SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate by filing a
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
(CASE DIGESTS)
(1)
SILVERIO, SR. v. SILVERIO JR.
G.R. Nos. 208828-29. August 13, 2014.
FACTS
During the settlement of estate of the deceased
Beatriz Silverio, an active exchange of pleadings to
remove and appoint a new administrator ensued
between Silverio SENIOR and Silverio JUNIOR to
which SENIOR was removed as administrator and
JUNIOR was appointed as the new administrator. By
virtue of an Order by the probate court for the sale of
certain properties belonging to the estate, JUNIOR
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Citrine
Holdings, Monica P. Ocampo, and ZEE2 Resources
over the properties located in Makati. SENIOR
opposed the sale of the properties and sought to
annul the same. The annulment of the sale was
granted by the probate court, however, on appeal,
the CA upheld the validity of the sale of the
properties. Hence, SENIOR argued before the SC
that the CA committed a reversible error in upholding
the validity of the sale of the properties upon the
ground that the probate court cannot annul the sales
as it has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not
include resolving issues of ownership.
ISSUE
Whether or not the probate court has the authority to
annul sales of the estate properties by the
administrator.
HELD
YES. The probate court having jurisdiction over
properties under administration has the authority not
only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but
also to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective
heirs or administrator. It is the probate court that has
the power to authorize and/or approve the sale
(Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said
court that can declare it null and void for as long as
the proceedings had not been closed or terminated.
(2)
SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 & 134029. February 6, 2007.
FACTS
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo San Luis, former governor of the
Povince of Laguna, who has contracted three
marriages (1) Virginia Sulit—predeceased; (2) Merry
Lee Corwin, an American citizen—divorced; and
lastly (3) Felicidad San Luis. Felicidad sought the
petition for letters of administration before the RTC of
Makati City. Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue for the
petition should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since
the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee. The RTC granted the motion to
dismiss and thus dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and held that under Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term “place of
residence” of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided
in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters
of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
Moreover, CA held that Felicisimo had legal capacity
to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not venue was properly laid; and
(2) Whether or not Felicidad has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.
HELD
(1) YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province “in which he resides at the
time of his death. There is a distinction between
“residence” for purposes of election laws and
“residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile”
are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence”
of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.
(2) YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry Felicidad, nevertheless, we find
that the Felicidad has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she estate, or the question is one of collation or
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as advancement, or the parties consent to the
regards the properties that were acquired through assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
their joint efforts during their cohabitation. A petition the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
for letters of administration must be filed by an probate court is competent to resolve issues on
interested person—one who would be benefited by ownership.
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest (4)
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect SUNTAY III V. CONJUANGCO-SUNTAY
or contingent. Hence, Felicidad would qualify as an G.R. No. 183053. October 10, 2012.
interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation. FACTS
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay was
(3) survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay and five
AGTARAP V. AGTARAP grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren,
GR. 177099 & 1771192. June 8, 2011. including herein respondent, Isabel; and two
illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio
III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio
FACTS
A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
Eduardo Agtarap filed with the RTC a verified petition
Three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted
for judicial settlement of estate of his deceased father
his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
Joaquin Agtarap. Joaquin left 2 parcels of land with
Isabel, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
improvements. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted
administration over Cristina’s estate. Federico,
2 marriages: [1] Lucia—3 children—Jesus, Milagros
opposed the petition. When Federico died, Almost a
and Jose (Survived by 3 children namely Gloria,
year thereafter the trial court rendered a decision
Joseph, and Teresa, the respondents); and [2]
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent
Caridad—3 children—Eduardo (Petitioner),
Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal, the CA
Sebastian and Mercedes. RTC appointed Eduardo as
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and
Special Administrator and issued an order of
appointed Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay as
partition. It also declared that the real estate
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina
properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Aguinaldo Suntay. On appeal by certiorari, SC
Joaquin and Lucia. CA affirmed RTC’s decision but
reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate
provided for a different partition.
court included Emilio III as co-administrator of
Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in
ISSUE
Federico’s estate. Isabel filed a motion for
Whether or not the RTC, acting as probate court with
reconsideration and argued that the explicit
limited jurisdiction, can determine questions of
provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
ownership, which properly belongs to another court
on the order of preference for the issuance of letters
with general jurisdiction.
of administration cannot be ignored and that Article
992 of the Civil Code must be followed.
HELD
YES. The jurisdiction of the probate court extends to
ISSUE
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
Whether or not a legitimate child has preference over
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the illegitimate child with respect to the appointment
the status of each heir and whether the property in
as administrator of the estate of their grandparent.
