Article # Topic # Case Facts Doctrine Inserted Cells

259 ULP of 1 Philcom Employees While negotiations were ongoing for a new cba, PEU filed with the
Employer Union v Philippine Global NCMB a Notice of Strike. This lead to the suspension of the
Communications negotiations which resulted to another strike
Parties agreed to consolidate the two notices and to maintain status
quo
However during one meeting of the representatives with the employers,
other union members staged a strike at the company premises.
Labor Sec issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute
directing the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of the Secretary's Order and for management to
resume normal operations, as well as accept the workers back under
the same terms and conditions prior to the strike.
union filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing, among others, the
authority of then Acting Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction over
the labor dispute which was denied
Unfair Labor Practive Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt, Not Bold
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers'
right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt, Not Bold
workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a Inserted Cells
CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt, Not Bold
are not unfair labor practices.23 The only exception is Article
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
248(f), which in any case is not one of the acts specified in
PEU's charge of unfair labor practice. Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
A review of the acts complained of as unfair labor practices of Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Philcom convinces us that they do not fall under any of the
prohibited acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the
Labor Code. The issues of misimplementation or non-
implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of
overtime and other monetary claims, inadequate
transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a
matter of implementation or interpretation of the economic
provisions of the CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to
the grievance procedure.

Interfering, 2 Standard Chartered Bank In August 1990, the bank and the union signed a five year CBA and In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Coercing, Employees Union v renegotiate after 3 years. Prior to the expiration of the three year period Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the
Restraining Confesor and before the 60 day freedom period, the union initiated the claim. Substantial ecidence has been defined as such
Employees negotiations. The bank gave a counterproposal. The parties agreed to relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
settle the differences in a meeting. adequate.
The non economic provisions were noted as deferred however it was
manifested that it should be changed to deadlock to indicate that it is
not yet resolved. The negotiations of the economic provisions were
commenced. Umali, the president of the union, said that the means on
how the union got what it wanted during the first negotiation of the
1987 will be applied again if needed in order to get what it wanted.
The union insisted the economic provisions however, the union
proposed that the bank make a revision of itemized proposal. On June
15, 1993 the union said that is would be best if they seek third party
assistance if the counter proposal was not revised. Afterwards, the
bank presented a counterproposal.
The union, then declared deadlock and filed a notice of strike before
NCMB. The bank filed a complaint for ULP alleging that the union did
not bargain in good faith, violated the no strike-no lockout clause, and
that the bank suffered nominal and actual damages and was forced to
litigate and hire the services of a lawyer.
The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
ordered the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions:
CBA shall be retroactive to April 1, 1993; effective for two years; the
provisions which are not expressly repealed or modified are retained
and without prejudice to the agreements as as the parties may arrive at

3 Hacienda Fatima v NLRC
in the meantime. The bank’s complaint for ULP was dismissed for lack
of merit. Both parties filed for MR to no avail.
On March 22, 1994, the parties signed the CBA.
In the course of a labor dispute between the petitioner and respondent
union, the union members were not given work for more than one
month. In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however
settled upon the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement. A
conciliation meeting was conducted wherein Luisa Rombo, Ramona
Rombo, Bobong Abrega, and Boboy Silva were not considered by the
company as employees, and thus may not be members of the union. It
was also agreed that a number of other employees will be reinstated.
When respondents again reneged on its commitment, complainants
filed the present complaint. It is alleged by the petitioners that the
above employees are mere seasonal employees.
"Indeed, from respondents' refusal to bargain, to their acts of
economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those
who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to
prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union
officials and members, one cannot but conclude that
respondents did not want a union in their hacienda—a clear
interference in the right of the workers to self-
organization." 17
We uphold the CA's affirmation of the above findings. Indeed,
factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme
Court. 18 Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight
upon appeal, especially when supported by substantial
evidence. 19 Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound to
delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the
absence of a clear showing that these were arbitrary and
bereft of any rational basis." 20

Contracting 1 Philcom Employees Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt

Out Union v Philippine Global
Services Communications
Discriminati 4 International School Private respondent International School, Inc. is a domestic educational
on Alliance of Educators v institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
Quisimbing personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to
continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard
of instruction, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-
hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and
home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. Petitioner claims that
the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory
to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination.
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
and penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a
female employee as against a male employee for work of
equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced
evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of
foreign-hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little
cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same
position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and
human experience. If the employer pays one employee less
than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why the others receive more. That would be
adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why
the employee is treated unfairly.

Retrenchme 5 Mabeza v NLRC The petitioner and her co-employees were asked by their employer to
nt sign an instrument attesting to the latter’s compliance with minimum
wage and other labor standard provision, and that they have no
complaints against the management.
petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City’s
Prosecutor’s Office to confirm the veracity and contents of the affidavit
as instructed by management.
That same day she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over
the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings in the
hotel’s premises. She then filed a leave of absence which was denied
by her employer. She attempted to return to work but the hotel’s
cashier told her that she should not report to work and instead continue
with her unofficial leave of absence. The management defended upon
a ground of loss of confidence.
Run Away 6 1. Complex Due to losses on production of the petitioner, it was constrained to
Shop Electronics Employees cease operations. In the evening of April 6, 1992, the machinery,
Association v NLRC equipment and materials being used for production at Complex were
pulled-out from the company premises and transferred to the premises
of Ionics Circuit, Inc. (Ionics) at Cabuyao, Laguna. The following day, a
total closure of company operation was effected at Complex.
A complaint was, thereafter, filed with the Labor Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC for unfair labor practice, illegal closure/illegal lockout, money
claims for vacation leave, sick leave, unpaid wages, 13th month pay,
damages and attorney’s fees. The Union alleged that the pull-out of
the machinery, equipment and materials from the company premises,
which resulted to the sudden closure of the company was in violation of
Section 3 and 8, Rule XIII, Book V of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the existing CBA. Ionics was impleaded as a party
defendant because the officers and management personnel of
Complex were also holding office at Ionics with Lawrence Qua as the
President of both companies.
The Union anchors its position on the fact that Lawrence Qua is both
the president of Complex and Ionics and that both companies have the
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden.
There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups
have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.
The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint,
interference or coercion, against his employee's right to
institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of
employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees
to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed
labor standards provisions of law when he might have not,
together with the act of terminating or coercing those who
refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme constitutes
unfair labor practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of
the hotel's workers to seek better terms and conditions of
employment through concerted action.
For refusing to cooperate with the private respondent's
scheme, petitioner was obviously held up as an example to
all of the hotel's employees, that they could only cause
trouble to management at great personal inconvenience.
Implicit in the act of petitioner's termination and the
subsequent filing of charges against her was the warning that
they would not only be deprived of their means of livelihood,
but also possibly, their personal liberty.
A “runaway shop” is defined as an industrial plant moved by Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
its owners from one location to another to escape union labor Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
regulations or state laws, but the term is also used to No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
describe a plant removed to a new location in order to
discriminate against employees at the old plant because of
their union activities. It is one wherein the employer moves its
business to another location or it temporarily closes its
business for anti-union purposes. A “runaway shop” in this
sense, is a relocation motivated by anti-union animus rather
than for business reasons.
In this case, however, Ionics was not set up merely for the
purpose of transferring the business of Complex. At the time
the labor dispute arose at Complex, Ionics was already
existing as an independent company. As earlier mentioned, it
has been in existence since July 5, 1984 (8 years prior to the
dispute). It cannot, therefore, be said that the temporary
closure in Complex and its subsequent transfer of business to
Ionics was for anti-union purposes. The Union failed to show
that the primary reason for the closure of the establishment
 same set of Board of Directors. It claims that business has not ceased
at Complex but was merely transferred to Ionics, a runaway shop. To
prove that Ionics was just a runaway shop, petitioner asserts that out of
the 80,000 shares comprising the increased capital stock of Ionics, it
was Complex that owns majority of said shares with P1,200,000.00 as
its capital subscription and P448,000.00 as its paid up investment,
compared to P800,000.00 subscription andP324,560.00 paid-up owing
to the other stockholders, combined. Thus, according to the Union,
there is a clear ground to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.
7 National Federationof National Federation of Labor Union (NAFLU) filed a request for
Labor Unions v Ople conciliation before the Bureau of Labor Relations requesting for the
intervention in its dispute with management
Several conferences were conducted by the Bureau to settle the
dispute but the management unilaterally declared a temporary
shutdown
After all efforts to mediate ULP charges, union filed notice of strike
Conciliation proved futile, union filed a complaint for ULP and even
after the expiration of the provisional shutdown, such period was
extended without notice to
Blue Sky 2 Standard Chartered Bank
Bargaining Employees Union v
Confesor
Surface 2 Standard Chartered Bank
Bargaining Employees Union v
Confesor
260 ULP of 8 Heirs of Cruz v CIR The Santiago Labor Union, composed of workers of the Santiago Rice
Labor Mill, a business enterprises engaged in the, buying. and milling of palay
Organizaito at Santiago, Isabela, and owned and operated by King Hong Co., Inc.,
ns filed before the respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) cases for
was due to the union activities of the employees.
The mere fact that one or more corporations are owned or
controlled by the same or single stockholder is not a sufficient
ground for disregarding separate corporate personalities.
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding
the separate corporate personality.
It is clear from the records of this case that the company
bargained in bad faith with the union when pending the
nehotiation of their collectige agreement, the company
declared a temporaty cessation of its operations which in
reality was an illegal lockout. Evidently, the company also
maintained run-away shop whenit started transferring its
machine first to libra and then to dolphin garments. Failure on
the part of the company to comply with the requirements of
notice and due process to the employees and the Labor
Ministry one month before the intended “closure” of the firm is
clearly against the law.
Blue sky bargaining is the act of making exaggerated or Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
unreasonable proposals. Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made
by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. The
minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its
economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and
the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees
from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines
and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.
Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
negotiating without any legal intent to reach an Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
agreement.[50] The resolution of surface bargaining
allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination
of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface
bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at
bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and
usually such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the
challenged partys conduct both at and away from the
bargaining table.[51] It involves the question of whether an
employers conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain
in good faith or is merely hard bargaining.
The Constitution enjoins the State to afford protection to Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
labor.19 Fair dealing is equally demanded of unions as well Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
as of employers in their dealings with employees.
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
 petition for overtime pay, premium pay for night, Sunday and holiday
work, and for reinstatement of workers illegally laid off. CIR favored the
union by a split decision of 3-2 vote. The case reached the Supreme
Court but the SC still favored the union. The SC remanded the records
for enforcement by respondent CIR. In examination of books, said
CIR’s Chief Examiner filed his Partial Report regarding the computation
of the benefits rendered in the case in favor of the Union.
Petitioners claim that in this computation of the Examiner did not,
include the claims of 70 other laborers whose total claims (for back
wages), at the rate of P6,300.00 each and would be P441,000.00.
Therefore, the correct. grand total amount due the laborers would be
864,756.74.
The trial judge took no action on the latest Urgent Motion of the union,
wherein it emphasized that respondent, with Court’s action rejecting its
appeal, no longer had any excuse for refusing to comply with the
deposit Order. Instead, an unscheduled conference was called and
held on October 31, 1963 in the chambers of the trial judge, and
attended by representatives of respondent firm, including their
counsels of record and the President of the union and 8 directors of the
union. Four of these nine union representatives, including the union
president himself, had no claims or awards whatever under the
judgment. Said union officials were not assisted by counsel, as
petitioner Mary Concepcion, counsel of record of the union, was not
present, not having been notified of the conference.
In this conference respondent firm made again the same offer to settle
and quitclaim the judgment in favor of the union members for the same
amount of P110,000.00, which offer had already been ‘rejected by the
union at the earlier conference held on June 25, 1963. But this time,
respondent and the directors of the union decided to settle the case
amicably with the payment by the firm of the same amount of
P110,000.00 which was deposited with the Court’s disbursing officer
“immediately upon the signing of the settlement which will be prepared
by the respondent firm through its counsel.”
One of the union director together with 49 of its members questioned
the amicable settlement that took place. They claim that the Board of
Directors did not have any express authority of the members of the
Santiago Labor Union to enter into any compromise for the sum of
P110,000.00, that it was tainted by apparent bad faith on the part of the
President of the Union, that the amount of P110,000.00 is
unconscionable, considering, that the total claims of the members of
the union is more than P400,000.00.

Union 9 Tanduay Distillery Labor Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the closed shop Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Security Union v NLRC (TDI) and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a arrangement as a form of union security. They do not Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
CLause duly organized and registered labor organization and the exclusive constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of the
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner freedom of association clause of the Constitution. There is no
 company. A CBA was executed between Tanduay Distillery Inc and TD showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of
Labor Union. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court
TDI including herein private respondents. The CBA had a term of three interpreting union security arrangements brought to us for
(3) years and also contained a union security clause, which provides: review. The action of the respondent company in enforcing
All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this Contract, the terms of the closed-shop agreement is a valid exercise of
become members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and its rights and obligations under the contract. The dismissal by
By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment, maintain virtue thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor practice, as it
membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the was in pursuance of an agreement that has been found to be
agreement. While the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar regular and of a closed-shop agreement which under our
period the private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng laws is valid and binding. As members of the TDLU, the
Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in private respondents owe fealty and are required under the
TDI, with private respondents Pedro Esteral and Lamberts Santos Union Security Clause to maintain their membership in good
being elected President and Vice-President, respectively. KAMPIL filed standing with it during the term thereof, a requirement which
a petition for certification election to determine union representation in ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period
TDI, which compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU based on their immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. When the
CBA. TDLU conducted an investigation of its erring members in private respondents organized and joined the KAMPIL
accordance with its by-laws wherein herein private respondents were Chapter in TDI and filed the corresponding petition for
present and given a chance to explain their side. A resolution was certification election in November 1980, there was no
ordered by TDLU wherein they expelled the private respondents from freedom period to speak of yet.
TDLU for disloyalty to the TDLU, whereby the latter notified TDI that
private respondents had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that
TDI terminate the employment of private, respondents because they
had lost their membership with TDLU. The private respondents then
filed with the MOLE a complaint for illegal dismissal against TDI and
Benjamin Agaloos, in his capacity as President of TDLU. The cases
were jointly heard and tried by the Labor Arbiter.
The Med-Arbiter granted the private respondents' petition calling for a
certification election among the rank and file employees of TDI. The
Med-Arbiter's Order stated, inter-alia that the existence of an
uncertified CBA cannot be availed of as a bar to the holding of a
certification election. On appeal of TDI and TDLU to the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR), the order for the holding of a certification
election was reversed and set aside.

