I.
EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is
invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the
historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that
the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they
ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national
economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of
the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder,
or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability
and performance of the Manila Hotel In a close bidding held
on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by
respondent GSIS state –
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set
forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of
Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan
for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and
Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING
BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not
later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995);
and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP
(Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10
October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the
Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition
and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted
by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First
Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in
the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino
people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of
the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51%
of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares
of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel
is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders
that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share.
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s)
x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be
existing laws to lay down conditions under which business
may be done.
 Second, granting that this provision is self-executing,
Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial
sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and
second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner
speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the
events that have transpired therein which make the hotel
historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under
the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of
the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and
distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of
the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is
still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51%
of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of
the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the
shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning
and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J.
1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege
of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by
petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong
Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares
and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege
to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave
abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did
not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner,
and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly,
the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no
clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not
have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them
by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of
fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which
all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations
of policies and principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable
rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus
a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of
laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one
more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x
x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they
quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this
question as the Chairman of the Committee on
Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a
preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos
who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it
clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of
Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As
against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is
understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because
 the existing laws or prospective laws will always
lay down conditions under which business may be
done. For example, qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by
respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is
couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as
the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise
of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be
used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise
of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The
rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does
not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is
not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing
nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the
tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section
which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing
because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage
the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference
to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing
in one part and non-self-executing in another.
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that
certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of
principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing
and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to
legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply
not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation speaks of constitutional provisions on personal
dignity, the sanctity of family life, the vital role of the youth in
nation-building, the promotion of social justice, and the
values of education. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance refers
to constitutional provisions on social justice and human
rights and on education. Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, the sanctity of family life, the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and the promotion of total human liberation
and development. A reading of these provisions indeed
clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The
very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa
loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be
conserved and developed refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of
our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop
not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural
resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It
was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the
Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official
visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality.
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the
book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. During World War II the hotel was converted by the
Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese
together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final
stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became
the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a
renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions,
an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In
1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an
aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the
Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot
sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not
the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands.
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified
Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment
to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment
would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR
CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY
SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the
proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-
percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to
an individual Filipino. What about a corporation
wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be
limiting it if we say that the preference should only
be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to
individuals and not to juridical personalities or
entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the
amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE
GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled
entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was
explained thus -
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request
Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY,
THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a
foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some
aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision
Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of
MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino
First policy. That means that Filipinos should be
given preference in the grant of concessions,
privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony.
The exchange of views in the sessions of the
Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision
was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-
Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as
the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference
shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable
contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate
the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens
or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be
chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also
determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent
GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was
pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own
guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner
has been found to be possessed of proven management
expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity
ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully
operate the Manila Hotel.
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the
Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-
executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional
provision - by the government itself - is only too
distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce
the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even
some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently
need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own
and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot
simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the
failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., on constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to
implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it
must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution
and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it
were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps
the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is
confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates.
Respondents further argue that the constitutional
provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS
which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is
undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed
out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the
sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state
action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered state
action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is
so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is
evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its
share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in
fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not
only to the people but also to the government as elements of
the State. After all, government is composed of three (3)
divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated
and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is
not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the
winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter
into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the
awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates
of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be,
impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of
the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law
that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f
for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of
shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we
cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there
is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated
nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat
is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this
policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always
open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which
investors must consider when venturing into business in a
foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since
petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner
could participate in the bidding is meritless.Undoubtedly,
Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino
qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest
bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us,
while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had
not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it
did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after
it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid
did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the
constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been
finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension
of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to
do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents
with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine
nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court
as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun,
under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding
the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It
is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court
to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of
foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and
welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of
the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its
function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not
been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to
economic progress and development x x x x in connection
with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian
Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a
major daily to the effect that that injunction again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a
major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no
business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind
referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are
viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that
they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk
that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-
informed criticism.
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of
enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not
take precedence over non-material values. A commercial,
nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at
the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material
values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after
all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as
to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved.
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the
Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all
government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The
nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation
of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic
concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is
merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism.
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is
not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder
solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about
an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are
talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the
most important events in the short history of the Philippines
as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation
of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state
function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in
the shaping of a country.
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the
determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical
landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total
stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent
of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a
veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of
foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot
be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by
the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold
to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if
the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be
preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept
in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this
Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the
nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share
and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
 Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo,
J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA
and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN,
ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative
for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO,
DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON
(DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP)
and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2
of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this
demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a
few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987
Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself,
through the original proponent and the main sponsor of the
proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as innovative. Indeed
it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only
two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a
vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention. For this and the other reasons
hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S.
Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution,
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative
(hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering
all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said
Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general
and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all
Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners
and volunteers, in establishing signing stations
at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding
member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative, a group of
citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to
institutionalize people power; that he and the members of
the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that
the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as
required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature
stations shall be established all over the country, with the
assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify
the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before
the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it
is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the
purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the
COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the
electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the
said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures
shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and
local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions
sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution embodying the
proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the
aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits,
and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF
ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will
first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at
least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters
in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was
forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order (a)
directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional
amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation
at his own expense not later than 9 December 1996; and (b)
setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00
a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December
1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q.
Quadra; representatives of the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-
oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other
lawyers; and representatives of, or counsel for, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LABAN). Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed
Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda within five days.
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition
raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in
fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and
Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples
Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24
November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes,
and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in
Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino
stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech
delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single
word in that law which can be considered as implementing
[the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the
law after publication in print media. This indicates that the
Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not
after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January
1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution
and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,
is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no
power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the
right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the peoples initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for
peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action
for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the
COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative
spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the
national treasury for general re-registration of voters
amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the
millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be
incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities
of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayers
and legislators suit. Besides, there is no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the
respondents to comment on the petition within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for peoples initiative to amend
the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty
Quadra, filed their Comment on the petition. They argue
therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES
TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS
THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL
EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL
FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES
AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER
DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and
TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS
IS P2,571, 200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS
ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW
COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY
PURSUANT TO ITS INITIATORY JURISDICTION UPHELD
BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989
IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF
PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION
OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT
NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED
ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735
WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE
RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND
RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE
BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING
TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO PROMULGATE
SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS
ACT. (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E,
PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF
OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN
AMENDMENT.AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION
CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE
DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT
EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP. 412-413, 2ND.
ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed
in his own behalf a Comment which starts off with an
assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk reaction to a
draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution ... which
is not formally filed yet. What he filed on 6 December 1996
was an Initiatory Pleading or Initiatory Petition, which was
legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend
the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures
under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive
allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law,
R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for
such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not
requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that
the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra
vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers
the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to
alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not
seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters,
Delfin considers petitioners estimate of P180 million as
unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact
figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any
event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise of
the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment for the public respondent COMELEC,
filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy
explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power;
and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems
of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines
the same as the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not
necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in
scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a
material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a
mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election
Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact
upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs.
COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro
tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty.
Quadra, as well as the latters Manifestation stating that he is
the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the
Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on
6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to
file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January
1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at
9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a
Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their
Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a
mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., it would
involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and
although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it
can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and
the limits provided for all other national and local elective
officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open
up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands
of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common
good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and
nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of
initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may
be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with
the performance of their elective officials, but not as a
premium for good performance.
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be
called the enabling law that implements the
peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails
to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b)
the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be
filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the
same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of
the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the
proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of
the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the
verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the
petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC,
(I) the holding of a plebiscite, and(g) the appropriation of
funds for such peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfins petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or
remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the
COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for
a peoples initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to
Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a
legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a
sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
 On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his
Petition in Intervention. He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the
enabling law that implements the peoples right to initiate
constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored
the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was
empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends
that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory
pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the
Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which
is signed by the required number of registered voters. He
also submits that the proponents of a constitutional
amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of
the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative
on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the
sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and
supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention
to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the
following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the
required implementing law on the initiative to amend the
Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that
it does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution,
which can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional
convention.
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a)
granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and
MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to
Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended
Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions
in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring
the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid
Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its
Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three
days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon
within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the
said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the
parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the
Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments
raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so,
whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
(In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum
on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on
the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and
local officials, as proposed in the draft Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or
an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has
jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations;
and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda
within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco
to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No.
21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in
Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments
in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC
should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state
a sufficient cause of action and that the Commissions failure
or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of
portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill
No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes
on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June
1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed
their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention
of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. The parties
thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda.
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due
course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues,
we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a
prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the
parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e.,
whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this
special civil action when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative
answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so,
it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding
any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section
2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to
an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior
tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally
vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is
an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and
adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of
the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of
legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial
statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional
law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the
Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the
paramount majesty of the Constitution.
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the
COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to
entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no ruling
thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments
of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December
1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or
specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due
course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition
for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing;
and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELECs failure
to act on Rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold
on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition
under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition
because the said petition is not supported by the required
minimum number of signatures of registered
voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin
Petition, which does not contain the required number of
signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may
likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor
Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental
importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
Jr.:
A partys standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed
aside this technicality because the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot
operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent
on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise
it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in
Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its
Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No.
332). That section reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as
provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of the Constitution.
After several interpellations, but before the period of
amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of
the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2;
thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we
respectfully call attention of the Members of the Commission
that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing the
matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7.
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details
for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple,
clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of
at least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on
how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we
are leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for
as long as the legislature does not pass the necessary
implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the
committee hearing, especially with respect to the budget
appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the
plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter
be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any
event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of
initiative can be called until after five years from the date of
the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first
amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of
this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably
expected that within that five-year period, the National
Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing
the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the
details on how this is to be carried out - is it possible that, in
effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is
the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does
this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility
because even the legislature itself as a body could propose
that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails
to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as
a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the
people for ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the
intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the
people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of
the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in
terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would
the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal
mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in
the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all
legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy
of constituent power we have a separate article in the
constitution that would specifically cover the process and the
modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the
provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or the requirement of determining the
mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's
initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very
well be placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not
unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics
that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations.
It was made clear during the interpellations that the
aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND -
- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory
that this matter of initiative, which came about because of
the extraordinary developments this year, has to be
separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should not extend
to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it
from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision.
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a separate section in
the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable
to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2
as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting
it up as another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the
Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting
to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1
to include the process of revision; whereas the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned
in the Committee.
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter
introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to
substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the
proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople,
de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as
follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF
WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN
FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY
FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF
THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the
proposed amendment is reflective of the sense contained in
Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we
accept the proposed amendment.
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed
modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was
a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the
right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment,
is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures
to carry out the initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does
not prevent the legislature from asking another body to set
the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words,
the implementation of this particular right would be subject to
legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the
determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive
right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be
proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the
right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified
amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to --
NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does
it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments"
and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the
process of proposing amendments through initiative must be
more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on
legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this
proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of
three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would
require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue
of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the
process of amendment must be made more rigorous and
difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or
putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly
by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative
because it would require another voting by the Committee,
and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of
an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the
Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on
plenary sessions.
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were
subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the
Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against,
reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as
amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF
WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN
FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY
FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF
THIS RIGHT.
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions
was approved on second reading on 9 July 1986. Thereafter,
upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon
was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which,
nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was
again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August
1986.
However, the Committee on Style recommended that
the approved Section 2 be amended by changing percent to
per centum and thereof to therein and deleting the phrase by
law in the second paragraph so that said paragraph
reads: The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right. This amendment was approved
and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the
system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the
exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor
Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage
of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale
of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional
Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of
Article XVII then reading:
The Congress shall by law provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
 This substitute amendment was an investiture on
Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The rules means the
details on how [the right] is to be carried out.
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by
the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the
House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with
the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32
of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No.
988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No.
497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section
3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for
in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill
No. 17 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning
ordinances or resolutions of local government units.The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill
No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and
by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now
R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power
and duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of
the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said
section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the
people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements
of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to
said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and
resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the
fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill
No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local
initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases
propose and enact, approve or reject and in whole or in part.
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of
the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution
and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and
that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the
other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said
paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed
at the top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring
supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed only strengthens
the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative
and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as
to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National
Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative
and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character. It is national
initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is
local initiative if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a law, ordinance, or resolutionwhich only the legislative
bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can
pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is
actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for
emphasis and clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms --
xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing
to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring
supplied).
 Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles
there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the
subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed
therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which
reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by
majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation of the Commission.
(Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to
indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of
the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts
under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, since the provision therein applies to both
national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and
void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local
legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost
diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and
local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it
failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on
national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the
petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and
the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the
proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the
following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of
signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative
body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act
thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a
consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through
its official in the local government unit concerned as to
whether the required number of signatures have been
obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the
submission of the proposition to the registered voters for
their approval, which must be within the period specified
therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three
sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in
Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the Constitution and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of
initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the process
by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the
constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who
should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the
more important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A.
No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No.
6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to
the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section
28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body
exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority
under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself
is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable
-- to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR
AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not
have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC
under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b)
a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a
full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the
right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has
validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of
the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he
has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his
petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather
signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition
are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars,
in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify,
through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of
the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition
under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it
cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition does not fall
under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No.
2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a
docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered
as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing
more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing
on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the
issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of the
elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and
not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if
not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer
be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No.
2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to
forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18
December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private
respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby
reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,Kapunan,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part; related to a co-petitioner and co-
counsel of the petitioners.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., joins the separate, concurring
opinions of Justices Puno, Francisco and Panganiban.
Puno, Vitug, , Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., has separate
opinions.
 EN BANC of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter FOUNDATION, INC.,
Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Intervenor.
Health Action for Human Rights, x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. G.R. No. 174153 Intervenors. JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH x--------------------------------------------------------x BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
Petitioners, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
- versus - HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, Intervenors.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Intervenors. x -------------------------------------------------------- x
Respondent. x--------------------------------------------------------x INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
x--------------------------------------------------------x ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
Intervenor. CHAPTERS,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., x ------------------------------------------------------- x Intervenors.
Intervenor. TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE x --------------------------------------------------------x
x ------------------------------------------------------ x PHILIPPINES, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Intervenor. Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. x---------------------------------------------------------x SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III, JAMBY
MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN Intervenor. ALFREDO S. LIM and
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and x ------------------------------------------------------- x PANFILO LACSON,
CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Intervenors.
Intervenors. ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO x -----------------------------------------------------x
x------------------------------------------------------ x F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
Intervenor. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO x -----------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson GAT INCIONG, MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, G.R. No. 174299
Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA Intervenors. SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and
represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo x ------------------------------------------------------- x RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Present:
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO Petitioners,
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Intervenors. - versus - PUNO,
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS x -------------------------------------------------------- x QUISUMBING,
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL YNARES-SANTIAGO,
MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN CARPIO,
represented by its Secretary General Intervenors. S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners AUSTRIA-
Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMENS x -------------------------------------------------------- x MARTINEZ,
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, CORONA,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., CARPIO
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented MORALES,
Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, CALLEJO, SR.,
STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Intervenor. RENE V. SARMIENTO, AZCUNA,
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the NICODEMO T. FERRER, and TINGA,
League of Concerned Professionals and x ------------------------------------------------------- x John Doe and Peter Doe, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT Respondents. GARCIA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
 centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group The Ruling of the COMELEC
Promulgated: also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified

October 25, 2006 the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition for lack
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
DECISION 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Courts ruling
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA
CARPIO, J.:
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
The Case
Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the proposals to amend the Constitution.
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31
Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the
August 2006 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set
denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to
1987 Constitution.
plebiscite for the voters ratification: compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
Antecedent Facts petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT
OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds
(Lambino Group), with other groups and individuals, UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS cognizance as an expression of the will of the sovereign
change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE people.
SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners (Binay Group) pray that the
5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended
Initiative and Referendum Act (RA 6735). show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
COMELECs verification of signatures and for entertaining
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the Lambino Groups petition despite the permanent
their initiative.[7]
the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each Groups petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
legislative district represented by at least three per
In his Comment to the Lambino Groups petition, the Solicitor The Issues Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is
General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court The petitions raise the following issues: the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples
to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The 1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the section states:
and its implementing rules as temporary devises to Constitution on amendments to the Constitution Sec. 2. Amendments to this
implement the system of initiative. through a peoples initiative; Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative
Various groups and 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling upon a petition of at least twelve per
individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, centum of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district must
opposing the Lambino Groups petition. The supporting inadequate or wanting in essential terms and be represented by at least three per
intervenors[10] uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC conditions to implement the initiative clause on centum of the registered voters therein. x x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. proposals to amend the Constitution; and
On the other hand, the opposing intervenors[11] hold the 3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly
contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
explain the meaning of an amendment directly proposed
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Groups petition.
by the people through initiative upon a petition, thus:
Lambino Groups standing to file the petition; (2) the validity
The Ruling of the Court
of the signature gathering and verification process; MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the
There is no merit to the petition.
mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
(3) the Lambino Groups compliance with the minimum propose a constitutional amendment. Is the
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with
requirement for the percentage of draft of the proposed constitutional
the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a amendment ready to be shown to the
voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, people when they are asked to sign?
peoples initiative. Thus, there is even no need to
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;[12] (4) the nature of the
revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably
proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments assumed, Madam President.
based alone on the Lambino Groups glaring failure to
as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor
Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Groups compliance with mean? The draft is ready and shown to
following the Courts ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
them before they sign. Now, who prepares
the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA the draft?
discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves,
Madam President.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they
arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving Proposal by the People sign there is already a draft shown to
them and they are asked whether or not
the parties memoranda, the Court considered the case
they want to propose this constitutional
submitted for resolution. amendment.

