ARTICLE 224

1. CELESTINO VIVIERO vs CA
FACTS:
CELESTINO VIVERO is a member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union
of the Philippines. On grounds of very poor performance and conduct complainant was repatriate.
Complainant filed a complaint for illegal dismissal at Associated Marine Officers’ and Seaman’s
Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) of which complainant was a member. Pursuant to Article XII of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, grievance proceedings were conducted; however, parties
failed to reach and settle the dispute amicably. Thus, complainant filed [a] complaint with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). While the case was pending before the
POEA, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the POEA had no
jurisdiction over the case considering petitioner Vivero's failure to refer it to a Voluntary Arbitration
Committee in accordance with the CBA between the parties. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor Jr., on
the basis of the pleadings and documents available on record, rendered a decision dismissing
the Complaint for want of jurisdiction since they should have referred first to voluntary arbitration
according to the CBA.

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his petition to the NLRC which set aside the decision of
the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the record was clear that petitioner had exhausted his remedy
by submitting his case to the Grievance Committee of AMOSUP. Considering however that he could
not obtain any settlement he had to ventilate his case before the proper forum. The NLRC further
held that the contested portion in the CBA providing for the intercession of a Voluntary Arbitrator was
not binding upon petitioner since both petitioner and private respondents had to agree voluntarily to
submit the case before a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. This would entail
expenses as the Voluntary Arbitrator chosen by the parties had to be paid. Inasmuch however as
petitioner chose to file his Complaint originally with POEA, then the Labor Arbiter to whom the case
was transferred would have to take cognizance of the case.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of an employee constitute a "grievance between the parties," as defined
under the provisions of the CBA, and consequently, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Voluntary Arbitrators, thereby rendering the NLRC without jurisdiction to decide the case?

HELD:
Private respondents attempt to justify the conferment of jurisdiction over the case on the
Voluntary Arbitrator on the ground that the issue involves the proper interpretation and
implementation of the Grievance Procedure found in the CBA. They point out that when petitioner
sought the assistance of his Union to avail of the grievance machinery, he in effect submitted himself
to the procedure set forth in the CBA regarding submission of unresolved grievances to a Voluntary
Arbitrator. The argument is untenable. The case is primarily a termination dispute. It is clear from the
claim/assistance request form submitted by petitioner to AMOSUP that he was challenging the
legality of his dismissal for lack of cause and lack of due process. The issue of whether there was
proper interpretation and implementation of the CBA provisions comes into play only because the
grievance procedure provided for in the CBA was not observed after he sought his Union’s
assistance in contesting his termination. Thus, the question to be resolved necessarily springs from
the primary issue of whether there was a valid termination; without this, then there would be no
reason to invoke the need to interpret and implement the CBA provisions properly.

In San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission21 this Court held that the
phrase "all other labor disputes" may include termination disputes provided that the agreement
between the Union and the Company states "in unequivocal language that [the parties] conform to
the submission of termination disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration."22 Ergo, it is
not sufficient to merely say that parties to the CBA agree on the principle that "all disputes" should
first be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator. There is a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that
illegal termination disputes should be resolved by a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, since the same fall within a special class of disputes that are generally within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law. Absent such express
stipulation, the phrase "all disputes" should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict
traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, i.e., disputes relating to contract-
interpretation, contract-implementation, or interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies. Illegal termination disputes - not falling within any of these categories - should then be
considered as a special area of interest governed by a specific provision of law.

In this case, however, while the parties did agree to make termination disputes the proper
subject of voluntary arbitration, such submission remains discretionary upon the parties. A perusal of
the CBA provisions shows that Sec. 6, Art. XII (Grievance Procedure) of the CBA is the general
agreement of the parties to refer grievances, disputes or misunderstandings to a grievance
committee, and henceforth, to a voluntary arbitration committee. The use of the word "may" shows
the intention of the parties to reserve the right to submit the illegal termination dispute to the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, rather than to a Voluntary Arbitrator. Petitioner validly exercised his
option to submit his case to a Labor Arbiter when he filed his Complaint before the proper
government agency. Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Voluntary Arbitration is mandatory in
character if there is a specific agreement between the parties to that effect. It must be stressed
however that, in the case at bar, the use of the word "may" shows the intention of the parties to
reserve the right of recourse to Labor Arbiters. As earlier stated, the instant case is a termination
dispute falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter

2. ATLAS FARMS vs NLRC

FACTS:
Private respondent Jaime O. dela Peña was employed as a veterinary aide by petitioner.
Peña was allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended for the
purpose. The farm manager of petitioner issued a formal notice directing him to explain within 24
hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for violating company rules and
regulations. Peña refused, however, to receive the formal notice. He never bothered to explain; a
notice of termination with payment of his monetary benefits was sent to him. Co-respondent Marcial
I. Abion was a carpenter/mason and a maintenance man. Allegedly, he caused the clogging of the
fishpond drainage resulting in damages worth several hundred thousand pesos when he improperly
disposed of the cut grass and other waste materials into the pond’s drainage system. Petitioner sent
a written notice to Abion, requiring him to explain what happened, otherwise, disciplinary action
would be taken against him. He refused to receive the notice and give an explanation, according to
petitioner. Consequently, the company terminated his services.

