Ala Mode Case
concerted action of its line leaders to
 Petitioner is a garment manufacturer
and exporter and respondent are
employees
 There was a boycott that happened and
so petitioner demanded respondents to
explain
 Respondents were prohibited from
entering premises
 Respondents filed for illegal dismissal
 Labor arbiter favored the respondents
because petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient evidence
 NLRC affirmed LA decision
 SC found petition bereft of merit
 "Even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that there was a
company investigation being then
conducted, still petitioner should not
have ordered private respondents to
await its decision on the matter but
instead imposed on the latter
preventive suspension in conformity
with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule XIV of
Book V of the Implementing Rules of
the Labor Code, considering that private
respondents were accused of having
sabotaged petitioner's operations
which resulted in business losses, a
clear example of a serious and
imminent, if not actual, threats to
petitioner's property. Hence, having
been placed in suspended animation, so
to speak, by petitioner, private
respondents had every reason to
believe that they were dismissed by the
former, as they actually were, thereby
warranting the filing of the complaints
for illegal dismissal
 Absent any proof that complainants
(private respondents in this case)
actually initiated what it termed a
sabotage its business operations by
absenting themselves all at the same
time on May 5 and 6, 1993, the
respondent (herein petitioner) cannot
just invoke sabotage that does not
exist. Besides, what makes it difficult for
respondent to charge complainants of
illegal strike, if such existed? That it
miserably failed to show that there
were other line leaders (aside from
complainants) who were likewise
absent on said dates, we cannot but
consign this defense to the 'dustbin' of
afterthoughts
Prasnik Case
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which
he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children
without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor
General opposed this stating that Art. 338
of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be
adopted by his father refers only to a child who
has not been acknowledged
as natural child. It maintains that in order that
a natural child may be adopted by his
natural father or mother there should not be
an acknowledgment of the status of the natural
child for it will go against Art. 335.
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of
acknowledged natural children of the father or
mother.
HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the
child be recognized or not. If the intention were
to allow adoption only to unrecognized
children, Article 338 would be of no useful
purpose. The rights of an acknowledged
natural child are much less than those of a
legitimated child. Contending that this is
unnecessary would deny the illegitimate
children the chance to acquire these rights. The
trend when it comes to adoption of children
tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not
prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged
natural child which when compared to a
natural child is equitable. An acknowledged
natural child is a natural child also and
following the words of the law, they should be
allowed adoption.
Matabuena vs Cervantes
Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena
executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor
of Petronila Cervantes during the time they
were living as husband and wife in a common
law relationship. They were later married on 28
March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13
September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being
the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative
to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation
claiming that the ban on donation between
spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship. She had the land
declared on her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in
1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court
upheld the validity of the donation as it was
made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code
apply to donations between live-in partners.
Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a “donation between the
spouses during the marriage,” policy
considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-
law relationship, as it is contrary to public
policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may
be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of
the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. It is a
principle of statutory construction that what is
within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it
as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be
attained.
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23
November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2)
declared the questioned donation void and
recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant
as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3)
remanded the case to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the
current decision; without pronouncement as to
costs.
People vs Macarandang
Macarandang was convicted with illegal
possession of firearms. He invokes his legal
authority such as being appointed as a secret
agent by Governor Dimakuta
It may be true that, as held by the trial court,
the Governor has noauthority to issue any
firearm license or permit; but section 879 of
theRevised Administrative Code provides, as
shown at least by the subjectmatter thereof,
that "peace officers" are exempted from the
requirementsrelating to the issuance of license
to possess firearms. The appointment of
theaccused as secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the categoryof a "peace officer" equivalent
even to a member of the municipal
policeexpressly covered by section 879.
People vs Mapa
On or about August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa was
apprehended due to possession of an
unlicensed firearm. The defendant admitted
before the trial court that he was carrying the
unlicensed firearm and that he does not have a
permit to carry such a weapon. In his defense,
he said that he is a secret agent of the Governor
of Batangas and that he is exempt from the
requirement of securing a license of firearm.
The defendant also showed a certification that
he was appointed as such.
Issue: whether or not an agent of the governor
can hold a firearm without a permit issued by
the Philippine Constabulary
Held: In the present case, there is no room for
interpretation or construction because the law
is clear. The law provides for the class of people
who are not covered in the prohibitive law. No
exemption was provided for secret agents.
Construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them."
People vs Santayana
On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana
y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent”
by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of
the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued
an undated certification to the effect that the
accused was an accredited member of the CIS
and the pistol described in the said
Memorandum Receipt was given to him by
virtue of his appointment as special agent and
that he was authorized to carry and possess the
same in the performance of his official duty and
for his personal protection.