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any
Filipino can prepare that proposal and
pass it around for signature.[13] (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that
the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the
people before they sign such proposal. The framers plainly
stated that before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must prepare that proposal andpass it
around for signature.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full
text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If
so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise,
it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove
that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly
borrowed[14] the concept of peoples initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause. In almost all States[15]which allow initiative
petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments
before they sign to signify their assent, and that the
people must sign on an initiative petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments.[16]
The rationale for this requirement has been
repeatedly explained in several decisions of various
courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be
meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is
that he or she is signing. Further, and
more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of
an initiative petition to a potential signer,
without the signer having actually examined
the petition, could easily mislead the signer
by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or
even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the
petition that might not be to the signer's
liking. This danger seems particularly
acute when, in this case, the person
giving the description is the drafter of
the petition, who obviously has a vested
interest in seeing that it gets the
requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.[17] (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,[18] the Court of Appeals
of Oregon explained:
The purposes of full text provisions
that apply
to amendments by initiative commonly are
described in similar terms. x x x (The
purpose of the full text requirement is to
provide sufficient information so that
registered voters can intelligently
evaluate whether to sign
the initiative petition.); x x x (publication
of full text of amended constitutional
provision required because it is essential for
 the elector to have x x x the section which Province: City/Municipality: No. of
is proposed to be added to or subtracted can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of
Verified
from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents Legislative Barangay: Signatures:
have this knowledge. Otherwise in many District:
instances he would be required to vote in present favorably their proposal to the people and do not
the dark.) (Emphasis supplied) present the arguments against their proposal. The
PROPOSITION: DO YOU APPROVE OF THE
proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signatures. CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE
and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which
GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN
renders the initiative void.[19] signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS
they complied with the constitutional requirements in TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or

expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of
the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of
the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987
Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my
support for the filing thereof.

peoples initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people Preci Name Addr Birthd Signat Verifica
signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group nct Last ess ate ure tion
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
Num Name, MM/DD
intended that the people must first see the full text of the submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet[20] after ber First /YY
the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed Name,
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the M.I.
people must sign on a petition containing such full their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet 1
with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature 2
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
3
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group sheet attached[21] to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 4
invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra. 5
6
the petition x x x as signatories. 7
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadras 8
9
The proponents of the initiative secure the opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino
1
signatures from the people. The proponents secure the Groups Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below 0

signatures in their private capacity and not as public the signature sheet in full:
_________________ _________________ _____________
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name
and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence
of text of the Lambino Groups proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
that the text of the proposed changes is attached to
it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the
oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether
the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of
the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the petition that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that
during the signature-gathering from February to August
2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the
signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Groups draft
petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft
of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated
both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and
stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30
August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25
August 2006 petition.
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for
that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of
the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of
petition almost seven months earlier in February Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in
2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner October 2005;
Erico B. Aumentados Verification/Certification of the 25 WHEREAS, the Peoples Consultative Commission
on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution
has submitted its final report sometime in December
2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as
2005;
follows: WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current
I have caused the preparation of the political developments in Congress which militates
foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal against the use of the expeditious form of amending
capacity as a registered voter, for and on the 1987 Constitution;
behalf of the Union of Local Authorities
of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, institutional members and the failure of Congress to
and as representative of the mass of amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly,
signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied) ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the
constitutional reform agenda through Peoples
Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP pragmatic means to pursue the same;
Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS
HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-
Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of
LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL
the Philippines[22] has posted the full text of Resolution No. AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP)
SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE
2006-02, which provides: PEOPLES CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION
ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLES
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02 AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS DONE, during the ULAP National Executive
OF THE PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE Board special meeting held on 14 January
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE 2006 at the Century Park
THROUGH PEOPLES INITIATIVE Hotel, Manila.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a
common stand on the approach to support the 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed
proposals of the Peoples Consultative Commission with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
on Charter Change;
02 support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support
to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria (sic) Commission on Charter Change through peoples
initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Groups It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the
Constitution. The proposals of the Consultative proposed changes. Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first
Commission[24] are vastly different from the proposed claimed that they circulated the petition for initiative filed with
In their Manifestation explaining their amended
changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August the COMELEC, thus:
petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect
the COMELEC. After the Petition was filed, that (w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a
Petitioners belatedly realized that the signer who did not read the measure
proposed amendments alleged in the attached to a referendum petition cannot
For example, the proposed revisions of the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of question his signature on the ground that
Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of he did not understand the nature of the
the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately act. [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan,
existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory stated and failed to correctly reflect their 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the
Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact proposed amendments. registered voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with
on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the the petition for initiative filed with the
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending COMELEC below, are presumed to have
existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Groups
understood the proposition contained in the
proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Groups the petition because the amended petition was what they petition. (Emphasis supplied)
proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of had shown to the people during the February to August 2006

