Conflicts of Law Outline Reviewer • Results either from seizure of the property under a legal process or from

Kilberg Doctrine the institution of legal proceedings wherein the court’s power over the
Conflicts of Laws - That part of municipal law of a State which directs its It is a rule to the effect that the forum is not bound by the law of the place of property is recognized and made effective.
courts and administrative agencies, when confronted with a legal problem injury or death as to the limitations on damages for wrongful act because such • This kind of jurisdiction of jurisdiction is referred to as in rem jurisdiction.
involving a foreign element, whether or not they should apply a foreign law/s rule is procedural and hence the law of the forum governs on this issue. Another form of jurisdiction is quasi in rem which affects only the
(Paras). (Northwest Airlines vs. CA) interests of particular persons in the thing.
• NOTE: Summons by publication is authorized in
(4) Elements Center of Gravity Doctrine three cases:
1. Conflict of laws is part of the municipal law of a state; Choice of law problems in conflicts of law are resolved by the application of the 1. If the action is in rem;
2. There is a directive to courts and admin agencies; law of the jurisdiction which has the most significant relationship to or contact 2. quasi in rem; and when
3. There is a legal problem involving foreign element; with the event and parties to litigation and issue therein. 3. Involves the personal status of the plaintiff
4. There is either an application or a non-application of a foreign law or
foreign laws. Forum Non Conveniens Philippine Trust Co. vs. Bohanan
A forum may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is GR L-12105, January 30, 1960
Distinctions between Conflicts of Law and Public International Law authorized by law on the ground that the forum is inconvenient or the ends of
justice would be best served by trial in another forum or the controversy may be Facts: The testator C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen
Bases COL PIL more suitably tried elsewhere tried elsewhere. of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties were
As to nature Municipal in International in located. Notwithstanding his long stay in the Philippines, he continued to be a
character character It may be manifested in the following ways: citizen of the US and of the state of his particular choice, Nevada and remained
Persons involved Private Individuals Sovereign states; and other 1. The evidence and the witness may not be readily available; to be a citizen of that state until his death.
entities possessed of an 2. The court dockets of the forum may already be clogged to permit He declared in his will that the same was executed in accordance with the laws
international personality additional cases would inevitably hamper the speedy administration of the State of Nevada. On April 24, 1950, the will which the testator executed in
such as the UN org of justice; Manila on April 23, 1944 was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila. The wife
3. Evils of forum shopping; Magdalena C Bohonan and her two children questioned the validity of the
Transactions Private Generally affected
4. Forum has no particular interest in the case; testamentary provisions, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime
involved transactions by public interest;
5. The case may be better tried in other courts. that the laws of the Philippines, concede them. The children were only given
between those in general
legacies of P6,000 each, while the wife received nothing.
private are of interest only
The doctrine should generally apply only if the defendant is a corporation
individuals to sovereign
Issues:
States
Elements: Is the wife entitled to any share in the estate?
Remedies Resort to -Peaceful (diplomatic
a. The forum State is one to which the parties Is the failure of the testator to give his children what they are entitled to under
and Sanctions municipal negotiations, tender &
may conveniently resort to; Philippine laws valid?
tribunals exercise of good office,
b. It is in a position to make an intelligent Is it necessary to reintroduce the proved Nevada Law?
mediation, conciliation)
decision as to the law and the facts; and
-Judicial
c. It has or is likely to have power to enforce its Held:
arbitration/settlement
decision. No. The laws of Nevada of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to
-Forcible (severance of
dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his
diplomatic relations,
Jurisdiction estate to his wife. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a
retorsions, embargo,
In international law, it is often defined as the right of a State to exercise divorced wife exists to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists
pacific blockade, war
in the state of Nevada and since there was no conjugal property between the
authority over persons and things within its boundaries, subject to certain
testator and Magdalena C Bohanan, the latter can have no legal claim to any
Sources exceptions.
portion of the estate left by the testator.
Direct:
Constitutions Jurisdiction over the Person
Yes. Art 10 para 2 of the CC (now par 2, Art 16 of NCC) provides that legal and
Codifications 1. Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the
testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
Special Laws moment he invokes the aid of the court and voluntarily submits himself
the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions.
