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More intensive efforts to encourage local ed as the regions which offer the greatest tional donors, satisfactory development
food production began in the early 1980s potential for more intensive agriculture, of rice production in Senegal remained
when the old model of industrialization at although they are home to just 10 percent elusive. Compared with the downturn
the expense of agricultural development of the rural population. The technical that had occurred during the previous
proved to be non-viable. The industrializa- parameters required for irrigated rice cul- decades, a slight increase in output was
tion strategy had yielded very little in the tivation appear to be in place: in principle, achieved, but the overall growth trend
way of internationally competitive prod- the disadvantage of costly dependence on during the period 1980-1996 stood at just
ucts. The Senegalese economy – initially a a system of irrigation which uses mecha- 3.1 percent per year, barely exceeding the
beacon of hope in sub-Saharan Africa – nized pumps is more than offset by the rate of population growth (see graph). The
outstanding climatic con- development of key production factors –
Since independence in 1960, rice ditions prevailing in these harvest yields, number of harvests per
areas, especially during year, water consumption and the expan-
consumption in Senegal has grown the dry season, which are sion of irrigated areas – lagged far behind
extremely conducive to Senegal’s potential. An important factor
almost ten-fold in just four decades, growth. By contrast, rain-
fed cultivation is viewed
was the powerful but often ineffective
role of the state in all areas of production
currently standing at around 1 million as very fragile and offers
little potential for more
development, starting with research into
irrigation management, agricultural
tonnes. intensive farming, al- extension, the granting of loans and deliv-
though 90 percent of ery of inputs, and extending to processing
farms depend on this and marketing. Faced with these unsatis-
lapsed into structural crisis. Rural regions form of cultivation. factory outcomes, donors scaled down
were worst affected, especially since the Until the mid 1990s, rice imports were a their funding for the irrigation projects,
urban bias of Senegalese politics now had key element of Senegal’s highly central- which led to a further stagnation of rice
a firm demographic basis. The austerity ized and regulated economic policy. The production.
measures imposed through the internal state’s price stabilization fund operated Another general disadvantage affecting
and external structural adjustment pro- an import monopoly; it organized the Senegal’s rice production was the increas-
grammes mainly hit the rural popula- marketing and fixed the prices of both ing overvaluation of the Senegalese cur-
tions. imported and local rice. The price of bro- rency from the end of the 1980s. This
Soil fertility in the Sahel’s fragile produc- ken rice was fixed at around 50 percent of pushed down the price of imports while
tion systems declined dramatically as a the price of whole rice. Within this system, intensifying price pressure on local food
result of the use of non-sustainable culti- a substantial levy was imposed on markets, making agriculture even less
vation techniques, especially in ground- imported rice; in 1994/95, the year before attractive. Other – rain-fed – crops were
nut production, and the increasing pres- the system was abolished, the difference affected even more than rice; production
sure on natural resources. A series of between the cif world market price and of these crops rose by just 1.3 percent over
droughts also occurred in the 1970s, lead-
ing to a permanent drop in rainfall and
harvest yields. The situation was exacer-
Photo: Schucht
24
The WTO agreements
should allow moderate
import protection
measures for Senegal in
order to protect local
rice production.
Photo: Schucht
this period, even though growth-imped- 1999. In cereals production as a whole this stability for producers while managing
ing state intervention in production and took until 2002. Due to the major fluctua- processing and marketing effectively. The
marketing were abolished in these sectors tions in production (see graph, p. 23), it is current scenario gives little cause for opti-
more rapidly than in the rice sector. still impossible to say whether this marks mism. In recent years, the situation in
Between early 1994 and mid 1996, the the start of a long-term trend. Ultimately, rural areas has worsened. The number of
economic parameters for food cultivation food production is influenced not only by rural poor remains constant in Senegal at
changed radically. The currency was deval- developments in the food markets but a very high level despite an acceptable
ued by 100 percent, imports were liberal- also by trends in the groundnut sector, rate of economic growth.
ized and privatized, and the role of the making it more difficult to draw any firm Could Senegal do more to promote and
rural development associations was conclusions. protect its local food production? This
reduced to a handful of core tasks such as question is not only significant for the
the granting of loans, agricultural exten- rural poor. A key question is whether a
Conclusions
sion and providing support to private pro- country which is so heavily dependent on
ducers and processing companies. The a handful of export products for its for-
transfer of responsibility for rice imports The high levels of food imports, especially eign currency reserves should be leaving
from the state to the private sector pro- broken rice, into Senegal undoubtedly the matter of its food security to the
ceeded smoothly, despite fears to the con- pose a major problem for local food pro- world markets to this extent. After all,
trary, although over time a significant ducers. They have created consumption with the increasing liberalization of the
concentration process has occurred. With patterns which local agriculture now finds global rice markets, higher prices and
the liberalization of imports, the state’s almost impossible to satisfy, while foreign wider price fluctuations are a distinct pos-
levies and quota system were abolished producers can meet this demand at very sibility. China’s future development poses
and the basic tariff now stood at around low cost with agricultural by-products. particular risks in this respect.
15 percent. Rice imports increased dramat- But it is debatable whether the imports However, even if politicians were able to
ically as a result. Two attempts to impose are the sole reason for, or rather the out- assert their will against the interests of
a special tax on broken rice imports come of, the weakness of local rice pro- the extremely influential import lobby, it
between 1996 and 1998 achieved only duction. Experience has shown that earli- would be almost impossible to enforce a
limited success, although it is unclear er policies which might have afforded massive increase in external protection
whether this was due to a lack of political some protection against imports have due to the ensuing price impacts on the
will and/or poor implementation. Since had very little impact on local production. urban population. Very high food prices
2001, the external protection of the rice The unfavourable economic parameters, would also curtail Senegal’s international
market has been regulated through the especially strong intervention by the competitiveness in its other economic
common trade policy of the West African state, have often made it impossible for sectors. The solution to the dilemma is to
Economic and Monetary Union and producers to respond by increasing sup- introduce moderate agricultural import
stands at between 5 and 10 percent. In all, ply. protection measures, which must be
imports of broken rice have increased So will the ongoing liberalization of im- accompanied by substantial support to
from around 400 000 to almost 900 000 ports and production, under way since improve agricultural productivity and pro-
tonnes since 1994. 1995, stimulate local production over the mote a range of diversification options in
Yet even after the structural adjustment long term? It is difficult to draw any firm rural regions. There is likely to be ade-
process, food production did not experi- conclusions at this stage. This will depend quate scope for such measures within the
ence the expected upturn; instead, it substantially on whether private and gov- WTO. Senegal is also supporting the
entered a phase of stagnation and even ernment actors are able to ensure an ade- demand being voiced by many developing
decline. Notable increases in production quate supply of loans, technology, agricul- countries for the introduction of special
were not achieved in the rice sector until tural extension, seeds, inputs and legal import protection measures.