A.M. No.

RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.

JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the “administrative complaints” filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant) against
Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to have
Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the
Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge.
The complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-
7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave
Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s objections and
despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time,
the external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal
adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order2dated
May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in
Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she
wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for
SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him.
Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the
rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be no
record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge
and presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and, at the same time,
as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of
₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a
motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIB’s
witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management committee), the
respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio;
blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and
snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the
Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court’s power to
approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor and made
comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement in
the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the
respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website
called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a
compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that
nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008, referred the complaints
to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable,
feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and equity to
all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the
rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still
available.5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the contrary, she
argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of
rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to
meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to
approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested
that informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the
parties would attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the rehabilitation
plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section
11, Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of the
complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis.
Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself
(as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not
remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant
raised warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the
complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Section 1,
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may decide
matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and substantiated by
evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the
informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the
social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-
shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further
stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been
aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala9 should
not be applied to her case since the facts are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting "seductive" pictures
and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and
2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular administrative
matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a hearing, followed by
the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in
nature since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation proceedings,
it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no
longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison
ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and
deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on mandatory
inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is primarily a matter of
conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular despite the
out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s creditors. She also found
satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period
prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s
legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the
words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to
be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of
a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their
language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria
should be held liable.16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social networking
account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the account) – even during
these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of impropriety
which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges
shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that
such professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended
a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict
propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY
of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law
as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not
supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to observe the
reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in
nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct
unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and
impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive
photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on the
respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross
ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate
should be forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave

Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his
complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in
the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the
complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to
circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to
prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in
the adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal
errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant.
"An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision
issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23 Errors
committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies.24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth about the
respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint.
Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the
complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating
the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped
its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted
regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and
convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official
duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules, which
provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition
of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor
is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the modifications she
found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her
authority and effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show
that the respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross
ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to
bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan.
Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith
cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to
bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In rehabilitation
proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent
danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s assets and properties that are or may
be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation
court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their
submissions, on whether the appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in
every adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence, nor to confront
the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying
SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to
grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the procedures
prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he
renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of his/her official
functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce
an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that
the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a
hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the respondent’s
explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it
appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance,
however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the
date of filing of the petition.37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried a good
measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or
whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-
8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the date of filing
of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of the period from the
Supreme Court.38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of the rehabilitation
plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she granted and for
the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states
that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in
expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,42 a judge should be considerate,
courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his passion guarded. He can never
allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although respondent judge
may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands
from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over
trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that
the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial temperament
and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use
temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above
reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance
thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6, Canon 6 and
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a new medium
through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other.45 While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not
thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and
duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the
respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or
maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right
"includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The
respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges:
in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves
the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the
course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety
required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and
made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what
they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and
contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This
is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but
by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and
close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature
of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had
this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice, however,
judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters.1âwphi1 The very
nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the
performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily
accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the
following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6),
months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than
₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for any wrongdoing
in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is
FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from
further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

MAURICIO C. ULEP v. LEGAL CLINIC +

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from Issuing advertisements similar to or of
the same tenor as that of Annexes 'A' and 'B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming
that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in
the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona.[2] reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the .(1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association
(PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the, Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda.[3] The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly
be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder, excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

XXX

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to
layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute
practice of law?

xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice
it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic"
and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.[4]

XXX

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated
by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
res

pondent - "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services
for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the
term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with
(the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the
bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as
to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to
make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:

Article 26. x x x.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject .to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for
a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited
for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. - A lawyer, shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one
may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example
alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the, crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal
services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by 'lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging
or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements
in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited
from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by
non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by-specialists in other fields,
such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of, illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members
of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts
which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void
under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding
such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and
that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of
law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear
and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself
as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate
and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Articles of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court.[5]

2. Philippine Bar Association:

XXX

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines"
(pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under
the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm
of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to ' stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a. certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal rights and then take them to an attorney
and ask the latter to look after their case in court (See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., P. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded
by a corporationemploying competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an
odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against
the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are
subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is apersonal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice.[6]

3. Philippine Lawyers" Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

XXX

Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge
and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely
and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."[7]

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of
the general public from the danger of being, exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in
the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified
to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of justice, there are
in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the
general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to take measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers
but, by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from
falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services."[8]
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them
if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name - The Legal Clinic, Inc. - does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent
is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article."[9]

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit, cases for the purpose of gain which, as
provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in
this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage-
which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay
P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only
by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is
not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the. USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify
an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such as act
could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in
this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in thePhilippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the
Bar.[10]

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogadas:

XXX

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the
business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of
the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

"x x x Of necessity, no one x x x acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems x x x
clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law x x x. It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law x x
x. Our knowledge of the law - accurate or inaccurate - moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must
be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect
in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field
had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this
is not the case. The most important body of industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that the larger employers get from their
own specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be
used by the graduates in their business.

"In determining whether a man is practicing law we should consider his work for any particular client or customer,
as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations
to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law.
But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primary efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform
his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees wills.
"Another branch of defendant's work is the representation of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent
for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may
be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle
it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party
the right to appear 'in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th,
1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and 'other representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase
of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal."
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.)

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of
the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succinctly states
the rule of conduct:

"Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law
shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity."

1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A", Petition). Services on
routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a
judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute practice of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines by
himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may
apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized
practice of law.

"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amounts to legal
practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not affect this. x x x Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is,
the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of
law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey'sbook is sold to the public at large.
There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE -
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar, to a designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation - in the publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the
unlawful practice of law x x x. There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was
no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having
an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal
contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the charge of
$75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant, relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed." (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory." It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for
the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles
2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services" or "legal support services",
and not legal services, are available."[11]

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper determination
of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the
subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines
explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill.[12]

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court.[13]

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for
clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law.[14]

When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.[15] One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.[16] Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law.[17] One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing
law.[18]

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod.[19] after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of ' another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to .actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)."

This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)."

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and,
communication, such as computerized, legal research; encoding and reproduction of. documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail
of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients
in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services."[20]

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to
legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated
as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
"specialists" in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law,
medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what
doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe
you for the symptoms, and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then
it's referred to one of our specialists."

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or, follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a
while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindikailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who
died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative's will, then
you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence
to support the case."[21]
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry «out its services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts, sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a
client may-avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law.[22]

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.[23]

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal
if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the 'incompetence or dishonesty' of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court.[24]

The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for,
and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide.[25] The practice of law is
not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law.[26] The justification for
excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.[27]

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and
not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines.
[28] As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines
also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association.[29]
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render .legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor.[30]

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice
of law.[31] That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state.[32]

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts.[33] He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.[34]
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business.[35] Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons
of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.[36]

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement, of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods.[37] The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs
vs. Estanislao R. Bayot[38]an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding,[39] was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill
as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, * * * is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.[40]
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions.[41]

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent, with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented."[42]

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession.[43]

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.[44]

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken
to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered,
we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona.[45] which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state."[46] This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein
respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative,
even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances[48] or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[49] Considering
that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic,
Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action,[50] after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Office of the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.

HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public
respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707
and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for
making certain public statements.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the
Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal
informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).

On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R.
Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things,
petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal
informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September
1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion
to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that
respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with
power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against
public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and
12163-12177 were all null and void.

On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez,
Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion for
preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the
respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and
trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned
and from hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19
November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24
September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that additional
criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once
again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such
criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R.
No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition: (1)
required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ...
and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were
ordered consolidated by the Court.

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary
restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the
Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused
in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8
December 1987:

G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor
General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within which
to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order is GRANTED.

Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court Resolved to (a)
Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the
Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et
al." and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and
from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.

The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner to submit
a Reply 10 thereto.

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of
the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain
allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the
latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in
the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"

Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating
graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the
progress of a trial."

What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get
favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.

Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country,
especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the
Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to help promote the
political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.

Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against the
governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.

While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty,
the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said.

In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two "very powerful" officials
of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.

While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed
that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial,
he said.

He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while she symphatizes with
local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people
and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.

Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time could be mere harassment
suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should
be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez
"to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its
Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:

WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed
against him in the Sandiganbayan; and

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases
with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion,
respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements totally
unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:

1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was asked to 'go slow on
Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "

2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the
Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the
Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)."

Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some members
of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released
his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above
extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those statements
and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the
Consolidated Petitions:

G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs.
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988, the Court
Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the media which not only deal
with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and
calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and
degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing
within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of
the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily
Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:

(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had taken that the SC Justices
cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him
'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or friends;"

(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of persons with pending cases
before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"

(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on him and to refrain
from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will
embarass the Court;

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices; and

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and circumstances attendant upon the
notes written to said public respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court
and now form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this
Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent
Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.

4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent Gonzalez was
misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE
of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension and
Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to
have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold
neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal
who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out
his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit
themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.

On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an
extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial
was made "final and immediately executory.

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May
1988;

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition and

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;"
24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and
addressed to respondent):

5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;

6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17
June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses
against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as
Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called
"Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.

II

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the
Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission
to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of

law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an
orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for
contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers
and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt
is "necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is
not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here; the Court's
inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both
by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court. 35Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over
lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority
of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the
Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.

It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary authority of
the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the
same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit
themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked
the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot
expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of
the Court in such proceeding.

Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred
Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:

xxx xxx xxx

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have it appear, the members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into
one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the
proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a
body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such
individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So
that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the
individual members thereof—as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even
lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the
Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot
disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise
the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.

xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the
respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of
office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to
abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against
attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an
exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present
case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements
attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is
not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his
part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here
are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.

III

It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out above.
Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of
the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or
wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578.
That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the
position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or
friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its
Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free
intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution
in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus
undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the
system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and
Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose
private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his
duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of
this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in
complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more
than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and
desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also
disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by
Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist
from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the
constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.

A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they have
improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of
"cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a
cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to
respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April
1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that
the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This
charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to
the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even
with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again,
in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to
cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial
institutions of the Republic.

Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful
persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor
and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded
as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against
the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.

Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and
disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other
statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of
the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of
reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of
law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's
faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the
attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those
administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He
would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures
there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership
of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always
and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To
be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process. 44

As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be punished for
contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In his
subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:

(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and administrative charges against
the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the
language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"

(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able
to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;

(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china man's
chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"

(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation running riot;"

(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in its decision denying the
Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it
extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;"
and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a specified Member of
the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap still more
opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according
to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due process but
indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy
tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members
of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land
would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private
feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice
and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.

Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court as
contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may
best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as
constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.

1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case,
moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he
should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred
to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered
through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held
guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for
damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed
slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the
Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some
time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander
case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had
voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for
Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:

I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two
Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M.
Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did
to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed
for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis
supplied)

Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above statements. In
his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:

... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that
convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God
the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)

The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:

... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and
outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by
his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and
injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and
those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...

xxx xxx xxx

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is
the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec.
20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its
paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege
and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.

xxx xxx xxx.

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the
evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of
the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both
instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both
Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot
be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the land when on the flimsy
ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that
they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not
with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish
to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself
to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at
242-247: emphasis supplied)

2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur
International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's
third Motion for Reconsideration:

d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-representation and obfuscation
of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and
all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or
just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that
in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31
SCRA at 6)

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking

Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering,
judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges
"It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the
chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary
injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even
before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a
short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics,
and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31,
1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's
belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners,
their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision

(31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in
fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-
entitled case—which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote:
"Justices; who may take part—... . Only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument
will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially significant in the present
instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately
four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary
of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United
States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's
proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law and
invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until
restitution or compensation is made.

(31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys
guilty of contempt:

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find
language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He
speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal'
in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two
justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral
and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to
itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism,
only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice
and Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or
party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could
make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only
were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their
judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, 'although the
process has already begun.

xxx xxx xxx

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not
limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition
is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any
of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president.'
The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the
President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these
justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in
fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to
know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing
litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much
from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create
an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.

xxx xxx xxx

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in
the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is
thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

xxx xxx xxx

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the
decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the
motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case' in its favor. A notice of appeal
to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal
and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already
abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is
being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

xxx xxx xxx

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a
judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the
assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)

3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great injustice
committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He
alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client
"in the people's forum" so that "the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released
to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements
attributed to him as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the tribunal's'unconstitutional and
obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without
knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of
men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of
the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will
purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566;
emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him.
His explanation, which in part read:

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We
have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court
has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been
DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We
only described the impersonal state of Things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we
offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained
tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must
end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members
of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)

was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen
from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries
of "fair criticism."

4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made the following
statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:

The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated April 20,1966
on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this
very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the most important right in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.

... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means, because the rule of law
creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws
and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We do
not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of
the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should be
done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis
supplied)

The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required counsel to show
cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely
related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such
acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements
contumacious.

... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and
reference to the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such
threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has
been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L-
9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the
guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-

Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect.
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the
fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require.
(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the
source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator
and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source
of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said
law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe
that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect,
I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as
its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today
constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may
hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through
Mr. Justice Feria, said-

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and
injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the
part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon,
and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which contained the
following paragraph (in translation):

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo
and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust
all the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas,
resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner
has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of
each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider
unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.
(61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)

When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded
by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court held:

... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an
intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in
utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its
power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging
and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all
these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the
Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a member
of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the
court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to
appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by
reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled
threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong
should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what
he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to
in his motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred
in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and
disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court
is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound
to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re
Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases,
is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In the
following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers
who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed above:

1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);

5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized as
contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the
justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here,
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the
Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That
respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly
demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of
respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.

IV

The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free
speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public
interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like
all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly
system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press.
Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself
presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the
potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be protected in its
fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which
come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be
preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be
confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free
exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the
Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and
if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and
control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in
the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's
right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier
than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out
where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its
limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined
to rein up their tempers.

xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)

The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather
to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are
irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to
disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out
that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points to
the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and
reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage
sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the
disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful
review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and
rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts
and statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of
a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What
is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the
Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but
damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered.
The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily
measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of
democratic government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and
suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by
individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an
exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but
the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until
further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the
Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors1 in response to the
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an administrative matter,
not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting
opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of
indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting
opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with the
exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a member
of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are
decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of
respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code
of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds, they must ever
be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and
abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered,
especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism
against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect
everyone’s attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations whether or
not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and
speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending
case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to
act on their Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the
Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom
of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or
in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is
precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young
aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if
purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual
antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the
"Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the
Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and
constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian
standards, including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a
party.4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of
states to protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes
obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado
Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited
for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among
other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:

I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO
PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR
THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN
TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of
(sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the
assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1)
Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape
as an International Crime."11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C.
Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on
the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard
Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not
properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent,
had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news
report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog
entry in this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with the
Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/

The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are identical to
sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I
were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the
prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available here:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of
plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18

In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote
the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the integrity of
my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the
possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international crime in your esteemed Court’s
Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of the
Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence
Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said
Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the
arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article was
written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006 has
been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study
the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)

Dr. Mark Ellis20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an
En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the
Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice
Del Castillo.21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the
statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on
the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin
board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines College of
Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover
letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:

The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty

from the UP College of Law

on the Plagiarism in the case of

Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the
faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)

Marvic M.V.F. Leonen

Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures of the alleged
signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each
name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW

ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION

IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse
during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as
"comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as
from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the charge that an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have
been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the
Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s
own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s
ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions
into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is
dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty.
Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the
production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of
justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely copied select
portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original
work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision
now becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the
Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers’ names and the publications from which they came,
the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to the ‘primary’
sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the
effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The
inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the
plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work
of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly
journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and
careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected of
all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent,
that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of
rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it
obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of
the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works
without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and
deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and responsibility
for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the
pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an
international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during
the Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of
acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of
many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on
misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the
Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and
nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The
reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other
Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for
failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these
undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history
and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass
without sanction as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the
significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the
world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny
relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct,
whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only
the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond question.
The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of
sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the
establishment of a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires
competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of
judicial and professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the
profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach
of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines
the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment
of legal precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of
the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts research, prepares
drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in pleadings,
practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN

Dean (1978-1983) (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN

Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA

Dean (1995-1999) (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON

Professor (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR DAWAY

Associate Dean and Associate Professor (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN

Associate Professor (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE

Assistant Professor (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY

Assistant Professor (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO

(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH

(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS

(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA

(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO

(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC

(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY

(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA

(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ

(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA (SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29

(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the alleged
plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow. I am writing to
you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the section addressing
the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were
taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote
69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with
respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate
form of referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s cautious approach to
the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the
opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary
international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of
the ‘very mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law,
established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited to support –
as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable
Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.

I remain
Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)

Christian J. Tams31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity
Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.)
beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said
Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty
Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty
members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty
members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include
former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous
copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit
(Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous
copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.

The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been formally
submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding the UP Law
Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted
portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence
alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse
during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible
act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of
the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for
even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society,
there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and
unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to
discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that
would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the
oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations
omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis,
Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica,
Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña,
Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B.
Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show
cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10,
2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the
consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty
Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the following
pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch
and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the
same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par.
(1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of
Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance which was
signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance,
respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties
and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a
matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with
the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the
Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s findings and conclusions
were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors
and officers of the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility."41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and the courts43 and of tending
to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their Statement, respondents
assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to
ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the portion of
their Statement "focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for the Court "to provide
clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in
adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of
justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal
processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to
vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound
impact in the academe, especially in our law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional
attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time the Statement
was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for
their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court
Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an
inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but
to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their
perception of the Court’s indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo
that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.

(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held
accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of respondents’ charge of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the
plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing their
Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter
dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno,
alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana
Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court
of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity
and International Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice
Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise spoken on the
"plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations
are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in agreement with and in
opposition to the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero;56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business
Mirror on August 5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8,
2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in
the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and
the Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16, 2010;64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
on August 10, 2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions and the charge in
the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.

(d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position that in issuing
their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of
the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise
of free speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales
v. Commission on Elections.69

(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also issued in
the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of
the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national university has the right and
responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as
to encourage a free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of
reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they
would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture
and generation of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for
research and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s
conduct."71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion of the
dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench than by an
attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his
side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the
interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook
occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a
case.73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and officers of the Court,
respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that
respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b]
committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the
alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before final judgment be rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the findings and conclusions of fact in
the Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that
connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them
the full and fair opportunity to require the production of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230,
April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions in or relating
to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed
a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the
Common Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings and
conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and
hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best intentions to
protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her
deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the
Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that
academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools have the
freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who
may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in
these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic
freedom of the University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be
taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents’ constitutional right to
freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public
morale, public health or other legitimate public interest.78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered mail (the
Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the
Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the
first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the
sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and
that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good
faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in
a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the attention of the Court to the following
authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in
American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor
entertained any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and
that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he signed the
Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views
on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:

13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the view that willful
and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were of
the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been
viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now,
this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it
off as one’s own.85 (Emphases supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss in correctly
assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends his
discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause
Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of
the Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to his submission of
a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement,
which he described as follows:

• "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing pages,
and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy
was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

• "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which reflects as signatories the
names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was
publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II
was also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010,
almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.

• "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which presently serves as the official file
copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It
bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed
names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty
above their handwritten or typewritten names.87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since what Dean
Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents.
Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a draft statement,
Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty members so that those who
wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing
pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April
2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the faculty. Some faculty
members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it brought to their classrooms in the College of Law,
or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign
Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as
soon as they could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been circulated long enough,
Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate for posting in the
College of Law. Following his own established practice in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them
to reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed draft would appear,
together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-signatories in
the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the
integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open
invitation to vandals and pranksters."90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in
fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his
administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen
noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not
among those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called
the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity
II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on
Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable
at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States the following
week. It would later turn out that this account was not entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so placed full
reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to
indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their signatures physically to
the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the circumstances
surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this was what actually
transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice
Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its
contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the
United States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity
Statement to him.

2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to teach
on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received from Justice
Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring
Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had
already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the
faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a
former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement.95 (Emphases
supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when he was
one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010
letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it
was explained in the Compliance that:

Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to him. However, his
name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring
Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned
in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice
Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not a
true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in
all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the
Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its
signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in
the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by
analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a
person has participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent
which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper
and/or had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02
for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law
faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts
that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate
channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper
disposition with the hope that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing
Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has
not been met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant
an administrative sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common Compliance,
including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only
in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine bar;
but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the
UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e
subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he
believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila
Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be
forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an
atmosphere of repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-
assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive
evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee
on free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause
Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material issues to be
resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined as Members of the
Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a
Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, are
respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or
could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?

DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.

It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered
with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying
assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize
the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view
on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which
respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to
said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to
this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of
plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was
"[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the
Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain
those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or
constructive, to wit:

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence
alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse
during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible
act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of
the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for
even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society,
there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and
unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to
discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that
would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the
oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations
omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the right
to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not
only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded
the limits of fair comment and common decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of
contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo
and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust
all the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas,
resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner
has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of
each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider
unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held that:

[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and
to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in
question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble
and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good
practice can never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a
serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled
threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong
should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what
he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to
in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred
in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and
disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court
is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases
supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority view of Justice
Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the
respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing
at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the
following principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound
to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re
Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases,
is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his pleading, by accusing
the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the
Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the Court
indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s
Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme
Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one
of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition
with a prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession."121

It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just
like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial
authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or
outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive
discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due
to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves,
when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing
the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his
patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the
judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in
the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been
considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to
contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial
tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the
enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms
of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the
court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it
should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.

xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many blunders and
injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the
part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon,
and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned even from more
recent jurisprudence.

In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine, for
making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus:

As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to
its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon.
Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That
is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen
(31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a
scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen."
(Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x.

xxxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of
people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In
re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or
abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive,
manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs.
Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association
vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate,
and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded and
impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x
x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in
pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment
and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the
Common Compliance, held that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any
limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a
complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be
too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There
are other societal values that press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the
orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions
pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a
lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in
relation to a pending case, to wit:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like
all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly
system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)

For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents133 that the Statement presents no grave
or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and
undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must
point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter
they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and
speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure,
even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case before this
Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in
an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome
of a case or degrade the courts.

Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence
discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be
circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in
the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so
delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical
standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons
of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is
inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of
the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the
demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that
tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given
particular situations. With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are
expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just
their preferred portions thereof.

The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.

Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and academic freedom, the Court
considers here the other averments in their submissions.

With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their position
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the
correct action on said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo
has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause
Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for
denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into
disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong,
should be applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the
Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement using contumacious language, which with
temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of the
objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court
cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

xxxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly
immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly
threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to
dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the
Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism
charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents’
submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it
is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no
bearing on their own administrative case.

Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for effective speech;
that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect
respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for
the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow
respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade
others to their point of view is to be offensive.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in the narration
of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic
irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would expectedly be affected by any
perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they
still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the
Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the
tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true
intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and
unproductive recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on the
plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this
Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first before it was submitted to this
Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to
capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on
the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court,
particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits
of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final
disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time
the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and
they had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge
against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the
Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics
Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their perception of
indifference on the part of the Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there
was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account
in the interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents’ reliance on various
news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled
out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one to
criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account
the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism
comes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose
personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them.
However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary
and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence
would have a grave implication on legal education in our country.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to be the
first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give
them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement.
However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and
undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or to be recreant
to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is
a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want
of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by
the facts a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not
admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart,
118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case,
taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said
motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to
prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to
treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be
reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts
and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance compared to his
colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere
deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign the Statement. He
was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism
was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010
Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not
willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have
been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did
all this without having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as
will be discussed below) and without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is
all that this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize
that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing
that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For
these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.

As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota and,
therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings.
However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive
to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this
Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar,
civility and respect among legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of
decency and fairness.

The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.

To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt
with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there were no
differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions
of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live"
public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He
likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law
faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to
be signatories thereto."140

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in the Statement are
not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court
at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as
a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s
persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same.
Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as
UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.

Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not from the
beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted
Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out, according to Dean
Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff.
First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to
allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff
also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in
fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed document may
have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing
to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism
concerns.

However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document for the Court’s
consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed
document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean
Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of
Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring
Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism
with respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of documents and records that
may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not
contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.

Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the course of his explanation of his
willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory,
Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized him to indicate them as
signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed,
posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same.
Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person
or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.

We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of
intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least
one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of
an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former
intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his
dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their
desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed
document. If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave
for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.

We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures before submission
of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya
case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a
required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.

In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing to ascribe
these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due
consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen
for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.

Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC are unmeritorious.

In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find their
Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be
allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented
in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she
similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt,
under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."141 It is this
group of respondents’ premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.

The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.

Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely from its
characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority’s purported failure to follow the
procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.

However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which
requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was
docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the specified
officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We have
held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of
due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.144
(Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the Prohibition from
Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation
where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after
considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor
on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the
Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus
operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their
cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents'
administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required before the
respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.

xxxx

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant
lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer
or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the
opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this
Court.146(Emphases supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right
they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification
for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence,
documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism
and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of
this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related
to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to
the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that
is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring
Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the
proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent
matter from this case.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents issued a
Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four corners of the Statement
itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in
their Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement and the
circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does
not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these
facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters
the same would be in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as September 2010, i.e., before
the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19,
2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the
Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the
Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally
agreed" with the Statement’s principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit
recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies
respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order
to divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or chosen not
to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’
own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential
doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the
risk they have taken.

Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.

A final word

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be
it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they
are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be
shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another
under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this
sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which
they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be
satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico
A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B.
Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon
F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista,
Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos,
Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found
UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and
13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and
offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the
administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of
the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is
reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for
lack of merit.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC October 15, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a designated member plagiarized
the works of certain authors and twisted their meanings to support the decision.

The Background Facts

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,
filed with the Court in G.R. No. 162230 a special civil action of certiorari with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office
of the Solicitor General.

Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese army
systematically raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in houses or cells where
soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.

Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department, represented by the
respondent public officials, requesting assistance in filing claims against the Japanese military officers who
established the comfort women stations. But that Department declined, saying that petitioners’ individual claims
had already been fully satisfied under the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive Department to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other
international tribunals.

On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners’ action. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote
the decision for the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot grant the petition
because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative under the Constitution and the law to
determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claim against Japan; and, second, the Philippines is not under any
obligation in international law to espouse their claims.

On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision. More than a month later on
July 18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his online blog that his clients
would file a supplemental petition "detailing plagiarism committed by the court" under the second reason it gave
for dismissing the petition and that "these stolen passages were also twisted to support the court’s erroneous
conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two have no further legal remedies." The media gave
publicity to Atty. Roque’s announcement.

On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that Atty. Roque announced. It
accused Justice Del Castillo of "manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism"1 when he wrote the decision for
the Court and of "twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources … to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment."2 They charged Justice Del Castillo of copying without acknowledgement certain passages from three
foreign articles:

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law
(2009);

b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law (2006); and

c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Court’s deliberations in the case has been put into question by Justice Del
Castillo’s fraud. The Court should thus "address and disclose to the public the truth about the manifest intellectual
theft and outright plagiarism"3 that resulted in gross prejudice to the petitioners.

Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for reconsideration generated, Justice Del Castillo circulated
a letter to his colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the decision for the Court he had the
intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in the pertinent part:

It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources, whenever due. At no point was there
ever any malicious intent to appropriate another’s work as our own. We recall that this ponencia was thrice
included in the Agenda of the Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during the Baguio session on April 13, 2010,
April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010. Each time, suggestions were made which necessitated major
revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied, discussions modified, passages added or deleted. The resulting
decision comprises 34 pages with 78 footnotes.

xxxx

As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as contained in the above foreign materials were
"twisted," the same remains their opinion which we do not necessarily share.4

On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, for investigation and recommendation. The Chief Justice designated
retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve as consultant of the Committee. He graciously accepted.

On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to comment on Justice Del Castillo’s verified letter. When
this was done, it set the matter for hearing.

In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his co-author Evan Fox-Descent
(referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving their work but Criddle’s concern,
after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration, was the Court’s conclusion that prohibitions against
sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally binding norms that treaties cannot diminish.

On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in mentioning his work, the Court "may
have misread the argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross purposes." Dr. Ellis said that he
wrote the article precisely to argue for appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes.

On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for investigation, the Dean of the University of
the Philippines (U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming that the Vinuya decision was
"an extraordinary act of injustice" and a "singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the
Highest Court of the land." The statement said that Justice Del Castillo had a "deliberate intention to appropriate
the original authors’ work," and that the Court’s decision amounted to "an act of intellectual fraud by copying
works in order to mislead and deceive."5

On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although relevant sentences in
the Court’s decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference only in the footnote and in
connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the passages taken from
his work. He thought that the form of referencing was inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also concerned that the
decision may have used his work to support an approach to erga omnes concept (obligations owed by individual
States to the community of nations) that is not consistent with what he advocated.
On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties’ submissions in the summary manner of administrative
investigations. Counsels from both sides were given ample time to address the Committee and submit their
evidence. The Committee queried them on these.

Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the other parties not in attendance so they could make
submissions that their client regarded as sensitive and confidential, involving the drafting process that went into
the making of the Court’s decision in the Vinuya case. Petitioners’ counsels vigorously objected and the Committee
sustained the objection. After consulting Justice Del Castillo, his counsels requested the Committee to hear the
Justice’s court researcher, whose name need not be mentioned here, explain the research work that went into the
making of the decision in the Vinuya case. The Committee granted the request.

The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted passages to the writings
of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del Castillo, were unintentionally
deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her "grievous mistake" and grief for having "caused an enormous
amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family."6

On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researcher’s explanation, counsel for petitioners
insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for a writer to acknowledge that
certain words or language in his work were taken from another’s work. Counsel invoked the Court’s ruling in
University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret
Celine,7arguing that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.

After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to file their respective memoranda. They filed their
memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee submitted its unanimous findings and
recommendations to the Court.

The Issues

This case presents two issues:

1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo plagiarized the
published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.

2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear that such works
supported the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision.

The Court’s Rulings

Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the Court like its Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards will purposely avoid touching the merits of the Court’s decision in that case or the soundness or
lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in the same. The Court will deal, not with the essential merit or
persuasiveness of the foreign author’s works, but how the decision that Justice Del Castillo wrote for the Court
appropriated parts of those works and for what purpose the decision employed the same.

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another person’s language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is
commonly understood according to Webster, is "to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as
one’s own."8 The passing off of the work of another as one’s own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

The Passages from Tams

Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from Tams’ book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law (2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author thought was a mere generic
reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed that the footnoting in this case was not "an appropriate
form of referencing,"9 he and petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such
passages. Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tams’ work as his own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas
embodied in the passages to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned,
apart from Simma, Tams’ article as another source of those ideas.

The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards
of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing. The statement "See Tams,
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005)" in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if
Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea
that Justice Del Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his own.

That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase "cited in" rather than the
phrase "See" would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of "manifest intellectual
theft and outright plagiarism." If the Justice’s citations were imprecise, it would just be a case of bad footnoting
rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would be target of abuse for every editorial error, for
every mistake in citing pagination, and for every technical detail of form.

The Passages from Ellis

and Criddle-Descent

Petitioners also attack the Court’s decision for lifting and using as footnotes, without attribution to the author,
passages from the published work of Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page 27 of its decision,
marked with Footnote 65 at the end:

We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally
prohibited under contemporary international law. 65 xxx

Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthy passages in that footnote came almost
verbatim from Ellis’ article,10 such passages ought to have been introduced by an acknowledgement that they are
from that article. The footnote could very well have read:

65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The concept of rape as an international crime is relatively new. This is not
to say that rape has never been historically prohibited, particularly in war. But modern-day sensitivity to the crime
of rape did not emerge until after World War II. In the Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not mentioned. The
article on crimes against humanity explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not mentioned by name. (For
example, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the United States provides that in time of war all
women and children "shall not be molested in their persons." The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between his
Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Pruss., 8 Treaties & Other
Int'l Agreements Of The U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber Instructions classified rape as a crime of "troop discipline."
(Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the
Doctrine, 15 Duke J. Comp. Int’l. L. 219, 224). It specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the death penalty
(Id. at 236). The 1907 Hague Convention protected women by requiring the protection of their "honour." ("Family
honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected." Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907. General
Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, "Affirmation of the Principles of International Law
recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal"; General Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c) of the Charter established crimes against humanity as the following:

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not prosecuted. (Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the International Arena,7 ILSA J. Int’l.
Comp. L. 667, 676.) However, International Military Tribunal for the Far East prosecuted rape crimes, even though
its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, Commander
Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister Hirota criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including rape, committed
by persons under their authority. (The Tokyo Judgment: Judgment Of The International Military Tribunal For The Far
East 445-54 (1977).

The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when Control Council Law No. 10 included the
term rape in the definition of crimes against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the four occupying powers in
Germany, was devised to establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war criminals in German courts. (Control Council
for Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against
Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50, 53 (1946))

The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modern-day international
instrument to establish protections against rape for women. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950)
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a war
crime, and a crime against humanity.

But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing from Footnote 65.

Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences and their accompanying footnotes appear in text
on pages 30-32 of the Vinuya decision:

xxx In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in
the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority.711avvphi1

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms began to attract
greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties
in International Law.73 The recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILC’s
preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a consensus that certain
international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper
criteria for identifying peremptory norms.

After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that
"there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as
having the character of jus cogens."76 In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that
"the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in
the jurisprudence of international tribunals."77 Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is
undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78

Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descent’s article, A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens.11 Criddle-Descent’s footnotes were carried into the Vinuya decision’s own
footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes.

The Explanation

Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be construed as
plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillo’s researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained how she accidentally
deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually
became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts, she did her research electronically. For
international materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-
related materials to which the Court subscribes.

In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice would have assigned a case for study and report, the
researcher would source his materials mostly from available law books and published articles on print. When he
found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of the issue or for the other, he would place a strip of paper
marker on the appropriate page, pencil mark the item, and place the book on his desk where other relevant books
would have piled up. He would later paraphrase or copy the marked out passages from some of these books as he
typed his manuscript on a manual typewriter. This occasion would give him a clear opportunity to attribute the
materials used to their authors or sources.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillo’s researcher also explained, most legal references,
including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in internet websites that offer
virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she
downloaded or copied them into her "main manuscript," a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she
might need. The researcher’s technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The
carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has
in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the pieces of
lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps.

Here, Justice Del Castillo’s researcher did just that. She electronically "cut" relevant materials from books and
journals in the Westlaw website and "pasted" these to a "main manuscript" in her computer that contained the
issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program.12 Later, after she
decided on the general shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials
that did not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting
paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor,
demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in
their work.

Justice Del Castillo’s researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these
included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions to
these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally
deleted the attributions.
First Finding

The Court adopts the Committee’s finding that the researcher’s explanation regarding the accidental removal of
proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the Microsoft program in
use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of research materials is not remote.

For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate, a familiar example similar to the circumstances
of the present case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident happening. If researcher X, for
example, happens to be interested in "the inalienable character of juridical personality" in connection with an
assignment and if the book of the learned Civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino, happens to have been published in a
website, researcher X would probably show interest in the following passage from that book:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be
alienated or renounced.15

xxx

_____________________________

15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to other sources, it is evident that
Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it from Von Tuhr and
Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.

When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote into a manuscript-in-the-making in his
computer, the footnote number would, given the computer program in use, automatically change and adjust to the
footnoting sequence of researcher X’s manuscript. Thus, if the preceding footnote in the manuscript when the
passage from Tolentino was pasted on it is 23, Tolentino’s footnote would automatically change from the original
Footnote 15 to Footnote 24.

But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme, researcher X would have to tag the Tolentino passage with
a short description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject description would be: "The inalienable
character of juridical personality.23" The footnote mark, 23 From Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the
subject tag, serves as reminder to him to attribute the passage in its final form to Tolentino. After the passage has
been tagged, it would now appear like this:

The inalienable character of juridical personality.23

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be
alienated or renounced.24

xxx

_____________________________

23 From Tolentino.

24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It serves but a marker to help researcher X maneuver
the passage into the right spot in his final manuscript.
The mistake of Justice Del Castillo’s researcher is that, after the Justice had decided what texts, passages, and
citations were to be retained including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and when she was already cleaning up
her work and deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally deleted the footnotes that went with such tags—with
disastrous effect.

To understand this, in Tolentino’s example, the equivalent would be researcher X’s removal during cleanup of the
tag, "The inalienable character of juridical personality.23," by a simple "delete" operation, and the unintended
removal as well of the accompanying footnote (#23). The erasure of the footnote eliminates the link between the
lifted passage and its source, Tolentino’s book. Only the following would remain in the manuscript:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be
alienated or renounced.43

_____________________________

43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a function that raises an alarm when original materials
are cut up or pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the manuscript, adjusting the
footnote number and removing any clue that what should stick together had just been severed.

This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-Descent. The researcher deleted the subject tags
and, accidentally, their accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources of the lifted passages. With
119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them was not easily detectable.

Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillo’s verified letter of July 22, 2010 is inconsistent with his
researcher’s claim that the omissions were mere errors in attribution. They cite the fact that the Justice did not
disclose his researcher’s error in that letter despite the latter’s confession regarding her mistake even before the
Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By denying plagiarism in his letter, Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured
himself and sought to whitewash the case.13

But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony. Justice Del Castillo merely explained "that
there was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due" and that there was never "any malicious intent to
appropriate another’s work as our own," which as it turns out is a true statement. He recalled how the Court
deliberated upon the case more than once, prompting major revisions in the draft of the decision. In the process,
"(s)ources were re-studied, discussions modified, passages added or deleted." Nothing in the letter suggests a
cover-up. Indeed, it did not preclude a researcher’s inadvertent error.

And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially disclose his researcher’s error. He wrote the
decision for the Court and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising from its preparation. What is
more, the process of drafting a particular decision for the Court is confidential, which explained his initial request to
be heard on the matter without the attendance of the other parties.

Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted
passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly respected professors of international law. The
law journals that published their works have exceptional reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit
attribution to these authors when the decision cites an abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as the
sources of the lifted passages would enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del Castillo
and his researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure to mention the works of Criddle-Decent and
Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure oversight.
Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to
avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge the sources from which these
were taken.14 Petitioners point out that the Court should apply to this case the ruling in University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine.15 They argue that
standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.

But petitioners’ theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is
inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position considering that there is
hardly any substantial written work in any field of discipline that is free of any mistake. The theory places an
automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in this case, have reasonable and logical explanations.

Indeed, the 8th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of
another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one's own."16 Thus, plagiarism presupposes intent and a
deliberate, conscious effort to steal another’s work and pass it off as one’s own.

Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an intent to pass off another’s
work as one’s own is not required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed the academic freedom of a university to
withdraw a master’s degree that a student obtained based on evidence that she misappropriated the work of
others, passing them off as her own. This is not the case here since, as already stated, Justice Del Castillo actually
imputed the borrowed passages to others.

Second Finding

The Court also adopts the Committee’s finding that the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis did not
bring about an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages that he lifted from their published
articles. That he merely got those passages from others remains self-evident, despite the accidental deletion. The
fact is that he still imputed the passages to the sources from which Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the
first place.

This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the deletion of the subject tag and, accidentally, its
footnote which connects to the source, the lifted passage would appear like this:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be
alienated or renounced.43

_____________________________

43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

Although the unintended deletion severed the passage’s link to Tolentino, the passage remains to be attributed to
Von Tuhr and Valverde, the original sources that Tolentino himself cites. The text and its footnote reference cancel
out any impression that the passage is a creation of researcher X. It is the same with the passages from Criddle-
Descent and Ellis. Because such passages remained attributed by the footnotes to the authors’ original sources, the
omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations of
Justice Del Castillo. This wholly negates the idea that he was passing them off as his own thoughts.