International by institution of the suit through proper pleadings
Shall be regularized by the national law of the person whose succession is in
Treatises and International Conventions question, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
Judicial Decisions 2. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through:
country wherein said property may be found. Pursuant to this article, the validity
International Customs a. Voluntary appearance or
of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the
b. Personal or Substituted service of summons
testator in this case, Nevada, which allows a testator to dispose of all his
Indirect: property according to his will. The testamentary provisions of the will, therefore
Natural Moral Law Jurisdiction over the Property
are valid.
Work of Writers

1

Fleumer vs. Hix
54 Phil 610
Facts: The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He
alleged that the latter’s will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November
3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of
that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of
Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E.,
vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as certified to by the Director of National Library.
The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the
grounds that Sec 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied
with. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in
West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will.
Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various states of the American Union. Such laws must
be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was
no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or
published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec
30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by
the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the
State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced
showing that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time
alleged will was executed.
The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence
of such law in West Virginia must be proved.
In Re: Estate of Suntay
95 Phil 500
Facts:
Facts: Jose B Suntay, the testator is a Filipino Citizen and a resident of the
Philippines. On May 14, 1934, he died in the City of Amoy, Fookien Province,
Republic of China, leaving properties both in China and the Philippines and nine
children by the first marriage and 1 child by the second marriage with Maria
Natividad Billian, who survived him. On Oct 15, 1934, the surviving widow filed
a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the probate of the last will and testament
claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November
1929.
This petition was denied because of the loss of said will and of insufficiency of
the evidence to establish the loss of said will. The petition was remanded to the
CFI of Bulacan after the Court overruled the decision on appeal. Subsequently,
the petition was dismissed on February 7, 1938.
After the war, Silvino Suntay claiming he had found among the files and
documents of his father a will in Chinese characters executed and signed by the
deceased on January 4, 1931 and filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy
District Court a petition praying for the probate of the will executed in the
2
Philippines on November 1929 or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China
on January 4, 1931.
Issue:
1. Has the existence of the said law been proved?
2. What is the effect of the absence of proof to the existence of said
law?
Held:
1. The order of the Municipal District court of Amoy China does not
purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the
proceedings. In view thereof, the will ans the alleged probate
thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the
accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed
in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district
court of Amoy, China cannot be deemed and accepted as
proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will.
2. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a
probate court and on Chinese law of procedure in probate matters,
it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating
or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject.
Theories Why We Should Apply Foreign Laws
Theory of Comity – foreign law is applied because of its convenience &
because we want to give protection to our citizens, residents, & transients in our
land.
>Hilton vs. Guyot
Facts: Defendants Henry Hilton and William Libbey, residents of New York and
trading as co-partners in Paris under the firm name of A.T. Stewart & Co. were
sued in France for debts due to a French firm, Charles Fortich & Co. Gustave
Guyot, liquidator of the French firm, sued Hilton and Libbey on the French
judgment in the US Circuit Court for the Southern Distrtict of New York seeking
an amount totaling over $195,000. The court held the judgment conclusive and
entered a decree in favor of the French firm without examination anew the
merits of the case.
Defendants question this decree on many grounds, foremost of which that
French courts gave no force and effect to the duly rendered judgments of US
courts against French citizens.
Summary of ruling:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived. The extent to which one nation shall be allowed to
operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon the "comity of
nations."
"Comity" , in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, nor of
mere courtesy and good will. It is a recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to int'l duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
"The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty.
It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible
when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes so
largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a friendly
intercourse between the sovereignty to which they belong, that courts of justice
have continually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations."
"It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is
administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same
reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and
guided."
Notes:
· Comity is a general principle of international law that US Supreme Court has a
long history of acknowledging.
· A respect of reciprocity between jurisdictions Respect - we will not demean the
laws and policies of other countries, because we expect other ountries to
respect ours as well
Theory of Vested Rights – we seek to enforce not foreign law itself but the
rights that have been vested under such foreign law; an act done in another
State may give rise to the existence of a right if the laws of that State crated
such right.
Theory of Local Law- we apply foreign law not because it is foreign, but
because our laws, by applying similar rules, require us to do so; hence, it is as if
the foreign law has become part & parcel of our local law.
Theory of Harmony of Laws – we have to apply the foreign laws so that
wherever a case is decided, that is, irrespective of the forum, the solution
should be approximately the same; thus, identical or similar solutions anywhere
& everywhere. When the goal is realized, there will be “harmony of laws”
Theory of Justice – the purpose of all laws, including Conflict of Laws, is the
dispensing of justice; if this can be attained in many cases applying the proper
foreign law, we must do so.
