People vs Villalon

Facts: Accused Federico de Guzman was able to procure a loan from a bank. In order to get the loan, accused mortgage a
property owned in equal shares by the complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother by virtue of a notarized special power
of attorney allegedly executed in February 5, 1964.

Both the power of attorney and the mortgage contract were registered in the Register of Deeds on February 13, 1964. The
property was foreclosed by the bank and was later sold to another.

Complainant only learned that his property is already registered in the name of another when an ejectment suit was filed
against him in January 1972. Because of this, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of
public document against the accused on March 29, 1974.

He alleged that the accused made it appear that complainant signed and affixed his signature in the said power of attorney
when as a matter of fact; he did not so participate therein.

Issue: Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact

Ruling: YES.

The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The damage to
another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the
public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.

Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-
half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to complainant, otherwise complainant would not
have quoted his brother's words. The theory of petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the same.
We agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below:

"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record, as
regards the first ground, the court finds that the contention of the defense that the authorization given to him to mortgage
the whole property is not sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness
complainant clearly shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to
Severo Carrera, excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant.
US vs Capule

Facts: On September 2, 1903, Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of appropriating to himself a tract of coconut land, situated
in the town of San Pablo, Laguna, without the knowledge or consent of the owners thereof, the married couple Aniceto
Maghirang and Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation with the notary public, Inocente Martinez, who later died,
prepared and drew up a document setting forth the sale in his favor of the said land, pretending that it was made and
executed by the said owners of the tract, stating in the document that they had made the declaration that they had sold
said land for the sum of 550 pesos paid at the time of the sale to the vendors, and Jacinto Peñaflor and Jorge Tolentino
appear in said document as witnesses of the execution thereof; and Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia as the signers of the
deed of sale, because the alleged vendors did not know how to do so. Recorded at the bottom of the document was their
ratification of its contents in the presence of said notary, before whom the said married couple appeared. The defendant
Capule exhibited said document later, although he had been assured that it was false, in a trial before the justice of the
peace of that town in the attempt to sustain his alleged right to the said piece of land.

The owners sold portions of the same land to two other people. Capule, claiming to be the owners, accused the owners of
theft.

Aniceto Maghirang denies that he sold the said land to Nicasio Capule or that he executed in his favor any document of
sale, stating that he had conferred a power of attorney upon him so that he might represent himself and his wife, who later
died, in a suit they had with Maximino Reyes, because of the absolute confidence they had in the defendant, just as it was
the latter himself who drew up the document that was later signed in his stead by Eulogio Ortega, because he could not
read or write; but he denied that he or his wife had ever been in the house of the notary Inocente Martinez to execute or
ratify any document or that he and his wife Isabel Pili, when she was alive, had told the defendant Capule that they wished
to sell the said land and that he had offered to buy it.

Issue: Did Capule commit falsification?

Ruling: YES.

It therefore appears to be plainly proven that the crime of falsification of a document has been committed because the
defendant executed upon said notarial document of an official character acts constituting falsification, by counterfeiting
therein the intervention of the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, to whom he ascribed statements different
from what they had made to him and by perverting the truth in the narration of facts, getting two persons to sign in the
name of said married couple through deceit, after giving them to understand that the document contained a commission
or power of attorney, when in fact it was a deed of sale of a piece of land, the legitimate owners whereof had never
intended or consented to its alienation.

None of the persons who appear to have signed said document and seem to have been present at its execution were
informed of its true contents, because they all confided with the greatest good faith in the false and deceitful statements
of the defendant, believing what he said to the effect that said instrument was a commission voluntarily conferred upon
him by the couple executing it, who never intended to execute any document of sale of their property to the defendant,
who went to the extreme of getting a notary to certify to its ratification before him, made apparently by the alleged vendors
in the contents of the said false document.

People vs Manansala
Facts: Felix Manansala was apprehended by Corporal del Rosario for driving his jeepney outside of his route. Required to
present his driver's license, Manansala showed a duplicate of his Traffic Violation Report which was previously issued to
him on account of his third traffic violation. Noticing that the TVR had been altered, del Rosario brought Manansala to the
police station for investigation.

The alterations were found to consist in erasing the originally written figure "III" and the word "three", and superimposed
thereon was the figure "I" and the word "one". The alterations made thus changed the meaning of the said official
document, because it was made to appear in said duplicate TVR that Manansala only had one pending case of traffic
violation instead of three.