Peña and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated.
Both claimed that their termination from service was due to petitioner’s suspicion that they were the
leaders in a plan to form a union to compete and replace the existing management-dominated union.
The labor arbiter dismissed their complaints on the ground that the grievance machinery in the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had not yet been exhausted. Private respondents availed of
the grievance process, but later on refiled the case before the NLRC in Region IV. They alleged
"lack of sympathy" on petitioner’s part to engage in conciliation proceedings. Later, the labor arbiter
once again dismissed the complaint for lack of merit stating that Article 217 (c) of the Labor
Code6 was inapplicable to the case and und that although both complainants did not substantiate
their claims of illegal dismissal, there was proof that private respondents voluntarily accepted their
separation pay and petitioner’s financial assistance.

ISSUE: WON the labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction to decide complaints for illegal
dismissal?
HELD:
Yes. Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor arbiters have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over termination disputes; an exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code that
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. But as held in Vivero vs.
CA,14 "petitioner cannot arrogate into the powers of Voluntary Arbitrators the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over unfair labor practices, termination disputes, and claims for
damages, in the absence of an express agreement between the parties in order for Article 262 of the
Labor Code [Jurisdiction over other labor disputes] to apply in the case at bar."

Coming to the merits of the petition, the NLRC found that petitioner did not comply
with the requirements of a valid dismissal. For a dismissal to be valid, the employer must
show that: (1) the employee was accorded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for any
of the valid causes provided for by law.22 No evidence was shown that private respondents
refused, as alleged, to receive the notices requiring them to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them. Without proof of notice, private respondents who were
subsequently dismissed without hearing were also deprived of a chance to air their side at
the level of the grievance machinery. Given the fact of dismissal, it can be said that the cases
were effectively removed from the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing them
within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the dispute is just in the interpretation,
implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in
the CBA, or brought to voluntary arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination,
with alleged violation of the employee’s rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.

ARTICLE 225
1. PAL VS NLRC (please refer to page 83 sa boogz ni azucena)

ARTICLE 229
1. PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP vs NLRC
FACTS:
Lourdes A. de Jesus is petitioners reviser/trimmer. As reviser/trimmer, de Jesus based her
assigned work on a paper note posted by petitioners. The posted paper which contains the
corresponding price for the work to be accomplished by a worker is identified by its P.O. Number. On
August 15, 1992, de Jesus worked on P.O. No. 3853 by trimming the cloths ribs. She thereafter
submitted tickets corresponding to the work done to her supervisor. Three days later, de Jesus
received from petitioners personnel manager a memorandum requiring her to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for dishonesty and tampering of official records and
documents with the intention of cheating as P.O. No. 3853 allegedly required no trimming. In her
handwritten explanation, de Jesus maintained that she merely committed a mistake in trimming P.O.
No. 3853 as it has the same style and design as P.O. No. 3824 which has an attached price list for
trimming the ribs and admitted that she may have been negligent in presuming that the same work
was to be done with P.O. No. 3853, but not for dishonesty or tampering Petitioners personnel
department, nonetheless, terminated her from employment and sent her a notice of termination
dated September 18, 1992. De Jesus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. The
Labor Arbiter held petitioners guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioners were accordingly ordered to
reinstate de Jesus to her previous position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages
from the time of her suspension. The NLRC affirmed.

ISSUE: WON she was illegally dismissed, and does an order for reinstatement need a writ of
execution?
HELD:
A. Yes. Gleaned either from the Labor Arbiters observations or from the NLRCs assessment,
it distinctly appears that petitioners accusation of dishonesty and tampering of official records and
documents with intention of cheating against de Jesus was not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Petitioners simply failed, both before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, to
discharge the burdent of proof and to validly justify de Jesus dismissal from service. The law, in this
light, directs the employers, such as herein petitioners, not to terminate the services of an employee
except for a just or authorized cause under the Labor Code.[8] Lack of a just cause in the dismissal
from service of an employee, as in this case, renders the dismissal illegal, despite the employers
observance of procedural due process.