Nature and Proof of Foreign Judgment
Nature of foreign judgment – It is imperative that it be proved in accordance
with our prescribed rules on the matter.
A foreign judgment is recognized when it is given the same effect that it has in
the state where it was rendered with respect to the parties, the subject matter of
the action and the issues involved. Where the foreign judgment is being
presented as a defense to the claim of the plaintiff, what is involved is the
recognition of a foreign judgment.
A foreign judgment is enforced when, in addition to being recognized, a party is
given affirmative relief to which the judgment entitles him. When a plaintiff asks
the court of one state to carry out and make effective a judgment obtained by
him in another state, what is involved is the enforcement of a foreign judgment.
Conditions for Recognition of Foreign Judgment
1. Foreign judgment was rendered by a judicial or a quasi-judicial tribunal which
had competent jurisdiction over the parties and the case in the proper judicial
proceedings in which the defendant shall have be given reasonable notice
and the opportunity to be heard;
2. It must be a judgment on civil and commercial
matters;
3. The judgment must be valid according to the
court that delivered it; and,
4. Judgment must be final and executory to constitute res judicata in another
action;
ELEMENTS: The judgment must be:
a. Final;
b. Rendered by a competent court;
c. On the Merits Involve the same parties, subject matter; and,
cause of action.
5. Foreign judgment must not be contrary to the
public policy or the good morals of the State.
Querubin vs. Querubin
47 OG 316
Facts: A Filipino married an American lady with whom he subsequently had a
daughter. The man later obtained a Californian divorce on account of his wife’s
adultery with another man. The custody of the daughter was awarded to the
innocent husband. However, the court said that the child could not be brought
out of California without judicial permission. A year later, the Filipino came back
to the Philippines with the child. In the meantime, the wife had married her
former paramour and had been able to obtain an amendment for the divorce
decree, this time granting the custody of the child to her. To obtain enforcement
of this amendment in the Philippines, she brought a petition for the will of
habeas corpus in Ilocos Sur.
Issue: May she be awarded with the custody of the child?
Held: No, under the Philippine law, two important things stand out:
a. Preference in parental authority is given to the father, not to the
mother (Old Civil Code);
b. The guilty spouse generally loses parental authority except if the
child is under 7, there should be no separation from the mother
unless there be compelling reasons therefore (New Civil Code).
3
Kinds of Conflict Rules
 One-sided rule – when Philippine internal law will apply.
Art 15, CC:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
 All-sided rule –when foreign law will apply.
Art 16, CC:
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
Composition of Conflict Rules
Factual situation - set of facts presenting a conflicts problem. Ex. Capacity to
succeed
Point of contract – law of the country with which the factual situation is most
ultimately connected. Ex. Law of the nation of the decedent
Status and Capacity
Silverio vs. Republic
When God created man,He made him in the likeness of God;He created them
male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo.“Oh North Wind!North Wind!Please let us out!,”
the voices said.She pecked the reed once,then twice.All of a sudden,the
bamboo cracked and slit open.Out came two human beings;one was a male
and the other was a female.Amihan named the man “Malakas ”(Strong)and the
woman “Maganda ” (Beautiful).(The Legend of Malakas and Maganda) When is
a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular,does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel,drugs and counseling
with regard to a person ’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change
of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?
Facts: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed
a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
RTC of Manila, Branch 8,alleging that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female ” and that he had
always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man ’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a “woman ” culminated on January 27,2001
when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then
on,petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto ”
to “Mely,” and his sex from “male ” to “female.”
On June 4,2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating
that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity; that with his sexual re- assignment, petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a
female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court
believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fiancé
and the realization of their dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG,
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration. On February 23,2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
favor of the Republic, and set aside the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the change of petitioner ’s name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.
Held: No, RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of
sex reassignment. Under the said law, a petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community;
3. Or the change will avoid confusion.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Republic vs. Cagandahan
565 SCRA 72
Facts: Respondent Jennifer B. Cagandahan was registered as a female in her
Certificate of Live Birth. In her early years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy
and was found out that her ovarian structures had minimized. Respondent
Cagandahan also alleged that she has no breasts or menstrual development.