True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in the Vinuya decision without placing them in quotation
marks. But such passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert Frost,17 "The woods are lovely, dark, and
deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep." The passages
here consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged history of certain principles of law, and similar
frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal literature, already belong to the public realm.
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,18 while the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the writer’s
thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal
data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in
every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long
held legal opinions it draws from.

Third Finding

Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The Court adopts
the Committee’s finding that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or misrepresentation remains a
mystery to the Court. To twist means "to distort or pervert the meaning of."19 For example, if one lifts the lyrics of
the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that Jose Palma who wrote it "did not love his country," then
there is "twisting" or misrepresentation of what the anthem’s lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said
or implied that, based on the lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Court’s
conclusion that the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.’s claims.

The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally deleted, it is impossible
for any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors as to conclude that in
writing the decision Justice Del Castillo "twisted" their intended messages. And, second, the lifted passages
provided mere background facts that established the state of international law at various stages of its
development. These are neutral data that could support conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary
has the power today to order the Executive Department to sue another country or whether the duty to prosecute
violators of international crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.

Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have twisted the meaning of the passages he lifted
from the works of Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of "twisting" or misrepresentation against him is to
say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, the charge is reckless and obtuse.

No Misconduct

On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation marks,
inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in every case, amount
to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action.20
This is not the case here. Justice Del Castillo’s acts or omissions were not shown to have been impelled by any of
such disreputable motives.21 If the rule were otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or
dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record.22

No Inexcusable Negligence

Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that the omission was the result of plain error, Justice
Del Castillo is nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that he has full control and
supervision over his researcher and should not have surrendered the writing of the decision to the latter.23

But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of the Vinuya decision to his researcher, which is
contrary to the evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher testified, the Justice set the direction that
the research and study were to take by discussing the issues with her, setting forth his position on those issues, and
reviewing and commenting on the study that she was putting together until he was completely satisfied with it.24
In every sense, Justice Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the report to the Court, which report eventually
became the basis for the decision, and determined its final outcome.
Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the equivalent of a "law clerk" in the United States
Supreme Court, is standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated by necessity. With about 80 to
100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be truly senseless for him to do all the studies
and research, going to the library, searching the internet, checking footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he
does all these by himself, he would have to allocate at least one to two weeks of work for each case that has been
submitted for decision. The wheels of justice in the Supreme Court will grind to a halt under such a proposition.

What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing of the decision in the
Vinuya case without, however, having to look over his researcher’s shoulder as she cleaned up her draft report to
ensure that she hit the right computer keys. The Justice’s researcher was after all competent in the field of
assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in
Chief of her school’s Law Journal, and placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a
master’s degree in International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under the
Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top post graduate programs on
International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in assigning the research work in
the Vinuya case to her.

Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until computers cease to be operated by human beings who
are vulnerable to human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the courts should be as error-free as they
themselves are.

Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners’ exhibits, the Committee noted that petitioners’ Exhibit J,
the accusing statement of the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and
misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the statement was reproduced but the signatures portion
below merely listed the names of 38 faculty members, in solid rows, with the letters "Sgd" or "signed" printed
beside the names without exception. These included the name of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, a U.P. professor.

Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque to present the signed
copy within three days of the August 26 hearing.25 He complied. As it turned out, the original statement was
signed by only a minority of the faculty members on the list. The set of signatories that appeared like solid teeth in
the dummy turned out to be broken teeth in the original. Since only 37 out of the 81 on the list signed the
document, it does not appear to be a statement of the Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired Justice
V. V. Mendoza did not sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy represented. The Committee wondered
why the Dean submitted a dummy of the signed document when U.P. has an abundance of copying machines.

Since the above circumstances appear to be related to separate en banc matter concerning the supposed Faculty
statement, there is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the same to the en banc for its
consideration in relation to that matter.

WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:

1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.’s charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross
neglect against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo;

2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this decision to Professors Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-
Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis, and Professor Christian J. Tams at their known addresses;
3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys involved in legal research and reporting with copies of
this decision and to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in the Vinuya case while using the existing
computer program especially when the volume of citations and footnoting is substantial; and

4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary software for use by the Court that can prevent future
lapses in citations and attributions.

Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards to turn over to the en banc the dummy
as well as the signed copy of petitioners’ Exhibit J, entitled "Restoring Integrity," a statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law for the en banc’s consideration in relation to the separate pending
matter concerning that supposed Faculty statement.

SERENO, J.:

What is black can be called "white" but it cannot turn white by the mere calling. The unfortunate ruling of the
majority Decision that no plagiarism was committed stems from its failure to distinguish between the
determination of the objective, factual existence of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision1 and the determination of the
liability that results from a finding of plagiarism. Specifically, it made "malicious intent", which heretofore had not
been relevant to a finding of plagiarism, an essential element.

The majority Decision will thus stand against the overwhelming conventions on what constitutes plagiarism. In
doing so, the Decision has created unimaginable problems for Philippine academia, which will from now on have to
find a disciplinary response to plagiarism committed by students and researchers on the justification of the
majority Decision.

It has also undermined the protection of copyrighted work by making available to plagiarists "lack of malicious
intent" as a defense to a charge of violation of copy or economic rights of the copyright owner committed through
lack of attribution. Under Section 184 of R.A. 8293 ("An Act Describing the Intellectual Property Code and
Establishing the Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes"), or
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, there is no infringement of copyright in the use of another's work
in:

(b) the making of quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use and only to the extent
justified for the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press
summaries: Provided that the source and the name of the author, if appearing on the work, are mentioned.
(Emphasis supplied)

Because the majority Decision has excused the lack of attribution to the complaining authors in the Vinuya decision
to editorial errors and lack of malicious intent to appropriate ─ and that therefore there was no plagiarism ─ lack of
intent to infringe copyright in the case of lack of attribution may now also become a defense, rendering the above
legal provision meaningless.2

TABLES OF COMPARISON

The tables of comparison below were first drawn based on the tables made by petitioners in their Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. This was then compared with Annex "A" of Justice Mariano del Castillo's letter, which
is his tabular explanation for some of the copied excerpts.3 The alleged plagiarism of the cited excerpts were then
independently verified and re-presented below, with the necessary revisions accurately reflecting the alleged
plagiarized works and the pertinent portions of the decision. A few excerpts in the table of petitioners are not
included, as they merely refer to in-text citations.

Forms of Plagiarism

There are many ways by which plagiarism can be committed.4 For the purpose of this analysis, we used the
standard reference book prescribed for Harvard University students, "Writing with Sources" by Gordon Harvey.

Harvey identifies four forms of plagiarism5: (a) uncited data or information;6 (b) an uncited idea, whether a specific
claim or general concept;7 (c) an unquoted but verbatim phrase or passage;8 and (d) an uncited structure or
organizing strategy.9 He then explains how each form or mode of plagiarism is committed. Plagiarism is committed
in mode (a) by "plagiarizing information that is not common knowledge."10 Mode (b) is committed when
"distinctive ideas are plagiarized," "even though you present them in a different order and in different words,
because they are uncited."11

Even if there has been a prior citation, succeeding appropriations of an idea to make it appear as your own is
plagiarism, because the "[previous] citation in [an earlier] passage is a deception." Mode (c) is committed when
"you … borrowed several distinctive phrases verbatim, without quotation marks…" Mode (d) is committed when,
though the words and details are original, "(y)ou have, however, taken the structural framework or outline directly
from the source passage … even though, again, your language differs from your source and your invented examples
are original."12

These forms of plagiarism can exist simultaneously in one and the same passage. There may be a complete failure
to use quotation marks in one part of the sentence or paragraph while combining that part with phrases employing
an uncited structure or organizing strategy. There may be patchwork plagiarizing committed by collating different
works or excerpts from the same work without proper attribution.13

These acts of plagiarism can also be committed in footnotes in the same way and at the same degree of
unacceptability as plagiarized passages in the body. This is especially frowned upon in footnotes that are discursive
or "content" footnotes or endnotes. Harvey explains that a discursive footnote or endnote is "a note that includes
comments, not just publication information . . . when you want to tell your reader something extra to the strict
development of your argument, or incorporate extra information about sources."14

Violations of Rules against

Plagiarism in the Vinuya Decision

Below are violations of the existing rules against plagiarism that can be found in the Vinuya decision. The
alphanumeric tags correspond to the table letter and row numbers in the tables provided above.

A.1 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the entire paragraph in the body of the decision on page 30 was
not the ponente’s original paragraph, but was lifted verbatim from Tams’s work. The attribution to Tams is wholly
insufficient because without the quotation marks, there is nothing to alert the reader that the paragraph was lifted
verbatim from Tams. The footnote leaves the reader with the impression that the said paragraph is the author’s
own analysis of erga omnes.

The "See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga omnes in International Law (2005)" line in footnote 69 of the
Vinuyadecision does not clearly indicate that the statement on Simma’s observation was lifted directly from Tams’s
work; it only directs the reader to Tams’s work should the reader wish to read further discussions on the matter.
B.1 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the two sentences were not the ponente’s, but were lifted
verbatim from two non-adjoining sentences found on pages 331 and 332 of the Yale Law Journal of International
Law article of Criddle & Fox-Decent and with absolutely no attribution to the latter.

B.2 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the sentence fragment on peremptory norms was not the
ponente’s original writing, but was lifted verbatim from page 334 of the Yale Law Journal of International Law
article of Criddle & Fox-Decent with absolutely no attribution to the authors.

B.3 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the first sentence in discursive footnote number 71 was not the
ponente’s idea, but was lifted verbatim from Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work at page 334.

B.4 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the third sentence in discursive footnote number 71 was not the
ponente’s idea, but was lifted from Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work at 334-335.

B.5 Failure to indicate that one footnote source in discursive footnote 71 was lifted verbatim from discursive
footnote 9 of Tams; thus, even the idea being propounded in this discursive part of footnote 71 was presented as
the ponente’s, instead of Criddle’s & Fox-Decent’s.

B.6 Failure to indicate that the last discursive sentence in footnote 71 and the citations thereof were not the
ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim from footnote 9 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

B.7 Failure to indicate that the first discursive sentence of footnote 72 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted
verbatim from page 335 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

B.8 Failure to indicate that the second discursive sentence of footnote 72 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted
verbatim from pages 335-336 of Criddle and Fox-Decent’s work.

B.9 Failure to indicate that the citation and the discursive passage thereon in the last sentence of footnote 72 was
not the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim from discursive footnote 18 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

B.10 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that a phrase in the body of the decision on page 31 was not the
ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim from page 336 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

B.11 Failure to indicate that the entirety of discursive footnote 73 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim
from page 336 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

B.12 Failure to indicate that the idea of lack of "consensus on whether certain international norms had attained the
status of jus cogens" was a paraphrase of a sentence combined with a verbatim lifting of a phrase that appears on
page 336 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work and was not the ponente’s own conclusion. This is an example of
patchwork plagiarism.

B.13 Failure to indicate that the entirety of discursive footnote 74 on page 31 of the Decision was not the ponente’s
comment on the source cited, but was lifted verbatim from footnote 23 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

B.14 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and with the proper attribution to Criddle that the first two
sentences of page 32 were not the ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim from two non-adjoining sentences on pages
337-338 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

B.15 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and the right citation that the discursive sentence in the second
paragraph of footnote 77, and the citation therein, were not the ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim from page 346
of the body of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work in the instance of the discursive sentence, and from footnote 72 of
Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work in the instance of the case cited and the description thereof.
B.16 Failure to indicate that the choice of citation and the discursive thereon statement in the second sentence of
the second paragraph of discursive footnote 77 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim from footnote 72 of
Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

B.17 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and the right citations that the entirety of the discursive third to
fifth paragraphs of footnote 77 were not the product of the ponente’s own analysis and choice of sources, but were
lifted verbatim from footnotes 73 and 77 on pages 346-347 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.

C.1 to C.6 Failure to use quotation marks and the right citations to indicate that half of the long discursive footnote
65, including the sources cited therein, was actually comprised of the rearrangement, and in some parts,
rephrasing of 18 sentences found on pages 227-228 of Mr. Ellis’s work in Case Western Law Reserve Journal of
International Law.

This painstaking part-by-part analysis of the Vinuya decision is prompted by the fact that so many, including
international academicians, await the Court’s action on this plagiarism charge ─ whether it will in all candor
acknowledge that there is a set of conventions by which all intellectual work is to be judged and thus fulfill its role
as an honest court; or blind itself to the unhappy work of its member.

The text of the Decision itself reveals the evidence of plagiarism. The tearful apology of the legal researcher to the
family of the ponente and her acknowledgment of the gravity of the act of omitting attributions is an admission
that something wrong was committed. Her admission that the correct attributions went missing in the process of
her work is an admission of plagiarism. The evidence in the text of the Vinuya Decision and the acknowledgment by
the legal researcher are sufficient for the determination of plagiarism.

The Place of the Plagiarized

Portions in the Vinuya Decision

The suspect portions of the majority decision start from the discursive footnotes of the first full paragraph of page
27. In that paragraph, the idea sought to be developed was that while rape and sexual slavery may be morally
reprehensible and impermissible by international legal norms, petitioners have failed to make the logical leap to
conclude that the Philippines is thus under international legal duty to prosecute Japan for the said crime. The
plagiarized work found in discursive footnote 65 largely consists of the exposition by Mr. Ellis of the development of
the concept of rape as an international crime. The impression obtained by any reader is that the ponente has much
to say about how this crime evolved in international law, and that he is an expert on this matter.

There are two intervening paragraphs before the next suspect portion of the decision. The latter starts from the
second paragraph on page 30 and continues all the way up to the first paragraph of page 32. The discussion on the
erga omnes obligation of states almost cannot exist, or at the very least cannot be sustained, without the
plagiarized works of Messrs. Tams, Criddle and Decent-Fox. There is basis to say that the plagiarism of this portion
is significant.

How the Majority Decision

Treated the Specific Allegations

of Plagiarism

The majority Decision narrates and explains:

"The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted passages to the
writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del Castillo, were
unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her "grievous mistake" and grief for having "caused an
enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family."

On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researcher’s explanation, counsel for petitioners
insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for a writer to acknowledge that
certain words or language in his work were taken from another’s work. Counsel invoked the Court’s ruling in
University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine,
arguing that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.

xxx xxx xxx

"… although Tams himself may have believed that the footnoting in his case was not "an appropriate form of
referencing," he and petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such passages.
Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tam’s work as his own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in
the passages to Bruno Simma, whom Tam himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from
Simma, Tam’s article as another source of those ideas.

The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards
of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing. The statement "See Tams,
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005)" in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if
Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea
that Justice Del Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his own.

That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase "cited in" rather than the
phrase "See" would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of "manifest intellectual
theft and outright plagiarism." If the Justice’s citations were imprecise, it would just be a case of bad footnoting
rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would be target of abuse for every editorial error, for
every mistake in citing pagination, and for every technical detail of form."

xxx

"Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthily passages in that footnote came almost
verbatim from Ellis’ article, such passages ought to have been introduced by an acknowledgement that they are
from that article. The footnote could very well have read:

65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said.) x x x

"But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing from Footnote 65.

xxx

"Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descent’s article, A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens. Criddle-Descent’s footnotes were carried into the Vinuya decision’s own footnotes
but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes.

"Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be construed as
plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillo’s researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained how she accidentally
deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually
became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts, she did her research electronically. For
international materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-
related materials to which the Court subscribes.

xxx

"With the advent of computers, however as Justice Del Castillo’s researcher also explained, most legal references,
including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in internet websites that offer
virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she
downloaded or copied them into her "main manuscript," a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she
might need. The researcher’s technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The
carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has
in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the pieces of
lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps.

"Here, Justice Del Castillo’s researcher did just that. She electronically "cut" relevant materials from books and
journals in the Westlaw website and "pasted" these to a "main manuscript" in her computer that contained the
Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would take, she began
pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of
those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with
Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate
court researchers use everyday in their work.

"Justice Del Castillo’s researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these
included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions to
these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally
deleted the attributions.

"The Court adopts the Committee’s finding that the researcher’s explanation regarding the accidental removal of
proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the Microsoft program in
use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of research materials is not remote."

Contrary to the view of my esteemed colleagues, the above is not a fair presentation of what happens in
electronically generated writings aided by electronic research.

First, for a decision to make full attribution for lifted passages, one starts with block quote formatting or the
"keying-in" of quotation marks at the beginning and at the end of the lifted passages. These keyed-in computer
commands are not easily accidentally deleted, but should be deliberately inputted where there is an intention to
quote and attribute.

Second, a beginning acknowledgment or similar introduction to a lengthy passage copied verbatim should not be
accidentally deleted; it must be deliberately placed.

Third, the above explanation regarding the lines quoted in A.1 in the majority Decision may touch upon what
happened in incident A.1, but it does not relate to what happened in incidents B.1 to C.6 of the Tables of
Comparison, which are wholesale lifting of excerpts from both the body and the footnotes of the referenced works,
without any attribution, specifically to the works of Criddle & Fox-Decent and of Ellis. While mention was made of
Tams’s work, no mention was made at all of the works of Criddle & Fox-Decent and of Ellis even though the
discussions and analyses in their discursive footnotes were used wholesale.
Fourth, the researcher’s explanation regarding the accidental deletion of 2 footnotes out of 119 does not plausibly
account for the extensive amount of text used with little to no modifications from the works of Criddle & Fox-
Decent and Ellis. As was presented in Tables B and C, copied text occurs in 22 instances in pages 27, 31, and 32 of
the Vinuya decision. All these instances of non-attribution cannot be remedied by the reinstatement of 2 footnotes.

Fifth, the mention of Tams in "See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga omnes in International Law (2005)" in footnote
69 of the Vinuya decision was not a mere insufficiency in "clarity of writing," but a case of plagiarism under the rule
prohibiting the use of misleading citations.

Sixth, the analogy that was chosen ─ that of a carpenter who discards materials that do not fit into his carpentry
work ─ is completely inappropriate. In the scheme of "cutting and pasting" that the researcher did during her work,
it is standard practice for the original sources of the downloaded and copied materials to be regarded as integral
parts of the excerpts, not extraneous or ill-fitting. A computer-generated document can accommodate as many
quotation marks, explanatory notes, citations and attributions as the writer desires and in multiple places. The
limits of most desktop computer drives, even those used in the Supreme Court, are in magnitudes of gigabytes and
megabytes, capable of accommodating 200 to 400 books per gigabyte (with each book just consuming roughly 3 to
5 megabytes). The addition of a footnote to the amount of file space taken up by an electronic document is
practically negligible. It is not as if the researcher lacked any electronic space; there was simply no attribution.

Seventh, contrary to what is implied in the statement on Microsoft Word’s lack of an alarm and in paragraph 4 of
the decretal portion of the majority Decision, no software exists that will automatically type in quotation marks at
the beginning and end of a passage that was lifted verbatim; these attribution marks must be made with deliberate
effort by the human researcher. Nor can a software program generate the necessary citations without input from
the human researcher. Neither is there a built-in software alarm that sounds every time attribution marks or
citations are deleted. The best guarantee for works of high intellectual integrity is consistent, ethical practice in the
writing habits of court researchers and judges. All lawyers are supposed to be knowledgeable on the standard of
ethical practice, if they took their legal research courses in law school and their undergraduate research courses
seriously. This knowledge can be easily picked up and updated by browsing many free online sources on the subject
of writing standards. In addition, available on the market are software programs that can detect some, but not all,
similarities in the phraseology of a work-in-progress with those in selected published materials; however, these
programs cannot supply the citations on their own. Technology can help diminish instances of plagiarism by
allowing supervisors of researchers to make partial audits of their work, but it is still the human writer who must
decide to give the proper attribution and act on this decision.

Plagiarism and Judicial Plagiarism

Plagiarism is an act that does not depend merely on the nature of the object, i.e. what is plagiarized, but also
hinges on the process, i.e. what has been done to the object. The elements of this process are the act of copying
the plagiarized work and the subsequent omission in failing to attribute the work to its author.15 Plagiarism thus
does not consist solely of using the work of others in one's own work, but of the former in conjunction with the
failure to attribute said work to its rightful owner and thereby, as in the case of written work, misrepresenting the
work of another as one's own. As the work is another's and used without attribution, the plagiarist derives the
benefit of use from the plagiarized work without expending the requisite effort for the same ─ at a cost (as in the
concept of "opportunity cost") to its author who could otherwise have gained credit for the work and whatever
compensation for its use is deemed appropriate and necessary.

If the question of plagiarism, then, turns on a failure of attribution, judicial plagiarism in the case at bar "arises
when judges author opinions that employ materials from copyrighted sources such as law journals or books, but
neglect to give credit to the author."16 Doing so effectively implies the staking of a claim on the copied work as the
judge's own.17 Note that there is no requirement of extent of copying or a minimum number of instances of
unattributed usage for an act to be considered a plagiarist act, nor is the intent to deceive or to copy without
attribution a prerequisite of plagiarism. In Dursht's exhaustive analysis of judicial plagiarism she cites the case of
Newman v. Burgin18 wherein the court said that plagiarism may be done "through negligence or recklessness
without intent to deceive."19 Dursht in addition notes that intent may also be taken as the intent to claim
authorship of the copied work, whether or not there was intent to deceive, citing Napolitano v. Trustees of
Princeton Univ.20

George describes the following among the types of judicial plagiarism:

Borrowed Text: When quoting a legal periodical, law review, treatise or other such source, the judicial writer must
surround the borrowed text with quotation marks or use a block quote. . . . Additionally, the source should be
referenced in the text . . .

Using another's language verbatim without using quotation marks or a block quote is intentional, as opposed to
unintentional, plagiarism.

Reference errors: The judge may fail to put quotation marks around a clause, phrase or paragraph that is a direct
quote from another's writing even though he cites the author correctly. This is plagiarism even though it may be
inadvertent.21

While indeed the notion of having committed judicial plagiarism may be unsettling to contemplate, as it may raise
in the mind of a judge the question of his or her own culpability22, it is a grievous mistake to overlook the
possibility of the commission of judicial plagiarism or the fact that judicial plagiarism is categorized by its very
definition as a subset of plagiarism. That a judge, in lifting words from a source and failing to attribute said words to
said source in the writing of a decision, committed specifically judicial plagiarism does not derogate from the
nature of the act as a plagiarist act. Nor does any claim of inadvertence or lack of intent in the commission of a
plagiarist act change the characterization of the act as plagiarism.

Penalties for Plagiarism and

Judicial Plagiarism

In the academe, plagiarism is generally dealt with severely when found out; many universities have policies on
plagiarism detailing the sanctions that may be imposed on students who are found to have plagiarized in their
coursework and other academic requirements. These run the gamut from an automatic failing grade in the course
for which the offending work was submitted, or in more egregious cases, outright expulsion from the university.
Sanctions for plagiarism in the academe operate through "the denial of certification or recognition of
achievement"23to the extent of rescinding or denying degrees. In the case of law students who do manage to
obtain their degrees, their admission to the bar may be hindered due to questions about their "character or fitness
to practice law."24Indeed, plagiarism, due to the severity of the penalties it may incur, is often identified with the
punishment of "academic death."25 The academe justifies the harshness of the sanctions it imposes with the
seriousness of the offense: plagiarism is seen not only to undermine the credibility and importance of scholarship,
but also to deprive the rightful author of what is often one of the most valuable currencies in the academe: credit
for intellectual achievement ─ an act of debasing the coinage, as it were. Thus the rules of many academic
institutions sanctioning plagiarism as a violation of academic ethics and a serious offense often classed under the
broader heading of "academic dishonesty."
The imposition of sanctions for acts of judicial plagiarism, however, is not as clear-cut. While George recognizes the
lack of attribution as the fundamental mark of judicial plagiarism, she notes in the same breath that the act is
"without legal sanction."26 Past instances of censure notwithstanding (as in examples of condemnation of
plagiarism cited by Lebovits et al27, most particularly the censure of the actions of the judge who plagiarized a law-
review article in Brennan28; the admonition issued by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in the case of
Apotex29) there is still no strictly prevailing consensus regarding the need or obligation to impose sanctions on
judges who have committed acts of judicial plagiarism. This may be due in a large part to the absence of
expectations of originality in the decisions penned by judges, as courts are required to "consider and usually . . .
follow precedent."30 In so fulfilling her obligations, it may become imperative for the judge to use "the legal
reasoning and language [of others e.g. a supervising court or a law review article] for resolution of the dispute."31
Although these obligations of the judicial writer must be acknowledged, care should be taken to consider that said
obligations do not negate the need for attribution so as to avoid the commission of judicial plagiarism. Nor do said
obligations diminish the fact that judicial plagiarism "detracts directly from the legitimacy of the judge's ruling and
indirectly from the judiciary's legitimacy"32 or that it falls far short of the high ethical standards to which judges
must adhere33. The lack of definitiveness in sanctions for judicial plagiarism may also be due to the reluctance of
judges themselves to confront the issue of plagiarism in the context of judicial writing; the apprehension caused by
"feelings of guilt" being due to "the possibility that plagiarism has unknowingly or intentionally been committed"
and a "traditional" hesitance to consider plagiarism as "being applicable to judicial writings."34

Findings of judicial plagiarism do not necessarily carry with them the imposition of sanctions, nor do they present
unequivocal demands for rehearing or the reversal of rulings. In Liggett Group, Inc., et al v Harold M. Engle, M.D. et
al35, a U.S. tobacco class action suit, "[the] plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for rehearing alleging that the
appellate opinion copied large portions of the defendants' briefs. . . . without attribution." The result of this, the
plaintiffs claimed, was the creation of the "appearance of impropriety," the abdication of judicative duties, the
relinquishing of independence to defendants, the failure to maintain impartiality, and therefore, as an act of judicial
plagiarism, was "a misrepresentation of the facts found by the trial court and denied plaintiffs due process of
law."36 The three-judge panel denied the motion. In addition, "courts generally have been reluctant to reverse for
the verbatim adoption of prepared findings."37 In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina38 it was held
that even though the trial judge's findings of fact may have been adopted verbatim from the prevailing party, the
findings "may be reversed only if clearly erroneous."39

On Guilt and Hypocrisy

It is not hypocrisy, contrary to what is implied in a statement in the majority Decision, to make a finding of
plagiarism when plagiarism exists. To conclude thus is to condemn wholesale all the academic thesis committees,
student disciplinary tribunals and editorial boards who have made it their business to ensure that no plagiarism is
tolerated in their institutions and industry. In accepting those review and quality control responsibilities, they are
not making themselves out to be error-free, but rather, they are exerting themselves to improve the level of
honesty in the original works generated in their institution so that the coinage and currency of intellectual life –
originality and the attribution of originality – is maintained. The incentive system of intellectual creation is made to
work so that the whole society benefits from the encouraged output.

In the case of judicial plagiarism, it is entirely possible for judges to have violated the rules against plagiarism out of
ignorance or from the sheer fact that in order to cope with their caseloads, they have to rely on researchers for
part of the work. That would have been a very interesting argument to consider. But ignorance is not pleaded here,
nor is the inability to supervise a legal researcher pleaded to escape liability on the part of the ponente. Rather, the
defense was that no plagiarism existed. This conclusion however is unacceptable for the reasons stated above.

As noted above, writers have ventured to say that the reluctance to address judicial plagiarism may stem from fear,
nay, guilt.40 Fear that the judge who says plagiarism was committed by another is himself guilty of plagiarism. But
that is neither here nor there. We must apply the conventions against judicial plagiarism because we must, having
taken on that obligation when the Court took cognizance of the plagiarism complaint, not because any one of us is
error-free. In fact, the statement on hypocrisy in the majority Decision betrays prejudgment of the complainants as
hypocrites, and a complaint against a sitting judge for plagiarism would appear impossible to win.

In a certain sense, there should have been less incentive to plagiarize law review articles because the currency of
judges is stare decisis. One wonders how the issue should have been treated had what was plagiarized been a court
ruling, but that is not at issue here. The analysis in this opinion is therefore confined to the peculiar situation of a
judge who issues a decision that plagiarizes law review articles, not to his copying of precedents or parts of the
pleadings of the parties to a case.

As earlier said, a determination of the existence of plagiarism in decision-making is not conclusive on the
disciplinary measure to be imposed. Different jurisdictions have different treatments. At the very least however, the
process of rectification must start from an acknowledgment and apology for the offense. After such have been
done, then consideration of the circumstances that mitigate the offense are weighed. But not before then.

The Unfortunate Result of

the Majority Decision

Unless reconsidered, this Court would unfortunately be remembered as the Court that made "malicious intent" an
indispensable element of plagiarism and that made computer-keying errors an exculpatory fact in charges of
plagiarism, without clarifying whether its ruling applies only to situations of judicial decision-making or to other
written intellectual activity. It will also weaken this Court’s disciplinary authority ─ the essence of which proceeds
from its moral authority ─ over the bench and bar. In a real sense, this Court has rendered tenuous its ability to
positively educate and influence the future of intellectual and academic discourse.

The Way Forward

Assuming that the Court had found that judicial plagiarism had indeed been committed in the Vinuya decision, the
Court could then have moved to the next logical question: what then is the legal responsibility of the ponente of
the Vinuya decision for having passed on to the Court en banc a ponencia that contains plagiarized parts?

There would have been at that point two possible choices for the Court vis-à-vis the ponente ─ to subject him to
disciplinary measures or to excuse him. In order to determine whether the acts committed would have warranted
discipline, the Court should have laid down the standard of diligence and responsibility that a judge has over his
actions, as well as the disciplinary measures that are available and appropriate.

The Court could also have chosen to attribute liability to the researcher who had admitted to have caused the
plagiarism. In In re Hinden, disciplinary measures were imposed on an attorney who plagiarized law review
articles.41

Response to the Decretal

Portion of the Majority Decision

In view of the above, it is my opinion:

1. That Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and his unnamed researcher have committed plagiarism in the drafting and
passing on of the ponencia in the Vinuya decision;

2. That this Court should request Justice del Castillo to acknowledge the plagiarism and apologize to the
complaining authors for his mistake;

3. That this Court should cause the issuance of a corrected version of the Vinuya decision in the form of a
"Corrigendum";

4. That court attorneys should be provided with the appropriate manuals on writing and legal citation, and should
be informed that the excerpts complained of and described in Tables A, B, and C of this opinion are acts of
plagiarism and not mere editing errors or computer-generated mistakes;

5. That the refusal of the majority to pronounce that plagiarism was committed by Justice del Castillo means that
any judicial opinion on his liability or that of his researcher would be academic and speculative, a ruling which this
Dissenting Opinion will not venture to make a pronouncement on; and

6. That a copy of this Dissenting Opinion should be circulated by the Public Information Office in the same manner
as the Majority Decision to the complaining authors Christian J. Tams, Mark Ellis, Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent.
2. Belo-henares vs. Guevarra, a.c. 11394, dec 1, 2016

A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Maria Victoria
G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged
violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws2 and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic
surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed
criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005,
purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.4

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social networking site,
insulting and verbally abusing complainant. His posts include the following excerpts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client's Ass, Belo. Senator
Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some
ass!!! I will launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You will go down in Medical
History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22 at 11:18pm)5

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office receptionist in Taytay
Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang kaso... si
Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya? (September
15 at 12:08pm)6

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon. Kaya lang, histado ko na kung sino-sino
ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at
10:31pm)7

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL
NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me, ok? Ang payola budget daw niya
runs into tens of millions.... (September 15 at 3:57pm)8

Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed the news of a picket demonstration in
front of the Belo clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the story when the next rallies
will have the following numbers 100, 200, 500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be
assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm)9
Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my reputation is worth that much. Aba
ako kaya magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince editors to pin me down with
something eh alam ko na wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si Aling Becky at may tama na sa utak
- eh kung gagastos ka lang ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect your burak na reputasyon as
a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung mga homeboys ko sa Pasig
na nilimas [ni] Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm)10

Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on national television to expose the
Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact that the much needed
partial restoration of her behind would cost a staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford Medical Hospital and she
will still remain permanently disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11 at 2:08am)11

Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT VICKI
BELO'S QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)12

Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which side you'll be taking- just pay Ms.
Josie Norcio a visit at St. Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10 at 12:08am)13

chanrobleslaw

The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to
destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no
fair or justifiable cause,14 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the operations of all
her clinic and seek out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good response – 70% decrease in her
July sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm)15

Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all. With only
2 surgeons of BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries like liposuction, nose lift,
boob jobs which have been performed by [BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk of something going
wrong with the procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's] hands:(" (July 12 at 12:21am)16

Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and trained doctors, they nearly killed a
client of mine, medical malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. just recently, in flawless clinic, a
patient who had a simple facial landed in the hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm)17
Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and friends in Cebu to greet Vicki
Belo with a boycott once she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set already knows that she is not a certified plastic
surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)18

Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-making machines, dapat convert them
into public health clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of those who want to look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at
2:16am)19

Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga
kapalpakan niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)20

Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a week to a place where
there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you want to find out more about our anti-quack
doctor campaign! (September 24 at 3:00pm)21

Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT
ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)22

Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard - BOYCOTT BELO!!! FLAWLESS
RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower batch sa akin at mabuti ang
pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50am)23

Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group. To all my friends and comrades,
please stay away from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have canceled their lipo from belo.
Please help me shut down the Belo Medical Group until they perform their moral and legal obligation to Ms. Josie
Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)24

chanrobleslaw

Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly threatened complainant with
criminal conviction, without factual basis and without proof,25 as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she will be jailed for plunder; Vicky Belo
will no longer be a doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal prosecution. The General Surgeon of France
will have a Philippine version. By October and November, some congressmen I have spoken with will be issuing
summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional inquiry; the subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic
surgery! (September 22 at 11:31pm)26
Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison - from Vicky Belo after she gets
convicted too for criminal negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)27

Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical Group for its criminal negligence
which nearly killed Ms. Josie Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He found out that the Dr. Belo
herself marketed the product to Ms. Norcio, the operation was carried out by her doctors who were not licensed by
the Philippine Association of Plastic Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm)28

chanrobleslaw

Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of
women,29 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest cebuana chic chick there nowadays?
haven't been there for quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-and-below naprends
diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)30

Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will soon picket the belo clinic there, can
u tell me where that is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)31

Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts of attacks na against me. to
thwart them, being the gayest gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like your type? at
yung preferred ko lang ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)32

chanrobleslaw

Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort money from her, as
apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a comment on his Facebook
post:33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)

Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman, maibagsak ko lang ang kaplastikan ni
belo, quits na tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)34

chanrobleslaw

Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire public hatred,
destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from
her as evident from his demand letter35 dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for
disbarment against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-
2551.
In defense,36 respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right
to privacy,37 asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account on
Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part.38 He also
averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was
filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against complainant.39 He denied that the remarks
were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against complainant.40 He
likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a
requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her. 41
Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair
comment.42

After the mandatory conference had been terminated,43 the parties were directed to file their respective position
papers.44 Thereafter, the IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for clarificatory
hearing.45 Upon termination thereof, the case was deemed submitted for report/recommendation.46

IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation47 dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be
suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.48 It held respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03,49 Rule
8.01,50 and Rule 19.0151 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having posted the above-quoted remarks
on his Facebook account, pointing out that respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his posts, considering
that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the IBP-CBD maintained that the
criminal cases he had filed against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence;
therefore, he can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not been
established.52

In a Resolution53 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,54 arguing that there was no specific act attributed to him that would
warrant his suspension from the practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases filed against him by an
employee of BMGI had already been dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.55

In a Resolution56 dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted respondent's motion,
reducing the penalty from one (1) year to six (6) months suspension.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based
on the allegations of the verified complaint.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's findings, except as to the penalty
imposed on respondent.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene
remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to
privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his "private account"57 that can only be viewed by his circle
of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.

The defense is untenable.

Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and
with 1.71 billion monthly active users.58 Social media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and
facilitate users to generate and share content. There are various classifications59 of social media platforms and one
can be classified under the "social networking sites" such as Facebook.60

Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit information. x x x It has a
worldwide forum enabling friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one
another."61 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as
friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user can post a
statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the user's privacy
settings.62

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy
tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v.
W,63 the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but with the cautionary advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies,
"makes every effort to protect a user's information, these privacy settings are however not foolproof."64
Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity - in this
case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.65

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts
respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of
the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a
select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as
the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-
serving, thus deserving scant consideration.66

Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable by his
"Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his
Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1)

Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in
any conceivable way";

(2)

A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;

(3)

The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4)

A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the
former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.67
chanrobleslaw

Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the
prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can
share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the
latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at "Friends."68 Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right
to privacy is negated.

Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise of his freedom of
speech and expression.

Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute.69 While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most
zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.70 As such, the constitutional right of
freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or
reputation or bring them into disrepute.71

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor,"
"Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing
people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of
complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon complainant and BMGI by
posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and
calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already
filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa
which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and
undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and
utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.

chanrobleslaw

By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact
that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He
overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm,
and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and
conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to
criticism72 does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.73 In this case, respondent's remarks
against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct
reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission
to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law invest in them."74 Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-
CBD, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

3. Ulep vs legal clinic, b.m. 553, june 17, 1993

4. Zaldivar vs gonzalez, g.r. 79690-707, oct 7 1988

5. Letter of UP law faculty, a.m. 10 10 4 sc, march 8, 2011

6. In the matter of charges of plagiarism against justice del castillo, am 10 7 17 sc, oct 12, 2010

7. A.m. 05-12-757-rtc, march 7, 2006, re: sexual harassment committed by judge pacuribot
A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC. March 7, 2006]

RE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMMITED BY JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, RTC, BR. 27, GINGOOG CITY

En Banc

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court dated MAR. 7, 2006

A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC (Re: Sexual Harassment Committed by Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Gingoog City)

This refers to the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated 14 December 2005, to wit:

Two (2) women filed separate complaints for sexual harassment against Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot. The first is
Sherlita O. Tan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City and the other is Johanna M.
Villafranca, Clerk II, Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office. Both are married.

Ms. Tan's ordeal started in August 2004 when she refused an invitation from Judge Pacuribot to have dinner. On
October 4, 2004, Judge Pacuribot sent her a text message saying that his blood pressure went up because she
refused to go out with him.

On October 20, 2004, Ms. Tan was attending a wedding at Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro when Judge
Pacuribot called her on the mobile phone asking when she will be back in Gingoog City. She said that she will leave
immediately after the wedding and she will just take a taxicab to the Agora Terminal. Judge Pacuribot said that she
would fetch Ms. Tan from the hotel. Ms. Tan declined the offer but Judge Pacuribot angrily insisted on the ground
that he was already waiting outside the hotel. Ms. Tan, who was now scared, went out and got in the car. However,
instead of bringing Ms. Tan to the terminal, Judge Pacuribot brought her to a motel. When she protested (sic) Judge
Pacuribot harshly told her to -"Shut up! As if you are a virgin!" x x x.

Judge Pacuribot and Ms. Tan left the motel but instead of going to the terminal, he brought her to the Discovery
Hotel saying that it would be better for Ms. Tan to sleep there instead of traveling alone. Judge Pacuribot left Ms.
Tan alone in the room because he had to attend a Masonic Conference. She however could not leave because she
did not have enough money to pay the balance of the hotel bill. At around 7 a.m. of the following morning, Judge
Pacuribot arrived. Ms. Tan's ordeal started all over again.

xxxx

Back in the office, the harassment continued. Whenever Ms. Tan would go inside Judge Pacuribot's chamber, the
latter would grab her blouse, mash her breast, kiss her, touch the crutch (sic) of her pants, pull the string of her
panty and kiss her neck while saying that she smelt so sweet. Judge Pacuribot got angry when Ms. Tan refused to
answer his text messages and insinuated that this will have an adverse effect on her performance rating.

Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca, on the other hand, was initially the recipient of amorous text messages from Judge
Pacuribot with invitations for dinner. Ms. Villafranca was wary of these invitations because both of them are
married. She refused all of these invitations but Judge Pacuribot was persistent forcing her to request for a transfer,
which was however denied. In the last week of February 2005, she got a call from Judge Pacuribot who was furious.
According to him, he was an honorable person and yet Ms. Villafranca refused his invitations. Consumed by fear,
she finally relented and accepted a dinner invitation on February 22, 2005.

