AUG 8 5 2010

clerk of the ~apaguperiorcoufi.

IN THE SUPERRIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIF 8
COUNTY OF NAPA
APPELLATE DIVISION

PEOPLE O F THE STATE OF No.: CR 151673

CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Napa Superior Court
No. CR 149144)
v.
RIK WAYNE MUNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

Appeal from.the Judgmeut of the Superior Court of the State of

Califoruia For the County of Napa in a MisdemeanorIInfraction Case

HONORABLE STEPHEN T. ICROYER, JUDGE

HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MONIQUE LANGHORNE-

JOHNSON

DON E. LAUGHRIDGE
(SBN 85238)
833 Franklin St., Suite 4
Napa, Ca. 94559
(707) 255-3535

Attorney for Appellant by

Appointmeut of the Court
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
? .3
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 4
FACTS OF THE CASE 5
ARGUMENT:
I. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE
NOT TO SUA SPONTE ASK THE PRO PER DEFENDANT
IF HE WANTED TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN DEFENSE? 9

11. DID THE HONORABLEMONIQUE LANGHORNE-

JOHNSON COMMIT ERROR BY NOT CONSIDERING SUA
SPONTE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH AS EITHER A
COMMON LAW SUPPRESSION MOTION OR A MOTION IN
ARREST OF JUDGMENT? 10

111. DID THE HONORABLE STEPHEN T. IUiOYER ERR IN

NOT SUA SPONTE TREATING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
QUASH AS EITHER A COMMON LAW SUPPRESSION MO-
TION OR A MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT? 14

IV. ARE VEHICLE CODE INFRACTIONS SUBJECT TO THE

GENERAL CRIMINAL LAW UNDER PENAL CODE S19.7? 15

V. ASSUMING THAT VEHICLE CODE INFRACTIONS ARE

NOT SUBJECT TO THE PENAL CODE, WAS THE DEFEN-
DANT'S DETENTION VIOLATIVE OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AS AN ARREST WITOUT WARRANT? 16

VI. DID THE PROSECUTION PROVE THAT SERGEANT

HUNTER AS A DEPUTY SHERIFF HAD THE AUTHORITY
TO ENFORCE TRAFFIC LAWS IN AMERICAN CANYON? 17

CONCLUSION
WORD COUNT
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES
A~izonav. Fthiinarite (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct.
1246,1265,113 L.Ed.2d 302,332

Clznpnzmz v. Califomin (1967) 386 US 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705

CALIFORNIA CASES
I72 re Estate of Homian 265 Cal.App.2d 796,71 Cal.Rptr.
780 (Cal.App. 1968)

People v. Holgui~z(1956) 145 Cal. App. 2d. 520

People. v. Horvath (1982) I27 CaI. App. 3d 398

People v. Martinez 14 Cal.3d 533, 537, 535 P.2d 739, 741,
121 Cal.Rptr. 611, 613 (Cal. 1975

People v. Mor-gmz (App. 3 Dist. 1977) 141 Cal.Rptr. 863,

75 Cal.App.3d 32.

People v. Sava (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 935

People v. Wolilleberl 261 Cal.App.2d 461,463 (Cal.App.2.

Dist.1968)

STATUTES AND MISCELLANEOUS CITES

Evidence Code 5320
Code of Civil Procedure 55 418.10,607
Penal Code $5 1044,152.7, 1538.5,1185,1186,1004
Vehicle Code $5 40300, 12801.5 (e), 4000 (a) (I), 12500 (a),
16028 (a), 4,40300.5

Government Code $26613

Witkin Criminal Law, Chapter XVII, 520 9
 ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE

NOT TO SUA SPONTE ASIC THE PRO PER DEFENDANT
IF HE WANTED TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN DEFENSE?

11. DID THE HONORABLE MONIQUE LANGHORNE-JOHNSON

COMMIT ERROR BY NOT CONSIDERING SUA SPONTE
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH AS EITHER A COMMON LAW
SUPPRESSION MOTION OR A MOTION IN ARREST OF
JUDGMENT?

111. DID THE HONORABLE STEPHEN T. KROYER ERR IN NOT SUA

SPONTE TREATING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH AS
EITHER A COMMON LAW SUPPRESSION MOTION OR A MOTION
IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT?