Consequently, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH)a condition where persons thus afflicted possess secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones
(androgen).She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
Thus, she filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. The trial
court granted the petition. Hence, this instant petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries
in the birth certificate of respondent Cagandahan
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
In deciding this case, the Court considers the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial. “It has been suggested that there is some middle
ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are
neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’.”The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female,
but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
The Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like Cagandahan, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Cagandahan here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like Cagandahan, is fixed.
Respondent Cagandahan here has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. He could have
undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force
his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do
so.
Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent Cagandahan’s
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on Cagandahan
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider
Cagandahan as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
4
become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Cagandahan is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the
path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an “incompetent “and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are
equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondent Cagandahan’s position and his personal judgment of
being a male.
In so ruling the Court do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, the Court respects Cagandahan’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
cannot but respect how respondent Cagandahan deals with his unordinary state
and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this
case
Characteristics of Status
1. Status is conferred principally by the state not by the individual.
2. Status is a matter or public or social interest.
3. Status being a concept of social order cannot easily be terminated
at the mere will or desire of the parties concerned.
4. Status is generally supposed to have a universal character: when a
certain status is created by law of one country, it is GENERALLY
judicially recognized all over the world.
Kinds of Capacity
Capacity to act – (active) power to do acts with legal effects.
Juridical capacity – (passive) fitness to be the subject of legal relations.
JURIDICAL CAPACITY CAPACITY TO ACT
fitness to be subject of legal relations Power to do acts with legal effects
(PASSIVE) (ACTIVE)
Inherent in every natural person acquired
Lost only through death May be lost
Personal Law is the law that attaches to an individual wherever he may go.
Theories of Personal Law
Nationality Theory - by virtue of which the status and capacity of an individual
are generally governed by the law of his nationality. This is principally adopted
in the RP.
Domiciliary Theory - in general, the status, condition, rights, obligations, &
capacity of a person should be governed by the law of his domicile.
Situs Theory - law of the place where property is situated; the general rule is
that real property is governed by the law of the State where it is situated.
Nationality and Citizenship
Nationality – membership in an ethnic, social, racial and cultural group.
Citizenship – membership in a political society.
Citizens of the Philippines
IN RP: 1987 CONSTI: ARTICLE 4: WHO ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS?
1. Citizens of the Philippines at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution
(ratification on Feb 2, 1987; effective Feb 11?)
2. Fathers and mothers are Filipino citizens
3. Born before January 17, 1973 + Filipino mothers + elect Philippine
Citizenship upon reaching age of majority
4. Naturalized according to law
*note: #s 1-3 are considered NATURAL-BORN Citizens
1. NATURAL BORN CITIZENS
-those who are citizens of a particular state w/o having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect citizenship
Jus soli principle Jus sanguinis principle
Looks to the law of the place of one's Rule of descent or blood
birth
You're a citizen of the place of your Your citizenship depends on your parents
birth
Followed in common law countries Followed in the Philippines
*most of the cases involved are with regards elections because elective public
officials from the President down to Governor are required to be natural-born
citizens
TALA RO C V. UY: J US S OL I AP P LIE D B E FORE 1 93 5 CO NS T I
-Uy was born of Chinese father but of Filipino mother in RP. His nationality was
contested for election purposes. Court held that Uy was a Filipino citizen by
virtue of being born in the Philippines, and the adoption of the Jus Sanguinis
principle did not effect the exclusion of those who were already considered
citizens. Besides, he already exercised rights which are only attributable to
Filipino citizens.
CO V. HRE T: CH IL DR E N OF FI LIP IN O M OTH E RS NE E D NOT
E LE C T FIL IP I NO CITI ZE N S H IP IF THE Y HA D ALRE A DY
A CQ UI RE D NATIO NA LI TY W HE N FATH E R NATUR A L IZ E D
-Ong’s nationality contested, his father being Chinese. Court held that since
father was already naturalized before he attained age of majority, he doesn’t
have to elect citizenship.