While inside his car, Judge Pacuribot displayed his firearm, which was allegedly for security purposes. It
nevertheless intensified Ms. Villafranca's fear. Instead of going to a restaurant, Judge Pacuribot drove to a drive-in
motel x x x.

xxxx

From that day, Judge Pacuribot constantly demanded that Ms. Villafranca send him text messages and letters
expressing sweet nonsense to feed his ego and any failure or refusal would be met by a threat to divulge the
incident in the motel.

xxxx

Then Judge Pacuribot started demanding food from Ms. Villafranca, which the latter was supposed to bring to his
boarding house. If she refused, Judge Pacuribot would threaten to tell damaging stories to her mother-in-law with
whom she had a strained relation and to show the picture he took on the cell phone. Because of these threats, Ms.
Villafranca was forced to bring some food to Judge Pacuribot. x x x.

When Judge Pacuribot sensed that she was not going to file an annulment case, he drafted a document wherein it
was stated that Ms. Villafranca and her husband supposedly agreed that they may freely co-habit with a third
person. Judge Pacuribot, using threats of physical and social harm, forced Ms. Villafranca and her husband to sign
the document.

When Ms. Villafranca still did not file the annulment case, Judge Pacuribot slapped her and hit her head with a
clenched fist. Again he placed a kiss mark on her neck and when her husband saw it, he beat her up. When Judge
Pacuribot knew of the beating, he forced Ms. Villafranca to file a rape case but she refused.

xxxx

The complainants filed their complaints personally before the Office of Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O.
Lock. Although Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca knew each other professionally, their meeting at the said office was
purely coincidental and they had no idea that the other was likewise the victim of Judge Pacuribot. Ms. Tan and Ms.
Villafranca tearfully related to Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock their harrowing experience at the
hands of Judge Pacuribot.

The investigation of Ms. Tan's complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Decorum and
Investigation of the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City while that of Ms. Villafranca falls within the jurisdiction of
this Office since she is not an employee of the judiciary. In either case, the seriousness of the offense calls for a full
blown investigation and for this purpose it is necessary to suspend Judge Pacuribot. His suspension from office will
serve not only to protect the principal witnesses against harassment but will also prevent him from committing
further acts of sexual harassment. The fact that two (2) women filed these complaints independent of each other
and that the allegations therein show a consistent pattern of sexual deviancy, present a prima facie case against
Judge Pacuribot whose immediate suspension is demanded by the circumstances.

In the same Memorandum, the OCA recommended that:

1. The complaint of Ms. Sherlita Tan be referred to the Committee on Decorum and Investigation of the regional
Trial court (sic) of Gingoog City for investigation;

2. The complaint of Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca be docketed as a regular administrative matter;

3. Judge Pacuribot be required to comment on the complaint of Ms. Villafranca; and

4. Judge Pacuribot be suspended immediately until further orders from this Court.
After painstaking consideration of the facts and existing laws, this Court finds the foregoing recommendations not
to be wholly in consonance with, as in fact it contravenes, Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,[1]cralaw providing for the manner by which complaints against Judges of regular and
special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals[2]cralaw are
investigated, in relation to the Supreme Court's constitutionally guaranteed power of administrative supervision
[3]cralawover all courts and the personnel thereof.

Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, categorically provides that:

Sec. 3. By whom complaint investigated. - Upon the filing of the respondent's comment, or upon the expiration of
the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer the matter
to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case for
investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a
Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a
Judge of a Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if
the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.

By virtue of the aforequoted provision, Section 8 of Administrative Circular No. 03-03-1 3-SC[4]cralaw, the Rule on
Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary,
which provides for the referral of work related sexual harassment complaints committed by officials and employees
of the Judiciary, necessarily including Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, but excluding the members of this Court and the Judicial and Bar
Council, to committees on decorum and investigation[5]cralaw (CODIs), appears to furtively dilute the exclusivity of
this Court's constitutionally guaranteed power of administrative supervision which necessarily includes the
authority to discipline Judges and Justices.

Section 8 of the Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work
Decorum in the Judiciary states that:

Sec, 8. Jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the CODIs. - The CODIs shall have jurisdiction over all complaints
for sexual harassment committed by officials and employees of the Judiciary. They shall:

(a) Receive the complaint, investigate its allegations, and submit a report and recommendation to the proper court
or authority, as provided for in Section 18 of this Rule;

x x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]
The composition[6]cralaw of a particular CODI, to all intents and purposes, partly grants rank and file employees of
courts the competence to recommend administrative sanctions over Judges of regular and special courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals thereby potentially diminishing
the authority of this Court over the position, the person and the courts over which they preside. Appropriately, this
Court deems it prudent to exclude said Judges and Justices from the ambit of the jurisdiction of CODIs as provided
under Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC.

Moreover, upon their assumption to office, Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals cease to be ordinary citizens. They become the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. The public look up to them as the epitome of integrity
and justice. For this reason, as this Court has stated in the case of Aquino v. Acosta[7]cralaw, "[a]dministrative
complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by this Court with utmost care, for proceedings of this
nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the entire judiciary as
well." Thus, ever mindful of such propensity, investigations of sexual harassment complaints involving Judges of
regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
must be kept in strictest confidentiality - quite relatively unrealistic in proceedings vis-a-vis referral of a sexual
harassment complaint to a group or panel as laid down by the subject rule.

In fine, the referral of Ms. Sherlita Tan's sexual harassment complaint against Judge Rexel Pacuribot to the CODI of
the RTC of Gingoog City for investigation, report and recommendation, contravenes Section 3 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and limits, nay, weakens this Court's constitutionally mandated disciplining authority over Judges of
regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals,
besides exposing the courts to ridicule and derision.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby Resolved, that in accordance with Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution vesting this Court with the power of administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof,
inclusive of which is the authority to discipline Judges and Justices, complaints of sexual harassment against Judges
of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the CODIs. Accordingly, Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC, the Rule on
Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary is
hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 8. Jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the CODIs. - The CODIs shall have jurisdiction over all complaints
for sexual harassment committed by officials and employees of the Judiciary, except those against Judges of regular
and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, which
shall fundamentally adhere to the proceeding laid down in Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

CODIs shall:
(a) Receive the complaint, investigate its allegations, and submit a report and recommendation to the proper court
or authority, as provided for in Section 18 of this Rule;

x x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]

With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA, finding them to be in accord with existing laws, the
same are hereby APPROVED. In particular, Judge Rexel Pacuribot is immediately SUSPENDED until further notice
from this Court. He is likewise DIRECTED to comment on the complaints of Mesdames Tan and Villafranca within
ten days. The complaint, however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed as a regular administrative matter to be
consolidated with that of Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca's for proper disposition in line with the foregoing discussion.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

[1]cralaw Re: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re Discipline of Justices and Judges.

[2]cralaw Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals have ceased to be referred to as Judges of special courts by virtue of
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282, entitled AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND
ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 1125, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Said R.A. amended Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1125, THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, by
elevating the rank of the Court of Tax Appeals to the same level as the Court of Appeals, possessing all the inherent
powers of a Court of Justice. Moreover, the incumbent Presiding Judge and Associate Judges shall bear the new
titles of Presiding Justice and Associate Justices.

[3]cralaw Section 6 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution emphatically provides that:

Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
[4]cralaw Promulgated by this Court on 14 December 2004, but which took effect on 03 January 2005.

[5]cralaw SEC. 6. Creation of the Committee on Decorum and investigation (CODI) - The Chief Justice shall appoint
the members of the Supreme Court Committee on Decorum and Investigation (SC-CODI), while the Presiding
Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the court of Tax Appeals shall appoint the members of
their respective CODIs. In the Court of Appeals Divisions in Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, the Executive
Justices shall appoint the members of their respective CODIs. In the lower courts, the Executive Judges shall
appoint the members of their CODIs.

[6]cralaw SEC. 7. Committee on Decorum and Investigation - Composition, Voting and Term of Office. - The SC-CODI
shall be composed of the Clerk of Court as Chairperson; a representative from the Office of the Court Administrator
as Vice - Chairperson; and a representative each from the Office of the Chief Attorney, the Office of Administrative
Services, the Medical and Dental Services, the Supreme Court Assembly of Lawyer - Employees, Inc. (SCALE), and
the Supreme Court Employees Association (SCEA). The representative of the SCALE and the SCEA shall be
designated by their respective governing boards from among officials or members in good standing.

The CODIs of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals shall be composed of the
Presiding Justice as Chairperson; the Clerk of Court as Vice - Chairperson; and one representative each from the
employees' associations duly accredited by the Office of the Court Administrator.

The CODIs of the Court of Appeals Division in Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City shall be composed of the
Executive Justice as Chairperson; the Clerk of Court as Vice - Chairperson; and one representative each from the
employees' associations duly accredited by the Office of the Court Administrator.

[7]cralaw In multi - sala lower courts, the CODIs shall be composed of the Executive Judge as Chairperson; the Clerk
of Court as Vice - Chairperson; and one representative each from the employees' associations duly accredited by
the Office of the Court Administrator. In the case of single sala lower courts, the Office of the Court Administrator
shall cluster them for the purpose of forming their respective CODIs.

A majority of the members of the CODI shall constitute a quorum. A vote of a majority of the CODI members
present, there being a quorum, shall be necessary for the issuance of a recommendation. No CODI member shall
participate in any proceeding where he or she is either a complainant or a respondent, or is related by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree to the complainant or the respondent.
In case the Chairperson is disqualified or inhibits himself, the Assistant Clerk of Court in the Supreme Court, the
most senior Associate Justice in the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, or the Vice
-Executive Judge in the lower courts shall serve as the Acting Chairperson of the CODIs in their respective courts.

The members of the CODI shall serve for a term of two years from their date of appointment. [Emphasis supplied.]

A.M. No. CTA-01-1, April 2, 2002.

8. A.m. rtj-06-1982, dec. 14, 2007, sherlita tan vs. Judge pacuribot

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)

SHERLITA O. TAN, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.

x---------------------x

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983 December 14, 2007

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)

JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.

x---------------------x

ANONYMOUS LETTER-WRITERS, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.
DECISION

PER CURIAM, J.:

These consolidated-complaints filed against Executive Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot (Judge Pacuribot) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, consist of the following:

1. Affidavit-Complaint1 dated 4 December 2005 filed by Sherlita O. Tan (Ms. Tan), Court Stenographer of RTC,
Branch 27, Gingoog City, and affidavit-complaint2 dated 20 December 2005 filed by Johanna M. Villafranca (Ms.
Villafranca), Clerk II, Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office, charging Judge Pacuribot with sexual harassment;

2. Letter3 dated 4 April 2005 from "concerned citizens," asking for the relief of Judge Pacuribot on the grounds that
he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the employees, both casual and contractual, of the Hall of Justice of
Gingoog City; and

3. An undated letter4 from "concerned citizens" also asking the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to
investigate the illicit relationship of Judge Pacuribot and a certain Sheryl Gamulo. They informed the OCA that
Sheryl Gamulo bore two acknowledged children of Judge Pacuribot, the eldest of whom named Rexell Pacuribot
was born on 15 October 2004, and the second child was born on 2 September 2005, both at Maternity Hospital,
Cagayan de Oro City.

On 14 December 2005, OCA issued a Memorandum5 recommending that:

1. The complaint of Ms. Sherlita Tan be referred to the Committee on Decorum and Investigation of the Regional
Trial Court of Gingoog City for investigation;

2. the complaint of Ms. Johanna M. Villafrancia be docketed as a regular administrative matter

3. Judge Pacuribot be required to comment on the complaint of Ms. Villafranca; and

4. Judge Pacurribot be suspended immediately until further orders from this Court.6
On 7 March 2006, we issued a resolution amending Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC, approving all the other
recommendations of OCA and suspending Judge Pacuribot, thus:

With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA, finding them to be in accord with existing laws, the
same are hereby APPROVED. In particular, Judge Rexel Pacuribot is immediately SUSPENDED until further notice
from this Court. He is likewise DIRECTED to comment on the complaints of Mesdames Tan and Villafranca within
ten days. The complaint, however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed as a regular administrative matter to be
consolidated with that of Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca’s for proper disposition in line with the foregoing
discussions.7

On 25 October 2006, the court referred the case to Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores of the Court of Appeals,
Cagayan De Oro City Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice thereof.

On 8 October 2007, Investigating Justice Dy Liacco Flores submitted her Report8 with the following findings:

Tan’s story

Ms. Tan’s nightmare as an underling of respondent judge started on 20 October 2004 – a Wednesday. Having
officially filed a half-day leave, she went to Cagayan de Oro City to attend a wedding ceremony at six o’clock in the
evening at Pryce Plaza Hotel. She stood as one of the principal sponsors to a couple named Kimberly Castillon and
Thomas Elliot. At around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, while relishing the "gala" portion during the wedding
reception (when the newly weds dance and guests pin peso bills on their attire), she received from [Judge
Pacuribot] a call through her mobile phone, asking when is she going back to Gingoog City. She said she intends to
go back right after the wedding reception. [Judge Pacuribot] offered to bring her to Agora Bus Terminal but she
politely refused the offer saying that she will just take a taxi in going there. Taking her answer as declining his offer,
he ordered her to come out, displaying short temper, saying he was already waiting outside the hotel. To hint at
urgency, he told her that he just slipped out from the Masonic Meeting he was attending and will immediately
return to it right after he will have shuttled her there. Aware that he has the tendency to humiliate anyone in public
when he is angry, she decided to abruptly leave the wedding reception and comply.

xxxx

Coming out into the lobby of the hotel, Ms. Tan saw respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] inside his car, alone. When
she came near, he opened the car door for her and she took her seat. Then, angrily he asked: "What took you so
long?" She kept mum. She saw in between their seats his clutch bag with his short firearm. That sight frightened
her although she was consoled by the thought that she would soon get rid of him at the bus terminal. Pryce Plaza
Hotel to the bus terminal would be about twenty (20) minutes ride, traffic considered.
Unfortunately, [Judge Pacuribot] had other ideas. Along the way to the bus terminal, he drove in to what looked
like a compound. She unexpectedly saw that his car entered a small garage, and when it stopped, the roll down
shutter quickly locked up from behind. She was brought not to the bus terminal but to a motel whose name she
came to recognize only after the incident as the City Lodge Motel in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. She felt
deceived. Knowing the implications, she protested: "Why did you bring me here, sir? Didn’t I tell you that I will just
take a taxicab to the Agora Terminal?" He rudely told her: "Shut up! As if you are still a virgin!" Respondent judge
[Judge Pacuribot] then directed her to get down the car. Timorously, she obeyed. As soon as she went down his car,
she looked for a possible exit and found none. All she saw was a door which opened. He ushered her into the room,
walking closely from behind her. He locked the door.

Ms. Tan, scared and confused, walked to the comfort room, where she pretended to relieve herself. There, she
again looked for a possible exit. Again, she found none. After a short while, she heard [Judge Pacuribot] asking:
"What are you doing there? What’s taking you so long?" Remembering, that he has a gun, she came out of the
comfort room. To her dismay, she found him nude in bed and fear overcame her more.

[Judge Pacuribot] ordered Ms. Tan to undress. Her reluctance made her move slowly. He let out more impatience
asking: "What’s taking you so long to undress? Excite me!" She refused at first, but he became furious. At that
moment too, she saw his gun on what seemed to her was headboard of the bed. Frightened, she undressed,
retaining her bra and panty. He asked her to kiss him and she obeyed half-heartedly. While she was kissing his neck,
he expressed dissatisfaction by asking: "You don’t know how to kiss! How do you do it with Ramon? Get into sex
right away without any preliminaries?" Ramon is her husband. She was quiet.

[Judge Pacuribot] ordered her to lie down on the bed. She yielded out of fear. He pulled her bra and panty, kissed
her neck and lips, and sucked her tongue and breasts. Minutes after, he inserted his penis to her vagina. While he
did a push and pull motion, she was complaining: "You are so rude, Sir! We work in the same office yet you disgrace
me!" He told her angrily: "Shut up! Concentrate! See! It’s softening...." She recalled that he tried several times to
stiffen his penis but he seemingly has some erection problem. At his attempt for coitus, she felt the penetration
was just slight. Later, he was getting exhausted and was breathing hard. He would rest each time he failed to have
full enjoyment. While he rested, she would ask him to let her go, but angrily he refused. Instead, he would forcibly
ride on top of her again and make more attempts at coitus until he finally gave up. He said to her: "It won’t stiffen
because I have been forbidden to eat many kinds of food such as meat which gives energy."

After a while, Ms. Tan saw [Judge Pacuribot] got up from bed, took his gun, and peeped through the window of the
motel. This time, she once again implored him, "Sir, I’ll just take a taxi to Agora." He answered: "I’ll bring you
there." At the time, she was so confused that she cannot recall whether he made payment in the motel. She could
not concentrate anymore.

The two left the motel in his car. However, instead of conducting her to the bus terminal, again [Judge Pacuribot]
brought Ms. Tan to another place . . . this time to Discovery Hotel adjacent to Limketkai Center, Cagayan de Oro
City. When she protested, he told her that it would be safer for her to sleep there instead of traveling alone. It was
around 10 o’clock in the evening. Still unrelieved of her fright which Ms. Tan calls "shock," or "rattled," she failed to
ask for help, nor did she think of escaping. She was not even able to call her husband. She was even wondering
whether anyone will help her if the judge will do anything to her. After he partially settled the room’s bill, he
warned her not to leave until his return the following morning saying he was returning to the Masonic Conference.
After he left, she asked a bellboy if she could leave, but the bellboy told her that she should first settle the hotel bill
before she can check out. Unfortunately, she had no money enough to pay the balance of the hotel bill. Meantime,
through his cell phone, he kept calling her that night and threatening her to watch out in the office if she would
disobey. She was crying in the hotel. She was terrified of what he will do to her and her family, and what reaction
her husband would make once he learns of what happened to her. She was scared that her husband might kill
[Judge Pacuribot] and her husband would be harmed in turn.

At around 7 a.m. of the following morning, [Judge Pacuribot] arrived. He came panting and rested in bed while Ms.
Tan just stood by. She saw him put his gun near the bed. She recounted the events that happened after, as follows:

Q: What did he do, if any?

A: He ordered me again saying: "Make Love to me!"

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I refused.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He angrily shouted at me: "My goodness! Why are you so slow? As if you are a virgin!"

Q: What did you feel, if any?

A: I was terrified of him.

Q: What did you do, if any?

A: I was forced to go near him, kissed his neck, but [I] stopped.

Q: Why did you stop?

A: I was disgusted with what I was doing and with him.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He angrily told me: "You don’t know how to make love! How do you do it with Ramon? You simply have sex
without foreplay? Kayati ba sab?"

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I felt helpless and kept quiet.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He ordered me saying: "Suck it!"

Q: What did he want you to suck on him?

A: His penis.

Q: What did you do, if any?

A: I refused.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He got angry, pulled my hair and pushed my face to his penis saying: "suck it! Let it in till deep your throat! Let
my penis reach your throat!"

Q: What did you do, if any?

A: I gasped for breath so that when I opened my mouth, his penis entered my mouth.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He tightened his hold on me so I was forced to suck his penis afraid that he might break my neck.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: His penis reached my throat and I felt nauseated so I ran to the bathroom and vomited.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I stayed in the bathroom for a while because I was not feeling well.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He angrily ordered me to go to him and lie beside him and I obeyed.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He rode on top of me again and tried to insert his penis into my vagina.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: His penis could hardly stiffen.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He got angry saying: "It can’t enter! Your vagina’s too small.

Q: What did he do next, if any?

A: He spread my two (2) legs wide apart and tried to insert his penis but it did not stiffen.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He pulled my head towards him by pulling my hair.

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I told him: "Don’t pull my hair, sir! It’s very painful! What a sadist you are!"

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He just kissed my lips, neck, sucked my nipple and mashed my breast by saying: "This is the breast of a lustful
woman" while continuing to suck my neck and breast.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He said: "I’m going to plant lots of kiss marks here to let the people know that you passed through my hands."

Q: What was he referring to as "here"?

A: My neck.
Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I cried.

Q: What happened after that, if any?

A: He rested while I went crying to the bathroom, washed my body then dressed up.

Ms. Tan again pleaded for [Judge Pacuribot] to let her go. This time, [Judge Pacuribot] assented, but he offered to
bring her to the bus terminal. Traumatized, she refused the offer. She told him that she will just take a taxi and will
have breakfast at the Ororama. Still he insisted to shuttle her there. Thus, at about past 8:00 o’clock in the morning,
he left her at Ororama Cogon, Cagayan de Oro City.

Ms. Tan did not report to the office the next working day, that was 22 October 2004 – a Friday. She absented
herself from her work because she still had noticeable number of kiss marks on her neck. She only reported on
Monday and covered her kiss marks with her hair. At the office, [Judge Pacuribot] told her not to file anymore her
leave for October 20 and 21, 2004 while bragging, "Ako na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako?" (It is me, who will prevail
against me?)

Ms. Tan told no one of her traumatic experience and carried on as if nothing happened. But from then on, [Judge
Pacuribot’s] advances on her went on unabated even in the office. Whenever she would go inside his chamber, at
times, he would grab her blouse, mash her breast, and kiss her neck saying that she smells so sweet. At times, he
would touch the crotch of her pants or pull the string of her panty. On 13 October 2005, he did the same indignities
to her in the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latter just pretended to see nothing by turning
his back. Every time she would resist and/or evade his sexual advances, he would shame her before her officemates
at a later time. He also told her to send him text messages of endearment. She was warned that her failure to
comply, or to receive his call, or reply to his text messages will have an adverse effect on her performance rating.

The situation got worse for Ms. Tan when respondent judge [ Judge Pacuribot] indicated his interest in renting a
room in her house which she used as her home office. Ms. Tan’s house is near the Police Station and the
courthouse. Initially, she candidly told him that the said room is not for rent. She even refused him in the presence
of her officemates who cannot comprehend why she should not allow him to rent the room considering that it
would be an additional income for her. At that time, they were unaware what she was going through.

Ms. Tan brought her commercial calendar to their office. It has her picture. Having seen it, [Judge Pacuribot], in the
presence of Ms. Tan, instructed Placido Abellana, the court aide, to mount her calendar at the door of his chamber,
saying: "Whoever removes the calendar would take a scolding from me. Don’t remove Shirley’s calendar. I like that
hot babes." Then, pointing to her picture, he added: "That’s my idol, the hot babes Kikay!" As he was still trying to
persuade her then to let him rent a room in her house, he said in jest to Placido Abellana: "If I rent the room, I will
call Shirly… she will massage me and step on my back and I will feel good because Shirley is sexy."

With the pressure on her to rent him a room being kept, Ms. Tan eventually yielded, but she erected a wall
between his rented room and her house, and provided for him a separate ingress and egress. Nonetheless, when
her husband is not around, she would find him knocking on her window and ordering her to go to his room.

Ms. Tan claims that if [Judge Pacuribot] could not have his way with her because she resists, he would scold her in
his chamber and would also humiliate her in the presence of her officemates. She would also receive threats from
him as regards her performance rating. In fact, her "Very Satisfactory" rating in the previous years of her service
went down to "Satisfactory" for the period of January to June 2005, the first and only time that she was given such
a rating.

Because of the very oppressive ways of [Judge Pacuribot], Ms. Tan eventually suffered from what doctors call
"chronic fatigue syndrome" and was hospitalized in December 2005. Dr. Virgilio Lim of Lipunan Hospital of Gingoog
City treated her. Dr. Lim testified that emotional stresses of a patient could lead to chronic fatigue syndrome.

Ms. Tan’s helplessness against the sexual abuses and advances of her judge was gnawing on her. She found it
revolting. She finally mustered enough courage to come out in the open to free herself. She executed an Affidavit
Complaint sworn before a woman Clerk of Court of Cagayan de Oro City on 06 December 2005. She flew to Manila
and went to the Supreme Court on 08 December 2005 to file her administrative case against her superior. In
February 2006, she filed criminal charges of rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual harassments against [Judge
Pacuribot] before the City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. At the onset, no lawyer in Gingoog City would even want to
accept her case. The criminal cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. She re-filed the case with the
Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro City. They were also dismissed.

Villafranca’s Story

Ms. Villafranca first met respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] sometime in November 2004 at the lobby near the
Probation Office at the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City where she holds office. When [Judge Pacuribot] passed by,
she was then talking to a certain Dondi Palugna, her childhood friend who at that time was [Judge Pacuribot’s]
driver. Short introductions followed.

On 18 December 2004, Ms. Villafranca received a call through her cell phone from [Judge Pacuribot]. To Ms.
Villafranca, the call was unexpected. After their talk, he asked her if he could call again for chitchat. She answered
"Ok lang." She asked him how he got her mobile number. He said he got it from Dondi Palugna. Later, she began to
receive text messages from him, telling her how beautiful and sexy she is, how the mini skirt suited her, etc. She
courteously acknowledged his praises and said "thank you" to him. Then, he started inviting her for dinner.
Knowing him to be married and the fact that she is married, she declined these invitations citing an inoffensive
excuse which is her evening teaching sessions at Bukidnon State College, Gingoog City. But she found him
persistent. One time, he took offense at her refusal, saying "Why don’t you come with me? I AM A JUDGE! Why
should you refuse me? Why do you go with Dondi and not with me when I AM A JUDGE?" At another instance, he
even asked her why she goes with Dondi Pallugna, a drug addict, and not him a judge. Although scared of his
outbursts, which by reputation he was known, she politely explained to him that his driver Dondi Pallugna was her
childhood friend. Still, she had to dodge his persistence.

In avoidance, Ms. Villafranca requested for a transfer to Probation Office, Cagayan de Oro City. This was in February
2005. She was asked to make a written request which she failed to file due to heavy work load. At that time, the
Regional Office of the Probation Office for Region X was about to hold a Timestral Conference. Venue of the
Conference was Gingoog City and so the host office for that conference was the Gingoog City Parole Office where
Ms. Villafranca works. She was assigned to take charge of the hotel accommodations of participants in the
conference. For that reason, she was too busy attending to her assigned task that she failed to prepare the written
request. Accordingly, nothing materialized out of her intended transfer.

Although calls of [Judge Pacuribot’s] were unwanted, but Ms. Villafranca wanted to be polite to him for two (2)
reasons: his status as a judge and his reputation, in the Hall of Justice, as "terror" which caused most people to fear
him. So, she took his calls politely, gave him respect, and when she had to turn down his call, she had to do it
courteously like: "Ok, sir, I still have work to do, I cannot talk long."

In the last week of February 2005, Ms. Villafranca got a call from [Judge Pacuribot] who was fuming mad because
she refused his dinner invitations. Scared, she finally relented. It was scheduled on 22 February 2005 which turned
out to be her worst nightmare.

February 22, 2005 came. [Judge Pacuribot] asked Ms. Villafranca to choose a restaurant. She singled out The
Mansion in Gingoog City for good reasons. The Mansion is owned by her relative. On that account, she thought
that in the place she will be safe. She planned to invite one of her relatives in that restaurant during the dinner. By
arrangement, she was to be picked up at 7 p.m. at the school gate.

A few minutes past 7 p.m., on the appointed date, [Judge Pacuribot], driving his car, fetched Ms. Villafranca. He
opened the car door to her and she took her seat. While she was talking to him, she saw him brought out his clutch
bag, took out his gun, cocked it and put it in between them. Frightened that it may blow off anytime, she voiced
out her fears of guns. He quickly replied that guns are for the safety of judges who are prone to ambushes.

Noticing that [Judge Pacuribot] was driving towards the opposite direction of The Mansion, she told him they are
driving the wrong way. But she was told that they are going to Butuan City as he knew a great dining place there.
While driving with his left hand, [Judge Pacuribot] would hold his gun with his right hand and put it down every
now and then when he had to change gear. This scared her even more and she started shaking in fear. She
observed that he was over speeding and would honk his horn furiously so the other drivers would allow him to
overtake. She started having frightening thoughts like imagining being killed if she resists and be left along the road.
She feared for her life, and of her children.

After about an hour, Ms. Villafranca noticed that [Judge Pacuribot] turned right from the national highway, and a
little farther, he honked his horn, entered a garage which then immediately closed as soon as his car entered. It was
late for her to realize that he brought her to a motel in Butuan City. She became numbed with fear. He alighted
from the car carrying his gun, and opened the door on her side. She asked him: "Why are you taking me here? You
told me we were going to a restaurant." He ignored her. He told her to get out of the car. Sensing she was
uncooperative because she would not get down, he grabbed her from the car. She tried to resist but she was
numbed with fear. She wanted to get away but she could not seem to move. He pushed her in the room. She
attempted to go out of the room but he locked the door and blocked it with his body. She pleaded to him to let her
go because her children and family are looking for her. Then, [Judge Pacuribot] grabbed Ms. Villafranca by her
shoulders and tried to kiss her. She evaded by backing out from him and turning her face away. As she continued to
back away from him, she fell on the bed while he immediately laid on top of her. She felt his hands groping all over
her body, as he tried to kiss her. She kept on pleading to him to let her go; that she wants to go home because her
kids are looking for her. He lifted her blouse, unbuttoned and unzipped her pants while she was pushing him away.
But he was too strong and big for her. She tried to get up when he took off his pants and brief, but he was fast and
was soon on top of her. As he pinned her down on the bed, she could hardly move and found him too heavy. All
along she was trembling in fear and was crying while pleading to him for mercy. But he could not be dissuaded. On
cross examination, [Judge Pacuribot’s] counsel asked her some details on this incident, as follows:

Atty. Kho:

Q: You said you were brought to Butuan City in a motel. Do you remember the name of the motel?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: Could you remember the size of the room that you were in on that day which you claim on February 22, 2004?

A: I’m sorry, Attorney, everything seems to be so blurred during that time. All I could really remember was asking
him to take me home because it was not agreed that I go with him in a motel but in a restaurant at Mansion by the
sea at Gingoog City.

Q: So you don’t remember really anything else?

A: I remember what happened to me.

Q: Why, what happened to you?

A: When he forced himself to me.

Q: When you say he forced himself to you, what do you mean?

A: When he was on top of me and he was kissing me. God, I can feel and I can remember how heavily he was
breathing in my face and he was kissing me all over and he was trying to position himself inside of me. Those are
what I can remember and I kept on telling him: "No! I want to go home to my children." I wanted to go home
because my family will be looking for me. What? Did he listen to me? No, he kept on telling me I am emancipated.
Nobody will look for me.

Q: What were you wearing at that time on February 22?

A: I was wearing pants and a blouse.

Q: Were you undressed at that time?

A: I am sorry?

Q: Were you undressed?

A: Undressed? He undressed me.

Q: He undressed you?

A: Yes.

Q: Nothing left?
(No reply).

Ms. Villafranca felt that her legs were being parted as [Judge Pacuribot] tried to insert his penis into her vagina, but
she could sense he had difficulty with erection. She felt penetration was slight. She recalled that he tried
penetration more than three times, but was unsuccessful. She felt his heavy breathing while he planted vile kisses
on her neck and chest. Her repeated pleas for mercy had not done her any good. Not long after, he rolled over with
her and she found herself on top of him. He grabbed her hair and pushed down her face to his penis, and forced
her to do oral sex on him instead. She resisted, but he insisted saying that it was what he wanted, otherwise she
would be put to harm. She took it to mean that he will kill her if she refuses him. Scared, she relented and had oral
sex on him. She felt shamed as she sucked his limp penis. She was disgusted with him, with herself and the very act
itself. Still not having an erection, he released his grip on her. While she was physically and emotionally exhausted,
she continued crying for mercy, but [Judge Pacuribot] was boasting that nobody in his right mind would refuse his
demands as he could easily cause damage to anybody’s honor if he wanted to.

Ms. Villafranca then got up, and put on her underwear and pants. [Judge Pacuribot] also got up and took his cell
phone. She pulled the sheets to cover herself because her blouse was on the opposite side of the bed. However, he
pulled the sheets from her and pushed her to the bed half naked. She braced herself with her arms so that the she
would not be pinned down on the bed again. But to her surprise, he took a picture of her, using his cell phone. She
was petrified. He then looked at the picture commenting that it was no good because she was not smiling, so he
ordered her to smile as he will take another picture of her. Although she defied him, yet he did take another picture
of her. She the hurriedly put on her blouse while he dressed up, fixed himself and tucked his shirt and his gun.

After [Judge Pacuribot] settled the bill, he led her out of the room. Ms. Villafranca shrugged him off. At the garage,
she was ushered to the front seat of the car. She was dying to go home. He drove back to Gingoog City. On their
way back, she turned her back on him, closed her eyes, covered her face with hand, and pretended to be asleep.
Later, he informed her of their approach to Gingoog City. She asked him to drop her off at the old Caltex gasoline
station along the national highway. From there, she hailed a motorela, went home, took a long bath to wash his
marks of her. At about 11 p.m., she fetched her children from her father’s house. When asked where she had been,
she gave her father a lame excuse that she went out with her friends.

Ms. Villafranca reported to work the next day. There had been some phone calls in their office. Like any other
office, whoever has the convenience to answer at the time would pick up the phone. [Judge Pacuribot] had called
twice their office already and when her officemates answer the phone, he would just hang the line. When the
phone rung again, she picked it up. It was [Judge Pacuribot] on the other end. After recognizing her voice, he
belittled her yelling: "Prostitute! Devil! Animal! Why don’t you pick up the phone?" She was consumed with fear,
and meekly told him that she was just busy. Days passed as he continued to threaten her with the publication of
her half naked picture. She tried to pacify him sensing that he could make real his threats. Being married to an
overseas worker with two kids, she was so scared of figuring in a scandal. Her fright of him was burdensome. He
would send her text messages telling her of sweet nothings, but every time she would ignore them, he would burst
in anger and would renew his threats. At times, she made excuses, like having no cell phone load, but he would
insist that she should secure a load, otherwise he would shame her. He was far too wise to accept excuses. Her
constant fear made her succumb to his blackmails.

[Judge Pacuribot] was always demanding that Ms. Villafranca send him text messages and letters expressing
nonsense, a matter she could not understand then. She thought it was only to feed his ego. On cross examination,
[Judge Pacuribot’s] counsel asked why she complied with these orders. She answered:

Atty. Kho:

Q: In your affidavit, do you remember having said that the respondent is forcing you to send to him text messages?

A: Yes.

Q: And you complied with the sending of these text messages?

A: Yes, because one day when I was not able to text he called me and he screamed at me over the phone and then
he said: "Burikat, animal ka, yawa ka, imo gibuhat… dili ko nimo i-ignore. This will be the last time na imo ko i-
ignore sa text or sa tawag nako. Otherwise, you will pay for it."

Atty. Ignes translating:

"You whore, you devil, you animal, don’t you dare! This will be the last time you will ignore me in my call, otherwise
you will pay for it."

Atty. Kho:

Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?

A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture, he will show that to my mother-in-law and then
he will destroy me and he will create scandal in Gingoog City.

Q: Is it not that you are well-connected? Your grandmother is the mayor. Did you not report it to her?
A: My husband is not around, Attorney.

Q: And?

A: And what? How would I explain to them that I was there? How he took my picture? How am I going to? I don’t
know. I just wanted to protect my family from any shame, from any scandal. And he knew that it would be his hold
to me. And he knew that I would be very careful with the name that my family had, that is why he is constantly
threatening me with such same arguments, you know. "Ikaw and madaot ani. Imo ning kuan tana."

Atty. Ignes:

"You will be destroyed because of this."

Atty. Kho:

Q: So, you admit that you sent him a lot of text messages?

A: I did not deny it in my affidavit. I had it in my affidavit, that there were text messages and forced notes written
for him.

[Judge Pacuribot] also asked her to send him cards with amorous messages. On these, she was also grilled on cross
– examination. It went as follows:

Atty. Kho:

Q: You mean you often wrote some notes?

A: Yes. I may even have some drafts there wherein he even edited it.

Q: What kind of notes were they?

A: Love notes and there was a time he made me write a letter to my mother-in-law which the very next day I was
posting myself at the Post Office awaiting for that letter to come so that I could intercept it.

xxxx

Q: Also attached to the Comment of respondent are some notes already marked as Annex 9. Could you go over
some of these notes and tell us if this is your handwriting? Annexes 9 and 9B.

A: I will not deny that I wrote these letters but they were under his supervision just like the ones he made to my
mother-in-law and to my husband.

Q: You mean to say you were writing the letters?

A: Yes. He will dictate to me what to do, what to say.

xxxx

Q: So you were acting like a stenographer who writes down his dictation?

A: I did not act like a stenographer who wrote down his dictation. But I acted like a victim who is under threat by
some…

Q: The words here in Annexes 9-A and 9-B, you mean to say all of these are his words, the respondent?

A: As I said Attorney, yes, under his dictation, under his supervision. Do you know what is this?

Atty. Kho:

No. Do not ask me a question. You are not allowed to do that.

Witness (continuing)

While I was doing those writing, I felt that all my limbs were so tired. I felt so heavy writing those letters.

Atty. Kho:

Q: So you admit sending the respondent a lot more letters that the ones I’ve presented you?

A: I admit that I wrote those letters under his supervision, yes.

Q: All of the letters that you sent were all under his supervision?

A: As I said, yes, under his supervision. There were times that he would even call me to his chamber to have some
cards signed.

Q: So, aside from notes, you also sent him cards?

A: Yes, I recall signing them because he would ask me to do so.

xxxx

Justice Flores:

Q: When you said that the judge would even call you to his chamber to sign cards, what kinds of cards?

A: Greeting cards, Your Honor.

Atty. Kho:

Q: Hallmark?
A: I don’t recall. I would just easily sign them, do whatever he wanted and then after he is done touching me I
would ask myself to leave.

Q: So, you also sent him lots of greeting cards?

A: I did not send your client. He gave it to himself.

Q: I am going to show you one last card. Tell me, is this one of the cards that you said you signed? I’m going to give
this to you. For submission.

A: Yes.

Q: This is one of the cards that you signed?

A: One of those cards that I signed.

xxxx

Q: Miss Witness, the handwriting on this card now marked as Exhibit 6, on the second line of the handwriting are
the words "Love you, Bi." Could you tell us what is the meaning of the word "Bi", if you know?

A: It has no significance with me because your client dictated it to me.

Q: So, it was dictated only.

A: As I said, he dictated words to me.

Ms. Villafranca’s resistance would always be met with a threat to divulge the incident in the motel. Although she
yielded to these promptings of sending him text messages or cards or notes, she never understood why [Judge
Pacuribot] behaved so. It was late in the day when enlightenment came to her that all his orders to her to send him
amorous text messages, letters and cards were not to feed his ego but to prepare for his defense even while she
was as submissive as a lamb. In his Comment to the administrative charge against him, he cited the text messages,
letters and cards he induced her to send to him to deflect her charges of rape and unprofessional conduct and
prove them untrue. He cited them in his Comment as her manifestation of "fatal attraction" to him.

xxxx

There had been occasions when [Judge Pacuribot] summoned Ms. Villfranca to his chambers on the pretext of
discussing probation matters, but once inside his chamber, he would lock the door, grab her, kiss her, put kiss marks
on her neck and chest. He would pull her hair and push her down to his crotch and demand that she performs oral
sex on him. Her overpowering fear of him and the scandal he can inflict on her family made her yield to him. When
she would disobey him he would call her cell phone with lots of insults like calling her "burikat" or with his threats.

Also, [Judge Pacuribot] demanded food from Ms. Villafranca which the latter had to bring to his room in Ms. Tan’s
house. Her fear of dire consequences of her resistance absorbed her. When demanded to bring food, she would
comply out of fear. In her words, "Yes, I went because he would put me under pressure and under fire." She went
not only because of his constant threat of making public his cell phone picture of her, half naked, but also because
of "his added threat that he is going to tell my mother-in-law; that he is going to destroy me; that I am nobody; that
my family is no good and he would call me ‘burikat, burikat (whore)’. He would call me that name ‘yawa ka, animal
ka. Sumunod ka nako." She was angst-ridden with the set – up. She was fearful that somebody might see her in his
rented room or on her way to it or back. She was made to go there about eight (8) times. All these instances, she
saw him display his gun. She found him too selfish and an ingrate. Once, on his demand to bring food, she brought
him only pansit and lumpia which was no longer crisp. Unappreciative, he furiously stabbed his plate with fork,
breaking it and carped that she served him food which is not fit for a judge, and suited only to her seaman
husband. He also made her eat with him on occasions which she abhorred so much because according to her "he
ate like a pig – eating fast with shoulders hunched, elbows on the table, mouth noisily chewing the food."

When grilled on those eight (8) times, the following exchanges between [Judge Pacuribot’s] counsel and Ms.
Villafranca took place:

Atty. Kho:

Q: In all of these times, 8 times which you said, you did not care to offer any resistance?

A: I had offered a lot of resistance, Attorney, but your client would make it a point that I should not refuse him.

Q: You tried to resist?

A: I had evaded him many times, many times but he would always point out that I should not refuse him, otherwise
he will destroy me and he did eventually when I finally had the courage to put up with him, you know.

(The witness is crying at the witness stand)

Q: During those 8 times which you said you went to the room of respondent at Sherlita Tan’s place which is near
the police station and the LTO, was there a time that you shouted?