On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in
Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and
ammunition without a license to possess them.
An investigation was conducted and there
upon, a corresponding complaint was filed
against the accused. The case underwent trial
after which the accused was convicted of the
crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to
Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was
liable for illegal possession of firearmsHeld:
The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent
to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently
puts him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by Section 879 (People
v.Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana
was appointed as CIS secret agent with
the authority o carry and possess firearms. He
was issued a firearm in the performance of his
official duties and for his personal protection.
Application of license was unnecessary,
according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is
government property. No permit was issued,
according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was
already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the
case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in
the Macarandang case, this was made only on
30 August 1967, years after the accused was
charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore
obtaining at the time of appellant’s
appointment as secret agent, he incurred no
criminal liability for possession of the pistol in
question. The Supreme Court reversed the
appealed decision, conformably with the
recommendation of theSolicitor General, and
acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond
for his provisional release
Republic vs Estenzo
 Parties in this case contest ownership of
a parcel of land
 The petitioners maintain that the lands
were public by virtue of cadastral court
decision
 Respondents claimed that the land was
owned by them based on a purchase
from original claimant Apolonia Parrila
and a previous adjudication in favor of
them by judge Estenzo
 The sps filed a petition to re-open the
1940 decision of the Cadastral Court
under RA 391.
 They allege that due to excusable
negligence, accident or mistake of the
previous claimant, the land was
declared public in 1940
 They also allege that the land has not
been used by the government
 The respondent judge granted the sps
petition
 Review on Certiorari was filed stating
that sps petition is barred by the
expiration of the period for re-opening
of cadastral proceedings under RA 931
 Sps argue that their petition can be
taken as one for the confirmation of an
imperfect title
 SC ruled that the sps petition to reopen
cadastral proceedings would show that
their cause of action is premised on RA
931 and not on the confirmation of an
imperfect title
 If the RA intended the extension it
provided for applies also to reopening
of cadastral cases, it would have so
provided in the same way it provided
the extension of time to confirmation of
imperfect titles
 Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterius –
the express mention of one person,
thing or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others
Acosta vs Flor
 Plaintif and defendant candidates for
the office of municipal president of the
said town
 Plaintiff was elected but defendant
usurped the office
 Quo warranto
 Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterius –
Attorney in general and provincial fiscal
and person claiming to be entitled to
the office unlawfully held by another
 Plaintiff failed to adduce evidence to
prove that he has the right to hold such
office
Commissioner of Customs vs CA
Importation of goods
Eusebio Dichoco imported goods, but the
petitioners seized the goods and detained them
They allege that the foodstuffs in question are
prohibited under the Tariff and Customs Code
Respondents contend that this last paragraph
must, by application of the principles
of ejusdem generis, be restricted only to those
articles the importation of which is "absolutely
prohibited," or to contraband. This contention
is not acceptable.
Sec 102 Prohibited Importations
K. all other articles the importation of which is
prohibited by law
SC said In the first place, the specific things
enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (j), inclusive, of
Section 102 have no distinguishable common
characteristics and they differ greatly from one
another, and the rule of ejusdem
generis"applies only where the specific words
preceding the general expression are of the
same nature. Where they are of different
genera, the meaning of the general word
remains unaffected by its connection with
them."
Sec 2301 the law prohibits the release under
bond of the imported foodstuffs in question
Mutuc vs Comelec
FACTS:The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a
candidate for the position of a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles
in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers” on 22 October
1970. Petitioner impugned the act of
respondent as violative of his right to
freespeech.
Respondent however contended that the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act, which made it
unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans
(of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin.”
It was its contention that the jingle proposed to
be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the phrase “and
the like.”
ISSUE:
Whether “jingles” falls down on the prohibited
electoral propaganda gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.
RULING:
For respondent Commission, the last three
words sufficed to justify such an order. We view
the matter differently. What was done cannot
merit our approval under the well-known
principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration being applicable
only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referredto. It is quite apparent that
what was contemplated in the Act was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referredto as
means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote
for the candidate responsible for distribution
Go Tiaco vs Union Insurance
Go Tiaoco Brothers, owner of certain rice
cavans insured by Union Insurance, transported
these cavans on May, 1915, on the steamship
Hondagua from the port of Saigon to Cebu. On
discharging the rice from one of the
compartments in the after hold, upon arrival at
Cebu, it was discovered that one thousand four
hundred seventy-three sacks and been damages
by sea water. The trial court found that the
inflow of the sea water during the voyage was
due to a defect in one of the drain pipes of the
ship and concluded that the loss was not
covered by the policy of insurance. The court
found in effect that the opening causing loss
had resulted in course of time from ordinary
wear and tear and not from the straining of the
ship in rough weather on that voyage. The court
also found that the repairs that had been made
on the pipe were slovenly and defective and
that, by reason of the condition of this pipe, the
ship was not properly equipped to receive the
rice at the time the voyage was begun. For this
reason the court held that the ship was
unseaworthy.
