Chapter 5

The Danish War:

Dessau and Lutter

By mid-1624, it appeared that the war was at an end. Brunswick had been
crushed at StadtIohn, Mansfeld had disbanded his army, and Bethlen Gabor of
Transylvania had (for the third time!) signed a peace treaty. All that remained
was the final settIement: the fate of the Palatinate, the punishment of rebel
sympathizers, plus the longstanding issue of Church lands. The emperor had
already begun paying off and disbanding his army,' the League, more cautious,
directed TilIy to stop recruiting and to quarter his troops at Hesse-Cassel's
expense.
Up to this time, the northem monarchs, Christian IV of Denmark and
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, had been little more than interested spectators in
the German war. The aggressiveGustavus had already (1623) begun preparing
his subjects for a crusade to save Lutheranism from "Rome." Christian's
position was more complex, tom between contradictory impulses. By
temperament and policy a member of the moderate Lutherans, his dynastic ties
lay with England and the Palatinate. His fear of Catholicism was balanced by his
hatred of Calvinism, his rivalry with the emperor for dominance in northern
Germany by his friendship with Spain and feud with Holland. Ultimately, he
was content to support the peace plans of England.
Unfortunately for the cause of peace, just as it appeared that Spain and the
Elector Palatine were coming to an understanding, the bellicose Buckingham
regime assumed control of English policy.i An anti-Hapsburg alliance was
contrived: Epgland, France, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Venice, Transylvania,
Brandenburg. This was unstable and jury-rigged: England was obsessed with the
Palatinate and disliked France, France and Holland were primarily interested in
hurting Spain, Denmark wanted peace with Spain and hated Sweden and
Holland, Sweden disliked both Denmark and France, Transylvania was strictly
interested in the subsidies, while Brandenburg and Venice were just along for
the ride. However, their combined strength would be a formidable challenge to
 -

118 BattIes of the Thirty Years War

the Catholic powers.

Their plan was as complicated as their association. Denmark would spearhead
their offensive, supported by an English army under Mansfeld. Sweden and
Brandenburg would launch a secondary offensive up the Oder River, while
Transylvania struck from the east. England, France, and Holland would bankroll
operations.
Aware of the threat, the emperor dispatched an envoy to Copenhagen with
proposals for a general peace (July 1624). Christian rejected the proposal and
countered with extreme, English-inspired, demands. He did not, however, finally
resolve on war until January of 1625.
Historians have asked why a c1ever man like King Christian allowed himself
to be persuaded into action without firm guarantees. He was later to complain
that he'd been deceived, that the aIlies failed to send the troops, the money, the
support he'd expected. However, he should not have taken verbal plans as solid
commitments, nor should he have assumed that the maximums suggested were
minimums subject to increase. It would appear that the aIlies played on
Christian's vanity and paranoia, his rivalry with Sweden and Gustavus
Adolphus. By telling Christian that if he declined their offer, the war would be
entrusted to Gustavus, the allies achieved their purpose.
Neither the English nor Christian had any way of knowing that the war's
outcome would be precisely opposite to their intentions.
The outbreak did not take the Catholics by surprise. After the failure of the
peace mission (July 1624) it was assumed that a Danish attack was probable if
not inevitable. Tilly and Maximilian bombarded Vienna with demands for
troops: the League army could not deal with this enemy on its own. This was
unweIcome news to the emperor's advisors, first because they had almost
finished disbanding the army, and second because they had no way of financing
a new one. Also, there was a lack of qualified commanders, Bucquoy and
Dampierre being dead, while Cordoba and his officers had retumed to F1anders.
During their discussions, the name of Wallenstein floated to the topo
Wallenstein was a minor nobleman from Moravia who had acquired wealth
and influence through shrewd marriages and well-timed support for the
Hapsburg cause. Although his military experience was limited by comparison
with Tilly or Gustavus, it was more than any courtiers could boast, and he made
the most of it. At this strategic moment (March 1625), Wallenstein offered a
proposal of his own: if he were given command, he would personally financé the
new army.' The size of the planned force varied, 25,000; 35,000; 50,000, eveñ
100,000. Some thought this might be a little too much of a good thing. Others
questioned giving so much power to a comparative outsider. But the offer was
simply too good to pass up. After months of debate-as late as June 23 the
emperor still hoped for peace-Wallenstein was commissioned as Imperial
Generalissimo (July 1625).
Thus the first consequence of England's machinations and Denmark's
ambitions was the creation of two new enemies: the enigmatic genius
Wallenstein and a massive Imperial Army. These would pro ve a far greater
threat than Tilly or the emperor ever dreamed of.
Christian's preparations for war were deliberate and drawn out. His plans were
based on solid control of the Lower Saxon Circle (the North Sea coast, the
The Danish War 119

Brunswicks, Holstein, and Mecklenburg). Starting in January 1625, he had

placed garrisons in the strong places of the circle. His poli tic al efforts were less
successful. In a meeting of February 16 the Danish Council of State" offered a
moderate tax grant for the king's adventure, but flatly declined a declaration of
war. They made it clear that the war was Christian's, not Denmark's. The king
lacked the authority to overcome their caution
The reaction of his German base, the Lower Saxon Circle, was hardly more
encouraging. The princes were reluctant, while the free cities and towns frankly
considered him more of a threat than the emperor. Continuous politicking from
March through May finally achieved him the coveted position of Kreisoberst
(circle military commander) and a grant of 12,900 men-another of those
promises that Christian took too literally. Caught up in this success, he ignored
the hesitancy with which it was given. At about the same time, Sweden dropped
out of the alliance. Gustavus would give "indirect support" by invading the
emperor's ally, Poland. Brandenburg immediately bailed as well.
Given the unhelpful responses of the Council, the circle members, Sweden,
and Brandenburg, a more cautious statesman might have reconsidered the whole
scheme. Nevertheless, on May 14, 1625, Christian sent the emperor a set of
demands that had, in his mind, the force of an ultimatum.
Only then, after he was already at war, did Christian begin the final, most
expensive stage, the actual mustering of troops. In discussion with the allies, he
had envisioned a professional army of 30,000 men, 6000 horse and 24,000 foot,
not including garrisons-at least another 10,000. He would provide 5000, the
circle 13,000, and the rest from private contractors and the allies. In the event, it
took much longer than he had expected to assemble his force s (May 18-Sept.30),
and the circle provided les s than 7000 men, mostly of poor quality and fit only
for garrison duty. Thus he had to rely heavily on contractors and the semi-
independent corps raised by Johann Emst Sax-Weimar and Christian of
Brunswick.
TilIy had some idea of marching into the circle and scattering the Danes
before they were properly formed, but the emperor held him back while
negotiations continued. These false negotiations and his foresight in garrisoning
the circle preserved Christian from his error in waiting to raise his army.
Operations began with Tilly's occupation of always anti-Imperial Hesse-Cassel
in June. Despite the elaborate allied plan, Christian placed his principal hopes of
victory in an unconventional approach. It was his belief-right up to 1629-that
if he could somehow "get past" TilIy and Wallenstein and break into Germany,
he would inspire widespread Protestant uprisings against the emperor's
"tyranny." This idea was perhaps not quite as blindly optimistic as it seems.
After Breitenfeld, the Swedes were able to overrun half of Germany on a similar
reaction. But they had not just gotten past TilIy, rather they had discredited him
with a decisive battle. AIso, the Protestant moderates were much more
disgruntled in 1631 than in 1625. Still, even under the circumstances, Christian
received a fair degree of German encouragement, Hesse-Cassel, Magdeburg, an
uprising in Upper Austria. He simply relied on it too mucho It is always a
mistake-a mistake avoided by Gustavus-to rely on speculative support as a
substitute for strategy.
The fighting in 1625 did not come to mucho Tilly won a minor action at
120 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Hoxter (July 29) and drove north, securing Hameln and Minden. Christian,
moving to block him, managed to fall off a wall he was inspecting (July 30); the
resultant concussion put him out of action for two months. Johann Ernst Sax-
Weimar won a minor action at Nienburg (Sept.3), blunting TilIy's offensive.
Mansfeld finally (October) wandered in, his 12,000 English reduced to 7000 by
disease and desertion. Tilly laid siege to the stronghold of Calenberg (fell Nov
3); a Danish relieving force was cut to pieces in the action at Seeze (Nov 4).
Both armies then went into winter quarters.

1626 CAMPAIGN: DESSAU

The Catholic strategy for 1625-6 was containment: safeguarding friendly
territory in Westphalia and containing enemy forces inside the Lower Saxon
Circle. Thus Tilly endeavored to control the line of the Weser River, dominated
by the strongholds of Hameln, Minden, Nienburg, and Hoxter, and to cut
Christian off from Cassel. In October-November 1625, Wallenstein occupied the
Halberstadt-Aschersleben area, extending the cordon as far as the border of
neutral Saxony. In early 1626, the League mustered over 35,000, but many had
to be detached as garrisons and covering forces. Others were sent to Upper
Austria to deal with the uprising. Tilly had only about 20,000 available for the
field army. At the same time, Wallenstein advised Vienna that he had 50,000
under arms; however, his colleague Collalto reported that the real figure was
only 20,000. In any case, the muster figures put 15,978 men in and around
Aschersleben. In addition, there was a Spanish corps of 6000 screening Cologne
and the Lower Rhine; this group saw no action.
Christian's strategy was opposite to Tilly's, in that he was trying to "break out"
and spread the fighting as widely as possible. To this end, he disputed the
possession of the Weser and especially the fortresses of Gottingen and
Calenberg that linked him with Hesse-Cassel. Christian had some 30-40,000
men, but half were dispersed in secondary corps under Mansfeld, Brunswick,
Fuchs, Solms, and Johann Ernst Sax-Weimar. Christian's main body, some 15-
20,000, was positioned at Wolfenbuttel, east of the Weser line and north of
Gottingen and Cassel.
The Danes began the campaigning season early; on February 20, Mansfeld
and Fuchs marched into neutral Brandenburg, occupying the Altmark and the
strategic Elbe crossing of Tangermunde. About the same time, Brunswick
started harassing Tilly's positions on the Weser, while Johann Ernst penetrated
into Westphalia, briefly occupying Osnabruck. Although Hesse-Cassel was
under League occupation, it was still friendly to the Danish cause. When Solms
ventured into Hesse in April, the peasants rose in revolt. Tilly's position at this
stage was unenviable: it would take months to resecure Westphalia and the
Weser, Hesse was effectively lost, and Magdeburg had joined Mansfeld. Given
the situation in Upper Austria, Christian had grounds for hope.
In les s than two months, Mansfeld's crew had "eaten out" the Altmark and
were hungry for fresh meat. Wallenstein, expecting an attack, had established a
defensive screen along the middle Elbe. Mansfeld and Fuchs agreed to break
this line. Mansfeld's eye was on the bridge at Dessau, the most important
crossing between Magdeburg and Saxony. Wallenstein had secured both banks:
the northern held by a sconce manned by four infantry companies under Col:
The Danish War 121

