

higher court authority. It is not a right but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedures provides that where the penalty imposed by the
RTC is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal is made directly to the SC
by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. On the other hand,
a case where the penalty imposed is death will be automatically reviewed by the Court
without a need for filing a notice of appeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NELSON ABON Y NOVIDO, Accused-
Appellant.

However, Mateo modified these rules by providing an intermediate review of the

cases by the CA where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death. Pursuant to the Mateo ruling, the Court issued A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC 2004-10-12,
amending the pertinent rules governing review of death penalty cases Also, under Sec. 2
of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines,
which took effect on June 29, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited. In
lieu thereof, it imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); or life
imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the RPC. Consequently, in the provisions of the Rules of Court on appeals,
death penalty cases are no longer operational. A review of the records of the case shows
that the RTC and the CA had carefully considered the questions of facts raised, and their
decisions are both sufficiently supported by evidence. A great weight is given to an
accusation a child directs against her father as it brings unspeakable trauma and social
stigma on the child and the entire family.