Hote:
ECONOMLC GROWTH CHUTER
YALE UALVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut
SATER DISCUSSION PAPER NO, 72
CURRENCY DEVALUATION TH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
Richard Wl. Cooper
July, 1969
Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials
circulated to stimulate discugsion and critical
comment, References in publications to Discussion
Papers should be cleared with the author to protect
the tentative character of these papers.Table of Contents
I. Nominal vs. Effective Devaluation
IT, Devaluation and the Balance of Payments
III, Devaluation and the Terms of Trade
IV. Devaluation and Aggregate Demand
V. Devaluation and the Wage-Price Spiral
VI. Political Effects of Devaluation
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendices
A. Calculations of Effective Devaluation
B, Devaluation and Aggregate Demand
C, Wage-Price Spiraling
Bibliography
Tables
Nominal and Effective Currency Devaluation
Balance of Payments
Changes in Volume of Merchandise Trade Four
Quarters Before and After Devaluation
4, Actual and Computed Merchandise Trade
5. Instances of Import Liberalization
6. Changes in Foreign Trade Prices and Terms
of Trade
Increases in Economic Aggregates from
Year Before Devaluation
8. Price and Wage Increases in the 12 Months
Following Devaluation
B1, Range of Import Demand Elasticity for which
Successful Devaluation will be Deflationary
Footnotes
44
a7
53
36
1a
15
18
22
31
49
59Introduction
By wide agreement, many less developed countries have “over-value:
currencies. Yet most countries are reluctant to devalue their currencies
even when the signs of over-valuation are unmistakable. A variety of objections
are raised to devaluation, but most of them reduce to three basic one:
1) devaluation will not in fact improve the devaluing country's payments
position; 2) devaluation might work if given a chance, but it will unleash
forces in the economy that will eventually undercut its benefits and those
of other economic policies; and 3) even if devaluation works it will be
politically disastrous to those officials who are responsible for undertaking
it.
Despite these sources of resistance, currency devaluation has frequently
taken place under the pressure of circumstances. These devaluations provide
an opportunity to evaluate, at least crudely, the consequences of devaluation
and to assess the extent to which the foregoing fears are justified.
This study generalizes from the experience of 24 devaluations, involving
19 different countries, It includes most of the currency devaluations during
the period 1959-1966, ‘Those devaluations during this period that are ex-
cluded involve countries in unusual circumstances, such as Laos and Vietnam,
Venezuela was also excluded because it is a country with a large trade surplus,
and therefore untypical of less developed countries. Canada, on the other
hand, was included in the study because of its large trade deficit and regular
importation of capital, making it similar in that respect to many less de~
veloped countries. Iceland and Spain, like many less developed countries,
both had multiple currency practices. A few cases of devaluation in the mid~
fieeles were also included, to enlarge the semple, Availability of data also
influenced the selection,