G.R. No.

145368 April 12, 2002

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The Committee was
mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."1
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the Committee
for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the
"National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary
Chairpersons.2
Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission "shall terminate upon the completion of all
activities related to the Centennial Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was
tasked to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to "prepare,
for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months
from the effectivity of" the Executive Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat
to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed
by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by the President.
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism
and the president’s Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved
by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of
the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was
created.4 Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9)
directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the
Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Coseteng’s privilege
speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue
Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.
On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc
and independent citizens’ committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was
appointed to chair the Committee.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee
Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committee’s recommendations was "the
prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating
the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction &
Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to
construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to
government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the
government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law."5
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended "the further
investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of," among others, NCC Chair Salvador
H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the Fact-
finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued
its Evaluation Report, recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP
chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Peña and AK President Edgardo H.
Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA
Rules and Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant.6
In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the
jurisdiction of said office.
In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was
denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding
"probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEÑA before the
Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act
No. 1594." The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed against
Laurel and Peña. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but
dismissed the charge against Peña.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, commanding
respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court against petitioner
for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because:
A.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE
FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
B.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.
C.
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A "PUBLIC
OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.7
In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Court’s decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,9 where it was held
that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over
public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioner’s position was purportedly not classified as Grade 27
or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Court’s decision in Uy, we held that "it is the prosecutor, not
the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the
regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan."
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:
The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial
and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate
to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An
Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other
purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan…" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that
the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsman’s and Special Prosecutor’s authority to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]
The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in
the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20, 2001.
The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act
or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or
employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1)
giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section
11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of
this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers
and employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the
powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority
of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to
confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The
Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government
and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To
carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his
supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases
outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important
functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman
with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in
public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the
original.]
Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner relies. We
first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.
The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as "protectors of the people," who "shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations." Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution11
upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to "[i]nvestigate… any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as
the "Ombudsman Act of 1989." Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide:
SEC. 13. Mandate. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act promptly on
complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and
enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order
to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases;
x x x.
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra:
SEC 16. Applicability. – The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof,
during his tenure of office.
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.12
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A
definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence13 is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on
the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer.14
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions,
its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and
the designation of the position as an office.15
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely:
(1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any compensation;
and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as
"[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that some portion of the sovereignty
of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.16
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law did
not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of
the NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally defined as the power
to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance."17 The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as
set forth by law.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports)
thereof:
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and
popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998:
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents
an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity;
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values;
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range planning
and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and capability,
particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and
continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of harnessing
the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective
instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project;
x x x.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the
"need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of
the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private
organizations." It also referred to the "need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries."
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into effect.
Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of programs and
projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for history, economic endeavors,
and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context
of the Centennial Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition ’98 within
Metro Manila, the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration of the
Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information about the plans
and events for the Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs and projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this regard, the
Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-transfer, and
similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and maintenance of the historical sites and structures;
(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private individuals
and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,
(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as well as the status
of the preparations for the Celebration.18
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,19 created the NCC by executive
order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes the nature of
executive orders:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. – Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character
in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive
orders. [Underscoring ours.]
Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the country’s economic development, especially in Central
Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court:
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:
And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, don’t you agree that the task of the
centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic development of the zone
and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by lack of material
time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in
Batangas because I am a Batangeño but President Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is
suffering, suffering because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in
that area by putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also
mention we wanted to generate employment aside from attracting business investments and employment.
And the Estrada administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost job, they
were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated,
accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to that because they had
the airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the original plan.
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental
state policy.20
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla21 that the holding by a municipality of a town
fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner argues that the "holding of a
nationwide celebration which marked the nation’s 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which
involved only the exercise of the national government’s proprietary function."22 In Torio, we held:
[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply gives authority
to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding
a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an
act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in
pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit
or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance,
the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking
as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may
be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in character.
Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.
Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court cautioned that
"there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function
of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be
decisive." Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the "surrounding
circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds" could produce a conclusion different from
that in Torio:
We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political, social,
and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City of New
Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July
fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants’
negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in
the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for
negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by
the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the
celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public governmental
duties, unless made liable by statute….
A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute, conducted a public
Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode in the
air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the
performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:
"July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called Independence Day,
by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States
statute making a similar provision, the different departments of the government recognize, and have
recognized since the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country
it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the
people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the
form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied
by a musical program including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by
fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their promotion a proper
subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x"
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations
was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former colonial
master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100
years of independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect
upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a "vehicle for fostering nationhood
and a strong sense of Filipino identity," an opportunity to "showcase Filipino heritage and thereby
strengthen Filipino values." The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who
remarked during the hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for
freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino,
proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair,
is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A
salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive.
The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office
is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.23
Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a
lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached.24 But it is
a public office, nonetheless.
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "ad-hoc body" make said
commission less of a public office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely
temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. "But," says Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty
be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an
individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without
any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult
to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an
officer."
At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if the
other elements are present "it can make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one act
or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held
for years or during good behavior."25
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.26 There the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission is an
"office of trust" as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-President.
(Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the
United States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.)
x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under
the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President and Vice-
President of the United States.
The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871. That statute
provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, "under
the auspices of the government of the United States," and for the constitution of a commission, to consist
of more than one delegate from each State and from each Territory of the United States, "whose functions
shall continue until close of the exhibition," and "whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the
execution of the plan for holding the exhibition." Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the
President of the United States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and Territories respectively.
Various duties were imposed upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it
to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should announce, by proclamation, the date
and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties
and functions of the commission were further increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called
"The Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate with the commission and to raise and disburse the funds.
It was to be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh section of the act provides "that
the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by the corporation, in accordance
with plans which shall have been adopted by the United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and
regulations of said corporation, governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the
rights, privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by the United
States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or privileges of any description connected
with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the consent
of the United States Centennial Commission, and said commission shall have power to control, change, or
revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums." The tenth
section of the act provides that "it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise
the closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the President
of the United States the financial results of the centennial exhibition."
It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the commission were
various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully performed only by men of large experience
and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest
degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons performing such duties
and exercising such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not to be regarded as
mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are, properly speaking, officers, and that the
places which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers by
Congress; for the act under which they were appointed declares, section 7, that "no compensation for
services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury of
the United States." The only other officers provided for were the "alternates" appointed to serve as
commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public office,
we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public corporation.
Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner’s position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of
Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.27
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his services
as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. – As used in this Act, the term –
xxx
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from
the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a "public officer" is expressly limited to the
application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsman’s
jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive.28
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define "public officers." Article 203
of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any
rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,29 on the other hand, states:
Officer – as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical
or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government.
When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person
in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having
authority to do the act or exercise that function.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a "public official" whether or not one
receives compensation, thus:
"Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether
in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of amount.
Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?
Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term "compensation," which
is not defined by said law, has many meanings.
Under particular circumstances, "compensation" has been held to include allowance for personal expenses,
commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services,
restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages.30
How then is "compensation," as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be interpreted?
Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not receive any
salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of
compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and
compensation.31 Would such fact bear any significance?
Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the trial court from
resolving them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Court’s Resolution
dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

