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Almendras vs Asis (Procedural Due Process: Aspects of the decision.

Thus, respondent judge, in rendering decision in Civil Case


Proceedings) No. 214, acted contrary to the doctrine of res judicata, the requisites
of which are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Almendra filed 3 administrative which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
complaints against Judge Enrique Asis of RTC Leyte for partiality, parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must
gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering unjust judgment, be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.Gaudencio matter and causes of action.
Almendra, sibling of the petitioner, filed with the RTC an action for
quieting of title over several parcels of land located in Abuyog, Leyte. Since the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3773 had reached
The trial court declared plaintiff Gaudencio Almendras and finality, respondent should have refrained from hearing the merits of
defendants Francisco, Vicente, and Antonio Almendra co-owners of Civil Case No. 214, considering that the issues in the latter case had
the parcels of land in question. The case was appealed to the CA been settled in a previous judgment involving the same parties. A
and the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thelma and Arthur judge cannot amend a final decision, more so where the decision
Almendra, legitimate children of Gaudencio, filed an action for was promulgated by an appellate court. Judges should respect the
quieting of title, with Antonio as one of the defendants. Judge orders, resolutions and decisions of higher courts, specially the
Enrique Asis declared Thelma and Arthur Almendra the rightful highest court.
owners. Antonio Almendra (petitioner) filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Asis for failing to observe the doctrine of res Moreover, respondents allegation that his decision in Civil Case No.
judicata. 214 favored complainant Antonio Almendra because of improved lot
area and productivity value of the portion awarded to him is
Respondent judge averred that his decision merely implemented the untenable for being unsubstantiated, considering that the decision
CA’s decision and further claims that the decision was in favor of was rendered without any reference to specifications of the lots in
petitioner since the land delineated to him was greater in area and question. Also, the contention that the decision is favorable to a party
productivity than the others. in the case runs contrary to respondents earlier claim that the land
was equally divided among the co-owners.
RULING; "When material facts or questions which were in issue in a
former action and were admitted or judicially determined there are
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or
questions become res judicata and may not again be re-litigated in a
subsequent action between the same parties of their privies
regardless of the form of the latter."[18]

The decision rendered by respondent judge in Civil Case No. 214


and the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the decision of
the lower court in Civil Case No. 3773 clearly show that the issues,
parties and subject matter are identical. Both cases are actions for
quieting of title involving the same parcels of land. Plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 3773 merely sold to his children, or his successors-in-
interest, two portions of the subject property and the latter filed
another case for quieting of title ruled upon in a previous final
People vs Rivera The question, therefore, is whether the trial court correctly disallowed
accused-appellants counsel from questioning complainant as
WON the court failed to observe the constitutional right of the regards the other supposed acts of lasciviousness contained in her
accused-appellant to due process and right to counsel. sworn statement. On this point, Rule 132, 6 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
After private complainant testified on direct-examination, counsel for Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be
accused attempted to cross-examine her on matters relevant to the cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the
complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness which was objected to by Asst. direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness
Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the ground that private and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
complainant did not testify on that matter but limited her testimony on interest, bias or the reverse and to elicit all important facts bearing
the rape case only. Counsel for the accused argued that although upon the issue.
that is correct nonetheless because [of] the sworn statement The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art.
executed by private complainant identified by said witness in her III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall
direct examination and marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution, he is have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115,
at liberty to cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in her 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in
sworn statement including that portion touching on the acts of all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront
lasciviousness subject matter of another case before another court. and cross-examine the witnesses against him.[27] The cross-
The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule 132, Revised examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility,
Rules on Evidence provides that the witness may be cross-examined expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed
by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give
interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the
upon the issue. witnesses against him.[28]
The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not
anything about acts of lasciviousness committed upon her person. without limits but is subject to the rules on the admissibility and
She may not therefore be questioned on this matter because it is not relevance of evidence. Thus, in People v. Zheng Bai Hui,[29] this
connected with her direct testimony or has any bearing upon the Court upheld the ruling of the trial judge disallowing the questions
issue. To allow adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the propounded by the accuseds counsel on the ability of the arresting
acts of lasciviousness which is pending trial in another court and officer to distinguish between tawas and shabu without a laboratory
which the witness did not testify is improper. examination, the academic degree of his training instructor, and the
Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will not in any way test officers authorship of books on drug identity and analysis for being
the accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or irrelevant, improper, and impertinent.
