CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No.

175289
ANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable
of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[1] as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended.Likewise assailed in this
petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]

Factual Antecedents

In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B.
Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain
Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.[7]

Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Resolution[8] dated March 13, 1996
recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against
petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint
against Sudaria was likewise recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through
a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.

Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo
and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:

That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being the
Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named accused, all private individuals, namely:
Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada, confederating and mutually helping one another did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes
belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet
valued at P108,150.00, without any authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulation to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
 On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.[12] They alleged that the Joint Affidavit[13]of
the personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators
of the crime while the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also
asserted that their indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like Latayada and
Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated in the commission of the crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order[14] dated January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac,
and Baillo to file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the
Information in Court. On March 31, 1997, only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but same was, however, denied by the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not based on newly
discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial to the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
likewise opined that Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a public
utility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons,
one of whom was Boyatac while the rest could not be identified by Granada.[18] They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber
10 to 15 meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor
Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19] Being then
the president of a community-based organization which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a
certain Mario Bael to count the timber.[21]

At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)[22] noticed that the pile of timber was already
placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover that
the timber would be used for the repair. After inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac
delivered the timber.[23]

Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven oclock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac
bought a stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and
covered the pile with coconut leaves.[24]

On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV personality of
RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber[25] hidden and covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a
bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.

On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong
flitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet[26]and subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.

Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was then Barangay Captain of
Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed
Villarin that the timber was already delivered on December 31, 1995.[27]

On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office, received and signed for the confiscated
timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City,
Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge.The project was allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.

Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the availability
of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo
and Boyatac to attend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However,
the timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz, the
security guard on duty.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatacs demise.[28] However, the trial court did not
act on such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein
petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The
dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence
of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[29]

In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:

Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de
Oro City, was the one who procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac
mutually helped him and each other by transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge. The
accused would like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were intended for the repair of
the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No. 110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The
Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the flitches were intended for the repair of the
bridge. The Court finds it a laudable motive. The fact remains though that the said forest products were obtained
without the necessary authority and legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.[30]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the

RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28, 2005. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding [d]efendant-[a]ppellants
Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 68 of
Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[33]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied for lack of merit in its
Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 2006.

Issues

Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
 1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,]
DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;

2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS
BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and;

3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,]
DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,]
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING
HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]

Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due
process. As Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the
TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they claim that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that
persons who appear to be equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right
to preliminary investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute the guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should not have
relied on the prosecutors Certification[37] contained in the Information to the effect that a preliminary investigation was conducted in
the case.

Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they
had no intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of the
prosecution to present the timber, which were the object of the offense.

Our Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.

Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38]The said complaint did not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither
was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their
counter-affidavits were also not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said
infirmities do not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of Villarin.

It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the
accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal case.[39] They
knew about the filing of the complaint and even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the
opportunity to submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.

Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a preliminary
investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying
Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on the certification contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation
was properly conducted in this case. The certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who
is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted that Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his
affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of
Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration of witnesses.[41]

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow
the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation,
which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the
accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation.[42]

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when
the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not
guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again
assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument Villarin may have
regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively
participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission of the offense. However,
whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may
have in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the
March 13, 1996 Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.

Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.[45]

The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents.

We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legal documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing
TSNs.Notwithstanding the incomplete TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners
culpability.

The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from petitioners. It presented a Tally
[46]
Sheet to prove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996. The number, volume and
appraised value of said timber were also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated
timber were placed in the custody of Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There was a photograph of the timber
taken by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]

The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that
Latayada and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.[50]

More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of the timber[51] for the repair
of the Batinay bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the
logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery of timber. However, he could not present any document to show that his possession
thereof was legal and pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:

Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident on December 31, 1995
that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like forest lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.

Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one but several persons from
Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.

Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being loaded, the lumber will be taken
when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.

Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to load illegally
cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was the Barangay Captain of
Tagpangi.

Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.

Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay Captain of
Pagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to build his house and he
told me he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.

Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the repair of the bridge in
Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.

Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?