Aldringer. On April 7, Aldringer reported enemy cavalry. On the iz", Mansfeld

arrived in force. Despite superior numbers, his attempt on the sconce was
unsuccessful.
Had Mansfeld withdrawn at this point, the affair would have been
insignificant. Instead, he deterrnined to reduce the position by siege. His reasons
are unknown: the sconce was in itself unimportant, capturing the north end of
the bridge would be useless if the enemy still held the south, and if he intended
to cross the river, there were safer places available. On the other hand, a success
would silence the criticisms he had suffered at Christian's headquarters. In any
case, he started digging trenches and bringing up guns.
On April 14, Fuchs, in a supporting thrust, had bumped into a strong
detachment of Wallenstein's and was treated so roughly that he fell back into
Tangermunde. Mansfeld was enraged, telling Christian that he had been left in
the lurch. Christian replied by placing Fuchs under Mansfeld (Apr 20), which
the general took as an insult. Mansfeld ordered reinforcements; Fuchs stalled,
playing for time.
The Imperials were not inactive. Although under heavy pressure, the sconce
had not been cut off from communication with the south bank. The southem
group had received a trickle of reinforcements and were strengthening and
extending their works. Still, the position of Aldringer's men remained very bad;
at one point Wallenstein considered evacuating the sconce altogether. On April
21, however, FM Schlick forced his way across the bridge with reinforcements
and supplies; the threat was effectively over. Two days later, the Tiefenbach and
Wallenstein Leib infantry regiments arrived, and Aldringer and Schlick began to
extend their entrenchments to the southeast along the river bank. On the 24th,
Wallenstein himself appeared with a powerful corps of cavalry.
By this point it must have been obvious, even to Mansfeld, that the situation
was hopeless. He had less than 7000 men in all,5 while the Imperials had at least
double that," in and around the bridgehead. But he had invested too much
"reputation" to simply give up. Against Knyphausen's advice;' he, rather
uncharacteristically, insisted on an all-out attack.
Wallenstein had been making his own plans. Aldringer, of course, had had
ample time to reconnoiter Mansfeld's lines, specifically their weaknesses. There
was a large woods to the Imperial right which extended north to outflank
Mansfeld's whole position. Short of manpower, he had not placed a single sentry
to hold it, and the woods edge was not 200 meters from the end of the Imperial
line (as extended on the 23rd). Almost immediately upon reaching the
bridgehead, Wallenstein directed the Leib and Tiefenbach regiments to occupy
the woods and link it to the river line with another trench.
Mansfeld's position was now untenable, unless he could retrieve it by
attacking. At 6:00 A.M., April 25, the Protestant forces left their works and
began the assault. Mansfeld's own three infantry regiments and the Dutch one
attacked the woods, while the Magdeburg levies were hurled against Aldringer
and Schlick in the sconce. The fighting dragged on until 11:00. Anhoff, leading
the main column, blasted the woods with artillery. Wallenstein reinforced the
defender with the Alt-Saxon and Nassau infantry regiments. A battalion of
Collalto Infantry Regiment, just then arrived, counterattacked a Protestant
demilune behind Anhoffs right. Superior numbers and better defenses
122 Battles of the Thirty Years War

outweighed the Mansfelders' elan; Anhoff was killed and the attack collapsed.
The Magdeburger attack on the sconce was even less successful, ending in
ignominious rout.
Mansfeld now gave the battle up for lost. He secretly ordered the guns and
baggage sent back to Zerbst, but continued fighting to cover their escape.
Possibly he hoped to exhaust the enemy and disengage. If so, he had
miscalculated. During the first stage of the battle, the Gonzaga and Coronini
cavalry regiments had been skirmishing with the Protestant horse northeast of
the disputed woods. Behind this screen, Wallenstein mas sed 28 companies of
fresh cavalry and 1600 Croats, plus the three infantry regiments already in the
woods. Just about noon, they swung down on Mansfeld's left, shattering it. At
the same time, Schlick and Aldringer counterattacked out of the sconce against
the line of circumval!ation, now held only by the depleted and demoralized
Magdeburgers. The Protestant dissolved; their cavalry fled, abandoning the
infantry to their fate. Most of these were cut off by Wallenstein's envelopment;
they threw down their arms and surrendered en masse.
Mansfeld salvaged about 2000 men, mostly cavalry, eleven guns, and part of
the baggage. Wal!enstein captured 3000 men-mostly infantry-32 ensigns, six
guns, four mortars, and 48 officers, including Knyphausen. The dead numbered
over 1000, including Cols Anhoff and Ferentz; the Dutch and the Magdeburgers
were virtual!y annihilated. Imperial losses were less than a thousand in al!.
The efficient use of superior numbers to eliminate a weaker opponent was to
become something of a Wal!enstein specialty.
It might seem that Wallenstein could, by a vigorous counteroffensive, have
destroyed Mansfeld altogether. He did not. From caution or policy, he remained
passive for the next two months and al!owed Mansfeld to recover.
This defeat carne as a terrible blow to King Christian. Reinforcements were
rushed to Mansfeld; Johann Emst's successful diversion in Westphalia was
aborted so that his corps could be sent east. New regiments were hastily
improvised. Mansfeld had not lost his organizational ability; by the beginning of
May, a new army of 10,000 men lay at Zerbst.
Mansfeld, who was now terminal!y il!, had lost interest in the Elbe war. The
Dessau operation having failed, he began to push a scheme he had been
considering for some time, the invasion of Silesia. He knew that Silesia was one
of the emperor's richest provinces (in fact, it was the chief financial support of
Wallenstein's army), and he believed, correctly, that it was fuI! of disgruntled
Protestants. He also believed, not quite so correctly, that they would welcome
him as a liberator and would flock to his army. Christian liked the idea too. It fit
in with his notions of international al!iances and striking at the Hapsburg
heartlands. Fuchs and Johann Ernst were not so enthusiastic, but they were
overruled. In its final form, the plan envisioned reaching Silesia through neutral
Brandenburg, a rapid conquest, then driving south to join Bethlen Gabor's
Transylvanians for an attack on Vienna itself. At the same time, the main army
under Christian would ignite rebellion throughout Protestant Germany.
Mansfeld, Bethlen Gabor, and Christian would form three prongs of a trident
aimed at Austria. On June 30, Mansfeld, Johann Ernst Sax-Weimar, and Danish
Commissioner Mitzlaff set off for Silesia."
The Danish War 123

THE LUTTER CAMPAIGN

The earlier Danish successes had petered out after Dessau. TilIy spent May,
June, and July systematically securing Westphalia, the Weser line, and Hesse, a
task made easier by Johann Ernst's withdrawal. Christian of Brunswick died
June 3, and Solms was reduced to garrisoning Gottingen. Distracted with the
Silesia project, King Christian neglected the main front. His army stood
immobile at Wolfenbuttel while Tilly regained the initiative.
Wallenstein, rather belatedly, decided that Mansfeld's destruction was his first
priority. However, he could not leave TilIy completely unsupported.
Immediately after Dessau he had, in a very characteristic move, insulted the
brave and capable Aldrínger." Now, equally characteristically, he appointed
Aldringer his Iieutenant, commanding a independent corps of 8000 to support
TilIy and maintain the Elbe cordon. The bulk of the army, about 30,000 men,
pursued Mansfeld to Silesia.
Having regained Minden, Hameln, and Calenberg, TilIy laid siege to
Gottingen. Christian detached the Rhinegrave'" to obstruct the League advance;
they were intercepted by a similar Catholic detachment under Jakob
Furstenberg.!' In the action of Rossing (July 27), the Danes were routed with
loss. Gottingen surrendered August 11.
Christian finally stirred from Wolfenbuttel, intending to join the Rhinegrave
and move aggressively against Tilly. Some believe that this was a serious
offensive, intended to complement Mansfeld's eastern thrust, others that it was
essentially defensive, an attempt to blunt Tilly's advance and protect the circ1e.
Christian's intentions may well have been ambiguous, his operations dependent
on Tilly's reaction and the amount of support received.
Tilly was unhappy at Christian's approach; he overestimated the Danes at
19,500 foot and 8600 horse. Weakened by success-a whole infantry regiment
had been left to garrison Gottingen- Tilly was down to 20,000 himself. He
suspended operations against the castle of Northeim (Aug 15), and sent to
Aldringer for reinforcements. 4300 Imperials under Col Desfurs were
irnmediately dispatched.
Christian, meanwhile, was hesitating. The arrival of 2000 men under Fuchs
(Aug 16) gave him a marginal edge over Tilly, 21,000 to 20,000. This was
inadequate to ensure victory. The Danes were aware of Desfurs's approach and
hoped to intercept him on the marcho A quick win over that small body would
induce Tilly to withdraw. Unfortunately for them, Desfurs moved faster than
expected and reached Tilly (Aug 22) before Christian realized he was in the
area. Tilly was now ready to fight; on the 23rd, he marched directly against
Christian's camp at Duderstadt.
Christian quick1y grasped the situation. He had lost the chance to hit Tilly, he
had failed to intercept Desfurs, and he was now threatened by superior numbers.
His remaining option was to fall back to the safety of W olfenbuttel. He began
his retreat on August 24. His bad luck was holding, constant rainstorms on the
24th and zs" transformed the roads into muddy bogs. Because of his superior
artillery and his weighty baggage train, he was more inconvenienced than
Tilly-and burning the bridges after he crossed did not redress the difference.
By sunset of the zs". the Leaguers were near Katlenburg, less than a mile
behind him.
124 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Christian had entered an area unsuited for rapid movement, thickly wooded
with long, narrow roads and many streams with bridges. The rain aggravated the
situation. Several hundred of Christian's recruits feIl sick in the wet and were left
behind for the Croats.
The next leg of the retreat, on August 26, was a nightmare for the Danes.
Desfurs's Imperials had been given charge of the pursuit, and they harried the
enemy mercilessly. Christian detached a small rearguard to hinder them": it was
cut to pieces. Around noon, the Danes were forced to form line to face down the
pursuit. There were repeated exchanges of fire and cavalry skirmishes; the
Danes would occupy a hiIl to block Desfurs, only to abandon it as soon as TilIy's
main body carne into sight. Then they would retire behind the shelter of a
similar hilI further north, withdrawing by groups. It must have been a relief
when they encamped for the night at Seesen. Neither army would enjoy much
rest. TilIy fired his cannon aIl night and thrust smaIl parties forward, around the
Danish campo Christian had sent his heavy baggage ahead without stopping. At
midnight, a falconet signaled the Danes to form up. By 4:00 A.M., they were on
their way. Christian had hoped to slip away unnoticed and gain a march on TiIly,
but the Catholics were soon aware of his intention. The Croats pursued so
closely that at 6:00, the Danes had to form line again to hold them back.
Nevertheless, by 9:00, the Danish van had reached the town of Lutter am
Barenberg.
Here, unfortunately, the road to Wolfenbuttel narrowed to a mere defile
through dense woods. The baggage train was backed up and snarled, a worse
obstac1e than the trees. Fuchs and so me cavalry were skirmishing with Desfurs
at Hahausen when he was summoned to a council of war. Christian had decided
that it was necessary to offer battle in order to give the baggage time to get
away. They would assume a strong defensive position along the Neile River13
and face down TilIy's whole army, or defeat him if necessary.
Fuchs argued very strongly against this plan. He had, he said, warned
Christian that he was taking too many risks; now he was vindicated. The Danish
arrny was fuIl of raw recruits, demoralized by defeat and retreat, and certainly
no match for TilIy's veterans. The defensive advantages of their position were
negligible. TilIy's light horse were already enveloping their flanks through the
unguarded woods. When he thought of offering battle here, he said, his skin
crawled. Apparently he would have preferred to abandon the baggage to save
the men rather than risk the army to preserve the baggage. As before, Christian
overruled him.

THE COMMANDERS
Christian IV, Oldenburg, King of Denmark and Norway (1588-1648) was and
is unfavorably compared with his rival Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. ActuaIly
the two monarchs were remarkably similar in opinions, talents, outlook, and
disposition, but Christian was the better-rounded character. This worked to his
disadvantage; Gustavus's fixation with war enabled tiny Sweden to overrun half
of Europe. Christian spread his efforts thinly over many areas and so
accomplished less in each. Christian's policies were essentiaIly conservative.
When Catholic successes seemed to threaten the status quo, he allowed himself
to be drawn into the war. When, after Breitenfeld, Sweden became the threat, he
The Danish War 125

regarded the Catholies as allies.