IV. ARE VEHICLE CODE INFRACTIONS SUBJECT TO THE

GENERAL CRIMINAL LAW UNDER PENAL CODE SECTION 19.7?

V. ASSUMING THAT VEHICLE CODE INFRACTIONS ARE NOT

SUBJECT TO THE PENAL CODE, WAS THE DEFENDANT'S
DETENTION VIOLATIVE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS AN
ARREST WITOUT WARRANT?

VI. DID THE PROSECUTION PROVE THAT SERGEANT HUNTER

AS A DEPUTY SHERIFF HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE
TRAFFIC LAWS IN AMERICAN CANYON?
 FACTS OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case was prosecuted by a citation issued to the appellant
on October 29, 2009 alleging violations of sections 4000 (a) (I), 12500 (a)
and 16208 (a) of the California Vehicle Code. Sergeant Mike Hunter who
issued the citation was a Sheriffs Deputy working under contract to the
City of American Canyon at the time of issuance. Appellant was convicted
of violating $12500 (a) and $16208 (a) on March 8,2010. Appellant now
attacks the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the charges and alleges that
he was denied fair hearings on December 22,2009 and March 8,2010.
When appellant failed to appear pursuant to the November 30,2009
date stated on the citation, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On
December 7,2009, appellant surrendered on the warrant and filed and
sewed a NOTICE OF MOTION MOTION TO QUASH CCP $418.10;
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES (Hereafter "Motion To Quash"). Although
at first glance this filing seems unusual in a misdemeanorlcriminal case,
appellant believed that it was wholly consistent with his belief that Vehicle
Code misdemeanors and infractions are subject only to the Vehicle Code
and the civil laws and not subject to the Penal Code. On December 7,
2009, defendant requested that advisory counsel be appointed to assist him
in the presentation of his case, was given Faretta Wainings and, instead of
signing his name to the RECORD OF FARETTA WARNINGS, wrote "Do
Not Waive Rights" above the signature line. Defendant was released on his
own recognizance on December 7,2009 with a promise to appear.
Appellant thereafter represented himself for all purposes through trial and
conviction even though his desire was to have advisory counsel to assist in
protection of his rights.
Appellant's Motion To Quash was denied by COMMISSIONER
MONIQUE LANGHORNE-JOHNSON on December 22,2009 as not an
appropriate filing. The Learned Commissioner was of the opinion that a
 Penal Code $1538.5 n~otionneeded to be filed. (See electronic recording of
December 22,2009 hearing).
The appellant's trial on one n~isdemeanorand two infraction counts
for violation of the California Vehicle Code took place on March 8,2010
and the appellant represented himself. Jury trial was waived and the trial
judge was the HONORABLE STEPHEN T. KROYER. The bulk of the
trial transcript, docun~entssubmitted with appellant's December 7, 2009
Motion To Quash, and trial exhibits set forth the substance of appellant's
claim that the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed against him on the
citation.
It is obvious from the record of the trial proceedings that defendant
was not accorded the opportunity to testify in his own defense. Prior to
commencement of the trial, the trial judge only touched upon the issue of
the appellant's testifying once and that was in discussions prior to
conmencement of the trial. The appellant told the judge at that time (prior
to trial) that "My witness list is blank." (Reporter's transcript of trial
hereafter "R.T." (R.T. 3-8-10, p. 28,l. 24 throughp. 29,l. 7). Toward the
end of Sergeant Hunter's testimony, the trial judge (in response to
appellant's questioning-whetherthe officer recalled certain facts col-rectly)
told the defendant "You're chance to testify is going to come". (R.T., 3-8-
10, p. 43,l. 22 through p. 44,l. 8).
At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the trial judge asked
appellant if he wanted to make an opening statement to begin his defense
but appellant waived. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 55,1.24 through p. 55. I. 26). Then
the Court asked appellant if he wanted to "present any additional evidence"
and defendant introduced one document (Defendant's Exhibit "8", a copy
of which is attached hereto) over which there was some discussion
regarding its relevance. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 55,I. 27 through p. 57,l. 24.)