Manansala admitted having made the alterations in question, in order to hide his pending traffic violation cases. At the
hearing however, he denied having admitted responsibility for such alterations, claiming he did not know the contents of
the confession, but only signed the same in order that he may be released.

Issue: Is the possessor of a falsified document presumed to be the author of the same?

Ruling: YES.

The accused is guilty of falsification of a public document mainly on the proposition that "the only person who could have
made the erasure and the superimpositions is the one who will be benefited by the alterations this made" and that "he
alone could have the motive for making such alterations". Besides, accused had a sufficient and strong motive to commit
the falsification. The policy and practice of the MPD was proved to be to arrest a driver who commits a 4th traffic violation
instead o f merely issuing to him a TVR, as is usually done for the 1st, 2md, and 3rd violation. Hence, Manansala had the
strongest temptation to erase the 3 violation in the TVR in question and make it appear thereon that he only had committed
one violation in order to escape arrest in case of a 4th infraction.

Manansala's exclusive possession, opportunity and motive to falsify the TVR in question constitute circumstantial evidence
justifying the inference (presumption of fact) that the forger was himself, in the absence of adequate explanation.

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS

US vs Castillo
Facts: Pio Castillo is one of the 3 clerks in Sheriff James Watkin's office. Watkin's blank checkbook was kept in a drawer in
gis offcie, and Castillo was left alone in the office he having locked the same after all the clerks have gone.

On the morning of Dec 2, 1905, Pio Castillo presented a check for the 56 pesos, Philippine currency, to Chinese merchant
named Lim Ponso. The said check was made payable to bearer and purported to be drawn by one James J. Watkins.
Watkins' signature upon said check was a forgery made in imitation of the genuine signature of James J. Watkins, sheriff of
the city of Iloilo, and that, in fact, the said James J. Watkins never signed or issued the said check. Castillo was paid the su,
of moneyThe blank upon which the check was written was stolen from a book of blank checks.

The trial court found Castillo not guilty of falsification, but guilty of the crime of knowingly using with intent to gain a
falsified mercantile document.

Issue: Does the uttering of a forged document prove that the utterer is author of the same?

Ruling: YES.

If the utterance of such document is unexplained, it is strong evidence that the utterer himself forged the instrument or
caused it to be forged. The SC held that Castillo is guilty of falsification as charged.

For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to hold, and we do not hold, that the mere fact that the accused uttered
the check in question is proof of the fact that he also forged it or caused it to be forged, but we do hold that the utterance
of such an instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence tending to establish the fact that the utterer either himself
forged the instrument or caused it to be forged, and that this evidence, taken together with the further evidence set out
above and brought out on the trial of the case, establishes the guilt of the accused of the crime with which he was charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The uttering may be so closely connection with the forgers that it becomes when so accomplished, probable proof of
complicity in the forgery.

It has been decided, nevertheless, that "possession of a forged instrument by a person claiming under it is strong evidence
tending to prove that he forged it or caused it to be forged." In several jurisdiction it has been held that one found in the
possession of a forged order issued in his own favor is presumed either to have forged it or procured it to be forged.

(NOT IN THE CASE, BUT UNDER ART. 172) Elements which would DEEM the utterer as the author:

1.) The use was so closely connected in time with the falsification;

2.) The user had the capacity of falsifying the document.

In the case at bar, Castillo was in J. Watkin's office on the night of Dec 1 and early in the morning of Dec 2. The forged
mercantile document was presented on the morning of Dec 2. Castillo was also one of the 3 clerks assigned by Watkins,
and was the one who locked the door on the night of Dec 1. As the uttering of the check was so closely connected in time
with the forging, Castillo should be considered the forger thereof.

People vs. Dava

Facts: On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner Michael T. Dava, then
holder of non-professional driver's license No. 1474427 1 with official receipt No. 7023037, bumped pedestrians
Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to the former and physical injuries to the latter.
Dava's driver's license was confiscated and submitted to the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal.

On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava driving a maroon
Volkswagen (beetle-type) car. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic
violation receipt had been issued to Dava, Roxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in
apprehending Dava for driving without a license and was assisted by the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.

On the evening of July 21, 1978, Dava was confronted by M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya and was asked
for his driver’s license. They were shown non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 with official receipt No. 0605870
issued by Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava informed
them that his officemate Felizardo Manalili had secured it for him.