As a military leader, Christian was a fair organizer, with a sound theoretical
grasp of the new Duteh taeties. As a strategist, he was erratie, fluetuating
between exeessive eaution and high-risk gambles. Possibly due to inexperienee,
he was laeking in operational skill.
Aside from inexperienee, Christian's inferiority to Gustavus and principal
weakness, both as general and as king, lay in the realm of leadership. Christian
did not possess Gustavus's unique personal eharisma. He laeked the ability to
translate popularity into power. Despite the absenee of organized opposition, he
failed to dominate his kingdom politieally. He was a poor judge of men and
repeatedly ehose inadequate subordinates. Finally, he didn't understand how to
delegate authority, so he either spread himself too thinly trying to do everything
himself or left his people without direetion while distraeted with other matters.
Despite his considerable abilities and sound initiatives in areas like rnilitary and
politieal reform, eommeree, development, and the arts, he aeeomplished .Iess
than he might have.
Politically, Christian was equally eonservative, eoneeding his ineompetent
aristoeraey their traditional authority even when they obstrueted his polieies.
Religiously, he was, like most moderate Lutherans, intolerant but not
expansionist. He had tendeneies toward megalomania and paranoia, aggravated
by deep-seated hatreds of both Sweden and Catholieism. He _was self-eentered
and self-indulgent in food, alcohol, and women. His iron eonstitution, however,
eompensated both for his exeesses and a number of serious wounds and injuries:
the eoneussion of 1625 should ha ve killed him. He was physieally strong,
personally fearless, and, despite his laek of "charisma," not without eharm. His
last years were bitter, marked by military humiliation, family loss, politieal
failure, and declining health.
General Hans Philip Fuehs von Bimbaeh (c. 1585-1626) was a professional
soldier who, up until 1620, had held high rank in both the Imperial army and the
Protestant Union. A moderate Lutheran, the spread of the war to Germany had
driven him to resign from both forees, to eventually drift into Christian's serviee.
Fuehs was a sound, eautious strategist of the Duteh sehool, repeatedly overruled
by the adventurous king. He has been blamed, unfairly, for not supporting
Mansfeld at Dessau. Clearly, his eomparatively small force eould have made
littIe differenee in view of Wallenstein's superior numbers. Although he kept his
troops out of the fiaseoes of Dessau and Silesia, he eould not save them from
Lutter.
Rhinegrave Otto Ludwig von Salm-Kyrburg (1597-1634) had supported the
Protestant cause from 1622 and later served in the Swedish and Weimarian
armies. Dashing and irresponsible, he made an adequate regimental eommander,
but mismanaged independent eommands under both Danes and Swedes. He
finished off his eareer in Denmark by sedueing King Christian's wife and fleeing
the eountry (1627).
Landgrave Philip von Hesse-Kassel (1604-26) was the seeond son of ruling
Landgrave Moritz. Despite near-total laek of experienee, his birth made him
effeetive eommander of all three Hessian regiments.
Count Hermann Wilhelm von Solms-Hohensolms (c. 1600-1626), younger
brother of General Count Philip Reinhard Solms, was a seion of a military
126 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Lutheran family long associated with the anti-Hapsburg cause.

Aside from Anholt, Tilly's generals were off leading independent corps,
Pappenheim in Upper Austria, Lindelo in Westphalia, Furstenberg in Hesse. He
therefore entrusted vital roles to colonels, Erwitte, Cronberg, and Desfurs, and
even lieutenant colonels, Gronsfeld and Albert.
Both Erwitte and Cronberg were able, experienced officers who had served
under Tilly since 1619.
Imperial General Count Nicholas Des Fours de Montville (c. 1580-1642) was
a Walloon veteran who had been commissioned by Spain in 1618 to raise a
cavalry regiment to support the emperor. During his long career, he took part in
innumerable actions as well as the battles of White Mountain, Lutter, Lutzen and
2nd Breitenfeld. Wallenstein disliked him, calling him the worst thief in the
Empire (!). Aggressive and able, Desfurs did well in skirmishes and minor
actions, but not in formal battle; Lutter was his best day.

THEARMIES
Imperial-League Army-Tilly
Right Wing-Cronberg: 2048 cavalry, 6156 infantry
UNIT DATE COY STR NOTES:
Cronberg CR 1620 8 823 Bavaria
Schonberg CR 1620 12 600 Wurzburg
Lindelo CR 1620 6 625 Bavaria
Musket Detachment 1000 Albert; Herliberg & Herbersdorf
Gronsfeld Bn 1620 10 3035 Bav; Herliberg & Herbersdorf
Schmidt IR 1620 10 2121 Graubunden; LtCol Reinach

Center-Anholt: 10,804 infantry, 12 guns

Gallas IR 1624 10 2000 Bavaria
Furstenberg IR 1620 13 2279 Bavaria
Jung-Tilly IR 1620 6 1439 Eichstadt
Colloredo IR 1625 10 1400 IMP; German
Cerboni IR 1625 10 1000 IMP; German
Alt-Tilly IR 1620 8 2686 Wurzburg; LtCol Wahl

Left Wing-Erwitte: 3509 cavalry

Erwitte KUR 1620 10 858 Bavaria-Neuburg
Herbersdorf KUR 1620 7 622 Bavaria
Bock CR 1621 5 529 Bavaria
Cortenbach CR 1621 5 513 Austria
Assenberg CR 1622 6 587 Cologne
Westerhold CR 1625 6 400 Westphalia

Enveloping Detachment-Desfurs: 1900 cavalry, 3 guns

Desfurs ARK 1625 10 600 IMP; German
Alt-Saxon KUR 1625 10 600 IMP; Low German
Hussmann KUR 1626 6 400 IMP; German
Gall Croats 1626 5 300 IMP
Total: 16,960 infantry; 7457 cavalry; 15 guns =24,417
The Danish War 127

The Army of Christian of Denmark

Like his rival and contemporary, Gustavus Adolphus, King Christian was a
progressive military reformer, and in many ways their thinking was parallel,
however Christian, lacking Gustavus's single-mindedness and personal
experience, remained much closer to the parent Dutch system and more
influenced by derivative thinkers like Baden and Montgomery. His ideal
infantry regiment consisted of twelve companies of 200 men, with a proportion
of two muskets to one pike. In battle it fought in two battalions of 1200, ten
deep. The cavalry regiment had six companies divided into four troops or
"corporalships." three troops consisted of 27 cuirassiers each, the fourth of 25
arkebusiers, for 106 men per company and 636 per regiment. In action it would
divide into two squadrons of 300, formed 6 deep and 50 wide, arkebusiers
behind cuirassiers. Christian preferred to place lieutenant colonels in command
of his regiments; so each regiment would have the king himself as colonel.
The battle line would form in three echelons of three infantry regiments each,
these regiments fighting as pairs of battalions side-by-side, with wide intervals
between each pair. The 2nd echelon would cover the intervals in the first, so that
the two could combine as a solid line. The 3rd echelon corresponded to the 1SI
(i.e., checkerboard) with a cavalry regiment filling each interval. The bulk of the
cavalry, also in checkerboard, was divided between the two wings. Like the
infantry, the cavalry regiments were kept together as paired squadrons.
Again like Gustavus, Christian conducted elaborate experiments with
artillery, leading him to standardize on five calibers: the 48 pdr cannon, the 24
pdr demicannon, the 12 pdr demiculverin, the 6 pdr double-falconet, and the 3
pdr falconet. These are similar to Gustavus's three calibers (both systems were
copied from the Dutch), but Christian retained the awkward full can non and
favored the double-falconet of his own invention. All these guns were somewhat
sturdier and correspondingly less mobile than their Swedish counterparts.
Christian seems to have desired a proportion of one to two guns per 1000
men. A list of 1627 gives his "ideal" train for an army of 32,000 (25,000 foot
and 6000 horse): six cannon, twelve demicannon, six 12 pdr "field guns," six
double falconets, six falconets, and three small mortars (8 pdr). An actual list of
1629 gives 19 pieces for 8000 men: two demicannon, two culverins (16 pdr),
two 8 pdr "dragons," two falcons (4 pdr), eight "regimental guns" (6 pdr double
falconets), and three large mortars (30 pdr). In battle the 24 and 12 pdrs would
form a battery, while the 6 pdrs could be divided among the infantry as
regimental guns. The 3 pdrs might do the same or act as light support for
skirmishers or cavalry.
Unlike Sweden, Denmark had no standing army. Its peacetime forces
consisted of a small royal guard and skeleton garrisons in the king's fortresses.
The "national" arrny comprised a militia of 1600 "knightly" cavalry and 4004
conscripted peasant infantry-next to useless. Unlike Gustavus's conscripts,
these would not, in any case, serve outside of Denmark. Separate, equally poor,
militias served in Norway and Holstein. King Christian did have two assets, a
dozen modern fortresses (built by Christian himself) and the most powerful navy
in the Baltic.
As the Danish Council of State refused to declare war on the Empire, only
two of Christian's regiments were Danes. His other units were a hodgepodge of
128 Battles of the Thirty Years War

English, Scots, French, Dutch, Holsteiners, and, predominately, Protestant

Germans; these Germans in tum divided between units raised by Christian
himself, those raised by contractors in his service, and those of the semi-
independent corps ofMansfeld, Brunswick, and Sax-Weimar. The basic material
was good, and the Germans at least were well provided with experienced men,
survivors of the campaigns of 1622. The cavalry was of high quality, the
infantry and artillery passable. The army was well-equipped, in contrast to
Mansfeld's or Brunswick's levies, and perhaps the best fed and supplied of the
war.

Danish-Lower Saxon Army-Christian IV

I" Echelon-Fuchs: 2000 cavalry, 6000 infantry & 16 guns
UNIT DATE COY Bn/Sgd STR NOTES:
SolmsCR 1625 6 2 400 LtCol H. Solms KIA
Uslar CR 1625 6 1 300 Hesse
Geist CR 1625 6 1 300 Geist captured
Brunswick CR 1625 10 2 400 ex-Christian of Brunswick
Hesse CR 1626 6 1 300 Landgrave Philip KIA
Wersabe CR 1626 6 1 300 Hesse. Wersabe KlA
Leib InfCoy 1625 1 400 Capt Rosenkranz
Leib IR 1625 20 3 2800 Dane; Blue; Lohausen cap
Mogens Kaas IR 1626 1 1000
Linistow IR 1625 12 2 2000 Holstein; Linistow cap

2nd Echelon-Christian: 2000 cavalry, 6000 infantry

Leib Coy 1625 1 1 300 Royal Escort Squadron
Nell CR 1625 lO 2 600 Royal Leib ARK
Freitag CR 1625 10 2 600 ARK; Freitag KlA July
Baudissin CR 1625 6 1 300
Kruse IR 1626 20 3 2800 Dane; Red ; Kruse wnded
Frenking IR 1625 12 1 1000 LtCol Frenking captured
Riese IR 1625 3 1 500 Fuchs corps
Rantzau IR 1626 3 500 " Rantzau captured
Ungefugt IR 1626 700 Ungefugt KIA

3rd Echelon-Rhinegrave: 1000 cavalry, 4000 infantry & 4 guns

Erbot CR 1626 5 1 300
Rhinegrave CR 1625 10 2 600 Otto Ludwig
Courville CR 1625 6 1 300 Courville captured
Limbach IR 1625 12 1 800
Solms IR 1625 1 600
Volunteers IR 1626 1 700
Schlammersdorf IR 1625 7 1 800 Fuchs corps
Gotzen IR 1626 1 700 Gotzen captured
Swedes IR 1626 1 700
Total: 16,000 infantry; 5000 cavalry; 20 guns = 21,000

