Villareal v People

Facts:
 Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law have been initiated
by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The initiation rites started when the
neophytes were met by some members of the mentioned fraternity at the lobby of the Ateneo Law
School. They were consequently brought to a house and briefed on what will be happening during
the days when they will be initiated. They were informed that there will be physical beatings and
that the neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were brought to another house to commence
their initiation.
 The neophytes were insulted and threatened even before they got off the van. Members of the
fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as they alighted from the van. Several initiation rites
were experienced by the neophytes like the Indian run, Bicol express and rounds. They were
asked to recite provisions and principles of the fraternity and were hit everytime they made a
mistake.
 Accused fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked the head of the initiation rites (Victorino)
to reopen the initiation. Fraternity members subjected neophytes to paddling and additional
hours of physical pain. After the last session of beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that
night, he was feeling cold and his condition worsened. He was brought to the hospital but was
declared dead on arrival.
 Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized with reclusion perpetua.
 CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. 19 of
the the accused were acquitted, 4 of the appellants were found guilty of slight physical injuries,
and 2 of the accused-appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide.

Whether Villareal and Dizon are guilty of homicide – NO.

 As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the
two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical
injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently
been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father’s parking
space had been stolen by the victim’s father. As to Villareal, the court said that the accused
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death
of Villareal’s brother.
 We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
 The testimony of Marquez (see p577) shows that the utterances of Dizon were mistaken for those
of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CA’s primary basis
for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the
intentional felony of homicide.
 With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence
of intent to kill based solely thereon.
 As to accused Dizon, to our understanding, his way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates.
 The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. Thus,
without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the
context of the fraternity’s psychological initiation.
 Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill.
 HOWEVER

 The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all
of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death
ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
 In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code which includes homicide, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled
with dolus malus.
 If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.
 Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.
 The rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent and even after going through Aquila’s grueling
traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second
day of initiation.
 Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi (intent to
inflice physical injuries) was not present in this case.

NOW

 The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
 The collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the
resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony.
 With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim’s death was the
cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who
directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.

Other issues:

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries. – YES
 The consitution prohibits double-jeopardy.
 There is a doctrine of finality-of-acquittal that says the a verdict of acquittal is final amd a
reexamination will pit the accused in double jeopardy.
 This is not absolute. Exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a
finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.
 In relation to this, the rule of double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the
imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. Another exception is when there is a grave
abuse of discretion. AS IS IN THIS CASE.
 the CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for
slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the
 four accused “were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishmentundertaken
during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.
 Considering that the CA found that the “physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was]
serious in nature,” it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to
slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
 Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries.

NOTES:

Hindi ko alam kung bakit nasa Rape itong case. Dapat sa Hazing.

Meron discussion on Hazing sa case. See p560-568

And at the time of decision meron ng anti-hazing law pero nung commission wala pa. May
quotations from the floor deliberations. See p585 onwards.