The policy of insurance was signed upon a form
long in use among companies engaged in
maritime insurance. It purports to insure the
cargo from the following among other risks:
"Perils . . . of the seas, men of war, fire,
enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, . . .
barratry of the master and mariners, and of all
other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have
or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage
of the said goods and merchandise or any part
thereof."
Issue: What is meant by the phrase “perils of
the sea” as used in the marine insurance
contract between Go Tiaoco and Union
Insurance?
Held: It must be considered to be settled that
a loss which, in the ordinary course of events,
results from the natural and inevitable action of
the sea, from the ordinary wear and tear of the
ship, or from the negligent failure of the ship's
owner to provide the vessel with proper
equipment to convey the cargo under ordinary
conditions, is not a peril of the sea. Such a loss
is rather due to what has been aptly called the
"peril of the ship." The insurer undertakes to
insure against perils of the sea and similar
perils, not against perils of the ship.
In the present case the entrance of the sea
water into the ship's hold through the defective
pipe already described was not due to any
accident which happened during the voyage,
but to the failure of the ship's owner properly
to repair a defect of the existence of which he
was apprised. The loss was therefore more
analogous to that which directly results from
simple unseaworthiness than to that which
results from perils of the sea. As applied to the
present case it results that the owners of the
damages rice must look to the shipowner for
redress and not to the insurer.
US vs Sto Nino
FACTS:
On or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Victor
Santo Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully, and criminally, had
in his possession and concealed about his person a
deadly weapon, to wit: One (1) iron bar, about 15
inches in length provided with an iron ball on one end
and a string on the other to tie to the wrist, which
weapon had been designed and made for use in
fighting, and as a deadly weapon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Santo Nino is liable for violating
Section 26 of the Act 1780 of the Philippine
Commission?
Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: “An Act to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use,
and transfer or firearms, and to prohibit the
possession of same except in compliance with the
provisions of this Act.”
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows:
“It shall be unlawful for any person to carry
concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk,
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon; Provided, That
this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in
possession of persons who have secured a license
therefor or who are entitled to carry same under the
provisions of this Act.”
HELD:
A demurrer (pleading in a lawsuit that
objects to or challenges a pleading filed by an
opposing party) to this complaint was sustained in the
court where below the Governmenthas appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court was that:
“The words of other deadly weapon” only signify
a kind of weapon included within the preceding
classification. In short, the court below held that the
carrying of a revolver concealed about the person
would not be a violation of this Act.
The rule of construction referred to is resorted
to only for the purpose of determining what the intent
of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent
clearly appears from other parts of the law, and such
intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result
which would reached by application of the rule of
ejusdem generis, the latter must give way.
In this case the proviso of the Act clearly
indicates that in the view of the legislature the
carrying of an unlicensed revolver would be a
violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its
intention to include in the prohibition weapons other
than the armasblancas therein specified.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson,
JJ., concur
*Concealed about his person-if the weapon be within
reach and control of the defendant, it is sufficient to
bring the case within the meaning of the statute.
*Ejusdem Generis-of the same kind
Roman Catholic Archbishop vs SSC
 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
thru counsel, filed a request with the
respondent Social Security Commission
a request that they be exempted from
coverage of RA No. 1161, otherwise
known as the Social Security Law of
1954 because said act is a labor law and
does not cover religious and charitable
institutions.
 Appellant contends that the term
"employer" as defined in the law should
— following the principle of ejusdem
generis — be limited to those who carry
on "undertakings or activities which
have the element of profit or gain, or
which are pursued for profit or gain,"
because the phrase ,activity of any
kind" in the definition is preceded by
the words "any trade, business,
industry, undertaking."