BATTLE OF LUTTER AM BARENBERG, AUGUST 27,1626

The Neile position was set in a c1eared valle y bounded to north and south by
forest. These woods were quite dense, but grew gradually more open as they
approached the valley, degenerating into scattered copses and then individual
The Danish War 129

trees widely spaced. Thus the woodland immediately around the battlefield
could be traversed by formed units, while that further out blocked formations,
but not small groups. The Danish front lay about 100 meters behind the river
line. The water-course was not very deep and had lost much of its width in the
hot summer. It was, however, a formidable obstac\e: the banks were thick with
brush and small, scattered c\umps of trees; the rain had con verted both banks
into marsh. The stream could be forded by cavalry and, with so me difficulty,
waded by infantrymen, but was not crossable by formed units. There were five
bridges, but Fuchs burned three, leaving intact that at Rohde village to the south
and that at Muhle (a mill?) to the north. A low rise, which Christian called the
Bakenberge, lay just east of the Neile. Behind the river was Lutter am
Barenberg, a largish village and an old castle.
Christian deployed in three echelons, placing the 1st under Fuchs, taking the
2nd himself, and giving the 3rd to the Rhinegrave. Curiously, he seems to have
appointed no wing commanders-only the echelon commanders stood between
him and the individual battalion or squadron. By the same token, each echelon
commander had to supervise both wings and center too. Fuchs had no authority
over his 2nd line supports. Note that at this time Christian was short of senior
officers: Solms was absent, while Mansfeld had swallowed up Johann Ernst,
Mitzlaff, and Knyphausen. Unlike Tilly, he preferred to rely on the inept
Rhinegrave rather than promote experienced colonels Iike Nell, Lohausen, or
Limbach.
It would seem that Christian still hoped to avoid battle; once the road was
c\eared, Fuchs could easily convert his echelon into a rearguard.
Fuchs positioned the 16 guns of the main battery on the Bakenberge, with his
six battalions behind, and about 1000 horse on each wing. The exact placement
is unc\ear, but his foot certainly consisted of the Leib, Linistow, and Kaas
infantry regiments, and the Hesse and Solms cavalry regiments were on his
right. Christian's eche Ion included Kruse Infantry Regiment, and probably
Frenking and Ungefugt." The Rhinegrave's force inc\uded the Swedish Infantry
Regiment, his own cavalry regiment, and that of Courville. His four fa\conets
were deployed near Dolgen village to protect the left flank.
The rain that had hampered the retreat had finally c\eared up-too late for
Christian. The day would be c\ear, sunny, and very hot. This was to Tilly's
advantage, as his troops were able to stop and rest at noon, whereas the Danes
had been in line of battle since 9:00. Tilly also had the advantage of "sun"; the
afternoon sun was to his back and in Christian's face. The Danish field sign was
"Fur Religion und Vaterland!"
Desfurs's horse skirmished throughout the morning, but Tilly's main body did
not come up until almost noon. Under the harassment of the Danish guns, he
formed his battle line. The Catholics were encouraged at the prospect of battle
because of an omen seen the night before, a fiery sword in the sky with its hilt
toward Tilly and its point toward Christian. Tilly's field word was "Seligste
Jungfrau Maria!" ("Blessed Virgin Mary!"). .
Tilly divided his army into wings, center, and two detachments. Cronberg led
the right or southern wing, with three cavalry regiments, his own, Schonberg,
and Lindelo, plus the Schmidt Infantry Regiment and a combined battalion
under Gronsfeld. Anholt had the center, five more tercios in a single echelon:
130 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Gallas, Furstenberg, Jung-Tilly, Colloredo, and Cerboni. Alt-TilIy stood behind.

A battery of eleven or twelve guns were placed facing the Danish line, these
were reinforced by musketeers drawn from the infantry regiments. The left wing
cavalry, under Erwitte, was in three echelons, first Herbersdorf and Cortenbach,
then Erwitte and Bock, with Assenberg and Westerhold in reserve.
Desfurs, with his own 1900 horse and two or three guns was to operate on the
far left. LtCol Albert and 1000 musketeers would do the same on the right.
Tilly remarked that the Danish army was as well drawn up as any he had ever
seen. Their position was formidable, with a near-impassible river protected by
16 guns and 16,000 infantry and both flanks covered by woods. TilIy was, of
course, unaware of Christian's deficient command structure. Nevertheless, his
trained eye spotted two weaknesses which he hoped would bring about the
king's downfall: firstly, the woods guarding the flanks; secondly, the river itself.
Tilly devised a subtle and daring plan. First, he would draw the enemy's
attention with his guns while forcing a crossing on his right. At the same time,
his two detachments would conduct independent envelopments of both flanks
using the woods themselves to conceal their advance. This would leave his own
center dangerously weak, but the same river obstacle that protected Christian's
center from him would protect him from Christian!
While Tilly was still forming up, Christian was informed that his baggage
train was hopelessly ensnarled halfway up the woods road. Instead of leaving it
to his quartermaster, he rode off to de al with the problem himself. For the
moment, neither the 2nd echelon nor the army had a commander.
The first phase of the battle consisted of an "artillery duel" beginning at noon.
Desfurs and Albert had already been dispatched on their missions. Around 1:00,
five companies of Cronberg Cavalry Regiment, skirmishing with their Danish
opposites, pushed across the Neile and secured the bridge at Rohde. TilIy at
once ordered that the crossing begin (1 :30). Securing the bridge with 200
musketeers, Gronsfeld formed up on the eastem bank. He was supported by the
Cronberg and Schonberg cavalry, who probably forded the stream. Schmidt
Infantry Regiment followed close behind. At the same time, Anholt swung south
with Gallas, Furstenberg, and Jung-Tilly, leaving Tilly with the three remaining
tercios to hold the center.
The moment that the Gronsfeld Battalion reached the bridge, Fuchs directed
that six guns place them under heavy fire. This did not break Gronsfeld, but
seems to have bothered the cavalry. Meanwhile, Fuchs took command of the
1000 horse of his own left. At 2:00, he sent them against the bridgehead force.
This began the third and decisive phase, the Danish counterattack.
Fuchs has been criticized because his attacR masked his artillery.
Nevertheless, the charge achieved immediate success. Cronberg and Schonberg
were caught at a stand, still reforming and shaken by the artillery. They broke
before contact, routing past Gronsfeld and sweeping away the Schmidt Infantry
in their flight. Unfortunately for Fuchs, Gronsfeld was fully formed and stood as
solidly as a breakwater splitting the Danish horse. The Danes harried the routed
back to the bridge, then disengaged and fell back to their starting point.
More unfortunate were the events on Fuchs's other wing. In the absence of
formal command, Hesse and Solms were acting as joint brigadiers. When they
saw Fuchs attacking on the left, they seem to have assumed that a general
The Danish War 131

counterattack was underway. Like Pappenheim at Breitenfeld, they had been

galled by the enemy artillery fire. Now they charged, the whole 1000 horse,
right across the Neile and into the Catholics. Herbersdorf and Cortenbach were
taken at a disadvantage and "bounced" with little resistance. Hesse then hurled
himself against Tilly's center.
Seeing Hesse's rash action, Fuchs was faced with a terrible choice: should he
try to assist his right wing, or write it off and concentrate on holding the line and
finishing off Gronsfeld? He made the wrong decision; all six battalions of his
center were ordered to swing right, cross the river, and take the Catholic guns.
At about the same time, Albert's detachment carne out of the woods and
seized Dolgen, to the left of the Rhinegrave's echelon. The Rhinegrave
apparently mistook it for a major attack. He turned on him with four battalions
and half his horse, and blasted the village with his guns, setting it on fire. Albert
hastily retired to the safety of the woods. Although this operation didn't
accomplish much, the Rhinegrave was drawn out of position; he had, in any
case, now lost all interest in the main battle.
When Christian heard the gunfire heating up around 1:30, he decided to return
to the battlefield, reaching Fuchs some time after Gronsfeld's crossing. They
conferred briefly and agreed that Fuchs should take forward some cavalry to
sUfPort Hesse15 and, they hoped, crush Tilly's left, while the king brought up the
2n echelon to destroy Gronsfeld. Gronsfeld now had to cover the bridgehead
while facing Kruse's Infantry. The Danes did not close with the pike-of which
they had very few-but relied on musket fire to break the League tercio. To the
rear, Schmidt was being reorganized and Anholt was funneling more men across
the bridge.
The six battalions of Lohausen, Linistow, and Kaas crossed the river without
opposition. Much as Fuchs earlier, their colonels were confronted with a pivotal
decision. They had been disorganized by the crossing. Should they stop to
regroup, giving Tilly time to prepare and bring up reserves? Or should they
attack at once, relying on momentum and surprise? Again the wrong choice was
made: without pausing, they threw themselves at Tilly, an armed mob of 6000
men.
TilIy stood waiting for them at the battery. This was the crisis of the battle:
Christian was battering Gronsfeld, Tilly faced double his numbers, while Anholt
lay uselessly between. To TilIy's left, Hesse and Solms charged the Colloredo
and Cerboni regiments, hoping to sweep them aside as easily as Fuchs had
broken Schmidt. Utterly calm and self-controlled, TilIy ordered that no shot be
given until his signal-and none wasted after. The Danes closed within 100
meters. Suddenly, every gun belched grape, every musket was emptied. The
Daoes were halted, cut to pieces. Tilly threw forward his veterans of Alt-Tilly
Iofantry Regiment to convert the mob to a rout.
Things went equally badly for Hesse and Solms. Despite their relatively small
size and lack of experience, the two Imperial tercios stood as firmly as
Gronsfeld's veterans. As the Danes reeled back, repulsed, Erwitte attacked with
his own regiment and Bock's. Solms was killed trying to rally his men; the rest
fled back to the river. In this fourth phase (3:30), the counterattack collapsed;
the initiative returned to Tilly.
Fuchs arrived too late to save the situation; nevertheless, he determined to
132 Battles of the Thirty Years War

fight. Alt-TilIy, CoJloredo, and Cerboni pressed into the wreckage of the Danish
infantry while Tilly and Erwitte raJlied their cavalry to deal with Fuchs. The
Danes went down in defeat; Fuchs was shot and Hesse cut down by the strearn."
To the Catholic right, Anholt had brought more of his force s across and was
now pressing Kruse back. The ruin of the cavalry and the 1st echelon had
demoralized the unengaged infantry. Defying their officers, men were melting
away, singly and in small groups. The rout was swelled as survivors of the 1st
echelon recrossed the stream and fled past. Many others had been trapped on the
bank and slaughtered.
The arrival of Desfurs, a little after 4:00, marked the fifth and last phase.
Desfurs emerged from the woods to the northeast, behind the Danish 3rd
echelon. The Rhinegrave attempted to block him with his nearest regiments,
Rhinegrave Cavalry, CourviJle Cavalry, and the Swedish Infantry. It was futile.
The appearance of an enemy corps in their rear completed the Danes'
demoralization. Courville was taken, the rest dissolved. Meanwhile, TiIly and
Erwitte were crossing the river, and Anholt destroyed the Kruse Infantry. By
5:00, the Danish battery was lost. King Christian placed himself at the head of
his Leib Cavalry Regiment and personaJly led a series of charges against Anholt
and Desfurs. His force was destroyed, and only the self-sacrifice of his escort
enabled him to escape capture. However, he did hold open the jaws of the
Catholic trap long enough for most of his foot to escape. .
About 2000 foot of the 1st echelon and right wing of the 2nd were cut off when
Desfurs reached Anholt. These, harried by Tilly, took refuge in the castle of
Lutter; they surrendered the next day." nie last shot was fired at 6:00. Christian
lost about 8000 men, 3-4000 kiJled, up to 500 captured on the field, the 2000 in
the castIe, and another 2000 missing (deserted). Among the dead were Fuchs,
Hesse, Solms, and three other regimental commanders; seven more were
captured plus 130 lesser officers and NCOs. Also taken were aJl 20 guns, six
comets, the Danish royal standard, 32 ensigns on the field, another 29 with the
castle, and part of the baggage. TiJly reported 200 League troops killed and 300
seriously wounded, plus 200 Imperials in all.
This was probably Tilly's greatest victory; in conception it resembles
Stadtlohn. TiJly credited the victory to Gronsfeld, Desfurs, and Anholt (but not
Erwitte). It could be argued that Anholt was too sluggish in the second and third
phases, and that if Desfurs had pressed more vigorously, the whole Danish
infantry would have been cut off.
Christian was overmatched from the start, a talented amateur pitted against
Europe's foremost professional. The king's most egregious errors in volved his
weakness of leadership. First saddling the army with a cJumsy command
structure, he then tried to do everything himself, playing in tum army
commander, echelon commander, quartermaster, and cavalry colonel. Christian
was not directly responsible for the fiasco on his right, but he did set up a
situation that invited such errors. The one phase we can cJearly allot to him, the
later counterattack, shows no skill. By dispatching Fuchs to assist Hesse, he was
throwing good money after bad; during this decisive moment, he kept the 1000
men of the Leib Cavalry Regiment uselessly in reserve, and he failed to crush
Gronsfeld and eliminate the bridgehead. Throughout, Christian was purely
reactive, making no effort to exploit the risky separation of Tilly's elements.
The Danish War 133

