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SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR.

y ASUELA
v.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017


PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11


of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused


to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his
not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law,
with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender
and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea


bargaining in all violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2


thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section


5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and

3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal


branches of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it


encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure.

2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for


being violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of
the law.
RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of


pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and
no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three
co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable
wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other
branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural
rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous


attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of


the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should
be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule
43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose


Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on
notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of
the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS


from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors
MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge
Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep.
of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of
the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The


first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits
courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is
unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the
Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative
and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s
authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether


Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to
equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future
discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory


provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on
drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.