A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me sign it.

Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.

Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano Latayada delivered the lumber
flitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already there. So, it was delivered.

Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

A Boyatac.

Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.

A Yes, Sir.
 Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the compensation for the delivery of
those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.

Q To whom did you give the advance?

A To Latayada.

Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

A No, Sir.

Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of the lumber from Tagpangi
to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.

PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.

COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.

Q How much?
A P2,000.

Q And you gave this to the conductor?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did the conductor say?

A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber from
Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)

Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is

malum prohibitum.

As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the
timber.[53] Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists
when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.[54]

There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal
documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit
issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that
the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.

Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime

Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been established. They assert that
the failure to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the
crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized timber. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has
ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]

Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation.
The testimonies of the petitioners themselves stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they
were charged with were likewise crucial to their conviction.

We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual findings of a trial court are binding
on us, absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[57] The legal precept
applies to this case in which the trial courts findings were affirmed by the appellate court.[58]

The Proper Penalty

Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:

Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional
ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x

The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the requisite legal documents
measuring 4,326 board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify,
among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of
the timber exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its
maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Since none of the qualifying
circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged in the Information, the penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted from P108,150.00, which results
to P86,150.00. This remainder must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8)
years must be added to the basic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken anywhere within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree, without considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one degree lower from prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the minimum
period of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.

Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the RTC rendered its Judgment.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 22,
2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are
each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 205015 November 19, 2014

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio's (petitioner) conviction for violation of Section 681 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705,2 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (Forestry Code), as amended by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTalibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case
No. 96-27, on August 12, 2008.4 The Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 01162, dismissed the appeal in its
Resolution5 dated April 15, 2011 for failure to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). The CA, in its Resolution6 dated November 19, 2012, also denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution.

The Facts

Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity of the house of the
petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the ForestProtection Unit of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) - Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Talibon, Bohol, together with Forest Rangers
Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to the petitioner’s house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol
on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of the petitioner
and at the shoreline about two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate
from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the
DENR personnel entered the premises of the petitioner’s house without a search warrant.7

Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were discovered. When the
DENR personnel asked for documents to support the petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter showed to them Official
Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the said lumber. However, when the
DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and the species of the lumber did not tally with
the items mentioned in the receipt. The said receipt showed that the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red lawaan lumber
with sizes 2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the lumber in the petitioner’s
house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3
pieces 2x8x18; and 1 piece 2x10x12.8

Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the lumber, asked for police
assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to transport the confiscated lumber to the DENR office for
safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being
Confiscated,9 which showed the value of the lumber to be 9,040.00, were issued to the petitioner. Forest Rangers Butal
and Ramos corroborated Abaniel’s testimony.10

SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance, he and PO3 Antonio Crescencio
went to the house of the petitioner where they saw some lumberwhich was later loaded on a cargo truck. Thereafter,
they escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San Roque, Talibon, Bohol.11
On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the seized lumber were owned by
the petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from Pengavitor Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol and from Java
Marketing in Ubay, Bohol.12 However, the defense had only the Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor
Enterprises which, however, did not tally with the forest products confiscated.

On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. The Information13 alleged:

That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon, Bohol, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to possess and to gain for her own benefit,
without any legal document as required under existing jurisprudence, laws and regulations, and without any lawful
authority under existing rules and regulation of DENR Forest Management Sector, willfully, unlawfully and illegally
possess and have under her custody and control forest products consisting of twenty-four (24) pieces of magsihagon
lumber with a volume of 452 board feet and a total value of Nine Thousand Forty (₱9,040.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.14

During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.Thereafter, trial
ensued.15

On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment16 convicting the petitioner of the offense charged and sentenced her to
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years and six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum. The RTC also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber owned
by the petitioner.17

As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its Resolution18 dated April 15, 2011, the CA
dismissed the appeal outright because the petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a copy of the Appellant’s Brief in violation
of the Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA,in its Resolution19 dated
November 19, 2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue

The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA’s dismissal of the appeal due to the petitioner’s failureto serve a
copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the OSG is proper, in view of the attendant factual circumstances and in the interest of
substantial justice.