the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged

Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January
2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25
August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition with the COMELEC.However, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group
caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the
signature sheets, six months before the filing with the
COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
casts grave doubt on the Lambino Groups claim that they
circulated the draft petition together with the signature
sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at
that the petition of 25 August 2006 inaccurately stated and
failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August
2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with
the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before
this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft
petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature
sheets.
The Lambino Groups statement that they circulated
to the people the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC appears an afterthought, made after the
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had
pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text
of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the
Lambino Group alleged that they circulated the petition for
initiative but failed to mention the amended petition. This
contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral
arguments that what they circulated was the draft of
the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
 The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus
Juris Secundum, stating that a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act. The Lambino Group quotes
an authority that cites a proposed change attached to the
petition signed by the people. Even the authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change
must be attached to the petition. The same authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the
petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the
proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the
present initiative, the Lambino Groups proposed changes
were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature
sheets. The Lambino Groups citation of Corpus Juris
Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group
prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006
during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition
or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The
Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their
belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with
the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty.
Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only
100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than
six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added
that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies
of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how
many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty.
Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of
100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing
of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Groups Memorandum filed
on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly
admits that petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and
reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for
initiative x x x.[25] This admission binds the Lambino
Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the
Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people
who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000
signatories could have received with certainty one copy each
of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no
wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy
of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000
signature sheets could have circulated with the
petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten
signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these
100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the
maximum number of people who saw the petition before
they signed the signature sheets would not exceed
1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it
would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of
the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before
they signed the signature sheets.The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to
the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed
changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw
the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Groups signature sheets
do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either
on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an
indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during
the oral arguments, and this admission binds the
Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere
reading of the signature sheet. This omission is
fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed
changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for
non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
amendment must be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition. The signature sheet is
not the petition envisioned in the initiative clause of the
Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people
who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of
the proposed changes before signing. They could not have
known the nature and effect of the proposed changes,
among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be
lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected
indefinitely;[
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function
indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present
members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary
elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament
will determine the expiration of their own term of office;
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed
changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
These three specific amendments are not stated or
even indicated in the Lambino Groups signature sheets. The
people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that
they were proposing these amendments. These three
proposed changes are highly controversial. The people
could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes
merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino
stated that he and his group assured the people during the
signature-gathering that the elections for the regular
Parliament would be held during the 2007 local
elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the
2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed
changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII
Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition,
states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide
for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular
Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local
elections. This section merely requires that the elections for
the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the
local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the
principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily
written the word next before the phrase election of all local
government officials. This would have insured that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next
local elections following the ratification of the proposed
changes. However, the absence of the word next allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will
decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows
incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold
office beyond their current three-year term of office, and
on possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular
members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to
the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to
the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3
million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people
to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of
Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets
did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The
result is a grand deceptionon the 6.3 million signatories
who were led to believe that the proposed changes would
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Groups initiative springs another
surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The
proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions,
provides:
 Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from language in the instant case fails to do that. The
to propose further amendments or revisions to the
ratification of these amendments, the interim very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, to state what it will affect and effect and violates the Constitution.
or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the requirement that proposed amendments embrace
principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied) Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the
proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from
provision is a surplusage and the Court and the people
people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,[30] the Supreme ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May
should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this
Court of Alaska warned against inadvertence, stealth and 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section
provision invalidates the Lambino Groups initiative.
fraud in logrolling: 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives
outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same
petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can
answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing
them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of
logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only
the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v.
Firestone,[29] the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into
one proposal constitutes logrolling, which, if our
judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we
cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed
amendment amounts to logrolling because the
electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the
amendments proponents simplistic explanation
reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot
must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed
amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot
Whenever a bill becomes law through amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed
the initiative process, all of the problems that the single- Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
subject rule was enacted to prevent are
exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again
deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood
the Constitution.
of an initiatives passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for inadvertence, stealth and fraud in the
enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of
an initiative operate independently of any structured or However, the signature sheets do not explain the
supervised process. They often emphasize particular reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon
provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on
other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain
communicating to the public. x x what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
x Indeed,initiative promoters typically use simplistic
advertising to present their initiative to proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why
potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many
there is a need for such further amendments or
voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the
election. More importantly, there is no process for revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom
amending or splitting the several provisions in
an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly,
the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis such an initiative is not directly proposed by the people
supplied)
because the people do not even know the nature and effect
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a
of the proposed changes.
preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be
undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the
assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets
Lambino Groups amended petition of 30 August 2006. The
could not have known that their signatures would be used to
proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament
 Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office
ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament
until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will
remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament
does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30
June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for
the present members of the House of Representatives even
if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years
earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the
present members of the House will remain members of the
interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30
June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the
powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not
schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June
2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present
members of the House of Representatives
the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain
discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people
who signed the signature sheets could not have known
that their signatures would be used to discriminate
against the Senators. They could not have known that
their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June
2010, the interim Parliaments choice of Prime Minister
only to members of the existing House
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people
without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can
operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.That is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning that
the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text
of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. (1)
(2)
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts
the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court
do not personally know the people who sign the
petition. However, this trust emanates from a
to
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign
the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
this
In short, the Lambino Groups initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that
the initiative must be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition.
of
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A peoples initiative to change the Constitution
applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to
its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions to
the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec.1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or
A constitutional convention.
Sec.2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of
amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a peoples initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second
modes, applies to [A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to
the third mode, applies only to [A]mendments to this

Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by
the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam
President.
May we respectfully call the
attention of the Members of the Commission
that pursuant to the mandate given to us last
night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing
the matter of initiative. This is now covered
by Section 2 of the complete committee
report. With the permission of the Members,
may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five
years from the date of the
last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to
this Constitution thru
initiative upon petition of at
least ten percent of the
registered voters.
This completes the blanks
appearing in the original Committee Report
No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative, which
came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated
from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system
of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and
should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it
from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable
except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not
expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the
Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the
Committee was attempting to distinguish
the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the
public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were
the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and
thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question:
Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the
word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because
"amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate
to "amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.[31] (Emphasis
supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between amendment and revision of the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
peoples initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to
propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme
courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
Jordan,[32] the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by
the people by amendment to the
Constitution x x x applies only to the
proposing and the adopting or rejecting
of laws and amendments to the
Constitution and does not purport to
extend to a constitutional revision. x x x
x It is thus clear that a revision of the
Constitution may be accomplished only
through ratification by the people of a
revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as
 outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the
scope of the proposed initiative measure
(hereinafter termed the measure) now
before us is so broad that if such measure
became law a substantial revision of our
present state Constitution would be effected,
then the measure may not properly be
submitted to the electorate until and unless it
is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention, and the writ sought by petitioner
should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled
in Holmes v. Appling:[33]
It is well established that when a
constitution specifies the manner in which it
may be amended or revised, it can be
altered by those who favor amendments,
revision, or other change only through the
use of one of the specified means. The
constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a
revision; and it is obvious from an
examination of the measure here in question
that it is not an amendment as that term is
generally understood and as it is used in
Article IV, Section 1. The document appears
to be based in large part on the revision of
the constitution drafted by the Commission
for Constitutional Revision authorized by the
1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and
submitted to the 1963 Legislative
Assembly. It failed to receive in the
Assembly the two-third's majority vote of
both houses required by Article XVII,
Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x
x.
While differing from that document
in material respects, the measure sponsored
by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough
overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a
misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new
constitution, it is not such a measure as can
be submitted to the people through the
initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if
a new constitution, it can only be proposed
at a convention called in the manner
provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute
that a peoples initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to
amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3
million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific
modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re
Initiative Petition No. 364:[34]
It is a fundamental principle that
a constitution can only be revised or
amended in the manner prescribed by
the instrument itself, and that any
attempt to revise a constitution in a instrument of a permanent and abiding
manner other than the one provided in
the instrument is almost invariably
treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x While it is universally
conceded that the people are sovereign and
that they have power to adopt
a constitution and to change their own work
at will, they must, in doing so, act in an
orderly manner and according to the settled
principles of constitutional law. And where
the people, in adopting a constitution, have
prescribed the method by which the people
may alter or amend it, an attempt to change
the fundamental law in violation of the self-
imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional. x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect
the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty
to insure compliance with the clear command of the
Constitution ― that a peoples initiative may only amend,
never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Groups initiative
constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If
the Lambino Groups initiative constitutes a revision, then the
present petition should be dismissed for being outside the
scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the
fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term constitution implies an
nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of
the people that the underlying principles
upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument,
shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nature. On the other hand, the significance
of the term amendment implies such an
addition or change within the lines of the
original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose
 for which it was framed.[35] (Emphasis
supplied) reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental
plan as to amount to a revision.[37] Whether there is an The abolition alone of the Office of the President as
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,