the reverse. On the contrary such questions, if allowed, will unduly In this case, accused-appellants counsel argued that his questions to
burden the court with immaterial testimonies.[25] Erlanie on the other acts of lasciviousness supposedly committed by
In another order, dated January 13, 1998, the trial court gave accused-appellant against her were for the purpose of testing her
accused-appellants counsel 20 days within which to elevate its ruling credibility. There was, however, no showing on his part how these
to the appellate court.[26] The records reveal, however, that no such questions had any bearing on complainants credibility or on the truth
petition was filed by Atty. Mangalindan as regards this particular of her claims. One is led to suspect that the purpose of these
matter. questions was to confuse complainant into committing mistakes in
her answers during cross-examination that accused-appellants opportunity to conduct the cross-examination of Erlanie Rivera in
counsel could later use to possibly put complainants credibility, not to order to test her truthfulness.
mention her character, in question.
B. The record shows that because accused-appellants private
Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been allowed counsel was not present when Dr. Barin testified, Atty. Eddie Bansil
to ask questions in relation to the sworn statement executed by was appointed by the trial court as accused-appellants counsel de
complainant. He cites Rule 132, 17 of the Revised Rules of Evidence oficio for that particular hearing. Atty. Bansil moved for the
which provides that: postponement of the witness cross-examination, but the trial court
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is denied his request because, on the one hand, accused-appellant
given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject matter was a detention prisoner and Dr. Barin was a very busy person,
may be inquired into by the other. while, on the other hand, Atty. Bansil had heard the testimony of the
said witness. Atty. Bansil then decided not to cross-examine Dr.
Neither can this rule be invoked to justify the questioning of Barin.[40]
complainant which the trial court did not allow. As the above
provision states, this rule applies to parts of an act, declaration, Accused-appellant now contends that the trial judge denied the
conversation, writing or record which is given in evidence. motion of Atty. Bansil for postponement because he was biased
against him. Accused-appellant claims that the counsel de oficio was
Indeed, the records show that after Erlanie had finished with her not familiar with the facts of his case and was thus in no position to
direct examination on November 25, 1997, the trial judge granted the cross-examine Dr. Barin.
motion made by Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, accused-appellants
private counsel, to postpone Erlanie Riveras cross-examination to While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds right to competent
allow him time to secure copies of the transcript of stenographic and independent counsel of his own choice, his option to secure the
notes of Erlanies testimony and thus enable him to fully question services of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering the
complainant.[30] Erlanie was first cross-examined on December 2, States and the offended partys right to speedy and adequate justice,
1997, but several postponements, namely, on January 13, 1998, [31] the court may restrict the accuseds option to retain a private counsel
February 10, 1998,[32] March 12, 1998,[33] March 31, 1998,[34] April 7, if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the
1998,[35] May 12, 1998,[36]May 26, 1998,[37] May 28, 1998,[38] and chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney
June 11, 1998,[39] on Erlanies cross-examination took place because declines to represent the accused for a valid reason.[41]
of the failure of Atty. Mangalindan to appear on the said trial dates.
Erlanies cross-examination was continued on July 14, 1998 and July The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent
23, 1998. Her cross-examination by accused-appellants counsel was accused-appellant on October 6, 1998 because his regular counsel,
thorough and covered various subjects, such as the nature of the Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation.
relationship between her parents, who were present during the Atty. Mangalindan had previously been granted several
execution of her sworn statement, whether the same had been postponements. As this Court ruled in another case:
executed by her voluntarily, the date when she was raped by
accused-appellant the reason for her delay in reporting the rape . . . Courts are not required to wait indefinitely the pleasure and
committed by accused-appellant, her understanding of Tagalog, who convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote
were with her in the house at the time of the rape, the details the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they
surrounding the rape committed against her, and her age. It is countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public
evident that accused-appellant and his counsel were given ample policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that
appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the
shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at
him. the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted
the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that
Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge
prosecution witness, on that day. Dr. Barins testimony on direct must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to
examination was simple, containing primarily a discussion of her witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the
findings on the hymenal laceration sustained by complainant. Her record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of
testimony did not require considerable study and extraordinary both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the
preparation on the part of defense counsel for the purpose of cross- performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice
examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer found it necessary to as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness
cross-examine Dr. Barin. which might develop some material bearing upon the outcome. In the
exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the
Moreover, beyond stating that Dr. Barin was a vital witness, witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the
accused-appellant has not indicated what questions his counsel ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may
wanted to ask from Dr. Barin. It may well be that these questions do examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
not exist at all and that the importance given by accused-appellant to questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth.
counsel de oficios failure to cross-examine the witness is He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that
exaggerated. Indeed, a medical examination of the victim, together testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or
with the medical certificate, is merely corroborative and is not an the other party. . .