Ruling of the Court

In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure and submits that the CA erred in
dismissing her appeal purely on the basis of mere technicalities.

Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for
the determination of their cases on the merits and of dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so
warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.20

The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,technical
sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not override – substantial justice. For this reason, courts must
proceed with caution so asnot to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure thatall litigants are
granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of
technicalities."21

It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the petitioner’s cause, the appellate court opted not
to decide the case on the merits. The subject of the appeal was the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner of
violation of the Forestry Code and sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of no less than six (6) years to eleven (11)
years.

In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to subvert and
delay the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the petitioner learned that her appeal was dismissed by the CA for
failure to serve a copy of her Appellant’s Brief to the OSG, she immediately confronted her previous counsel who denied
having filed such brief. Asthe petitioner was very much worried of being incarcerated, she asked her previous counsel to
withdraw from the case. Thus, the petitioner submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to the incompetence
and ignorance of her former counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has indeed filed an Appellant’s Brief.
As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate
court’s indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law; (b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (c) where the
interests of justice so require.22

Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief tothe OSG is a
persuasive reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure as the wanton recklessness or gross
negligence of her counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in the outright deprivation of her
liberty.

In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules and ruled on the meritsof the
appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than the petitioner’s liberty.

Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s culpability.

In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting documents to show that she
bought the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the
DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against her.

The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain view.1âwphi1 Under the plain view
doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.24

There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to the house of
the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under the latter’s
house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It isclear, therefore, that the said
lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioner’s house falls within the
purview of the plain view doctrine.

Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant. Section 8025 of the
Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National Police
to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense orthe
forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel
had inadvertently come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.

The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, as well as her subsequent failure to
produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for
violation of the Forestry Code. Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two distinctand separate offenses
punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land withoutany authority; and (2) possession of
timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.26

In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products are
legal or not. Mere possession of forest products withoutthe proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not
the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper documentation as malum prohibitum.27

In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly owned by the petitioner but unfortunately no permit
evidencing authority to possess said lumber was duly presented. Thus, the Information correctly charged the petitioner
with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents. The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that the lumber was confiscated from the petitioner,
namely: a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure
receipt, a photograph of the house of the petitioner, and a photograph of the confiscated lumber. Moreso, the direct
and affirmative testimony of the DENR personnel as state witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension
well establishes the petitioner’s liability.

As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras
maximum.
The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in
the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is ₱9,040.00 which is alleged in the
Information. However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel and Butal that this amount is the estimate based on
prevailing local price as stated in the apprehension receipt they issued, the prosecution did not present any proof as
tothe value of the lumber.

Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to prove the amount of the property taken for
fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the prosecution
must present more than a mereuncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.28 Hence, the lower court erred in finding that the
value of the confiscated lumber is ₱9,040.00 for no evidence of such value was established during the trial.

Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)29 of the RPC, whichis arresto
mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, considering that violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is
punished as Qualified Theft under Article 31030 in relation to Article 309 of the RPC, the statutory penalty shall be
increased by two degrees, that is, to prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods or within the range ofthree
(3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days, considering that
there are no attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense.

In accordance with current jurisprudence31 and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court finds it
proper to impose on the petitioner, in view of the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of frmr (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol,
Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie Crescencio is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four ( 4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No. 165448

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 27, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision[2] and 24 September 2004 Resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total
volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.

On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the
City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.

Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under the
following terms and conditions:

2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;

3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an appropriate
place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the same is required to
plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly maintained
and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of the planted seedlings;

4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by
E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and

5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and regulations
shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of penalties in
accordance with existing laws and regulations.

This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as soon as the
herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.[4]

On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and
Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority. They
proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising
the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site,
together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the
trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees
cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The
market value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges were P11,833.25.

An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[5] (PD 705) was filed against petitioner, Cuteng,
Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market price as P182,447.20
(Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25
or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law.[6]
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy of the permit. Masing
stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in possession of the necessary
permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated
that while he was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.

Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was in possession of the
permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two were stumps and two were rotten.

Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely followed petitioners instructions.

Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit was issued. He stated
that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.

Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the
trees in petitioners presence.

Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his superior,
Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees
without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not
prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three other
men.
The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 26 May 1994 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL CUTENG
y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional,
as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the Government in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25, representing the market value
of and forest charges on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares
in the costs.

The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government.

On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are acquitted
on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their provisional liberty
in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated February 4, 1996 and
February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper receipt therefor.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court
further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit.

Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.
 The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago
and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino is found
guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the
cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms of the permit which only he possessed. The Court
of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The
Court of Appeals rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of Santiago
because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of Appeals further rejected
petitioners contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without permit, while in this case there was a permit
for cutting down the trees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not covered by
the permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that the
prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago
because he was only following orders as to which trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises questions of facts and not
questions of law. We do not agree.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[10] For questions to be one of law, the same must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[11] The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[12]

In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.

Section 68 of PD 705 provides:

 Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered
the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest

products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal

documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.[13]

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case,
petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered,
collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the
cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of
conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what
was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really
intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to
convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.

Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership,
association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24 September 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.,

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), AND ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES,

CHIEF, SPECIAL ACTIONS AND INVESTIGATION DIVISION, DENR, RESPONDE

Parent Category: 1996

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.1996 Jun 18En BancG.R. No. 104988DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the Second and Third
Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.

Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a
Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a
lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469.
Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.

Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time
material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief
of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.

The material operative facts are as follows:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the
lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and
sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from
the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes
and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized
the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. 1 The
team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. 2

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's
lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and
approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. 3

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000
board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin,
auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the
legitimacy of their source and origin. 4

Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the
seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further orders. 5

On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14
April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the
certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino Robles denied the motion on the ground that the
documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure. 6

On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:

1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an
unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required
documents;

2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the
lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing
legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;

3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the
circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no.
2 pushes through;

4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for transport
lumber using "recycled" documents. 7

On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit
No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's
permit should not be cancelled.

On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had
already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted. 8

On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April
and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law" the
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's
lumberyard. 9

On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The
case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of the said
court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by
a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan
of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April
1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897,
series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's
permit had already been suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team
went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed
that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales
invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms.
Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then
out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut
ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber.
The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted
sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipttherefor. 10

As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and
assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.

In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and
general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution 11 whose dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy
Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal
shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.

It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents be
released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as Chairman of the Task
Force on Illegal Logging." 13

On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 58 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as
follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have in his possession truckloads of
almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws andregulations. 14

On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:

1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated,
and instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts
and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by Law;

2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the proper court regarding
the Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-
322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;

3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon
compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;.

4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned
above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said petitioner is withheld in this case until after the
proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those Lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and

5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's
truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes
of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional
mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and
accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle. 16 As to the
seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled
that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the
search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question. 17 And, although
the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid
because it is settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of
thesearch. 18

The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized
articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the
warrant.

As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been
rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact
the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.

The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed
the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.

On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings
based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed
to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue
of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then
pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 19

The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of
lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has
resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20

In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21 respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the
motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents
required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.

On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of
merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the
issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the
possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is
unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:

This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has always been foisted by
those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is
that when appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the
lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it. 25

The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March
1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988,
which was filed on 2 May 1992. 27

On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing
the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when
the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under
suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified
as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.

The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No.
33778.

In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for
lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on
the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building
purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest product.

The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest product involved in a
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in
part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed
or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor
of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or
taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.

Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents.

Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996,
the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.

We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.

G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not
charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and
penalized under the said section.

Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is
the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of theoffense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the
information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense.

Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which
provides:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products
from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an
exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly
charge a violation of the said section?

A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject
matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the
required legal documents, are truckloads of

(1) almaciga and lauan; and

(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.

The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber." They cannot refer to the
"lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction
"and," and not with the preposition "of." They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under
Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:

Sec. 3. Definitions. --

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or
other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest
lands.