basic principle in the constitution, like altering the governmental plan includes change in its fundamental the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.[38] A system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-
and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of

change affects substantial provisions of the government and the system of check and balances.[39] By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a

constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-

to a change that adds, reduces, or Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of

deletes without altering the basic principle Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not merely an the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress,

involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of
the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause
amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in
our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of
the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions.[36] The court examines only the number
of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of
the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative
effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed
changes overhaul two articles -Article VI on the Legislature
and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution.[40] Qualitatively, the
proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
allows
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into
two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is
a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the
face alone of the Lambino Groups proposed changes, it is
readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an
alteration of one or a few specific
and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to
improve specific parts or to add new
provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions
that may have become obsolete or that are
judged to be dangerous. In revision,
however, the guiding original intention and
plan contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications
for the entire document, to determine how
and to what extent they should be
altered. Thus, for instance a switch from
the presidential system to a
 parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its over-all impact on
the entire constitutional structure. So
would a switch from a bicameral system
to a unicameral system be because of its
effect on other important provisions of
the Constitution.[41] (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,[42] an initiative petition
proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution
to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The
issue turned on whether the initiative was defective and
unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x
affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution. The
Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as
outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section
1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to
provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects
not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in
the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence
in the United States Congress and in all of
the states of the nation, except one, since
the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary
change. The concept of a House and a
Senate is basic in the American form of
government. It would not only radically
change the whole pattern of government
in this state and tear apart the whole
fabric of the Constitution, but would even
affect the physical facilities necessary to
carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation
that if such proposed amendment were
adopted by the people at the General
Election and if the Legislature at its next
session should fail to submit further
amendments to revise and clarify the
numerous inconsistencies and conflicts
which would result, or if after submission of
appropriate amendments the people should
refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would
prevail in the government of this State. The
same result would obtain from an
amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of
Article V, to provide for only a Supreme
Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be
other examples too numerous to
detail. These examples point unerringly to
the answer.
The purpose of the long and
arduous work of the hundreds of men and
women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution
of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and
conflicts and to give the State a workable,
accordant, homogenous and up-to-date
document. All of this could disappear very
quickly if we were to hold that it could be
amended in the manner proposed in the
initiative petition here.[43] (Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with
greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Groups
initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive
and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not
even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida
enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that
would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Groups present
initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution
would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.[44] There is no doubt that the Lambino
Groups present initiative seeks far more radical changes in
the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a
deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions
because members of the deliberative body work full-time
on the changes. However, the same substantive changes,
when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments
because the changes are made by ordinary people who
do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out
of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following
exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that
the constitutional provisions expressly
provide for both amendment and revision
when it speaks of legislators and
constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for
amendment when it speaks of the people. It
would seem that the apparent distinction is
based on the actual experience of the
people, that on one hand the common
 people in general are not expected to work
full-time on the matter of correcting the
constitution because that is not their
occupation, profession or vocation; while on
the other hand, the legislators and
constitutional convention delegates
are expected to work full-time on the same
matter because that is their occupation,
profession or vocation. Thus, the
difference between the words revision
and amendment pertain only to the
process or procedure of coming up with
the corrections, for purposes of interpreting
the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference
between amendment and revision cannot
reasonably be in the substance or extent
of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the
original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present
initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the
proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a
revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had
drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group
as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the
fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain
language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the
language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated,
courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and
language.[45] Any theory espousing a construction contrary to
such intent and language deserves
consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by
creating inconsistencies in the form of government
established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any
jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the
Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino
Groups position. Any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in government
does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that
initiative proponents in American jurisdictions
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v.
Keisling,[46] the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this
theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII,
section 2, does not apply to changes to
the constitution proposed by initiative. His
theory is that Article XVII, section 2
merely provides a procedure by which
the legislature can propose a revision of
the constitution, but it does not affect
proposed revisions initiated by the
people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed
ballot measure constitutes a wholesale
change to the constitution that cannot be
enacted through the initiative process. They
assert that
the distinction between amendment and revi
sion is determined by reviewing the scope
and subject matter of the proposed
enactment, and that revisions are not limited
to a formal overhauling of
the constitution. They argue that this ballot
measure proposes far reaching changes
scant outside the lines of the original instrument,
including profound impacts on existing
fundamental rights and radical restructuring
of the government's relationship with a
defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert
that, because the proposed ballot measure
will refashion the most basic principles
of Oregon constitutional law, the trial court
correctly held that it violated Article XVII,
section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot
without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument
that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not
prohibit revisions instituted
by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the
Supreme Court concluded that a revision of
the constitution may not be accomplished
have
by initiative, because of the provisions of
Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article
XVII, section1, relating to
proposed amendments, the court said:
From the foregoing it appears that
Article IV, Section 1, authorizes
the use of the initiative as a means
of amending the
Oregon Constitution, but it
contains no similar sanction for its
use as a means
of revising the constitution. x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section
2, relating to revisions, and said: It is the
only section of the constitution which
provides the means
for constitutional revision and it excludes the
idea that an individual, through the initiative,
 may place such a measure before the
electorate. x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's
argument that Article XVII, section 2,
does not apply
to constitutional revisions proposed
by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Groups theory
which negates the express intent of the framers and the
plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a
spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the
other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the
spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining
whether there is an amendment or revision. The present
initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red
spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks
a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers
among the three co-equal departments of government,
requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and
articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific
provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered
an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change
reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years [47] is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing
Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100
percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.[48] Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.[49]
The changes in these examples do not entail any
modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other
than the specific provision being amended. These changes
do not also affect the structure of government or the system
of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
These three examples are located at the far green end of the
spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought
by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is
an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of
one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not
an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article
II[50] of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological
basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will
have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it
affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully crafted system of
checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of
the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic
principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best
suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered
principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to
undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow
peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake
only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Groups
proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the
term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended
and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be
deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are
hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to
26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in
which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary
form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is
irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of
constitutions. However, the Lambino Groups draft of Section
2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of
construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples
government. The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable Malaysian models, which have initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
provisions until the earlier one shall be amended, which all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
requires a future separate constitutional amendment. signature sheets realize that they were adopting the incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Zealand parliamentary form of government? Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment,
change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that
arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a This drives home the point that the peoples initiative
RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
surplusage. In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
rule of statutory construction so that the later provision amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
amendments to the Constitution.
automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing
inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that. several provisions in many articles of the
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a peoples
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can
initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the
be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a
Constitution.
proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not
logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case
and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the
can be resolved on some other grounds.[51]
is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not an
and the Parliamentary system of government, and the amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to
inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a unicameral unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend
parliamentary form of government. the Constitution limiting the scope of a peoples initiative to the Constitution, this will not change the result here because
[A]mendments to this Constitution. the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