After the appellant began arguing the relevance of Exhibit "8", the trial
judge informed him that the case was not at the argument phase yet and
asked whether "there are any other items of evidence you want to present?"
(R.T., 3-8-10, p. 25,1.25 through p. 58,l. 10). When appellant indicated he
had no further documentary evidence, the Court asked the prosecutor if
there was any rebuttal case and, being informed that there was none,
proceeded to explain that closing arguments would be the next order of
business. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 58,l. 9-27). Defendant was never asked if he
had witnesses to present in his own defense or if he wanted to testify but,
and this is somewhat ironic, the prosecution was offered the opportunity to
re-open its case after appellant had started his final argument. (R.T., 3-8-
10, p. 59,l. 11 through p. 61,l. 4). In addition, at no time did the trial judge
ask the appellant if he wanted his marked and identified exhibits moved
into evidence and, consequently, only Defendant's exhibits 7 and 8 were
received and made a part of the record. The prosecutor's proffered
documentary evidence was marked, identified and received into evidence.
Most of the appellant's arguments at trial rested on the
concept that the stop of his vehicle by Sergeant Hunter was an illegal anest
and not a mere detention. While making the vehicle stop, appellant was
told by Sergeant Hunter that he was not under arrest but he could not leave
until he signed the citation to appear. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 43,l. 18 tl~roughp.
44,1.6 and p. 48,l. 20-24) Sergeant Hunter did not have a wanant to arrest
or detain the appellant. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 48,l. 11-19) The scope of the stop
(and whether or not it was merely a detention or an actual arrest) cannot be
detel-inined from the evidence because appellant did not testify. Appellant
admitted to Sergeant Hunter that he did not have a valid driver's license.
(R.T., 3-8-10, p. 33,l. 13 -23). Sergeant Hunter admitted that he searched
the appellant's vehicle without consent. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 44 1. 20 -28.)
Appellant could have testified on the scope and duration of the detention
but was never given an opportunity to do so. While the trial judge asked
 appellant if he had "any other items of evidence", he never asked the
defendant if he had witnesses or if he would be testifying himself. (R.T. 3-
8-10, p. 58,l. 9 -13) Upon conclusion of the prosecution's case,
documentary evidence was submitted by the appellant and then argument
was invited. Defendant was never sworn to testify as a witness at any stage
of the trial nor did he testify.
In his final argument, the appellant argued that his detention/airest
on October 29,2009 was violative of the Fourth Amendment, that there
was no criminal jurisdietion to enforce the traffic laws which were
essentially civil and that the tsial court did not have jurisdiction of the
subject matter of his case. The trial judge acknowledged that the
appellant's arguments were akin to an oral motion to suppress pursuant to
51538.5 of the Penal Code hut found that no motion had been timely made
before trial. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 89,l. 9- 17). The tsial judge also indicated
that, based on the record before him, he would probably deny the motion if
it was properly before him. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 89,l. 9- 17).
The appellant made numerous attempts to get Sergeant Hunter to
state the authority under which he had detained and searched appellant on
October 29; 2009 but &s not able to get an answer as his questions were
deemed to have called for legal conclusions. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 35,l. 21
throughp. 38., 1. 14).
Appellant complained to the trial judge that he was being denied the
assistance of counsel in his case and the trial judge responded by telling
him that it was not possible for him [the trial judge] to countermand the
decisions of "anotherjudge of equal stature". (R.T. 3-8-10, p.19, 1. 26
through p. 20,l. 25.)
 WAS IT ERROR FOR THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE
NOT TO SUA SPONTE ASIC THE PRO PER DEFENDANT
IF HE M7ANTEDTO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN DEFENSE?