Fuchs made two major errors. The first, sending the infantry across the river,
could have worked out had TilIy failed to repel them. The second, throwing in
his horse after Hesse was already beaten, is difficult to defend. Clearly, he
underestimated the disorganization involved in crossing the river.
Lutter was the last "old style" battle. Never again would individual regiments
like Alt-Tilly and Gronsfeld decide the day through a desperate stand. It had all
the 16th century characteristics, supernatural portents, knightly heroism,
deathless rhetoric: Christian charging sword in hand, trying to regain by courage
what he'd lost by folly; Erwitte telling his troopers that since they were at half
strength, every man must fight for two; TilIy coolly watching the Danes
swarming toward him, forbidding his men from firing, and, later, during Fuchs's
charge, asking his wavering cavalry if they wished to abandon their old
commander. There would be more heroic moments, of course, but the linear
battles to come would value science over epic.

LUTTER CONTROVERSIES
Although we ha ve a fair idea of TilIy's operations, the Danish plans and aims
are imperfectly understood. Fuchs, Hesse, and Solms were all killed, and
Christian was uncharacteristically c1ose-mouthed about it. We cannot be certain
when Christian rejoined his army, or whether he was ever actually out of
cummand, nor who made the decisions at each phase. Too much rests on the
interpretation of the historian.
Even the site is disputed. We know that the Danes deployed behind a
"watercourse," that TilIy stood to the west, that the Rhinegrave's left lay near
Dolgen, that the remnants of the infantry took refuge in Lutter castle, and that
Christian referred to deploying near the "Bakenberge."
Streams suggested as the "watercourse" are the Middelbeck, the Hummecke,
and the Neile. None of them is a perfect choices, but the Neile most closely
corresponds to the known facts. An army the size of Christian's would have had
a front of at least two kilometers; the Middelbeck and Hummecke positions are
too cramped. The deployment suggested by Lichtenstein, Fuchs along the
Middelbeck, Christian on a line Nauen-Rohde, and the Rhinegrave back at
Dolgen, would indicate an interval between each echelon of 1000 meters instead
of the normal 200. AIso these lines are bisected by difficult-to-ford rivers and
would certainly be incapable of mutual support. Forces holding the Middelbeck
or Hummecke would ha ve had great difficulty reaching Lutter castle after the
defense collapsed.
Christian's "Bakenberge" is unknown. It has been suggested that he was
referring to the Pobbeckenberg. 1 believe that he meant "Barenberg," either
Lutter itself or a particular hill between the town and the Neile.
From the point of view of the retreating Christian, the area between the
Middelbeck and the Neile was mostly traversable by parallel columns and
masses. The bridge s would constitute bottlenecks for the baggage train, but the
streams could be forded. Only after passing Lutter does the forest road narrow to
a defile.
The size of the rival armies is generally set at 21,000 (16,000 foot; 5000
horse) Danes and about 25,000 Catholics. Some prefer 18,000 (12,000 foot;
6000 horse) Danes and 20,000 or so for TilIy. The Danish army is poorly
 134 Battles of the Thirty Years War

chronicled. The presence and role of so me units are specifically attested: Solms,
Hesse, Leib, Linistow, Kaas, Kruse, Rhinegrave, Courville, and the "Swedish"
Infantry Regiment. Others appear in the casualty lists: Geist, Wersabe, Rantzau,
Ungefugt, Frenking, Gotzen, the Volunteers, and LtCol Pentz. The presence or
absence of the rest must be inferred.

AFTERMATH: THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1627 AND 1628

Tilly exploited the victory cautiously, relying on diplomacy to erode
Christian's control of the circle. The king's prestige had suffered an irreparable
blow, and the German princes were eager to make what terms they could. He
also added the 2100 prisoners to his own arrny."
Christian, meanwhile, was working tirelessly to rebuild his destroyed army,
drawing on garrisons, paying large bonuses to recruits, and even larger ones to
deserters. By such means he quickly assembled a force of 15,000 foot, 3000
cuirassiers, and 4000 arkebusiers (on paper). Although this improvised and
demoralized crew had little offensive power, they were adequate for defense.
Tilly spent the remainder of 1626 occupying the Brunswicks. The Danes' new
line rested on the Elbe.
Mansfeld had marched off to disaster. He had quickly overrun most of Silesia,
and lost itjust as quickly to Wallenstein's pursuit. At length he reached Hungary
where he joined a large Turkish- Transylvanian army under Bethlen Gabor.
Wallenstein adopted a defensive posítíon," and faced them down. Bethlen lost
his nerve and abandoned Mansfeld, alleging orders from the Turk. Mansfeld led
his depleted remnants into Bosnia, hoping to reach Venice. He died there of
tuberculosis'? (Nov.30, 1626); Johann Ernst Sax-Weimar followed within a few
months. Mitzlaff assumed command of the remnant.
Now that it was too late, Christian's allies carne forward with the aid they had
promised: troops from England, money from Holland, both from France.
Christian raised new regiments and squeezed more help out of the State Council.
His plan for 1627 was to established a cordon along the Elbe resting on Stade
and Magdeburg. His main army mustered 30,000 (on paper), there were 15,000
in Magdeburg, and a linking corps of 10,000 under Baderr" midway between.
The three fortresses of Wolfenbuttel, Nienburg, and Nordheim still held out
south of the river. Unfortunately for Christian, the outbreak of war between
England and France (June), accompanied by a French civil war and short-lived
Franco-Spanish alliance, aborted any further foreign aid.
Tilly spent the first half of 1627 reducing the three fortresses.i" Wallenstein,
\ meanwhile, was harrying Mitzlaff back up through Silesia. Finally, the
hopelessly outnumbered Danes were mousetrapped and destroyed at Kosel
(July-August). Wallenstein c1aimed 15,000 taken, with all their banners and
1 guns'"; Mitzlaff and a bare handful escaped to inform Christian that he'd lost
another army.
When Wallenstein joined Tilly at Lauenburg (Sept 2), the League general had
already seized a bridgehead on the Elbe. Together, the two general s had 80,000
men (on paper) to Christian's 55,000. They drove between the king and Baden,
TilIy swinging west, Wallenstein northeast toward Mecklenburg, and Schlick,
Wallenstein's current lieutenant, north into Holstein. Danish resistance
collapsed: the militia dissolved, fortresses surrendered without a shot fired,
The Danish War 135

Christian's 30,000 men turned into a demoralized rabble of 10,000. The key
fortress of Rendsburg was evacuated, opening Denmark itself to attack. Of all
Christian's strongholds, only Gluckstadt, Krempe, Stade, and Pinneberg resisted.
Baden's army was destroyed in the action of Heilígenhafen." In October,
Schlick thrust into Jutland. The Danes fled to their islands. By the end of
November, the Catholics were in possession of Holstein, Jutland, and
Mecklenburg; of Christian's .continental holdings, only Gluckstadt, Krempe, and
Stade remained.
At this point, the Spanish approached Wallenstein with a strange proposition. '
Their interminable war with Holland had bogged down; they had abandoned
hope of any sort of real victory. Instead, they believed that they could force the
Dutch to negotiate a reasonable peace by attacking their shipping. The most
important Dutch commerce was with the Baltic. Therefore, they would increase
the pressure by establishing raiders in the Baltic and North Seas. They offered
the generalissimo some 600,000 florins to create an "Imperial" fleet in the
Baltic.
The idea was not, perhaps, quite as unrealistic as it sounds, although the
Spanish greatly underestimated the difficulties involved. Certainly the emperor
had doubts, but he owed Spain too much to refuse. Unfortunately, Wallenstein's
unstable, protean imagination seized on the idea. He would become Imperial
Admiral of the Baltic, would secure the Mecklenburg and Pomeranian coasts,
and create an unstoppable warfleet. Together with his army, he would capture
Copenhagen; the emperor would as sume the Danish crown and Wallenstein
would be Duke of Jutland. Then he would combine with the Polish fleet and
conquer Sweden, finalIy tuming his forces west to crush the Dutch.
Needless to say, this ambitious scheme could never have been carried out.
The handful of armed merchantmen the Spanish improvised were no real threat
to Denmark, let alone Denmark and Sweden combined. But WalIenstein took it
seriously: he persuaded the emperor to make him Admiralissimo and Duke of
Mecklenburg" and established a naval base at Wismar. He did succeed in
frightening the Swedes and enraging both the Dutch and the English.
April of 1628 saw an improvised Swedish-Danish alliance against
Wallenstein; the Swedes were not yet realIy to intervene on the mainland, but
they would assist Christian to block WalIenstein's "Baltic Design." At the same
time, the Spanish triggered an unnecessary crisis in Italy, the Mantua War, into
which both France and the Empire were soon drawn.
Christian, meanwhile, had been considering two possible strategies for the
1628 campaign: an all-out invasion and reconquest of Jutland, or a drawn-out
series of seabome strikes and raids, designed to weaken the Catholics, establish
and extend new coastal beachheads, and incite uprisings in the occupied
territories. Wisely, he opted for the less ambitious course. TilIy and Wallenstein
adopted a somewhat complementary strategy: Tilly would reduce the remaining
Danish mainland strongholds, while Wallenstein established control of the
Baltic coast and tried to capture the off-shore islands." Fighting was indecisive;
Wallenstein's garrison on Fehmam Island was cut off and captured, a Danish
raid destroyed his garrison at Eckernforde. Similar raids on Kiel and
Heiligenhafen were beaten off. Tilly took Pinneberg, Krempe, and, after fierce
resistance, Stade, but Gluckstadt proved impregnable. There were peasant
136 Battles of the Thirty Years War

uprisings in Ditmarschen, Holstein, and parts of Jutland, ruthlessly repressed.