Now, what unicameral parliamentary form of Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative
must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
government do the Lambino Groups proposed changes refer 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not
to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Necessary Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

Zealand models, which are among the few countries

with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b)
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known of RA 6735 which requires that the petition for an initiative on
comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII
the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French,
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as To allow such change in the fundamental law is to
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave
signatories. Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed
Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the
people must sign the petition x x x as signatories. Lambino Groups Initiative and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If
this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the
In dismissing the Lambino Groups initiative petition,
of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August new dominant political group that comes will demand its own
the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Courts ruling
2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
in Santiago and Peoples Initiative for Reform,
Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.[52] For
signed the petition and amended petition as counsels the rule of law in this country.
following this Courts ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is
for Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado,
attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters
Petitioners. In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming
present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes
to act together with the 6.3 million signatories, merely
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA: cast[53] − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite
attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended
The Court ruled, first, by a held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with
unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of
the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the the peoples sovereign will. That approval included the
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as
petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing prescribed modes for amending or revising the
valid. that it only complied with the dispositions in
the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. Constitution.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997,
The Lambino Groups logrolling initiative also violates Section and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
10(a) of RA 6735 stating, No petition embracing more
than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; 5. Conclusion
x x x. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952
Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a
deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that
subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they
government.Since the present initiative embraces more than
by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-
one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid constitutional change, which means subverting the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is
down in the Constitution itself. peoples sovereign will and discarding the
valid, the Lambino Groups initiative will still fail.
Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should
never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- RENATO C. CORONA
Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, MARTINEZ Associate Justice
Associate Justice
protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic
will of the people. principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to
Incantations of peoples voice, peoples sovereign will, or CONCHITA CARPIO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
lose this Courts raison d'etre.
let the people decide cannot override the specific modes of MORALES Associate Justice
Associate Justice
changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No.
itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the peoples
174153.
fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative Associate Justice Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
changes by political groups gathering signatures through
false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
bedrock of the nations stability.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the WE CONCUR:
peoples voice. However, the Lambino Group unabashedly
states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
their petition with the COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Associate Justice

unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency Chief Justice

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional

CERTIFICATION
reforms. The Lambino Group thus admits that their peoples
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda of the
QUISUMBING certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
Associate Justice
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
Associate Justice
writer of the opinion of the Court.
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of peoples
voice or sovereign will in the present initiative.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
CONSUELO YNARES- ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to SANTIAGO GUTIERREZ Chief Justice

defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which Associate Justice Associate Justice

embodies the peoples sovereign will, is the bible of this