It was st~uchlralerror in the trial of this case not to afford the

appellant the opport~~nity
to testify in his own defense. The record shows
that the appellant had willingly given up his right to remain silent under the
Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees "con~pulsoryprocess
for obtaiuing witnesses" in favor of the accused. In Arizona v. F~rlrm~~mlfe
(1991) 499 US.279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 332, "trial"
en-ors were found to be subject to the CI~apnzunharmless error standard.
Clzrpina~~
v. Califor.izia (1967) 386 US 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705. Examples of
"struchral errors" whicb are per se reversible, include total deprivation of
the right to counsel at trial, trial before a biased judge, unlawful exclusion
of members of the defendant's race fiom the grand jury, denial of the self-
representation right at trial, and denial of public trial. 6 WITCRIM Ch.
XVII, § 20. It would seem that not affording a criminal defendant his right
to testify in his own defense would constitute a structural error which was
reversible per se and not subject to the harmless error rule of Chapman,
supra. The right to testify in one's own behalf is as fundamental as the
right to remain silent. A harmless enor determination on the facts of this
case would be tantamount to saying the defendant didn't have his day in
court and the deprivation of the right to testify is of no consequence.
Pursuant to Penal Code $1044, it is the "duty of the judge to
contsol all proceedings during the trial". Section 320 of the Evidence Code
states that "Except as otherwise provided by law, the court in its discretion
shall regulate the order of proof '. Section 607 of the Code of Civil
Procedure sets forth the suggested order of proceedings in civil and
 criminal trials. The object of these statutes is to give the judge wide
discretion in providing a fair and impartial trial. In the case In re Estate of
H o i - I ~ ,265
I Z Cal.App.2d 796, 71 Cal.Rptr. 780 (CaLApp. 1968) the
following language appears with respect to the exercise of the court's
discretion in conducting a trial:
"A party is entitled to have received in evidence and
considered by the court, before findings are made, all
competent, relevant and material evidence on any material
issue, and while it is within cowt's sound discretion to define
the issues and direct the order of proof, the court may not
act so as t o preclude a party from adducing competent,
material and relevant evidence which tends to prove or
disprove any material issues."

Even though the trial judge was courteous, patient and attentive to
what he thought were erroneous arguments being put forth by appellant at
trial of this case, the appellant was effectively denied his rights under the
First and Sixth Amendment to give testimony in his own behalf. Even
though the failure to ask defendant if he wanted to testify or the failure to
inform him that it was his time to testify (if he wanted) was most likely
inadvertent, the failure was structural error and is reversible per se.
ZI,
DID THE HONORABLE MONIQUE LANGHORNE-JOHNSON
COMMIT ERROR BY NOT CONSIDERING SUA SPONTE
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH AS EITHER A COMMON
LAW SUPPRESSION MOTION OR A MOTION IN ARREST OF
JUDGMENT?

The appellant's Motion To Quash under Code of Civil Procedure

$418.10 which was filed on December 7,2009 argued that the Court had no
jurisdiction to proceed against appellant and that his seizure in a traffic stop
without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Appellant brought this civil motion
because he believed (based upon his reading of the law) that Vehicle Code
infractions are not "public offenses" punishable under the Penal Code. It is
appellant's position that the offenses for which he was charged are offenses
punishable only under the California Vehicle Code and not subject to the
Penal Code. +.

Defendant could have testified (had he been given the opportunity)

that the duration of his detention by Sergeant Hunter exceeded the scope
required to ticket him and involved two searches of his vehicle even though
he had already (as the evidence at the trial confirms) admitted that be had
no license and the vehicle registration had expired. Even though he knew
the vehicle was not registered and appellant had told him that his license
had expired, Sergeant Hunter searched appellant's vehicle anyway.
The procedure for arvests for traffic violations is set forth in $40300
of the Vehicle Code and that section controls whether a person may be
arrested when driving. '-Section 12801.5 (e) of the Vehicle Code provides
that "Notwithstanding Section 40300 or any other provision of law, a peace
officer may not detain or arrest a person solely on the belief that the person
is an u~llicenseddriver, unless the officer has reasonable cause to believe
the person driving is under the age of 16 years." The case of People v.
Wolzlleben 261 Cal.App.2d 461, 463 (Cal.App.2.Dist.1968) confirms the
autonomy of theVehicle Code and the principle that arrests without
wanant for Vehicle Code violations are allowed only in limited situations:

"The trafGc violation for which defendant was stopped could

not provide the basis for a lawful arrest. Procedure on arrests
for traffic violations is specified in division 17, chapter 2 of
the Vehicle Code commencing with section 40300. Section
40300 of the Vehicle Code provides: "The provisions of this
chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests for
violations of this code without a warrant for offenses
committed in their presence, but the procedure prescribed
 herein shill not otlwwise be exclusive of any other method
prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person
for an offense of like grade." (Italics added.) A statute is to be
construed where possible to give effect to all of its temls.
(Code Civ. Proc., 3 1858.) The insertion of the word
"othenvise" in the second clause of section 40300 can only
mean that to the extent stated in the first clause the arrest
procedure of the Vehicle Code is exclusive. (See People v.
hfaggiorn, 207 Cal.App.2d Supp. 908, 91 1 [24 Cal.Rptr.
6301.) Thus, although it is a misdemeanor for any person to
violate a provision of the Vehicle Code unless the violation is
expressly described by the code to be a felony or an offense
punishable as a felony or misdenleanor ($ 40000, subd. (a)),
the procedure on arrests without a warrant for misdemeanor
Vehicle O d e violations is that prescribed by the Vehicle
Code and not the procedure prescribed by the Penal Code.
(Pen. Code, $ 833 et seq.)

In addition, $4 of the Vehicle Code provides that the comnlon law in

existence at the time of adoption of the Vel~icleCode was not abrogated.
The appellant's Motion to Quash should have been considered on its merits
by COMMISSIONER LANGHORNE-JOHNSON and it was prejudicial
error not to consider the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to determine
whether or not appellant's detention by Sergeant Hunter was impermissible.
Even 319.7 of the
..
Penal Code which states that "all provisions of
law relating to misdemeanors shall apply to infractions" cannot save the
court's jurisdiction because that statute begins with "Except as otherwise
provided by law" which would mean the Vehicle Code would be the law
determinative of the Court's jurisdiction.
Appellant's Motion To Quash was in effect a common law motion to
suppress which exists independently of Penal Code $1538.5. An
evidentiary hearing should have been conducted on the Motion To Quash
on December 22,2009 and the Court should have ruled on whether or not
the appellant was illegally detained and anested as well as the question of
the court's jurisdiction.
Courts often entertain motions that are not properly denominated and
take evidence and arg~urnenton those misnamed motions in accordance with
their legal effect. Most courts do not exalt form over substance. For
instance, an iinpermissible motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
in a criminal trial was treated as a n~otionin arrest of judgment under $ 1185
of the Penal Code. People v. Mo~gan(App. 3 Dist. 1977) 141 Cal.Rptr.
863,75 Cal.App.3d 32. In that case, a judgment of acquittal was entered
after the jury (which had been dismissed) had fo~unddefendant guilty of
manslaughter on a charge barred by the statute of limitations. In the case at
bar, it would have been appropriate to treat the Motion To Quash as a
common law suppression motion in view of the fact that it was propounded
by a self-represented party and such treatment would have been fair and
just in the circumstances.
COlMMISSIONER LANGHORNE-JOHNSON could also have
considered the appellant's motion to quash as a motion in arrest of
judgment pursuant to Penal Code 5 1185 because it attacked the jurisdiction
of the court to proceed on grounds other than those listed in Penal Code
$1004. Section 1186 of the Penal Code gives the court discretion to anest
judgment sua sponte at any appropriate time in the proceedings.
Therefore, appellant's motion can also be viewed as an appropriate request
to arrest judgment.
I/
 DID THE HONORABLE STEPHEN T. ICROYER ERR IN NOT SUA
SPONTE TREATING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH AS
EITHER A COMMON LAW SUPPRESSION MOTION OR A
MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT?^