In his affidavit of apprehension, Lising concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he compared it with
the xerox copy of Dava's license which was attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and the dates
of birth indicated in the two licenses did "not tally."

Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT), who was then the registrar of the
said office found that Dava’s license was "fake or illegally issued.

Issue: Whether or not Dava should be convicted of the crime charged

Ruling: YES.

The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's license that "officials of the
Pampanga LTC agency participated" in the in-preparation of said license and with having used the said driver's license
knowing that it was falsified. The charges therefore are found on the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
which punishes any private individual who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article 171 specifically
paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any
act proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava with having knowingly used a
false document under the last paragraph of Article 172.

The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed
penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by
another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c
he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to another or
at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason
doubt in this case.

It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili
that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license. Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili
awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform
duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing
the subject driver's license. Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend, did not
hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the legal fee then was only P15.00. As it was
in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili
and not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is,
beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the commission of said crime.

The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner was apprehended by Lising it
was in his possession and it was what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who
did his job with the use of a car, it is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978,
petitioner used the driver's license.

The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least
intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing
being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.

USURPATION

Gigantoni vs People

Facts: In 1981, accused Melencio Gigantoni was an employee of Black Mountain Mining Inc. and Tetra Management
Corporation, which are both private companies doing business in the Philippines.

On May 14, 1981, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) allegedly to conduct verification of some
travels made by Black Mountain's officials. Upon reaching the said PAL office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL
legal officer as a PC-CIS agent. To further convince the PAL officials of his supposed mission, Gigantoni exhibited his I.D.
purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS agent. Thereupon, his aforesaid request was granted, and PAL legal officer Atty.
Conrado A. Boro showed to him the requested PAL records. Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested manifest.

When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr., inquired from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni's
purpose in securing copies of PAL records. They then became suspicious of the accused’s real identity prompting them to
conduct verification from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no
longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the service.

On May 15, 1981, in the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real
Identity. He later admitted that he was no longer with the CIS.

The gist of petitioner's contention is that he could not be guilty of the crime charged because at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, he was still a CIS agent who was merely suspended and was not yet informed of his termination
from the service. Furthermore, he avers that the receipt by him of the notice of dismissal, if there was any, could not be
established on mere presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed.

Issue: Whether or not Gigantoni knowingly and falsely represent himself as an agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary

Ruling: NO.

The information charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely representing
himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government."

Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under which the petitioner was
charged, punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative
of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of
official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or
any foreign government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime
of usurpation of authority under which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of
usurpation of official functions.

Petitioner admits that he received a notice of his suspension from the CIS effective June 20, 1980. However, as to
petitioner's alleged dismissal effective June 20, 1980, he denies having been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any
evidence or proof adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually conveyed to petitioner.

The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the
charge that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to
establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS agent, by presenting
proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present
proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the
service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient.
Estrada vs Desierto

Facts: On 23 January 2001, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) placed petitioner’s foreign currency deposit account at
Citibank Greenhills Branch under constructive distraint.

Contending that the BIR action was unlawful, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent BIR and respondent Citibank
officers before the Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly violating (a) Section 8 of the Foreign Currency Deposits Act
(Republic Act No. 6426); (b) Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Rep. Act No. 3019);

The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution
recommending the dismissal of the aforesaid complaint for want of probable cause to indict respondent bank and BIR
officials.

Paul Elmer Clemente, Legal Counsel, Acting Director–Office of the Chief Legal Counsel (OCLC), issued a Memorandum
approving EPIB’s recommendation, a copy of which was received by petitioner on 01 February 2002.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65[4] before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition on the ground that it did not fall under its jurisdiction pursuant to Rep. Act No. 6770. The Court of Appeals held
that the petition does not fall under any law as coming within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are liable for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC

Ruling: NO. Under Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, in order for one to be held liable for Usurpation of Official Function,
there must be a clear showing that the person being charged had performed an act pertaining to any person in authority
or public officer of the Philippine government or any agency thereof, under pretense of official position, and without being
lawfully entitled to do so.

In this instant case, respondent Hefti was the one specifically charged with Usurpation of Official Function, in view of her
act of issuing the notice of constructive distraint against the foreign currency deposit of complainant with the Citibank. The
rest of the public respondents and all the private respondents were merely charged in conspiracy with the said respondent.
Hence, the issue that must be resolved is whether or not respondent Hefti being the Deputy Commissioner of BIR had
indeed usurped the duty of the BIR Commissioner when she issued the notice of distraint.