A: I could not shout, I’m scared.

Q: You were scared of what?

A: Scared of your client.

Q: Of the person?

A: Yes and how intimidating he could be and how evil he could be.

After eating, Ms. Villafranca would be ordered to take off her clothes; then, [Judge Pacuribot] would lay on top of
her for his sexual pleasures. But penetration would be slight because, as usual, he had difficulty with erection. As a
consequence, he would push her down to his organ and order her to do oral sex on him. She detested his routine of
putting kiss marks on her neck and chest which he intentionally used so that, as he told her, people would know
that he owned her. At times, she left his rented room wearing a hooded jacket in order o hide her face fearful that
certain people might recognize her along the way. There were times she also left his room without underwear
because he would not give it to her. She hated his sexual abuses, but she was more afraid of causing scandal to her
family.

In April 2005, after having dinner with [Judge Pacuribot] in his rented room, Ms. Villafranca was pulled by her hair
and was asked, "[w]ho owns you now?" She answered in fear – "you." He looked very pleased. Then, he told her to
leave her husband and promised to help her file a marriage annulment complaint in Gingoog City. She did not say a
word. He went on top of her and pulled her hair demanding for an answer. Terrified, she said "opo". Then, she was
forced to have sex with him.
[Judge Pacuribot] wanted to destroy the relationship Ms. Villafranca has with her husband and his family. He forced
her to write a letter, asking for a break up of marriage from her husband which [Judge Pacuribot] edited. He also
ordered her to write to her mother-in-law with whom she had some difficulty in their in-law relationship, to say she
wanted a marriage break-up. She told him she does "not need to write letters to her mother-in-law. What for?" But
he insisted. Her hands felt heavy writing them, in fact it took her three drafts to write as shown in Exhibits "B", "C"
and "D" of Ms. Villafranca. Discontented with her drafts, he took away the last from her, edited it, and told her he
will mail it to her mother-in-law. Thinking he will make good of his threat, the following day she posted herself
outside the Gingoog City Post Office for a long time and waited for the mailing of said letter so that she can
intercept it. No one came. She instructed the postal clerk that if there is a letter intended for her mother-in-law, she
should not give it to her mother-in-law but to her instead.

Meantime, Ms. Villafranca’s morbid fear of [Judge Pacuribot], his threat to mire her and her family in scandal and
her guilt toward her family had been sucking her into a vortex of emotional and physical collapse. She bore the
immense pain of yielding to him. She seemingly could not withstand the humiliation for being involved in forced
sordid incidents with [Judge Pacuribot] whom she detested.

On 9 May 2005, seemingly depressed for her accumulated frustrations for not being able to see her way out of her
predicament, Ms. Villafranca, sent a text message to her husband who was then working aboard a foreign vessel.
Her text message went this way: "Whatever will happen to me, you take care of the kids." He asked: "What’s
wrong?" She answered: "I cannot fully disclose to you everything but in due time I will. Whatever happens to me,
just take care of the kids and that I love them." Her disturbing message constrained her husband to pre-terminate
his employment contract and rushed home to Gingoog City on 15 May 2005. She then personally told [Judge
Pacuribot] to stop calling her or asking for food, but he grabbed her hair, twisted her head and planted a kiss mark
on her neck, telling her that it would send a message to her husband that he, not her husband, owned her. Still, she
was not prepared to make her revelations to her husband.

In the third week of May 2005, Ms. Villafranca was persistently instigated by [Judge Pacuribot] to file an annulment
case against her husband. Later, he asked her to sign what Ms. Villafranca calls a "ridiculous document" he drafted
wherein it purported to show that she and her husband agreed that each of them may freely cohabit with a third
person. She signed it in the face of his threats. Worse, he asked her to ask her husband to sign the same document.

On 25 May 2005, at the Hall of Justice in Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca was summoned to [Judge Pacuribot’s]
chamber. Once inside, he slapped her for not filing her petition for annulment of marriage and hit her head with
clenched fist. Then, he planted on her neck kiss marks which he said he wanted her husband to see. Indeed, when
her husband found her with kiss marks, she suffered from her husband’s beating.

Citing her husband’s beating her, Ms. Villafranca pleaded to [Judge Pacuribot] to stop molesting her. He countered
with an unusual suggestion – File a rape case against him. When she refused, the threat of the dire consequences
of her refusal came again. She still kept from her husband what she was going through.
But [JudgePacuribot] seized another incident to destroy her more. On 15 June 2005, he reported in writing to the
superiors of Ms. Villafranca – superiors in local office and superiors in Manila – alleging her negligence allegedly
committed on 6 June 2005 in forgetting to shut off the air-con unit in their Probation Office. Her local superior in
the Probation Office referred to her the letter of [Judge Pacuribot]. She prepared an explanation which her local
superior used as letter to the judge. Thinking that because she authored that letter, the explanation there covered
already her side, she did not write nor see the judge anymore. This further infuriated him.

xxxx

In July 2006, Ms. Villafranca’s request for transfer was granted and she started working in Cagayan de Oro City on
17 July 2006. The transfer of assignment resulted in her constant separation from her nine (9) year old son and four
(4) year old daughter, plus the great inconvenience of a 2½ hours bus ride from Gingoog City one way, and
transportation expenses. She would usually go home to Gingoog City to be with her family and children on
weekends, or every now and then, and sometimes late at night.

After her transfer to the Probation Office in Cagayan de Oro City on 17 July 2006, Ms. Villafranca was able to tell her
husband what she went through. Before that, she just could not find the courage to tell him because she was
scared. When she was twitted on cross examination on how so long that she was scared, she said:

Atty. Kho:

Q: So, what you told him at that time was that you were scared?

A: Attorney, I was walking in fear most of those times and even up to now when I came home I am walking in fear. I
don’t know if I’m safe. I don’t know if the next day I will be dead. I don’t know. Those were the times when I asked
my husband to accompany me because I’m always scared all the time. Even if I just go out of the gate ask my
husband to accompany me.

(At this juncture, witness is sobbing)

Ms. Villafranca decided to fight back with this administrative charge. She subscribed her Affidavit-Complaint before
State Prosecutor Roberto A. Escaro on 13 December 2005. In Ms. Villafranca’s Complaint she prayed that [Judge
Pacuribot] be found guilty of gross violation of the Judicial Code Of Professional Responsibility (Code of Judicial
Conduct) for being totally unfit to stay in the Judiciary and she prayed that he be ordered immediately dismissed
from service. She also prayed that [Judge Pacuribot] be immediately ordered to cease and desist from causing any
further assault on her person, in her personal and professional capacity.
On the same day, Ms. Villafranca submitted her Affidavit-Complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator. [Judge
Pacuribot] filed his Comment. Among others, he cited that Ms. Villafranca was "fatally attracted to him" and that he
refused to reciprocate because "he is a judge and happily married," and for the reason that Ms. Villafranca’s
"misdirected adoration is atrociously immoral." Ms. Villafranca filed a Rejoinder refuting point by point the
defenses of [Judge Pacuribot] and calling them lies. Ms. Villafranca said his defenses are presumptuous and
revolting because in the Hall of Justice, female personnel "invariably veer away from his path in trepidation." She
asserts that [Judge Pacuribot’s] extramarital indiscretions are well known, if not well documented, in Gingoog City,
that it is common knowledge that his mistress Sheryl Gamulo, whom [Judge Pacuribot] housed in Motomull St.,
Gingoog City, gave birth to two (2) children by [Judge Pacuribot] on 16 October 2004 and 02 September 2005 at the
Maternity Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City; that the eldest child was baptized in Opol, Misamis Oriental with Atty.
Wilfredo Bibera, his clerk of Court, and Dondi Pallugna, his driver, as baptismal sponsors. Ms. Villafranca claims
therein that respondent judge is also known to have sired a daughter in Ozamiz City now about ten (10) years old
whose picture has been circulated in the Hall of Justice and that [Judge Pacuribot’s] immorality most probably
inflicted on victimized women is a sick source of scandal and gossip in the city.

To be able to put behind her harrowing experience, Ms. Villafranca applied for leave of absence with their office to
work abroad knowing that [Judge Pacuribot’s] order in People v. Anude and his letter to her superiors have
effectively made her lose that desired promotion. Eventually she left the country on 2 October 2006 for Dubai, UAE
to work and forget her past even if her leave of absence in their office was not yet approved. On 18 March 2007,
she returned to testify in this case after struggling against employment restrictions and financial constraints, she
not having been half a year yet abroad. On 22 March 2007, when asked on the witness stand when she will leave
again for Dubai, she said: "I want to leave the country as much as possible and stay out of here. I don’t want to be
reminded of what happened to me." At the time she testified in March 2007 in this case, her leave of absence in
the Probation Office was not yet granted.

In his Comment,9 Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of Ms. Tan and Villafranca for "lack of factual and legal
bases"; and opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were motivated by revenge and were part of a
comprehensive and sinister plan to drive him out of service.

Judge Pacuribot made total denial of Ms. Tan’s charges against him and claimed that the alleged incidents on 20
and 21 October 2004 were "big lie[s], a fraud, a hoax and deception." He insisted that he could not have committed
the acts complained of by Ms. Tan because in his first five months in office, he was busy planning what to do and
how to quickly dispose of the almost 500 cases he inherited, including the new ones raffled to him.

In particular, Judge Pacuribot denied the alleged rape incidents on 20-21 October 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and
interposed the defense of alibi. He contended that he was in faraway Gingoog City, which is 120 kilometers away
from Cagayan de Oro City. He stated that on Mondays, he reports for his duties in Gingoog City, and goes home to
Cagayan de Oro City only on Fridays. He maintained that on 20 October 2004, a Wednesday, at 7:00 p.m., he went
out of his chambers with his court aide Placido Abellana, Jr., and his security officer SPO1 Ronald Espejon. They
proceeded to Garahe Sugbahan Grill for dinner. After dinner, Espejon and Abellana escorted him back to his
boarding house. Abellana left him at 9:00 p.m. while Espejon went home at about 11:00 p.m.

Judge Pacuribot admitted that he did not hold trial on 21 October 2004, a Thursday, because the scheduled settings
were all cancelled that day which cancellation was made a week before. He averred that on the same day, he was
writing decisions in his chambers. In the evening, he asked Abellana to buy food and they ate supper with Espejon.
Abellana left him about 8:00 p.m. while Espejon left at about 10:00 p.m.

He, thus, concluded that it was impossible for him to be with Ms. Tan on 20 and 21 October 2004, a Wednesday
and a Thursday, respectively. He argued that no proof existed to show his physical presence in Cagayan de Oro City
on those dates; hence, the presumption of his continuing physical presence in his station during the inclusive
period alluded to ran in his favor.

Judge Pacuribot also cited several factors which made Ms. Tan’s allegations unbelievable:

1. Ms. Tan’s behavior was not reflective of a rape victim. Ms. Tan did not immediately report the incident to the
authorities. As a 43-year-old lady who is no longer naïve and having assisted as stenographer in countless rape
cases, she should know how important it is to immediately report the incident.

2. Judge Pacuribot pointed to Ms. Tan’s admission that she did not put up a struggle when he allegedly brought her
to City Lodge Motel and Discovery Hotel. Had she wanted to catch the attention of employees, she could have done
so. He also stressed that what Ms. Tan called a headboard where he allegedly put his gun in the motel room was
merely less than one inch in width, too narrow for a .45 cal. gun to rest.

3. On 25 November 2004, a month and three days after the alleged rape, Ms. Tan invited all her officemates,
including him, to her birthday party held at her home, where she sang and danced. She displayed her dancing skills
then. She even taught him how to dance the swing. Again, during the Court’s Christmas Party in December 2004,
she socialized with her fellow workers, including him, and even performed the "kikay dance" during the program.

4. On 1 Septemeber 2005, all the staff of Judge Pacuribot, including Ms. Tan, attended his birthday party at his
house in Cagayan de Oro City, where she merrily danced with dance instructors and posed with Judge Pacuribot’s
wife.

5. On May 2006, five months after she filed the administrative charge against Judge Pacuribot, Ms. Tan joined the
Search for Mrs. Gingoog City Contest as one of the candidates and she paraded in the gymnasium, all smiles, while
attired in an elegant gown.
6. Judge Pacuribot alleged that Ms. Tan and her husband were publicly known to be putting up a façade that all was
well with them, although they constantly quarreled and had been sleeping in separate rooms already.

Judge Pacuribot disputed Ms. Tan’s version of how he became the lessee of a room at Ms. Tan’s house. He claimed
that in January 2005, she came to know that he was looking for a new boarding house and she offered two small
rooms at her house available for rent. He chose the one facing the Police Station of Gingoog City, which he claimed
to be only about five meters more or less from the room he rented. He paid an advance rental of P5,000.00.

Judge Pacuribot denied sexually harassing Ms. Tan. In refuting her claim that he sexually harassed her in his
chambers, he countered that this could not have happened as his court aide, Placido Abellana, was always in his
chamber with him. If Abellana was out on an errand, his security officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, temporarily took
over. There had never been any moment in his chambers that he was without companion. There was always either
his court aide or his security officer with him. Even when he had visitors, his court aide was still in his chambers to
maintain transparency and avoid unwarranted talk. Once in a while, his branch clerk of court, Atty. Willfredo Bibera,
Jr., would go to his chambers to confer with him regarding cases. Sometimes, too, his security officer Espejon would
take his blood pressure in his chambers. Under these circumstances, Judge Pacuribot argued that no sexual
harassment could have occurred. He also called attention to the fact that Ms. Tan’s affidavit and testimony
presented the dates of the alleged sexual harassments as follows:

27 October 2004

06 January 2005

03 November 2004

08 August 2005

25 November 2004

03 October 2005

08 December 2004
04 October 2005

09 December 2004

11 October 2005

05 January 2005

13 October 200510

The 6 January 2005 alleged incidents were followed only on 8 August 2005, thus, belying Ms. Tan’s claim that the
sexual harassments were done regularly. Also, Ms. Tan’s allegation that he sexually harassed her on 25 November
2005 was incredible, because on that date she was on her birthday leave, and was busy preparing the dishes she
was going to serve them during her party. He emphasized that the criminal complaints for rape, acts of
lasciviousness and sexual harassments filed by Ms. Tan against him with the City Prosecutors Office in Gingoog City
and Cagayan de Oro City were all dismissed.

Judge Pacuribot explained that these administrative and criminal charges filed against him by Tan and Villafranca
were part and parcel of a grand plot hatched by Ronnie Waniwan, a radio commentator, to oust him from office. He
claimed that Waniwan was then facing four counts of libel in his sala. The City Prosecutor recommended
P50,000.00 bail for each. When Waniwan filed a motion to reduce bail bond, respondent denied it for several
reasons, i.e., (1) there was a previous conviction, (2) he was not from Gingoog City, and (3) when a warrant for his
arrest was issued, he went into hiding instead of surrendering. Waniwan filed a motion for respondent to inhibit
himself, which the latter denied. As a consequence, Waniwan spent 13 days in jail for failure to put up a bail bond.
Judge Pacuribot learned that Waniwan had contacted the NPA for Judge Pacuribot’s "liquidation" as revealed in the
affidavits of two captured NPA sparrow unit members. He discovered that Waniwan with Mesdames Tan and
Villafranca plotted and conspired to destroy him after his personal talk with other media men including Jonas
Bustamante, Jerry Orcullo and Jessie Mongcal.

Judge Pacuribot believed that Ms. Tan succumbed to the egging of Waniwan to jump the gun on him. Ms. Tan knew
that her job was in danger because of her growing inefficiency, a subject of his several warnings, since her
inefficiency would essentially affect the performance of his court, a scenario which he abhorred, having been a
consistent performer in the disposal of cases during his days as labor arbiter. In fact, he considered Ms. Tan the
most inefficient among the four stenographers he had. She was allegedly lazy, inarticulate in the English language,
and flawed in spelling, which hampered her effectiveness in preparing transcriptions. Worse, due to her
moonlighting as manager of the Tan-Hoegee Internet Café, she would usually go home during office hours to catch
some sleep. He believed that his good relationship with her soured when he asked Ms. Tan to be more focused on
the job; that he was going to move to a new house; and when he did not let her borrow P200,000.00, or at least be
a guarantor of her loan.

Anent the written charges of Ms. Villafranca, Judge Pacuribot specifically denied all material allegations therein for
being untrue. In particular, he denied the alleged rape incident on 22 February 2005 in Butuan City. He asserted
that he never went out alone at night in Gingoog City, knowing the place to be dangerous, and the fact that PNP
confirmed to him that he was in the list of those slated for "liquidation" by the NPA. Hence, he insisted that he
neither invited Ms. Villafranca for dinner, nor did he travel from Gingoog City to Butuan City during night time.

Judge Pacuribot claimed that on 22 February 2005, at 5:00 o’clock more or less in the afternoon, he asked a certain
Fil Sumaylo to buy and cook a big fish and ten pieces of small octopus because they would have dinner at the
latter’s house. At about 6:30 p.m., respondent went with his security officer Espejon and court aide Abellana to
Sumaylo’s house. His branch clerk of court, Atty. Bibera, was also there. After dinner, Espejon and Abellana escorted
him back to his boarding house at about 11:00 p.m. Abellana left ahead, while Espejon left at about 11:30 p.m.

Also, Judge Pacuribot gave several reasons why he would not venture at all to go to Butuan City alone. He said he
was security conscious, considering that he handled drug cases and other high-profile cases. He had also received
NPA threats on his life. He claimed that Butuan City was about 80 kilometers from Gingoog City and he would not
go there and risk his life for a woman he barely knew.

In denying Ms. Villafranca’s allegations of sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness, Judge Pacuribot pointed
out that the acts of grabbing, kissing and performing oral sex in his chambers could not have happened as his court
aide, Abellana, who is the uncle of Ms. Villafranca, was always present in his chambers, aside from the fact that his
chamber was just beside the room of the staff.

Judge Pacuribot contended that Ms. Villafranca’s charges were improbable. He assessed her to be a very intelligent
woman with a strong personality. Ms. Villafranca is well connected, because she is a recognized illegitimate
daughter of a certain Polkem Motomull, a one-time member of the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental and
nephew of Mrs. Ruthie Guingona, incumbent City Mayor of Gingoog City. A sister of her father is the Assistant City
Auditor of Gingoog City, while Judge Pacuribot’s predecessor, Judge Potenciano de los Reyes, is her father’s first
cousin-in-law. RTC Judge Downey Valdevilla of Cagayan de Oro City is also her uncle; and even Judge Pacuribot’s
court aide, Abellana, is her father’s first cousin. Considering the big family of Ms. Villafranca, anyone will think, not
just twice, but several times, before doing anything against her. Ms. Villafranca will not just allow herself to be
raped and beaten by a stranger like him in Gingoog City. He found out that, as indicated in the police blotter of
Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca reported that she was raped and mauled by Mr. Ricky Lee Villfranca, her husband,
who carted away important belongings at about 2:00 a.m. of 26 May 2005. He claimed that if Ms. Villafranca could
report her husband to the police for said offense, then she should have reported him also to the police if her
allegations were true.
Judge Pacuribot denied calling Ms. Villafranca through her cellphone. On the contrary, it was she who was calling
him. She also sent him adoring or alluring text messages including seductive notes and poems. He claimed that
being a happily married man, he ignored the flirtatious and seductive advances of Ms. Villafranca, to her
consternation and bewilderment. He claimed that her adulation of him came to an abrupt end and
metamorphosed into an intense hatred and dislike after he issued the 6 June 2005 Order in Criminal Case No. 2004-
2879 entitled, "People v. Anunde" pointing out her incompetence, inexperience and unprofessional attitude toward
her work. He opined that the charges of Ms. Villafranca are typical under the adage, "Hell hath no fury than a
woman scorned."

Judge Pacuribot further complained that Ms. Villafranca would follow up cases of her relatives in his sala.

After weighing the evidences and arguments of all the parties, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores found:

FATHERHOOD UNPROVEN

On the Anonymous Letters about [Judge Pacuribot’s] illegitimate fatherhood, the Investigator finds the claim
unsupported by any documentary evidence. Although the certification of the hospital’s administrative officer
proves correct the claim in the anonymous letter as to (1) the hospital; (2) the identity of the mother; (3) the
number of children delivered; and (4) the date of birth of the two children, but it did not shed light on the identity
of the children’s father. In this case, the certificates of birth of the two (2) children mentioned in the anonymous
letter showing [Judge Pacuribot’s] fatherhood would be the best evidence adequate to prove the claim. With no-
record-of-birth-certifications issued by the local civil city registrar and the office of the Civil Registrar General, no
finding of guilt can be made.

RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENTS PROVEN BEYOND REASONBLE DOUBT

Ms. Villafranca’s story of rape and repeated sexual harassments is credible. [Judge Pacuribot’s] defense of denial
and alibi failed to overcome complainants’ evidence.

On the rape in Butuan City motel, [Judge Pacuribot] insists on the improbability of his presence at the scene of the
crime because he alleges that he does not go out at night in Gingoog City without company for two (2) reasons –
that he is security conscious and that there is an NPA threat on his person.

Firstly, [Judge Pacuribot’s] being security conscious is no proof of improbability in going to Butuan City. So many
criminals are security conscious yet they go out alone at night to commit a crime. Hence, his being security
conscious could not have deterred him to go out.
Secondly, his claim of an NPA threat on his person is suspect. He claims that he learned he was marked for NPA
liquidation when he was given a copy of the affidavits of two (2) captured NPAs named Marvin Lumod and Rico
Roselem marked as Exhibits "22" and "23" respectively. Unfortunately, these two (2) affidavits will not help [Judge
Pacuribot]. Marvin E. Lumod’s Affidavit is dated 20 June 2006 while Rico A. Roselem’s Affidavit is dated 19 June
2006. The incident in Butuan City occurred on 22 February 2005. The reason, therefore, in not wanting to go out at
night without company on 22 February 2005 was still absent. [Judge Pacuribot’s] alibi that he was in Gingoog City
on 22 February 2005 is backed up by the testimonies of SPO1 Ronald Espejon and Placido Abellana. But these two
are his loyals aside from the fact that Abellana, as his court aide, is also one whose employment is under control
and supervision of [Judge Pacuribot]. Thus, on that account, their testimony must be taken with grain of salt. Their
testimony cannot discredit the straightforward testimony of Ms. Villafranca on how [Judge Pacuribot] deceived her
twice – on the purpose and on the place. He invited her for dinner but ravished her instead. They agreed on The
Mansion in Gingoog City for the dinner, yet drove her to a Butuan City motel.

[Judge Pacuribot] asks: Why did Ms. Villafranca not report to the authorities that he sexually assaulted her, if true,
when she even reported to the police that her husband raped her on 26 May 2005? [Judge Pacuribot], to prove
that Ms. Villafranca reported to the Police, presented Annex "3", a certified copy of an entry in the Police Blotter of
Gingoog City. [Judge Pacuribot] should have noted that in that certified copy, it is shown that it was his security
officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, not Ms. Villafranca, who had the report entered in the police blotter. The certification
did not say that Ms. Villafranca appeared at all in the Police Station and had the incident blottered. All that Ms.
Villafranca did was to ask Espejon for assistance because he was beaten by her husband.

[Judge Pacuribot] claims that the administrative charge is Ms. Villafranca’s reprisal against him. He claims that Ms.
Villafranca appears to be "fatally attracted to him" and that he "remains steadfast in his refusal to reciprocate he
atrociously immoral and misdirected adoration to him." He claims the administrative charge is proof of the fury of a
woman scorned. On the "fatal attraction" [Judge Pacuribot] cited the text messages, notes and cards he claims Ms.
Villfranca sent him. Ms. Villaffranca explained how he has always demanded of her to send him those, the reason
for which she could not fathom then. He would even have cards in his chamber and then summon her to sign them.
When she resists, he would let out a barge of insults and threats. [Judge Pacuribot’s] possession of those letters,
cards, and text messages was adequately explained by Ms. Villafranca.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] theory of Ms. Villafranca’s "fatal attraction" and "misdirected adoration" of him is funny. He
never disputed the testimony of the two (2) complainants that [Judge Pacuribot] is reputed in the Hall of Justice as
"terror", that he is fond of humiliating people in public, using excoriating language on his victim, that female
employees avoid him and veer away from him when they meet in the Hall of Justice. He also failed to specifically
deny the claim of Ms. Villafranca that he housed his mistress, Sheryl Gamulo, in Motomul St., Gingoog City. He also
failed to specifically deny her claim that he sired a ten (10) year old daughter in Ozamis City. Will all the dark side of
his character publicly known, hardly would a twenty-nine (29) year-old, very pretty married woman who [Judge
Pacuribot] claims is very intelligent fall for such character. Thus, [Judge Pacuribot’s] claim of Ms. Villafranca’s "fatal
attraction" and "misdirected adoration" of him becomes incredible.
[Judge Pacuribot] asks why did Ms. Villafranca allow herself to be raped and victimized over a prolonged period of
time when there were people capable of helping or protecting her considering her illustrious, although illegitimate,
lineage? Further, if he committed sexual abuses on Ms. Villafranca at his rented room which was very near the
police station, why did she not shout or report to the police?

The fact that Ms. Villafranca is well connected in Gingoog City was actually not a boon but a bane. It was on that
account that she wanted to protect at all costs their family from any scandal. [Judge Pacuribot] capitalized on it
with his constant threat that he will bring scandal to them by making public her half naked picture taken in the
motel. Her wanting to protect her family from shame cowed her into silence and submission. Her testimony
demonstrates that. It reads:

Atty. Kho:

Q: A cellphone picture that is what you are afraid of?

A: No, also his added threats that he is going to tell my mother-in-law, that he is going to destroy me, that I am
nobody, that my family is no good, and that he would call me "burikat, burikat." He would call me that name. "Yawa
ka. Animal ka. Sumunod ka nako."

(Atty. Ignes – Div. Clerk of Court interpreting:)

"Burikat" means a whore. "You lewd devil, and you have to follow me."

xxxx

Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?

A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture, he will show that to my mother-in-law and then
he will destroy me and he will create a scandal in Gingoog City.

Q: Is it not that you are well-connected?

A: My husband is not around, Attorney.

Q: And?

A: And what? How could I explain to them that I was there? How he took my picture? How am I going to? I don’t
know. I just wanted to protect my family from my shame, from any scandal. And he knew that it would be his hold
to me. And he knew that I would be very careful with the name that my family had, that is why he is constantly
threatening me with such same argument, you know: "Ikaw and madaot ani. Ino ning huan tanan."

(Atty. Ignes:)

"You will be destroyed because of this."

Ms. Villafranca said she was scared of [Judge Pacuribot’s] person and "how intimidating he could be and how evil
he could be." She feared him because when she resists him he would tell her "madaot ka ani." (You will be
destroyed because of this.) So she had to yield to him because she knew he could do what he threatens to do – to
destroy her. She points to the Order dated 6 June 2005 in People v. Anude of how indeed he had destroyed her.

[Judge Pacuribot] claims in his Comment and Consolidated Memorandum that Ms. Villafranca is a very intelligent
girl and with strong personality, reasons why it is improbable to make her a victim of rape and sexual harassments.
And yet, when he issued the Anude Order, he made her look like she is an irredeemable incompetent who "cannot
spell", who "uses high falutin words in her Post Sentence Investigation Report which she herself may not have
understood," whose sentence construction is horrendous," "her proper noun is written with small letter" and that
"her adjectives or adverbs do not fit the things or persons described." [Judge Pacuribot] engages in double – talk.

In the three – paged Anude Order, [Judge Pacuribot] tried to show that Ms. Villafranca’s incompetence is toxically
mixed with acute haughtiness because Ms. Villafranca refuses to consult the judge or see him or refused to come
to him even when summoned repeatedly. [Judge Pacuribot] should not gripe. He summoned Ms. Villafranca to his
chamber on 25 May 2005. Once inside, [Judge Pacuribot] slapped her for not filing her petition for annulment of
marriage and her head with his clenched fist. He planted on her neck kiss marks which he said he wanted her
husband to see. When Ms. Villafranca’s husband saw them later, he beat her. At 2:00 am of 26 May 2005, SPO1
Ronald Espejon claims that Ms. Villafranca called him for assistance. It was the start of Ms. Villafranca’s growing
defiance to [Judge Pacuribot], a fact that roiled him to point of issuing the Anude Order eleven (11) days later.

[Judge Pacuribot] also belittled Ms. Villafranca repeatedly in said Order by referring to here as "MERE Clerk
II/understudy Johanna M. Villafranca of Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office," calling her "visibly
inexperienced mere clerk," "very raw," and that her report was atrocious. He ordered her Post Sentence
Investigation Report returned "OFFICIALLY" to the superior of Ms. Villafranca for proper corrections. [Judge
Pacuribot] stated therein that Ms. Villafranca cannot be located in her office as she is always absent per
information in her office. He stated that she should not be allowed to practice making post sentence investigation
in preparation for a desired promotion.

The Anude Order is the classic proof of how Ms. Villafranca’s disobedience to [Judge Pacuribot] ended up in her
destruction – "Madaut ka ani." The Order destroyed her person and her career. Therein, he has beaten Ms.
Villafranca’s career to a pulp. Any superior of Ms. Villafranca who will read the Anude Order will block any desire of
Ms. Villafranca for promotion which the latter was aiming for at the time. She rued with tears how the Anude Order
displaced her from her job.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] repeated harping in said Order about Ms. Villafranca’s failure to consult him and to come to him
even when summoned, rendered more believable Ms. Villafranca’s claim that [Judge Pacuribot] would summon her
to his chamber on the pretext of official matters and thereafter subject her to his lasciviousness conduct.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that Ms. Villafranca was part of Ms. Waniwan’s conspiracy was unproven. All the Sun Star
pictures of Ms. Tan’s filing of the criminal complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not show at any instance
the face of Ms. Villafranca. Also, she made it clear in her testimony that sometime in February 2006, when Ms. Tan
filed her criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor, two other media men called her up to see if they
can get a copy of her Affidavit-Complaint. But she refused to prevent the public from knowing what she went
through.

Indubitably, Ms. Villafranca’s testimony and the anguish that came with it can only come from a very sad
experience. Even on the very delicate matters where [Judge Pacuribot] had stripped her mercilessly of her dignity
and womanhood, Ms. Villafranca was frank and straightforward, proof of how outraged she was when [Judge
Pacuribot] had raped her and had sexually harassed her repeatedly.

Her spontaneity in answering the cross examination questions, the anguish she revealed in court, her very natural
and coherent way of telling how she was ravished and abused repeatedly as an underling leaves no room to doubt
her testimony and the things she said under oath in her Affidavit – Complaint, her Rejoinder, and her Sworn
Statement. Her tears could only be the clues to her righteous indignation against the indignities she suffered from
[Judge Pacuribot]. Indeed, the conviction to reveal the truth must have been so strong that she had to come back
to the country hurdling employment restrictions and the difficulty of not having saved enough yet for her trip back
just to testify in this case.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that her administrative charge is a fabrication is unacceptable against the avalanche of
Ms. Villafranca’s evidence. The Investigator cannot find any valid reason to sustain [Judge Pacuribot’s] denial and
alibi as a defense.
[Judge Pacuribot] is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of rape in Butuan City and guilty of multiple
sexual harassment committed inside respondent judge’s chamber and in his rented room in Gingoog City. His claim
that Ms. Villafranca’s charge is a fabrication is unacceptable considering the avalanche of evidence against him.

While [Judge Pacuribot] committed physical assault on Ms. Villafranca on 25 May 2005 when after summoning her
to his chamber, he slapped her for not filing the petition to annul her marriage and hit her head with his clenched
fist, the same is deemed absorbed by the offense of sexual harassment considering that brute force and
intimidation had always been used by [Judge Pacuribot] to commit said offenses.

On the eight (8) occasions that [Judge Pacuribot] had carnal knowledge of Ms. Villafranca in his rented room while
[Judge Pacuribot’s] gun was always displayed on the table, implying the commission of rape, the same are treated
as sexual harassments only for Ms. Villafranca’s failure to state when they were committed and to provide details
on those occasions.

Ms. Tan’s agony started with [Judge Pacuribot’s] deception. He made her believe he will bring her in his car to the
bus terminal from Pryce Plaza Hotel, only to surprise her after riding with him by bringing her to the City Lodge
Motel to ravish her. Again, while about to leave City Lodge Motel, he deceived her again by telling her that he will
bring her now to the bus terminal, only to bring her to the Discovery Hotel, so that he can ravish her some more
later. Aside from deception, [Judge Pacuribot] uses extravagantly another tool – intimidation. Immediately after Ms.
Tan settled herself on the front seat on that infelicitous night of 20 October 2004, he immediately had his bag
between them, the bag Ms. Tan knows contains [Judge Pacuribot’s] gun. Also, he used on her an uncouth language
in a loud voice, an irrational temper, a fake message of urgency to rattle Ms. Tan and make her jump to obedience
without thinking. By the time Ms. Tan realized [Judge Pacuribot’s] repulsive intentions, it was too late to fight back
because she had been trapped in the motel.

His repeated intimidating warnings on Ms. Tan that she could harm her if she disobeys were indeed proven true.
On 24 November 2004, Ms. Tan was severely and publicly scolded before her office mates, a fact that was affirmed
by Atty. Wilfredo Bibera. Her performance rating from "Very Satisfactory" slipped down to "Satisfactory" in 2005.

[Judge Pacuribot] uses force and cruelty on his hapless victims. When he ordered her to do oral sex on him and she
refused, he pulled her hair and pushed her face to his penis with an order: "Suck it. Let it in till deep your throat.
Let my penis reach your throat." He tightened his hold on her that she was frightened he might break her neck. In
pain, she had to plead: "Don’t pull my hair, sir. It’s very painful. What a sadist you are." While he was sucking her
nipple and mashing her breasts, he was telling her: "This is the breast of a lustful woman." While he was planting
vile kisses on her neck to produce "chiquinini" on her, he told her: "I am going to plant lots of kiss marks here to let
the people know that you passed through my hands." Upon hearing it, Ms. Tan cried. Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot] is a
sadist beyond description capable of declaring his unconcealed intention to parade her to the public as his victim.
At the trial, when issues would touch on her tender feelings towards her family or when it would recall [Judge
Pacuribot’s] cruelty that crushed her respectability or the delicateness of her womanhood, she would invariably
sob on the witness stand. The way he ravished her and sexually harassed her showed how irrationally lewd or
unbearably cruel he was.

Even when Ms. Tan was already abused, still the thought that he is her superior had never been lost to her. Ms. Tan
has always addressed him – "Sir."

"Why did you bring me here, Sir? Didn’t I tell you I will just take a taxi to Agora Terminal?

"Don’t pull my hair, Sir. It is very painful. What a sadist you are."

"You are so rude, Sir, we work in the same office yet you disgrace me."

"Sir, I just take a taxi to Agora."

[Judge Pacuribot’s] moral ascendancy over Ms. Tan was an undeniable factor to her blind submission to his
depravity.

[Judge Pacuribot] pointed to Ms. Tan’s inefficiency, her not being a happily married woman, that her husband is a
wife beater and a violent man, that she is in financial straits who even run to him for help. It is precisely these
weaknesses, personal problems, and economic difficulties which added to Ms. Tan’s inability to fight back and
made her so submissive. She was the ideal prey. As she was made to admit during her cross examination, she is the
lone breadwinner in the family with two (2) children to support.

[Judge Pacuribot] challenges Ms. Tan’s claim of rape and repeated sexual harassments by arguing, to wit:

"Why did she not refuse to go with respondent when he allegedly fetch her at Pryce Plaza Hotel on 20 October
2004 and instead go voluntarily with him?"

"At the Discovery Hotel, if indeed she stayed and slept there all by herself, why did she not escape or call for help
and instead wait for respondent to arrive the next morning? So that he can sexually assault her again? Or why did
she fail to ask for help from any of the hotel staff or from anybody while in the Discovery Hotel?"
"If she immediately reported to the police authorities the maltreatment of her son by her husband, why did she
not complain of the alleged incidents of sexual harassments and acts of lasciviousness she experienced from the
respondent?"

Despite her claims of having been subjected to rape, sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness, why did she
gleefully socialize with respondent during their Christmas party and respondent’s birthday celebration?"

Ms. Tan had only two (2) options –

"Lose her job by promptly fighting back at [Judge Pacuribot]; or

"Keep her job tolerating him with muffled defiance.

Ms. Tan had correctly assessed the far reaches of his influence. When she was looking for a lawyer to help her file
the administrative charge, no lawyer in Gingoog City would like to accept her case. She had to look for one in
Cagayan de Oro City. She was thus correct to wonder while she was in Discovery Hotel whether anyone there would
come her aid if [Judge Pacuribot] will start harming her.

Ms. Tan as a victim cannot be put in the same footing as other rape victims where the offender holds no control on
the victim’s survival and has no moral ascendancy over her. Fighting back immediately against the offender is a
rational move. In the case at bench, [Judge Pacuribot’s] moral ascendancy and influence over her was a given. It
was that together with his flair to humiliate people and his blackmails which made her succumb to his sexual
abuses. Ms. Tan values her job; in fact, she consciously keeps track of her performance ratings. An underling who
believes that her immediate superior wields control over her continued employment or sudden separation from
service will cower in fear to the point of tolerating the indignities committed on her. As [Judge Pacuribot] impressed
on her, looking for a new job at her age is not easy.

At the time that [Judge Pacuribot] was taking advantage of Ms. Tan, [Judge Pacuribot’s] proverbial explosives
temper and short fuse were being put to good use to terrorize her with remarkable frequency. That dark spot in his
character which has been brought up front in other people’s consciousness in the months following his arrival in
the Hall of Justice as a "terror" is enough intimidation. To Ms. Tan, to "submit now and complain later" is a good,
albeit temporary, shelter against immediate public humiliation or job separation. Thus, Ms. Tan’s failure to report to
the police is understandable.

Also, [Judge Pacuribot] seems to have a masterful skill on how to exploit his victim’s weaknesses. Ms. Tan is a
stenographer, a position she has difficulty coping with because as [Judge Pacuribot] noted, her spelling, her
grammar and her knowledge of the English language are not at par with the demands of her job. He has warned
her of her "inefficiency" and of staying late in the evening as manager of the internet café. He pointed to her joining
without prior SC permission a trip to Hongkong on a weekend in a packaged tour for stenographers in Cagayan de
Oro City. Thus, with such faults and difficulties, she is the ideal prey. Her fear of losing a source of livelihood has
made her behave submissive to him.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] alibi that on October 20 and 21, 2004, he was in Gingoog City and it was impossible for him to
be in Cagayan de Oro City on those days does not impress. It fails to establish the impossibility of his presence at
the scene of the crime. With the convenience of his car, [Judge Pacuribot] could travel and be in different places,
one after another in a short time. After all, the incidents on October 20 and 21, 2004 were all beyond office hours.

To support [Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that he was present on those days in Gingoog City, he presented his Certificate
of Service for the month which shows that he was only on leave on October 4 to 7, 2004.

Noteworthy is the testimony of Ms. Tan stating that when she met [Judge Pacuribot] on Monday in their office after
the rape incident, the latter told her not to file anymore her leave for October 20 and 21, 2004 and bragging, "Ako
na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako?" (It is me, who will prevail against me). If he can forego the filing of application for
leave for his subordinates, much more is there reason for him not to submit an application for leave for his own
absence reason why his Certificate of Service for the month of October is not reliable.

On 21 October 2004 – a Thursday, all schedule of hearing were cancelled and [Judge Pacuribot] said that they were
cancelled the week before. Was the cancellation the week before due to the fact that [Judge Pacuribot] received
the notice of their Masonic Conference scheduled on October 20 in Cagayan de Oro City? It was [Judge Pacuribot]
who informed Ms. Tan of that Masonic Conference that evening of October 20. Ms. Tan could not just have
invented that idea of a Masonic Conference. That is the reason why the cancellation of hearing on October 21 casts
doubt on [Judge Pacuribot’s] alibi.

Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, like alibi, is a self-serving
negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.

[Judge Pacuribot] cites Ms. Tan’s merry behavior during the Christmas Party and his Birthday Party in Cagayan de
Oro City as hardly the behavior of a rape victim or a victim or repeated sexual harassments. Normally, such a victim
is expected to behave with animosity and grievance toward the offender. Unfortunately for her, she cannot afford
to display such animosity and grievance unless it is at the cost of her job. If she cannot defy his demands when he
victimizes her, shouldn’t her economic realities prompt her to win her war with friendship? [Judge Pacuribot]
should be reminded that in sexual harassments under Section 3 of RA No. 7877, an offense is committed regardless
of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the subject of said act.
Ms. Tan’s testimony was clear, frank and consistent. Her candid and clear-cut account of how respondent judge had
been deceitful and intimidating in his dealings with her that evening has inspired belief. And throughout her
testimony, she succeeded in revealing how [Judge Pacuribot] took full advantage of his moral ascendancy over her
as his underling, destroying whatever resistance she could put up by belittling her, outwitting her and insulting her
to reduce her to submission.