Toward the end of spring, attention shifted east to Pomerania.
Bogislaw of Pomerania had aIlowed Wallenstein to occupy most of his duchy,
but was reluctant to surrender the most valuable port, Stettin. He suggested that
Wallenstein use Stralsund instead-that town had annoyed the duke by cIaiming
the status of a free city.
Stralsund was built not on a peninsula so much as an island connected to the
mainland by a spit of sand. It was virtually impregnable to land assault;
supported by the Danish and Swedish fleets, it was as safe as Copenhagen.
Many thought the whole idea was madness: when informed that Wallenstein
intended to take it, the emperor, very uncharacteristicaIly, ordered him to leave
it alone. However, Wallenstein hoped they could be bluffed into surrendering;
when they refused, he was unwilling to back down. He sent 25,000 men under
his latest lieutenant, Arnim. Faced with this threat, the citizens turned to
Denmark and Sweden. Christian garrisoned the town in June, but tumed it over
to Swedeu" in July. Arnim's assaults were bloodily repulsed, and his army
starved in the barren sands. The unsuccessful siege of Stralsund (M ay 23-July
28) represents the Imperial "high water mark."
Encouraged by this success, Christian tumed his seaborne strategy against
Pomerania. Hoping to lure the aggressive king, WaIlenstein feigned defeat and
passivity. Christian fell into the trap, losing his army in the Action of Wolgast.28
The 1628 campaign ended in defeat for Denmark.
By this time, both sides realized that total victory was impossible. The
emperor was concerned that he was being drawn into too many wars (Denmark,
Holland, Mantua, Sweden) and wished to establish a final settlement. Elector
Maximilian was concerned by the increasing power of Wallenstein and his
army. Wallenstein had grown bored with Denmark and the Baltic; he wished to
deal with France, Holland, and Sweden. Christian, meanwhile, was informed
that Gustavus would soon be landing in Germany. Holland and England,
responsible for his own eclipse, now wished him to support his rival's victory.
The Council of State, of course, had been urging peace since 1626. When
offered very lenient terms, Christian accepted (Peace of Lubeck, May 22, 1629).
Immediately, .Wallenstein began his new projects. 50,000 men were
dispatched to Mantua; 20,000 to Flanders, and 12,000 to Poland?9 The
remaining 50,000 occupied Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, and Pomerania, while
TilIy secured the Lower Saxon CircIe. Unfortunately, Gustavus Adolphus and
Richelieu had projects too. At the same time, the emperor was busily alienating
his remaining supporters with the Edict of Resritutíon'" The Peace of Lubeck
merely marked the end of round two.

SOURCES
There are no good accounts of Lutter in English, and not much in any
language. The student is referred to Heilmann, Opel, Lichtenstein, Schafer,
Villermont, and Jespersen. Despite its bias, Lockhart's Denmark in the Thirty
Years' War is the latest and best-practically the only-English account of the
Danish War.
The Danish War 137

APPENDIX A: TILLY'S ARMY, 1625-26

Unit Date ~ Str? Notes:
Anholt IR 1620 14 3150 Bavaria
Furstenberg IR 1620 11 2279 Bavaria; ex-Mortaigne
Herliberg IR 1620 10 2475 Bavaria
Alt- TilIy IR 1620 11 2686 Wurzburg; ex-Bauer, Truchses
Jung-TilIy IR 1620 12 2877 Eichstadt; ex-Haimhausen
Schmidt IR 1620 10 2121 Graubunden
Herbersdorf IR 1620 10 1946 Bavaria
Hubner IR 1621 12? HG; AKA Neu-Pappenheim
Gallas IR 1624 12 Bavaria; ex-Erwitte
Blankhart IR 1624 14 1704 Lower Rhine Gottingen gar Aug 1626
Alt-Pappenheim IR 1625 7 1800 Bavaria
Plarer IR 1626 10
Free Coys (int) 1622? 2? 500? Cologne
Erwitte CR 1620 10 858 Bavaria-Neuburg; KUR
Herbersdorf CR 1620 7 622 Bavaria; KUR+ARK
Van der Nersen CR 1620 4 381 Cologne
LindeloCR 1620 8 830 Bavaria
Pappenheim CR 1620 6 Bavaria; Mixed
Schonberg CR 1620 12? Wurzburg; ex-HerzelIes
Cronberg CR 1620 8 823 Bavaria; ex-Cratz
Eynatten CR 1620 Cologne; KUR
Furstenberg CR 1620 Bavaria; ex-Cronberg
BockCR 1621 5 529 Bavaria; ex-Neu-Cratz
Cortenbach CR 1621 5 513 Austrian; ex-Desfurs
Assenberg CR 1622 6 587 Cologne; ex-Neuenheim
Westerhold CR 1625? 6 Westphalia
Witzleben CR 1627 6 Ex- Westerhold?
Eckstedt CR 1627 5
Free Coys (cav) 1622? 2 203
Croats

APPENDIX B: CHRISTIAN'S ARMY, 1625-26

Unit Date ~ Str? Notes:
Leib Coy 1625 1 400 LtCol Nell
Leib IR 1625 20 2700 LtCol Lohausen; Danes
Linistow IR 1625 12 1700 Holstein
Limbach IR 1625 12 1700 North German
NeuhoffIR 1625 12 900 German, to Mansfeld
Frenking IR 1625 12 1700 German
Schlammersdorf IR 1625 7 1400? German
Solms IR 1625 600 North German
Rantzau IR 1625 3 North German
Hatzfeld IR 1625 15 3000 German
Streiff IR 1625 15 3000 Col Streiff von Lauenstein
Wobersnow IR 1625 Gottingen garrison
Kruse IR 1626 20 3000 Danes; Red Regiment
Oppen IR 1626
Riese IR 1626 3
Gotzen IR 1626 German
Mogens Kaas IR 1626 Mixed
Ungefugt IR 1626 Brandenburg
138 Batt1es of the Thirty Years War

Vo1unteers IR 1626 German

Swedes IR 1626
Leib Coy 1625 1 300 Probably KUR
Leib CR 1625 10 1000 LtCol Nell; ARK
Freitag CR 1625 10 1000 North German; ARK
Sax-Altenburg CR 1625 6 600 N Germ; ARK; AKA Geist, Hagen
Nerpracht CR 1625 5 500 AKA Norprath
Sax-Weimar CR 1625 4 400 Johann Ernst; German 3 KUR+ 1 ARK
Rhinegrave 1625 4 400 Rhinegrave Otto Ludwig; German
Birkenfe1d CR 1625 4 400 German; AKA Pa1sgrave
Vizthum CR 1625 4 400 Saxon
Sterling CR 1625 4 400 German, to Mansfeld
Quernheim CR 1625 4 400 German
Baudissin CR 1625 4 400
Courville CR 1625 6 600
Solms CR 1625 6 600 German
UslarCR 1625 6 600 Hesse-Casse1
Brunswick CR 1625 10 400 ex-Christian of Brunswick
Wersabe CR 1626 6 600 Hesse & Brunswick
Hesse CR 1626 6 600 Landgrave Philip of Hesse-Casse1
ErbotCR 1626 6 300

APPENDIX C: WALLENSTEIN'S ARMY

Wallenstein began operations with seven infantry and six cava1ry regiments:
Unit Date Coy Str Notes:
AIt-Saxon IR 1618 5-10 1244 High German
Tiefenbach IR 1619 10 1952 German
Schlick IR 1620 10 2046 Bohemian/High German
WaBenstein Leib 1621 10 2091 Moravian; LtCol St Julian
Colloredo IR 1625 10 2168 Bohemian
Wratis1av IR 1625 10 2317 BohemianlHigh German
Cerboni IR 1625 10 1823 German
Wallenstein Leib 1625 2 150 Bohemian
Gonzaga KUR 1626 10 391 German
Lamotte ARK 1625 5-6 229 Bohemian
Desfurs ARK 1625 6-10 698 German
Schaffenberg ARK 1625 6-10 436 Bohemian
Isolano Croats 1625 6 433
By early 1626, he had added eleven more regiments:
Collalto IR 1619 10 3000? High German
Aldringer IR 1625 10 3000? Low German
Alt-Saxon KUR 1620 10-12 600 Low German; LtCol Bindauf
Neu-Saxon KUR 1620 10 ioooz Low German
Pechmann KUR 1625 5-10 1000? Bohemian
Hussmann KUR 1626 6 400 German; AKA Hausmann
Coronini ARK 1624 5 500? Bohemian
Hebron ARK 1625 8-10 iooov German.; AKA Hepburn
Pechmann DR 1626 10 lOoo? German; AKA Gotz
Gall Croats 1626 5 500?
Zrinyi Croats 1626 5 500
Of these, the A1t-Saxon, Collalto, Tiefenbach, Wallenstein Leib, Schlick, and
A1dringer infantry regiments, Gonzaga, Alt-Saxon, Neu-Saxon, and Pechmann
cuirassiers, Coro ni ni and Hebron arkebusiers, and Isolano, Gall, and Zrinyi Croats took
The Danish War 139

part in the Dessau action.

Aldringer's corps inc1uded the Aldringer, Wratislav, Brunswick, and Schlick infantry
regiments, the Lamotte and Merode arkebusiers, and the Gotz Dragoons as well as
Desfurs's detachment of Colloredo, Cerboni, Alt-Saxon, Hussmann, Desfurs and Gal!.

APPENDIX D: MANSFELD'S ARMY

Mansfeld's corps was remarkably changeable and unstable even for this periodo He
started out, in 1624, with his English expedition, six infantry regiments each of 2000 men
in nine companies, under Doncaster, Cromwell, Rich, Grey, and Burrough. By the end of
1625, these were down to 2000 in all under Grey and Ramsey, however he had acquired a
French infantry regiment of se ven companies and 15 companies of horse. He was given
the Hatzfeld and Neuhoff infantry regiments for a total of 4000 foot and 500 horse.
At Dessau, Mansfeld reported having three German infantry regiments of his own
(4000 total), 17 cavalry companies, a Dutch infantry regiment (Anhoff), the Danish
cavalry regiments Geist and Sterling, and a contingent from Magdeburg, perhaps 5500
foot and 1500 horse in al!. He was well provided with artillery, having perhaps 25 pieces.
The principal German infantry regiment was the "Red" under Ferentz. Other colonels
present were Berlin, Knyphausen, and Franz Karl Sax-Lauenburg.
The Silesia expedition was based on Johann Ernst Sax-Weimar's corps, which inc1uded
the Carpzo, Amsterraedt, and Sax-Lauenburg infantry regiments, the Sax-Weimar and
Sax-Lauenburg cavalry regiments and six guns. AIso presento were a Danish infantry
regiment under Mitzlaff, and the Flodorp and Berbisdorf regiments. Mitzlaff indicated
that they mustered 3000 horse and 6000 foot; ViIlermont gave them a paper strength of
16,000 men and 15 guns. Mansfeld's will gives his officers as Cols Ferentz and Peblis,
cavalry chief Rive, and LtCols Barnadino and Bellesheim.
Dessau O.B.
Unit Date Str? Notes:
Ferentz IR 1625 1500 Red IR
Berlín IR 1625 1250
Knyphausen IR 1625 1250
AnhoffIR 1626 500 Dutch
Christian Wilhelm 1626 1000 Magdeburg IR
GeistCR 1625 4 300 ex-Sax-Altenburg AKA Hagen
Sterling CR 1625 4 300
Mansfeld CR 1625 5 400
Sax-Lauenburg CR 1626 4 300
Christian Wilhelm 1626 200 Magdeburg CR

APPENDIX E: TILLY'S ARMY AT LUTTER

Unit Date Coy Est Str Notes:
Herbersdorf IR 1620 8 1560 1 Bn =3035+ 1000 detached
Herlíberg IR 1620 10 2475 Gronsfe1d
Alt-Tilly IR 1620 8 2686 LtCol Wah1
Gallas IR 1624 10 2000?
Schrnidt IR 1620 10 2121 LtCol Reinach
Furstenberg IR 1620 13 2279
Jung-Tilly IR 1620 6 1439 LtCol Albert (led detachment)
14,560
Erwitte CR 1620 10 858
Herbersdorf CR 1620 7 622
LindeloCR 1620 6 625
Schonberg CR 1620 12? 600
Cronberg CR 1620 8 823
140 Battles of the Thirty Years War

BockCR 1621 5 529

Cortenbach CR 1621 5 513
Assenberg CR 1622 6 587
Westerhold CR 1625? 6 400
5557
Colloredo IR 1625 10 1400 IMP; German
Cerboni IR 1625 10 1000 IMP; German
Alt-Saxon KUR 1625 10 600 IMP; Low German
Hussmann KUR 1626 6 400 IMP; German
Desfurs ARK 1625 10 600 IMP; German
Gall Croats 1626 5 300 IMP
4300
14,560 infantry + 5557 cavalry = 20,117 Catholics + 4300 Imperials = 24,417
TilIy's main battery is given as eleven or twelve guns, which probably does not include
the two or three light guns reported with Desfurs nor the two demicannon captured on
August 26. There may have been a few light guns with Anholt. Therefore TilIy had at
least 13, but not more than 20 guns. A probable breakdown would be nine demicannon,
three demiculverins, and three falcons.