While it is true that under Sec. 206 of the NIRC as amended, the Commissioner of the BIR and not any Officer of the BIR
was the one granted with the power to issue a notice of distraint, it bears to stress, however, that when respondent Hefti
exercised such function of the BIR Commissioner, she was then designated Officer-In-Charge of the BIR by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, as evidenced by a photocopy of her Memorandum of Appointment. By virtue of her appointment as
Officer-In-Charge of BIR, it necessary follows that respondent Hefti can now legally exercise the duties and functions
pertaining to the BIR Commissioner, including the issuance of a constructive distraint. Suffice it to say that when
respondent Hefti issued the notice of distraint, she was clothed with authority to issue the same in view of her appointment
as the then Officer-In-Charge of the BIR. Hence, the charge for Usurpation of Official Function does not apply to said
respondent.

With the establishment of respondent Hefti’s authority in the issuance of the constructive distraint, the subsequent act of
respondent Dagdag in serving the said distraint to the Citibank, as well as the act of respondents Equillos and Albiento in
witnessing the service of the same to the said bank, cannot be construed as act in agreement to commit the crime of
Usurpation of Authority in the light of the foregoing discussion. The same thing holds true to the bank officers who were
made respondents in this case, considering that their act in informing complainant regarding the existence of the
constructive distraint as well as in implementing the said distraint against the latter’s account with the said bank, [were]
merely in compliance to an order issued by a competent authority.
USING OF FICTITIOUS NAME

Hock Lian vs Republic

Facts: This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental which
granted the petition for naturalization of Ong Hock Lian alias Julian Ong.

Appellant contends that the lower court erred (1) in holding that the petition was published in a newspaper of general
circulation; (2) in not holding that appellee uses an alias without court authority and in violation of the Anti-Alias Law; (3)
in not holding that appellee had failed to report his true income; and (4) in not holding that appellee has no lucrative
occupation.

Appellee, a citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in the Philippines on April 30, 1927. He used to reside in Zamboanga
City but since March 1, 1940 he has been living in Dumaguete City. He is married to Tan Ko Kiem, also known as Alice Tan,
a Chinese national, by whom he has three children, two of whom are school age and are enrolled at the St. Paul's College,
Dumaguete City. Appellee himself finished his first year high school education at the Zamboanga Chinese High School,
Zamboanga City. He speaks the English language and the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. A merchant by occupation, he has a
store in Colon Street, Dumaguete City where he sells rice, corn and general merchandise. He has two cargo trucks worth
and office equipment. To prove that he has none of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, he
presented tax and police clearances; clearances from the Philippine Constabulary, the City Fiscal, the Provincial Fiscal, the
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and the Municipal Court of Dumaguete City; and a medical certificate of the City
Health Officer.

Issue: Whether or not Hock Lian is in violation of R.A. 6085 (Act Regulating the Use of Aliases)

Ruling: YES.

Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is
using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has been baptized with the latter name or that he has been
known by it since childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore committed a violation
of the Anti-Alias Law.
Legamia vs IAC

Facts: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio
died. During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes.

From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled
herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.

After Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death
benefits.

The letter as well as the voucher were signed "Corazon L. Reyes” for using the name Reyes although she was not married
to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution.

Issue: Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated?

Ruling: NO.

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is
living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman.

And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and
understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and
she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits
upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the
lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had
their own Corazons.
Limson vs Gonzalez

Facts: On or about December 1, 1997, Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification, before the
Prosecutor's Office.

The charge for [sic] falsification of [sic] Limson is based on Limson’s assertion that in the records of the Professional
Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain ‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ is registered as an architect and that Gonzalez, who uses,
among others, the name ‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, and who pretends to be said architect.

Gonzalez alleged that in his youth, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ, and
when he transferred to UST, he made use of his second name, JUAN.

In his practice, he identified himself as Arch. Eugenio JUAN Gonzalez, because the surname Gonzalez is very common and
he want to distinguish himself with his second given name JUAN.

Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez after receiving pertinent Affidavits and evidentiary documents.
Secretary of Justice affirmed the findings of Prosecutor.

But still Limson filed a new complaint, adding the accusation that because Gonzalez used various combinations of his name,
in different signature, on the [sic] different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085 (the Anti-Alias Law)
Limson insists that the names “Eugenio Gonzalez” and “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado” did not refer to one and the
same individual; and that respondent was not a registered architect contrary to his claim.