indispensable element of rape.[43] The primordial issue in this case
remains to be whether the complainants testimony, not Dr. Barins, D. We also find no merit in accused-appellants argument that he was
established beyond reasonable doubt the crime of rape. denied due process considering the speed with which the trial court
rendered judgment against him, which judgment was promulgated
C. Accused-appellant likewise points to the trial judges questions one day after he filed his memorandum.
propounded to him during his cross-examination as an indication of
the latters partiality for the prosecution. The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account of the
facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the courts
We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial court is judge both findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and defense
of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes necessary in the due and witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both parties. What we
faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge to re-examine said in the analogous case of People v. Mercado applies to this case:
a witness so that his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full
and clear understanding of the facts.[44] Our reading of the transcript . . . A review of the trial courts decision shows that its findings were
of stenographic notes in this case shows that the trial judge merely based on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic
wanted to clarify certain points relating to the defense of accused- notes during the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed
appellant and not to establish his guilt. It is a judges prerogative to of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance
ask questions to ferret out the truth.[45] It cannot be taken against him of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only
if the questions he propounds reveals certain truths which, in turn, after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of
tend to destroy the theory of one party.[46] As this Court held: diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long
before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has
arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-appellants
memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient Judge Martin Ocampo of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City, and the state
time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the prosecutors assert that petitioner is no longer entitled to a
decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly preliminary investigation because he had previously waived his right
administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition to such investigation. In his omnibus order dated October 14, 1997,
of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with Judge Ocampo held that petitioner waived his right to preliminary
due dispatch. . . investigation when he failed to appear during the preliminary
investigation set by the City Prosecutor in the afternoon of
People vs Larranaga September 17, 1997, despite the express warning that "failure of the
counsel (to present the petitioner to the Cebu City Prosecutor on
The prosecutors argument is bereft of merit. Section 7 of Rule 112[13] said time and date) would be treated as a waiver of his clients right
applies only to persons lawfully arrested without a warrant. Petitioner to preliminary investigation."
in this case was, in the first place, not arrested either by a peace We disagree. A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made in
officer or a private person. The facts show that on September 15, clear and unequivocal manner. Mere failure of petitioner and his
1997, some members of the Philippine National Police Criminal counsel to appear before the City Prosecutor in the afternoon of
Investigation Group (PNP CIG) went to the Center for Culinary Arts September 17, 1997 cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to
in Quezon City to arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant. Petitioner preliminary investigation, considering that petitioner has been
resisted the arrest and immediately phoned his sister and brother-in- vigorously invoking his right to a regular preliminary investigation
law. Petitioners sister sought the aid of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit. since the start of the proceedings before the City Prosecutor. At 9:00
Atty. Armovit, over the phone, dissuaded the police officers from in the morning of September 17, 1997, petitioners counsel appeared
carrying out the warrantless arrest and proposed to meet with them before the City Prosecutor of Cebu and moved that petitioner be
at the CIG headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The police accorded a regular preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor,
officers yielded and returned to the CIG headquarters. Petitioner, however, denied the motion, stating that petitioner is entitled only to
together with his sister and brother-in-law also went to the CIG an inquest investigation. Petitioner orally moved for a
headquarters aboard their own vehicle. Atty. Armovit questioned the reconsideration, to no avail. Petitioner assailed the decision of the
legality of the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer Ruben City Prosecutor before the Court of Appeals on a petition for
Zacarias. After consulting with his superiors, Legal Officer Zacarias certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. After the Court of Appeals
ordered to stop the arrest and allowed petitioner to go home. Atty. dismissed said petition, petitioner went to this Court, still asserting
Armovit made an undertaking in writing that he and petitioner would that he should be accorded a regular preliminary investigation.
appear before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997 for Furthermore, petitioner and his counsel cannot be faulted for their
preliminary investigation. refusal to comply with the City Prosecutors directive to appear before
An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order him in the afternoon of September 17, 1997 for preliminary
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[14] investigation. As stated above, petitioners counsel appeared before
It is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by the City Prosecutor earlier that day and specifically demanded a
his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.[15] An regular preliminary investigation for his client.The City Prosecutor,
arrest signifies restraint on person, depriving one of his own will and however, insisted that petitioner was entitled only to an inquest
liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. [16] The investigation which he scheduled in the afternoon of the same day.
foregoing facts show no restraint upon the person of petitioner. Petitioner and his counsel refused to submit to such investigation as
Neither do they show that petitioner was deprived of his own will and it might be construed as a waiver of petitioners right to a regular
liberty. Hence, Section 7 of Rule 112 does not apply to petitioner. preliminary investigation.
Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned him or her the opportunity to be heard.[36] Thus, the exhaustion
on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court or tribunal,
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or while due process is considered from the point of view of the
at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.[18] Petitioner, in this litigating party against whom a ruling was made. The commonality
case, has been actively and consistently demanding a regular they share is in the same opportunity that underlies both. In the
preliminary investigation even before he was charged in court. Also, context of the present case, the available opportunity to consider and
petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because appreciate the petitioners counter-statement of facts was denied the
there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail of Ombudsman; hence, the petitioner is barred from seeking recourse
a regular preliminary investigation.[19]Clearly, the acts of petitioner at the CA because the ground she would invoke was not considered
and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary at all at the Ombudsman level. At the same time, the petitioner who
investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived had the same opportunity to rebut the belatedly-furnished affidavits
unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed. of the private respondents witnesses was not denied and cannot now
claim denial of due process because she did not take advantage of
Ruivivar vs OMB the opportunity opened to her at the Ombudsman level.

The Due Process Issue


The records show that the petitioner duly filed a motion for
The CA Decision dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground reconsideration on due process grounds (i.e., for the private
that the petitioner failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies respondents failure to furnish her copies of the affidavits of
available to her before the Ombudsman. This ruling is legally correct witnesses) and on questions relating to the appreciation of the
as exhaustion of administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing of evidence on record.[37] The Ombudsman acted on this motion by
a petition for certiorari.[34] Other than this legal significance, however, issuing its Order of January 17, 2003 belatedly furnishing her with
the ruling necessarily carries the direct and immediate implication copies of the private respondents witnesses, together with the
that the petitioner has been granted the opportunity to be heard and directive to file, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, such
has refused to avail of this opportunity; hence, she cannot claim pleading which she may deem fit under the circumstances.[38]
denial of due process. In the words of the CA ruling itself: Petitioner
was given the opportunity by public respondent to rebut the affidavits Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits, the
submitted by private respondent. . . and had a speedy and adequate petitioner simply chose to file a Manifestation where she took the
administrative remedy but she failed to avail thereof for reasons only position that The order of the Ombudsman dated 17 January 2003
known to her. supplying her with the affidavits of the complainant does not cure the
04 November 2002 order, and on this basis prayed that the
For a fuller appreciation of our above conclusion, we clarify that Ombudsmans decision be reconsidered and the complaint dismissed
although they are separate and distinct concepts, exhaustion of for lack of merit.[39]
administrative remedies and due process embody linked and related For her part, the private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to
principles. The exhaustion principle applies when the ruling court or Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 January 2003 and prayed for
tribunal is not given the opportunity to re-examine its findings and the denial of the petitioners motion.
conclusions because of an available opportunity that a party seeking
recourse against the court or the tribunals ruling omitted to take. [35] In the February 12, 2003 Order, the Ombudsman denied the
Under the concept of due process, on the other hand, a violation petitioners motion for reconsideration after finding no basis to alter or
occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving modify its ruling.[40] Significantly, the Ombudsman fully discussed in
this Order the due process significance of the petitioners failure to still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to
adequately respond to the belatedly-furnished affidavits. The protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which
Ombudsman said: attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims there were
placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside
Undoubtedly, the respondent herein has been furnished by this the courtroom clapped their hands and converted the proceedings
Office with copies of the affidavits, which she claims she has not into a carnival. In another instance, he was allegedly given the
received. Furthermore, the respondent has been given the "finger sign" by several young people while he was leaving the
opportunity to present her side relative thereto, however, she chose courtroom on his way back to his cell.
not to submit countervailing evidence or argument. The respondent, We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to
therefore (sic), cannot claim denial of due process for purposes of impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
assailing the Decision issued in the present case. On this score, the broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
Supreme Court held in the case of People v. Acot, 232 SCRA 406, high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that
that a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had the the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
opportunity to present his side. This becomes all the more press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right
important since, as correctly pointed out by the complainant, the to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always
decision issued in the present case is deemed final and been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
unappealable pursuant to Section 27 of Republic Act 6770, and especially in the criminal field . . . The press does not simply publish
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. Despite the clear information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
provisions of the law and the rules, the respondent herein was by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
given the opportunity not normally accorded, to present her extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 173
side, but she opted not to do so which is evidently fatal to her Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused
cause. [emphasis supplied]. to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-
to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
petitioners cause is a lost one, not only for her failure to exhaust her impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of
available administrative remedy, but also on due process grounds. the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
The law can no longer help one who had been given ample criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system
opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right
proffered chance. to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the
facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial
People vs Teehankee judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We
have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms
conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his case against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and
impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: "When
pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears
avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than Vice- that testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with him,
President Joseph Estrada and then Department of Justice Secretary street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is
Franklin Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and
Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman while she was stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men
of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" that the public was not unruly. The trial judge noted that there were
174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off- yet no guidelines drafted by the Supreme Court regarding media
court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. coverage of the trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating defense counsel,
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy by
se fatally infect their impartiality. spectators inside the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part carnival. He also manifested that he personally saw that when
of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the accused was being brought back to his cell from the courtroom, a
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et group of young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full
a1., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and view of policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he could
adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a not be dissuaded by public sentiments. He noted that the clapping of
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that hands by the public was just a reaction at the spur of the moment.