//Digest
In 1998, a committee was created to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration
of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence.
President Ramos issued E.O. No. 128, “reconstituting the Committee and renamed the Committee as the
“National Centennial Commission.” Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel.
The Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created and petitioner was among the nine
incorporators, and was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
However, there were alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition
Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone that were was referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee for
investigation.
President Joseph Estrada issued A.O. No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent Citizens’ Committee to
investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects.
Among the Committee’s recommendations was “the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Laurel, chair
of National Centennial Commission (NCC) and of Expocorp for violating the rules on public bidding, relative
to the award of centennial contracts to AK Corp.; for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP
(Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that
has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of
the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation… of the
anti-graft law.”
Probable cause was found to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEÑA before
the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic
Act No. 1594.” The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed against
Laurel and Peña.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge
against Peña.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer as defined
by R.A. No. 3019 and that NCC was not a public office.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was a public officer.
RULING:
The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as “protectors of the people,” who “shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.”
Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution upon the Office of the
Ombudsman is to “[i]nvestigate… any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.”

In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A
definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the
subject:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer.

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions,
its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and
the designation of the position as an office.
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely:
(1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any compensation;
and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as
“[t]he most important characteristic” in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that some portion of the sovereignty
of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.

Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law did
not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined as the power
to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as
set forth by law.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the policies and objectives, to carry them into effect.
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss. There the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission is an “office
of trust” as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-President.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public office,
we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public corporation.
Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner’s position as CEO of Expocorp arose from
his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in
the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.
A “public officer,” under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms. – As used in this Act, the term –

xxx
(b) “Public officer” includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from
the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]

It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a “public officer” is expressly limited to the
application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsman’s
jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term “includes” in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define “public officers.”
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:

x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any
rank or class.

Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, on the other hand, states:

Officer – as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee”, refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical
or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government.
When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person
in the exercise of governmental power, “officer” includes any government employee, agent or body having
authority to do the act or exercise that function.

It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a “public official” whether or not one
receives compensation, thus:

“Public Officials” include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether
in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of amount.

Petition was Dismissed.