The appellant's main argument in his Motion To Quash and at trial

was that Sergeant H~mter'sdetaining him was an impermissible arrest for a
Vehicle Code infraction, i. e., V.C. $4000 (a), unregistered vehicle. His
pretrial motion to quash should have been considered a common law
motion to suppress as has been argued in the previous section of this brief.
A motion to su<press can be made during trial. Subdivision (11) of
section 1538.5 of the Penal Code provides a defendant shall have the right to
make a motion to suppress evidence during trial if, prior to trial, 'opportunity for
this motion did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the
motion.' People v. Martinez 14 Cal.3d 533, 537, 535 P.2d 739, 741, 121
Cal.Rptr. 61 1, 613 (Cal. 1975). The trial judge did not consider the
appellant's motion to quash as a common law motion to suppress which
should have been luled on prior to trial. Because the motion to qr~ashhad
never been addressed on its merits, the appellant could raise the suppression
issue and was entitled to have the court decide the issue at trial. There was
no pretrial discovery provided by the prosecution which would inform the
defendant that Sergeant Hunter would admit to knowing the vehicle was
unregistered and appellant unlicensed and searching appellant's vehicle
without consent after having already acquired such knowledge. These
admissions were all new facts that the appellant only learned of during
cross-examination at trial. Based on these facts, the appellant was entitled
to renew his motion to suppress1 motion to quash. The trial judge saw
clearly that the tenor of the appellant's motion to qnash was suppression of
the evidence based on illegal search and seizure of appellant.
 In addition, the trial judge could have treated the motion to quash as
a motion in arrest of judgment and sua sponte arrested judgment pursuant to
sections 1185 and 1186 of tbe Penal Code. This would have been
appropriate at any stage of the trial.
IV.
-

In People v. Suva (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 935, it was held that
Vehicle Code infractions are not crimes.
The trial judge cited 5 19.7 of the Penal Code for the proposition that
infractions under the Vehicle Code are subject to the same treatment as
misdemeanors under the Penal Code. This was erroneous because the
beginning language of that section states that such treatment can be had
only as "Except as otherwise provided by law.. ." The California Vehicle
Code 5 40300.5 provicks that an arrest without a warrant can only be
effected in certain circuinstances:

In addition to the authority to make an arrest without a

warrant pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of
Section 836 of the Penal Code, a peace officer may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when the officer has reasonable cause
to believe that the person had been driving while under the
influence of an alcoholic beverage or any di-ug, or under the
combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and any drug
when any of the following exists:
(a) The person is involved in a traffic accident.
(b) The person is observed in or about a vehicle that is
obstructing a roadway.
(c) The person will not be apprehended unless immediately
arrested.
(d) The person may cause injury to himself or herself or
damage property unless immediately arrested.
 (e) The person may destroy or conceal evidence of the crime
unless immediately
.. aixested.

Applying the maxim "expressio unio et exclusio alterius" to the

above statute, the Vehicle Code can be seen to have expressly detailed
when an aixest without a warrant can be made and, having done such,
excludes the appellant's situation. Sergeant Hunter was not entitled to
search and arrest appellant pursuant to any authority granted in the Penal
Code. The trial judge's assertion that P. C. $19.7 was controlling was error.
Vehicle Code infractions, unless otherwise specified in the Vehicle Code ,
cannot provide a peace officer with the right to aiuest or search a motorist.
TWieii Sergeant Hunter ..stopped appellant for no valid registration, he was
only entitled to write the ticket for which appellant was stopped.
v,
ASSUMING THAT VEHICLE CODE INFRACTIONS ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO THE PENAL CODE, WAS THE DEFENDANT'S
DETENTION VIOLATIVE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS
AN ARREST WITOUT WARRANT?

It is hornbook law that, when an aixest or search is made without a

wanant, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the arrest was
legal or the search was reasonable. People v. Holglriij (1956) 145 Cal. App.
2d. 520. The evidenceat trial showed that Sergeant Hunter was told the
defendant had no license and knew the vehicle was not registered. Despite
this inforination, he searched. Sergeant Hunter searched even though he
admitted at trial he had no consent to search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment rights of the appellant. ( SeePeople. v. Honmtlr (1982) 127
Cal. App. 3d 398.) The search was unreasonable. He could have just
written the ticket and left the appellant alone without violating his rights.
 Compounding the obvious illegality of the search was the fact that
the defendant, for whatever reason, was deprived of the opportunity to
testify to the facts of the search as known to him. Had appellant been able
to testify, the trial result may well have been different as the trial judge may
have indulged the hearing of the untimely motion to suppress because
justice and fairness would have been served by such action.

>
.
VI.