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might He then admonished the audience not to repeat it. 179
be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not 3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a the coverage of the trial by the press. The defense alleged that the
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and media coverage will constitute mistrial and deny accused's
trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not constitutional right to due process. It invoked the provision in the
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of Rules of Court which allows the accused to exclude everybody in the
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence courtroom, except the organic personnel. The prosecutor, however,
presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this argued that exclusion of the public can be ordered only in
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and He added that the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of
they do not disclose that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to public offenses. He quoted the U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell 180
turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any where it was held: "A responsible press is always regarded as the
manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in the
courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. The transcripts reveal criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about
the following: trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called police, the prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public
the attention of the court to the visible display of a placard inside the scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in the courtrooms public
courtroom. Acting on the manifestation, the trial judge immediately property." The trial judge then ruled that the media should be given a
directed that the placard be hidden. Only then did he order the start chance to cover the proceedings before the trial proper but,
of the arraignment of accused. 176 thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures during the trial.
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were ordered
the media after they had enough opportunity to take pictures. The to desist from taking live coverage of the proceedings. 181
court granted defense's request, noting that the courtroom was also 4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began,
too crowded. 177 the trial judge gave the media two (2) minutes to take video coverage
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument and no more. Trial then ensued. 182
ensued between the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the 5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave
audience clapped their hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule the media two (2) minutes to take pictures before the trial proper.
119, Section 13 of the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion of Afterwards, the reporters were duly admonished to remain silent, to
the public. Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground quietly observe the proceedings and just take down notes. 183
6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity
session, the judge admonished the media people present in the was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified
courtroom to stop taking pictures. 184 that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt
against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her
reveal he presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million.
reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for Napoles' information about her association with respondent was
his defense. The defense's documentary evidence consists mostly of confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they
newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued
and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be by Napoles in 2012.
fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by
judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case at the respondent, we find credible evidence of his association with
bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and partiality. 185 Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.
However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly
Inhibition to this Court, we directed the trial judge to proceed with the indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the
trial to speed up the administration of justice. 186 We found nothing in public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By
the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions,
against the trial judge. respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to
Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which
In re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of
Committee partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the
publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel"
is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself
there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative proceeding,
for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of
be overwhelming or even preponderant.13 what they know of that government corruption controversy, and how
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.
in contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of
the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who Summary Dismissal vs Torcita
is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities.
Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the “conduct unbecoming of officer / notice & hearing” PO Torcita was
case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in charged w/ several counts of conduct unbecoming of an officer,
the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her grave threats, and abuse of authority. All charges were dismissed.
mother, brother and some employees. Having closely observed and However, he was instead convicted of Simple Irregularity in the
heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even prior Performance of Duty – for w/c he was not specifically charged.
to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were Petitioners allege that the offense of Simple Irregularity (w/c includes
being drunk during duty hours) is covered by the more serious This rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was explained
offense of Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer. A person cannot be thus:
found guilty of an offense for w/c he was neither notified nor charged. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
It violates the rudimentary requirements of due process. remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative
agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter,
DD: A person cannot be penalized for an offense for w/c he was not will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical
charged or one w/c is not alleged in the information because to do so reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to
would violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature provide less expensive and more speedy solution to disputes. Where
and cause of the accusations against him. It is a violation of due the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review
process. and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration,
the courts - for reasons of law, comity and convenience - will not
Respondent was entitled to know that he was being charged with entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have
being drunk while in the performance ofduty. Notification of the been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an
charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the opportunity to act and correct errors committed in the administrative
specific charges againsthim. The absence of specification of the forum. [17] (Emphasis supplied).
offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a Indeed, the issues which administrative agencies such as the NTC
properobservance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them
legal process. and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Associated Communications vs Dumlao The purpose of the administrative case was precisely to thresh out
the legality of the continued operation of Channel 25.