Kampil filed a motion for reconsideration whereby the BLR ruled that it
should be given due course, because CBA has now expired, there
appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election to be
conducted among the rank and file of respondent. The contract bar rule
will no longer apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the
expiration of the contract. TDLU filed a petition for review of the BLR
decision the SC but it denied the same. Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision denying TDI's application to terminate the private respondents
and ordering TDI to reinstate the complainants with backwages. This
decision of the arbiter was upheld by the respondent NLRC.

Common 10 Salunga v CIR Petitioner is an employee of San Miguel Brewery, Inc and a member of Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Types of PAFLU.
Union Petitioner by being a member of PAFLU adheres to its collective
Security bargaining agreement that upon resignation from latter he would be
Clauses forfeiting his position in the company.
Due to open criticism by petitioner against the union, he had been
treated badly and teased by the members of the latter, which prompt
his resignation. The Union accepted the resignation and transmitted it
to the company.
The company informed petitioner of the consequence of resignation
which prompted the latter to withdraw his resignation. The union did not
accept his withdrawal and urged company to implement the collective
agreement. Petitioner notified the union that it was appealing to the
PAFLU National Convention, hence urging to defer his case pending
appeal. Notwithstanding such appeal, he was given notice of
dismissed. Hence, petitioner filed for unfair labor practice against
PAFLU, the company and etc.
The trial judge ruled that the union and company had committed unfair
labor practice, but upon motion by respondents to the CIR, the latter
reversed the decision. Hence, this appeal to the Court.
Closed 11 2. Ang Malayang Ang Tibay Inc and the Naitonal Workers Brotherhood, a registered
Shop Manggagawa ng Ang LUrepresenting its affiliate Pima concluded a bargaining agreement
Agreement TIbay Enterprises v Ang approved by the Secretary of Labor. The agreement is to run for one
TIbay year with a right to enter into a new one and more beneficial agreement
for both parties
A copy of the agreement was posted on the bulletin board for everyone
to read. Complainant then was not yet registered with the Dept of
Labor buut was later registered by Mario Paminutan. The 22
complainants herein were formerly members of the NWB and Pima
which concluded a CBA with the employer. Without first resigning from
the two unions, they joined the complaining union and the latter was
immediately registered to the DL demanding concessions for its
members thru a CBA. Employer disagreed stating that it had already
entered into an agreement with the NWB
The 22 complainants were expelled from Pima due to their non-
resignation which also resulted from their discharge from work
W/N the CBA provisions are derogatory
12 3. Lirag Textile Epifanio D. Blanco, who was employed by LITEX joined the LEA
Mills, Inc v Blanco LEA entered into its first collective bargaining agreement with LITEX for
a period of two (2) years, which was subsequently renewed for three
(3) years. The CBA contained a Union Security Clause and Union
Shop clause
Thereafter Blanco and some other employees organized another Union
and filed a petition for certification election at LITEX. In the same
voluntary associations to admit thereto any given individual,
because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as
a matter of privilege,1 the rule is qualified in respect of labor
unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a
given locality, or as regards a particular employer with which
it has a closed-shop agreement.2 The reason is that
. . . The closed shop and the union shop cause the admission
requirements of trade union to become affected with the
public interest. Likewise, a closed shop, a union shop, or
maintenance of membership clauses cause the
administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the
public interest.
Nothing in the CBA is violative of the Industrial Peace Act as Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
invoked by the complainants. It is stipulated that the employer Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
would recognize the unions as sole agent of all employees in No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
all matters which affect the relationship of management and
labor. This it is true may be considered derogatory on the part
of the members of any other labor unions of the same
employer which may discourage membership in one union as
against another and as such destroy the right of any laborer
to self organization, but while this may be true it however
finds encouragement in the same law that prohibits it for the
la wrecognizes the conclusion of a closed shop agreement.
Closed shop agreement is an agreement whereby an
employer binds himself to hire only members of the
contracting union who must continue to remain members in
good standing to keep their jobs.
There is no justifiable reason to single out BLANCO. He was Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
in an Identical position as the five other complainants. If his No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
name was not included in the list of 18 employees
recommended for dismissal it was because he had been
dismissed three days before by the company. And if he had
not been dismissed by the company, his dismissal would
have been demanded by LEA considering that he was one of
 month of April, 1964, LEA's grievance committee conducted an
investigation of its members suspected of having joined Blanco’s Union
BLANCO was dismissed by LITEX for violation of company rules and
regulations
LEA addressed a letter to LITEX recommending the immediate
dismissal of 18 members named therein, who had been found to have
violated the Union's constitution and by laws and the Revised
Collective Bargaining Agreement by joining CIALO
LITEX advised LEA of its reluctance to effect the termination from the
service of the 18 employees, and asked for reconsideration. 6 LEA
insisted on the dismissal of the 18 employees threatening to go to
Court should LITEX refuse to honor its commitment under their
collective bargaining agreement
18 employees were dismissed on different dates. They filed separate
complaints against LITEX. After investigation a case was filed for
Unfair Labor Practice against LITEX
10 Salunga v CIR
Union Shop 13 Liberty Flour Mills Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) and respondent Liberty Flour
Agreement Employees v Liberty Mills, Inc. entered into a three
Flour Mills,Inc year collective bargaining agreement. The parties agreed to establish a
union shop by imposing “membership in good standing for the duration
of the CBA as a condition for continued employment” of workers. PLA
C filed a complaint against the respondent company for non-
payment of the emergency cost of living allowance under P.D. No. 525.
A similar complaint was filed by the petitioners, who apparently were al
those investigated by LEA's grievance committee which had
approved the recommendation to dismiss them on the charge
of being members of another union.
This Court has held that closed-shop is a valid form of union
security and such provision in a collective bargaining
agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution. 10 Respondent
Court upheld the validity of the closed-shop agreement of
LEA and LITEX, when it ruled as legal the dismissal of
complainants except respondent, pursuant thereto.
Respondent Court should have also upheld as legal the
separation from the service of BLANCO on the same ground
in the face of evidence that he committed the same violation.
The closed shop and the union shop cause the admission
requirements of trade union to become affected with the
public interest. Likewise, a closed shop, a union shop, or
maintenance of membership clauses cause the
administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the
public interest.3
Consequently, it is well settled that such unions
are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify
the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the
discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to
admit to membership, without any reasonable ground
therefor.4 Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled
to admit new members, who have the requisite qualifications,
with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the
coercive power when the employee involved is a long
standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union
officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he
forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least,
invoke the rights of those who seek admission for
the first time, and can not arbitrarily he denied readmission.
It is the policy of the State to promote unionism to enable the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
workers to negotiate with management on the same level and Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually
and independently bargain for the improvement of their Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
respective conditions. To this end, the Constitution
guarantees to them the rights "to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted actions
including the right to strike in accordance with law." There is
 ready veering away from PLAC. Petitioners Evaristo and Biascan, after
organizing a union caged the Federation of National Democratic Labor
Unions, filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certificati
on election among the rank-and-
file employees of the respondent company .PLAC then expelled the tw
o for disloyalty and demanded their dismissal by the respondent compa
ny.
In the certification election held at the Liberty Flour Mills, Inc, the Ilaw a
t Buklod ng Manggagawa, with which the union organized by Biascan a
nd Evaristo was affiliated, won overwhelmingly with 441 votes as again
st the 5 votes cast for PLAC.
Maintenanc 14 Carino v NLRC Petitioner was the former president of private respondent Harrison
e of Industrual Workers. Other members of the union conducted an
Membershi investigation against him because of his grossly mismanaged union
p Clause affairs
Petitioner failed to respond to calls or invitations of the investigating
committee and during the union’s general assembly, they elected a
new set of officers
The petition of special election of officers was filed with the BLR.
Several hearings were conducted with notices to petitioner but he still
failed to appear
The union met again for Carino to be impeached. They found him to be
guilty and recommended his expulsion from the Union and termination
from employement
Union accordingly informed private respondent Harrison Industrial
Corporation ("Company") of the expulsion of petitioner Cariño from the
Union and demanded application of the Union Security Clause of the
then existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on 15 September
1987. Petitioner Cariño received a letter of termination from the
Company, effective the next day
no question that these purposes could be thwarted if every
worker were to choose to go his own separate way instead of
joining his co-employees in planning collective action and
presenting a united front when they sit down to bargain with
their employers. It is for this reason that the law has
sanctioned stipulations for the union shop and the closed
shop as a means of encouraging the workers to join and
support the labor union of their own choice as their
representative in the negotiation of their demands and the
protection of their interest vis-a-vis the employer.
Turning now to the involvement of the Company in the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
dismissal of petitioner Cariño we note that the Company upon
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
being formally advised in writing of the expulsion of petitioner
Carino from the Union, in turn simply issued a termination
letter to Cariño, the termination being made effective the very
next day. We believe that the Company should have given
petitioner Carino an opportunity to explain his side of the
controversy with the Union. Notwithstanding the Unions
Security Clause in the CBA, the Company should have
reasonably satisfied itself by its own inquiry that the Union
had not been merely acting arbitrarily and capriciously in
impeaching and expelling petitioner Cariño. From what was
already discussed above, it is quite clear that had the
Company taken the trouble to investigate the acts and
proceedings of the Union, it could have very easily
determined that the Union had not acted arbitrarily in
impeaching and expelling from its ranks petitioner Cariño.
The Company offered the excuse that the Union had
threatened to go on strike if its request had not been forthwith
granted. Assuming that such a threat had in fact been made,
if a strike was in fact subsequently called because the
Company had insisted on conducting its own inquiry, the
Court considers that such would have been prima facie an
illegal strike. The Company also pleaded that for it to inquire
into the lawfulness of the acts of the Union in this regard
would constitute interference by the Company in the
administration of Union affairs. We do not believe so.
While respondent company, under the Maintenance of
Membership prevision of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, is bound to dismiss any employee expelled by
PAFLU for disloyalty, upon its written request, this
undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily. The
company acted in bad faith in dismissing petitioner workers