There is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. In fact, not every victim of rape can be expected to act
in conformity with the expectations of anyone who has not been subjected to the same danger at any time. The
workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently.

Investigator, thus, finds [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of rape committed on
October 20 and 21, 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and guilty of sexual harassments committed in respondent judge’s
chamber in RTC, Branch 27, Hall of Justice, Gingoog City against Ms. Sherlita O. Tan.

One can see in these two cases a common strategy used by [Judge Pacuribot] in achieving his vile purposes. He
used deceit on Ms. Tan. He used deceit on Ms. Villafranca. He used intimidation on Ms. Tan and he used it on Ms.
Villafranca. He makes use of a substantial blackmail against both.

In the case of People v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court had occasion to instruct us on the effects of intimidation,
thus:

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim
submits herself to her attackers because of fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine
whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some
may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon,
by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a gun is sufficient to
bring her into submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the burden of proving
resistance.

[Judge Pacuribot] computed nine (9) months, twenty-one (21) days as interval from the time Ms. Villafranca
claimed she was raped on 22 February 2005 to 13 December 2005 when she filed the complaint. Ms. Tan also filed
her administratively charge only thirteen (13) months of being his superior’s prey. Did delay cast doubt on the
truthfulness of their claim?

In the case of People v. Aguero, Jr., where there was a two (2) years delay in the filing of the complaint for rape, the
Supreme Court said:
As to the alleged two-year delay in the filing of the complaint, suffice it to say, that complainant’s failure to
promptly report the incident does not sufficiently detract from her credibility and cannot be taken against her. It
has been held that a rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the
complaint and is not an indication of deceit as it is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear for her
aggressor and lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused.

In the case of People v. Espinosa, where the criminal complaint was filed about one and a half years from
commission of the offense, the Supreme Court said:

x x x Delay in reavealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape
never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain,
rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender’s making good on his threats. This is
understandable, considering the inbred modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the public disclosure of matters
affecting their honor.

Delay in the filing of the charges does not necessarily undermine the credibility of witnesses.

The Supreme Court has deemed delay as justified when there is fear of reprisal, social humiliation, familial
considerations and economic reasons. In the case of Ms. Tan, her tormentor is her superior who constantly dangles
his influence and power over her and her job. As regards Ms. Villafranca, the threat to destroy her, her family and
her family’s good name was ever present; thus, haunting her emotionally and psychologically. The delay in
reporting the rape cases committed by [Judge Pacuribot] has been justified.

On the repeated sexual harassments and violence committed separately on the persons of Ms. Tan and Ms.
Villafranca within the chamber of [Judge Pacuribot], the latter deems them improbable because of the situation in
his chamber. He points out that outside his chamber is the staff room and there is a glassed window that divides
them. Ms. Villafranca cited the incident on 13 October 2005 where [Judge Pacuribot] did lascivious acts on her
inside the chamber in the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latter’s just turned his back and
pretended to see nothing.

In the case of People v. Lavador, the rapist-appellant argued that rape was impossible due to the presence of the
victim’s son on her side. The Supreme Court said:

Nor can we accept the argument that the rape was improbable due to the presence of Noniluna’s sons by her side.
This Court has repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter of time and place and rape can be committed even in
places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within the school premises, inside the house where
there are several occupants and even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping. x x x.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] defense of "improbability" cannot, therefore, be accepted.

[Judge Pacuribot] declares that the charges against him are complainants’ tools of revenge against him. He cites his
Order in People v. Anude and his letter reporting Ms. Villafranca’s negligence as reasons from Ms. Villafranca’s
anger and resentment. Against Ms. Tan, he cites his warning against her inefficiency as stenographer, her
moonlighting in her internet caféhis refusal to grant her a loan of P200,000.00 or being her guarantor.

In the case of Simbajon v. Esteban, the Supreme Court in believing the testimony of the complainant saying:

"The investigating judge correctly disregarded the respondent’s imputation of ill motive on the part of complainant.
No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and
strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a falsehood.

Indeed, it is against human nature for a married woman to fabricate a story that would not only expose herself to a
lifetime of dishonor, but destry her family as well. Besides, there is no sufficient evidence of any ill-motive
imputable to Mesdames Tan and Villafranca to narrate anything other than their respective desire to tell the truth
and seek redress for the wrong inflicted on each of them. For the kind of reputation [Judge Pacuribot] has in the
Hall of Justice and by his behavior where he projects himself as full of influence and power, these two women will
be the last to even cross the path of respondent judge without just cause. Thus, the presumption applies that, one
will not act and prevaricate "and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] theory that all these charges are part of the sinister plan to oust [Judge Pacuribot] from office at
the instigation of Ms. Waniwan is far fetched.

On 8 December 205, or earlier, when Ms. Tan filed her complaint, there was no Mr. Waniwan to speak of. Mr.
Waniwan only materialized in February 2006 when she filed the same charges against [Judge Pacuribot] before the
City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. Media men at the slightest clue of a "scoop" hound without let up those who could
be sources of information. When the media men became nosey, it was already in February 2006 when Ms. Tan filed
the case in the Prosecutor’s Office. By then, the filing of the administrative charge of Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca
was fait accompli. In the case of Ms. Villafranca, the Waniwan theory is patently absurd. Two media men were
eager in February 2006 to take hold of Ms. Villafranca’s affidavit but she refused them staunchly. It is incredible that
two (2) married women would prevaricate against a person who has power and control over their jobs at the mere
urging of Mr. Waniwan is irrelevant. In People v. Mortales, the Supreme Court, speaking through now Chief Justice
Renato Puno, appositely said:
No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation to foist a false charge of rape. Neither
would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her family. The fact that the victim resolved to
face the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret evinces that she did so to
obtain justice. Her willingness and courage to face the authorities as well as to submit to medical examination are
mute but eloquent confirmation of her sincere resolve.

Finally, it may be true there are minor and trivial discrepancies in Ms. Tan’s testimony, but they neither impair the
integrity of the victim’s evidence as a whole nor reflect negatively on the witness’ honesty. Such inconsistencies,
which might have been caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken
the credibility of the witness, for they shake off the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

In sum, [Judge Pacuribot] should be made administratively liable for the charges against him in A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-
1982 and RTJ-06-1983.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean "soundness or moral principle and character." It is said to be
synonymous with "probity," "honesty," and "uprightness." The evidence adduced indubitably show that [Judge
Pacuribot] lacks the honesty in dealing with his two subordinates herein. Not only did he fail to live up to the high
moral standard expected of a member of the Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms of morality expected of
every person.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] offenses in raping his victims and sexually harassing them were committed with aggravation. He
knew they were married but instead of helping strengthen or protect their marriage, he tried his best to destroy
their marital bonds.

Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot’s] reprehensible acts amount to gross misconduct, and immorality the depravity of which
is quite rare. They undoubtedly violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. They are classified as severe charges under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 22 of the same Rules, any of the following sanctions may be imposed if the respondent is guilty of a
serious charge:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more that three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Simbajon v. Esteban, the respondent Judge Esteban, for his sexual advances on one of his female subordinates
which consisted of "grabbing her, kissing her all over her face, embracing her and touching her right breast" was
preventively suspended for the duration of the investigation until further notice AND was subsequently dismissed
from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government – owned or controlled corporations.

Herein [Judge Pacuribot’s] conduct is far worse that those of Judge Esteban. [Judge Pacuribot’s] acts indubitably
went far beyond the bounds of decency and morality. He raped and repeatedly sexually assaulted, not only one,
but two female, married subordinates. He did not only violate his victims’ womanhood and their dignities as
persons but he aimed to weaken, then eventually destroy two families. By such act, [Judge Pacuribot] disgraced his
noble office, as well as the judiciary, in the eyes of the public. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe.

When the fading sobs of two tearful women finally died down and their copious tears dried in the numerous
hankies that absorbed them what emerges is a figure that unmistakably exudes the abominable torpedo of marital
bonds, a practicing deceiver and a merciless pervert whose face is unrecognizable as he is hooded with a judicial
robe that helps conceal his dark side. His family, wife and children may have all been innocently kept away from
knowing this dark side and to spare them from the afflictive and crushing humiliation of having a husband and
father of such a character, may the foregoing description be a "for your eyes only" to the members of the highest
court and the court administrator.

Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended:

This finding is made with full awareness of the recent Supreme Court ruling on quantum of evidence required in
the cases at bench. In the 7 August 2007 case of Alquizar v. Carpio, et al., the Supreme Court pronounced that:

x x x. In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on
the complainant. While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit
different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against
judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases.
The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the removal
of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To
borrow from Reyes v. Mangino:
Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would
entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree
of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The evidence adduced here
overwhelmingly established moral certainty that respondent judge raped and sexually harassed complainant
Mesdames Tan and Villafranca on separate and repeated occasions.

xxxx

Having found [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of rape and repeated sexual
harassments, the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits is hereby recommended.11

We agree in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice.

We have reviewed the record of this case and are thereby satisfied that the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Justice are in truth adequately supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal
principles. We therefore resolve to adopt such findings and recommendations relative to the administrative liability
of the respondent judge for grave misconduct and immorality.

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice, but also upon the
perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have administered justice. At
times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create
confidence among the people that justice, indeed, has been served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the
people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive
and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and in their private lives. Only then can the people be
reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the
judicial system.

With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct has the following
provisions:
Canon I

Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Canon II

Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.

We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and
suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge
of their official duties but also in their everyday lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good
moral character and are at all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public
decency. We have adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency, which every member of
the judiciary must observe.12 A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to
the extent that such private morals are externalized.13 He should not only possess proficiency in law but should
likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.

We explained the rationale for requiring judges to possess impeccable moral integrity, thus:

The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be beyond reproach and above suspicion.
The faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice cannot be maintained if a judge who
dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely continues to
commit an affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.14

We also stressed in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.15 that:

The code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates
that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or
separated from his personal experience. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in
the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion."

Judge Pacuribot miserably failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He behaved in a manner unbecoming
a judge and model of moral uprightness. He betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in
which they hold the Judiciary in general.

It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.16 In the cases at bar, the complainants Ms.
Tan and Ms. Villafranca were able to adequately substantiate their allegations.

We find totally unacceptable the temerity of Judge Pacuribot in subjecting the complainants, both his subordinates,
to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Over long periods of time, he persistently solicited
sexual favors from Ms.Tan and Ms. Villafranca. When they refused, he made their working conditions so unbearable
that Ms. Tan was eventually forced to transfer to another office and Ms. Villafranca to seek employment abroad.
Certainly, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from any court employee, even from a woman of loose
morals.17 Judge Pacuribot’s conduct indubitably bears the marks of impropriety and immorality. Not only do his
actions fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the
standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to
women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily "x x x result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the employee[s]."18

We need not detail again all the lewd and lustful acts committed by Judge Pacuribot in order to conclude that he is
indeed unworthy to remain in office. The narration of the Investigating Justice was sufficiently thorough and
complete. The audacity under which the sexual violation of the complainants were committed and the seeming
impunity with which they were perpetrated by Judge Pacuribot shock our sense of morality. All roads lead us to the
conclusion that Judge Pacuribot has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in the Judiciary. His
actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the Judiciary, fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his
acts deserve no less than the severest form of disciplinary sanction -- dismissal from the service.

On his part, Judge Pacuribot put up the defense of denial, attributing ill feelings and bad motives to Ms. Tan and
Ms. Villafranca.
Already beyond cavil is the evidentiary rule that mere denial does not overturn the relative weight and probative
value of an affirmative assertion. Denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with no evidentiary value.
Like the defense of alibi, denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations.19 Denial cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by the witnesses who had no ill motive to testify falsely. Moreover, in the case
at bar, there is utter lack of basis to sustain the purported ill motives attributed by Judge Pacuribot to the
complainants. The Investigating Justice correctly disregarded Judge Pacuribot’s imputation. No married woman
would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage
in order to perpetrate a falsehood.20 The only plausible and satisfactory explanation for us is that the charges
against respondent are true.

Judge Pacuribot and his witnesses failed to overcome the evidence presented by the complainants.

Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere
employees of the court of which he is an officer. His actuations are aggravated by the fact that complainants are his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of
his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of acting in loco parentis over
his subordinate employees, he was even the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.21

In sum, we concur with the Investigating Justice in holding that complainants were able to muster the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove their charges against Judge Pacuribot. By having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and
Ms. Villafranca, his subordinates, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and completely failed to
live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of members of the Judiciary.

Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, we hold, without any hesitation, that Judge Pacuribot be meted out
the severest form of disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the service for the charges of sexual harassment against
him.

We, however, find the complaints of the Anonymous Letter Writers without merit. Beyond the bare allegations that
Judge Pacuribot maintained an illicit relationship with a certain Sheryl Gamulo and fathered two children with her,
there is nothing in the records that would indicate that he, indeed, committed the crime charged. We have stressed
time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.22 The letter dated 4 April 2005 from "concerned citizens" asking for the relief of Judge
Pacuribot on the grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the employees has been rendered
moot by the disposition of these cases.

All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that "[T]he administration of
justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy,
beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all that is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against
injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is
sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come to pass."23

WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct and immorality
prejudicial to the best interests of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except
the money value of accrued earned leave credits. Respondent judge is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist
immediately from rendering any order or decision; or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever,
effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision. Lastly, respondent judge is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be disbarred as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

This Decision is immediately executory. The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this
resolution be immediately served on respondent.

9. Aquino vs. Acosta, cta 01-1, April 2, 2002

A.M. No. CTA-01-1 April 2, 2002

ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO, complainant,

vs.

HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA, Presiding Judge, Court of Tax Appeals, respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The present administrative case filed with this Court originated from a sworn affidavit-complaint1 of Atty. Susan M.
Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charging Judge Ernesto Acosta,
Presiding Judge of the same court, with sexual harassment under R.A. 7877 and violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility.

In her affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged several instances when respondent judge sexually harassed her.

On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the United States, bringing gifts for the three
judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and greeted her by
shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek.
On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, saying he will get
something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry
Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.
Complainant submitted the Joint Affidavit2 of Ma. Imelda C. Samonte and Anne Benita M. Santos, CTA Tax
Specialists, to prove that respondent went to her office that day.

On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could see him in his
chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her but she
was able to evade his sexual attempt. She then resolved not to enter his chambers alone.

Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, while complainant
and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her
shoulders and kissed her.

In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to his office. She then
asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her. Fortunately, when they reached his chambers,
respondent had left.

The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant and asked her to see
him in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany her. The latter
agreed but suggested that they should act as if they met by accident in respondent's office. Ruby then approached
the secretary's table which was separated from respondent's office by a transparent glass. For her part,
complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill.
Respondent seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at the
secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of
the office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then approached
complainant saying, "me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa." Thereupon, he tried to "grab" her. Complainant
instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and
kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and
covered his face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a comfort room. After
that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note3 stating, "sorry, it won't happen again."

In his comment, respondent judge denied complainant's allegation that he sexually harassed her six times. He
claimed that he has always treated her with respect, being the head of the CTA Legal Staff. In fact, there is no strain
in their professional relationship.
On the first incident, he explained that it was quite unlikely that complainant would ask him to go to her office on
such date in order to give him a "pasalubong."

With respect to the second incident on December 28, he claimed it could not have happened as he was then on
official leave.

Anent the third incident, respondent explained that he went to the various offices of the CTA to extend New Year's
greetings to the personnel. He also greeted complainant with a casual buss on her cheek and gave her a calendar.
In turn, she also greeted him.

As to the fourth episode, he averred that he and complainant had been attending the deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee at the Senate on the bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA. Hence, when the
bill was finally approved that particular day, respondent, in jubilation and in the presence of other people, gave
complainant a spontaneous peck on her cheek. He could not recall any resentment on her part when he kissed her.
She even congratulated him in return, saying "Justice ka na Judge." Then he treated her to a lunch to celebrate the
event. Respondent recounted several times when they would return to the CTA in the evening after attending the
committee hearings in Congress to retrieve complainant's personal belongings from her office. Surely, if he had
malice in his mind, those instances would have been the perfect opportunities for him to sexually harass her.

As to the fifth incident, respondent alleged that he did not call complainant to harass her, but to discuss with her
and Elizabeth Lozano, HRMO III, and Elsie T. Forteza, Administrative Officer, the health plan for the CTA officers and
employees. The fact that such meeting took place was confirmed by a Certification issued by Lozano.4

Regarding the sixth incident, respondent narrated his version as follows: Complainant arrived in his office past 9
a.m. that day, followed by another court employee, Ruby Lanuza. He proceeded to discuss the CTA Expansion Bill
with complainant. Then he went for a while to the rest room. When he returned, Ruby had already left but
complainant was still there. Forthwith, he remarked that he forgot to greet her on Valentine's Day, the day before.
He approached complainant to give her a casual buss on the cheek. But she suddenly stood and raised her arms to
cover her face, causing her to lose her balance. So he held her arms to prevent her from falling. Her rejection came
as a surprise to him and made him feel quite embarrassed. Shortly, complainant excused herself and left the room.
Stunned at the thought that she might misinterpret his gesture, he sent her a short note of apology. Respondent
further explained that the structure of his office, being seen through a transparent glass divider, makes it
impossible for anyone to commit any improper conduct inside.

In a Resolution dated August 21, 2001, this Court referred the instant case to Justice Josefina G. Salonga of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Justice Salonga set the hearing of the case on November 6, 2001. However, the parties, through counsel,
manifested that "they will not be adducing any further evidence." On November 7, 2001, Justice Salonga issued an
Order directing them to submit their memoranda simultaneously, after which, the case shall be considered
submitted for resolution.

On January 9, 2002, Justice Salonga forwarded to this Court her Report on Investigation and Recommendation,
thus:

"We find for the respondent.

"The complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on
the cheek, in a 'beso-beso' fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice
or ill-motive. It is clear under the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and special
occasions. In fact, complainant's testimony that she was sexually harassed on November 21, 2000, is hardly
believable. Notably, complainant declared in her affidavit-complaint that she brought some 'pasalubongs' for the
respondent judge from her trip abroad. Therefore, Atty. Aquino could not have been 'taken aback' by the
respondent's act of greeting her in a friendly manner and thanking her by way of a kiss on the cheek. Moreover, it
was established that Judge Acosta was on official leave of absence from December 26-29, 2000. This was
corroborated by Ricardo Hebia, the driver of respondent judge, in his Panunumpa (Affidavit) dated March 26, 2001,
where he stated among others, to wit:

x xx

"Corollarily, the joint affidavit of Ms. Santos and Ms. Samonte attesting to the fact that respondent dropped by at
the third floor of the CTA and greeted them Happy New Year, even if it true, can not be given any evidentiary
weight. Clearly, they did not make any categorical statement that they had witnessed or seen Judge Acosta making
sexual advances on the complainant. Nor did they even attribute any malicious acts on respondent constituting
sexual harassment.

"In addition, the respondent admitted that when he handed a calendar and greeted complainant with a buss,
complainant reciprocated by greeting him a Happy New Year. The allegation of Atty. Aquino that the respondent
merely used the calendars as 'props' to kiss her on the cheek and that she was singled out by respondent is not
supported by any convincing evidence. The affidavit of Ms. Aurora U. Aso and Renelyn L. Larga that Ms. Carmen
Acosta gave them calendars for the office of Attys. Margarette Guzman and Felizardo O. Consing, is immaterial and
irrelevant, as Judge Acosta had stated that he handed to complainant Aquino, a 2001 calendar in the course of
greeting her with a buss on the cheek. Said affidavit could not account for the calendars distributed to the other
offices in the CTA, more specifically, the Legal and Technical Staff headed by Atty. Aquino.
"Moreover, the claim of the complainant that she was sexually harassed immediately after the final reading of the
bill anent the expansion of the CTA at the Senate, can not be accorded great evidentiary value. The alleged kissing
incident took place in the presence of other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness of
the moment, due to the approval of the subject bill. Quite interesting to note, is that Atty. Aquino reciprocated by
congratulating respondent and remarking "justice ka na judge" after the latter had bussed her on the cheek.
Complainant even failed to dispute the fact that after the kissing incident, she joined Judge Acosta and his driver for
lunch at a seafood restaurant in Luneta. There was even a time that she allowed the respondent judge to
accompany her to the office alone and at nighttime at that, to retrieve her car keys and bag when they returned to
the CTA after the hearing at the Senate on the CTA expansion bill. These acts are not at square with the behavior of
one who has been sexually harassed, for the normal reaction of a victim of sexual harassment would be to avoid
the harasser or decline his invitations after being offended. In fact, this occasion could have provided the
respondent judge with the right opportunity to commit malicious acts or to sexually harass complainant, but then
Judge Acosta never even attempted to do so. Undoubtedly, it could be said that no strained relations existed
between Atty. Aquino and Judge Acosta at that moment.

"Neither can the alleged continuous call of Judge Acosta on complainant in the morning of February 14, 2001 to
see him in his office, be considered as acts constituting sexual harassment. Atty. Aquino failed to state categorically
in her affidavit-complaint that respondent demanded sexual advances or favors from her, or that the former had
committed physical conduct of sexual nature against her. The telephone calls were attributed malicious implications
by the complainant. To all intents and purposes, the allegation was merely a product of her imagination, hence, the
same deserves no weight in law. Indeed, Atty. Aquino's own version, indicates that she well knew that the purpose
of the respondent in calling her in the morning of February 14, 2001 was to discuss the CTA Health Plan which was
disapproved by the Supreme Court and not for the respondent to demand sexual favors from her. This was
corroborated by Atty. Margarette Guzman in her affidavit dated February 28, 2001, attached to the complainant's
affidavit, where she stated:

x xx

"Finally, while Judge Acosta admitted having pecked Atty. Aquino on her cheek, which was avoided by the latter, the
same was not meant to sexually harass her. Judge Acosta's act of extending his post Valentine greeting to
complainant was done in good faith and sans any malice. This is so because immediately after the complainant had
displayed annoyance to the kissing episode, Judge Acosta immediately extended an apology by way of a
handwritten note saying that the incident won't happen again.

"Parenthetically, the undersigned is convinced that Ms. Lanuza's affidavit that she supposedly accompanied
complainant to respondent's office as she allegedly had a previous 'bad experience' with the latter when he was
still an Associate Judge, was merely concocted to add flavor to the baseless imputations hurled against Judge
Acosta. The accusation is implausible as Ms. Lanuza did not seem to complain about the alleged bad experience
she had with Judge Acosta or relate it to anyone until ten (10) years later. It must be stressed that Ms. Lanuza is a
biased-witness who harbored ill feelings against the respondent, as she was reprimanded by Judge Acosta for
habitual absenteeism and tardiness in 1996. More importantly, Ms. Lanuza did not even attest that she was a
witness to the alleged sexual advances of Judge Acosta.

"In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be understood
in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter hat she
was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and
innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the
'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms.
Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on
occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it
does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who
belongs to complainant's department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would
likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive
occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of
Judge Acosta's well wishers. (Annex "8" to Comment, p. 65, Rollo)

"In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty.
Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to
sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious
connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably,
there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents."5

Justice Salonga then made the following recommendation:

"Considering the above, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint for sexual
harassment and violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility be
DISMISSED and accordingly, respondent Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta be exonerated therefrom; that in view of
these charges which might have tainted the image of the Court, though unsubstantiated they may be, Judge Acosta
is WARNED to refrain from doing similar acts, or any act for that matter on the complainant and other female
employees of the Court of Tax Appeals, which in any manner may be interpreted as lustful advances."6

We agree with the findings of Justice Salonga.

Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by this Court with utmost care, for
proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the
entire judiciary as well.
We have reviewed carefully the records of this case and found no convincing evidence to sustain complainant's
charges. What we perceive to have been committed by respondent judge are casual gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. In kissing complainant, we find no indication that respondent was
motivated by malice or lewd design. Evidently, she misunderstood his actuations and construed them as work-
related sexual harassment under R.A. 7877.

As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice:

"A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall within the purview of sexual
harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to wit:

'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education or training-related
sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor
from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
object of said Act.

a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions or privileges; or the refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in anyway would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employees;

2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under existing labor laws; or

3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.'

"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as follows:

1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach,
trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another;
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;

3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, or
any other person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor.

"In her Complaint-affidavit, Reply and Sur-rejoinder, complainant did not even allege that Judge Acosta demanded,
requested or required her to give him a buss on the cheek which, she resented. Neither did Atty. Aquino establish
by convincing evidence that the busses on her cheek, which she considers as sexual favors, discriminated against
her continued employment, or resulted in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. In fact, complainant
continued to perform her work in the office with the usual normalcy. Obviously, the alleged sexual favor, if there
ever was, did not interfere with her working condition (Annexes "9" - "9-FFF"). Moreover, Atty. Aquino also
continued to avail of benefits and leaves appurtenant to her office and was able to maintain a consistent
outstanding performance. On top of this, her working area which, is at the third floor of the CTA, is far removed
from the office of Judge Acosta located at the fourth floor of the same building. Resultantly, no hostile or
intimidating working environment is apparent.

"Based on the foregoing findings, there is no sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that Judge Acosta
committed the acts complained of; that Atty. Aquino's determination to seek justice for herself was not
substantiated by convincing evidence; that the testimony of respondent judge and his witnesses are credible and
therefore, should be given weight and probative value; that the respondent's acts undoubtedly do not bear the
marks of misconduct, impropriety or immorality, either under R.A. No. 7877 or the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the
Code of Professional Responsibility."7

Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded, requested or required
any sexual favor from complainant in exchange for "favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or
privileges" specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics
or the Code of Professional Responsibility.

While we exonerate respondent from the charges herein, however, he is admonished not to commit similar acts
against complainant or other female employees of the Court of Tax Appeals, otherwise, his conduct may be
construed as tainted with impropriety.

We laud complainant's effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it
was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her superior of sexual harassment.
However, her assessment of the incidents is misplaced for the reasons mentioned above.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ernesto D. Acosta is hereby EXONERATED of the charges against him. However, he
is ADVISED to be more circumspect in his deportment.

10. Tuvillo vs. Laron, a.m. mtj-10-1755, oct 18, 2016

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016

WILFREDO F. TUVILLO, Complainant, v. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON, RESPONDENT.

A.M. NO. MTJ-10-1756

MELISSA J. TUVILLO A.K.A MICHELLE JIMENEZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a consolidation of two cases filed against Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Makati City (MeTC). The first case arose from the complaint of Wilfredo Tuvillo (Wilfredo) for immoral
conduct, and the second case from the complaint of Melissa Tuvillo (Melissa) for unexplained wealth and
immorality.

Wilfredo and Melissa Tuvillo are husband and wife. Wilfredo works as a seaman and is out of the country most of
the time. Melissa is a businesswoman with several B.P. Blg. 22 cases filed against her in the MeTC of Makati City. In
her desire to have her cases resolved, she approached the respondent Judge Henry Laron (Judge Laron). The
respondent is married but his wife was in the United States at the time the events of this case transpired. Due to
their frequent interaction with each other, Melissa and Judge Laron became intimate with each other and their
relationship gave rise to these administrative cases.

The Complaint of

Wilfredo Tuvillo

On May 2, 2008, Wilfredo wrote a letter-complaint against Judge Laron to the Court Administrator for immorality
and unacceptable wrongdoing. He submitted a Complaint-Affidavit1 where he alleged, among others, that his wife
Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron for t resolution of the cases filed against her; that, in turn, Judge Laron
asked money from Melissa and forced her to produce it whenever he needed it; that they lost all their savings and
their two houses and lots because of Judge Laron's constant requests for money from Melissa; that Judge Laron
would physically hurt Melissa when she could not produce the money he needed; and that Judge Laron
"transgressed, intruded and besmirched the tranquility and sacredness of our marital union and family unity" To
support his complaint, Wilfredo attached Melissa's complaint-letter and her affidavit where she admitted having
illicit relations with Judge Laron.2chanrobleslaw

Wilfredo also submitted the Joint Affidavit of his two sons3 wherein they alleged:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

6. That sometime in the year 2007, we were living in our house in Antipolo city; We were surprised that certain Tito
Henry Laron used to go to our house in Antipolo; He slept in our house twice or thrice a week specially during
weekends; Nagtaka kami mga magkakapatid bakit natutulog si Tito Henry Laron sa bahay namin at sinusundo na
kami at ang mama namin tuwing umaga minsan gamit ang kanyang sasakyan minsan aming sasakyan ang ginagamit
niya at sunduin kami sa school tuwing hapon.

This allegation was confirmed by their caretaker in her Affidavit4 stating that Judge Laron slept in the Antipolo
house during weekends, picked up Melissa and her children in the morning, and fetched them from school in the
afternoon using either his own or Melissa's car.

In his July 2, 2008 Comment,5 Judge Laron averred that he had already confessed his affair with Melissa to his wife.
In his December 18, 2008 Comment,6 he claimed that Melissa told him that she was a widow and explained that
his relationship with her was an intimate emotional and personal attachment that did not involve any sexual
liaison.

Wilfredo subsequently filed an adultery case against Melissa and Judge Laron before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Makati but it was later dismissed for lack of probable cause.7 Wilfredo's petition for review was also dismissed by
the Department of Justice8 for failure to comply with DOJ Circular No. 70 and for lack of reversible
error.9chanrobleslaw

The Complaint of Melissa Tuvillo

This case was initiated by Melissa on May 14, 2008 when she wrote a letter to the Court Administrator accusing
Judge Leron of unexplained wealth and immorality. In her letter, she asked that Judge Laron be investigated
because based on his salary as a judge, he could not have acquired their P9 million house. She also claimed that
Judge Laron could not have afforded to buy several Lamarroza paintings, four Plasma televisions, expensive
furniture, a Nissan Patrol, and to send his three children to private schools. Her letter also bore her admission that
she was his mistress for three years.
In his July 21, 2008 Comment,10 Judge Laron explained how he was able to afford and own the properties that
Melissa claimed were beyond his means. He said that he and his wife sold their townhouse for P1.7M and obtained
a P3.2M loan from Land Bank to cover the P4.4M construction cost of his house.11 The Nissan Patrol, a 2001
model, was allegedly bought for P1.15M with money borrowed from his father's retirement proceeds.12 The
Lamarroza paintings, accumulated through the years from 2004 to 200713 for a total value of P410,000.00, were
purchased at a low price because the artist was his wife's friend. The two (2) plasma televisions, on the other hand,
were gifts to them while the other two were purchased in 2000 and 2002. His children's tuition fees were covered
by educational plans14 and their furniture was part of his wife's commission as a dealer in his relative's furniture
shop.

In her July 31, 2008 Complaint-Affidavit,15 Melissa admitted that she had approached Judge Laron when she
needed help regarding the pending cases against her. Her liaisons with Judge Laron started in November 2005 in his
office (doon una niya akong naangkin). She said that he slept in their house in Antipolo and was in her Pasong Tamo
condominium almost daily from August 2007 to January 2008. At that time, Melissa was receiving a monthly
allowance of US$2,000.00 from her husband while Judge Laron would ask money from her every month and
whenever he needed it. She cited several occasions when she gave him money. Judge Laron would hurt her
physically and threaten to tell her husband about their relationship every time she would refuse to give him money.
To meet Judge Laron's demand for money, she said that she sold her house and lot in Taguig City and her two
vehicles - a Pajero and a Honda CRV. Yet, only two of her four pending cases were settled. She also mentioned an
incident in Judge Laron's office in April 2008 when a lawyer attempted to effect a reconciliation between her and
Judge Laron.

Defense of Judge Laron

In his October 27, 2008 Comment,16 Judge Laron related that Melissa was introduced to him in November 2005
and that in December 2005, she informed him about her B.P. Blg. 22 cases. He refuted the alleged sexual liaisons
that happened in his chambers by attaching affidavits of his staff who swore that the door to his chambers was
necessarily open because the air conditioner that supplied the cold air to the staff room, the telephones, the fax
machine, the coffee maker, and the refrigerator were all in his chambers. He likewise denied that he had asked
Melissa for money or that she gave him money. He pointed out that Melissa could have settled the cases against
her by paying the complainants because she had the money. The cases against her were violations of B.P. Blg. 22:
two counts for P20,000.00, two counts for P19,377.00, and two counts for P24,620.00. He also mentioned that the
threats and harassment against him started when he began avoiding her.

A member of the staff of Judge Laron, Ma. Anicia Razon, related in her affidavit that on April 16, 2008, a woman
went inside the chamber of Judge Laron and started shouting and berating the judge.17 A man, who was then with
her, pulled the woman away and brought her out of the room. She, however, continued her outburst even when
they were already along the corridor. Seven other staff members executed a joint affidavit18 about the incident
narrating that they ran to his chambers after they heard a woman shouting and then saw the woman berating
Judge Laron (minumura at inaalipusta) while the judge just remained quiet (nanatiling tahimik). The woman's
shouts were heard even in the courtroom. They recounted that the woman told the judge: "IDEDEMANDA KITA!" to
which the judge retorted: "Idedemanda ka rin ng misis ko."

Imelda Laron, the wife of Judge Tuvillo, also executed an affidavit where she recounted that sometime in January
2008, she lifted their home phone and heard a conversation between her husband and another person.19 She
confronted her husband about what she overheard and they had a serious talk about Melissa. She also stated that
after that incident, "nasty text messages with threats from different cellphone numbers were sent to me;" that
their sons also received the same messages in their cell phones; and that her relatives in the province, whose
cellphone numbers were listed in her list of contacts, called her "about the damaging text messages they received
about my husband and the woman named Michelle."

The Office of the Court Administrator in its Report20 recommended the consolidation of the two complaints as all
the allegations in both were rooted on the alleged affair between Judge Laron and Melissa.21 After its evaluation,
the OCA recommended that Judge Laron be found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and be fined
P10,000.00, and that the case for unexplained wealth be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.

The Court's Ruling

Unexplained Wealth

The charge of unexplained wealth was disputed by Judge Laron who was able to explain the source of the money
he used to pay for the construction of his house and the purchase of his vehicle, televisions and furniture. He also
attached copies of the educational plans of his children. On the other hand, Melissa failed to substantiate her claim
that Judge Laron, by his salary, could not afford to buy those properties and send his children to private schools. For
said reason, the Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation that the complaint for unexplained wealth against
Judge Laron be dismissed.

Immorality

The charge of immorality, however, is a serious one covered by Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The
penalty therefor includes dismissal from the service. Section 8 of Rule 140 provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Serious charges include:

Bribery, direct or indirect;

Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);

Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate

proceeding;

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

Willful failure to pay a just debt;

Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;

Immorality;

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;

Partisan political activities; and

Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. [Emphasis supplied]

Moreover, members of the judiciary are essentially guided by Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial
Ethics in their acts. Canon 4, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Judge Laron's conduct of carrying on an affair with a
married woman is highly improper. Pertinently, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety.

A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety both in his
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court.22 As the judicial
front-liners, judges must behave with propriety at all times as they are the intermediaries between conflicting
interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. These most exacting standards of decorum are
demanded from the magistrates in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
Judiciary.24 No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than
a seat on the Bench.25cralawred As the epitome of integrity and justice, a judge's personal behavior, both in the
performance of his official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. For moral integrity is not only a
virtue but a necessity in the judiciary.26chanrobleslaw
In these cases at bench, the conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this exacting standard. By carrying an affair with a
married woman, Judge Laron violated the trust reposed on his office and utterly failed to live up to noble ideals and
strict standards of morality required of the members of the judiciary.27 As the Court wrote in Re: Letter of Judge
Augustus Diaz,28 "a judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. He must comport himself in a
manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his
official duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His character must be able to
withstand the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system."

In these cases, both Judge Laron and Melissa admitted the affair. In the case filed by Wilfredo, the July 2, 2008
Comment29 of Judge Laron reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sometime in November 2005, Melissa Tuvillo was introduced to me. In December 2005, Melissa approached me
regarding problems about a vehicular accident she was involved in. She later informed me about the bouncing
checks filed against her. At that time, I had been married for more than 17 years, and my wife was in the United
States attending to her ailing father. Melissa was likewise then without a husband and Mr. Tuvillo was out at sea.
She was aware of my marital status and that I have three sons. We were both mature lonely people whose
marriages had lessened sheen. She brought me a sense of soul connection, understanding and great company.
[Emphasis supplied]

On the week of the May 2007 elections, Melissa called and told me that her husband Wilfredo died of illness in
China. She even told me that the remains were cremated, that a padasal was held at Brgy. Pitogo, Makati City, the
place of her husband. After that, she frequently asked for my presence and company, she even asked me to help
her guide her four children, and we developed an intimate personal attachment to each other. She showered me
with the affection I felt I needed, and I reciprocated. We however tried our best to be discreet and sensitive to the
sensibilities of those around us.

September of 2007 was a turning point. Imelda, my previously distant wife became ever present. My wife was all
over me, ever caring and loving. On November 2007, I started to distance myself from Melissa.

Around the first week of January 2008, Imelda would later hear of the affair, she confronted me and I soon had to
choose between the mother of my three children, or Melissa, the woman who made me feel needed and cared for.
One look at my three sons made the choice plainly clear. I could not abandon my family. I confessed to the affair,
and vowed that I would immediately mend my ways. I started to exercise more self-discipline, and became more
aware of my responsibilities to my family. I now persevere in keeping true to the straight and narrow path."
[Emphases supplied]
The affidavit of Melissa, on the other hand, stated that:30chanrobleslaw

2. I have been maintaining an illicit relation with the said Judge above-named since November 2005 until March
2008. Our relation is known among the personnel in the court's premises in Makati City.

3. To support my complaint are the various text messages and videos, ATM cards, bank checks which I am willing to
present in the proper forum. [Emphasis supplied]

The illicit affair must have been known to the staff of the court because in their joint affidavit recounting the scene
created by Melissa when she berated the judge in his office, none of them attempted to stop her harangue which
was highly disrespectful of the judge's status. Judge Laron's inaction on the face of Melissa's verbal attack was a
strong indication that they had a relationship which was more than official or professional.

In finding Judge Laron guilty of immorality, the Court is guided by the ruling in Geroy v. Calderon31 where it was
written:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The bottom line is that respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every
member of the judiciary is expected to observe. Respondent is a married man, yet he engaged in a romantic
relationship with complainant. Granting arguendo that respondent's relationship with complainant never went
physical or intimate, still he cannot escape the charge of immorality, for his own admissions show that his
relationship with her was more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.

As the Court held in Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr.;32chanrobleslaw

[I]mmorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate attitude
toward good order and public welfare. [Italics Supplied]

Immorality under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001
on the discipline of Justices and Judges, is a serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions: (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more
than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

The Court also finds Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is
another serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. The illicit relationship started because
Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron with respect to her pending B.P. Blg. 22 cases and, apparently, he
entertained the request for assistance. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 2.04.—A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency.

Judge Laron admitted that Melissa had informed him about the f@ B.P. Blg. 22 cases against-her one month after
she was introduced to him. One of those cases was before Judge Laron himself. The case was dismissed upon
agreement of the parties.33 Another case was pending before the sala of another judge which was provisionally
dismissed.34 The situation highly smacked of impropriety because Judge Laron, at the very least, "aided" Melissa in
a case pending before him and before another judge.

Another situation of impropriety was when Judge Laron asked money from Melissa who was a litigant in a case
pending before his court. This is also a serious charge under Section 8 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Wilfredo and
Melissa alleged in their complaints that Judge Laron continuously demanded money from Melissa which led to the
sale of their houses and vehicles. Melissa claimed that: Judge Henry Laron was asking an amount of money on a
monthly basis. In addition, he is also asking me to purchased his medicines (Teveten, Forecad. I even shoulder the
expenses of his executive check-up (07-08 June 2007) and also the normal visitation, to his doctor (Dr. Antonio
Sibulo, St. Luke's Hospital) in which he kept all the receipt. He was also asking for cell phone load, gasoline, and
monthly groceries (Puregold). Judge Henry Laron even ask for an allowance when he was sent to Canada (a total of
2,000 US dollars) for a study grant last year.35 She further claimed that Judge Laron would physically hurt
whenever she could not give him money and this averment was corroborated by her sons who stated in their
affidavit that "he is hurting physically our mother because we saw once our mother having maraming paso, the
result of the physical punishment made by Tito Henry Laron."36 Melissa also submitted a photocopy of a Bank of
Philippine Islands deposit slip US$200 deposited in the account of "Henry E. Laron."37chanrobleslaw

All these conduct and behavior are contrary to the canons of judicial conduct and ethics. Judges are held to higher
standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and confidence. Judges
should uplift the honor of the judiciary rather than bring it to disrepute. Demanding money from a party-litigant
who has a pending case before him is an act that this Court condemns in the strongest possible terms. In the words
of Velez v. Flores,38 such act corrodes respect for the law and the courts, committed as it was by one who was
tasked administering the law and rendering justice.
Judge Laron's immorality and serious misconduct have repercussions not only on the judiciary but also on the
millions of overseas Filipino workers (OFW) like Wilfredo. While Wilfredo was working hard abroad to earn for his
family, Judge Laron was sleeping with his wife in his bed in his house and spending his hard-earned dollars. What
was even worse was the flaunting of the illicit relationship before his young boys (aged 13 and 14) who related it to
him upon his return from abroad. This is the nightmare scenario of every OFW - to be confronted upon their return
with stories from their own children about the "other man or woman" sleeping in their house while they were
away enduring the bitter cold or searing heat, homesickness, culture shock, and occasional inhumane treatment
just to earn the dollars for the food, shelter, clothing, and education of their family back home.

