(1)
(Prosecutor Delos
JAMES IENT v. TULLETT PREBON, GR No. 189158, 2017-01-11
Facts:
Petitioner Ient is a British national and the Chief Financial Officer of Tradition Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. (Tradition
Asia) in Singapore.[4] Petitioner Schulze is a Filipino/German who does Application Support for Tradition
Financial Services Ltd. in London (Tradition London).
Tradition Group and Tullett are competitors in the inter-dealer broking business.
Sometime in August 2008, in line with Tradition Group's motive of expansion and diversification in Asia,
petitioners Ient and Schulze were tasked with the establishment of a Philippine subsidiary of Tradition Asia to
be known as Tradition Financial Services Philippines, Inc. (Tradition Philippines).[9] Tradition Philippines was
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 19, 2008
Jaime Villalon (Villalon), who was formerly President and Managing Director of Tullett
Mercedes Chuidian (Chuidian)... formerly a member of Tullett's Board of Directors
John and Jane Does
Issues:
On October 15, 2008, Tullett, through one of its directors, Gordon Buchan, filed a Complaint-Affidavit...
against the officers/employees of the Tradition Group for violation of the Corporation Code.
Villalon and Chuidian were charged with using their former positions in Tullett to sabotage said company by
orchestrating the mass resignation of its entire brokering staff in order for them to join Tradition Philippines.
With respect to Villalon, Tullett claimed that the former held several meetings between August 22 to 25, 2008
with members of Tullett's Spot Desk and brokering staff in order to convince them to leave the company.
Villalon likewise supposedly intentionally failed to renew the contracts of some of the brokers. On August 25,
2008, a meeting was also allegedly held in Howzat Bar in Makati City where petitioners and a lawyer of
Tradition Philippines were present. At said meeting, the brokers of complainant Tullett were purportedly
induced, en masse, to sign employment contracts with Tradition Philippines and were allegedly instructed by
Tradition Philippines' lawyer as to how they should file their resignation letters.
On August 26, 2008, Villalon allegedly informed Mr. Barry Dennahy, Chief Operating Officer of Tullett Prebon
in the Asia-Pacific, through electronic mail that all of Tullett's brokers had resigned.
Subsequently, on September 1, 2008, in another meeting with Ient and Tradition Philippines' counsel,
indemnity contracts in favor of the resigning employees were purportedly distributed by Tradition Philippines.
According to Tullett, respondents Villalon and Chuidian... violated Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code
which made them criminally liable under Section 144. As for petitioners Ient and Schulze, Tullett asserted that
they conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in the latter's acts of disloyalty against the company.
Villalon and Chuidian filed their respective Counter-Affivadits.
Villalon claimed that the DOJ had previously proclaimed that Section 31 is not a penal provision of law but
only the basis of a cause of action for civil liability. Thus, he concluded that there was no probable cause that
he violated the Corporation Code nor was the charge of conspiracy properly substantiated.
Chuidian claimed that she left Tullett simply to seek greener pastures.
She argued that Section 144 as a penal provision should be strictly construed against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused and Tullett has failed to substantiate its charge of bad faith on her part.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[17] petitioner Schulze denied the charges leveled against her.
she concluded that a charge of conspiracy which has for its basis Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code cannot
be made applicable to the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Ient alleged in his Counter-Affidavit that the charges against him were merely filed to harass Tradition
Philippines and prevent it from penetrating the Philippine market.
t
Tullett filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice to assail the foregoing resolution of the Acting
City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Ient and Schulze moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution by the Secretary of Justice.
Ient and Schulze brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
The main bone of disagreement among the parties in this case is the applicability of Section 144 of the
Corporation Code to Sections 31 and 34 of the same statute such that criminal liability attaches to violations
of Sections 31 and 34.
Ruling:
In a Resolution... dated February 17, 2009, State Prosecutor Cresencio F. Delos Trinos, Jr.
Trinos), Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City, dismissed the criminal complaints.
On the issue of conspiracy, Prosecutor Delos Trinos found that since Villalon and Chuidian did not commit any
acts in violation of Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code, the charge of conspiracy against Schulze and
Ient had no basis.
d... ated April 23, 2009, then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez reversed and set aside Prosecutor Delos
Trinos's resolution and directed the latter to file the information for violation of Sections 31 and 34 in relation
to Section 144 of the Corporation Code against Villalon, Chuidian, Harvey, Schulze, and Ient before the proper
court.
Undeniably, respondents Villalon, Chuidian and Harvey occupied positions of high responsibility and great
trust as they were members of the board of directors and corporate officers of complainant.
the consolidated petitions are GRANTED
Principles:
The provision of Section 144 of the Corporation Code is also applicable in the case at bar as the penal
provision provided therein is made applicable to all violations of the Corporation Code, not otherwise
specifically penalized.
After a meticulous consideration of the arguments presented by both sides, the Court comes to the
conclusion that there is textual ambiguity in Section 144; moreover, such ambiguity remains even after an
examination of its legislativ... e history and the use of other aids to statutory construction, necessitating the
application of the rule of lenity in the case at bar.
There is no provision in the Corporation Code using similarly emphatic language that evinces a categorical
legislative intent to treat as a criminal offense each and every violation of that law. Consequently, there is no
compelling reason for the Court to construe Section 144 as similarly employing the term "penalized" or
"penalty" solely in terms of criminal liability.
The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute. Sections 31 to
34 in particular were intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on corporate officers and directors but
without unduly impeding them in the discharge of their work with concerns of litigation.
(2)
WHO VS AQUINO
Facts:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health
Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties
and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of
highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge
Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity
from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to
the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly
joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied
the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in
asserting diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic
immunity.