Preferential Non membership due to Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an
Shop 15 religious beliefs employee of Elizalde Rope Factory and was a member of the Elizalde
Agreement 4. Victoriano v Rope Workers' Union. Membership with the Union was mandatory as
Elizalde Rope Workers provided for under a collective bargaining agreement: "Membership in
Union the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement."
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded
"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18,
1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic
Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor
organizations, the Petitioner wrote a letter informing the Union of his
resignation. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company
asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the
fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.
16 Valid termination of Complainants filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal
employment pursuant to dismissal against respondent SHellwood Industries Philippines, the
union security clause owner of the company and the former president of the union, NUguid.
5. Soriano v The union entered into a compromise with the company wherein the
Atienza company agreed to give financial assistance amounting to 20k in
consideration of the withdrawal of the Unions case filed against the
company. However in a meeting, Nuguid refused to disclose where the
Php20K went and tendered her resignation instead.
After being dormant for three months, the remaining officers convened
a meeting in order to pass resolutions affiliating the union with the NFL
and giving authority to represent the employees
A year after, Nuguid approved the expulsion of the complainants in a
general union meeting and asked the company to terminate their
without giving them the benefit of a hearing. It did not even
bother to inquire from the workers concerned and from
PAFLU itself about the cause of the expulsion of the
petitioner workers. Instead, the company immediately
dismissed the workers on May 29, 1964 — in a span of only
one day — stating that it had no alternative but to comply with
its obligation under the Security Agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement thereby disregarding the right of the
workers to due process, self-organization and security of
tenure.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be
refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining
union.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can
do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce
them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining;
and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to
join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
In view of the aforestated finding of good faith on the part of Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
the company, the Court holds that there is no factual or legal
basis for an order against the company to grant either
backwages or financial assistance in the form of separation Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
pay to petitioners. This is because under settled law and Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
jurisprudence, the company is not considered guilty of unfair No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
labor practice if it merely complied in good faith with the
request of the certified union for the dismissal of employees
expelled from the union pursuant to the union security clause
in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
 sevices which was approved
17 6. Olvidio et al v R. Olvido, Suico, and Macasinag, with the assistance of respondent
CA Antonio C. Cedilla, President of their Federation, ADFLO, filed a
complaint for illegal lay-off, illegal deductions, non-payment of overtime
pay, premium pay for holiday, service incentive leave pay, 13th month
pay, and night shift differential pay
SEU-ADFLO filed a petition for certification election on August 28,
1992. During the certification proceedings, ADFLO and Sicaltek agreed
that SEU-ADFLO will withdraw the labor case in exchange for the
company's voluntary recognition of SEU-ADFLO as the sole bargaining
agent of its employees
18 Malayang Samahan ng Petitioner MSMS, (local union) is an affiliate of ULGWP (federation). A
mga Manggagawa sa M local union election was held under the action of the federation. The
Greenfield defeated candidates filed a petition for impeachment. The local union
MGreenfield v Ramos held a general membership meeting. Several union members failed to
attend the meeting. The local union requested the company to deduct
the union fines from the wage of those union members who failed to
attend the general membership meeting. The Secretary General of the
federation disapproved the resolution imposing the Php50 fine. The
company then sent a reply to petitioner’s request stating it cannot
deduct fines without going against certain laws. The imposition of the
fine became the subject of a bitter disagreement between the
Federation and the local union culminating to the latter’s declaration of
general autonomy from the former. The federation asked the company
to stop the remittance of the local union’s share in the education funds.
The company led a complaint of interpleader with the DOLE. The
federation called a meeting placing the local union under trusteeship
and appointing an administrator. Petitioner union officers received
letters from the administrator requiring them to explain why they should
not be removed from the office and expelled from union membership.
The officers were expelled from the federation. The federation advised
the company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded
their separation pursuant to the Union Security Clause in the CBA. The
Federation filed a notice of strike with the NCMB to compel the
company to effect the immediate termination of the expelled union
officers. Under the pressure of a strike, the company terminated the 30
union officers from employment. The petitioners filed a notice of strike
on the grounds of discrimination; interference; mass dismissal of union
officers and shop stewards; threats, coercion and intimidation ; and
union busting. The petitioners prayed for the suspension of the effects
of their termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition stating it
was an intra-union matter. Later, 78 union shop stewards were placed
However, we have recently ruled that this doctrine is Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
inconsistent with Article 27910 of the Labor Code, as Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
amended by Republic Act No. 6715.11 It is now provided in No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
the Labor Code that an employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. Thus, where reinstatement is adjudged,
the award of backwages and other benefits continues beyond
the date of the Labor Arbiter's decision ordering
reinstatement and extends up to the time said order of
reinstatement is actually carried out
"the right of an employee to be informed of the charges Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side
in a controversy with either the company or his own union is
not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop
clause in a collective bargaining agreement. An employee is
entitled to be protected not only from a company which
disregards his rights but also from his own union the
leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and
arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal
from his job."
While respondent company may validly dismiss the
employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the
union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement
upon the recommendation by the union, this dismissal should
not be done hastily and summarily thereby eroding the
employees right to due process, self-organization and
security of tenure. The enforcement of union security clauses
is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not
characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due
process.[16] Even on the assumption that the federation had
valid grounds to expell the union officers, due process
requires that these union officers be accorded a separate
hearing by respondent company.
In its decision, public respondent also declared that if
complainants (herein petitioners) have any recourse in law,
their right of action is against the federation and not against
the company or its officers, relying on the findings of the
Labor Secretary that the issue of expulsion of petitioner union
officers by the federation is a purely intra-union matter.
Again, such a contention is untenable. While it is true that the
issue of expulsion of the local union officers is originally
 under preventive suspension. The union members staged a walk-out
and officially declared a strike that afternoon. The strike was attended
by violence.
261 Procedure 19 7. Cainta Catholic A CBA was entered into between Cainta Catholic School (School) and
in Collective School v CCS Employees the Cainta Catholic School Employees Union (CCSEU).
Bargaining Union The Union held an election of officers, with Llagas and Javier being
elected as President and Vice-President respectively.
Subsequently, the School retired Llagas and Javier, who had rendered
more than 20 years of continuous service, pursuant to Section 2,
Article X of the CBA, to wit:
An employee may be retired, either upon application by the employee
himself or by the decision of the Director of the School, upon reaching
the age of 60 or after having rendered at least 20 years of service to
the School the last 3 years of which must be continuous.
3 days later, the Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB. Later, the
Union struck and picketed the School’s entrances.
ISSUE: Was the forced retirement of Llagas and Javier a valid exercise
of management prerogative?
20 8. Rivera v PAL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was
Espiritu faced with bankruptcy and was forced to adopt a rehabilitation plan and
downsized its labor force by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees
Association) went on a four-day strike to protest retrenchment
measures in July 1998. PAL ceased operations on Sep 23, 1998.
PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among
others, it proposed the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period
of ten years, subject to certain conditions. PALEA members accepted
such terms through a referendum on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed
domestic operations on Oct 7, 1998.
Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul
the Sep 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.
Issue: WON negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.
between the local union and the federation, hence, intra-
union in character, the issue was later on converted into a
termination dispute when the company dismissed the
petitioners from work without the benefit of a separate notice
and hearing. As a matter of fact, the records reveal that the
the termination was effective on the same day that the the
termination notice was served on the petitioners.
YES. Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a
voluntary agreement between the employer and the Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
employee whereby the latter after reaching a certain age
agrees and/or consents to sever his employment with the
former.
By their acceptance of the CBA, the Union and its members
are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they
had agreed to cede to management. The questioned
retirement provisions cannot be deemed as an imposition
foisted on the Union, which very well had the right to have
refused to agree to allowing management to retire retire
employees with at least 20 years of service.
We can thus can comfortably uphold the principle, as
reiterated in Philippine Airlines, that the exercise by the
employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire
an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice.
YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years. Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the
light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer,
with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting
industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latter’s closure.
There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-
A of the Labor Code. CBA under Article 253-A of the Labor
Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial
stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement
sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its
rehabilitation, said agreement satisfied the first purpose of
said article. The other purpose is to assign specific timetable,
wherein negotiations become a matter of right and
requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties
from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetable and
agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.
21 Kiok Loy v FACTS:
On Oct 3, 1978 the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa a LLO won in
the certification election and subsequently certified in a resolution by
the BLR as the sole bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of
Sweden Ice Cream Plant. The company’s MR was denied.
On Dec 7, 1978 the union furnished the company of its proposal for the
CBA and requested for a counterproposal to no avail. Two subsequent
requests were made but itbwere ignored and remained unacted byt the
company. The union then filed a notice of strike with the BLR based on
the ground of unresolved economic issues in the CBA.
Conciliation proceedings were made but the amicable settlements
failed. Compulsory arbitration was resorted however the parties failed
to submit position papers then there were subsequent postponements
and resets of the hearing. Upon the submission of the union of its
position paper, itbwas again reset to another date, the company filed its
position paper on May 28, 1979.
There were postponements again.
The labor arbiter submitted a report to NLRC and declared that the
company is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain. The draft agreement
submitted was found to be reasonable under the premises.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the company violated its duty to bargain.
HELD:
The SC found that there was a valid cause to complain
against the company.
Collective bargaining is the negotiations towards a collective
agreement, democratic frameworks designed to stabilize the
relations between the labor and management and to create a
climate of sound and stable industrial peace.
It is a mutual responsibility of both parties, however, the
employer is not under the obligation of initiating contract
negotiation.
Jurisdictional preconditions:
1) status of majority representation of the employees
2) proof of majority
3) demand to bargain
The three JP enumerated above were proved by the union.
A company’s refusal to make counter proposal may indicate
bad faith and especially true when left unanswered. The
undue delay during the compulsory arbritration leads to no
other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and
reach an agreement.
Additional notes:
1. Collective bargainingis a mutual responsibility and legal
obligation of the employer and the Union. Under Article 249,
par.(g) of the Labor Code, it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other
terms and conditions of employment including proposals for
adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an
agreement and executing a contract incorporating such
agreement, if requested by either party.
2. The employer is not duty-bound to initiate contract
negotiations. The collective bargaining process is set in
motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions
are present, namely,
(1) possession of the status of majority representation of the
employees' representative thorugh any of the means of
selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the
New Labor Code.
All these preconditions are present in the present case.
3. The totality of the conduct of the Company shows

CBA is a 22 Holy Cross of Davao v In 1997, the parties agreed in a CBA the granting of scholarships for
Binding HCD Faculty Union academic teaching personnel.
Contract One of the teachers applied for a scholarship grant abroad and was
accepted. However, the petitioner granted her 12 months study leave
without pay instead of her requested study leave with grant-in aid
equivalent to 18 months allowance. Before she left for Japan, she
asked help from respondent union.
Issue: whether petitioner should be obliged to grant Jean Legaspi a
grant-in aid considering that she failed to comply with the substantive
requirements set forth in their CBA, such as (1) that the course is within
her area of competence; and (2) that she will acquire higher academic
degree; and that the Monbusho scholarship is a non-degree program
disregard of, and failure to live up to the duty to bargain in
good faith. It is guilty of unfair labor practice. Despite union
being a a certified bargaining agent and having filed twice a
request to bargain, the Company did not answer or act on
such. , nor did the COmpany make any counter-proposal ==
all these indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. The
COmpany continued even during the compulsory arbitration
stage: it stalled negotitation with repeated postponements;
non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay
in submitting its financial statements. All these show its
unwillingness to negotiate and reach an agreement with the
Union.
The actuations of the Company run counter ti the policy
enshrined in the New Labor Code towards expediting
settlement of economic disputes.
On its claim that the Collective Bargaining Agreement
approved and adopted by the NLRC is a total nullity for lack
of the company's consent, and itr argument that once the
Collective Bargaining Agreement is implemented, the
Company will face the prospect of closing down because the
amount of economic benefits it has to pay the Union will
equal or exceed its capital: it should have presented its stand
before the Labor Arbiter .
Neither party is compelled to accept or agree to the proposals
of the other. But an erring party cannot be allowed the
impunity feign negotiations by going through empty gestures.
The case was certififed to the NLRC after conciliation efforts
failed. This Court must accord deference to its findings of
reasonableness of any Collective Bargaining Agreement by
the employees and management .
No. Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
According to the provisions of the CBA, Management shall
grant to all academic personnel a grant-in-aid program,
where the academic teaching personnel, whenever
scholarship opportunities should arise, be afforded a leave of
absence to further their studies in Institutions of Higher
Learning with a grant-in-aid equivalent to their salary and
allowance .
Academic teaching personnel, like Jean Legaspi, as recipient
of a scholarship grant are entitled to a leave of absence with
a grant-in-aid equivalent to their monthly salary and
 outside her area of competence (English)
Purpose of Union of Filipro Before impending expiration of the existing CBA between Nestlé and U
CB 23 Employees-Drug, Food FE-DFA-
and Allied Industries KMU, a Letter of Intent, informed Nestlé of their intent to open new Coll
Unions-KMU v Nestle ective Bargaining Negotiation for the next 3 years. Nestlé acknowledge
Philippines (2006) d receipt of the letter and informed that it was preparing its own counter
- to the union, though Nestlé underscored its position that “unil
proposal. In another letter, Nestlé underscored its position that “unilater
al grants, one-time company grants, company-
initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the
Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premiu
m, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and
therefore shall be excluded therefrom.” On despite 15 meetings betwe
en them, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CB
A. So, the company requested the NCMB to conduct preventive mediat
ion proceedings between them. Conciliation proceedings nevertheless
proved ineffective.
The union argued that Nestlé’s “refusal to bargain on a very important
CBA economic provision constitutes unfair labor practice” when it alleg
edly set as a precondition for the holding of collective bargaining negoti
ations the non-inclusion of the issue of Retirement Plan.
ISSUE: Whether or not a company is guilty of unfair labor practice whe
n it considers some economic benefits as unilaterally granted and there
fore excluded from CBA negotiations.
24 2008 case UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank and file employees of Nestle belonging to the latter’s Alabang and
cabuyao plants. Despite 15 meetings, the parties failed to reach any
agreement on the proposed CBA. The union filed for ULP
Issue: was there ulp?
allowance, provided such grant is to promote their
professional growth or to enhance their studies in institutions
of higher learning. Such provisions need no interpretation for
they are clear. Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be
interpreted according to their literal meaning and not beyond
their obvious intendment.
No. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in holding Nestlé Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
free and clear from any unfair labor practice. It is not enough Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
that the union believed that the employer committed acts of u
nfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate ev
en a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief. In its letter
ateral grants, one-time company grants, company-
initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limi
ted to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and
Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subj
ects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded ther
efrom,” such attitude is not tantamount to refusal to bargain.
This is especially true when it is viewed in the light of the fact
that eight out of nine bargaining units have allegedly agreed t
o treat the Retirement Plan as a unilateral grant. Nestlé, there
fore, cannot be faulted for considering the same benefit as un
ilaterally granted. To be sure, it must be shown that Nestlé w
as motivated by ill will, “bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive
to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good custo
ms, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, w
ounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x x x” in disclaimin
g unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective bargai
ning negotiations.
Employers are accorded rights and privileges to assure their
self-
determination and independence and reasonable return of ca
pital. This mass of privileges comprises the so-
called management prerogatives. In this connection, the rule i
s that good faith is always presumed. As long as the compan
y’s exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interes
t and not for purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights
of employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exerci
se will be upheld.
No.
The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an
agreement resulting in a contract binding upon the parties;
but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have
continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of
good faith. The duty to bargain does not include the

Procedures 25 9. General Milling In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner
for CB Corp v Ca General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were
all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation
Independent Labor Union. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union
concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the
issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The day
before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA,
with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10)
days. However, GMC had received collective and individual letters from
workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union
membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal
differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to
negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.
On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the union’s officers, Rito
Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was
no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that
management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on
matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the
company may improve its operations. In answer, the union officers
wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive
disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto,
signed by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the
union.
NLRC held that the action of GMC in not negotiating was ULP.
ISSUE: WON the company (GMC) should have entered into collective
bargaining with the union
obligation to reach an agreement.
There is no showing that ULP was committed by Nestle. It is
not enough that the union believed that there is ULP on the
part of their employer which constitutes ULP
The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
should last for five years. The relation between labor and
Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union
requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the
CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective
bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said
renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity
of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The union’s proposal was
also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the
date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of
said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to
refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing
to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew
on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed
an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. –
Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may
enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is
concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining
agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall
be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment
outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of
expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3)
years after its execution….
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
labor practice:
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by
this Code;
Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to
perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly
and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it
presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3)
years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed
in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a
flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and
the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.