B. No. Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5)
years from the date a decision, an order or awards becomes final and executory. It cannot
relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article 223
contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be
immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall
not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative content is quite obvious, i.e., to make an
award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for
and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would
certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i. e., the immediate
execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and
its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a
scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could
easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose
envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so
declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by
Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature
is presumed to have ordaineda valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be
necessary to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light of the
purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied.[30] And where statues are fairly
susceptible of two or more construction, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to
give effect to the manifest intent of the law maker and promote the object for which the statute was
enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions
of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.[31] In
introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R.A. No. 6715,
Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however,
the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its
sound discretion.

Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws
should be resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order or award for reinstatement does not
require a writ of execution the Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth,
we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is self-executory. After receipt of the decision or
resolution ordering the employee's reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to
re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal
or to reinstate the employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the
employee of his choice. The notification is based on practical considerations for without notice, the
employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for work or not.

2. JUANITO A. GARCIA VS PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

FACTS:
The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by PAL against its employees-herein
petitioners fter they were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company
security personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom Section. After due
notice, PAL dismissed petitioners on October 9, 1995 for transgressing the PAL Code of
Discipline,4prompting them to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages which was, by
Decision of January 11, 1999,5resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their favor, thus ordering PAL to, inter
alia, immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. NLRC reversed but the Labor
Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting the reinstatement aspect of his January 11, 1999
Decision.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to back pay?

HELD:
Yes. In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory,
pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement provided herein. [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages
of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On
the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever
salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the
period. A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to
receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is
a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement
and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.

NOTE: Halos similar lang din ruling sa ibang cases na binigay niya under this article.

3. ST MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS NLRC

FACTS:
Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for
misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a case against St.
Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner’s (St. Martin
Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an employee due to the lack of an
employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-
employee relationship between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a
situation. The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and
remanded the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied
by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme Court?

HELD:
No. Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose
decisions are then appealable to the Office of the President. However, the new rules do not anymore
provide provisions regarding appellate review for decisions rendered by the NLRC. However in this
case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such decisions from the NLRC by virtue
of their role under the check and balance system and the perceived intention of the legislative body
who enacted the new rules. “It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the
acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction
and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.” The
petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should have been
filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

NOTE: Atty Plagata disagrees with SC because NLRC and CA is co-equal; commissioners
equal salary with CA Justices. But don’t follow him; opinion niya lang daw to mga tihhh.

ARTICLE 233
1. EMCO Plywood vs Abelgas
FACTS:
Respondents the retrenched employees of petitioner seek the review and reversal of the
resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission for dismissing respondents’ complaint
against emco for illegal dismissal. EMCO, represented by Lim, informed the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) of its intention to retrench some of its workers. The intended
retrenchment was grounded on purported financial difficulties occasioned by alleged lack of raw
materials, frequent machinery breakdown, low market demand and expiration of permit to
operate its sawmill department. Upon receipt of their separation pay, they were made to sign
quitclaims. At this time, the respondents filed their complaint for illegal dismissal. EMCO countered
by interposing the defense of lack of cause of action, contending that [respondents], by signing the
quitclaims in favor of EMCO, had, in fact, waived whatever claims they may have against the latter.

ISSUE: WON the quitclaims/waivers executed by [respondents] are valid and binding?

HELD:
No. We hold that the labor arbiter and the NLRC erred in concluding that respondents had
voluntarily signed the Waivers and Quitclaim Deeds. Contrary to this assumption, the mere fact that
respondents were not physically coerced or intimidated does not necessarily imply that they freely or
voluntarily consented to the terms thereof.[34] Moreover, petitioners, not respondents, have the
burden of proving that the Quitclaims were voluntarily entered into. Furthermore, in Trendline
Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (TEA-SPFL) v. NLRC[36] and
Philippine Carpet Employees Association v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation,[37] similar
retrenchments were found to be illegal, as the employers had failed to prove that they were actually
suffering from poor financial conditions. In these cases, the Quitclaims were deemed illegal, as the
employees consents had been vitiated by mistake or fraud.

These rulings are applicable to the case at bar. Because the retrenchment was illegal and of
no effect, the Quitclaims were therefore not voluntarily entered into by respondents. Their consent
was similarly vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases
by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal
responsibilities. As a rule, deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding
benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The
acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel.[39] The amounts already received by the
present respondents as consideration for signing the Quitclaims should, however, be deducted from
their respective monetary awards.