TE CS O N V. COM E LE C: CO NS T IT UT IO N DOE S NOT QUA L IFY
CH IL DR E N TO LE GI TIM ATE OR ILL E GI TI M ATE
-FPJ alleged to have followed nationality of mom. Since he was allegedly born
before parents were married, he was deemed an illegitimate child. Court held
that the Constitution does not qualify children to legitimate or illegitimate, as
long as the child’s father is Filipino, then he acquires citizenship of father which
is Filipino
2. CITIZE NS B Y NATURA LIZATION
NATURALIZATION
-confers to an alien a nationality
after birth
by any of the means provided by law (in RP: CA 473 as amended)
QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPLICANTS OF NATURALIZATION
1. AGE: Not less than 21 on date of HEARING the petition (so could file while
20 y.o.)
2. RESIDENCE: resided in RP + Continuously + not less than 10 years prior to
application
3. Good moral character
Believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Consitution
Must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in RP in his relations w/ the constituted
government + community in which he is living
4. ECON: Own real estate + in RP + worth NOT LESS THAN p5K
+ must have some lucrative trade/profession/lawful occupation
5. LANGUAGE: able to SPEAK & WRITE English/Spanish/any one of the
principal Philippine languages
6. CHILDREN & SCHOOL: enrolled minor children of school age
…in any PUBLIC or PRIVATE SCHOOL recognized by the Bureau of Private
Schools
…where PHILIPPINE HISTORY
GOVERNMENT\
And CIVICS are taught or prescribed as part of the
school curriculum
…during the entire period of the residence required of him (not less than 10
years)
…PRIOR TO HEARING of his PETITION for naturalization as citizen
MORE DISCUSSION:
*On 10 yr-continuous residence requirement
Ratio: enable government to
*observe applicant's conduct
*ensure that applicant has imbibed the principles and spirit of our
Consti
When reduced to 5 years: Applicant… (Section 3, CA 473)
1. honorably held office under Gov't
2. Established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in RP
3. Married to a Filipino woman
4. Engaged as a teacher (public or private - but not int'l school) for
2 years
5
(note however YEE V. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 7
SCRA 832: only Filipino citizens can be public school teachers)
5. Born in RP
*On CHARACTER
-requires:
+Good Moral character
+conducted self in a PROPER + IRREPROACHABLE manner
Proper and Irreproachable conduct
-higher standard of morality than good moral character
-moral character of the highest degree, not enough to be a law-abiding citizen
(Dy Lam Go vs. Republic)
-EVIDENCE: testimony of 2 character witnesses
>well known in the community and enjoy such a high reputation for probity
(honesty/integrity), their word may be taken on its face value
>can't be employees of the petitioner
>must have known applicant for the period prescribed by law
>had opportunity to observe him personally
>can attest to the possession of the applicant of the qualifications - e.g. proper
and irreproachable conduct during the entire period of residence
-on consti requirement: not merely recitation BUT BELIEF!
*ON ECONOMIC REQUIREMENT
>REAL ESTATE worth P5k (min)
>lucrative trade, profession, lawful occupation
Y U K IA N CHIE V S . RE P UB L IC : P ROO F OF LU CR ATIV E
TRA DE
-Chinese citizen applying for naturalization was held not qualified because he
failed to sufficiently prove lucrative trade, he having only a small fixed income
and the rest of the amounts he allegedly received were all depended on the
profits made by the corporation.
(econ requirement continued)
Lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
-substantial gainful employment or the obtaining of tangible receipts
-appreciable margin of income over expenses in order to provide for adequate
support for himself and his family in the event of sickness, unemployment or
disability to work
-his financial condition must be such as to permit him and the members of his
family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this
stage of our civilization
-regard w/ caution if family business
Real estate requirement
-at odds with Article XII, Section 7 of 1987 Consti: "Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain"
GR: Aliens can't own lands
X:
1. Intestate succession (Section 2, BP 185, effective 1982): allowed natural-
born citizen who had lost his Filipino citizenship to be a transferee of a private
land for residential purposes
...as long as it did not exceed 1,000 m2 (urban)
1 ha (rural)
Why intestate: if otherwise, it would allow aliens to circumvent the prohibition
by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land
2. In pari delicto: vendor (who knew that he was selling to an alien) cannot file
suit to void sale to an alien (who cannot own land, and must have known it)
3. Foreigner later naturalized as a Filipino: purpose of prohibition is to
prevent the patrimony of our nation for future generations of Filipinos; since
vendee already a Filipino, end would not be frustrated
*ON LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS
-not enough that applicant understands
*ON MINOR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS
Ratio: for the children to learn and imbibe customs and traditions and ideals of
Filipinos to prepare them for a life of responsible and law abiding citizenship
-should be complied with and proven
-insufficient finances not an excuse for failing to comply with this requirement
-initial failure to comply with this requirement is a BAR TO SUBSEQUENT
PETITION even if during 2nd petition, child no longer of school age (meaning,
nakapag-aral na sa ibang school not under the law)
-not allowed if predominantly composed of children of a specific race (e.g.