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse. The general rule is that the
HELD
jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an
YES. The paramount consideration in the
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do
appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the
decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in
estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to
the estate. This is the same consideration which
the determination of questions of ownership that arise
Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing
during the proceedings. However, this general rule is
the order of preference in the appointment of
subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the
convenience: (1) the probate court may provisionally
rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
speedy and economical administration of the estate,
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to
waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
the final determination of ownership in a separate
highest interest and most influential motive to
action; (2) If the interested parties are all heirs to the
administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to
be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate
must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate,
but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin”,
whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among
members of a class the strongest ground for
preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is
to be preferred. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest
in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin”.
(5)
LEE V. RTC OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004.
FACTS
Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate of
Dr. Juvencio Ortañez from the very start as in fact
these shares were included in the inventory of the
properties of the estate submitted by Rafael Ortañez
after he and his brother, Jose Ortañez, were
appointed special administrators by the intestate
court. The controversy here actually started when,
during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of
Dr. Ortañez, his wife Juliana Ortañez sold the 1,014
Philinterlife shares of stock in favor petitioner FLAG
without the approval of the intestate court. Her son
Jose Ortañez later sold the remaining 1,011
Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the
approval of the intestate court.
ISSUE
Whether or not sale of property included in the
inventory of the estate by some of the heirs made
during the pendency of the intestate proceeding
without intestate court’s approval may be declared
null and void.
HELD
YES. The rule is clear that (1) any disposition of
estate property by an administrator or prospective
heir pending final adjudication requires court approval
and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition. Moreover, the intestate
court has the power to execute its order with regard
to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate
property, otherwise its power to annul the
unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate
property would be meaningless. In other words,
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or
probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or
fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of
estate property before final adjudication.
(6)
ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ V. COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996
FACTS
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as
his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, Montes and his three granddaughters
(private respondents) with Edmond as the executor.
Four years after the testator's death, private
respondent Montes filed a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. During the
pendency of the probate proceedings, the court
ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk the
rental deposit and payments representing the one-
year lease of the Valle Verde property. In
compliance, Edmond turned over the amount net of
expenses for repair and maintenance on the estate.
Subsequently, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario
Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed a motion
praying for the release of the rent payments
deposited with the Branch Clerk. Respondent Montes
opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion
and prayed for the release of the said rent payments
to the testator’s grandchildren and for the distribution
of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in
accordance with the provisions of the holographic
will. The probate court denied Edmond's motion but
granted respondent Montes' motion. The probate
court, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but
only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the
expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their share in
the inheritance. The court, however, held in
abeyance the release of the titles to respondent
Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse
of six months from the date of first publication of the
notice to creditors. Hence, Edmond filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the SC and argued that
affirming the Probate Court’s order would have the
following effect: (1) disallow the
executor/administrator of the estate of the late Hilario
M. Ruiz to take possession of all the real and
personal properties of the estate; (2) grant support,
during the pendency of the settlement of an estate, to
certain persons not entitled thereto; and (3)
prematurely partition and distribute the estate
pursuant to the provisions of the holographic will
even before its intrinsic validity has been determined,
and despite the existence of unpaid debts and
obligations of the estate.
ISSUES
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the
will to probate but before payment of the estate's
debts and obligations, has the authority:
(1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testator's grandchildren;
(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs;
and
(3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate
to the executor of the will.
HELD
(1) NO. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The
law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and
children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate
court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator
pending settlement of his estate.
(2) NO. In settlement of estate proceedings, the
distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment
of said obligations only if the distributees or any of
them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations. In the
case at bar, Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when
he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto
been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is
one of those obligations that must be paid before
distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make
such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in
proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued
the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
(3) NO. The right of an executor or administrator to
the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised “so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration.” An heir’s right of ownership over the
properties of the decedent is merely inchoate as long
as the estate has not been fully settled and
partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his
father’s estate. The funds of the estate in his hands
are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He
cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all
his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without
first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real
and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a
true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination
by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.
(7)
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
SANTIBAÑEZ
G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005
FACTS
During his lifetime, Efraim M. Santibañez obtained
two (2) set of loans used to buy three (3) tractors
which remained unpaid upon his death. Upon his
death, his heirs commenced a testate settlement
proceeding pursuant to his holographic will. During
the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of
the three (3) tractors. Each of them was to assume
the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them. FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Petitioner Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Pursuant to the assigned assets and liabilities, Union
Bank sent demand letters to Edmund, but the latter
failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus,
Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and
Florence. Respondent Florence filed her Answer and
alleged that considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not
approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the
joint agreement. The trial court found that the claim of
Union Bank should have been filed with the probate
court before which the testate estate of the late
Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of
money being claimed was an obligation incurred by
the said decedent. The trial court ruled in favor of
Florence and Edmund.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the heirs may, during the
pendency of the probate proceedings, enter into an
agreement distributing among themselves properties
of the testator and by virtue of such agreement
assumed the indebtedness corresponding to such
properties.