Apparently, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for by ACWS The administrative case was the proper forum for ACWS to ventilate
before the NTC, the Court of Appeals and now before this Court are its side. The administrative case also provides an opportunity for the
identical and based on the same facts. ACWS did not wait for the NTC to correct any actual or fancied errors attributed to it by way of
administrative case to proceed to its appropriate conclusion before re-examination of the factual and legal aspects of the case. This is
seeking judicial intervention. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly the reason why ACWS was required to file an answer and hearings
denied the petition for premature invocation of the courts jurisdiction. were held on the matter.

It is not disputed that ACWS had in fact applied for a franchise with Resort to Mandamus and Prohibition was Premature
the 9th Congress of the Philippines but failed to submit the necessary The NTC in its Order dated February 26, 1998 gave ACWS ten days
supporting documents. The Committee on Legislative Franchises from receipt to file an answer. On March 17, 1998, ACWS filed an
issued a certification attesting to this fact. It was then that the NTC, answer. Upon ACWSs request, a hearing was held on April 22,
now acting as a three-member commission, inquired why ACWS 1998. Upon ACWSs motion, a continuance to June 8, 1998 was
failed to submit the documents. The NTC also warned ACWS about granted. ACWS filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with
the probable recall of its assigned frequency for failure to secure a the Court of Appeals on May 15, 1998, thirteen days after the first
legislative franchise as required by Act No. 3846. hearing and twenty-four days before the scheduled second hearing.
Under these circumstances, the NTC could hardly be expected to
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies is Fatal have acted on the issues and corrected itself. Clearly, ACWS filed
Before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first the petition prematurely.
avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. [16]
The special civil actions of prohibition and mandamus are procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the
extraordinary remedies that a party can resort to only in cases of law is enforced, while substantive due process requires that the law
extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced,
powerless to afford relief and where there is no other clear, adequate is fair, reasonable, and just.[19]
and speedier remedy. In this case, NTC Administrative Case No. 98- ACWS argues that NTC failed to observe due process in the
009 was the adequate, speedier and less expensive remedy to issuance of the Order dated February 26, 1998 because ACWS did
secure the reliefs sought. not receive the letter dated November 17, 1998[20]mentioned in the
It is basic that a partys failure to exhaust administrative remedies is Order. The letter required petitioner to submit its new congressional
fatal, especially where the case involves not just issues of law and of franchise within 30 days from expiration of the temporary permit to
fact but of administrative discretion. The available administrative be renewed. The letter did not refer to Channel 25 but to the radio
procedures must be pursued until a definite and final determination is stations maintained and operated by ACWS. ACWS likewise assails
held.[18] the directive to cease and desist from operating Channel 25.
Litis Pendentia also Fatal to Petitioners Cause Obviously, ACWS is referring to the procedural aspect of the due
In its Memorandum filed before this Court on December 14, 1999, process clause.
ACWS claims that the NTC has already decided NTC Administrative Notice and hearing are fundamental requirements of procedural due
Case No. 98-009. ACWS further claims that it filed an appeal under process when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals from functions. Both were complied with in this case.
the NTCs decision in the administrative case. There are in effect two It is of no moment that ACWS did not receive the letter dated
cases pending between the same parties for the same causes of November 17, 1998. What is important is that ACWS received the
action and reliefs, one in the Court of Appeals and the other in this Order dated February 26, 1998 requiring it to show cause why its
Court. permit to operate Channel 25 should not be cancelled. In any case,
If we resolve this case on the merits while ACWSs appeal is pending the Court has maintained a clear position with regard to the due
before the Court of Appeals, the duplicity of suits would result in process requirements in administrative cases, that is -
confusion and the possibility of conflicting decisions could arise. For (a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests
an orderly administration of justice, ACWSs appeal now pending in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process
before the Court of Appeals should be resolved first considering that of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
the appeal is from a decision of the NTC on the merits of the case. process.Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed
satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
No Denial of Due Process reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [21]
Neither could ACWS plead denial of due process as justification for (Emphasis supplied).
its immediate resort to the court. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays The NTC afforded ACWS an opportunity to be heard by requiring it
down what is known as the due process clause of the Constitution, to submit an answer and by conducting hearings on the matter. All
thus: told, ACWS had an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property Order dated February 26, 1998 before the NTC.
without due process of law, x x x.
In order to fall within the protection of this provision, two conditions
must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such
deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When
one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence,
Marcelo vs Bungubung management must accord the employee to prepare adequately for
his defense.