APPENDIX F: CHRISTIAN'S ARMY AT LUTTER

Unit Date Coy Bn? Est Str Notes:
Leib Coy 1625 1 400 LtCol Nell
Leib IR 1625 20 3 2800 Dane; Blue; LtCol Lohausen cap
Linistow IR 1625 12 2 2000 Holstein; Linistow captured
Limbach IR 1625 12 1 800
Solms IR 1625 1 600
Frenking IR 1625 12 1 1000 LtCol Frenking captured
Mogens Kaas IR 1626 1 1000
Gotzen IR 1626 1 700 Gotzen captured
KruseIR 1626 20 3 2800 Danes; Red Regt: Kruse captured
Ungefugt IR 1626 1 700 Ungefugt KlA
Volunteers IR 1626 1 700
Swedes IR 1626 1 700
Schlammersdorf 1625 7 1 800 Fuchs corps
Riese IR 1625 3 1 500
Rantzau IR 1626 3 500 " Rantzau captured
16,000 in 18 bns
Leib Coy 1625 1 1 300 Royal Escort Squadron
Nell CR 1625 10 2 600 Roya1Leib ARK
Freitag CR 1625 10 2 600 ARK; Freitag KlA July 1626
Rhinegrave CR 1625 10 2 600 Otto Ludwig
Courville CR 1625 6 1 300 Courville captured
SolmsCR 1625 6 2 400 LtCo1 H. Solms KIA
Uslar CR 1625 6 1 300 Hesse
Geist CR 1625 6 1 300 Geist captured
Baudissin CR 1625 6 1 300
Brunswick CR 1625 10 2 400 ex-Christian of Brunswick
HesseCR 1626 6 1 300 Hesse; Landgrave Philip KIA
Wersabe CR 1626 6 1 300 Hesse. Wersabe KIA
ErbotCR 1626 5 1 300
88 5000 in 18 sqds
It is possible that elements of Hatzfeld lnfantry Regiment, Brunswick lnfantry Regiment, Nerpracht
Cavalry Regiment, or Bremer Cavalry Regiment were present. Some indicate that Philip Solms &
Hermann Solms were separate units.
 The Danish War 141

Artillery
We know that Christian's train was estimated at 30, of which Tilly captured two
demicannons on August 26 and 20 of all types on the rr:
Christian sent seven can non
back with the baggage, but two of the captured guns were "great" (i.e., larger than
demicannon). This indicates a heavy, siege-oriented train.
A possible breakdown would be: nine can non (48pdr), four demicannon (24pdr), four
demiculverins (12 pdr), six double falconets (6pdr), four falconets (3pdr), one mortar =
28 guns of which 20 took part in the battle. Fuchs's gun line would consist of twocannon,
four demicannon, four derniculverins, and six double falconets. The double falconets may
have been the six guns that fired on Gronsfeld at the bridge, while the larger guns dealt
with Tilly's battery. The 3 pdrs were probably with the Rhinegrave near Dolgen.

APPENDIX G: DANISH WAR FINANCE

Denmark in 1625 had one of the more backward (i.e., traditional) state finances in
Europe, even as compared to Austria or Bavaria. Like other states, the Danes used the
single entry system of ordinary and extraordinary income, but in Denmark taxes were
strictly "extraordinary," being levied only in wartime or for emergencies. King Christian
treated state finance as a minor subdepartment of his personal finances. This was possible
because of the unusually prosperous condition of the king's ordinary revenues, his control
of the vital Sound Toll, and a relatively low rate of state expenditure. The Sound Toll was
the single most lucrative item, but a source of constant friction with the Netherlands.

Table 5-1
Tvpical Year's Finance (Prewar, peacetime)
Revenue (Rigsdalers) Expenditure -._--:-.,...,.._-i
Domain & Investments 257,000 Navy 150,000
Sound Toll 142,000 Fortresses 25,000
Customs & Excise 67,500 Civil & Personal 30,000
::..::..:c:=---+-''7'':-=---i
Municipal Taxes 3,500 Pensions 15,000
Totals = 470,000 220,000
Surplus = 250,000
Note: Danish Rigsdaler = German Ta\er = 1\12 Florins

Between a war reparation of 1,000,000 rdr levied on Sweden 1614-19, and an annual
surplus 1615-24 exceeding 200,000, Christian IV was, in 1625, the third richest person in
Europe, with assets valued at 1,500,000 rdr (=2,250,000 florins). The others were
Maximilian of Bavaria (10,000,0000 florins), and Christian's own mother, Sophia of
Denmark (3,000,000 rdr). Unlike Maximilian, Christian did not hoard his cash in a war
reserve, but invested it, partially in loans, partially in land.
Conservative in financial matters, Christian rejected the kontribution system employed
by Tilly, Wallenstein, and Gustavus, for a more traditional "full-pay" approach. He fed
his troops by purchases in bulk in Hamburg and Bremen, which supplies were ferried up
the Elbe. This system had worked well in minor Baltic conflicts, but it required reliable
sums of cash. When he entered the war, he assumed that the money would be available.
Although the Council had refused to declare war, he was able to levy large war taxes not
only in Denmark, but in Holstein and Norway as well. However, the chief source o'f funds
would be his allied subsidies. England had prornised 120,000 rdr a month; Holland,
20,000, and France 50,000, for 190,000 rdr a month or 2,280,000 rdr ayear, giving him a
theoretical 2112-3 rnillion ayear.
Christian had allocated 430,000 rdr from his personal fortune as a warchest, but had
already spent 750,000 by October 1625-250,000 for recruiting and 500,000 in food,
weapons, and pay. The allied subsidies pro ved disappointing, both inadequate and late;
most of the sum did not arrive until 1628.
11
142 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Table 5-2
Subsidies 1625-29
Promised Received
En land 4,080,000 1,842,400
Netherlands 580,000 534,800
France 1,433,333 716,667

Equal1y serious was the sudden drop in Sound Tol1 receipts. Gustavus Adolphus had
not only failed to assist Christian, his invas ion of Prussia caused the Tol1 to drop to less
than a third of its prewar leve!. Final1y, the circIe princes mostly failed to produce the
promised money. Christian was therefore forced to Iiquidate his remaining assets (he lost
up to 500,000 rdr in the process), to sel1land , and to borrow, mostly from Sophia.

Table 5-3
Assets & Loans
Assets: 1,250,000
So hia: 961,000
Other Loans: 372,400 (at 6-8% interest)

Table 5-4
. hW ar E xt en dítI ures,
Darns -
162529
1625 1626 1627 1628-29 1630-2 TOTAL
Ordinarv 69,200 224,800 153,700 ? ---
Sound Tol1s 55,800 39,500 26,700 ? ---
Extraordinary 154,000 261,300 209,300 550,000 332,270 1,174,600
Assets&Loan 430,00 186,600 251,700 1,342,700 372,400 2,583,400
Kontributions --- 80,300 39,800 --- --- 120,100
Subsidies 267,900 150,000 65,800 2,186,466 --- 2,670,166
TOTAL: 976,900 942,500 747,000 4,079,166 704,670 7,450,236
Arrny Cost: 910,000 937,000 710,700 2,500,000 --- ---
..
"Arrny Cost " refers to the military treasury and does not include the navy (at least 200,000 ayear),
royal fortresses, or civil expenses. Note that these were current expenditures; many costs were
deferred lo 1629-32. As always, these figures are approximate.

Finally, the king levied cash kontributions against those allied princes who failed to
meet their obligations. Despite al1 these measures, Christian was insolvent by 1628. The
Council of State was able to force the king to surrender control of war finances to them. It
was a futile concession: leaving aside that the increase in taxation did not justify the loss
of control, the allies had at last begun to provide reasonable sums.
The Council had promised Christian 1,000,000 rdr as compensation for his losses, but
in fact they only paid 438,070-barely enough to cover his debts of 372,400. The
inheritance of Sophia's remaining 2,000,000 in 1631 temporarily restored. him to
solvency, but the increased expenditures associated with a larger navy (261,000 ayear)
and the new standing arrny soon dissipated his reserve. The Swedish War of 1644
(costing 5,750,000 rdr) finally bankrupted him.
For Danish finance see E. L. Petersen and K. Kruger.

APPENDIX H: ACTIONS OF THE WAR

Action at Seeze, November 4, 1625
TilIy laid siege to Calenberg in mid-October, King Christian dispatched Duke
Friedrich Sax-Altenburg's Cavalry Regiment (700) to assist the place. The duke obtained
the assistance of a detachment from Nienburg under Col Obentraut, and the garrison of
the tiny village of Wunsdorf. Unknown to Friedrich, Calenberg had surrendered
The Danish War 143

November 3. The same day, Tilly dispatched three cavalry regiments on a sweep; they
discovered the enemy at Seeze. Friedrich decided to attempt to relieve Calenberg the next
morning. During the night, Tilly posted Anholt with 800 horse and 1200 foot in ambush
along the approach. In the morning, the duke set off hurriedly, without scouting or
waiting for the Wunsdorfers (these had taken the wrong road and never arrived at all).
Anholt sprung the ambush, surprising the Protestants in the flank. The raw troops were
unable to change face in time. Obentraut was shot trying to rally the fleeing horse;
Friedrich was cut down in the pursuit. The Danes lost over 500.

Action of Rossing, July 27, 1626

King Christian instructed the Rhinegrave to assist the defense of Gottingen. He
decided to undercut Tilly's siege by capturing the castle of Calenberg. He had the cavalry
regiments Rhinegrave, Freitag, Brunswick, Solms, Courville, Erbot (45-47 companies)
and four infantry regiments, some 6-7000 in al!. Tilly detached an intercepting force
under Jakob Furstenberg, 4000 men including the Schonberg, Cronberg, and Eynatten
cavalry regiments, 300 cuirassiers from Erwitte Cavalry Regiment, a detachment of 300
musketeers, and Imperial Arkebusier Regiment Desfurs. Furstenberg encountered the
Danes forrning up for action near the village of Rossing. A cavalry attack spearheaded by
Desfurs, broke the Danish horse, who in turn scattered the unformed infantry. The Danes
lost 300 killed, including Freitag, and 300 captured, plus 15 ensigns, six cornets, and their
baggage. The Catholic loss was less than 200 in all. The Rhinegrave abandoned the relief.