26 Colegio De San Juan De During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective
Letran v Association of Bargaining Agreement with the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as
Employees and Faculty of the newly elected President of the union. Ambas wanted to continue
Letran the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao,
claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties.
However, the union members rejected the said CBA. Thereafter,
petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before
the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner. This
decision was reversed on appeal with the NLRC.
The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start
negotiation on new five-year CBA. During the pendency of approval of
proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being
changed. Ambas protested and requested management to submit the
issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA.
After the petitioner’s inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to
strike. After meeting with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for
renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her for alleged
insubordination. The petitioner then ceased negotiations when it
received news that another labor organization had filed a petition for
certification.
The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment
ordered them to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment later rendered judgement that
the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.
Issue(s):
ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. – The following
procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall
serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement
of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto
not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
notice.
GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals
presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest
in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union
no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it
turned out to be utterly baseless.
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a
reply to the union’s proposals, GMC violated its duty to
bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.
The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.
The petitioner’s failure to act upon the submitted CBA
proposal within the ten-day period exemplified in Article 250
of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing
procedure of collective bargaining. As the Court has held in
Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the company’s refusal to make counter-
proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an indication of bad
faith. Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs
that the petitioner had merely been employing delaying
tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA. Moreover, in
order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining
process, there must be a valid petition for certification
election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the
mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso
facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer.
The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the
Court to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order
to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of
her co-workers in the bargaining table. While the Court
recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the services
of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless,
the dismissal of employees must be made within the
parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair
play. Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of
insubordination, such disobedience was not a valid ground to
terminate her employment. When the exercise of the
management to discipline its employees tends to interfere
with the employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to
union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.
 Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to
bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing
negotiations for a new CBA; and
Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an
interference of the employees’ right to self-organization.

Good Faith 23 Union of Filipro Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt

Bargaining Employees-Drug, Food Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
and Allied Industries
Unions-KMU v Nestle
Philippines (2006)
262 Jurisdiction 21 10. Kiok Loy doing Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
al business under the name Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Preconditio and style of Sweden Ice
ns in Cream v NLRC Formatted: Normal, Space After: 0 pt, Line spacing: single,
No bullets or numbering, Tab stops: Not at 0.5"
Collective
Bargaining
27 Associated Labor Unions -Several days before the expiration of the CBA between petitioner ALU 1. NO
v Ferrer-Calleja and the Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation Reasoning in cases of organized establishments where there
(PASAR), private respondent National Federation of Labor Unions exists a certified bargaining agent, what is essential is
(NAFLU) filed a petition for certification election with the Bureau of whether the petition for certification election wasfiled within
Labor Relations Regional Office in Tacloban city. the sixty-day freedom period. Article 256 of the Labor Code,
-Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that as amended by Executive Order No. 111, provides:
NAFLU failed to present the necessary signatures in support of its ART. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments.
petition. In organized establishments, when a petition questioning the
ISSUES majority status of the incumbentbargaining agent is filed
1. WON the holding of certification elections in organized before the Department within the sixty-day period before the
establishments is mandated only where a petition is filed questioning expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-
the majority status of the incumbent union, and that it is only after Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot to
establishing that a union has indeed a considerable support that a ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate
certification election should be ordered bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of
all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The
labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall
be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the unit.
When an election which provides for three or more choices
results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes
cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the
choices receiving the two highest number of votes.
Article 256 is clear. The mere filing of a petition for
certification election within the freedom period
is sufficient basis for the respondent Director to order the
holding of a certification election.
Was the petition filed by NAFLU instituted within the freedom
period? The recordspeaks for itself. The previous CBA
entered into by petitioner ALU was due to expire on April 1,

Non-posting 28 Associated Trade Unions Public Respondent Trajano as OIC of the Bureau of Labor Relations
of CBA is a v Trajano sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one
fatal defect hundred forty-one members of the “Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK), all
employed in the same company, at a certification election at which two
labor organizations were contesting the right to be the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the
Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union
Industries Corporation. The competing unions were Tri-Union
Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and
Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS).
The final tally of the votes showed the following results:
TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1,
CHALLENGED 141
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They
were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an
agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election
conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote
“because they are not members of any union and refused to participate
in the previous certification elections.”
The INK employees promptly filed a petition to cancel the election
alleging that it “was not fair” and the result thereof did “not reflect the
true sentiments of the majority of the employees.” TUEU-OLALIA
opposed the petition contending that the petitioners “do not have legal
personality to protest the results of the election,” because “they are not
members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK” which prohibits
its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor
organization . . . .”
ISSUE: W/N employees who are not part of any union may validly
exercise their right to vote in a certification election
1987. The petition for certification was filed by NAFLU on
March 23, 1987, well within the freedom period.
YES. Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the “right to Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
bargaining.” This is made plain by no less than three
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or
affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more
unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in
concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or
for their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the protection,
promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests.
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily
includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said
right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied
the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should
be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that
a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union
does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such
membership.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the
ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be
represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative
case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of
the election should disclose that the majority of the workers
do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes
must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as
the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining
unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment. The minority
employees — who wish to have a union represent them in
collective bargaining — can do nothing but wait for another
suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and
hope that the results will be different. They may not and
should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the
majority — who do not desire to have a union certified as the
exclusive workers’ benefit in the bargaining unit — upon the
plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the
right of self-organization and collective bargaining.
The respondents’ argument that the petitioners are
disqualified to vote because they “are not constituted into a
duly organized labor union” — “but members of the INK
 which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from
joining or forming any labor organization” — and “hence, not
one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and
exclusive bargaining representative,” is specious. Neither
law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only
employees affiliated with any labor organization may take
part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly
discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote
to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether
they are members of a labor organization or not.
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied
the right to vote because they “did not participate in previous
certification elections in the company for the reason that their
religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor
organizations,” persuade acceptance. No law, administrative
rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by
reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification
elections.

Posting of 27 Associated Labor Unions Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt

CBA is v Ferrer-Calleja Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Employer’s
Responsibili
ty
263 Duty to 29 Manila Mining Corp Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) is a publicly- No. Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since, as Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
bargain Employees Association v listed corporation engaged in large- ruled by the Court of Appeals, the call of MMC for a suspensi Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
collectively 26 manila Mining Corp scale mining for gold and copper ore. MMC constructed several tailings on of the CBA negotiations cannot be equated to “refusal to b
Colegio De San Juan De dams, as mandated by law, to treat and store its waste materials. One argain.” Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
25 Letran v Association of of these dams was Tailings Pond No. 7 (TP No. 7), which was was ope The Union based its contention on the letter request by MMC Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Employees and Faculty of rated under a permit issued by the DENR. for the suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations u
Letran When MMC-Makati Employees Association- ntil it resumes operations. Verily, it cannot be said that MMC
General Milling Corp v Ca Federation of Free Workers Chapter acquired its legitimate registration deliberately avoided the negotiation. It merely sought a suspe Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
status, it submitted letters to MMC relating its intention to bargain colle nsion and in fact, even expressed its willingness to negotiate
ctively. Then, CBA proposal to MMC. once the mining operations resume. There was valid reliance
Upon expiration of the tailings permit, DENR- on the suspension of mining operations for the suspension, in
EMB did not issue a permanent permit due to the inability of MMC to se turn, of the CBA negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad f
cure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Due to this, it wa aith in MMC’s actuations.
s compelled to temporarily shut down its mining operations, resulting in Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the CA that MM
the temporary lay- C’s suspension of its mining operations was bonafide and the
off of more than 400 employees in the mine site. MMC called for the su reason for such suspension was supported by substantial evi
spension of negotiations on the CBA with the Union until resumption of dence. MMC cannot conduct mining operations without a taili
mining operations. ngs disposal system. When the renewal permit was not imme
The Union insists that MMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it unil diately released by the DENR-
aterally suspended the negotiation for a CBA. They alleged that MMC d EMB, MMC was compelled to temporarily shutdown its milling
id not want to bargain collectively with the Union, so that instead of sub and mining operations. Here, it is once apparent that the sus
mitting their counterproposal to the CBA, MMC decided to terminate all pension of MMC’s mining operations was not due to its fault n
 union officers and active members.
ISSUE: Whether or not suspension of the CBA negotiations due to the t
emporary shutdown of operation is tantamount to refusal to bargain, he
nce, an unfair labor practice.
30 Stevedoring Services v Petitioner and private respondent, THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE
Abarquez UNIONS (ATU-TUCP), entered into a CBA providing for 2 sections on
sick leave with pay benefits which apply to both the regular non-
intermittent workers or those workers who render a daily eight-hour
service to the company as governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the
1989 CBA, and the intermittent field workers who are members of the
regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool, as
governed by Sec. 3 thereof.
Sec. 1, however, of said CBA had a proviso that only those regular
workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to
the commutation of sick leave privilege.A proviso not found in Sec. 3.
This caused the new assistant manager to discontinue the
commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay
benefits of the intermittent workers or its conversion to cash.
The Union objected and brought the matter for voluntary arbitration
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board with respondent
Abarquez acting as voluntary arbitrator who later issued an award in
favor of the Union. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON intermittent(irregular) workers are entitled to commutation of their
unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefits.
Boulwarism 31 Herald Delivery Carriers Respondent employer unilaterally and without notice to petitioner union
Union and PAFLU v contracted out 12 so-called independent contractors to perform the
Herald Publication Inc work done by the delivery carriers who served him bargaining
proposals.
Respondent employer never did submit an answer or reply tendering
an issue respecting the written bargaining proposal submitted by
petitioner union, and all that was mentioned in the answer of
respondent Herald Publications on the above points were to the effect
that: "When petitioners presented their bargaining proposals to
respondent company, the latter sent a reply asserting that the carriers
are independent contractors and not employees. Neither respondent
company nor its counsel promised to submit an answer or
counterproposal to the individual proposals submitted by petitioners
or was it necessitated by financial reasons. Such suspension
was brought about by the non-
issuance of a permit for the continued operation of TP No. 7
without which MMC cannot resume its milling and mining ope
rations.
Yes. Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
The CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits
which apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in
petitioner’s company, namely: (1) the regular non-intermittent
workers or those workers who render a daily eight-hour
service to the company and (2) intermittent field workers who
are members of the regular labor pool and the present
regular extra labor pool.
Sick leave benefits, like other economic benefits stipulated in
the CBA such as maternity leave and vacation leave benefits,
among others, are by their nature, intended to be
replacements for regular income which otherwise would not
be earned because an employee is not working during the
period of said leaves. They are non-contributory in nature, in
the sense that the employees contribute nothing to the
operation of the benefits. By their nature, upon agreement of
the parties, they are intended to alleviate the economic
condition of the workers.
***Notes: Petitioner-company is of the mistaken notion that
since the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of
the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits is
found in Section 1, Article VIII, only the regular non-
intermittent workers and no other can avail of the said
privilege because of the proviso found in the last sentence
thereof.
There is failure on the part of the respondent to yield Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
obedience to the law’s command that it should bargain in Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
good faith.
Nor did the adoption of a new method of distribution, even on
the assumption that it was prompted solely "by economy,
efficiency and simplicity of operations," 21 justify its refusal to
abide by a clear statutory duty. Precisely, the fact that
thereby a number of workers would as a result stand to lose
their job unless absorbed by the new distributors ought to
have led private respondent to take the matter up with the
petitioner labor unions.
An unfair labor practice having been committed, the
separation of the members of petitioner labor unions from the
service by private respondent is contrary to law. They would