(2) Whether or not a creditor of the testator may,
during the pendency of the probate proceedings, file
a separate complaint for collection against the heirs
based on an agreement executed by the heirs
whereby they distribute the properties of the estate
and assume the debts corresponding to such
property.
 HELD
(1) NO. It must be stressed that the probate
proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all
the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the
probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it
with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every
act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
Thus, in executing any joint agreement which
appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court
of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
(2) NO. The assumption of liability was conditioned
upon the happening of an event, that is, that each
heir shall take possession and use of their respective
share under the agreement. It was made dependent
on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel that they were each to receive. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect
did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that
the assumption of liability cannot be given any force
and effect. Moreover, the loan was contracted by the
decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the
late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its
money claim with the probate court in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
(8)
QUIAZON V. BELEN
G.R. No. 189121. July 31, 2013
FACTS
Eliseo died intestate. Elise filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration and claimed that she is the natural
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that
it was bigamous for having been contracted during
the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. Claiming
that the venue of the petition was improperly laid,
Amelia, wife of the decedent, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance
of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las
Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should
have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the
petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of
Eliseo’s estate. The lower court ruled that the venue
of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City and
directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the residence of the decedent as
indicated in the death certificate should be taken into
account for purposes of determining the venue for the
probate of the will.
(2) Whether or not the natural child of the decedent
may be appointed as an administrator.
HELD
(1) NO. While the recitals in death certificates can be
considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the
time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is
not binding on the courts. Under Section 1, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be
filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death. The word “resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same
meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context
of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
(2) YES. Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition
for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person. An "interested party," in estate
proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who
stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
(9)
PILAPIL AND HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ
BRIONES V. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R.
BRIONES
 G.R. No. 150175. February 5, 2007.
FACTS
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did
not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1
May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to
settle her husband’s estate. CFI issued Letters of
Administration appointing Donata as the
administratrix of Maximino’s estate. Subsequently,
CFI issue an Order, awarding ownership of the
aforementioned real properties to Donata. Donata
died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s
nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of Donata.
Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed
by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate
estate. On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed
a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata
for the partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property. They alleged that
Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino,
through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of
trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs,
succeeded in registering in her name the real
properties belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino. The RTC rendered its Decision, in favor of
the heirs of Maximino. The heirs of Donata appealed
the RTC Decision before the Court of Appeals but the
latter court affirmed the decision. Unsatisfied the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Donata
elevated the case before the SC. SC reversed the
decisions of CA and RTC and dismissed the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property filed by the heirs of
Maximino.
ISSUE
Whether or not a judgment awarding ownership of
the properties included in the decedent’s estate to his
surviving wife may be assailed on the ground of fraud
after more than 30 years had lapse from the
promulgation of the said judgment.
HELD
NO. The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Donata managed,
through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging
to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her
name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was
established between Donata and the heirs of
Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code.
Donata was able to register the real properties in her
name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to
an Order issued by the CFI. The CFI Order,
presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared
Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner
of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real
properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other
heirs of her deceased husband. While it is true that
since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still
had surviving siblings and so the court was not able
to order that these siblings be given personal notices
of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in
mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or
intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the
publication in the newspapers of the filing of the
application and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to
the whole world of the existence of the proceedings
and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in
the publication. The publication requirement of the
notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who were not
named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless
of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
(10)
SABIDONG V. SOLAS
A.M. No. P-01-1448. June 25, 2013
FACTS
The subject of this controversy is Lot No. 11 which is
part of the Hodges Estate which is subject of a
pending intestate proceedings. Rodolfo Sabidong is
the son of Trinidad Sabidong, one of the longtime
occupants of Lot 11. Lot 11 was the subject of an
ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate, docketed
at the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4. A decision was
rendered in said case ordering the occupants to
immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to
her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s
fees, expenses and costs. At the time, respondent
Nicolasito Solas was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC,
Branch 3, Iloilo City. He submitted an Offer to
Purchase Lot 11. Under the Order issued by the
probate court, Solas’ Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was
approved. Then, the probate court issued another
Order granting Solas’ motion for issuance of a writ of
possession in his favor. The writ of possession over
Lot 11 was eventually issued. Thereafter, a Deed of
Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed.
Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to him on installment
for the total purchase price. Thus, a new certificate of
title in the name of Solas’ was issued. Later, this
Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting
that as court employee, Solas cannot buy property in
litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good
faith), commit deception, dishonesty, oppression and
grave abuse of authority.
ISSUE
Whether or not an estate proceeding may be
considered a pending litigation in relation to the
property included is such estate which disallows a
court official from purchasing the same on the ground
of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code.
HELD
YES. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
Where the property is acquired after the termination
of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the Civil Code attaches. A thing is said to be in
litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation
over it in court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A
property forming part of the estate under judicial
settlement continues to be subject of litigation until
the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that
as long as the order for the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts
and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same. Since there is no
evidence to show that the Special Proceeding in the
RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed
and terminated at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Sale With Mortgage, Lot 11 is still deemed to
be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code. This notwithstanding, it
was held that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of Solas did
not violate the rule on disqualification to purchase
property because the special proceedings was then
pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC
where he was Clerk of Court.
(11)
ARANAS V. MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014
FACTS
Emigdio S. Mercado owned shares in Mervir Realty
Corp. and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corp. He
assigned his real properties in exchange for stocks in
Mervir Realty and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu to Mervir Realty. Emigdio died intestate,
survived by his second wife, Teresita and their five
children, and his children from his first wife, Thelma
Aranas. Teresita was appointed as administrator.
Teresita indicated in her inventory that at the time of
his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but
only personal properties." Thelma claimed that
Emigdio owned properties that were not included in
the inventory. The parties agreed to submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the
issue of what properties should be included in or
excluded from the inventory. Thereafter, the RTC
ruled that Teresita should have included in the
Badian Property in the inventory.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC have the authority to order
the inclusion of the Badian Property in the inventory
in the course of the intestate proceedings.
HELD
YES. The determination of which properties should
be excluded from or included in the inventory of
estate properties was well within the authority and
discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making
its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection,
and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was
best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties
that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
estate. The usage of the word “all” in Section 1, Rule
83, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. However,
the word “all” is qualified by the phrase which has
come into his possession or knowledge, which
signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that
no properties appearing to belong to the decedent
can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of
their being in the possession of another person or
entity.
(12)
BUTIONG V. PLAZO
G.R. No. 187524. August 5, 2015
FACTS
Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his first wife, respondents
Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as
several properties including a resort covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and
No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters,
and a family home, the land on which it stands is
covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located
in Nasugbu, Batangas. Respondents Plazo filed an
action for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Possession on the ground that their
co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and
other children, had sold the subject properties to
petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by
their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their
knowledge and consent. When confronted about the
sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing
respondents a document she believed evidenced
receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did
not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan
obtained by Pedro and Benita from a
bank. Subsequently, respondents learned that a
notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their reasons that where the deceased dies without
late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. pending obligations, there is no necessity for the
Because of this, they caused the annotation of their appointment of an administrator to administer the.
adverse claims over the subject properties before the Estate for hem and to deprive the real owners of their
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their possession to which they are immediately entitled. In
complaint praying, among others, for the annulment this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint,
of all documents conveying the subject properties to and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will,
the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant leaving his estate without any ending obligations.
thereto. The RTC nullified the transfer of the subject Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents
Properties due to irregularities in the Documents of were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
conveyance offered by petitioner’s as well as the properties of the estate of a special proceeding for
circumstances Surrounding the execution of the settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact,
same. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Before the encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
SC, petitioners contended that the RTC had no extrajudicially.
jurisdiction. According to them, the allegations in the
complaint filed by the respondents show that the
cause of action is actually one for settlement of
estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
settlement of estate is a special proceeding
cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction,
while judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions
cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial
court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the
respondent’s complaint.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction on the
ground that the complaint filed is for the settlement of
the estate of Pedro and not of Partition.

HELD
YES. It is true that some of respondents' causes of
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the
decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and
extent of their interests thereon may fall under an
action for settlement of estate. However, a complete
reading of the complaint would readily show that,
based on the nature of the suit, the allegations
therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is
clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title
and recovery of possession. That the complaint
alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights
thereto, does not perforce make it an action for
settlement of estate. It must be recalled that the
general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if
testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the
trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the
Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent court shall
appoint a qualified administrator the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found in
Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent,
who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may
divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an
ordinary action or partition without submitting the
same for judicial administration nor applying for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. The