Action of Heiligenhofen, September 23-26, 1627

In August 1627, Wallenstein and Tilly forced the Danish defensive river line and
advanced into Holstein. A corps of 10,000 Danes under Baden, Mitzlaff, and Bernhard
Sax-Weimar was cut off in MeckIenburg and had to escape by sea. By now reduced to
6000, Baden decided to land at Heiligenhafen and press inland, hoping to reverse the
Catholic conquest of Holstein. He was intercepted by a superior Imperial force under
Schlick. In a series of skirrnishes, Baden lost about 1000 men, 27 ensigns, 17 cornets, and
all his guns. The 4000 survivors surrendered on the 26th, les s than 1000 got away with
Bernhard (Mackay's Scots were among them, much reduced from its original 900).
Baden's army consisted of four infantry regiments (including Baden, Mackay, and Sax-
Lauenburg), three free infantry companies, 16 cavalry companies (including the Baden,
Sax-Weimar, Nell, and Sax-Lauenburg regiments), and twelve light guns (falconets).
Schlick had seven infantry and seven cavalry regiments including his own infantry
regiment, the Collalto Infantry, and the Wittenhorst Cuirassiers.
Baden and Mitzlaff were court-martialed. Baden's rniJitary career ended in disgrace,
but Mitzlaff subsequently achieved promotion in the Swedish army. Schlick, on the other
hand, was shortly to become president of the Imperial War Counci!.

Action of Wolgast, August 24,1628

Pursuant to his strategy of coastal harassment, Christian captured the Pomeranian
island of Usedom (Aug 11). Encouraged by this success, he then ejected the Imperial
garrison from the castle at Wolgast (Aug 14). The enthusiasm of the popuJace was such
that he decided to turn the place into another Stralsund. Wallenstein quickIy assembled an
army, but waited, inactive, nearby, hoping that Christian would move too far from his
coastal supports. Hearing, however, that Swedish reinforcements were en route, he
moved on the town. Christian assumed a defensive position a half rnile west of Wolgast.
His army was smaller, but well sited, the flanks guarded by sea and marsh. Wallenstein
secured the marsh with musketeers, then turned the Danish flank, routing them. Christian
lost about 1000 killed and 600 captured four ensigns and one cornet, plus another 500
mencut off in Wolgast and forced to surrender. The rest of the Danes escaped by ship.
Wallenstein's army consisted of 33 infantry companies (Tiefenbach, B. Waldstein, 8
144 Battles of the Thirty Years War

companies of Dohna, 5 of Alt-Saxon), 20 of cuirassiers (11 of Marradas, 4 of Alt-Saxon,

3 of Neu-Saxon, 2 of Sparr), and eleven guns = 7-8000 men. Christian had six infantry
regiments and 1500 horse for 5-6000. Certainly present were the Scots infantry regiments
Mackay (400 strong) and Spens, and the Solms and Rhinegrave cavalry; possibles
inelude the Red, Blue, Solms and Rhinegrave infantry, and the Leib and Holk cavalry.

APPENDIX 1: THE PRUSSIA WAR, 1626-29

Gustavus Adolphus launched his third invasion of Poland June 1625, winning the
Battle of Wallhof (Jan 1626) and finally conquering Livonia. The following May, he
landed in neutral Prussia, secured it, and made it his base. It proved a valuable conquest.
He levied a lucrative toll on seaborne trade, further, he developed a kontribution system
very similar to Wallenstein's, quartering his troops on the populace. The Poles accepted
the loss of Livonia, but this new threat inflamed them. Between renewed resistance and
logistical breakdowns, Gustavus was unable to achieved major gains-despite building
up an army of 30,000 men. In 1628, the Stralsund crisis drew his attention westward.
The arrival of Arnim's corps in 1629 broke the deadlock. Fortunately for Gustavus, the
Poles did not want them-like many others, they distrusted Wallenstein-and refused to
cooperate. Nevertheless, the two forces managed to overcome Gustavus at Honigfelde
(June 17, 1629), the worst defeat of his career. He had, in any. case, decided to invade
Germany instead. Despite recent setbacks, he got good terms (Truce of Altmark Sept 26,
1629), he would remain in control ofPrussia (and the valuable licenses) until 1635.
The impact of the Prussian War on subsequent events can hardly be overestimated.
Gustavus's invasion of Germany would have been financially impossible without Prussia.
Fighting the Poles gave Gustavus's new model army a vital field test, refining the tactics
later so successful and giving him a powerful cadre of fully trained, battle-hardened
veterans, led by experienced officers-a sharp contrast with Christian's improvisations.
Less tangible, but most valuable of all, Gustavus received "on-the job training"; when he
landed at Stettin, he was already one of the most experienced commanders in Europe.

APPENDIX J: THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION, MARCH 28,1629

The Peace of Augsburg (1555) had been intended as a compromise to end the religious
wars in Germany. Unfortunately, the then-radical Protestants continued to expand at the
expense of Church lands; this was the chief Catholic grievance and one of the reasons for
the formation of the Catholic League. Secularized Church lands fell into four major
categories: (1) Lands conceded by the 1555 settlement (these were mostly in Saxony and
Brandenburg); (2) Lands obtained under alleged loopholes (these were mainly large
principalities in the north-northwest, such as Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Hildesheim);
(3) Lands simply seized by Protestants (many small places, especially in Swabia), and (4)
Transfers from groups 2 and 3 subsequently ratified by Church or emperor (very few).
It had been agreed in 1619 that, in exchange for the League's assistance, the emperor
would address the issue. For almost ten years he stalled, elaiming the time was not yet
ripe and trying to fob off the League with ad hoc concessions. After the humiliation of
Denmark, it was apparent that the Protestants were as weak as they would ever be, and
Maximilian pressed the issue. It is believed that the emperor originally envisioned a less
extensive settlement directed primarily against rebels, but that Jesuit elements insisted on
the fullletter of the law. As issued, the Edict affected alllands in categories 2 and 3.
Although he had taken a stern position, the emperor urged moderation in execution.
This was not done. Even Protestants not directly affected found it easy to believe that this
was the first step in a general overthrow of the Augsburg settlement.
Maximilian's stance was paradoxical. Although he was the advocate of the edict and
had helped draw it up, he subsequently urged that it be moderated. Was it a cynical ploy
to alienate Saxony from Vienna? If so, it succeeded. Between the Edict, Wallenstein, and
the League's flirtation with France, the emperor entered 1630 without an ally to his name.
Map5-1
The BattIe of Lutter am Barenberg, August 27, 1626

Erwitte
R~e
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Catholics (Tílly)
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A - Grons1eló Bn N-BockCR.
B - Schmidt IR O - Assenberli CR
C - Gallas IR P - WesterhoTd CR
D - Furstenberg IR
E - Jung-lílly IR
Q - Desfurs Column
R - Albert Fortom e "e '
F - Alt-lílly IR
G - Cerboni IR 1- Gronsfeld's crossing
H - Colloredo IR 2 - Fuch's counterattack 7 - Erwitte's counterattack Danes (Christian IV)
I - Cronberg CR 3- Hesse & Solms charge 8 - Anholt's advance aa - Blue IR ee - Ungefugt IR
J - Schonberg CR 4- Danish infantry attack 9 - Desfurs envelopment bb - Kaas IR ff - Swedislí IR
K - Hersbersdorf CR 5 - Albert takes Dolgen te - Linistow IR gg - Hesse & Solms
10-Unsuccessful
L - Cortenbach CR 6 - Rhinegrave retakes counterattack by Rhinegrave dd-RedlR hh - Rhinegrave CR
M - Erwitte CR Dolgen
Map 5-2
The Danish War, 1625-29

./ Kiel·
CJ~t1and•
Ditmarchen Rendsburg
Holstein
"'---..;:,Krempe .
• Gluckstadt
Mecklenburg Pomerania

Brandenburg

+ Brunswick.
Osnabruck
• Wolfenbuttel •
Lutter'
Halberstadt +
Aschersleben +
• Dessau Silesia
• Duderstadt
Calenberg • Gottigen·

• Cassel Saxony

Hesse
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__ t:;.80;,,.. I_¡I_ 2_ 0 II60 + Catholic Imperial
I 64 kilometers 128 .. g 2 ...;2,,:5,,:6---- • Protestant
 The Danish War 147

NOTES
l. To its wartime low, eleven IRs and twelve CRs, mostly along the Hungarian border.
2. Within three years, England would be at war with Spain, the Empire, and France.
3. The raising costs would be considered a loan to the emperor-not a gift. The
emperor would still be liable for normal pay-however Wallenstein had a plan to use
kontributions to cover most of that. In essence, Wallenstein was offering to contract for a
whole army, as lesser enterprisers contracted for individual regiments. In exchange, the
emperor would give him a free hand in subcontracting and granting commissions.
Wallenstein estimated that his army would cost the emperor 2,000,0000 florins a year in
cash plus advances from contractors.
4. The Council of State was a small clique of very wealthy nobles and high officials
roughly analogous to the Imperial Privy Council. However, in Denmark, these high
aristocrats had usurped most of the legislative authority more properly resting with the
full Estates.
5. See Appendix D.
6. See Appendix C.
7. Before every disaster, there was always some cautious professional urging
prudence; Knyphausen played this role well.
8. They were a bit understrength; Fuchs had pointblank refused to give them the
Schlammersdorf, Rantzau, and Riese IRs. They had about 3000 horse and 6000 foot.
9. Aldringer, who was of noble blood, but very poor and lacking in influence, had
worked his way up to colonel from company clerk. By dubbing him "ink-swiller,"
Wallenstein mocked both his poverty and his career.
10. See Appendix H.
11. Not to be confused with Egon or Friedrich Furstenberg. The Rhinegrave was at this
time acting as Christian's lieutenant, as Brunswick was dead and Solms, Fuchs, and
Johann Emst were leading independent corps.
12. 200 dragoons, 400 musketeers, and two demicannon under a Capt Hodiriowa.
Hodiriowa, the guns, and most of the foot were taken prisoner.
13. Or the Middelbeck or the Hummecke. See p. 137.
14. Supposedly Christian was accompanied by the whole Leib CR throughout the
battle. It seems more likely that only the escort squadron went everywhere, and that the
regiment was deployed normally in the 2nd echelon. Even 300 men were too many for a
• commander to drag along on his peregrinations.
15. Probably his own left wing horse plus those on the right of the 2nd echelon.
16. Erwitte had over 3000; Fuchs about 2000 of his own plus whatever was left of
Hesse's.
17. These were 30 companies from the Leib IR, Linistow, Frenking, and Rantzau.
Ungefugt was killed just north of the castle, presumably getting his men to safety.
18. This pro ved to be wasted effort as they soon deserted.
19. As at Dessau, Alte Veste, and Lutzen.
20. A soldier of fortune, personally amoral and totally ruthless, Mansfeld was certainly
the most "mercenary" of the great military contractors. Nevertheless, his career, from
Savoy to Bohemia to Friedrich to the Dutch to the Danes, shows a certain consistency.
Although his anti-Hapsburg activities did not do much for the peace of Europe, they raise
him above the level of a common condottiere.
21. The same Baden that lost Wimpfen; he had replaced Fuchs. Thum from White
Mountain also held high rank.
22. Nienburg, under Col Limbach, put up a particularly able and prolonged defense.
23. The decisive skirmish was won by Pechmann, who had led the Austrian Protestants
at White Mountain. He was now killed fighting his former allies.
24. See Appendix H.
148 Battles of the Thirty Years War

25. Deposing the legitimate dukes. While not "illegal"-the dukes had supported
Christian, an invader-this high-handed act offended every German prince.
26. Tilly had been weakened by a wound and an outbreak of plague; among the dead
were Furstenberg and Limbach.
27. The Swedes were to retain it for almost two centuries.
28. See Appendix H.
29. See Appendix 1.
30. See Appendix J.