264 Freedom 32 PAFLU v Estrella PAFLU filed with the CIR a petition for certification elections at Visayan
Period 28 Associated Trade Unions Glass Factory. The Cebu Central Union of the Philippines moved to
v Trajano intervene. ALU moved to dismiss stating that it already had a previous
collective agreement with the company. The latter motion was denied.
In 1968, ALU renewed the contract which was set to expire in 1971
and again moved to dismiss the petition. The case remained unsolved
and a new contract was renewed expiring in 1974.
1975, ALU appealed to this Office alleging that its contract of
November 25, 1971 still subsisted because of its automatic renewal
clause. On April 26, 1975, it filed a motion to dismiss alleging that it
had negotiated a new contract on April 15, 1975 which the National
Labor Relations Commission approved on April 11; the contract would
expire on April 4, 1979.
1975, the Bureau affirmed the Med-Arbiter's order, ruling that the
alleged contract could not bar the election because at the time it was
approved, a representative question was pending resolution. Pre-
election conference was then ordered.
ALU filed an election protest contending that the election was void
because its contract was allegedly ratified by the employees and
approved by the National Labor Relations Commission on April 11,
1975, and therefore barred the election held long after.
Bureau dismissed the protest
Automatic 26 Colegio De San Juan De The National Federation of Labor (NFL, for brevity) was certified as the
Renewal Letran v Association of sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-
Clause 33 Employees and Faculty of and-file employees of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc.
Letran (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Company). As such, NFL started
New Pacific Timber and to negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment for the
Supply v NLRC employees in the bargaining unit which it represented. However, the
same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by petitioner Company, so
that the former was prompted to file a complaint for unfair labor
practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of refusal to bargain
collectively.
Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abdulwahid issued an order
declaring (a) herein petitioner Company guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA
proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the regular rank-
and-file employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner Company.
Petitioner Company appealed the above order to the NLRC. On
November 15, 1989, the NLRC rendered a decision dismissing the
appeal for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration thereof was,
have been entitled then to reinstatement. Judicial notice can
be taken of the fact, however, that private respondent, Herald
Publications, had ceased operations as of September 23,
1972, after the declaration of martial law. That would bar
reinstatement. There it still its responsibility though for back
wages. as under the circumstances, it hardly had any choice
except to stop publication,
Med-Arbiter was not in error in issuing an order calling for a Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
certification election at the Visayan Glass Factory, Inc.
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Neither was the BLR in error when, on 22 July 1975, it
affirmed such order of the Med-Arbiter Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
It does not appear from the record of this case that the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Petition for Certification Election filed by petitioner PAFLU on
26 March 1968, did not satisfy the requirements stated in the
above provision. On the contrary, the Med-Arbiter found as a
matter of fact that said petition was supported by at least 30%
of all company employees. Consequently, it was mandatory
upon the BLR to grant the petition and, thereafter, to conduct
certification elections at the Visayan Glass Factory, Inc.
petitioner PAFLU was entitled to be certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees at the Visayan
Glass Factory, Inc
HELD: Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
1) when a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
union representing the employees and the employer, even
the non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the
contract. To accord its benefits only to members of the union Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
without any valid reason would constitute undue
discrimination against nonmembers.
the benefits under the CBA in the instant case should be
extended to those employees who only became such after
the year 1984. To exclude them would constitute undue
discrimination and deprive them of monetary benefits they
would otherwise be entitled to under a new collective
bargaining contract to which they would have been parties.
Since in this particular case, no new agreement had been
entered into after the CBA’s stipulated term, it is only fair and
just that the employees hired thereafter be included in the
existing CBA. This is in consonance with our ruling that the
 likewise, denied.
petitioner Company filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. But the
Court dismissed said petition.
the records of the case were remanded to the arbitration branch of
origin of the execution of Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid’s Order, dated
March 31, 1987, granting monetary benefits consisting of wage
increases, housing allowances, bonuses, etc. to the regular rank-and-
file employees. Following a series of conferences to thresh out the
details of computation, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo S. Villena issued an
Order, dated October 18, 1993, directing petitioner Company to pay the
142 employees entitled to the aforesaid benefits the respective
amounts due them under the CBA. Petitioner Company complied; and
the corresponding quitclaims were executed. The case was considered
closed following NFL’s manifestation that it will no longer appeal the
October 18, 1993 Order of Labor Arbiter Villena.
Petition for relief was filed and was treated as an appeal by the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the Order of the
Labor arbiter dated October 18, 1993 is hereby. Set Aside and
Vacated. Petitioner Company filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1) petitioners argues that the private respondents are not entitled to the
benefits under the CBA because employees hired after the term of a
CBA are not parties to the agreement, and therefore, may not claim
benefits thereunder, even if they subsequently become members of the
bargaining unit.
2) petitioner maintains that Article 253 of the Labor Code refers to the
continuation in full force and effect of the previous CBA’s terms and
conditions. By necessity, it could not possibly refers to terms and
conditions which, as expressly stipulated, ceased to have force and
effect.
265 Lifetime of 25 General Milling Corp v Ca
CBA
BCA 20 Rivera et al v Espiritu
extended to
terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement
continue to have force and effect even beyond the stipulated
term when no new agreement is executed by and between
the parties to avoid or prevent the situation where no
collective bargaining agreement at all would govern between
the employer company and its employees.
2) Anent the issue of whether or not the term of an existing
CB, particularly as to its economic provisions, can be
extended beyond the period stipulated therein, and even
beyond the three-year period prescribed by law, in the
absence of a new agreement, Article 253 of the Labor Code
explicitly provides:
Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a
collective bargaining agreement. — When there is a
collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate
nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However,
either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify
the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration
date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision of law that until a new
Collective Bargaining Agreement has been executed by and
between the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement. The law does not
provide for any exception nor qualification as to which of the
economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain
force and effect, therefore, it must be understood as
encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said
agreement.
In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered into by
and between petitioner Company and NFL pending appeal of
the decision in NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-0334-82; nor were
any of the economic provisions and/or terms and conditions
pertaining to monetary benefits in the existing agreement
modified or altered. Therefore, the existing CBA in its entirety,
continues to have legal effect.
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt, English (United
10 years -
valid
Exclusive 34 FVC Labor Union – Petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO signed a five-year collective bargaining No. The negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Bargaining FTGWO v Sama samang agreement with the company, which should originally run from effect on the FVCLU-PTGWO’s exclusive bargaining Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
status Nagkakaisang February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of the 3rd year of the representation status which remained effective only for five
cannot go Manggagawa sa FVC CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation years ending on the original expiry date of January 30, 2003.
beyond five of the CBA and modified, among other provisions, the CBA’s duration. While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-
years The renegotiated CBA extended the original five-year period of the year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such
CBA by four months.On January 21, 2003, nine days before the amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with
expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term, the respondent it a change in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining
SANAMA-SIGLO filed before the DOLE a petition for certification status. By express provision of Article 253-A of the Labor
election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO Code, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five
CBA. years and the representation status is a legal matter not for
FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite
certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years,
outside of the 60 days before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, either as an original provision or by amendment, the
2003. bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60)
outside the 60-day period counted from the May 31, 2003 expiry date days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years.
of the amended CBA. DOLE set aside the Med-Arbiter’s decision. She
ordered the conduct of a certification election in the company.
FVCLU-PTGWO moved for the reconsideration of the Secretary’s
decision. The Acting Secretary set aside the previous decision of the
DOLE. The Acting Secretary held that the amended CBA had been
ratified by members of the bargaining unit some of whom later
organized themselves as SANAMA-SIGLO, the certification election
applicant.
The CA found SANAMA-SIGLO’s petition meritorious on the basis of
the applicable law and the rules, as interpreted in the congressional
debates. It set aside the challenged DOLE Secretary decisions and
reinstated her earlier ruling calling for a certification election.
Issue:
Whether the negotiated extension of the CBA term has legal effect on
the FVCLU-PTGWO’s exclusive bargaining representation status which
remained effective only for five years ending on the original expiry date
of January 30, 2003

Contract 26 Colegio De San Juan De June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees 1) This new provision states that the CBA has a term of five Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Bar Rule Letran v Association of Union — PTGWO entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (5) years instead of three years, before the amendment of the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
35 Employees and Faculty of (CBA) with private respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to take law as far as the representation aspect is concerned. All
Letran effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on June 30, 1989. other provisions of the CBA shall be negotiated not later than
San Miguel Corp Effective October 1, 1991, Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division three (3) years after its execution. The “representation Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Employees Union v were spun-off and became two separate and distinct corporations: aspect” refers to the identity and majority status of the union
COnfesor Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia) and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining
Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA remained in force and effect. representative of the appropriate bargaining unit concerned.
After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the “All other provisions” simply refers to the rest of the CBA,
terms of the CBA and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Negotiations
started sometime in July, 1992 with the two parties submitting their
respective proposals and counterproposals.
During the negotiations, the petitioner-union insisted that the
bargaining unit of SMC should still include the employees of the spun-
off corporations: Magnolia and SMFI; and that the renegotiated terms
of the CBA shall be effective only for the remaining period of two years
or until June 30, 1994.
SMC, on the other hand, contended that the members/employees who
had moved to Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of
the bargaining unit at the SMC. Furthermore, the CBA should be
effective for three years in accordance with Art. 253-A of the Labor
Code.
Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and
duration of the CBA, petitioner-union declared a deadlock on
September 29, 1990.
On October 2, 1992, a Notice of Strike was filed against SMC.
In order to avert a strike, SMC requested the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) to conduct preventive mediation. No
settlement was arrived at despite several meetings held between the
parties.
On November 3, 1992, a strike vote was conducted which resulted in a
“yes vote” in favor of a strike.
On November 4, 1992, private respondents SMC, Magnolia and SMFI
filed a petition with the Secretary of Labor praying that the latter
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in a vital industry.
Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Several
conciliation meetings were held but still no agreement/settlement was
arrived at by both parties.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the
Secretary of Labor issued the assailed Order on February 15, 1993
directing, among others, that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall
be effective for the period of three (3) years from June 30, 1992; and
that such CBA shall cover only the employees of SMC and not of
Magnolia and SMFI.
TRO was filed and granted.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is
to be effective for three years of for only two years; and
2) Whether or not the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the
employees of the Magnolia and SMFI.
economic as well as non-economic provisions, except
representation.
the law is clear and definite on the duration of the CBA
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, but is quite
ambiguous with the terms of the other provisions of the CBA.
It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that the
Court must ascertain the legislative intent for the purpose of
giving effect to any statute. The history of the times and state
of the things existing when the act was framed or adopted
must be followed and the conditions of the things at the time
of the enactment of the law should be considered to
determine the legislative intent.
the legislators were more inclined to have the period of
effectivity for three (3) years insofar as the economic as well
as non-economic provisions are concerned, except
representation. Obviously, the framers of the law wanted to
maintain industrial peace and stability by having both
management and labor work harmoniously together without
any disturbance. Thus, no outside union can enter the
establishment within five (5) years and challenge the status of
the incumbent union as the exclusive bargaining agent.
Likewise, the terms and conditions of employment (economic
and non-economic) can not be questioned by the employers
or employees during the period of effectivity of the CBA. The
CBA is a contract between the parties and the parties must
respect the terms and conditions of the agreement. Notably,
the framers of the law did not give a fixed term as to the
effectivity of the terms and conditions of employment. It can
be gleaned from their discussions that it was left to the
parties to fix the period.
2) the transformation of the companies was a management
prerogative and business judgment which the courts can not
look into unless it is contrary to law, public policy or morals.
Neither can we impute any bad faith on the part of SMC so as
to justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil. Ever mindful of the employees’ interests,
management has assured the concerned employees that
they will be absorbed by the new corporations without loss of
tenure and retaining their present pay and benefits according
to the existing CBAs. They were advised that upon the
expiration of the CBAs, new agreements will be negotiated
between the management of the new corporations and the
bargaining representatives of the employees concerned.
Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate
juridical personalities. Thus, they can not belong to a single
bargaining unit

Justified 36 Port Workers Union of the -The CBA between the workers of the International Container
Deviation Philippines v Laguesma Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI and Associate Port Checkers and
from Workers Union (APCWU) was about to expire. Other unions were
Contract seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA
Bar Rule and were already plotting their moves.
-Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for
certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the
employees in the bargaining unit were submitted 11 days after the
petition.
-Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for
intervention.
-Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port
Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990.
The consent signatures were submitted 35 days after the filing of the
petition. The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for
joint decision. APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground
that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6,
Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, which requires that the
signatures be submitted upon filing of petition. This contention was
upheld by the Med-Arbiter.
Moreover, in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the
test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The
employees sought to be represented by the collective
bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in
terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by
the type of work they performed. Considering the spin-offs,
the companies would consequently have their respective and
distinctive concerns in terms of the nature of work, wages,
hours of work and other conditions of employment. Interests
of employees in the different companies perforce differ. SMC
is engaged in the business of the beer manufacturing.
Magnolia is involved in the manufacturing and processing of
diary products while SMFI is involved in the production of
feeds and the processing of chicken. The nature of their
products and scales of business may require different skills
which must necessarily be commensurated by different
compensation packages. The different companies may have
different volumes of work and different working conditions.
For such reason, the employees of the different companies
see the need to group themselves together and organize
themselves into distinctive and different groups. It would then
be best to have separate bargaining units for the different
companies where the employees can bargain separately
according to their needs and according to their own working
conditions.
-Doctrine in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines vs. Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Trajano: “it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor
Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a certification
election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain
concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent
the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to
said basic concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion, may
order a certification election notwithstanding the failure to
meet the 30% requirement”.
-SC: In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule
requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent
signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election
should not be strictly applied to frustrate thedetermination of
thelegitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the
requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it
seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the
regulation should at best be given only a directory effect.
Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for
 -PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Article 256 of certification election within the freedom period is sufficient
the Labor Code did not require the written consent to be submitted basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a
simultaneously with the petition for certification election. certification election, subject to the submission of theconsent
-DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the signatures within a reasonable period from suchfiling.
Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP’s appeal.
-Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a
new collective bargainingagreement, which was ratified by a majority of
the workers in the bargaining unit, and subsequently registered with the
DOLE.
ISSUE/S
WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in application of
Art 256 of the Labor Code (On Submission: WON simultaneous
submission is required)
-PWUP argues that under A256, the Med-Arbiter should automatically
order election by secret ballot when the petition is supported by at least
25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU
substantially complied with the law when they submitted the required
consent signatures several days after filing the petition.
-PWUP complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification
election, including its own petition for intervention, had the effect of
indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the ICTSI employees.