 Respondent denied the request and the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Act provides
“in the System shall be compulsory upon all
members between the age of sixteen and sixty
years inclusive, if they have been for at least six
months at the service of an employer who is a
member of the System, Provided, that the
Commission may not compel any employer to
become member of the System unless he shall
have been in operation for at least two years
and has at the time of admission, if admitted for
membership during the first year of the
System's operation at least fifty employees, and
if admitted for membership the following year
of operation and thereafter, at least six
employees”
employer  any person, natural or juridical,
domestic or foreign, who carries in the
Philippines any trade, business, industry,
undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the
services of another person who is under his
orders as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities,
including corporations owned or controlled by
the Government" (par. [c], see. 8)
employee  any person who performs services
for an 'employer' in which either or both mental
and physical efforts are used and who receives
compensation for such services" (par. [d], see.
8).
Employment  covers any service performed
by an employer except those expressly
enumerated thereunder, like employment
under the Government, or any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities
including corporations owned and controlled by
the Government, domestic service in a private
home, employment purely casual, etc.
(paragraph [i] of said section 8)
Issue: Whether or not the term employer
following the principle of ejusdem generis be
limited to those who carry on activities for gain.
Held: No
Ratio:
 ejusdem generis applies only where
there is uncertainty. It is not controlling
where the plain purpose and intent of
the Legislature would thereby be
hindered and defeated.
- Contributions are intended for the
protection of said employees
against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death in line
with the constitutional mandate to
promote social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of
all the people.
 The law explicitly states those which are
not covered by the contribution and the
petitioner is not among those cited.
significant to note that when Republic Act No.
1161 was enacted, services performed in the
employ of institutions organized for religious or
charitable purposes were by express provisions
of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec.
8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the
law, however, has been deleted by express
provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took
effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the
Legislature intended to include charitable and
religious institutions within the scope of the law
Lopez vs CTA
Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire
netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila
Collector of Customs assessed the
corresponding customs duties on the
importation on the basis of consular and
supplier invoices. Said customs duties were
paid and the shipments were released.
Subsequently, however, the Collector
reassessed the dollar value of the cost and
freight of said wire netting and as a result of
the reassessment, additional customs duties in
the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and
imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a
reconsideration of the reassessment and levy
of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting
upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by
the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of
23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on the
ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila,
citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax
court. From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez
& Sons appealed to the Supreme Court,
seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of
Customs is directly appealable to the Court of
Tax Appeal.
Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125
specifically provides that the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to
review decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the
same Act in lifting the enumerating the
persons and entities who may appeal mentions
among others, those affected by a decision or
ruling of the Collector of Customs, and fails to
mention the Commissioner of Customs. While
there is really a discrepancy between the two
sections, it is more reasonable and logical to
hold that in section 11 of the Act, the
Legislature meant and intended to say, the
Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector
of Customs. If persons affected by a decision
of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly
to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the
supervision and control of the Commissioner of
Customs over his Collector of Customs, under
the Customs Law found in sections 1137 to
1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, and
his right to review their decisions upon appeal
to him by the persons affected by said decision
would, not only be gravely affected but even
destroyed. The Courts are not exactly indulging
in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to
rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the
wording of a statute, in order to give due
course and carry out the evident intention of
the legislature.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
order, holding that under the Customs Law and
RA 1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review
by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs;
with costs.
Sanciangco vs Rono
Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay
Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in
the 17 May 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he
was elected President of the Association of
Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the
Board of Directors of the said Association. As
the President of the Association, petitioner was
appointed by the President of the Philippines as
a member of the City’s Sangguniang
Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May
1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis
Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao
Alliance. He was not successful in the said
election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of
BP 697, petitioner informed Vice-Mayor
Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was
resuming his duties as member of that body.
The matter was elevated to the Minister of
Local Government Jose A. Roño, who ruled
that since petitioner is an appointive official, he
is deemed to have resigned from his appointive
position upon the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy.
Issue: Whether the accused is considered
resigned from the latter’s filing of a certificate
of candidacy for the Batasan.
Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2),
Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than one
construction, taking into sconsideration the
nature of the positions of the officials
enumerated therein, namely, governors,
mayors, members of the various sanggunians
or barangay officials, the legislative intent to
distinguish between elective positions in
section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive
positions in section 13(l) under the all-
encompassing clause reading “any person
holding public appointive office or position,” is
clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that
when the language of a particular section of a
statute admits of more than one construction,
that construction which gives effect to the
evident purpose and object sought to be
attained by the enactment of the statute as a
whole, must be followed. A statute’s clauses
and phrases should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts. The legislative
intent to cover public appointive officials in
subsection (1), and officials mentioned in
subsection (2) which should be construed to
refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned
from the proceedings of the Batasan
Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably
an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was
appointed by the President as a member of the
City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his
having been elected President of the
Association of Barangay Councils, he is
deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such
member when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan
elections.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and

denied the writs prayed for, holding that there
was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the officials; without costs.