Bungubung took advantage of his position as Chairman of the
PDSBAC of the PPA, using it as leverage in soliciting cash and a After the filing of the Complaint, Bungubung was allowed by the
Mitsubishi Pajero van from the bidders as consideration for the Ombudsman to submit the following: (a) a counter-affidavit refuting
award of the security contract. the charges against him; (b) a rejoinder-affidavit; and (c) a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 11 January 2005 Order of the Ombudsman.
Before proceeding to the merits of the instant Petition, this Court Moreover, Bungubung had the option to subject the case to a formal
deems it necessary to first address the allegation of Bungubung that investigation, but his Manifestation dated 21 February 2002 before
he was denied due process by the Ombudsman. The fact that no the Ombudsman was evidence that he did not choose to do so and,
formal hearing took place is not sufficient ground to say that due instead, agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
process was not afforded Bungubung. It is well-settled that in affidavits on record. These facts establish that Bungubung was not
administrative proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman, deprived of his right to due process, having ample opportunity to
cases may be submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits and present his side before the Ombudsman. In fact, it was only later on
pleadings. The standard of due process that must be met in in a Manifestation filed on 25 February 2002 that Doromal changed
administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as his mind and informed the Ombudsman that he was opting instead
fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for for the conduct of a formal investigation.
being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve
a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary Substantial evidence and laid down guidelines relative to the conduct
evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take of judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in
the place of their direct testimonies.[20] Undoubtedly, due process in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power, viz:
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling x x x Substantial evidence is more than a mere
complained of,[21] which requirement was afforded Bungubung.[22] scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
In Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. National Labor support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
Relations Commission,[23] this Court held that: reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
[A]ctual adversarial proceeding becomes necessary only for Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions executive branch of the government, the findings of
to unclear witnesses. This is a procedural right which the employee facts made therein are to be respected so long as
must, however, ask for it is not an inherent right, and summary they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it
proceedings may be conducted. This is to correct the common but is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
mistaken perception that procedural due process entails lengthy oral evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
arguments. Hearings in administrative proceedings and before quasi- otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
judicial agencies are neither oratorical contests nor debating administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency
skirmishes where cross examination skills are displayed. Non-verbal of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in
devices such as written explanations, affidavits, positions papers or matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be
other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely aggrieved set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud,
parties predicament or defense. What is essential is ample or error of law. These principles negate the
opportunity to be heard, meaning, every kind of assistance that
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were
sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case no annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. As stated in the
as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize Joint Committee’s Order dated November 15, 2011 denying GMA’s
the court to receive additional evidence that was not Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to
submitted to the administrative agency concerned. furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence. However,
Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits
The fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that the attached to the Fact-Finding Team’s Initial Report. Therefore, when
complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial
the allegations in his complaint. Report, she was already granted the right to examine as guaranteed
by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal
Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence Procedure. Those were the only documents submitted by the
are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in complainants to the Committee. If there are other documents that
adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule were referred to in Senator Pimentel’s complaint but were not
that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. submitted to the Joint Committee, the latter considered those
documents unnecessary at that point (without foreclosing the
After evaluating the totality of evidence on record, this Court reaches relevance of other evidence that may later be presented during the
the inescapable conclusion that complainant Doromal failed to trial) as the evidence submitted before it were considered adequate
present substantial evidence that Bungubung is administratively to find probable cause against her. x x x
liable for grave misconduct.