DID THE PROSECUTION PROVE THAT SERGEANT HUNTER

AS A DEPUTY SHERIFFHADTHE AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE
TRAFFIC LAWS IN AMERICAN CANYON?

At trial, appellant asked many questions attempting to deternline

Sergeant H~~nter's
knowledge of the procedures that he was entitled to use
in enforcing the Vehicle Code. Most of these questions met sustained
objections on the basis that they called for legal conclusions on the part of
Sergeant Hunter. (R.T., 3-8-10, p. 34,l. 21 thronghp. 38,l. 14). This line
of q~~estions
was completely appropriate because it was designed to
detemine how a deputy Sheriff was entitled to enforce the traffic laws of a
city.
Generally, a County Sheriff does not have authority lo enforce the
traffic laws in nlunicipal areas. Such authority must be legally delegated
and appellant's questions were designed to elicit whether such delegation
had occulred and the actual authority of Sergeant Hunter to stop him for a
Vehicle Code infraction. California Government Code § 26613 provides
that "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 29601 the board of
supervisors in a couuty..having a population in excess of 3,000,000 may
authorize the sheriff to enforce the provisions of the Vehicle Code in the
unincorporated area of such county but only upon county highways.. . "
 There was no proof that Sergeant Hunter was entitled to enforce the
Vehicle Code in Alilerican Canyon except his statenlent that the Sheriffs
Depaltlnent was under Contract with the City of American Canyon to
provide police services.

CONCLUSION
The appellant was denied his day in court on at least two occasions.
First, on December 22, 2009, his motion to quash was denied by
Commissioner Langhome-Johnson and he was not accorded an evidentiary
hearing. While the motion to quash appeared peculiar (a civil motion filed
in a criminal action), its gravamen was entirely appropriate and the motion
C,

raised legitimate issues for consideration by the Court. The Court should
have exercised its discretion to hear and decide the motion to quash either
as a common law motion to suppress, a Penal Code 51538.5 motion or a
motion in arrest of judgment.
Second, at his trial on March 8,2010, defendant did not testify in his
own defense. The right to testify for one's self in a criminal case is a
fundamental right. It was the duty of the trial judge to protect that
fimdamental right but he failed to do so. This was structural error and
undermines any confidence in the justness and fairness of appellant's hial.
The verdict of guilty 0x1 Counts 2 and 3 should be set aside and the case
remanded for filrtlier proceedings which protect the fully panoply of
appellant's rights. Such findings should be included in the remittitt~ras the
Appellate Department deems meet and proper.
Dated: 8-23-10

Attorney at Law
 CERTIFICATION OF NUMBER OF WORDS IN BRIEF

I, DON E. LAUGHRIDGE, certify and declare that the foregoing

brief contains 4768 words not including this page or the PROOF OF
PERSONAL SERVICE attached hereto. Said word count was achieved on
a f~mctioningMicrosoft Word program.
I, DON E. LAUGHRIDGE, declare under penalty of perjury of the
laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that
this certification was signed by me on August 23,2010.

DON E. LAUGHRIDGE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
 PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE
I, DON E. LAUGHRIDGE, declare:

I am a citizen of the United States and am over the age of eighteen (18)
years. I am not a party t o this action. My business address is:

DONE. LAUGHRIDGE, Attorney at Law, 833 Franklin St., Suite 4, Napa, Ca.
94559.

On August 23,2010, I served the APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF

in appellate action number CR 151673 of the Napa Superior Court on the
following persons and/or entities, by personally delivering copies thereof to
them at the addresses indicated below and giving the document to a person of
suitable age and discretion who was authorized to receive service:

NAPA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

931 Parkway Mall
Napa, Ca. 94559

HONORABLE STEPHEN T. KROYER

Criminal Courts Building
1111Third St.
Napa, Ca. 94559

HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MONIQUE LANGHORNE-JOHNSON

Crimninal Courts Building
1111Tlurd St.
Napa, Ca. 94559

I, DON E. LAUGHRIDGE, declare under penalty of peljury of the laws

of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct except as to tliose
matters which are herein alleged on information and belief and, as to those
matters, I believe them to be true. This declaration was executed by me on
August 23,2010, at Napa, California.

DON E. LAUGHRIDGE