G.R. No.

183591 October 14 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al . v . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, et al .

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the
MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and
decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were
held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli
Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.)
ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last
August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has
the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The
sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources
is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the
Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial
and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared
responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship
was described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation
and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as
mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the
Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and
right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:

The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as
a ―splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure
under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section
28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of
expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the
effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot
revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to
say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until
there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as
an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin
rights to informationand disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public
consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents.
The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the
peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3
declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive
peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the three underlying principles of the
comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values
and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the
different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community. Included as a component of the
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which
includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace
agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace
process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing”
consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.Further,
E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct
regular dialogues with the NationalPeace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek
relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on
the progress of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to
be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek
advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and
local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil
society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes
petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right
to information and disclosure. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the
powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those
granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM.
Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would
be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-
AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to
this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is
referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be
associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on
executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative
relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive
Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-
AD – by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal
context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the
term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into
economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure
the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to
participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental
protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall
Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These
provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed,
the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M
OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X,
Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.

The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the
term ―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in
conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic
area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the
ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are
automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories
A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-
mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their
inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD
is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the
associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present
legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect.
The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the
only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.

G.R. No. 187167 16Aug2011

Prof. Merlin Magalona, et al., Petitioners, vs.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita in his capacityas Executive Secretary, et al., Respondents.
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that
the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as
follows:

1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty
of Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
3. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime
area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regime of nearby territories.

Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the
outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby
as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the
archipelagic doctrine.

Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power
that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the
status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil
and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine
Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to
$400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of
the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more
working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The
respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring
suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of
those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
$80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912,
and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the
competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted
only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank
for the reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?

Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the
people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No
other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the
right to take back the money intended for the people.

Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in
representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae,
has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over
the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly
look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient
functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that
it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the
purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any
other cases whatever.