Held:
Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of
the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment,
likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the
search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor
General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by
seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of
petitioner Verstuyft.
(3)
Case Digest: KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No. 142396
February 11, 2003)
Facts
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust operation”
conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian
national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent
of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his
motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification
of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULLING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough indication that
the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory
of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
(4)
Liang vs. Peole
FACTS: Petitioner Jeffrey Liang, an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) , was charged
before the MeTC of Mandaluyong with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against a fellow ADB worker. Liang was arrested but later released. The next day, the judge received an
"office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity
from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government.
Based on the said protocol communication, the judge, without notice to the prosecution, dismissed the two
criminal cases. The RTC set aside the MeTC ruling and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. Liang appealed arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.
ISSUES:
1. Was the judge correct in dismissing the cases on the basis the protocol communication without notice to
the prosecution?
2. Is Liang covered with immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government?
HELD:
1. No. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is
covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu proprio
dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was
violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The
needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its
resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled
that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
2. No.

Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a.)....... immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in
"official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section
45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be
accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Likewise, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do
not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating
to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his
official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty. (Liang vs
People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000)
(5)
LIANG VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Jeffrey Liang is an economist working in the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, he was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Because of this, he
was arrested, but then, he was able to post bail, and so he was released from custody. The next day, the MTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government. Because of this, the MTC judge dismissed the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. It then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The latter set aside the MTC ruling
and ordered for an enforcement of a warrant of arrest. Liang filed a MR but it was denied. Hence, this Petition
for Review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Liang is covered by immunity under the Agreement??? – NO.
HELD: The immunity mentioned in Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception
that the act was done in an “official capacity.” Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the
name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent
enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official
functions. The commission of a crime is not part of an official duty.
(6)
PEOPLE V. ROGER TULIN
MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of
kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of 40.4M. The vessel was suddenly boarded by 7 fully armed
pirates (accused in the case – Emilio Changco, Cecilio Changco, Tulin, Loyola, Infante, etc.). they detained and
took control of the vessel. The name MT Tabangao and the PNOC logo were painted over with black. Then it
was painted with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore. In Singapore, the ship was
awaiting another vessel that did not arrive. Instead, the ship went back to Batangas Philippines and remained
at sea. Days later, it went back to Singapore. This time, another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it.
Another accused, Cheong San Hiong, supervised the Navi’s crew and received the cargo on board MT
Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee went back to the
Philippines and the original crew members were released by the pirates in batches. The crew was ordered not
to tell authorities of what happened. The chief engineer of the crew, however, reported the incident to the
coast guard. Afterwards, a series of arrests were effected in different places. An information charging the
accused with qualified piracy or violation of the PD 532 – Piracy in the Philippine Waters – was filed against the
accused. As it turns out, Navi Pride captain, Hiong, was employed with Navi Marine Services ( a Singaporean
firm, I think). Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was dealing for the first time with Paul Gan,
a Singaporean broker who offered to sell bunker oil to the former. When the transaction pushed through, Hiong
was assigned to supervise a ship to ship transfer. He was told that the Galilee would be making the transfer, so
Navi Pride ship-sided with Galilee and the transfer was effected. Paul Gan received the payment. Upon arrival
in Singapore, Hiong was asked again to transact another transfer of oil. The same procedure was followed.
Hiong then went to the Philippines to arrange another transfer with Changco – the pirates head. This was how
Hiong was arrested by the NBI agents. CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO 10 NOTE: ©
= Callejo Ponente All the accused put up denials and alibis. The trial court, with ROMEO CALLEJO deciding, ruled
that the accused were all guilty.
ISSUE: w/n the accused are guilty of qualified piracy – YES!
RULING: [only the important part for crim] Hiong argues that he can not be convicted under PD 534 or Art 122
of the RPC as amended, since both laws punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. Hiong also contends that
the court never acquired jurisdiction over him since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters. Art.
122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas) provided that piracy must be committed in the
high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659,
which broadened the law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand,
embraces any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in the Philippine
waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. No conflict
exists among the mentioned laws, they exist harmoniously as separate laws. The attack on and the seizure of
MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought
by the pirates to Singapore, where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under
Hiong’s supervision. Although the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not done in
Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is
charged with violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it
remains to be a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
(7)
People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.
FACTS:
· appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
· Lower court dismissed the case
ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters
HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
YES.
· 2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted
in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within territory they were committed.
· As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction
or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where
the crime in question was committed belongs.
· mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts,
because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the
disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our
territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence
such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
· to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within
our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute.
(8)
Case Brief: White Light Corporation v City of Manila
NOVEMBER 26, 2013JEFF REY
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the
Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of
room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will
affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to
operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought
to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all
ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that
the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually
limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The
common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of
regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be
described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions
and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power
as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the
general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting
and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
(9)
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they
were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized
Garcia vs. Drilon on the Constitutionality of RA 9262
the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who
would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. Constitutionality of RA 9262 "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004"
The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has
been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
FACTS:

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private respondent (wife and
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must
with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.
for squealing on him.
It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt suicide on December 17,
invaded.
2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her
when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and
drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away
enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would
have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This
apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any deprived her of access to full information about their businesses.
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
“wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other
the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained things, to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is
in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons.
The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not to husbands/men. Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.
All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" is already incitement to such discrimination.
sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men against women.

3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and other women.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it because the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the
husband/male gender.

5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, theequal Declaration of Policy in RA 9262
protection guarantee is violated.
· enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity
and human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical,
psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim.
Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:
· The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality, which
1. Safeguard Human Rights, is quoted as follows:
2. Ensure Gender Equality and Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
3. Empower Women

International Laws ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental
freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone. HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In addition,
the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human rights treaties such as the

2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW

3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits
4. Convention Against Torture, and the women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore
as the Philippines’ compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination against women
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others. and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against
women in all forms both in law and in practice.

UDHR
CEDAW
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive
Among the standards under the UDHR are the following: document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges
the existence of extensive discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
xxxx
2. Philippine’s obligation as state-party to CEDAW · Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.

· English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement for the improvement
of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the · However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of
concept of discrimination used in many legal standards and norms, focuses on discrimination against women, husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to
with the emphasis that women have suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
on account of their biological sex.

Statistics:
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which includes promoting
gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not only by our Constitution, but also by commitments The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving violence committed
we have made in the international sphere, are undeniably important and essential. against women in the Philippines.

· In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases involving violence
against women were filed under RA 9262.
RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which are
·
often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different categories of violence committed
the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship. against women. The number of reported cases showed an increasing trend from 2004 to 2012,

· The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable
victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis
to anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.

3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the Achievement of Governmental

Objectives

4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and cultural differences
Historical Perspective:

· A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the form
of violence, were facts of life,
· Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code: all "assumed patriarchy as
natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male superiority."
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and men prescribe that
they be treated differently under particular conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for women.
Thus, the disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a man requires the special protection of the law,
as gleaned from the following recommendations of the CEDAWCommittee:

· 18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological assumption that: husband and wife were
· The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling
‘one body’ before God; thus "they were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was the husband," a environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to
concept that evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and
Code. men must be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will
be required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an
· Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are expected to take on the effective strategy aimed at overcoming under representation of women and a redistribution of resources and
dominant roles both in the community and in the family. This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power between men and women.
power over women – power, which must necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women is
one of the ways men control women to retain such power. · Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These results may be quantitative
and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with
· In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, men, enjoying the same income levels, equality in decision-making and political influence, and women enjoying
they were treated as property. freedom from violence.
· The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his
property right over her.
 The government’s commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of her life are parallel to
that of a man, requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative measures, such as RA 9262. Unless
the woman is guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the
government, which is committed to uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can neither
achieve substantive equality nor be empowered.
5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake ameliorative action6.
that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by women and children brought about by
years of discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger
mandate for the government to combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."
RA 9262 is “THE” ameliorative action
· In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that would address the evil effects of the
social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply embedded in the society’s subconscious, on Filipino women
and children and elevate their status as human beings on the same level as the father or the husband.
· R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of discrimination against women. It is an
ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse discrimination" against. Ameliorative action "is not an exception
to equality, but an expression and attainment of de facto equality, the genuine and substantive equality which
the Filipino people themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative measures are
necessary as a redistributive mechanism in an unequal society to achieve substantive equality.
Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality
In the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the Convention on the Elimination
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires that women be given an
equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not
enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and
culturally constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such
differences.
Women’s struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the same. But this model does not take
into account biological and socially constructed differences between women and men. By failing to take into
account these differences, a formal equality approach may in fact perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model – this recognizes differences between women and men but considerswomen’s weakness
as the rationale for different treatment. This approach reinforces the inferior status of women and does not
address the issue of discrimination of women on account of their gender.
3. Substantive equality model – this assumes that women are "not vulnerable by nature, but suffer
from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed disadvantages were eliminated, there was no further
need for protection." Thus, the substantive equality model gives prime importance to women’s contexts,
realities, and experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts and measures directed, at or affecting them,
with a view to eliminating the disadvantages they experience as women.
The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause (application of the
substantive equality model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal
footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in
light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The
gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the
1987 Constitution.
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal protection simply requires that
similarly situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not connote identity of rights among individuals,
nor does it require that every person is treated identically in all circumstances. It acts as a safeguard to ensure
that State-drawn distinctions among persons are based on reasonable classifications and made pursuant to a
proper governmental purpose. In short, statutory classifications are not unconstitutional when shown to be
reasonable and made pursuant to a legitimate government objective.
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that domestic and other forms
of violence against women and children contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby
impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote the family’s total development. Congress also found, as
a reality, that women and children are more susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among
others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within the family
environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it necessary to recognize
the substantial distinction within the family between men, on the one hand, and women and children, on the
other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in the laws as our law on persons and
family under the Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the distinctions between men and women in the
context of the family.

Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should not be seen and
encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.
By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative constitutional requirements of human
dignity and fundamental equality can become descriptive reality. The socially constructed distinctions between
women and men that have afflicted us and spawned discrimination and violence should be eradicated
sooner. Power and intimacy should not co-exist.
The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens from the helter skelter of this world.
It is in that space where we grow in the safety of the special other who we hope will be there for our entire
lifetime. If that is not possible, then for such time as will be sufficient to create cherished memories enough to
last for eternity.
I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full course.
Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle to be freed from a long-held belief
that men are entitled, when displeased or minded, to hit their wives or partners and their children. This law
institutionalizes prompt community response to this violent behavior through barangay officials who can
command the man to immediately desist from harming his home partner and their children. It also establishes
domestic violence as a crime, not only against its victims but against society as well. No longer is domestic
violence lightly dismissed as a case of marital dispute that law enforcers ought not to get into.
Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a
guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. "It ought to be construed in consonance with social
justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987 Constitution—a transformative covenant in which the Filipino
people agreed to enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely
egalitarian democracy." This means that the weak, including women in relation to men, can be treated with a
measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.
Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the human rights rationale, is
designed as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in the patently unequal Philippine society,
each person may be restored to his or her rightful position as a person with equal moral status."
(10)
Guinguing vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 128959
FACTS: Cirse Choy Torralba, a broadcast journalist with two radio programs airing in Visayas and Mindanao,
filed a criminal complaint for libel against Segundo Lim and petitioner, Guinguing for causing the publication
of records of his criminal cases as well as photographs of his arrest. The criminal records and photos were
published by means of a one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication
edited and published by petitioner. Choy Torralba asserted that he has been acquitted and that the cases
referred to in the publication had already been settled. He sought the conviction of Lim and Guinguing for
libel and claims that such publication placed him in public contempt and ridicule and was designed to degrade
and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
found the publication indeed libelous declaring that malice, the most important element of libel, was present
in this case every defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and publisher
towards the person subject thereof. The lower courts also ruled that publication of calumny even against
public officers or candidates for public office, according to the trial court, is an offense most dangerous to the
people. It deserves punishment because the latter may be deceived thereby and reject the best and
deserving citizens to their great injury. Thus, petitioner prayed for reversal of the judgment against him
contending that his conviction by the lower courts constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to
freedom of speech and of the press.
ISSUES: Whether or not the publication in the instant case is indeed libellous
RULING: The lower courts applied the strict letter of the law. However, this Court is compelled to delve
deeper into the issue considering that changes in the factual milieu evoked a change in the judgment
applicable. Under the law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. However, in
order to protect the constitutional guarantee of free speech, additional rules were applied to libel cases
involving public figures. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong defined a public figure as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a
legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.'
The citizens have a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such public figures, and freedom of
the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as
it is in the case of public officials. Public opinion may be the only instrument by which society can attempt to
influence their conduct. Thus, in libel cases involving public figures, actual malice standard rule applies. As
held in New York Times vs. Sullivan and reiterated in Agiong vs. Comelec, even if the defamatory statement is
false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the
statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. Therefore, in order to justify a conviction for criminal libel against a public figure,
it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the libelous statements were made or published with
actual malice. In the present case, Torralba was a public figure, being a broadcast journalist who hosts a
public affairs program. By entering into this line of work, complainant in effect gave the public a legitimate
interest in his life. He likewise gave them a stake in finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to
have the right to criticize others for their conduct. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said
publication was true, the intention to let the public know the character of their radio commentator can at
best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done with good motives and for justifiable ends. Since
Torralba failed to establish actual malice against Lim and Guingguing, the petition for reversal of the judgment
of libel against petitioner was granted.
(11)
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man
who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s
husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such
act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’
under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson
put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim.
In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality
and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
(12)
People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997
Per Curiam
Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime
of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which
time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the
victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused.
This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.
Ratio:
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual
evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal
acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary
tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not
the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S.,
436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either
morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as
long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect
and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall
not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it
and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still
plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the
form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the
death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the
Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose
the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that
the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised
Penal Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely
abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the
discretion to review it at the propitious time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has
correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No.
7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those
mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is
when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in
exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial
court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives
reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House
seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous
crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what
crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to
suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of
Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill
No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so
re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death
penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary
legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress
define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only
crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill
and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be
heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in
enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact,
interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate
the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and
consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political
and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether
eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that
for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should
first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the
said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms
have failed to abate criminality in society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such
crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress,
in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal
sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
(13)
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of sentence
under the following information:
"That on or about the 17th. day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro
during which he should not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by
virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for
attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence
by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy.
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prisión correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that
vision with the following assignment of error:
1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not
criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code for
the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and
completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English
text of said article which in part reads as follows:
"Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall
be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment."
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code been in the English
language, then the theory of the appellant could be upheld. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling
in case of doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part reads thus:
"ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. Será castigado con prision correccional en sus grados medio y
máximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugándose mientras estuviere sufriendo privación de
libertad por sentencia firme; * * *."
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and
enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo
privacion de libertad used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly
admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense
that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the
City of Manila. This view has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36553 (July 26, 1932; 57
Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person
under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the
penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by this Court, though,
indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)[1], where it was held
that one evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area specified in the
judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which
provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157
of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of
final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Parás, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
(14)
LADONGA VS PEOPLE
Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines
GR no. 141066, February 17, 2005
Facts:
In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga, petitioner, became the regular customer of Alfredo
Oculam in his pawnshop. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a loan from him, guaranteed
by check of United Coconut Planters Bank, issued by Adronico. On last week of April 1990 and during the first
week of May 1990 the spouses obtained additional loan guaranteed by UCPD. And between May and June
1990, the spouses obtained the third loan guaranteed by UCPD. The three checks bounced upon presentment
for the reason that the account was closed. When the spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated
demands, Oculam filed a criminal complaint against them.
 While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or
the account was closed, the spouses claim that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with
an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature, and, that petitioner is not a
signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, who was not the issuer of the three checks that bounced, could be held
liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.