It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private respondents
obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section
68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information
validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four
corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid
of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment."

The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the
information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.

Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint
Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to
infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:

8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and
slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species.

In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31 of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis
for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy
Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of
almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.

The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's
conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is
penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber.

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant," which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other
finished wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term
lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." 32 Simply put, lumber
is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And insofar as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.

Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.

G.R. No. 104988

We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.

It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the
petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid
exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No.
1775.

Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.

Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that no
search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. 35

We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a
continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days.
Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one
day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on
one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the
ten-day period. 36

As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber without the required
legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein
nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No.
106424.
G.R. No. 123784

The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpally fail to shaw prima facie that a reversible
error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6
February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to
require the respondents to comment on the petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by
Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to
25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly,
Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize the Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:

Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head
or his duly authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .

The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail view of our disquisition and
ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as
lumber dealer.

All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block
the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of
the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only
ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The
Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person
who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita
Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d)
DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that
the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE.

Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

<b>Separate Opinions</b>

<b>VITUG, J., dissenting:</b>

The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th August
1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that
has charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the
Forestry Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the 18th October 1991 Order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:

The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of violation of Section 68, Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2

Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that the facts comprising
the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a
prejudicial question, private respondent having formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in
question in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of
Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the motion of private respondent to
quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of "timber or other forest products" (without supporting
legal documents), the mere possession of "lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of
PD 705. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come within the purview of
"timber" defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986. The motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution before this Court.

Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand,
from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size
or dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition of
almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR
Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species
(supa included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa
included) punishable by mere inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of 1983,
clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on lumber
shipped outside the province, city or the greater Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice
to accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the origin and destination points are both within the
greater Manila area or within the same province or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not
removed from the lumber yard.

Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the compound of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, the possession of which without requisite legal
documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989,
that defines "lumber" to be a --

. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;

and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December 1987, to be
--

. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all
mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size;

which may either be --

 a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar mechanical hard tools in the forest and which
from the size of the piece and the character of the wood is obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR
Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated December 28, 1987); or

b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into
pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise
worked to approximate its finished form, such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas,
troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series
of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) --

(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or
minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private
respondent that a CLO is required only upon the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is merely
stored in a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to show any CLO or
other legal document required by administrative issuances raises the presumption that the lumber has been shipped
or received from illegal sources; and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality
of the seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.

The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases
(G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term "timber or other forest products" the possession of
which without the required legal documents would be a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers
"lumber".

Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the possession without required
legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there
mentioned refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however,
would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance --

(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, 3 subscribed and sworn
to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis the latter recommended the filing of the information,
read, as follows:

"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail from our agency continued to monitor the activities
inside the compound and in fact apprehended and later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck loaded
with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering the shipment;

xxx xxx xxx

"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang
Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited
wood and wood products without the required documents." 4
 (b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by Undersecretary of
Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that --

" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact
apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber
without the necessary legal documents covering the shipment." 5

(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of Registration
No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the latter's possession
of almaciga lumber without the required documents. 6

(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran, authorized the confiscation of
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and
dimensions owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc. 7

(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the Department of
Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession of lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal
documents, 8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277.

(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash, sought to argue that the possession
of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., 9 was covered by the penal
provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.

Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber"
should be held to be among the items that are banned under Section 68 of PD 705.

While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following
the standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone be considered and should not be challenged, there
should, however, be no serious objections to taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not
made out in the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the case of People vs.
Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain --

. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were
precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the
complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond
the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his
evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts,
because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that
all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from
considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to
"timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree defines "forest product" to mean --

(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other
forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational
and geologic resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied);

and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining
a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to refer to --

. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw
materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.

In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while lumber has been categorized,
under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood products.

The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:

(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to be --

. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all
mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size; 12
 (2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber"
includes --

. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;" and

(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest
products" shall include "lumber --

cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.