Disaffiliation 37 ANGLO-KMU v SAMANA ANGLO is a duly registered labor organization while SAMANA is its
Prior to BAY affiliate. Anglo entered into a CBA with Manila Bay Spinning Mills and
Freedom JP Coats Manila Bay. In 1994, Samana decided to disassociate from
Period Anglo. in view of the latter’s dereliction of its duty to promote and
advance the welfare of SAMANA BAY and the alleged cases of
corruption involving the federation officers. Said disaffiliation was
unanimously confirmed by the members of SAMANA BAY.
a petition to stop remittance of federation dues to ANGLO was filed by
SAMANA BAY with the Bureau of Labor Relations on the ground that
the corporations, despite having been furnished copies of the union
resolution relating to said disaffiliation, refused to honor the same.
ANGLO counter-acted by unseating all officers and board members of
SAMANA BAY and appointing, in their stead, a new set of officers who
were duly recognized by the corporations.
In its position paper, ANGLO contended that the disaffiliation was void
considering that a collective bargaining agreement is still existing and
the freedom period has not yet set in. The Med-Arbiter resolved that
the disaffiliation was void but upheld the illegality of the ouster officers
of SAMANA BAY. Both parties filed their respective appeals with the
Department of Labor and Employment.
ISSUE: whether petitioner can validly oust individual private
We rule for the respondents. Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
For clarity, we shall first consider the issue respecting the
validity of the disaffiliation.
Petitioner ANGLO wants to impress on us that the
disaffiliation was invalid for two reasons, namely: that the
procedural requirements for a valid disaffiliation were not
followed; and that it was made in violation of P.D. 1391.
Anent the first ground, we reiterate the rule that all employees
enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and join labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining. This is a fundamental right of labor and
derives its existence from the Constitution. In interpreting the
protection to labor and social justice provisions of the
Constitution and the labor laws, rules or regulations, we have
always adopted the liberal approach which favors the
exercise of labor rights.
Non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation, being
premised on purely technical grounds cannot rise above the
fundamental right of self- organization.
 respondents from their positions.
CBA signed 38 Oriental Tin Can Labor -Company entered into CBA with OTCLU (Oriental Tin Can Labor
Prior to the Union v Secretary of Union). -248 rank and file workers FFW to file a petition for certification
Expiration Labor election. However, this petition was repudiated by waiver of 115
of FP – signatories who ratified the new CBA.
Invalid -OTCWU-FFW filed petition for certification election, accompanied by
“authentic signatures” of 25% of employees.
-OTCLU filed motion for dismissal of the petition for certification
election. It said the petition was not endorsed by at least 25% as some
of the employees allegedly withdrew their support.
-Company filed comment alleging that the new CBA was already
ratified.
-OTCWU-FFW filed a reply, alleging that the employer has no legal
personality to oppose petition for certification election.
-DOLE issued certificate of registration of the CBA. It showed that the
CBA between the OTCLU and the company has the force and effect of
law.
-OTCWU-FFW officers walked out of their jobs. The union filed notice
of strike with NCMB.grounded on alleged dismissal of union
members/officers. Company directed the officers to return to work.
None of them did.
-Med-arbiter dismissed petition for certification election.
-OTCWU-FFW appealed to Sec of Labor. Pending appeal, they staged
a strike. They prevented free ingress and egress of non-striking
employees, and vehicles. NLRC issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
-Labor Usec issued resolution granting the appeal and setting aside the
order of Med-arbiter.
-After denial of their MFR, the company and OTCLU filed petitions for
certiorari before SC.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the employer can challenge petitions for certification election
2. WON the DOLE correctly granted the petition for certification
election
3. WON it is proper to dismiss a petition for certification election
because a new CBA has already been ratified.
4. WON the 25% support requirement has been met in this case
NO Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
-Certification elections are exclusively the concern of Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal personality to
challenge the same.
-The only instance when an employer may concern itself with
employee representation activities is when it has to file the
petition for certification election because there is no existing
CBA in the unit and it was requested to bargain collectively,
pursuant to Article 258 of Labor Code. After filing the petition,
the role of the employer ceases and it becomes a mere
bystander. Company’s interference in the certification election
below by actively opposing the same is manifestly uncalled-
for and unduly creates a suspicion that it intends to establish
a company union.
2. YES
-Since question of right of representation as between
competing labor organizations in a bargaining unit is imbued
with public interest, law governs the choice of a collective
bargaining representative which shall be the duly certified
agent of the employees concerned. An official certification
becomes necessary where the bargaining agent fails to
present adequate and reasonable proof of its majority
authorization and where the employer demands it, or when
the employer honestly doubts the majority representation of
several contending bargaining groups. IArticle 255 of the
Labor Code allows the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit to designate
or select the labor organization which shall be their exclusive
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.
-The designation or selection of the bargaining representative
without, however, going through the process set out by law
for the conduct of a certification election applies only when
representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union
is unanimously chosen by a majority of the employees as
their bargaining representative, but a question of
representation arising from the presence of more than one
union in a bargaining unit aspiring to be the employees’
representative, can only be resolved by holding a certification
election under the supervision of the proper government
authority.
3. NO
-Petition for certification election was filed 28 days before
expiration of existing CBA, well within 60-day period provided
for.
-Filing of petition for certification election during 60-day