Under these circumstances, the Court finds itself unable to adopt the recommendation of the OCA that Judge
Laron be simply found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a public official and be fined P10,000.00. The OCA's
recommended dismissal of the charge of immorality is not warranted by the evidence on hand. Judge Laron himself
admitted his immorality and even prayed that he be forgiven and that no disciplinary action be taken against
him.39 To disregard Judge Laron's admission and grant his plea would mean a betrayal of the public trust.

WHEREFORE, finding Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City,
GUILTY of IMMORALITY and SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, the Court hereby metes him the maximum penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits. He is likewise disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The charge of Unexplained Wealth is DISMISSED for insufficient evidence.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., cocnur.

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Bersamin.

Brion, J., pls. see my concurring and dissentiing opinion.

Del Castillo, J. I concur with the dissent of J. Bersamin.

Perez,* J., no part. I acted on the matter as Court. Adm.

Leonen, J., see separate opinion, concurring and dissenting to add disbarment.

Endnotes:
* No Part.

1Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), pp. 24-26.

2 Id. at 31.

3 Id. at 34-35.

4 Id. at 36.

5 Id. at 20-23.

6 Id. at 52-65.

7 Id. at 95-99.

8 Id. at 99-100.

9 The verification of the petition was made, not by Wilfredo Tuvillo as required by the DOJ Circular, but by
Wilfredo's counsel.

10Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), pp. 22-25.

11 Id. at 27-28.

12 Id. at 31.

13 Id. at 29.
14 Id. at 33-34.

15 Id. at 36-39.

16 Id. at 58-65.

17 Id. at 72.

18 Id. at 73-74

19 Id. at 70-71

20Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-1755), p. 118.

21Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-1756), pp. 80-84.

22Garcia v. Valdez, 354 Phil. 475, 480 (1998).

23Calilung v. Suriaga, 393 Phil. 739, 764 (2000).

24Vedana v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 329 (1998).

25cralawred Naval v. Judge Panday, 378 Phil. 924, 939 (1999).

26Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 328 Phil. 692-707 (1996).

27 Naval v. Panday, 378 Phil. 937 (1999).

28 560 Phil. 1,4-5(2007).

29 Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), pp. 20-23.

30Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 5.

31 593 Phil. 585, 597 (2008).

32 375 Phil. 1, 17 (1999), citing Alfonso v. Juanson, A.M. No. RTJ-92-904, December 7, 1993, 228 SCRA 239.

33Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 50a.

34 Id. at 51.

35 Id. at 15.

36Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 34.

37 Rollo (AM. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 50.

38 445 Phil. 54, 64 (2003).

39Rollo (AM. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 22.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:
I CONCUR with the ponencia finding respondent judge Henry Laron1 guilty of immorality and serious misconduct. I
DISSENT, however, from its imposition of only a three-year suspension for his grave offenses. I submit that the
respondent should be dismissed from judicial service and be disbarred from the practice of law.

Background Facts

The case arose from two letter-complaints filed against Judge Laron by Wilfredo Tuvillo (Wilfredo) and Melissa
Tuvillo (Melissa). Wilfredo charged Judge Laron with immorality and unacceptable wrongdoing. Melissa accused
Judge Laron of unexplained wealth and immorality and of violation of anti-graft laws and disgraceful immoral
conduct, in her complaint and supplemental complaint, respectively.

A. Wilfredo is letter-complaint and supplemental complaint

In his May 2, 2008 complaint, Wilfredo, a seaman, declared that he treated Judge Laron as a close family member
and would "entrust" his wife to him whenever he was abroad. Fie heard rumors about the relationship of Melissa
and Judge Laron while he was overseas; his children had confirmed to him that Judge Laron was always in their
house and had physically hurt Melissa. He stated that Melissa admitted to having an affair with Judge Laron when
he confronted her about it.

In his comment to Wilfredo's complaint, Judge Laron claimed that Melissa approached him sometime in December
2005, to inform him about the 'bouncing checks cases' filed against her; that Melissa told him that her husband had
died of illness in China. He said that Melissa knew of his marital status yet they still "developed an intimate
personal relation with each other."2 He claimed to have distanced himself from Melissa in September 2007, and
that he had already confessed his affair with Melissa to his wife.

Judge Laron further explained that his affair with Melissa "is a purely personal matter"3 which has no bearing on
his professional responsibilities as a judge and as a lawyer.

In his supplemental complaint-affidavit dated June 3, 2008, Wilfredo further alleged that Melissa had sought Judge
Laron's help for the expeditious resolution of the cases filed against her; that Judge Laron had demanded money
from Melissa whenever he needed it; that he and Melissa had lost all their savings and their property because of
Judge Laron's constant demands for money; that Judge Laron had physically hurt Melissa when she could not
produce the money he needed; and that Judge Laron had "transgressed, intruded, and besmirched the tranquillity
and sacredness of [their] marital union and family unity."4chanrobleslaw
In his comment to the supplemental complaint, Judge Laron maintained that he did not extort money from Melissa,
and that the loss of the complainant's houses and lots could not be attributed to him. He denied inflicting physical
harm on Melissa, pointing out the lack of any medical certificate to support this allegation. He also denied violating
the marital union and family unity of the spouses Tuvillo, adding that Melissa had led her to believe that Wilfredo
had died of illness in China. Further, he described Wilfredo's complaint as a "harassment suit supported by dubious
documents."5chanrobleslaw

B. Melissa's charges against Judge Laron

In her May 14, 2008 letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Melissa asked that Judge Laron be
investigated for unexplained wealth and immorality alleging that he could not have acquired the following
properties on his salary as a judge: a P9-million house not including appliances and decor — four (4) Lamarroza
paintings; four plasma television sets and expensive furniture; a 2005 model Nissan Patrol vehicle; and various
high-caliber guns. Melissa also questioned how Judge Laron could have afforded to send his three children to
private schools.

Melissa disclosed that she had been Judge Laron's mistress for three (3) years. She claimed that Judge Laron had
constantly asked money from her for various expenses such as medicine and medical check-ups, cellular phone
loads, gasoline, monthly groceries, and study grant allowance. Melissa also accused Judge Laron of physically
hurting her.

In his comment to Melissa's letter, Judge Laron explained that he and his wife bought their present house by selling
their old town house for P1.8 million and by obtaining a P3.2-million bank loan to cover construction costs. He said
that he borrowed his father's retirement proceeds to buy a 2001 Nissan Patrol vehicle, and that he purchased the
Lamarroza paintings at a low price because the artist was his wife's friend. He added that the two plasma television
sets were gifts by his wife's uncle while the other two were purchased in 2000 and 2002. Judge Laron also said that
his children's tuition fees were covered by educational plans and that their furniture were part of his wife's
commission as a dealer in his relative's furniture shop. He explained that he had acquired his guns before joining
the judiciary.

Judge Laron likewise denied asking money from Melissa for his personal expenses and maintained that he did not
inflict any physical harm on her.

In her supplemental complaint-affidavit dated July 31, 2008, Melissa stated that she was introduced to Judge Laron
by a fiscal to assist in her cases pending before the Makati City courts. She claimed that Judge Laron promised to
help her in these cases. When she followed up her cases on the second week of November 2005, Judge Laron
kissed her on the cheeks. On November 28, 2005, they had their first sexual encounter; subsequent trysts took
place inside his office and at the Silver Place Hotel in Makati City.

Melissa added that Judge Laron often slept in her house in Antipolo, and came to her condominium almost daily
from August 2007 to January 2008. She added that she was receiving a $2,000.00 monthly allowance from her
husband, and that Judge Laron had asked money from her every month. She reiterated that he had physically hurt
her and had threatened to reveal their relationship to her husband whenever she refused to give him money.
Melissa also disclosed that she sold her house and lot in Taguig City and two vehicles to meet Judge Laron's
demands for money.

In his comment to the supplemental complaint, Judge Laron explained that he was introduced to Melissa sometime
in November 2005, and that the latter informed him about her B.P. 22 cases pending before the Makati courts.
Judge Laron denied that he had sexual liaisons with Melissa inside his chambers; he also denied having asked
money from Melissa. He countered that the threats and harassments against him began when he started avoiding
Melissa.

Wilfredo filed an adultery case against Melissa and Judge Laron before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, which
was later dismissed for lack of probable cause. Wilfredo's petition for review was also dismissed by the Department
of Justice for lack of reversible error and failure to comply with DOJ Circular No. 70.

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

The OCA recommended the consolidation of the two (2) complaints against Judge Laron, After evaluating the
evidence presented, the OCA recommended that Judge Laron be found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge,
and be fined P10,000.00. However, recommended the dismissal of the charge of unexplained wealth for being
unsubstantiated.

The ponencia's Ruling

The ponencia found Judge Laron guilty of immorality and serios charge of misconduct, and suspended him for
three (3) years. It dismissed the charge of unexplained wealth due to insufficiency of evidence.

The ponencia stressed that immorality is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
carries with it any of the following sanctions: dismissal from the service; suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
Noting that both Judge Laron and Melissa admitted their affair, the ponencia thus concluded that Judge Laron
"violated the trust reposed in office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards morality
required of the members of the judiciary"6 when he carried on affair with a married woman.

The ponencia also found-Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for aiding Melissa "in a case pending before him
and before another Judge."7 It found that Judge Laron entertained Melissa's request for assistance regarding her
B.P. 22 cases pending in his (Judge Laron's) and in another judge's sala.

Citing Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the ponencia stressed that a judge shall refrain from influencing in
any other manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrate agency.

The ponencia also considered as gross misconduct Judge Laron's act of asking money from Melissa who was a
litigant in a case pending before his court. It found that Judge Laron continuously demanded money from Melissa
that led to the sale of the houses and vehicles she and her husband owned. The ponencia also believed Melissa's
allegation that Judge Laron would physically hurt her whenever she would not give in to his request for money, as
corroborated by Melissa's sons.

The ponencia imposed on Judge Laron the penalty of suspension for three (3) years since he "admitted his
immorality and even prayed that he be forgiven x x x."8 According to the ponencia, Judge Laron's admission of his
weakness and lapses during the times he felt lonely and forlorn due to the prolonged absence of his wife can be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. It added that Judge Laron appeared contrite and apologetic.

On the charge of unexplained wealth, the ponencia explained that Melissa failed to substantiate her claim that
Judge Laron could not afford to buy the properties she mentioned in her complaint and to send his children to
private schools. Judge Laron, on the other hand, clarified the sources of the money he used for the construction of
his house and the purchase of his vehicle, television sets, and furniture. He also presented copies of his children's
educational plans.

The Dissent

I take the position that Judge Laron should be dismissed from the service since his transgressions make him
unworthy to wear the judicial robe. He should likewise be disbarred as he does not deserve to remain in the legal
profession any minute longer.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. His personal behavior,
not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for he is,
as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification of law and justice.9chanrobleslaw

I. The Immorality Charge

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court enumerates transgressions classified as serious, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:

Bribery, direct or indirect;

Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);

Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate

proceeding;

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

Willful failure to pay a just debt;

Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;

Immorality;

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;

Partisan political activities; and cralawlawlibrary

Alcoholism and/or vicious habits, (Emphasis supplied)

Immoral conduct is behavior that is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community.10 It refers not only to sexual matters but also to
"conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.11chanrobleslaw

In the present case, Judge Laron did not deny that he, a married man, had an affair with Melissa - a married
woman; he even asked he be forgiven by the Court Administrator and that no disciplinary action i taken against
him.

In his comment to the May 2, 2008 complaint of Wilfredo, Judge Laron averred that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

1. x x x At that time, I have been married for more than 17 years, and my wife was in the United States attending to
her ailing father. Melissa was likewise then without a husband as Mr. Tuvillo was out at sea. She was aware of my
marital status and that I have three sons. We were both mature lonely people whose marriages had lessened
sheen. She brought me a sense of soul connection, understanding, and great company.

2. xxx After that, she frequently asked me to help her guide her four children, and we developed an intimate
personal attachment to each other. She showered me with the affection I felt I needed, and I reciprocated. We
however tried our best to be discreet and sensitive to the sensibilities of those around us.

3. x x x x

4. Around the first week of January 2008, Imelda would later hear of the affair; she confronted me and I soon had
to choose between the mother of my three children or Melissa, the woman who made me feel needed and cared
for. xxx I confessed to the affair, and vowed that I would immediately mend my ways, x x x

5. Ironically, my troubles seem[ed] to start after I decided to mend my ways, x x x x I started paying dearly for my
indiscretion after I distanced myself from Melissa.
xxxx

8. The affair is a purely personal matter and does not affect my professional responsibilities as a judge and as a
lawyer.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and trusting myself to your mercy, I have the courage to respectfully pray to
the Honorable Court Administrator, that I be forgiven, and that the present administrative complaint be dismissed
and that no disciplinary action be taken against me.12 [Emphasis supplied]

In his comment to Wilfredo's supplemental complaint affidavit, Judge Laron stated that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

23. Respondent did not wilfully violate the marital union as what was present then as intimate personal attachment
was emotional attachment and not sexual liaison.13

Significantly, Melissa admitted in her May 14, 2008 letter to then Court Administrator Zenaida Elepano that she was
Judge Laron's mistress, thus:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIt's hard to admit, but I am the mistress of Judge Henry Laron for three years. I am one
of whom he cheated and maltreated in different ways, x x x14chanrobleslaw

Melissa reiterated this admission in her affidavit submitted to support her letter-complaint to Court Administrator
Elepaño, viz:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

2. I have been maintaining an illicit relations with the said Judge above-named since November 2005 until March
2008. Our said relation is known among the personnel in the court's premises in Makati City;
3. To support my complaint are the various text messages and videos, ATM cards, bank checks which I am willing to
present in the proper forum; x x x15

Melissa also revealed in her supplemental complaint affidavit that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxxx

9. That after such unforgivable moments of our indecent affair, it was followed with several times, inside his office
last December 3, 2005 (Sat.), December 15, 2005, and then continued December 2005 to October 2007, we
check[ed]-in at Silver Place Hotel at the side of the new City Hall building at Makati City. Not only that sometimes
he slept in our house in Antipolo, and almost daily in our condo at Pasong Tamo, Makati City, since August 2007 up
to January 2008.

10. That due to our indecent affair, he capitalized and abused my innocence, by asking money monthly x x x.

xxxx

12. Not only that, when [he] attended seminar at Baguio City last November 13-16, 2007, he asked me money
again, I gave 700 US $ for his pocket money, all these caprices of Judge Henry Laron was uncontrollable because
every time I refused to give him money, he will hurt me, followed by threatening me to divulge our relation to my
husband, afraid of losing my husband and my family, I was forced to follow all the caprices with closed eyes, co'z I
was already there at the middle of darkness of agony;

xxxx

14. That it was too late for me to realize the disgraceful and immoral conduct of our unforgiven happiness, damage
has been done, my relation to my husband and family were ruined by Judge Laron, thru his seduction move[d] and
promises that make us both disgraceful and immoral one[s] x x x.

No less than Melissa's children also acted as witnesses, stating in tr.c joint affidavit that Judge Laron fetched them
from school and Meli starting in 2007, and slept in their house twice or thrice a week. Socor Divina, the caretaker of
the Tuvillo's house, likewise declared in affidavit that Judge Laron fetched Melissa and her children and slept at
house of the spouses Tuvillo during weekends.
Clearly, Judge Laron showed his moral indifference to the sensitivities of Melissa's minor children and to the
opinions of respectable members of the community by having a relationship with a married woman, by violating
the complainants' own marital abode, and by attempting to rationalize this forbidden affair. The souring of his
relationship with his wife, coupled with his feeling of loneliness, could never justify Judge Laron's marital
indiscretion.

That Melissa allegedly told Judge Laron that her husband died of illness in China is of no moment. Even if true,
Judge Laron is a married person: he had no business entering into an affair with a woman even if the latter was a
widow.

Also, the claim that Melissa has been "widowed" is preposterous and cannot be reconciled with Judge Laron's
having a share of Melissa's monthly bonanza from overseas. At any rate, it had been proven that Melissa's
husband, Wilfredo, was alive. In fact, even after Judge Laron saw Wilfredo in the Philippines after the latter was
hospitalized in China, Judge Laron did not put an end to this illicit relationship.

I find it unnecessary to dwell on the specific issue of whether Judge Laron and Melissa had engaged in a sexual
relationship from all the evidence presented, including Judge Laron's; the only direct evidence missing would be
the actual copulation between them.

Overwhelmingly and by direct admission of both Judge Laron and Melissa, they had slept together in Melissa's
Antipolo house and in her Makati condo. It would certainly be very naive to believe that their relationship was
platonic. Precisely, by his own admission, his relationship with Melissa started because his wife was away and he
was lonely.

In appreciating all these, the Court should not forget that the mere act of having an affair with a married woman
and, worse, acting as her husband (i.e., sleeping in her house and condominium, fetching her and the children, etc.)
already shows the depravity of Judge Laron's morals.

It is also immaterial that Melissa was the one who "sought" Judge Laron, or that she gave way to the forbidden
relationship. It was incumbent upon Judge Laron - as a married person and a member of the Judiciary - to have
distanced himself from any woman with whom he felt he could have an emotional attachment. Being the visual
representation of justice, Judge Laron should have exercised restraint, and not have given in to whatever feelings
he might have had for Melissa.

I cannot agree, too, with Judge Laron's pronouncement that his affair with Melissa was a purely personal matter
that does not affect his professional responsibilities as a judge and as a lawyer. The faith and confidence of the
people in the administration of justice cannot be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the
cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity and, more so, who obtusely continues to commit an affront to public
decency.16chanrobleslaw

Under the norms of legal and judicial ethics that a judge adopts when he becomes a lawyer and a judge, the line
between his official and personal conduct blurs when it comes to morality. This is the price a judge has to pay for
occupying an exalted position in the judiciary; he cannot freely venture outside this circumscribed circle of morality
and expect to retain his exalted position. No position is more demanding on an individual's moral righteousness
and uprightness than a seat on the Bench. Thus, a judge ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty,
integrity, and uprightness. To be sure, having and maintaining a mistress are not acts one would expect of a judge
who is expected to possess the highest standard of morality and decency.17chanrobleslaw

Our ruling in De Villa v. Judge Reyes18 on this point is instructive:

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The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to his behaviour outside his sala and as a private
individual, x x x [t] here is no dichotomy of morality: a public official, particularly a member of the judiciary is also
judged by his private morals.

Simply put, a judge's official life cannot be detached or separated from his individual persona. As the subject of
constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by an ordinary citizen. Stricter still, personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official
duties in private life, should be above suspicion.19chanrobleslaw

II. Gross Misconduct

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in
connection with one's performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the
judicial act complained of "should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law or by a persistent
disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error
judgment.20chanrobleslaw

In the present case, Melissa informed Judge Laron that she had several pending B.P. 22 cases in different courts in
Makati City, indue the sala where Judge Laron was a pairing judge. Instead of distancing himself from Melissa,
Judge Laron entertained her request for assistance meeting her frequently from 2005 to 2007.
Judge Laron's frequent fraternizing with a litigant who has a pending case in a court where he is a pairing judge is
highly condemnable. We note in this regard that Judge Laron (as pairing judge of Branch 66) issued an order on
April 10, 2006, dismissing one of the cases filed against Melissa (Civil Case No. 86602) on joint motion of the
parties. Whether the dismissal was proper or not is beside the point; Judge Laron's acquaintance with Melissa put
the order of dismissal in a suspicious light and totally against his ethics as a judge.

Judge Laron's act, too, of promising to aid Melissa in her other cases pending before other judges - even if he did
not actually broker for the favorable decision in these cases - is reprehensible and cannot but have a corrosive
effect on people's respect for the law and the courts. The promise gave the impression that judges could be used
for influence peddling or intercession.

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities." Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.04 of the Code provide as follows:

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Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.

xxxx

Rule 2.04 - A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency."

The New Code of Judicial Conduct21 essentially reiterated these rules, as follows:

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CANON 4

PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SEC.1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxxx

SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a
member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that
anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.

CANON 1

INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall
therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

xxxx

SEC. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.

The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provide that [a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties but also
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

These canons require judges to avoid not only impropriety, but even the appearance of impropriety in all their
conduct, whether in their public or private life. The proscription includes a judge's meddling with judicial processes
in courts other than his own and acting in a manner that would arouse suspicion that he is meddling with such
court processes.22chanrobleslaw

Clearly, Judge Laron violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The ponencia itself affirmed this when it held
that "Judge Laron apparently entertained" Melissa's request for assistance, and "aided her in a case pending before
him and before another judge." We cannot tolerate this appalling conduct as it erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.

It has also been claimed that Judge Laron had been constantly requesting money from Melissa. As a result, the
latter was forced to sell some of her houses and lots. I cannot support this claim for lack of supporting evidence.
Nonetheless, it has been shown that Melissa submitted a Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) deposit slip for $200
deposited to the account of "Henry E. Laron" Whether this money was voluntarily given by Melissa on account of
their illicit relationship or requested by Judge Laron himself, under the threat of blackmail if Melissa would refuse
to give in to Judge Laron's request, is of no moment: Judge Laron cannot accept any money from a party-litigant.

Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and
Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross misconduct and immorality are classified as serious charges,
each of which carry with it a penalty of either (a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits; (b) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.23chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron's behavior demonstrates his unfitness to remain in office and to continue to discharge the functions of
a judge. He has tainted the image of the judiciary whose reputation and integrity he must keep unsullied at all
times.24 Taking into account the Court's policy to purge the judicial ranks of those unworthy to don the judicial
robe, I find no reason for the Court to withhold the imposition of the severest form of disciplinary action for Judge
Laron's irresponsible and shameless conduct. This penalty, after all, is what the rules and jurisprudence command.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office.
Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty, and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding
the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. His personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties,
must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act
of a judge degrades the institution he represents.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

I disagree in particular with the ponencia's ruling that Judge Laron's "admission of his weakness and lapses during
the times he felt lonely and forlorn during the prolonged absence of his wife can be considered as a mitigating
circumstance." This is the kind of lax ruling that cannot be allowed to stand in the case book as it can, down the
road, only lead to the weakening of the moral fiber of the judiciary.

I also find misplaced the ponencia's reliance on the case of Judge Caguioa v. Floral26 to justify the three-year
suspension it imposed on Judge Laron.

First, the respondent in Flora was not a judge, but a sheriff. Second, the acts committed by the respondent sheriff in
Flora were different from those committed by Judge Laron. The respondent sheriff in Flora was intoxicated when he
shouted "kalbo" at Judge Caguioa during trial; Judge Laron, in the present case, was a married man who had an
affair with a married woman with a pending case before his court, and who accommodated the woman's request
for help in cases pending before his sala and the sala of other judges.

Thus, the difference in the factual situations between Judge Caguioa v. Flora and Judge Laron's case renders
inapplicable the use of the Caguioa ruling. To be sure, Judge Laron's remorsefulness should not be enough to steer
the Court's decision towards leniency. With transgressions as severe as Judge Laron's, the Court itself would be
brought to disrepute if it simply imposes a slap on the wrist of Judge Laron. As we explained in Concerned
Employees of RTC of Dagupan City v. Judge Fallora-Aliposa:27chanrobleslaw

[A] member of the Judiciary is commanded by law to exhibit the highest degree of moral certitude and is bound by
the highest standards of honesty and integrity. Life, liberty, and property are defined and molded as judges perform
their sworn tasks to uphold the law and to administer justice. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who
cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This court has been watchful of dishonest
judges and will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people's faith in the Judiciary.

III. Charge of unexplained wealth

As the OCA did, I find that Melissa failed to substantiate her allegations that Judge Laron was living beyond his
means. Other than her bare claims on this matter, Melissa failed to present any other evidence to corroborate her
charge of unexplained wealth.

Judge Laron, on the other hand, submitted the following pieces of evidence to refute Melissa's allegations: deed of
sale of motor vehicle showing that what had been sold to him was a 2001 and not a 2005 Nissan Patrol model;
certificate of registration showing that the vehicle's ownership was transferred under his name, and not under the
name of his father; two Prudential Life Education Plans dated May and July 1996, respectively; a certification from
Mrs. Ano Tan that three paintings were sold to to the spouses Laron at special discounted prices; and a notarized
bill of materials and cost estimates showing the estimated construction costs of their house.

Disbarment

A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC (which took effect on October 1, 2002) provides that an administrative case against a judge of
a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be
considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar. It also states that judgment in
both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice law, among others, for gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct:
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Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Indar,28 the Court automatically disbarred the respondent judge
pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, adopting the reasoning held in Samson v. Caballero that:

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Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as member of the Bar." The rule
does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be
required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinarily sanctioned as a lawyer separately
from the order for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as a member of the
bench. In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should
not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the
fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to
disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid
the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a
member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus,
a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case
against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-
level court.

It cannot be denied that respondent's dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral
character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning, [emphasis in the original]

The Court had a similar ruling in the fairly recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Presiding Judge Joseph
Cedrick O. Ruiz29 where we dismissed the erring judge from the service and at the same time disbarred him.
Judge Laron is a disgrace to both the bar and the bench. Considering that Judge Laron is guilty of immorality and
gross misconduct, I maintain that - aside from being dismissed from the service - he should likewise be disbarred
and his name stricken out from the roll of attorneys.

A Heinous Administrative Offense

A point that I have reserved for the last in order not to be missed, is the heinous character of the administrative
offenses committed considering the parties' respective situations. This characterization entitles this case to
category a of its own - a heinous administrative offense.

This case involves a member of the Judiciary found liable for charges related to the discharge of the functions of his
office. He used and abused the functions and prerogatives of his office to the prejudice of the offended parties and
of the institution he serves, the Judiciary. He breached the trust that the Constitution, the laws, and the Judiciary
have conferred on him a public official, a lawyer, and a judge.

On the complainant's end, one of the offended parties is a female litigant with a case pending before the
respondent Judge, which gave the Judge the excuse and occasion to commit the offenses charged. The other
offended party is the litigant's cuckolded spouse, an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) whose rights to the sanctity of
his marriage, the unity of his home, and his and her children's peace of mind were violated by the respondent
judge.

The members of the Court may not be fully aware of the nature of the offenses committed from the OFW
perspective: one of the worst news that an OFW could receive while overseas would be the infidelity of his or her
spouse. This has driven many an OFW to desperation and to commit wrongful or shameful acts they would not
otherwise have done in their sane moments. This was the news that the complaining husband rudely received,
together with the bitter confirmation that the salary he assiduously remitted from overseas had dissipated and
partly spent on the offending judge.

These painful and unpleasant circumstances and the heinous characterization of the offenses would be equivalent
to rubbing salt and chili on a raw wound or burn injury should the Judiciary, in taking care of its own, give the
respondent judge in this case a mere slap on the wrist by penalizing him with less than the capital penalties
required for the offenses committed. I pray this kind of judicial action will not take place. Such action, if taken by
this Court, will immeasurably damage this Court's integrity and reputation, and would negate everything positive
this Court has recently achieved in the field of legal and judicial ethics.
With the termination of the Court's action on this administrative case there should no longer be any stumbling
block to the referral of the Court's ruling to the Honorable Ombudsman for its appropriate action.

Endnotes:

1 Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City.

2Rollo, pp. 20-21.

3 Id. at 22.

4 Id. at 25.

5 Id. at 59.

6Ponencia, p. 7.

7 Id. at 10.

8 Id. at 11.

9Resngit-Marquez v. Judge Llamas, Jr., 434 Phil. 184, 203 (2002).

10 See Elape v. Elape, 574 Phil. 550, 553-554 (2008).

11 Judge Adlawan v. Capilitan, 693 Phil. 351, 354 (2012).

12Rollo, pp. 20-22.

13 Id. at 69.
14 Id. at 6A-6B.

15 Id. at 6D.

16 See Exec. Judge Naval v. Judge Panday, 341 Phil. 657, 690 (1997).

17Supra note 9, at 204, citing Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children against Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos, RTC, Br. 20, Cebu City, A.M. No. 97-2-53-RTC July 6, 2001, p. 23.

18 A.M. No. RTJ-05-1925, June 26, 2006, 525 SCRA 485, 511.

19 See Tormis v. Judge Paredes, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015.

20 See Myla C. Castro, joined by her husband, Tagumpay Castro, and Luciano Vda, De Rojales, complainant, v.
Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor, respondent, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268, en banc unsigned resolution dated November
25, 2014.

21 Took effect on June 1, 2004.

22 See Punzalan v. Judge Plata, 423 Phil. 819, 831 (2001).

23Rivera v. Blancaflor, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290, November 18, 2014, 740 SCRA 528, 554.

24 See Calilung v. Judge Suriaga, 393 Phil. 739, 765 (2000).

25cralawredSee Anonymous v. Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 18, 25.

26 412 Phil. 426(2001).

27 383 Phil. 168, 191 (2000).

28 685 Phil. 272, 292-293(2012), citing Samson v. Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 423,
435-436.

29 A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, February 2, 2016.

DISSENT

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Majority today vote to reject the charge of unexplained wealth brought against respondent Judge Henry E.
Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, in Makati City, but recommends his immediate
dismissal from the Judiciary for immorality and gross misconduct.

I respectfully DISSENT as to the penalty of dismissal, which I consider to be too harsh, and as to the finding of gross
misconduct.

The Case

Before us are the consolidated administrative cases filed against the respondent initiated by Wilfredo Tuvillo,
charging immoral conduct, and by Melissa Tuvillo, charging unexplained wealth and immorality.

Salient Facts of the Case

In his Complaint Affidavit filed on June 3, 2008,1 complainant Wilfredo Tuvillo stated that he had been a seafarer
for more than 20 years; that in 2005, a case was filed against his wife, Melissa Tuvillo, in the Makati MeTC; that he
came to know respondent only because his wife had sought the latter's help for the expeditious resolution of her
cases; that the respondent abused his wife's innocence and trust by extorting money from her to the point that
their savings and properties were dissipated; that in spite of all the money that the respondent received, the cases
of his wife were not settled; and that the respondent also transgressed the sanctity of the marriage and their
family.

In her Complaint Affidavits dated May 14, 20082 and July 31, 20083 complainant Melissa Tuvillo alleged that the
respondent amassed unexplained wealth in the form of a fully-furnished house and lot worth at an estimated cost
of P9,000,000.00 in Filinvest II, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,4 and a Nissan Patrol vehicle; that the respondent sent his
children to exclusive private schools;5 that he owned several expensive pieces of furniture and paintings;6 that he
solicited and got money from her for his cellular phone loads, gasoline expenses and monthly groceries;7 that her
husband was a seafarer, by reason of which she regularly received a monthly remittance of US$2,000.00 in addition
to her own income;8 that in the third week of October 2005, a certain Prosecutor Giorsioso introduced her to the
respondent in relation to her criminal cases pending in the Makati MeTC;9 that such first meeting was succeeded
by other meetings, one of which was in the second week of November 2005, when he kissed her on the cheek;10
that such kissing later on became a regular habit every time she visited him;11 that on November 28, 2005, their
first sexual congress occurred in his office; that several more sexual congresses occurred between them either in
his office or at the Silver Place Hotel near the Makati City Hall;12 that he also sometimes slept in her Antipolo
house and in her condominium unit in Makati City;13 that he asked money from her every month and whenever he
needed it; that she gave him US$1,000.00 of the US$2,000 monthly remittances from her husband;14 that the
respondent also borrowed money from her, including $800.00 to pay his executive check-up at St. Luke's Hospital,
P20,000.00 to defray his birthday treat for his office staff, P25,000.00 for his birthday celebration at Firewood,
Mandaluyong City, $2,000.00 as pocket money when he went on a study grant to Canada, $700.00 when he went
on a study grant to Baguio City;15 that he hurt her physically and threatened to divulge their relationship to her
husband if refused to give in to his demands for money; that only two of her four cases were ultimately settled; and
that she lost her husband as well as the respect of her family and friends because of their illicit affair.

In his Comment, the respondent admitted having developed an "intimate personal attachment to each other" with
Melissa,16 but denied her other allegations. Anent the charge of unexplained wealth, he asserted that he had
purchased the new house in Quezon City partly from the proceeds of the sale of his own townhouse and from the
proceeds of his loan from the Land Bank;17 that the pieces of furniture in his residence were earned by his wife
who was a dealer of wooden furniture; that he had acquired the Nissan Patrol second-hand with money borrowed
from his father;18 and that he sent his children to school with the use of the educational plans he had bought for
them.19chanrobleslaw

On the charge of immorality and gross misconduct, the respondent averred that he did not promise to help her
with her cases; that he did not have sexual congress with her in his office; that he did not demand or receive
money from her,20 having paid his executive check-up at the St. Luke's Hospital with his own funds;21 and that he
did not oblige her to pay for the office dinner on the occasion of his birthday.

The respondent denied that the Tuvillos' real properties had been sold because of him. He insisted that she had
told him that her husband had died in China.22 He contended that Wilfredo could not have written the letter dated
August 8, 2008 to the Judicial and Bar Council because he was not in the country at that time;23 that it was not
Wilfredo who had signed the complaint; that she was conducting a demolition job against him;24 that he had
reason to believe that she was responsible for the same because he had received text messages from anonymous
senders warning him of such demolition job against him; that the threats and harassment against him started after
he had decided to keep distance between him and Melissa; that even their telephone line at home was
tapped;25cralawred and that she had gotten hold of his contacts list and had then sent damaging text messages to
persons found in the list.

Recommendation of the

Court Administrator

After his own investigation, Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, now an illustrious Member of the Court,
recommended that the respondent be held guilty only of conduct unbecoming of a judge and fined in the amount
of P10,000.00; and that the consolidated charges of immorality and unexplained wealth be dismissed for being
unsubstantiated.

Recommendations

I agree that the charge of unexplained wealth was successfully disputed by the respondent; hence, the charge is
being properly dismissed.

I agree, too, that there was adequate basis for concluding that the respondent and Melissa had a romantic affair
that constituted immorality that is sanctionable under our canons of judicial conduct, but I am constrained to differ
from the Majority on the appropriate penalty to be meted on the respondent. He should not be dismissed from the
service, but should only be condignly punished with suspension from the service without at pay, or fined.

I respectfully differ on the finding of gross misconduct against him. I humbly submit that this charge was
unfounded, and, therefore, I urge that the Court dismiss the charge for insufficiency of evidence.

Re: Judge Laron's Alleged Gross Misconduct

The charge of gross misconduct against the respondent was not competently established.

First of all, Melissa claimed that she had come to meet the respondent for the first time in November 2005 with the
help of the public prosecutor because she was looking for someone who could help her with her pending cases in
the Makati Metropolitan Trial Court. The respondent strongly denied her claim, however, averring that he did not
know of the various cases pending against her when she was first introduced to him, and insisting that he came to
know of such cases only after a month following the first meeting. I feel that we should be more circumspect in
accepting her claim. To start with, she did not even present the public prosecutor who had arranged that first
meeting between her and the respondent to corroborate her version. Moreover, none of her cases was assigned to
his court, and he acted in two of such cases only as a pairing judge. Also, the dismissals of most of her pending
cases had been upon the joint instance of the parties (i.e., Melissa and the Prosecution), debunking her statement
that he had intervened with his co-judges in her behalf.

Secondly, Melissa charged that the respondent had physically maltreated her whenever she could not give him the
money he demanded; and that she had lost her family's possessions just to satisfy the respondent's immodest
demands, to the point of claiming that she had given to him half of her monthly remittance (i.e., $1,000.00) out of
fear that he would disclose their illicit affair to her husband. But her charges - which were not even supported by
evidence other than her self-serving allegations — were highly improbable for being inconsistent with human
nature and daily experience. For one, it was highly unnatural for her to be intimidated into giving to him so much if
she had her young children and a household to take care of on a daily basis. There was certainly something amiss
with her if she had given him half of her $2,000.00 monthly remittance with such regularity just to indulge the
respondent. As to his supposed threats of exposing their romantic relationship to her husband, this seems illogical
and highly unlikely in the face of the reality that he had much more to lose from making good such threats. Verily,
while she would lose her husband and the affection of her family and relatives, he would lose not only the affection
of his own wife and their family but also his professional life and his budding career in the Judiciary.

And, thirdly, Melissa's unilateral portrayal of the respondent as a poor leech-like opportunist and a violent person
should not be accepted without question. We should look for her motivations in suddenly denouncing him before
the Court for supposedly committing so many grave sins. In my view, she was either a spurned woman who could
not accept his rejection of her, or someone looking for a plausible scapegoat on whom to lay the blame for her
unexplainable loss of the family possessions and wealth by her own profligacy and recklessness. Either of these
scenarios seems to make more sense than her unproved charges of gross misconduct considering that the two
administrative complaints subject of these consolidated cases were simultaneously filed in the middle of 2008 right
at the time that her husband had returned to the country and could have discovered their depleted resources and
rightly demanded that she should account for them.

Judge Laron's Explanations Should Be

Carefully Studied And Considered

The appreciation of facts in these cases should not be solely based on the complainants' affidavits and complaints.
The charges of gross misconduct should be appreciated in the context of the probable ill motives of Wilfredo and
Melissa for bringing their charges. We should be cautious before condemning the respondent to suffer any penalty.
The complainants' convoluted and improbable tale of woe begs us to listen to the respondent's side of the story.
Audi alteram partem.26 This is what we should now do in this adjudication.

For the direct appreciation of every Member of the Court, therefore, I am quoting the succinct explanations
tendered by the respondent in his Comment,27 and let us reflect on his explanations to determine whether he
uttered the truth, or prevaricated; and whether or not it was Melissa who was duplicitous in her attempt to cover
the truth with her concocted tale against him, to wit:

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1. The charges against me by Ms. Tuvillo are full of allegations which, are distortions of the truth. This is not the first
charge against me by this person. It speaks of her propensity to present lies in order to put me to shame, public
ridicule or contempt, and as part of the demolition job against me.

2. She was introduced to me in November 2005. In December 2005, she informed me about her problems about a
vehicular accident and the cases against her for bouncing checks. I never told nor promised her that I can help
regarding her bouncing checks cases.

3. The allegations in no. 7 of the complaint affidavit are not correct. She could have mentioned again the cases
against her but I never promised any help. We merely shook hands after the conversation.

4. There is absolutely no truth to the allegations in no. 8 of the complaint affidavit. November 28, 2005 is a
Monday. For that Monday, I conducted hearings in civil cases in the morning in my court and criminal cases in the
afternoon in the pairing court, Branch 66. From July 2005 to May 2006, I presided over my pairing court, holding
hearings on Monday afternoon and Wednesday morning, aside from resolving incidents/matters, in addition to my
duties in my Branch. In the court at the old building (Chateau), at all times, the door of the chambers is always
open, not only because the lock of the same was destroyed, but also it is my habit not to close such door when I
am around. Also, there are only two aircon units in our office, one in the courtroom and one in the chambers. The
door in the chambers to the staff room is always open so that staff could also have cool air in their room. The
refrigerator and the coffee maker of the branch are inside the chambers that the staff go in and out freely when
they need something. Further, on top of the table in the chambers is a thin glass. The affidavits of Lylanie Cayetano,
Nelia Nanat, and joint affidavit of Amabelle Feraren and Nelly Montealegre, are attached hereto as Annexes "A",
"TB" and "C", respectively.

5. Same with the allegations in No. 8, what were stated in no. 9 are pure lies. In the Chateau, what divides the
chamber and the staff room is a mere plywood and an open door. As earlier stated, the door between the
chambers and the staff room is always open. Thus, the allegation about December 15, 2005, a Thursday, and her
account of "several times" is impossible. To her allegation about December 3, 2005, I never went to the office on
that day; as I only report on Saturdays if the branch is on duty. Even when we transferred to the new City Hall
building, the door of the chambers is always open when I am around, even if I have visitors. Her allegation about
Silver Place Hotel is another lie. There is also no truth that sometimes I sleep in her Antipolo house and almost
daily in the Pasong Tamo condo; I always sleep with my wife in our house (see affidavit of Imelda B. Laron attached
hereto as Annex "D"). Ms. Tuvillo's narrations are but a product of her imagination, her propensity to concoct lies.