Ruling:
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “a conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” To be held liable guilty as co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have perform an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.
It was not proven by direct evidence; petitioner was merely present at the time of the issuance of the
checks. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy
must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
(15)
Manuel vs People of the Philippines, GR No. 165842
Posted: October 5, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Bigamy 0
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to
the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after
his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months
after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge
of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo
was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo
Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was
done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had
to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court
ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount
0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA
ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years,
months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s wife
cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of
presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
HELD:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a
valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse
who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the
absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
The court ruled against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court
thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a
social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant
was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering
the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be
just and reasonable.
(16)
People vs. Puno (Crim1)
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y
Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants
Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent
Facts:
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at
Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC
He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will
temporarily take his place
When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes
Benz with Isabelo driving
After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao,
boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her
Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check
for P100,000
Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again
towards Pampanga
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway
and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to her, she fell down on
the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo, he
stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car
He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride
He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
No.
No.
Ratio:
There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive
the offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with
such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against
any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined
or particular victim
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway does
not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
(17)
PEOPLE V. DELIM
FACTS: Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon and Ronald Delim. Modesto
Delim, the victim (deceased), was adopted by the father of the brothers. On January 23, 1999, Modesto, Rita
(wife), Randy (son) and their 2 grandchildren were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald
barged into the house. They were armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert
and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of
Modesto. They then herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan. Leon and Manuel, also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto
and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house at around 7am the
following day. On January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, found Modesto under thick bushes
in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a
bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately
rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance. According to the autopsy, the cause
of death was a gunshot wound at the head and the stab wounds sustained by the victim on his left and forearm
were defensive wounds. The investigators confirmed that the accused had no licenses for their firearms. Only
Marlon, Ronald and Leon were arrested. Manuel and Robert were not found. To exculpate themselves, Marlon,
Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants
guilty of aggravated murder (The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance CRIMINAL LAW
REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO CALLEJO 13 NOTE: © = Callejo Ponente and of taking advantage of superior
strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission
of the crime) and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. The amount of P75,000 for moral damages and
P25,000 for exemplary damages was awarded.
ISSUE: 1) WON the crime charged in the information is murder or kidnapping – Murder 2) WON the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that accused are guilty of murder 3) WON the qualifying
circumstances should be considered
HELD/ RATIO: 1) The crime charged is murder. In determining what crime is charged in an information, the
material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are
controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific
intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in
People v. Isabelo Puno, et al., that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual
specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of
his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
malefactor. If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation
of the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing,
and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. The crime committed would either be
homicide or murder. What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the
information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with — that of
murder or kidnapping. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances
indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result
to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in
a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent. Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. Specific
intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the
circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record. Specific intent is not
synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage
in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need
not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not
show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime
charged such as murder. The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives
comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping,
the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused
cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the
victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge. In this case, it is evident on the face of the
Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and
that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors
of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no
specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his
freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime charged
in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268
thereof. 2) YES In this case, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two
things: 1) the criminal act and 2) defendant's agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus
delicti includes two things: 1) the objective; 2) the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the
death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident,
natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other
words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In the case at bar, the prosecution
adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE
ROMEO CALLEJO 14 NOTE: © = Callejo Ponente sustained 5 gunshot wounds. He also sustained 7 stab wounds,
defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in
the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are
evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences flowing therefrom. 3) NO
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly
and conclusively as the crime itself. Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of
execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of
execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon
and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was
defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although he
was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and
stabbed by the malefactors. As to superior strength, what is primordial is that the assailants deliberately took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the crime. In this case, the prosecution failed to
adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority when
Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while
Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority and
their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed. The aggravating circumstance of unlicensed firearm and
dwelling was not alleged in the information thus, cannot be considered. In sum, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are
guilty only of Homicide.
(18)
UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG
Ah Chong was employed as a cook at Officers' quarters No. 27 at Fort Mc Kinley and at the same place Pascual
Gualberto was employed as a house boy or muchacho. No one slept in the house except the two servants,
ocuppying a small room toward the rear of the building. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by
placing against it a chair. Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone who was forcing to open the door. He
sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the
door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, Ah Chong leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill
you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against
the door. In the darkness and confusion Ah Chong thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who
had forced the door open. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong struck out
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch
and fell down on the steps. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, Ah Chong called to his employers who slept in
the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds. The deceased
and the accused had an understanding to knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity. Ah
Chong alleged that it was because of repeated robberies that he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection. He admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that
Pascual was "a ladron" (burglar) because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite warnings. TC:
Ah Chong was guilty of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances. Ah Chong admitted that he killed his
roommate but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of
his lawful right of self-defense.
ISSUE: WON one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for
which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act
RULING: there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due
to negligence or bad faith. Ah Chong acquiited. There can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced
open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be.
No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion,
and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and
his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the
darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his
warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver
the first blow. But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he
struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as
defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the
knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge. ignorance or mistake of fact, if such
ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels
the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions
of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any
wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. Ignorantia
facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal
liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; That is to say, the question as to whether
he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal
or other wise, upon which he acted. Ah Chong struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief
that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in
imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of
all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good
faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate
right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt
from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to
defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge. TORRES, J., dissenting: the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and
punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully killed, and while
the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts
committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on
the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred
responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any
justifiable motive.