Effectivity 39 Mindanao terminal and Petitioner Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc., and
and brokerage v confessor respondent Associated Labor Unions, entered into a collective
Automatic bargaining agreement for a period of five (5) years.
retroaction On the third year of the CBA the Company and the Union met to
of cba renegotiate the provisions of the CBA for the fourth and fifth years. The
parties, however, failed to resolve some of their differences, resulting to
a deadlock.
A formal notice of deadlock was sent to the Company on the following
issues: wages, vacation leave, sick leave, hospitalization, optional
retirement, 13th month pay and signing bonus.
On November 18, 1992, the Company announced a cost-cutting or
retrenchment program.
Charging unfair labor practice and citing the deadlock in the
negotiations, the Union filed, on December 3, 1992, a notice of strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
After submission by the parties of their position papers, the Secretary
of Labor issued an Order dated May 14, 1993, ordering the Company
and the Union to incorporate into their existing collective bargaining
agreement all improvements reached by them in the course of
renegotiations. The Secretary of Labor held that the wage increases for
the fourth and fifth years of the CBA were not to be credited as
compliance with future mandated increases. In addition, the fourth year
freedom period gives rise to a representation case that must
be resolved even though a new CBA has been entered into
within that period. This is clearly provided for in the
aforequoted Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. The reason behind this rule is
obvious. A petition for certification election is not necessary
where the employees are one in their choice of a
representative in the bargaining process. Moreover, said
provision manifests the intent of the legislative authority
to allow, if not encourage, the contending unions in a
bargaining unit to hold a certification election during the
freedom period.
4. YES
-The support requirement is a mere technicality which should
be employed in determining the true will of the workers
instead of frustrating the same.
-All doubts as to the number of employees actually
supporting the holding of a certification election should,
therefore, be resolved by going through such procedure. It is
judicially settled that a certification election is the most
effective and expeditious means of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force in the
appropriate bargaining unit.
The respondent indeed stated in her order of May 14, 1993 Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
that this case is clearly beyond the scope of the automatic Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
renewal clause,[2] but she also stated in the same order that
the parties have reached an agreement on all the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
renegotiated provisions of the CBA on January 14,
1993, i.e., within six (6) months of the expiration of the third
year of the CBA.
The signing of the CBA is not determinative of the question
whether the agreement was entered into within six months
from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as
fixed in such collective bargaining agreement within the
contemplation of Art. 253-A.
The fact that no agreement was then signed is of no moment.
Art. 253-A refers merely to an agreement which, according to
Blacks Law Dictionary is a coming together of minds; the
coming together in accord of two minds on a given
proposition.[5] This is similar to Art. 1305 of the Civil Codes
definition of contract as a meeting of minds between two
persons.
The two terms, agreement and contract, are indeed similar,
although the former is broader than the latter because an
agreement may not have all the elements of a contract. As in
 wage increase was to be retroactive to August 1992 and was to be
implemented until July 31, 1993, while the fifth year wage increase was
to take effect on August 1, 1993 until the expiration of the CBA.[1]
On May 31, 1993, the Company sought reconsideration of the May 14,
1993 order. The motion was denied for lack of merit by the Secretary of
Labor in a resolution dated July 7, 1993.Hence, this petition
for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Secretary of Labor.
Issue: whether respondent erred in making the fourth year wage
increase retroactive to August 1, 1992. It denies the power of the
Secretary of Labor to decree retroaction of the wage increases, as the
respondent herself had stated in her order subject of this petition, that it
had been more than six (6) months since the expiration of the third
anniversary of the CBA and, therefore, the automatic renewal clause of
Art. 253-A of the Labor Code had no application. Although petitioner
originally opposed giving retroactive effect to their agreement, it
subsequently modified its stand and agreed that the fourth year wage
increase and the other provisions of the CBA be made retroactive to
the date the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction of the dispute on
March 10, 1993.
Effectivity of 40 LMG chemicals v LMG Chemicals Corp, (petitioner) is a domestic corp engaged in the
arbitral secretary of dole manufacture and sale of various kinds of chemical substances,
award including aluminum sulfate which is essential in purifying water, and
technical grade sulfuric acid used in thermal power plants. Petitioner
has three divisions, namely: the Organic Division, Inorganic Division
and the Pinamucan Bulk Carriers. There are two unions within
petitioner’s Inorganic Division. One union represents the daily paid
employees and the other union represents the monthly paid
employees. Chemical Workers Union, respondent, is a duly registered
labor organization acting as the collective bargaining agent of all the
daily paid employees of petitioner’s Inorganic Division.
Sometime in December 1995, the petitioner and the respondent started
negotiation for a new CBA as their old CBA was about to expire. They
were able to agree on the political provisions of the new CBA, but no
agreement was reached on the issue of wage increase. The economic
issues were not also settled.
With the CBA negotiations at a deadlock (Strike…Secretary assumed
jurisdiction)
Secretary of Labor and Employment granted an increase of P140
(higher than the offer of petitioner-company of P135). Also, as to the
effectivity of the new CBA…Sec held:
3. Effectivity of the new CBA
Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that when no
new CBA is signed during a period of six months from the expiry date
of the old CBA, the retroactivity period shall be according to the parties’
agreement, Inasmuch as the parties could not agree on this issue and
the case of contracts, however, agreements may be oral or
written.[6] Hence, even without any written evidence of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement made by the parties, a valid
agreement existed in this case from the moment the minds of
the parties met on all matters they set out to discuss.
Petitioner insists that public respondent’s discretion on the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
issue of the date of the effectivity of the new CBA is limited to
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
either: (1) leaving the matter of the date of effectivity of the
new CBA is limited to either: (1) leaving the matter of the date
of effectivity of the new CBA to the agreement of the parties
or (2) ordering that the terms of the new CBA be
prospectively applied.
It must be emphasized that respondent Secretary assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute because it is impressed with
national interest. As noted by the Secretary, “the petitioner
corp was then supplying the sulfate requirements of MWSS
as well as the sulfuric acid of NAPOCOR, and consequently,
the continuation of the strike would seriously affect the water
supply of Metro Manila and the power supply of the Luzon
Grid.” Such authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction
carries with it the power to determine the retroactivity of the
parties’ CBA.
It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the
Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all
questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is
plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to
effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.
This Court held in St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. vs. Torres:
Therefore in the absence of the specific provision of law
 since this Office has assumed jurisdiction, then this matter now lies at
the discretion of the Secretary of labor and Employment. Thus the new
Collective Bargaining Agreement which the parties will sign pursuant to
this Order shall retroact to January 1, 1996.
petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion when he ordered that the new CBA which the parties will
sign shall retroact to January 1, 1996
ISSUE: Whether or not the new CBA shall retroact?
Substitution 41 Benguet consolidated v On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (“BBWU”), for
ary doctrine bci employees and and in behalf of all Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BENGUET) employees
workers union in its mines and milling establishment located at Balatoc, Antamok and
Acupan, Mt. Province, entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract
(CONTRACT) with BENGUET. The CONTRACT was stipulated to be
effective for a period of 4-1/2 years, or from June 23, 1959 to
December 23, 1963. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout
clause.
3 years later, or on April 6, 1962, a certification election was conducted
by the Department of Labor among all the rank and file employees of
BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units. BCI EMPLOYEES
& WORKERS UNION (UNION) obtained more than 50% of the total
number of votes, defeating BBWU. The Court of Industrial Relations
certified the UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
agent of all BENGUET employees as regards rates of pay, wages,
hours of work and such other terms and conditions of employment
allowed them by law or contract.
Later on, the UNION filed a notice of strike against BENGUET. UNION
members who were BENGUET employees in the mining camps at
Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc, went on strike. The strike was attended
by violence, some of the workers and executives of the BENGUET
were prevented from entering the premises and some of the properties
of the BENGUET were damaged as a result of the strike. Eventually,
the parties agreed to end the dispute. BENGUET and UNION executed
the AGREEMENT. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto. About a year
later or on January 29, 1964, a collective bargaining contract was
finally executed between UNION-PAFLU and BENGUET.
Meanwhile, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their Presidents to
recover the amount the former incurred for the repair of the damaged
properties resulting from the strike. BENGUET also argued that the
UNION violated the CONTRACT which has a stipulation not to strike
during the effectivity thereof.
Defendants unions and their presidents defended that: (1) they were
not bound by the CONTRACT which BBWU, the defeated union, had
executed with BENGUET; (2) the strike was due, among others, to
unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was lawful and in
the exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU under Republic
prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of the arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent
is deemed vested with plenary powers to determine the
effectivity thereof.”
PETITION DENIED.
NO. BENGUET erroneously invokes the so-called “Doctrine Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
of Substitution” referred to in General Maritime Stevedore’s Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines where it was ruled that:
“We also hold that where the bargaining contract is to run for
more than two years, the principle of substitution may well be
adopted and enforced by the CIR to the effect that after two
years of the life of a bargaining agreement, a certification
election may be allowed by the CIR, that if a bargaining agent
other than the union or organization that executed the
contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect
said contract, but that it may bargain with the management
for the shortening of the life of the contract if it considers it too
long, or refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an automatic
renewal clause.”
BENGUET’s reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is
totally misplaced. This principle, formulated by the NLRB as
its initial compromise solution to the problem facing it when
there occurs a shift in employees’ union allegiance after the
execution of a bargaining contract with their employer, merely
states that even during the effectivity of a collective
bargaining agreement executed between employer
and employees thru their agent, the employees can change
said agent but the contract continues to bind them up to its
expiration date. They may bargain however for the shortening
of said expiration date.
In formulating the “substitutionary” doctrine, the only
consideration involved was the employees‘ (principal) interest
in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent’s (union)
interest never entered the picture. The majority of the
employees, as an entity under the statute, is the true party in
interest to the contract, holding rights through the agency of
the union representative. Thus, any exclusive interest
claimed by the agent is defeasible at the will of the principal.
The “substitutionary” doctrine only provides that the
employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective
bargaining contract with their employer by the simple
expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in the
 Act 875.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
CONTRACT, particularly the No-Strike clause, did not bind defendants.
BENGUET interposed the present appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and
BBWU on June 23, 1959 and effective until December 23, 1963
automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification, on August 18,
1962, as sole bargaining representative of all BENGUET employees
Cba 42 San Miguel corporation v Ibias (respondent) was employed by petitioner SMC on 24 December
deadlock nlrc 1978 initially as a CRO operator in its Metal Closure and Lithography
Plant. Respondent continuously worked therein until he advanced as
Zamatic operator. He was also an active and militant member of a
labor organization called Ilaw Buklod Manggagawa (IBM)-SMC
Chapter.
According to SMC’s Policy on Employee Conduct, absences without
permission or AWOPs, which are absences not covered either by a
light of this that the phrase “said new agent would have to
respect said contract” must be understood. It only means that
the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot
renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of
course to negotiate with management for the shortening
thereof.
The “substitutionary” doctrine cannot be invoked to support
the contention that a newly certified collective bargaining
agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings —
like the no-strike stipulation here — in the collective
bargaining agreement made by the deposed union. When
BBWU bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not
have validly bound also all the other rival unions existing in
the bargaining units in question. BBWU was the agent of the
employees, not of the other unions which possess distinct
personalities.
UNION, as the newly certified bargaining agent, could always
voluntarily assume all the personal undertakings made by the
displaced agent. But as the lower court found, there was no
showing at all that, prior to the strike, UNION formally
adopted the existing CONTRACT as its own and assumed all
the liabilities imposed by the same upon BBWU. Defendants
were neither signatories nor participants in the CONTRACT.
Everything binding on a duly authorized agent, acting as
such, is binding on the principal; not vice-versa, unless there
is mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself
to the party with whom he contracts. Here, it was the previous
agent who expressly bound itself to the other party,
BENGUET. UNION, the new agent, did not assume this
undertaking of BBWU.
Since defendants were not contractually bound by the no-
strike clause in the CONTRACT, for the simple reason that
they were not parties thereto, they could not be liable for
breach of contract to plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court appealed
from is hereby affirmed.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as a basis for Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
judgment on the legality of an employer’s dismissal of an Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
employee, nor even preponderance of evidence for that
matter, substantial evidence being sufficient. In the instant
case, while there may be no denying that respondent’s
medical card had falsified entries in it, SMC was unable to
prove, by substantial evidence, that it was respondent who
made the unauthorized entries. Besides, SMC’s (Your) Guide
certification of the plant doctor that the employee was absent due to
sickness or by a duly approved application for leave of absence filed at
least 6 days prior to the intended leave, are subject to disciplinary
action characterized by progressively increasing weight. The same
Policy on Employee Conduct also punishes falsification of company
records or documents with discharge or termination for the first offense
if the offender himself or somebody else benefits from falsification or
would have benefited if falsification is not found on time.
It appears that per company records, respondent was AWOP on the
following dates in 1997: 2, 4 and 11 January; 26, 28 and 29 April; and
5, 7, 8, 13, 21, 22, 28 and 29 May. For his absences on 2, 4 and 11
January and 28 and 29 April, he was given a written warning dated 9
May 1997 that he had already incurred five (5) AWOPs and that further
absences would be subject to disciplinary action. For his absences on
28 and 29 April and 7 and 8 May, respondent was alleged to have
falsified his medical consultation card by stating therein that he was
granted sick leave by the plant clinic on said dates when in truth he
was not.
After the completion of the investigation, SMC concluded that
respondent committed the offenses of excessive AWOPs and
falsification of company records or documents, and accordingly
dismissed him.
On 30 March 1998, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against SMC. The labor arbiter believed that respondent had
committed the absences pointed out by SMC but found the imposition
of termination of employment based on his AWOPs to be
disproportionate since SMC failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that it had strictly implemented its company policy on
absences. It also noted that termination based on the alleged
falsification of company records was unwarranted in view of SMC’s
failure to establish respondent’s guilt.
The appellate court also held that respondent’s AWOPs did not warrant
his dismissal in view of SMC’s inconsistent implementation of its
company policies. It could not understand why respondent was given a
mere warning for his absences on 28 and 29 April which constituted his
5th and 6th AWOPs, respectively, when these should have merited
suspension under SMC’s policy. According to the appellate court, since
respondent was merely warned, logically said absences were deemed
committed for the first time; thus, it follows that the subject AWOPs did
not justify his dismissal because under SMC’s policy, the 4th to 9th
AWOPs are meted the corresponding penalty only when committed for
the second time.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the findings of the
labor arbiter and the NLRC and in dismissing SMC’s claims that
respondent was terminated from service with just cause.
on Employee Conduct punishes the act of falsification of
company records or documents; it does not punish mere
possession of a falsified document.
Respondent cannot feign surprise nor ignorance of the earlier
AWOPs he had incurred. He was given a warning for his 2, 4,
and 11 January and 26, 28, and 29 April 1997 AWOPs. In the
same warning, he was informed that he already had six
AWOPs for 1997. He admitted that he was absent on 7 and 8
May 1997. He was also given notices to explain his AWOPs
for the period 26 May to 2 June 1997, which he received but
refused to acknowledge. It does not take a genius to figure
out that as early as June 1997, he had more than nine
AWOPs.
In any case, when SMC imposed the penalty of dismissal for
the 12th and 13th AWOPs, it was acting well within its rights
as an employer. An employer has the prerogative to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the
proper conduct of its business, to provide certain disciplinary
measures in order to implement said rules and to assure that
the same would be complied with. An employer enjoys a wide
latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and
regulations on work-related activities of the employees.
It is axiomatic that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within
the purview of management imposition. Thus, in the
implementation of its rules and policies, the employer has the
choice to do so strictly or not, since this is inherent in its right
to control and manage its business effectively. Consequently,
management has the prerogative to impose sanctions lighter
than those specifically prescribed by its rules, or to condone
completely the violations of its erring employees. Of course,
this prerogative must be exercised free of grave abuse of
discretion, bearing in mind the requirements of justice and fair
play.
All told, we find that SMC acted well within its rights when it
dismissed respondent for his numerous absences.
Respondent was afforded due process and was validly
dismissed for cause.
Petition granted
266 Injunction 43 Marino v Gamilla Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
prohibited Ilaw at Buklod ng Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Manggagawa v NLRC
Regular 45 Halaguena v PAL Petitioners were employed as flight attendants of respondent on Yes. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
courts may different dates prior to November 1996. They are members of FASAP estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC. Being an Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
acquire union exclusive bargaining organization of the flightattendants, flight ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
jurisdiction stewards and pursers. On July 2001, respondent and FASAP entered labor tribunals.
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
over a labor into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement
case for the years 2000 to 2005 (compulsory retirement of 55 for female and Not every controversy or money claim by an employee
60 for males). against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees
In July 2003, petitioner and several female cabin crews, in a letter, and employer where the employer-employee relationship is
manifested that the provision in CBA on compulsory retirement is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a
discriminatory. On July 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for different source of obligation is within the exclusive
Declaratory Relief with issuanceof TRO with the RTC Makati. The RTC jurisdiction of the regular court.
issued a TRO. After the denial of the respondent on itsmotion for
reconsideration for the TRO, it filed a Petition with the CA. CA granted Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the
respondent’s petition and ordered lower court to dismiss the case. jurisdiction of labor tribunals.The said issue cannot be
Hence, this petition. resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it
requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law
Issue: on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Whether or not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case. Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to
apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the
jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In
GeorgGrotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not
every dispute between an employer and employee involves
matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in
the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article
217 of the Labor Code is limited to dispute arising from an
employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved
by reference to the Labor Code other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreement.

267 Appropriate 46 San Miguel corp Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification or (1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
bargaining supervisors and exempt Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of not fall within the term “confidential employees” who may be Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
unit 35 union v laguesma the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando prohibited from joining a union.
San Miguel corp and Otis. They are not qualified to be classified as managerial Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
employees union v Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct employees who, under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
confessor of certification election among the abovementioned employees of the eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. In the
different plants as one bargaining unit. very same provision, they are not allowed membership in a
San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may
Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter’s error in grouping join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
together all three (3) separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a
including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate,
confidential in nature. determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of
The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent
company’s Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-
Arbiter of origin for determination of the true classification of each of
the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-union’s motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the
reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate
certification elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory
levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three
plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees
of the company are considered confidential employees, hence
ineligible from joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three
plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both
must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential
employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor
must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor
relations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the
normal course of their duties, become aware of management
policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective
sought to be accomplished by the ”confidential employee
rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees
should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict
of interests. “Management should not be required to handle
labor relations matters through employees who are
represented by the union with which the company is required
to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties
may obtain advance information of the company’s position
with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of
grievances, or other labor relations matters.”
The Court held that “if these managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be
assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict
of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated
with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership.”
An important element of the “confidential employee rule” is
the employee’s need to use labor relations information. Thus,
in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key
question frequently considered is the employee’s necessary
access to confidential labor relations information.
(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different
places, namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan,
Metro Manila, and in San Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial.
Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the
communal or mutual interests of the employees are not
sacrificed.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than
all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.”
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees
who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours,
working conditions and other subjects of collective