Chiang Kai Shek mostly caters Chinese children)
Tecson vs. COMELEC
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his
date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino
X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
(2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC
dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated
with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for
the offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person
may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day
of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is
defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis –
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis
of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some
degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ
were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August
1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At
the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in
the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence
by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But
while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
6
Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Ermita
Valles vs. COMELEC
Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco (Filipino) and
Theresa Marquez (Australian). In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia
and came to settle in the Philippines. In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo
Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then,
she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter
but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was
elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, alleging as ground
therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof
that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Comelec en banc
dismissed the petition.
In the 1995 local elections, Rosalind Lopez ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an
issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11,
1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo
Valles. the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the
petition.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a
public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and
by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the
1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making
her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Sec 4 of CA 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian
passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions, declaring her
a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental
governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent
is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: (a) In 1988,
private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an
Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695
dated September 19, 1988; (b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and (c) She was issued Australian
Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Issue: WON Rosalind Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualified to
run for public office
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of
jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this
was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what
served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known
as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens
of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens
as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children
are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly
evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to
wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship.
If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the
private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her
Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private
respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the
issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988. Under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign
country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the
laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs.
COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and
COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American
did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport
on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-
mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that Rosalind Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against
her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss
of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the case of
Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to
an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of
the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were
mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual
citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of
Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground
for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or
renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the
private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In the case of Mercado vs.
7
Manzano, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by
Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases.
on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens
with dual allegiance. Burca vs. Republic
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did Bengzon III vs. HRET (US Marines Corps, repatriation)
not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it RE Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar (Ching)
was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Djumantan vs. Domingo (Marriage)
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate Mercado vs. Manzano (Edu Manzano)
their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of Labo vs. COMELEC (Australian Citizenship)
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of RA 9225
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will AASJS vs. Datumanong (Secretary of Justice)
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true RA 9139
faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as Common Wealth Act No 473
an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein Legislative Naturalization
private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone
terminated her Australian citizenship. Domicile is that place where a person has certain settled,fixed, legal relations
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private because:
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship,
duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia 1. it is assigned to him by law at the MOMENT OF BIRTH (domicile of
on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian origin).
passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second 2. It is assigned to him by law AFTER BIRTH on account of legal
Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly disability caused for instance by minority, insanity or marriage in the
appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the case of a woman (constructive domicile or domicile by operation of
issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her law).
renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go 3. he has a HOME there – that to which whenever.
through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an RA 9189
issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon Macalintal vs. COMELEC
is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding
challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Rules on Domicile
Immigration. He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out 1. No natural person must ever be without a domicile
anew. 2. No person can have two or more domiciles at the same time,
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the except for certain purposes, and from different legal viewpoints
principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue 3. Every sui juris may change his domicile
of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic, an exception to this 4. Once acquired, it remains the domicile unless a new one is
general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the obtained:
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following a. By capacitated persons
must be present: b. With freedom of choice
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where c. With actual physical presence
said person is a party; d. And Provable intent that it should be one’s fixed and permanent
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the place of abode, there should be animus manendi (intent to remain)
resolution thereof, and or animus nonrevertendi (intent not to return).
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court. 5. The presumption is in favor of the continuance of domicile. The
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim burden of Proof is on the one who alleges that a change of domicile
Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It has taken place.
elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official
findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, Romualdez, Marcos vs COMELEC
there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Aquino vs. COMELEC
Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of Romualdez vs. RTC Tacloban
Renvoi
A procedure whereby a legal matter is referred by the conflict of laws rules of
the forum to a foreign state, the conflict of laws rule of which, in turn refers the
matter back to the law of the forum (remission) or a third state (transmission).

Bellis vs. Bellis

Domestic Adoption Act of 1998
Inter Country Adoption Law, RA 8043
Annulment, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Zamora vs. CA
Santos vs. CA
Republic vs. CA and Molina
Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
Perez vs. CA