Neither was GMA’s right violated when her motion for extension of
time within which to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing
Arroyo vs DOJ evidence was consequently denied. The Rules use the term "shall" in
requiring the respondent to submit counter-affidavit and other
The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is countervailing evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of the
governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure subpoena. It is settled that the use of the word "shall" which is a
and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under both Rules,46 word of command, underscores the mandatory character of the
the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his rule.50 As in any other rule, though, liberality in the application may
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his be allowed provided that the party is able to present a compelling
defense, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, with the justification for the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents.47 Also in both 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, investigating prosecutors
Rules, respondent is given the right to examine evidence, but such allow or grant motions or requests for extension of time to submit
right of examination is limited only to the documents or evidence counter-affidavits when the interest of justice demands that
submitted by complainants which she may not have been furnished respondent be given reasonable time or sufficient opportunity to
and to copy them at her expense.48 engage the services of counsel; examine voluminous records
As to the alleged denial of GMA’s right to examine documents, we submitted in support of the complaint or undertake research on
maintain that no right was violated in view of the limitation of such novel, complicated or technical questions or issues of law and facts
right as set forth above. We reiterate our explanation in the assailed of the case.51
decision, to wit: In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her
While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election counteraffidavit within the prescribed period because she needed to
documents which served as bases in the allegations of significant examine documents mentioned in Senator Pimentel’s complaint-
affidavit. It appeared, however, that said documents were not Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took judicial notice that
submitted to the Joint Committee and the only supporting documents not only did GMA enter a plea of "not guilty," she also filed a Motion
available were those attached to the Initial Report of the Fact-Finding for Bail and after due hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she
Team. Admittedly, GMA was furnished those documents. Thus, at benefited from the RTC Order giving her temporary liberty. In filing
the time she asked for the extension of time within which to file her the motion before the RTC and actively participating therein, she has
counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the documents she was chosen to seek judicial remedy before the RTC where the electoral
asking were not in the record of the case. Obviously, she was not sabotage case is pending instead of the executive remedy of going
furnished those documents because they were not submitted to the back to the Joint Committee for the submission of her counter-
Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to examine said affidavit and countervailing evidence. Besides, as thoroughly
documents. We cannot, therefore, fault the Joint Committee in discussed in the assailed decision, the irregularity or even the
consequently denying her motion for extension to file counter- absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of
affidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non- the information filed against her.
observance of the period she was earlier required to follow.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for
And as we held in the assailed decision: Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.
There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint
Committee in terminating the investigation, endorsing the Joint Guzman vs NU
Resolution to the Comelec for approval, and in filing the information
in court. Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and
However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings
quasijudicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had
injudicious performance of functions. The orderly administration of indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises,
justice remains the paramount consideration with particular regard to conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed
the peculiar circumstances of each case. To be sure, petitioners or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism,
were given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence. coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts
Instead of complying with the Joint Committee’s directive, several showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4
motions were filed but were denied by the Joint Committee. Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a
Consequently, petitioners’ right to submit counter-affidavit and criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,
countervailing evidence was forfeited. Taking into account the cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and following the debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of
procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by
Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Joint Committee finally reached its which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor
conclusion and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn, scholastic standing.
performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed, Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They even the right among others "to freely choose their field of study subject to
actively participated in the proceedings and in fact filed several existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
motions before the Joint Committee. Consistent with the graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of
constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases, unnecessary disciplinary regulations." 6Petitioners were being denied this right, or
delays should be avoided.52 being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition
in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty
shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in ...
(the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly OMB vs Magno
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted." 8 This Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of Detection Group,[36] the Court further warned that:
respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due
investigation. The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and
impartial, not only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but
Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court.
enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for ... (its) The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must
government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and
the college." 10 The rules may include those governing student the applicable laws, regulations, and/or jurisprudence. His judgment
discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good school discipline" is a should already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and
duty specifically enjoined on "every private school" by the Manual of law. There must be no more need for him to justify further his
Regulations for Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the
Manual further provides that- court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the
... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and
sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal since his
and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the
Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his
rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellants assignment
effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned
specified. 12 on appeal.
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that The administrative charges against Magno, arising from his alleged
due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, were
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and Misconduct and Oppression. Magno, in his pleadings filed before the
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student Ombudsman, argued and presented evidence based on such
discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, charges. However, the Ombudsman finally adjudged him to be guilty
'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are of Grave Misconduct for which he was ordered dismissed from
withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands service.
of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must
be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrongful conduct. It is
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. It generally means
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic
with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of
officer. On the other hand, when the elements of corruption, clear the charges against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are of a crime with which he was not charged.
manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.[38]
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
Simple Misconduct is distinct and separate from Grave Misconduct. fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process
The Court clarified in Landrito v. Civil Service Commission[39] that in in investigations and hearings.
grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in
disregard of established rule, must be manifest. administrative proceedings.

In point is the Courts ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Lucas,[40]


where: The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the
opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the
The issues are (a) whether respondent Lucas was denied due action or ruling complained of.[41] As found by the Court of Appeals,
process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a Magno was clearly deprived of his right to due process when he was
charge of simple misconduct, and (b) whether the act complained of convicted of a much serious offense, carrying a more severe penalty,
constitutes grave misconduct. without him being properly informed thereof or being provided with
the opportunity to be heard thereon.
Petitioner anchors its position on the view that the formal charge
against a respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted
with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is
sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against
him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of,
and not the designation of the offense.

We deny the petition.

As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline


of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In the case
of Landrito vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that in grave
misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest, which is obviously lacking in
respondents case. Respondent maintains that as he was charged
with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to due
process by convicting him of grave misconduct.

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