Test in 4 International school The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP
determining 47 alliance of educators v (ONAPUP) filed a petition for certification election with the BLR.
the quisimbing It claimed to have a membership of 3,236 members—more than 33%
appropriate UP v Ferrer-Calleja of the 9,617 persons constituting the non-academic personnel of four
bargaining UP campuses (Diliman, Manila, Los Baños, and Visayas).
unit UP did not object to the petition.
Another labor union, the All UP Workers’ Union (All UP) filed a motion
for intervention.
It alleged that its membership covers both academic and non-academic
personnel, and that it aims to unite all rank-and-file employees in one
union.
It assented to the holding of the certification election provided the
appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined.
It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and
Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel,
should not be deemed part of the organizational unit.
UP’s General Counsel was of the stand that there should be two
unions—one for the non-academic/administrative, and one for the
academic personnel.
BLR Director Calleja: The appropriate organizational unit should
embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees.
No evidence to justify the grouping of non-academic personnel
separate from academic personnel.
The Director quoted the pertinent provisions of EO 180 and its IRRs:
Section 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer
unit consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances
otherwise require.
Sec. 1, Rule IV. For purposes of registration, an appropriate
organizational unit may refer to:
xxx
d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
General intent of the EO is not to “fragmentize” the employer unit, as
can be gleaned from the definition of the term “accredited employees’
organization,” which refers to:
“x x x a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as
defined in these rules recognized to negotiate for the employees in an
organizational unit headed by an officer with sufficient authority to bind
bargaining.
Are the professors, associate professors and assistant Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
professors high-level employees? NO. Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
The matter was correctly resolved by respondent Director.
The College Academic Personnel Committee, through which Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
the academic personnel purportedly perform their supervisory
functions, is actually tasked to:
Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the
implementation of policies, rules, standards or general
guidelines as formulated by the University Academic
Personnel Board;
Review the recommendations submitted by the DAPCs with
regard to recruitment, selection, performance evaluation,
tenure, staff development, and promotion of the faculty and
other academic personnel of the College;
Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of available
funds for promotion;
Act on cases of disagreement between the Chairman and the
members of the DAPC particularly on personnel matters
covered by this Order;
Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel actions
made by the Department Chairman and/or the DAPC
(Department Academic Personnel Committee).
On the other hand, the University Academic Personnel Board
performs the following functions:
Assist the Chancellor in the review of the recommendations
of the CAPC'S.
Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the
CAPC.
Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to the
selection, compensation, and promotion of members of the
academic staff.
Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations on
academic promotions and on other matters affecting faculty
status and welfare.
It is clear that the high-level employees are those who
comprise the UAPB. These would refer to the deans,
assistants for academic affairs, and the chief of personnel.
They formulate rules, polices and standards respecting
selection, compensation and promotion of members of the
academic staff.
The functions of the DAPC and UAPB are merely
recommendatory.
Ultimately, the power to hire, fire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees rests with the
the agency, such as x x x state colleges and universities.”
She thus ordered the holding of a certification among all rank-and-file
employees, teaching and non-teaching.
At the pre-election conference, UP sought clarification of the term
“rank-and-file.” It claimed that there were some teaching and non-
teaching employees whose functions were in fact managerial and
policy-determining.
It sought the exclusion of high-level employees, pursuant to Sec. 3 of
EO 180:
SEC. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally
considered as policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a
highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of
rank-and file government employees;
It claims that the following should not be considered rank-and-file:
Those with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher;
Those administrative employees holding positions Grade 18 or higher.
The University claims that these employees perform supervisory
functions and are vested with effective recommendatory powers. As to
the professors, UP notes that these academic staff are members of the
University Council, a policy-making body.
ONAPUP did not oppose UP’s classification. All UP remained firm in its
stance to unite all the rank-and-file employees under a single
organizational unit.
BLR Director Calleja (Second Order): Declared that the professors are
rank-and-file employees.
Sec. 1, Rule I, IRRs of EO 180:
High Level Employee — is one whose functions are normally
considered policy determining, managerial or one whose duties are
highly confidential in nature. A managerial function refers to the
exercise of powers such as:
1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions;
2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or
3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or
discipline employees.
A careful perusal of the University Code shows that the policy- making
powers of the Council are limited to academic matters, namely,
prescribing courses of study and rules of discipline, fixing student
admission and graduation requirements, recommending to the Board of
Board of Regents.
It is also clear that ALL academic personnel cannot be
considered high-level employees, because not all of them are
members of the DAPC/UAPB. They must be appointed or
elected.
Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the
professors to the status of high-level employees.
The actions of such council are always subject to the
approval of the Board of Regents.
In addition, the policy-determining functions of the University
Council refer to academic matters, i.e. those governing the
relationship between the University and its students, and not
the University as an employer and the professors as
employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of interest results
in the professors being members of the University Council
and being classified as rank-and-file employees.
Should the academic employees comprise a bargaining unit
separate and distinct from that of the non-academic
employees of UP? YES.
Bargaining unit – a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
Labor laws do not provide criteria for determining the proper
collective bargaining unit.
Sec. 12 of RA 875 merely required an “appropriate
bargaining unit.” This was retained in the Labor Code.
Thus, the Court turned to American jurisprudence for
guidance.
Rothenberg:
Will of the employees (Globe doctrine);
Affinity and unit of employees’ interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation
and working conditions;
Prior collective bargaining history; and
Employment status, such as temporary, seasonal, and
probationary employees.
10th Annual Report of the NLRB:
History, extent and type of organization of employees;
History of their collective bargaining;
History, extent and type of organization of employees in other
plants of the same employer, or other employers in the same
industry;
 Regents the conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over
students.
On the other hand, the policies referred to in the definition of high level
employees refers to labor-related policies like hiring, firing, discipline,
labor standards and benefits, and terms and conditions of employment.
MR filed by UP was denied.
Application 48 Philips Industrial - PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and
of Globe Development v NLRC marketing of electronic products. Since 1971, it had a total of 6
Doctrine collective bargaining agreements with private respondent Philips
Employees Organization-FFW (PEO-FFW), a registered labor union
and the certified bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of
PIDI.
- In the first CBA, the supervisors (referred to in RA 875), confidential
employees, security guards, temporary employees and sales
representatives were excluded in the bargaining unit. In the second to
the fifth, the sales force, confidential employees and heads of small
units, together with the managerial employees, temporary employees
and security personnel were excluded from the bargaining unit. The
The skill, wages, work and working conditions of the
employees;
The desires of the employees;
The eligibility of the employees for membership in the union/s
involved; and
The relationship between the unit/s proposed and the
employer’s organization, management and operation.
BASIC TEST: “A unit, to be appropriate, must affect a
grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual
interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.”
Test applied: “community or mutuality of interests” test.
In the case at bar, the employees can easily be categorized
into two general classes:
First—non-academic—janitors, messengers, typists, clerks,
receptionists, carpenters, electricians, ground-keepers,
chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers; and
Second—academic—full professors, associate professors,
assistant professors, instructors, research, extension and
professorial staff.
It would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in
common with the University clerks and other non-academic
employees as regards responsibilities and functions, working
conditions, compensation rates, social life and interests, skills
and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc.
On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in
the nature of the work and duties as well as in the
compensation and working conditions of the academic and
non-academic personnel dictate the separation of these two
categories of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining.
DISPOSITION: Order affirmed.
NLRC decision is set aside while the decision of the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Executive Labor Arbiter is reinstated. Confidential employees Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
are excluded from the bargaining unit while a referendum will
be conducted to determine the will of the service engineers
and sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion
from the bargaining unit, but those who are holding
supervisory positions or functions are ineligible to join a labor
organization of the rank and file employees but may join,
assist or form a separate labor organization of their own.
Ratio:
The exclusion of confidential employees:
 confidential employees are the division secretaries of light/telecom/data
and consumer electronics, marketing managers, secretaries of the
corporate planning and business manager, fiscal and financial system
manager and audit and EDP manager, and the staff of both the
General Management and the Personnel Department.
- In the sixth CBA, it was agreed that the subject of inclusion or
exclusion of service engineers, sales personnel and confidential
employees in the coverage of the bargaining unit would be submitted
for arbitration. The parties failed to agree on a voluntary arbitrator and
the Bureau of Labor Relations endorsed the petition to the Executive
Labor Arbiter of the NCR for compulsory arbitration.
- March 1998, Labor Arbiter: A referendum will be conducted to
determine the will of the service engineers and sales representatives
as to their inclusion or exclusion in the bargaining unit. It was also
declared that the Division Secretaries and all staff of general
management, personnel and industrial relations department,
secretaries of audit, EDP, financial system are confidential employees
are deemed excluded in the bargaining unit.
- PEO-FFW appealed to the NLRC; NLRC declared PIDI's Service
Engineers, Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General
Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department,
Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included within
the rank and file bargaining unit, citing the Implementing Rules of E.O
111 and Article 245 of the Labor Code (all workers, except managerial
employees and security personnel, are qualified to join or be a part of
the bargaining unit)
The rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial
employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies
to confidential employees. With the presence of managerial
employees in a union, the union can become company-
dominated as their loyalty cannot be assured. In Golden
Farms vs Calleja, the Court states that confidential
employees, who have access to confidential information, may
become the source of undue advantage.
As regards to the sales representatives and service
engineers, according to the OSG, there is no doubt that they
are entitled to form a union as they are not disqualified by law
from doing so.
Globe Doctrine:
Globe Doctrine states that in determining the
proper bargaining unit, the express will or desire of the
employees shall be considered, they should be allowed to
determine for themselves what union to join or form. The best
way is through a referendum, as decreed by the Executive
Labor Arbiter. However, in this case, since the only issue is
the employees' inclusion in or exclusion from the bargaining
unit in question, the Globe Doctrine has no application in this
case. The doctrine applies only in instance of evenly
balanced claims by competitive groups for the right to be
established as the bargaining unit. (many unions 'competing'
to be the bargaining representative?)

Issue:
-Whether service engineers, sales representatives and confidential
employees of petitioner are qualified to be part of the existing
bargaining unit
- Whether the "Globe Doctrine" should be applied

Community 46 San Miguel Copr Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt

of Interest Supervisors and Exempt Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Rule 49 Union v Laguesma
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
UP v Laguesma
One 50 KNitjoy manufacturing v Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
company, 51 ferrer-calleja Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
One union KAMADA v Ferrer-Calleja Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
policy
268 Organized 52 Maricalum Mining v Brion Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Establishme Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
nts Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Certification 53 Notre Dame of Greater -Notre Dame of Greater Manila Teachers and Employees Union 1. NO. The appeal of the med-arbiter’s January 13, 1992
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Election 54 Manila v Laguesma (NDGMTEU) a legitimate labor organization duly accredited and handwritten notation –pertaining to the incidental matter
Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
registered with DOLE filed with Med-Arbitration Branch a petition for
direct certification as sole and exclusive bargaining agent or
certification election among the rank and file employees of NDGM. Med
Arbiter issued an order granting the certification election (in accordance
with A257 of LC, considering that NDGM was an unorganized
establishment, to give each employee a fair chance to choose their
bargaining agent) and ordering Representation officer Francisco to
undertake a pre-election conference.
-during the pre-election conference, the parties agreed that the
certification election shall be conducted and that the eligible voters
shall be those employees appearing in the list submitted by
management (who were regular employees). NDGM registered a
motion to include probationary and substitute employees in the list of
qualified voters, but was denied by Med-Arbiter through a notation.
NDGM filed an appeal to Labor Secretary, pending appeal, public
respondents conducted a certification election where NDGMTEU won
(56 vs 23 who did not want a union). NDGM filed a written notice of
protest against the conduct and results of the certification of election,
which was opposed by NDGMTEU. NDGMTEU filed a motion to certify
their union as the exclusive bargaining agent of NDGM, which was
granted and certified by the Med-Arbiter. NDGM’s protest was
dismissed so NDGM appealed, which was again dismissed for lack of
merit. NDGM filed MFR – rejected. CA: staying the holding of the
certification election unnecessary, certification election complaints
should have been raised before the pre-election conference, where the
qualification of voters was already determined. NDGM had no standing
to question the qualification of the workers because in the process of
choosing the collective bargaining representative, the employer was
definitely an intruder Petitioner’s contention: (1)A259, LC5 would allow
the staying (suspension) of the holding of certification election, with its
appeal of the denial of its Motion. (2) It has the support of all the
excluded employees so they could represent these employees and
question the validity of the election
ISSUE/S
1. WON the holding of certification elections was stayed by the
NDGM’s appeal of the med-arbiter’s notation to the DOLE Secretary on
the Motion to Include the probationary and Substitute Employees in the
list of Qualified Voters
2. WON the employer has legal personality to question the election
of the list of voters –should not stay the holding of the
certification election. Ratio. Not all the orders issued by a
med-arbiter are appealable. In fact, “[i]nter locutory orders
issued by the med-arbiter prior to the grant or denial of the
petition, including orders granting motions for intervention
issued after an order calling for a certification election, shall
not be appealable. However, any issue arising there from
may be raised in the appeal on the decision granting or
denying the petition.”
-The intention of the law is to limit the grounds for appeal that
may stay the holding of a certification election. This intent is
manifested by the issuance of Department Order No. 40.
Under the new rules, an appeal of a med-arbiter’s order to
hold a certification election will not stay the holding thereof
where the employer company is an unorganized
establishment, and where no union has yet been duly
recognized or certified as a bargaining representative.
-This new rule, therefore, decreases or limits the appeals that
may impede the selection by employees of their bargaining
representative. Expediting such selection process advances
the primacy of free collective bargaining, in accordance with
the State’s policy to “promote and emphasize the primacy of
free collective bargaining x x x”; and “to ensure the
participation of workers in decision and policy-making
processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.”
Reasoning. INTERPRETATION OF A259 OF LC: A259 is
supplemented by Section 10 of Rule V of Book Five of the
1992 Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Stating
that such appeal stays the holding of a certification election,
the later provision reads: Sec. 10. Decision of the Secretary
final and inappealable.” The Secretary shall have fifteen (15)
calendar days within which to decide the appeal from receipt
of the records of the case. The filing of the appeal from the
decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any
certification election. The decision of the Secretary shall be
final and inappealable.”
-A259 clearly speaks of the “order x x x of the election.”
Hence, the Article pertains, not just to any of the med-
arbiter’s orders like the subject notation, but to the order
granting the petition for certification election. This is an
unmistakable inference from a reading of Sections 6 and 7 of
the implementing rules6. and spirit of welfare legislations
intended to protect labor and to promote social justice.
Disposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO
 ORDERED.

Port Workers Union of the -The CBA between the workers of the International Container -Doctrine in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the Formatted: Font: Arial Narrow, 10 pt
Phil v Undersecretary of Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI and Associate Port Checkers and United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines vs.
Labor and Employment Workers Union (APCWU) was about to expire. Other unions were Trajano: “it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor
seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a certification
and were already plotting their moves. election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain
-Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent
certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to
employees in the bargaining unit were submitted 11 days after the said basic concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of
petition. Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion, may
-Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for order a certification election notwithstanding the failure to
intervention. meet the 30% requirement”.
-Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port -SC: In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule
Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent
The consent signatures were submitted 35 days after the filing of the signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election
petition. The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for should not be strictly applied to frustrate thedetermination of
joint decision. APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground thelegitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the
that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it
Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, which requires that the seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the
signatures be submitted upon filing of petition. This contention was regulation should at best be given only a directory effect.
upheld by the Med-Arbiter. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for
-PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Article 256 of certification election within the freedom period is sufficient
the Labor Code did not require the written consent to be submitted basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a
simultaneously with the petition for certification election. certification election, subject to the submission of theconsent
-DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the signatures within a reasonable period from suchfiling.
Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP’s appeal.
-Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a
new collective bargainingagreement, which was ratified by a majority of
the workers in the bargaining unit, and subsequently registered with the
DOLE.
ISSUE/S
WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in application of
Art 256 of the Labor Code (On Submission: WON simultaneous
submission is required)
-PWUP argues that under A256, the Med-Arbiter should automatically
order election by secret ballot when the petition is supported by at least
25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU
substantially complied with the law when they submitted the required
consent signatures several days after filing the petition.
-PWUP complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification
election, including its own petition for intervention, had the effect of
indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the ICTSI employees.