Issue: Whether or not Gonzalez violated the Anti Alias Law

Ruling: NO.

Sec. 2 of Anti Alias Law- Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person’s baptismal and family name and the
name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant’s name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names
other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use
of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant’s name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person
shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local
civil registry.

The Court observes that respondent’s aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson –
“Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names.

An erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous
middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and
unrectified over time.

What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and
that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for
unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and
in law.

An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different
from his true name.
PERJURY

Diaz vs People

Facts: Reolandi Diaz was a Senior Clerk at Jose Abad Santos High School in San Fernando Pampanga. He sought appointment
as School Administrative Assistant I, and as one of the requirements to said appointment, he filled up Civil Service Form
212 and swore to the truth and veracity of the date and information therein that his highest educational attainment was
Fourth Year A.B.(Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges.

On that basis, he was appointed to the position. But contrary to the claim of petitioner, he was never enrolled at the
Cosmopolitan Colleges certified by its Registrar, neither was he a student at the Harvardian Colleges, certified by the
school’s president. The name of the petitioner was not also included in all the enrollment lists of college students submitted
to the then Bureau of Private Schools.

Petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of Falsification of Official Document before the Court of first Instance
of Pampanga. He was found guilty as charged.

On appeal, the court modified its decision increasing the penalty of the accused.

Issue: Is the crime falsification?

Ruling: NO, the crime is perjury.

The court held that the crime committed was not falsification but Perjury, which is the willful and corrupt assertion of a
falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. The elements of which are:

a) the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;

b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath;

c) that the statement or affidavit, the accused made a deliberate assertion of a falsehood;

d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.

All the elements enumerated therein are present in the case at bar, thus the accused is guilty of perjury. The decision of
Court of Appeals was modified, finding the accused guilty of perjury, imposing the corresponding penalty therein and not
of falsification.
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY

People vs Padol

Facts: An information had been filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur charging Esminia Pudol and Alberto Reyes
with having committed the crime of perjury, the former by subscribing a false affidavit by induction and with the further
cooperation of the latter. When the case was called for trial, the provincial fiscal filed a motion asking for the discharge of
Esminia Pudol in order to utilized as a witness for the prosecution against her coaccused and the court dismissed the case
as to Esminia Pudol

The accused Alberto Reyes, in turn, asked for the dismissal of the case as to him, alleging: (1) that once the case is dismissed
as to Pudol, the alleged principally direct participation, there is no longer any ground for prosecuting the case against the
subowner Reyes, and (2) that the Revised Penal Code does not penalize subornation of perjury, as it was formerly penalized
by section 4 of Act No. 1697, which has expressly been repealed by article 367 of said Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not Reyes should be dismissed on the ground that Revised Penal Code does not penalize subornation of
perjury

Ruling: NO.

The Revised Penal Code does not penalize subornation of perjury, as it was formerly penalized by section 4 of Act No. 1697,
which has expressly been repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code, suffice it to state that, according to article 17
of said Code, the following are considered principals:

1. . . .

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it. (Emphasis ours.)

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.

The information charges Alberto Reyes not only with having directly induced Esminia Pudol to testify falsely under oath
and to subscribe the affidavit before a person authorized by law to administer oath, but also with having cooperate and
taken a direct part in the execution of said false affidavit, without which induction, cooperation and participation the false
affidavit in question would not have been accomplished.

Therefore, the fact that subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in the Revised Penal Code does not mean that the
direct induction of a person by another to commit perjury has ceased to be a crime, because said crime is fully within the
scope of that defined in article 17, subsection 2, of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, Alberto Reyes, as already stated,
is charged in the present case not only as subowner of the perjury committed by his coaccused but also as principal by
cooperation and participation in the preparation of the false affidavit subscribed by Esminia Pudol.
MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS

Ouano vs CA

Facts: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land registered under RFC (DBP). Said property was offered for
bidding for the second time because the first bidding was nullified due to Ouano’s protest.

It appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that
if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of their
enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the property-a group headed by a
Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid.

They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the
sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses.

Issue: Whether Ouano committed machinations in public auction

Ruling: YES.

These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the property in
question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause
and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction. in order to cause reduction of the price of
the property auctioned In so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in
Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.

That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby only one bid that of Echavez
was entered for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez eventually acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal
in character, the parties not only have no action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and
price of their agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance with the
so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.