6. The allegations in no. 10 of the complaint affidavit are absolutely lies. I never asked nor obliged her to give me
money, $1,000 monthly from November 2005 to February 2008 as she stated. I never received such amount from
her. She claimed to have a monthly allotment of $2,000.00, it is out of logic to throw away half of it and take only
half for her family.

To reiterate my comment in OCA IPI No. 08-2017-MTJ, I was the one who paid for my executive check-up at St.
Lukes Hospital, I did not borrow from her. The dinner for my birthday in July 3, 2006 was just for my staff in Branch
65 and the pairing court (Branch 66) and around ten guests; she showed up but I did not ask her for money for my
birthday and I did not obliged (sic) her to pay for the bills.

7. Another lie is her allegations in no. 11 of the affidavit complaint that I asked for $2,000.00 and $700.00 for the
Canada trip and Baguio seminar, respectively. As I have stated in my Comment in OCA IPI No. 08-1017-MTJ, I did
not ask for, and she did not give me, money in such occasions. As also stated in the same Comment, there is no
truth to her claim that I hurt her and threatened to blackmail her when she refused to give money.

8. I never interceded in the cases against her. The case she mentioned which I resolved was the one in my pairing
court, Branch 66, which was dismissed upon motion filed by the parties.

9. Her description about the incident in the presence of Atty. Laguilles is inaccurate. I requested Atty. Laguilles not
to go out of the room so he could hear what she might say, as she and/or her cohorts had previously scattered
information which maligned me. I did not shout at her, she was the one who boasted that she will file cases against
me. I did not call her tarantado, she was the one who shouted such word to me. She was the one who acted to put
up a scandalous scene in my office in the presence of my staff. The affidavit of Ma. Anicia Razon and the joint
affidavit of Nelly Montealegre, Amabelle Feraren, Liezl Mandin, Arlen Quirante, Lylanie Cayetano, Nelia Nanat and
Michelle Grace Malonzo are attached hereto as Annexes "E" and "F", respectively.

10. To the allegation that she lost her husband, here is a text message passed to me on August 13, 2008 from her
number (+639174794034):ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sweet na cut line tatawag ka pa ba? Tawag ka Ing para malibang ang pananakit ng sikmura kc.Ingat at wag
mambababae.kung d mapigilan INGAT Ing mabuti. Alam mo kung anong ibig kung sabihn. Nakausap kuna may ari
ng SCANMAR.21oy ang movilization by Nov.My 15% ncrease sa boung sahod mo at 50% bstat pa absorb or maiwan
ka dyan. Madami bnefit.na inilatag sakin..Wag kana muna Umuwi.Pagbigyan natn Scanmar kaht another 3
mnths.Xtension lang. Then lipat kana ky captain Paulin.Mas matsas pa dn offer sau dun! Biro mo 7,500$ sa scanmar
pwede na dn kc madami bnefit at malapit pa ofic d2 sa scol mga bata.Andyan na pala tao na nag join.Kunin u agad
ung pnadala ko,ma22wa ka sa.San Mateo yan. Tmbrland retirement lot mo.dream mo d ba mgkaron farm lot, yan
na un! D ba nakwn2 ko sau 2mama ng lottery c james.Eh ang bakla ask nya ako ano gus2 ko ko balato, e ngbro Ing
naman ako Yun! Tino2o nga.. Sana kuna ikwn2 lahat. Wag kana muna Umuwi ako na lang ulit pupunta sau..lagi ko
cnasabi sau para sa mga anak mo at sau gnagawa ko kaya ayaw na naman kita pauwiin..Ung 2ngkol sa pagka
kapitan mo wag kana dn mag alala my order na na dina kylangan mag take ng Exam mga chfmate. Sa Nov. Din ang
effctvty and kylangan lang Training 80,Th Ing ang bbyaran sa lahat. Pero inilalaban dn na Ma eliminate ung MLC nay
an!. Cge na Mag ingat ka at Wag mang agrabyado ng BABAE at wak ka mag bago, at asahan mo lagi ako and2
maggng ka2wang at mag aalaga sau.Bastat Magpaka bait ka.D ba motto ko yun.D baling ako ang Salbahe was Ing
ikaw,at d baling ako ang Mag Sinungaling was Ing din ikaw.Kc lahat ng gnagawa my Dahilan.Hay Buhay nga naman!
@

("sweet" refers to her husband.) Is this the message to a husband she claimed she lost? Definitely not.

If ever she still has unsettled cases, it was her sole decision and style not to settle the same. I never promised her
anything about her cases. It appears that the cases against her for violation of BP 22 in MeTC Makati City are: Crim.
Case Nos. 341616-17 (two counts for P20,000.00 each filed on June 27, 2005), Crim. Case Nos. 344609-10 (two
counts for P19.377.00 each, filed on October 2005), and Crim. Case No. 354008-09 (two counts of P24,620.00, filed
on October 2007). Is it not logical to just settle the cases rather than to always give money to someone so this
person will settle the cases? Is it not ludicrous for her to go through all the trouble and risk of giving money always
to me when she could have directly dealt with her cases by settling the sad amounts?

Much has to be known why she wants the cases for BP 22 to remain pending, even if she can and is able to settle
the cases.

If ever she sold her house and lot in Taguig City and the two vehicles she mentioned, it was her own decision to do
so, but not because I extorted from her. As I have stated in par. 7 of my comment in OCA-IPI No. 08-2017-MTJ dated
21 July 2008, assuming that she sold her property located at Taguig City, she did that for reasons only known to her,
but not because I was asking for her money.

11. As I have stated before, at about the time of the elections in May 2007, she told me that her husband Wilfredo
died while he and she was in China, (sic) I was surprised upon receipt of the complaint in OCA IPI No. 08-2011-MTJ
"signed" by Wilfredo Tuvillo.

In a text message to me on March 19, 2008 from her number (+639174794034), it was
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"Namatay nanay W.Kanina lam.'Nagulat lahat. Biglaan ulit wala pa lyear cya naman."
(She was referring to the death of the mother of Wilfredo Tuvillo [W] which happened less than a year from the
"death of Wilfredo").

. A check with the Bureau of Immigration record of Wilfredo shows that he arrived in the Philippines on May 17,
2007 (immediately after the elections) and left the country on June 9 of the same year.

For the year 2008, the record of Wilfredo shows that he arrived on March 24, 2008 and left the country on May 17,
2008. She coincided the presence of Wilfredo in the Philippines with the filing of the complaint verified by
"Wilfredo" on May 15, 2008. The truth is it was not Wilfredo Tuvillo who signed such complaint.

In a letter allegedly written and sent by "Wilfredo Tuvillo" to the Judicial and Bar Council, dated '8th day of August
2008", a time when he was not in the Philippines, "he" made allegations against my application with the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Such letter was submitted to the JBC after my name was read by her and/or her
cohorts as included in the publication for applicants. The immigration record taken on August 28, 2008 shows that
he was in the country on March 24, to May 17, 2008 only.

A text message from +639174916604 passed to me on August 10, 2008 states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"Bunso is the Jack of all trades of our GROUP.Gaya ng gnagawa sau ngaun.Iisa Ing ang kumikilos si bunso lng.wala
ng iba. Tip ko yan sau Panyero.Walang WILFREDO"

("Bunso" refers to Melissa Tuvillo, that is her name in what she calls her group.)

The immigration records of Wilfredo Tuvillo for the years 2007 and 2008 and the letter allegedly signed by "Mr.
Tuvillo" on August 8, 2008 are attached hereto as Annexes "G", "H" and "I", respectively."

12. In her desire to distort the truth, she stated that I took advantage of her so that I could gain profit. I did not do
any damage to her as she always claimed. In presenting her "facts", she has always casted aspersions on my person,
these could be seen upon a closer look at her statements submitted to this Office. In an attempt to discredit me,
she resorted to fabrications and prevarication. Here is a text message to me from her number (+639065594387) on
July 18, 2008:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"Kylangan lng mapaniwala ko cla na wala ako pera.walang wala..Yan palagi sabhn nyo.Yun and cnasbi nya daw palagi
MADRAMA ako.Pwes ggawin ko nga.Palibhasa gawain ny"

A text message to me from her number (+639174794034) on August 17, 2008 reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"Bntayan mo lang ang mga icnasagot at cnasabi.Wag Ing malaman na iisa ang kumikilos.Kylangan lagi ipaalam so
lahat magtatanong na agrbyado ung"

On October 17, 2008, (days after I received the Complaint Affidavit dated 31 July 2008 and filed a motion for
extension to file comment), I received a text message from +639158228039 stating:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary"Wag muna sagutin yan! Para d na lumala ng lumala."

These messages show that a demolition job has been set up against me. Her allegations were presented to portray
that she is grieving and down, as can be seen in the first two text messages, so as to merit sympathy. Then in the
third text message, she and/or her cohorts do not want me to put a defense and coupled it with a threat.

13. In the year 2007, she even told me about at least three incidents in that year wherein she was a victim of hold-
up. She stated that these happened in the corner of J.P. Rizal and F. Zobel Streets in Makati City, inside the ladies
comfort room at the ground floor of the Makati City Hall Building, and in Quezon City. I consider such incidents
involving a single person and which "happened" in a year to be strange; it is also odd that one incident happened
inside the City Hall of Makati.

Worth to note is an e-mail message about the names she has been using, to wit: Mishelle Jimenez, Catherin Lopez,
Socorro Rodrigo, Rowena Divina, Mishelle Mijares, Liza Geneta, Mary Borchers, etc.

14. Threats and harassment against me started when I distanced myself from her, these continue up to the present,
in text messages. I received text messages insisting that I must talk to her I realized that she wants me to be
associated with her, there is no reason for me to submit to what she wants.

Even the telephone line in my residence was tapped; I received text messages from her cellphone number the
contents/subject of which pertain to conversations I previously had with certain persons.

The acts of tapping our telephone line, getting into our Contacts list and sending messages to persons listed
therein, distributing mails/email to certain persons, and alleging fabrications to put me to shame, public ridicule
and content, and the lies from her, will show that there is ill-motive on the part of Melissa Tuvillo and/or her
cohorts and predeterminate plan to put me in jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied)

As the above-quoted portions of his Comment shows, the respond thoroughly and credibly bebunked the many
attributions to him of misdemeanor and misconduct, like committing physical abuse and extortion against Melissa,
and aiding her or intervening in her behalf with his co-judges in the Makati MeTC. His detailed explanations
reflected candor and sincerity, indicating the absence of prevarication and duplicity.

I do not wonder, therefore, that then Court Administrator Perez submitted the following well-studied evaluation
and rational conclusions on the charge of gross misconduct in his report and recommendation dated December 22,
2009,28 to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

EVALUATION: x x x

xxxx

Well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but it must be credible in itself - such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. (People vs. Ricamora, G.R. No. 168628 [December 6, 2006]); (People vs. Garin,
G.R. No. 139069 [June 17s 2004]).

We have no test of truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.

xxxx

As to complainant Melissa's claim that respondent took advantage of his position, frequently demanding and
receiving pecuniary gain from complaint, we also find these claims unworthy of belief. Under Section 3 (d) of Rule
131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is presumed that every person takes ordinary care of his concerns. It is
hard to believe that a businesswoman and a general manager of a local employment agency can be so "abused of
her innocence" that she would unhesitantly give away half of her monthly allotment of US$2,000 from the hard
labors of her husband overseas just to satisfy the caprices of the respondent. Such allegations of the complainant
totally run counter to common human experience and observation. It was likewise unbelievable that on top of
giving away half of her monthly allotment from her husband, complainant even went to the extent of selling their
conjugal house and two motor vehicles just only to give in to respondent's demands.

More importantly, not a scintilla of competent and credible evidence was adduced to support the claims of the
complainant. It is a

basic rule in evidence that a party must prove his affirmative allegations. Certainly, he who asserts not he who
denies must prove (Martin vs. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 82248 [January 30, 1992])

Although complainant attached an alleged deposit slip to the dollar account of the respondent, that can hardly
prove the alleged demands for money of the respondent as there is no showing that it was complainant who made
the deposit as demanded by respondent.
The claim of complainant Melissa that she was maltreated by respondent if she could not produce the amount
demanded cannot be given credence for being bare, self serving and uncorroborated. There is no evidence at all to
prove that respondent inflicted physical harm upon complainant. No medical certificate was adduced by the
complainant in support of her claim of maltreatment. The fact also that complainant Melissa did not file any
criminal complaint for physical injuries against the respondent betrays her allegation of physical harm inflicted by
the respondent.

The statements of the children of the complainants cannot also help establish the alleged physical punishment
being inflicted upon complainant Melissa as the same is admittedly hearsay. Moreover, it is likewise relevant to
note that in the joint affidavit of the children of the complainants, they refer to a "certain Tito Henry Laron, which
gives the impression that they do not know personally the person referred to as "certain" Tito Henry Laron. The
same is true with the affidavit of the caretaker of the complainants in their house in Antipolo City. She could not
have positively identified the respondent as the one who frequently slept at the complainant's house in Antipolo
City as there is no showing that she personally knows the respondent.

As to the alleged unexplained wealth of the respondent, suffice it to say that just like any other allegations of the
complainant Melissa, the same is completely bare, self serving and uncorroborated. No evidence was presented by
complainant to prove that respondent was living beyond his means. Moreover, the material allegations of the
complainant were convincingly refuted by the respondent with independent and competent evidence thereby
clearly showing that the complaint for unexplained wealth is merely concocted.

As to complainant Wilfredo Tuvillo, the same cannot be considered for being purely hearsay as it was completely
anchored on the complaint of his wife, complainant Melissa Tuvillo, of which he has no personal knowledge of and
which nonetheless has been fully passed upon above.

Be that as it may, we are not suggesting in any way that the allegations against respondent judge are untruthful or
fictitious, but rather we are inclined to dismiss the case for failure of the complainants to prove satisfactorily the
charges of immorality and unexplained wealth against respondent judge. However, respondent judge cannot be
completely exonerated because at the very least, complainants were able to prove and as admitted too by
respondent judge, that there existed between the complainant Melissa Tuvillo and respondent judge "an intimate
personal attachment to each other". The act of respondent judge who is a married man of having "an intimate
personal attachment" with complainant Melissa Tuvillo, who herself is married, does not necessarily constitute
immorality but certainly suggests an appearance of impropriety and unbecoming conduct and thus, exposes
respondent judge to administrative culpability.

Such behavior constitutes a light offense punishable by a fine not less than Pl,000.00 but not more than
P10,000.00. (Rule 140, Sees. 10 and 11, RULES OF COURT,) In light of the circumstances affecting not only the
reputation of Judge Laron himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable
to impose upon him the maximum fine of PI 0,000.00.
"A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private
morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity
for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man." (Tan v. Pacuribot, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 [December
14, 2007])

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Court are our recommendations:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) that these cases be RE-DOCKETED as regular administrative matters;

2) Hon. Henry E. Laron, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City be found guilty of
Unbecoming Conduct and be fined the amount of PI 0,000.00;

3) that these consolidated cases for Immorality and Unexplained wealth be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.29

The Majority should give due regard to the well-considered appreciation and conclusions by the Court
Administrator. I do not see any good reason why we should not. Accordingly, we should not punish the respondent
for gross misconduct for lack of evidence.

Proper Penalty for the

Charge of Immorality

The respondent cannot anymore undo or erase his past with Melissa. Had he resisted the temptation and fought
his very human needs and urges, he would not now be having these cases against him. What was done is done.

No offense by the respondent should go unsanctioned because the law will be less in the eyes of the people
otherwise. It is punishment that is one of the major moving factors for the people do what is legal and proper, and
for individuals to keep within the bounds of what is right and just. But the punishment should not exceed what is
condign and commensurate to the act or omission, and should be meted in consideration of all the circumstances
that have affected the offense as well as the offender. This is the reason why the Court has calibrated the sanctions
to be prescribed on members of the Bench and the Bar who have erred with a view to serving the essence of
justice and equity in administrative proceedings.
Accordingly, we have consistently mitigated or aggravated the sanctions after duly taking into good account all the
known circumstances surrounding the offenses and the offenders, including those personal to the respondents or
relevant to the charges notwithstanding that some of the circumstances may not have been expressly recognized in
the relevant administrative rules. Indeed, we have looked at the peculiar factual milieu of every case, the acts or
omissions of the respondents, their previous transgressions, their notable contributions to the legal profession as
well as to the Judiciary, their judicial and non-judicial backgrounds, and many others like length of service, remorse,
family circumstances, ages and even humanitarian and equitable matters. The objective for doing so has always
been to make the sanctions not only correct and commensurate but just and fair as well. As such, any tailor-fitting
of the sanctions imposed on the respondent will not be unprecedented.

The respondent should be favored with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary admission of the immorality that
reflected his genuine remorse, his commission of the offense for the first time, and his long years of service in the
Judiciary (i.e., nearly 12 years, having been appointed on Decembe 2004 as MeTC Judge in Makati City, Branch 65).
In addition, we sho weigh the fact that he has no record of other administrative charges.

The respondent was not an automaton, but was of flesh and blood, a descendant of Adam who fell prey to
temptation and engaged in consensual romantic relationship with an adult. We should also consider his
circumstance, and be more understanding of his weakness. Doing so would not be the first time for the Court. The
heavy hand of the Court should be stayed, and instead we should desist from imposing the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service. Although we should not be too tolerant, we should not also be too harsh. In Viojan v.
Duran,30 an administrative case against a sitting Justice of the Peace who had consensual sexual intercourse with a
married woman, the investigating district judge submitted a report and recommendation for the suspension of the
respondent judge for a period of three months through the Secretary of Justice for the consideration of the
President who would be acting on the recommendation. The erudite report and recommendation of the
investigating district judge justly recognized the human weakness that had intervened on the occasion of the
commission of the sin by the respondent through the following passages, which we should bear in mind in meting
the penalty to be justly imposed on the respondent herein, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"The respondent has committed an act of immorality. The flesh is weak. But man should possess that
consciousness to do the right and avoid the wrong. And one who has taken the oath of public service to dispense
with justice, should be more possessed of the courage and the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh. Since
the dispensation of justice has to originate from sound moral consciousness, one who lacks it, or has shown to be
wanting of it, cannot offer the guaranty required for the performance of a just dispensation. A magistrate has to
live by the example of his precepts. He cannot judge the conduct of others when his own needs judgment. It should
not be 'do as I say and not what I do.' For then the court over which he is called to preside will be a mockery, one
devoid of respect. Hence, the necessity for the magistrate to possess enough fortitude to subdue his passion for
wrong.

"There is, therefore, no question that for the immorality he committed within the territory.of his jurisdiction as a
Justice of the Peace, the respondent should be punished. But, considering the tempting circumstances which
surrounded him for that length of time, which circumstances, were indirect invitations, his falling to sin should not
be dealt with severity. Few men, and very few indeed, could have resisted that temptation; could have the moral
strength, the spiritual energy to impose on his weaker self the will to ignore such enticement. Although we want to
count the respondent among these few, yet it would be too much wishing to expect him to be among them before
he learns the hard lesson brought about by repentance. This misstep, the first that he committed, should not be
taken as the measure of his whole conduct. He should be given the chance after now to benefit himself out of his
stumble. For after all, it was rightly said that 'without an element of the obscene, there can be no true and deep
aesthetic or moral conception to life.'31

Given all the foregoing, the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service is too harsh a penalty. I am inclined to
impose the penalty of suspension from office for three years. The Court has to exercise compassion in favor of the
respondent. Let us not forget that the petitioner did not exactly come to the court with clean hands herself.

Re: Application of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC

A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which toot effect on October 1, 2002, relevantly states:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution.

Given that immorality is also a ground for disciplinary action against lawyers, the respondent may also be
considered as subject to disciplinary action as a member of the Bar.

However, this rule only goes as far as treating the complaint as both a disciplinary action against him as a judge and
as a lawyer, and does not in any way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, his
disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring him to comment on the disbarment is violative
of his right to due process.
I vote to DISMISS the charge of gross misconduct, and to impose on the respondent the penalty of suspension from
office for three years.

Endnotes:

1 Rollo, pp. 24-27,

2 Id. at 11-14.

3 Id. at 36-38.

4 Id. at 11.

5 Id. at 11-12.

6 Id. at 11.

7 Id. at 18.

8 Id. at 36

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 36-37.

12 Id. at 37.
13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id. at 20.

18 Id. at 22.

19 Id. at 23.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 24.

22 Id.

23 Id. at 62.

24 Id.

25cralawred Id. at 64.

26 Translated: The other side should be heard.

27Rollo, pp. 58-65.

28 Id. at 108-118.

29 Id. at 114-118.

30 Adm. Case No. 248, February 26, 1962, 4 SCRA 390.

31 Id. at 392.

SEPARATE OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

A married judge who enters into an illicit relationship with a married woman commits conduct unbecoming of a
judge. When their affair is flaunted in front of her young children, and his other woman is a party-litigant from
whom he solicits money, the married judge defiles the integrity of the judiciary even further.

I concur with the ponencia's findings that respondent Judge Henry E. Laron is guilty of immorality and serious
misconduct. However, looking into the odious conduct with which Judge Laron comported himself, I vote to impose
the more severe penalty of his dismissal from service.

On December 17, 2004, Judge Henry E. Laron (Judge Laron) was appointed to Branch 65 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City.1 He was concurrently Branch 66 Pairing Judge for the Pilot Project of the Small Claims Court.2
Before the same metropolitan trial court, Melissa J. Tuvillo (Melissa) was charged with criminal cases3 for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The first two (2) informations were filed on May 27, 2005,4 which were followed by two
(2) more on September 15, 2005.5chanrobleslaw
On the third week of October 2005, Melissa was allegedly introduced to Judge Laron by a certain Fiscal Giorsioso,
her godfather, as she needed help with the four (4) pending cases filed against her.6 According Melissa, Judge Laron
promised to provide her assistance.7chanrobleslaw

On the second week of November 2005, Melissa visited Judge Laron in his office to follow up on these cases. He
allegedly kissed her on the cheeks.8 Taken aback, Melissa asked why he did that, and Judge Laron said it was simply
beso-beso.9 According to Melissa, the beso-beso became a regular habit of Judge Laron on her visits to his
office.10chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron admitted that they were introduced sometime in November 200511 and that he knew of the bouncing
checks cases filed against her.12 At that time, Judge Laron was also aware that Melissa married to Wilfredo F.
Tuvillo (Wilfredo), who works as a seafarer.13 Melissa and Wifredo have four (4) children.14 Judge Tuvillo is likewi
married and has three (3) sons.15 His wife, Imelda B. Laron16 (Imelda), was in the United States to attend to her
ailing father.17chanrobleslaw

Melissa alleged that their affair began on November 28, 2005.18 According to her, while in his office, Judge Laron
asked her if she knows how to eat hamon (Christmas ham).19 He then pulled her close, held her by her nape, and
forced her20 towards the front of his pants.21 He unzipped his pants and made her suck his genital.22 Later, he
told her to lie on the table, where he "owned" her.23 Judge Laron relieved himself without having insert his whole
genital into her hers.24chanrobleslaw

Melissa did not specify if the act complained of happened during office hours, or whether it happened after work
was finished, when no one could possibly witness the scene.

In his defense, Judge Laron alleged that they merely shook hands and that he never promised to help
her.25cralawred He claimed to have been busy conducting hearings on November 28, 2005, which was a
Monday.26 To back up his claims, he attached the affidavits of his staff.27chanrobleslaw

In their Joint Affidavit, Branch 65 Criminal Case In-Charge Amabelle C. Feraren and Court Aide Nelly A. Montealegre
claimed that it was impossible for Judge Laron to have laid a hand on Melissa without anyone witnessing it.28 All
employees in the staff room were said to have access to Judge Laron's chamber at any given time,29 as the fax
machine, telephone, refrigerator, and coffee maker were inside his chamber.30chanrobleslaw

According to Branch 65 Court Stenographers Lylanie U. Cayetano31 and Nelia B. Nanat,32 Judge Laron's chamber
was inside the staff room.33 The door between the staff room and his chamber was allegedly always kept open for
the employees to enjoy the cool air from his chamber.34 The staff room may also get cool air from the adjacent
court room,35 which was cold as it had its own air-conditioning.36chanrobleslaw
Melissa alleged that the "unforgivable moments of [their] indecent affair"37 continued on December 3, 2005, a
Saturday, in Judge Laron's office, and then from December 15, 2005 to October 2007, where they checked in at
Silver Place Hotel, located beside the new City Hall Building.38 The new City Hall Building houses the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City.39 According to Melissa, Judge Laron would sometimes sleep in the Tuvillos' conjugal
house in Antipolo, and almost daily in her condo in Pasong Tamo, Makati City, from August 2007 to January
2008.40chanrobleslaw

For his part, Judge Laron admitted that his marriage to Imelda had "lessened [its] sheen" and that Imelda was
distant to him.41 Melissa "brought [him] a sense of soul connection, understanding and great company."42 He
stated that he reciprocated Melissa's affection to him.43chanrobleslaw

According to Socorro R. Divina (Divina), caretaker of the Tuvillo Family House in Antipolo, Judge Laron would come
and sleep over in Antipolo on weekends.44 Divina herself opened and closed the gate whenever Judge Laron would
fetch Melissa and the children in the morning.45 She would also see Judge Laron fetching the children back from
school in the afternoon, sometimes using his own car, and on other times, using Melissa's car.46chanrobleslaw

Wilfredo and Melissa's sons, Renz Don Willie (14 years old) and Raphael Thorn (13 years old) Tuvillo, corroborated
Divina's statement.47 They stated that Judge Laron would pick them up from home to school.48 According to
them, "Tito Henry Laron used to go to our house in Antipolo; [h]e slept in our house twice or thrice a week
specially durin weekends[.]"49chanrobleslaw

On one occasion, they saw their mother bruised and found out that Judge Laron inflicted the injury on her.50 Judge
Laron assailed the allegation of hitting Melissa as hearsay,51 as the children did not mention seeing the incident or
having personal knowledge of it.52chanrobleslaw

Melissa would receive a monthly allotment of US$2,000.00 from Wilfredo, who works as Chief Officer/Chief Mate
at sea.53 He has been an Overseas Filipino Worker for more than 20 years.54 Melissa claimed that in exchange for
his help, Judge Laron asked her for money every month, and whenever he needed it.55chanrobleslaw

On April 10, 2006, Judge Laron ordered the dismissal of a civil case, YL Finance Corp. v. Tuvillo, et al., with
prejudice.56 This was in lieu of the parties' Joint Motion to Dismiss.57 The other cases remained pending against
Melissa.

As regards Judge Laron's alleged extortion, Melissa cited that Judge Laron asked her for money to treat his office
staff on his birthday on July 3, 2006.58 Melissa paid a total of P25,000.00 for this birthday treat at Firewood,
Mandaluyong.59 Another time, when he went to Canada for a study grant on the second week of March 2007, he
solicited US$2,000.00 from her as pocket money.60 Melissa likewise advanced the payment for his executive check
up in June 2007 at St. Luke's Hospital.61 Judge Laron again asked her for allowance when he attended a seminar in
Baguio City on November 13 to 16, 2007, and she gave him US$700.00.62chanrobleslaw

Melissa alleged that she had to sell their house and lot in Taguig and two (2) vehicles, a Pajero and a Honda CR-V, to
satisfy Judge Laron's financial pleas.63 She presented a Bank of Philippine Islands deposit slip for US$200.00
addressed to one "Henry E. Laron," dated February 1, 2008.64chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron allegedly became uncontrollable and would hurt Melissa when she refused to give him money.65
According to Melissa, Judge Laron threatened to divulge their relationship to Wilfredo.66 Thus, she "was forced to
follow all his caprices with .. . closed eyes[.]"67chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron gave bare denials.68 He claimed that he never received these amounts from Melissa, nor did she give
him money on such occasions.69 He added that Melissa never attached any sworn medical certificate to prove that
she sustained an injury.70 Judge Laron also alleged that he did not blackmail her.71chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron claimed that he "always [slept] with [his] wife in [their] house."72 He attached his wife's affidavit to
support this.73 Imelda, however, had been in the United States to look after her ailing father.74 Neither she nor
Judge Laron mentioned when she actually came back home and slept with him.

Sometime in May 2007, more than one (1) year since the start of their extramarital affair, Melissa allegedly told
Judge Laron that Wilfredo died of illness in China.75 To support his allegation, Judge Laron presented the affidavits
of Branch Clerk of Court Romualdo I. Balancio76 and Clerk III Jeffrey C. Bat-og77 of Branch 67 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Makati City. Melissa questioned their affidavits for being "unbelievable and unreliable because of the
enormous influence and authority over them by respondent Laron."78chanrobleslaw

Wilfredo averred that Judge Laron's alibi "was a big lie, because on the [third] week of May 2007, [Judge Laron]
visited [the Tuvillo Family] house in Antipolo at the early time of the day[.]"79 Judge Laron allegedly told Wilfredo
of his meeting with an attorney in Ynares Stadium, Antipolo, Rizal.80 A purported record from the Bureau of
Immigration, which Judge Laron himself attached and relied on,81 showed that Wilfredo was indeed in the
Philippines on the third week of May 2007, specifically: from May 17, 2007 to June 9, 2007.82chanrobleslaw

On September 18, 2007, two (2) more criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against
Melissa. Prosecutor III George V. De Joy impleaded Melissa's husband, Wilfredo.83chanrobleslaw

On October 23, 2007, Presiding Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag of Branch 67 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City provisionally dismissed the first two (2) cases of bouncing checks against Melissa.84chanrobleslaw
Imelda learned of her husband's affair in January 200885 after she overheard a telephone conversation between
Judge Laron and Melissa.86 Judge Laron then confessed the affair to his wife and vowed to mend his ways.87 Their
three (3) sons, aged 18, 17, and 15, also found out about his indiscretion.88 Judge Laron acknowledged that his
family was hurt.89chanrobleslaw

On April 16, 2008, one Atty. Jun Laguilles90 (Atty. Laguilles) cai with Melissa to see Judge Laron in his chamber. Atty.
Laguilles is the husband91 of Former Makati City Regional Trial Court Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles. He
allegedly sought to settle the differences between Melissa and Judge Laron.92 Melissa averred that Judge Laron
cursed at her and ordered to have her sent out of his office.93 Melissa also cursed and shouted at Judge Laron.94
She demanded that he return all the money he took from her.95 He said he would, to which she replied that he
include everything he received from her, even his underwear.96 Atty. Laguilles helped Melissa out of Judge Laron's
chamber.97chanrobleslaw

In May 2008, Wilfredo arrived from abroad.98 The children reported to their father what happened at home: "Tito
Henry" would sleep in the Antipolo home, especially on weekends, and he physically hurt their
mother.99chanrobleslaw

Wilfredo filed a case for adultery against Judge Laron and Melissa. The Makati City Prosecution Office later
dismissed it for lack of probable cause (for failure to establish all the elements of the crime).100 This was affirmed
by the Department of Justice.101chanrobleslaw

On May 23, 2008, Melissa entered into the police blotter Judge Laron's alleged threats on her life. According to her,
Judge Laron told her, "ipapayari kita o kaya ipapatumba nalang kita."102chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron admitted the existence of their extramarital relationship.103 However, he denied that he ever asked
money,104 committed violence against her, or violated her marital union and family unity.105chanrobleslaw

Wilfredo maintained that Judge Laron "capitalized] and abus[ed] the innocence, trust and confidence of
[Melissa]."106 Judge Laron's extortion allegedly led to the depletion of all their savings, including their houses and
lots.107 He called Judge Laron "a hoodlum in robes who should be removed from the judiciary before he can
commit more atrocities."108chanrobleslaw

Regir v. Regir109 has defined immorality as:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[I]mmorality is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is not confined to sexual matters, but includes
conducts inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare110(Emphasis supplied)

Rule 140, Section 8(8) of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,111 classifies immorality as a
serious charge.112 As penalty Section 11(A)(1) allows for the imposition of dismissal from service, forfeiture of all
benefits except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from holding any public office, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations.113chanrobleslaw

In Perfecto v. Judge Esidera,114 we have ruled that lawyers and judges are bound to uphold secular morality, not
religious morality.115 We look past religious doctrine and determine what is good or right based on shared
community standards and values:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not have jurisdiction over
and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction
over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the public or its interest.

Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to
their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public's confidence in the Rule of Law.116

Guided by this standard, I find Judge Laron's actions to be indicative of his moral indifference and questionable
integrity, amounting to immorality.

Although it may be true that they were lonely people117 who reciprocated each other's affections,118 it is also
true that Melissa was desperate to wriggle out of the criminal cases that had strangled her.119 It is likewise true
that both of them are married,120 and their extramarital relationship was not kept hidden, especially from
Melissa's children.121chanrobleslaw

That Melissa first approached or sought Judge Laron122 is immaterial as a defense. Judge Laron knew that she was
in dire need, and he took advantage of her weaknesses. He was in a position of power: unlike Melissa, he has legal
expertise, and he was not facing a string of criminal cases. He is a judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, before which she was charged.

Judge Laron claims to have been fooled of Wilfredo's alleged death in 2007. This does not convince. Judge Laron
himself has shown that he is capable of acquiring Wilfredo's 2006-2008 travel information from the Bureau of
Immigration.123chanrobleslaw

Even if Judge Laron believed Wilfredo's death to be true, it still does not exonerate him. His attempts to dangle a
red herring must fail. Judge Laron entered into a relationship with Melissa beginning in 2005.124 At that time, he
was fully aware that her husband was simply at sea, alive and working.125chanrobleslaw

As the affair broke down, Judge Laron now paints himself as victim of Melissa's calls and text messages, as well as
threats to embarrass him and cause his dismissal from service.126 He attempts to soften the impact of his actions
by stating that they were "mature people"127 when they entered into the extramarital affair. However, when it
comes to facing the consequences, Judge Laron bails out and blames Melissa for allegedly hurting his wife and
children with her news of the affair.128chanrobleslaw

Maturity does not consist of welcoming a mistress' affections129 but rejecting the repercussions when things go
sideways. Judge Laron cannot lay the blame on Melissa, especially when he himself was a kept man of married
woman.

In any case, it is Judge Laron's private acts that are under scrutiny, not Melissa's. Judge Laron states that his
extramarital affair "[was] a personal matter and d[id] not affect [his] professional responsibilities as a judge and as a
lawyer."130 This is a tall tale.

In Perez v. Catindig,131 we disbarred a lawyer who had an extramarital affair with another woman. Although his
second marriage with the oth woman was void, we have stated that the lawyer "definitely manifested] deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. .
. . He exhibitec deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member the
bar[.]"132chanrobleslaw

In Leynes v. Judge Veloso,133 this Court ruled that "[i]f good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more
reason that requirement should be exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe
irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency."134chanrobleslaw

In Castillo v. Judge Calanog Jr.:135chanrobleslaw

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates
that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence.136 (Emphasis supplied)

Anyone applying for the judiciary is expected to have a thorough understanding of community standards and
values. No one forced Judge Laron to become a judge. When he became a judge, he agreed to abide by the Code of
Conduct for members of the Philippine Judiciary.

Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary137 provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 2

Integrity

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary[.]

Judges decide -not only on matters of law, but also of equity. They determine what is right and wrong in the cases
before them. A judge should, therefore, be able to walk the talk. He or she should be and appear to be a person
with integrity and credibility. In Dia-Añonuevo v. Judge Bercacio:138chanrobleslaw

Although every office in the government service is a public trust[,] no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport
himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct[,] official or otherwise[,] can bear the most searching scrutiny
of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.139
Judge Laron's words and actions reflect on the judiciary as a whole. He is expected to avoid conflicts of interest and
instances where the morality and legality of his actions are cast in a bad light. Judge Laron cannot simply accept the
perks of. his position but shy away from the discomfort and responsibilities involved. He should embrace both the
boons and banes of a the job, which he willingly entered into. In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr:140chanrobleslaw

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge,
both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.141

In that case, this Court dismissed a judge who had a mistress, with whom he bore a child, for immorality. This Court
held the dismissal to be "with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a
government-owned or controlled corporation, and forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any."142 Thus:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Judge Calanog has behaved in a manner not becoming of his robes and as a model of rectitude, betrayed the
people's high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.

It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts of
concubinage having indeed existed and been committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage but an
administrative matter that invokes the power of supervision of this Court over the members of the judiciary.

The circumstances show a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the respondent judge by failing to
avoid situations that make him suspect to committing immorality and worse, having that suspicion confirmed.143

Under Section 1 of Canon 4, judges have the duty to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities."

According to Judge Laron, he and Melissa "tried [their] best to discreet and sensitive to the sensibilities of those
around [them]."144 Thi not true. Judge Laron and Melissa were together for three (3) years.145 T did not even
attempt to hide it from Melissa's minor children146 and family's caretaker.147chanrobleslaw
The response of the court employees is even more telling. On April 16, 2008, when Melissa came to Judge Laron's
chamber, none of the them intervened when she began shouting at the judge148 and demanding that he return all
the money and things he received from her.149 The eight (8)150 court employees who witnessed the scene only
stood by to watch151 as the former lovers quarreled.152 Melissa shouted that she would file a case against Judge
Laron, who retorted, "my wife will also sue you."153 Only Atty. Laguilles, who came with Melissa to mediate
between her and Judge Laron,154 stepped in and helped her out of the door.155chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron willingly consented to their extramarital relationship. He did not keep it between only the two of them.
Divina156 and the Tuvillo children157 certainly knew. There are good reasons to suppose that Atty. Laguilles158
and his wife159 were likewise aware of the relationship. The court employees,160 who simply looked on as Melissa
and Judge Laron argued about returning her money and his underwear, could also have suspected about them, to
say the least.

While Wilfredo was busy providing for his family, Judge Laron usurped Wilfredo's role as husband and father,
sleeping in their house, driving for Melissa, and picking up her children from school.161 Judge Laron is well-known-
to the Tuvillo children. They even fondly called him "Tito Henry."162chanrobleslaw

Thus, one cannot imagine the shock of Wilfredo, who, for more than 20 years,163 worked away on board a ship—
battling against homesickness, the perils of sea, and the emotional strain caused by his physical separation from his
family—only to come home and find out that another man was enjoying his wife and the money he sent. Wilfredo's
children themselves broke the news to him.164 They found out about Judge Laron's trysts with their mother, as
Judge Laron did not mind flaunting their relationship in front of Wilfredo's children.165chanrobleslaw

In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Marcos and children against Judge Marcos,166 this Court dismissed from service a judge
who flaunted his other woman as though she were his wife. It did not matter that the judge had been physically
separated from his wife for three (3) years, or that he had no children with his mistress. His public display of the
illicit relationship constituted a conduct "unbecoming of a judge[,] whose conduct must at all times be beyond
reproach."167chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron entered into an extramarital affair with Melissa, a hapless litigant who faced a series of cases. His
seduction led to a three-year relationship where Judge Laron exchanged his help for her money, and their
relationship injured persons other than the two of them.

Judge Laron's indiscretion hurt not only his family168 but also Melissa's husband who, after discovering their affair,
sued his wife and the judge for adultery.169 The judge, a powerful figure in the legal circle, also publicly threatened
Melissa that Imelda, his wife, would sue her.170 The scandal in his chamber, in front of a private lawyer as well as
court and staff a employees, dragged down the dignity of his office.
Under Section 2 of Canon 4, "judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office."

Judge Laron's extramarital affair, his public display of his also married "other" woman, and the damage his
indiscretion caused not just to other people but also to the dignity of the office he serves, certainly reek of
immorality. His actions exhibit indecency, lack of integrity, depravity, and moral indifference to community
standards and values.171chanrobleslaw

For transgressing public morals and defiling the image of the judiciary, he must be stripped of his judicial robe and
dismissed from service.

II

Section 8(3), in relation to Section 11(A)(1)172 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, further supports Judge's Laron's
dismissal from service. [G]ross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct"173 is a serious
charge allowing for a judge's removal from service.174chanrobleslaw

In Sison-Barias v. Judge Rubia,175 we dismissed a judge who privately met with a litigant at a restaurant and
advised her to speak with the other party's counsel. We have ruled that this act violated Canons 1 (Independence),
2 (Integrity), 3 (Impartiality), and 4 (Propriety).176chanrobleslaw

Similarly, Judge Laron violated the same provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 1

INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall
therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

SECTION 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts
and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement,
pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

....
SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

....

SECTION 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a
dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain
and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.

SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public
confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

CANON 2

Integrity

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.

CANON 3

Impartiality

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but
also to the process by which the decision is to be made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary.

SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will
be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

....

CANON 4

Propriety

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

SECTION 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of
favoritism or partiality.

In Gacayan v. Judge Pamintuan,177 this Court ruled that it is improper for a judge to have a private meeting with
the accused, especially "in the seclusion of his [or her] chambers," without the presence of the
complainant.178chanrobleslaw

Judge Laron first met Melissa, who was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, inside his
chamber, without the presence of the offended parties. They became lovers, and their meetings extended to more
private spaces.

For a judge, having a close friendship with the litigant is to be avoided at all costs. With more reasons should a
romantic relationship with one be shunned as this destroys the litigants' confidence in the "judge's impartiality
and[,] eventually, undermine the people's faith in the administration of justice."179chanrobleslaw
Judge Laron, as the judge in a case against Melissa, dismissed that case with prejudice upon motion by the
parties.180 Another judge in the Makati City Metropolitan Trial Court likewise provisionally dismissed Melissa's two
other cases.181 It is not farfetched to conclude that Judge Laron provided assistance to his former lover in the
cases pending before him and another judge. These incidents cannot be said to be above suspicion, or otherwise
entirely free from the appearance of impropriety.

In Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on September 26, 2013
Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan,182 we found a Sandiganbayan Justice and Chairperson of
the Fourth Division liable for impropriety for visiting and socializing with a litigant, Janet Lim-Napoles (Napoles),
whom his Division acquitted. Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory S. Ong was relieved from service.183chanrobleslaw

Fraternizing with litigants taints a judge's appearance ofimpartiality.184 Canon 1, Section 3 states that "[j]udges
shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency." In Rallos v. Judge Gako Jr.:185

Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial.
Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. . . . Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. Thus, their
official conduct should be beyond reproach.186 (Emphasis supplied)

In Garcia v. Judge Burgos:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the trust and faith reposed in him by the parties as
an impartial and objective administrator of justice. When he exhibits actions that give rise fairly or unfairly, to
perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded[.]188

Likewise, Judge Laron's asking for money from a litigant constitutes gross misconduct. In Sison Jr. v. Camacho,189
we disbarred a lawyer for failing to account for the funds he solicited as payment for additional docket fees. We
have ruled that "[t]hose in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all
their dealings."190chanrobleslaw

According to Melissa, Judge Laron would solicit money from he. pay for his medicines, executive check-up, regular
visits to the doctor, cell phone load, gasoline expenses, and monthly groceries, among other things.191 A
US$200.00 deposit to the account of "Henry E. Laron"192 supports the claim of solicitation. There is no indication
that the money was ever returned or refused.

In Galang v. Judge Santos,193 a judge's personal actions, whether in the bench or in his daily life, should be beyond
reproach and free from the manifestations of impropriety.194chanrobleslaw

In In Re: Solicitation of Judge Virrey,195 this Court dismissed from service a judge who solicited "donations" for the
repair of his office and for his personal travel expenses. This Court has held that such irresponsible and improper
conduct erodes the public's faith in the judiciary.196 These acts clearly violate the judge's duties of integrity,
independence, and propriety.197chanrobleslaw

In Quiz v. Judge Castaño,198 this Court dismissed from service a judge who attempted to extort money from a
litigant. The judge visited the litigant in the place he stayed in, met with him at an eatery, and pocketed a sum of
money from him. This Court acknowledged that, under the prevailing circumstances, it could not simply give the
errant judge a slap on the wrist.199chanrobleslaw

We ruled similarly in Re: Allegations Against Justice Ong and dismissed the Sandiganbayan Justice for gross
misconduct. We held that the Sandiganbayan Justice's acts of consenting to be Napoles' contact at the
Sandiganbayan, "fixing" the criminal case in her favor, and accepting money and favors from her "constitute gross
misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary."200chanrobleslaw

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to find respondent Judge Henry E. Laron GUILTY of immorality and gross misconduct.
Respondent Judge Henry E. Laron should be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits, with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency,
including

11. Gonzales vs serrano, g.r. 175433, march 11, 2015.

G.R. No. 175433

ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES, Petitioner,

vs.

MAILA CLEMEN F. SERRANO, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Atty. Jacinto C.
Gonzales,2 assailing the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 16, 2006, and its Resolution4 dated
October 4, 2006, in CA G.R. SP No. 76959. The CA reversed and set aside the Memorandum-Order dated January 3,
2003 and the Order dated February 11, 2003 approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio
Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162, and reinstated the Decision dated March 19, 2002 of the Ombudsman Administrative
Adjudication Bureau approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB-ADM-01-0162 (RAS-2001-0156).

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

This case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Maila Clemen F. Serrano (respondent) against her
direct superior, Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales (petitioner), Chief, Legal Division of the Philippine Racing Commission
(PHILRACOM), for grave misconduct, sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness.

In her Complaint-Affidavit5 dated January 12, 2001, respondent alleged that on November 23, 2000, petitioner
invited her, along with her officemates, Administrative Officer V Eva Bataller, Atty. III Eugene Juanson, and
Stenographer II Roman Vidal, to eat lunch at Buddy's Restaurant, at J.P. Rizal St., Makati City. While seated at the
table waiting for their food to be served, petitioner suddenly took hold of respondent's face and forcefully kissed
her lips in the presence of Eva, Eugene, Roman and other customers. Respondent tried to ward off petitioner by
pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on kissing her against her will. She was so shocked, terrified, and
humiliated that she could hardly talk and move. She wanted to cry, but held her tears for fear of further
embarrassment. After releasing her, petitioner said: "Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila..." Then, he held her hand and
said "Maila sige na..." But, she took away her hand from him. Thereafter, she immediately reported the incident to
PHILRACOM Executive Director Juan Lozano.

Respondent also alleged that prior to that "kissing" incident, petitioner had already degraded her person on four
(4) separate occasions, namely: (1) on the very first day she met him in the office, he offered to purchase her a cell
phone so that he can text her, which offer she straightforwardly refused;

(2) on that same day, he wanted her to join him in his car in going home, which she likewise refused; (3) a week
later, he asked her to eat out for lunch; again, she refused; and (4) on August 23, 2000, after her sick leave from
office, petitioner called her in his office and scolded her and uttered the following unsavory remarks:

Eh ayoko na sa iyo. Hindi mo sinabi sa akin na may anak ka! Nasaan na ang tatay ng anak mo? Wala na? Ano pang
hindi mo sinasabi sa akin, may boyfriend ka? Akala ko pa naman ok ka, kaya nga sinabihan kita dati na sumabay ka
sa akin! Ang daming nagrereklamo sa iyo dito. Hindi ka marunong makisama. Makisama ka naman! Paano na kung
alisin ka dito, makakabalik ka pa ba sa dati mong opisina? Eh ayoko talaga sa iyo dito. Ano? Do you have a choice?
Alam mo ba na ako ang nagrekomenda kay Eva diyan sa Admin. kay Chairman. Kaya ka nakapasok dito dahil
pakiusap ka lang [ni] Eva sa akin. Alam mo bang nakasalalay dito and posisyon mo dito? Alam mo bang kung ano
mo ako dito? Ha? Ano mo ako dito? xxx Ano ngayon ang gagawin natin eh ayoko nga sa iyo? Anong gagawin natin
ngayon?

Respondent further alleged that she was constrained to elevate her complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
because the PHILRACOM Grievance Committee had not taken any concrete action on her administrative case which
had been pending for over a month, and also because of petitioner's relatively high position in the office.

To support her complaint-affidavit and to corroborate her account, respondent submitted the Joint Affidavit6 of her
officemates Eva, Eugene and Roman, who witnessed the entire "kissing" incident on November 23, 2000.

In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer dated March 22, 2001, petitioner alleged that at the prodding of his staff, he agreed
to treat them for lunch, as it was respondent's birthday, and she had no money for a "blowout".7 While their group
were talking in the restaurant, he greeted respondent and planted an innocent birthday greeting kiss on her left
cheek, near her lips. He also alleged that he first met respondent when she applied for Attorney III; that on July 1,
2000, he summoned her to explain the complaints forwarded by the Personnel and Administrative Division as to
her frequent absence and tardiness; and that his act of reviewing her official functions was in accordance with his
duties and responsibilities as a legal counsel of PHILRACOM.

In her Reply-Affidavit,8 respondent stated that she never solicited any favor from petitioner, let alone obliged him
to spend money for her birthday "blowout"; that his birthday lunch treat was part of a premeditated evil plan to
have her submit to his sexual desire; that she never allowed him to kiss her on the cheek, much less on the lips;
that in the course of her employment with petitioner as her supervisor, he had often made sexual advances and
gestures towards her, but she still tried to keep their relationship on a strictly professional level; that the alleged
work-related incidents of tardiness, inefficiency and laziness were all intended to harass her; and that because of
the administrative case she filed against him, she lost her job.

Meanwhile, records show that in an Order of Termination dated January 18, 2001, Executive Director Lozano
ordered the termination of respondent at the close of business hours of January 19, 2001.9 Records also show that
the Commission on Human Rights issued a Resolution dated May 8, 2001 in CHR Case No. 2001-037 which found
petitioner to have committed acts of sexual harassment, abuse of authority, and illegal dismissal against
respondent.10

In an Order dated June 27, 2001, the parties were directed to appear for the preliminary conference of the
administrative case. Both parties appeared as directed and agreed to submit the case for decision based on the
evidence on record and pleadings filed.
A Resolution dated July 17, 2001 was approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr.
(Overall Deputy Ombudsman) in OMB-0-01-0039, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds sufficient evidence that supports the conclusion that the crime
of violation of Section 3(a), Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as "An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment
Unlawful in the Employment, Education, or Training Environment, and for other purposes," was committed
probably by the herein respondent. Let therefore, the appropriate information be filed against Jacinto C. Gonzales
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City.

SO RESOLVED.11

On March 19, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau, through Graft Investigation
Officer Marlon T. Molina, issued a Decision finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. Approved by Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto, among other officers, the Decision has the following dispositive portion:

FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds substantial evidence that respondent JACINTO G. GONZALES
is guilty of Grave Misconduct.

Accordingly, the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service is hereby imposed upon him pursuant to Section 52 (A), par.
3, Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936 otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.

The Honorable Chairman of the Philippine Racing Commission, Electra House Building, Esteban Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City is hereby directed to implement this Decision in accordance with law and promptly report to
this Office compliance thereof.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau denied in the
Order dated September 9, 2002.13

However, on January 3, 2003, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the Memorandum issued by Graft
Investigation Officer II Julita M. Calderon, with a decretal portion that states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we most respectfully recommend that the herein ORDER dated
September 9, 2002 prepared by GIO Molina be MODIFIED insofar as the infraction and the penalty to be imposed
upon the herein respondent is concerned, i.e., from

GRAVE MISCONDUCT to SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and from

DISMISSAL from the Service to a mere ONE (1) MONTH SUSPENSION, without pay, pursuant to Section 52B (2) of
Rule IV of the "Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.14

Aggrieved, respondent brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman. On August 16, 2006, the CA sustained respondent and rendered the herein assailed decision. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The memorandum-order dated 03 January
2003 and the Order dated 11 February 2003 approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio,
Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 19 March 2002 approved by then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB-ADM-0-01- 0162 (RAS-2001-0156) is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against
private respondent.

SO ORDERED.15

Thereafter, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration,16 but the
CA denied it in a Resolution17 dated October 4, 2006 for being a prohibited motion.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE MEMORANDUM-ORDER
DATED 03 JANUARY 2003 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2003 APPROVED BY THE THEN OVERALL DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. IN OMB-ADM-0-01-0162, IT APPEARING THAT THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN, IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS ONLY SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO HAVE
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS OF DISCRETION [sic], UPON
WHICH THE INSTANT PETITION IS BASED, IN GROSS CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE GROSSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S URGENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, THE GROUNDS INVOKED THEREIN NOT BEING APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR AND
MOREOVER, THE DENIAL THEREOF HAS SACRIF[I]CED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY TO
TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE.18

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that it is only in an appealed case, not in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
that the CA has authority to substitute its own findings and conclusions with that of the disciplining authority. He
points out that what is claimed as "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman was
his alleged erroneous approval of the Memorandum-Order dated January 3, 2003 which modified the infraction
and the penalty from grave misconduct to simple misconduct, and from dismissal to a mere one (1) month
suspension without pay. But, he argues that such was merely an error in the exercise of judgment or discretion
which is not correctible by a writ of certiorari. He also argues that the mere fact that the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman made findings and conclusions contrary to or inconsistent with those of the Ombudsman
Administrative Adjudication Bureau cannot, by itself, be considered grave abuse of discretion, as the findings of the
disciplining authority is always subject to amendment, corrections or reconsideration. He concedes that the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman found him to have committed misconduct amounting to sexual harassment. However, he
points out that such finding of simple misconduct, instead of grave misconduct, is supported by facts and
circumstances, and such finding is within sole discretion of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman over which the courts
have no authority to interfere. At any rate, he submits that his misconduct was not motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose; hence, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not warranted. Finally, he maintains
that the issue of sexual harassment is better addressed and resolved in the criminal case for violation of Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 787719 (docketed as Crim. Case No. 311165) pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 64, for to do so in an administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and extremely
unreasonable.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that the CA grossly erred in applying the two prohibitions laid down in
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Court of Appeals,20 which was reiterated in Ma. Imelda Argel, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.,21 i.e., the doctrine that the 15-day period for filing an appeal is non-extendible, and the prohibition
against the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in all courts, except the
Supreme Court. He insists that the denial of such motion for extension should be based on the court's assessment
of the grounds relied upon and not on purely procedural technicality. He seeks to justify his urgent motion for
extension on the fact that, as Presiding Judge and Pairing Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Olongapo City, he
was beset with pressures of work attending to numerous court trials, preparation of court orders and decisions,
and large volume of case load. He prays for a liberal construction of procedural rules in order to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.

There is no merit in the petition

The Court shall first delve on the procedural issue of the case. In Imperial v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court ruled:
In a long line of cases starting with Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon, we have laid down the following guideline:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed
only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either
grant or deny the extension requested.

Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed. This
rule is consistent with the rule in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that unless an appeal or a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15- day reglementary period, the CA’s decision becomes final.
Thus, a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not stop the running of the 15-day
period for the computation of a decision’s finality. At the end of the period, a CA judgment becomes final,
immutable and beyond our power to review.23

This rule, however, admits of exceptions based on a liberal reading of the rule,24 so long as the petitioner is able to
prove the existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance.25 No such reasons were shown to obtain in
this case. Petitioner's reasons of pressures of work attending to numerous court trials, preparation of court orders
and decisions, and large volume of case load, are foreseeable and perennial problems of most trial court judges.
Such reasons are inexcusable, as ordinary prudence should have prompted him to secure the services of an
independent counsel to defend his administrative case.

While the CA was correct in denying his Urgent Motion for Extension to File Motion for Reconsideration for being a
prohibited motion, the Court, in the interest of justice, looked into the merits of the case, and opted to suspend the
prohibition against such motion for extension after it found that a modification of the CA Decision is warranted by
the law and the jurisprudence on administrative cases involving sexual harassment. The emerging trend of
jurisprudence, after all, is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of procedural rules.26 Rules of
procedure exist to ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases; to this end, inflexibility or liberality
must be weighed. Thus, the relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or exemption of a case from their
operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.27

The Court shall now delve on the substantive issue of whether the CA gravely erred in reversing the Memorandum-
Order of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman which downgraded petitioner's infraction from grave misconduct to
simple misconduct, and the penalty imposed on him from dismissal to a mere one (1) month suspension without
pay.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Amalio A. Mallari,28 the Court explained the difference between simple and grave
misconduct, as follows:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer.1âwphi1 The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional
elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. In
other words, in grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard
of an established rule must be evident.

In this case, the Court finds the element of corruption present. As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner used
his position and authority as Head of the Legal Division of PHILRACOM, as well as his moral ascendancy, to elicit
sexual favors and to indulge in sexually malicious acts from his respondent, his female subordinate.29 As to
petitioner's sole defense that he merely gave respondent an innocent birthday greeting kiss, the Court is
unconvinced in view of the Joint Affidavit of their officemates attesting that he forcibly kissed her on the lips and
said: "Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila. x x x"

In Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,30 the Court found the respondent public officer, who merely attempted to forcibly kiss
the complainant, guilty of grave misconduct through sexual harassment, thus:

Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the
incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to [complainant] De la Cruz, who made it
clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed against
petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have
escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that
might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as
petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status
lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation.

We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an
established rule attended the incident in question. RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on
March 5, 1995. Respondent was charged with knowledge of the existence of this law and its contents, more so
because he was a public servant. His act of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her without her consent was
an unmistakable manifestation of his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the
work environment. Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss
petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial – that intimate
physical contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondent’s defiance of custom and lack of respect for
the opposite sex were more appalling because he was a married man. Respondent’s act showed a low regard for
women and disrespect for petitioner’s honor and dignity.31 (Emphasis added)

However, it bears emphasis that in Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,32 the Court ordered the respondent public officer's
dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, because it was the
third time that he was penalized for acts of sexual harassment. In determining such penalty, moreover, the Court
considered the length of his service as an aggravating circumstance.

Apropos to this case is Civil Service Commission v. Nierras33 where the Court upheld the CA's decision finding the
respondent public officer guilty of grave misconduct through sexual harassment with a reduced sentence of six (6)
months suspension without pay, thus:

Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the case of Veloso v. Caminade in imposing the
proper penalty on Nierras since the facts of the case are different. Indeed, it should be noted that in the instant
case, Oña and Nierras are not co-employees while in the Caminade case, the complainants were the subordinates
of the offender. Also, in the Caminade case, there were several incidents of sexual harassment by a judge from
whom the expected standard of morality was more exacting. But here, there was only one incident of sexual
harassment. If a six-month suspension can be meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of morality is
more exacting, a fortiori, the same or lesser penalty should be meted to Nierras. Moreover, in the Caminade case,
the offender actually forcefully kissed and grabbed the complainants. However, in this case, Oña was able to flee
from the arms of Nierras even before he could cause more harm to her. Under the circumstances of the present
case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that suspension of the offender for a period of six (6) months without pay
is sufficient penalty.34

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner should be held liable for grave
misconduct, but holds that a reduction of the penalty from dismissal from service to a mere suspension of six (6)
months without pay, is in order. Like in Veloso v. Caminade,35 there is only one incident of sexual harassment in
this case where petitioner forcibly kissed respondent who was his subordinate. If a six (6)-month suspension can be
meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of morality is more exacting, it is logical that a similar penalty
should be meted to petitioner.

Moreover, the Court's reduced penalty of six (6)-months suspension without pay is in conformity with Civil Service
Commission Resolution (CSC) No. 01-0940 entitled the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment
Cases. Section 53, Rule X thereof classifies acts of sexual harassment as grave, less grave and light offenses, while
Sections 55 and 56, Rule XI provides the corresponding penalties therefor, to wit:

"RULE X
CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Section 53. Sexual harassment is classified as grave, less grave and light offenses.

A. Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:

1.unwanted touching of private parts of the body (genitalia, buttocks and breast);

2.sexual assault;

3.malicious touching;

4.requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment, promotion, local or foreign travels, favorable working
conditions or assignments, a passing grade, the granting of honors or scholarship, or the grant of benefits or
payment of a stipend or allowance, and

5.other analogous cases.

B.Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to: 1. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s
body; 2. pinching not falling under grave offenses;

3. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex, or one’s sexual
orientation or used to describe a person;

4. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and

5. other analogous cases.

C.The following shall be considered Light Offenses;

1.surreptitiously looking or staring a look of a person’s private part or worn undergarments;

2.telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text, electronic mail or other similar means, causing
embarrassment or offense and carried out after the offender has been advised that they are offensive or
embarrassing or, even without such advise, when they are by their nature clearly embarrassing, offensive or vulgar;

3.malicious leering or ogling;

4.the display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;

5.unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person’s sex life;

6.unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;

7.making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;

8.persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones;

9.unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones causing discomfort, embarrassment, offense or insult to the
receiver; and

10.other analogous cases.

RULE XI

ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITIES

xxx

xxx

xxx
Section 55. Any person who is found guilty of sexual harassment shall, after the investigation, be meted the penalty
corresponding to the gravity and seriousness of the offense.

Section 56. The penalties for light, less grave, and grave offenses are as follows:

A. For light offenses:

1st offense – Reprimand 2nd offense – Fine or suspension not exceeding thirty (30) days 3rd offense – Dismissal

B. For less grave offenses:

1st offense – Fine or suspension of not less than thirty (30) days and not exceeding six (6) months 2nd offense –
Dismissal

C. For grave offenses: Dismissal" (Emphasis added)

Applying the foregoing provisions, the Court finds that the sexual harassment offense petitioner committed falls
under less grave offenses which is analogous to "unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body", and to
"derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex", with the
corresponding maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay.36

Section 53 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS),37 states that in the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered. The following
circumstances shall be appreciated:

a.Physical Illness

b.Good faith

c.Taking undue advantage of official position

d.Taking undue advantage of subordinate

e.Undue disclosure of confidential information

f.Use of government property in the commission of the offense

g.Habituality

h.Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building;

i.Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense

j.Length of service in the government

k.Education

l.Other analogous circumstances.

Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or pleaded by the proper party, otherwise,
said circumstances shall not be considered in the imposition of proper penalty. The Commission, however, in the
interest of substantial justice may take and consider these circumstances.

The Court notes that the Deputy Overall Ombudsman was correct in appreciating the following mitigating
circumstances in determining the imposable penalty, to wit: (1) petitioner's weak physical condition and (2)
commission of the offense in a public place and in the presence of their office mates. However, the said
Ombudsman gravely erred in failing to consider the following aggravating circumstances: (1) taking undue
advantage of official position; (2) taking undue advantage of subordinate; and (3) education. As the Head of the
Legal Department of PHILRACOM and the direct superior of respondent, petitioner's act of forcibly kissing her lips
and saying "Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila x x x" in front of their office mates, smacks of bad faith, abuse of official
position, flagrant disregard of the anti-sexual harassment law,38 and willful violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.39 Under Section 54 (d) of the URACCS,40 where more aggravating circumstances are present than
mitigating ones, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the Court imposes the penalty of suspension of six
(6) months without pay.
Given that the Ombudsman is vested with plenary and unqualified power41 to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof,42 the settled rule is that courts will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reason to indicate otherwise.43
As discussed above, the Court finds such good and compelling reasons based on law and jurisprudence as would
warrant the modification of the CA decision, as well as the Memorandum-Order of Overall Deputy Office of the
Ombudsman.

Meanwhile, the Court disagrees on petitioner's contention that the issue of sexual harassment is better addressed
in the pending criminal case for sexual harassment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, for to do so in an
administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and extremely unreasonable. It bears to stress that
administrative and criminal charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and the trial court, respectively, are
separate and distinct from each other even if they arise from the same act or omission. This is because the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required. Moreover, the purpose of the administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the
public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the
purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.44 Thus, even the dismissal of a criminal case does
not necessarily foreclose the administrative action against the respondent.45

Finally, considering that the Court is reducing the penalty imposed on him from dismissal from service to a mere 6-
month suspension without pay, and that he is no longer connected with PHILRACOM, petitioner should refund the
salaries and all other monetary benefits he had received equivalent to six (6) months with legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from finality of this Decision until fully paid.46 His earned leave credits for the
duration of such suspension are likewise deemed forfeited.47 The Court stresses that his appointment48 as a trial
court judge should not be viewed as a sort of exoneration from such suspension that he should have served while
he was then PHILRACOM's Legal Department Head. Thus, in addition to the refund of salaries and benefits, and
forfeiture of earned leave credits during such suspension, the Court sternly warns petitioner not to commit similar
acts, otherwise, his conduct may be construed as tainted with impropriety which shall merit the penalty of
dismissal from the service.

Moreover, in view of Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council which disqualifies from being
nominated for appointment to any judicial post those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases, the
Court finds it necessary to investigate whether petitioner declared in his application for appointment his pending
administrative case for grave misconduct and criminal cases for sexual harassment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 16, 2006, and its
Resolution dated October 4, 2006, in CA G.R. SP No. 76959,are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, reducing the
penalty for grave misconduct through sexual harassment from dismissal from service to suspension of six (6)
months without pay, and with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be punished with
dismissal from the service. Considering, however, that petitioner Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales is no longer connected
with Philippine Racing Commission, he is ORDERED to REFUND the salaries and other monetary benefits he could
have received during the period of such suspension with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid. Further, his earned leave credits during such period of suspension are also
deemed FORFEITED.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to form part of petitioner's
service record. The OCA is hereby DIRECTED to investigate, report and recommend the necessary action on
whether petitioner declared in his application for appointment his pending administrative and criminal cases.

SO ORDERED.

12. B.m. 712 July 13 1995

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction
of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation
rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of
such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was
accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed
the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and
to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10)
months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having
persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with
his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or
should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but
quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the
duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief
concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow
path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom
of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be
made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully
met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession,
and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary
trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will
attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from
the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the
standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is one
of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and
interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents
and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of
the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who,
having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of
justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as
the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he covered an
upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to
the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain
bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to
his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject
him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects
honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish
his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a
very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our
people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon
Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider
de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within
ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if
any, of Raul Camaligan.

13. B.m. 712 March 19 1997

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not
guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the
order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took
advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and
treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to
their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack
upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an
untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty
of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but,
also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public
image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible,
irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of
death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for
forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community.
As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members
of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to
be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

14. Ac 7437 Avida land

IVISION

[ AC. No. 7437, Aug 17, 2016 ]

AVIDA LAND CORPORATION v. ATTY. AL C. ARGOSINO +

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

The only issue before Us is whether respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that caused delay in the
execution of a final judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.

In its questioned Resolution[1], the Board of Governors (Board) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation[2] of the Investigating Commissioner,[3] who found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 12, Rule 12.04[4] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying the
enforcement of a writ of execution, and recommended that the latter be reprimanded or censured with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same behavior in the future shall merit a harsher penalty.[5]

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision houses and lots.[6]
Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development Corporation (Rodman).[7]
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman,[8] under which the latter was to acquire from the former
a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In the event that such financing would
be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to pay the full contract price of P4,412,254.00, less the downpayment of
P1,323,676.20, within 15 days from its receipt of the loan disapproval.[9]

After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property.[10]

In three separate letters[11], complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance of P3,088,577.80.
[12] Both parties agreed that the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within 18 months.[13]

Rodman made a partial payment of P404,782.56 on 22 March 1999. It also claimed to have made other payments
amounting to P1,458,765.06 from March 1999 to July 1999, which complainant disputed.[14]

Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded that Rodman vacate the
subject property.[15]

As Rodman remained in possession of the property,[16] complainant filed an unlawful detainer case against the
former before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City.[17]

Soon after, Rodman filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) seeking the
nullification of the rescission of the Contract to Sell. It also prayed for the accounting of payments and the fixing of
the period upon which the balance of the purchase price should be paid.[18]

The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.[19]

HLURB Regional Office No. IV (HLURB Regional Office), through its arbiter Atty. Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino, similarly
dismissed Rodman's Complaint and ordered it to pay damages and attorney's fees.[20] Rodman appealed the ruling
to the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board).[21]

In its subsequent Decision,[22] the HLURB Board modified the arbiter's ruling, directing Rodman "to immediately
pay its outstanding balance failing in which respondent shall have the right to rescind the contract subject to a
refund of all the sums paid by complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly
compensation for the use of the premises at the rate of 1% of the contract price per month."[23]
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] of the HLURB Board's Decision, questioning the order to refund
the sums paid by Rodman less deductions in case of a rescission of the contract. Rodman filed a
Comment/Opposition[25] to complainant's motion and sought a clarification of certain aspects of the Decision,[26]
but did not move for reconsideration.

The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution[27] modifying its earlier Decision. Thus:

xxx [T]he complainant (Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the respondent (herein complainant) its
outstanding balance of P1,814,513.27, including interests and penalties which may have accrued in the meantime,
failing in which, the respondent shall have the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid
by the complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly compensation for the use
of the premises at the rate of 1% of the contract price per month.

As neither of the parties appealed the judgment within the period allowed, it became final and executory.

The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the judgment, but their efforts were in vain.[28] With
the judgment award still not satisfied after the lapse of six months, complainant filed a motion for writs of
execution and possession[29] before the HLURB Board.

Respondent filed an Opposition/Comment on the motion and subsequently a Rejoinder[30] to complainant's Reply.
[31]

In an Order[32] dated 10 August 2006, the HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and remanded the case
records to the HLURB Regional Office for proceedings on the execution of the judgment and/or other appropriate
disposition.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order dated 10 August 2006,[33] raising issues on the computation
of interests. Complainant filed an Opposition[34] and Rejoinder,[35] to which respondent filed a Reply[36] and Sur-
rejoinder.[37]

On 17 January 2007, the HLURB Board issued an Order[38] denying Rodman's Motion for Reconsideration. It said
that the computation of interests and penalties, as well as other matters concerning the implementation of the
final and executory Decision, shall be dealt with in the execution proceedings before the Regional Office. It
furthermore enjoined the parties from filing any pleading in the guise of an appeal on collateral issues or questions
already passed upon.[39]

On 5 March 2007, respondent filed a Motion for Computation of Interest[40] before the HLURB Regional Office,
citing the disagreement between the parties as to the reckoning date of the accrual of interest. Complainant filed
its Opposition with Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and Possession.[41]
In its Order[42] dated 31 July 2007, the HLURB Regional Office accordingly computed the interest due, arriving at
the total amount of P2,685,479.64 as payment due to complainant. It also directed the issuance of a Writ of
Execution implementing the HLURB Board's earlier Resolution.[43]

Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution,[44] respondent, on behalf of Rodman,
filed a Motion (1) to Quash the Writ of Execution; (2) for Clarification; and (3) to Set the Case for Conference.[45]
The said motion injected new issues and claims and demanded the inclusion in the Order of a "provision that upon
actual receipt of the amount of P2,685,479.64, [complainant] should simultaneously turn-over the duplicate
original title to Rodman." (Emphasis omitted)

Respondent also filed a Petition[46] to Cite Complainant in Contempt for issuing a demand letter to Rodman
despite the pendency of the latter's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.

On 7 November 2007, the HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference to thresh out the
problems with the execution of the writ. The conference, however, failed to serve its purpose.

Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case and for the setting of a
hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt.[47] The motion alleged that Arbiter Aquino had shown
bias in favor of complainant, and that she had failed to set the Petition for hearing.[48]

In an Order dated 23 April 2008,[49] the HLURB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for inhibition; (2) granted
complainant's Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Writ of Possession; and (3) directed complainant
to comment on the Petition citing the latter for contempt.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, reiterating that Arbiter Aquino should inhibit
herself from the case because of her bias. Arbiter Aquino eventually yielded and ordered the re-raffle of the case,
which went to Arbiter Raymundo A. Foronda.

When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Pending Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution, respondent submitted his vehement Opposition. He insisted that his Motion to be Furnished with Notice
of Re-raffle should be acted upon first and argued that "the merits of the instant case as well as the motions filed in
relation thereto must be re-evaluated by the new handling arbiter after the re-raffling x x x."
On 5 January 2009, respondent filed a Manifestation on the Notice of Conference issued by Arbiter Foronda. The
Manifestation stated that Rodman would be attending the conference, not to submit itself to the jurisdiction of
Arbiter Foronda, but to facilitate the re-raffling of the case.

On 16 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda, claiming that his designation
violated due process. He said the re-raffle was questionable because he was not notified of its conduct despite his
earlier Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle.

Thereafter, the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of whether or not Arbiter Foronda could rule on
the pending motions.

In a Resolution dated 22 September 2009, Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-raffle was not an
indispensable prerequisite for a substitute arbiter to have jurisdiction over a case at the execution stage; (2) the
claim of Rodman that its Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 April 2008 Order had remained unresolved was
rendered moot by Arbiter Aquino's eventual inhibition from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer for the summary
dismissal of complainant's motions to resolve the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution was denied.

The 22 September 2009 Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as respondent did not file any more
pleadings.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENT

On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant - through its vice president
for project development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-Affidavit[50] against respondent for alleged professional
misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint alleged that respondent's conduct in relation to the
HLURB case manifested a disregard of the following tenets:[51]

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.

Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

In his Comment,[52] respondent claimed that what primarily caused the delays in the HLURB case were the legal
blunders of complainant's counsel, to wit:

It took complainant's counsel a period of six months to file a Motion for Writ of Execution of the HLURB Board's
Decision dated 22 June 2005.[53]

The Motion for Writ of Execution was filed before the HLURB Board, which as an appellate body had no jurisdiction
to issue the writ.[54]

Respondent also raised the issue of complainant's counsel's erroneous acts of notarial rescission and filing of an
ejectment suit before the trial court. These acts allegedly contributed to the delay in the resolution of the dispute.
[55]

Further, respondent argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the execution of the Decision dated 22
June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed on 21 February 2007, as complainant filed its Motion for Writ
of Execution before the HLURB Regional Office only in April 2007.[56]

Lastly, respondent asserted that he merely followed his legal oath by defending the cause of his client with utmost
dedication, diligence, and good faith.[57]

As respondent allegedly continued performing dilatory and frivolous tactics, complainant filed Supplemental
Complaints[58] against him.

The Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.[59]

On 22 June 2013, the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation on the Complaint.[60] Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition within the
period allowed.[61]

THE RULING OF THE COURT

Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.

Despite the simplicity of the issue involved in the HLURB case, the path towards its resolution became long,
tedious, and frustrating because of the deliberate attempts of respondent to delay the actual execution of the
judgment therein. He continued to file pleadings over issues already passed upon even after being enjoined not to
do so, and made unfounded accusations of bias or procedural defects. These acts manifest his propensity to
disregard the authority of a tribunal and abuse court processes, to the detriment of the administration of justice.

The defense that respondent is merely defending the cause of his client is untenable.

As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his client and is expected to serve the latter with
competence and diligence. As such, respondent is entitled to employ every honorable means to defend the cause
of his client and secure what is due the latter.[62]

Professional rules, however, impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications.[63] Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are required to exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.[64] The Code also obliges
lawyers to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of their client.[65]

In Millare v. Montero,[66] the Court ruled that it is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial
process - such as the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation, and frivolous appeals - for the sole purpose of
frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.

In Garcia v. Francisco,[67] a lawyer willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse - all of which were rebuffed
- to get a favorable judgment. He was found to have violated his duty as a member of the bar to pursue only those
acts or proceedings that appear to be just, and only those lines of defense he believed to be honestly debatable
under the law.

Respondent cannot hide behind the pretense of advocating his client's cause to escape liability for his actions that
delayed and frustrated the administration of justice.

He even attempted to turn the tables on complainant by pointing out that the "legal blunders" of the latter's
counsel contributed to the delay in the execution of the judgment. Whether or not the actions or omissions of
complainant's counsel brought dire consequences to its client's cause is not a factor in the instant case. Even
assuming for argument's sake that complainant's counsel committed procedural errors that prolonged some of the
case incidents, these errors did not prejudice the delivery of justice, as they were later cured. More important, the
so-called "blunders" were independent of respondent's actions, which were the direct cause of the delay.
Respondent argues that he could not have possibly delayed the execution of the judgment, as no Motion for
Execution of Judgment had been filed when the instant administrative case was instituted. This argument can no
longer be considered viable, as he continued to employ dilatory tactics even after the Writ of Execution had already
been issued, and complainant later filed Supplemental Complaints against him.

What is patent from the acts of respondent — as herein narrated and evident from the records - is that he has
made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and ultimately caused unjust delays in the
administration of justice. These acts are in direct contravention of Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provide:

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court processes.

Further, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath[68] by disobeying the legal orders of a duly constituted authority,
and disregarding his sworn duty to "delay no man for money or malice."

While the IBP similarly found respondent guilty of professional misconduct, we find that its recommended penalty
of reprimand is not commensurate with respondent's transgression.

Under the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline's Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (IBP Guidelines),
reprimand is generally appropriate as a penalty when a lawyer's negligence causes injury or potential injury to a
client or a party.[69] In this case, respondent's injurious acts were clearly not caused by his negligence in following
procedures or court orders. He knowingly abused the legal process and violated orders of the HLURB Board and
Regional Office with the intent of delaying the execution of a judgment that had long been final and executory. That
he continued to do so even if a Complaint was already filed against him proved that his acts were deliberate.

Further, ethical violations analogous to respondent's infractions have not been treated as lightly by the Court.

In Foronda v. Guerrero, the respondent therein was suspended for two years from the practice of law for filing
multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter in violation of Canon 12[70] and Rule
12.04[71] of the of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Saladaga v Astorga,[72] the respondent was found guilty of (1) breach of the Lawyer's Oath; (2) unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and (3) disrespect for the Court and causing the undue delay of cases. For these
offenses, a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP, was imposed.

The respondents in Millare[73] and Garcia,[74] meanwhile, were suspended for one year from the practice of law.
In Saa v. IBP,[75] the petitioner was found to have violated Canon 12,[76] Rule 12.04,[77] and Rule 1.03[78] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying the resolution of a case. He was also suspended from practice of
law for one year.

Thus, We have meted out the penalty of one to two years' suspension in cases involving multiple violations of
professional conduct that have caused unjust delays in the administration of justice. The IBP Guidelines similarly
provide that "suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and there is
injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal
proceeding."[79]

Respondent, therefore, should not receive a mere reprimand; he should be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Public Information Office, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts. Likewise, a Notice
of Suspension shall be appropriately posted on the Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.

Upon his receipt of this Decision, respondent shall forthwith be suspended from the practice of law and shall
formally manifest to this Court that his suspension has started. He shall furnish all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
where he has entered his appearance a copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

[1] Dated 22 June 2013; Rollo, p. 890.

[2] Id. at 891-902.

[3] Atty. Manuel T. Chan

[4] Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse Court
processes.

[5] Rollo, p. 902.

[6] Id. at 2.

[7] Id. at 4.

[8] Id. at 3.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 893.

[11] Dated 24 September 1998, 13 January 1999, and 1 February 1999.

[12] Id. at 841.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 299-317.

[18] Id. at 319-328.

[19] Id. at 337-338.

[20] Id. at 47-55.

[21] Id. at 57-89.

[22] Id. at 41-45.

[23] Id. at 45.

[24] Id. at 117-127.

[25] Id. at 128-140.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 152-153.

[28] Id. at 154-169.

[29] Id. at 170-174.

[30] Id. at 442-445.

[31] Id. at 432-441.

[32] Id. at 175-176.

[33] Id. at 181-185.

[34] Id. at 186-193.

[35] Id. at 469-476.

[36] Id. at 461-468.

[37] Id. at 477-486.

[38] Id. at 195-196.

[39] Id.

[40] Id. at 487-490.

[41] Id. at 273-285.

[42] Id. at 750-752.

[43] Id. at 752.

[44] Id. at 746-749, issued on 16 August 2007.

[45] Id. at 693-698.

[46] Id. at 736-744.

[47] Id. at 776-785.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at 786-789.

[50] Id. at 1-15.

[51] Id. at 1-2.

[52] Id. at 203-242.

[53] Id. at 204.

[54] Id. at 207.

[55] Id. at 217.

[56] Id. at 211.

[57] Id. at 230.

[58] Id. at 502-508; 583-594; 625-632.

[59] Id. at 500.

[60] Supra note 1.

[61] Id. at 887.

[62] Pariñas v. Paguinto, 478 Phil. 239-247 (2004), citing Gamalinda v. Alcantara, A.C. No. 3695 24 February 1992,
206 SCRA 468.

[63] Millare v. Montero, 316 Phil. 29-37 (1995), citing Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 (1986).

[64] Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 12.

[65] Id. Canon 19, Rule 19.01.

[66] Millare v. Montero, supra note 63, citing Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 1069 (1976); Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1971).

[67] Garcia v. Francisco, A.C. No. 3923, 30 March 1993, 220 SCRA 512.

[68]

I, ___ of ____, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.

[69] C. Factors to be Considered in Imposing Sanctions

xxxx
6.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule, and
causes injury or potential injury to a client or other party, or causes interference or potential interference with a
legal proceeding.

xxxx

[70] Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

[71] Supra note 4.

[72] Saladaga v. Astorga, A.C. No. 4697, 25 November 2014.

[73] Millare v. Montero, supra note 63.

[74] Supra note 67.

[75] Saa v. Integrated Bar of the Phil., 614 Phil. 203-209 (2009).

[76] Supra note 69.

[77] Supra note 4.

[78] Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man's cause.

[79] Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, C(6.22).

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