While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency
called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be good, however, to the extent that such
interpretation or construction is congruous with the governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the
law into effect 15 but it would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those
which are penal in nature, of extending the scope of the law or its plainmandate. 16

Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988
and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate
the well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving
whatever remains of the country's forest reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed and
checked, the continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as well as
of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on end the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those who
call for the passage of remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes irreversible.

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, DENR, respondents., G.R. No. 104988, 1996 Jun 18, En Banc


 THIRD DIVISION
 G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002
 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented
by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi,, Petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and
Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, Respondents.
 DECISION
 PANGANIBAN, J.:
 Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the confiscation in favor of the
government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.
 The Case
 Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 6,
1995 Decision1 and the June 3, 1996 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in
Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
 WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN and
NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
 The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
 The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking custody of the Holy
Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner
thereof.3cräläwvirtualibräry
 The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the Decision
regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
 The Facts
 In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
 The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein
below:
 That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao,
Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of
lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and
THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper
authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by
Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.
 Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.
 Thereafter trial was conducted.
 The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
 That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger.
On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San
Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by.
He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber
consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In his estimate at the price
of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of
the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him
that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog
City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt
marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and
series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the
driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because
they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood
shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted
lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero,
Calbayog City.
 The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution and the
defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case would be merely corroborative [of]
those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and
their series. Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to
identify [them].
 For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely offer
corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established:
 That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure some
wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His
companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San
Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing.
They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in
circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral
Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a
favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross
Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The
subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their way
home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also
inquired about the assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop
in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero,
Calbayog City. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to
tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora,
San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle together
 with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so
Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about
what happened.4cräläwvirtualibräry
 After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.
 Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community and
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative
confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.5 The two
failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized.
Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final
confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.6 Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January
26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private
respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of
the Legal Division of the DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.7cräläwvirtualibräry
 Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof.8 He contended that the
vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED
approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.9 He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over
the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD
705, as amended by EO 277.
 The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
 Ruling of the Trial Court
 The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of
Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the
lumber to the latters house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also located. Asan
advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the authorization for the lumber were in the
formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise
insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
 In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on procedural
and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC
deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.
 Substantively, the trial court ruled:
 x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court the owner of the
vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not
commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio
Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that
he had x x x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain
Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.
 xxx xxx xxx
 The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become final and
executory.
 Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR Officer
Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found to be owned by Asan
Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made
an accused in the present case.
 Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or
has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or
consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence,
neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D.
705 as already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio
Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been
appealed.10cräläwvirtualibräry
 Hence, this Petition.11
 Issues
 In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:
 (A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property already
owned by the government.
 (B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705,
as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
 (C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake, error or failure of its
officers to perform their duties.12cräläwvirtualibräry
 Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether
the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action,
petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.
 The Courts Ruling
 The Petition is meritorious.
 First Issue:
 Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
 Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle,
because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR
on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as
amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air --
used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.
 We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.13 A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant
sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or
forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products
and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
 Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other ForestProducts Without License. -- Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
 The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.14cräläwvirtualibräry
 Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
 SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.15cräläwvirtualibräry
 If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and applied
without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The
courts may not construe it differently.16cräläwvirtualibräry
 Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts;17 equipment covers
physical facilities available for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;18 and implementspertains
to whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil.19 These terms do not
include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A
define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used
either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any
forest product.20
 Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used either by land, water
or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has
supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and
regulations.21
 To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and
disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
 Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private respondents to
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of
lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x
x. The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut,
gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.
 Confiscation Without Due Process
 Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false, falsified and perjurious
document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner
made it appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum
on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR
Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
 Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial
environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection
with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.22 Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in
running condition.23cräläwvirtualibräry
 We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of
the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents
acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was
based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning
only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have
not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.24 The genuineness of
the Order and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is
not a trier of facts.25cräläwvirtualibräry
 The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited to reviewing legal
errors committed by a lower court.26 Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by
the courts only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.27
 Second Issue:
 Construing PD 705, as Amended
 Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a
situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that
law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the
forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall
not bar its forfeiture.
 In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a
situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other persons who violated it
or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not
shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.
 We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because
what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without
legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction;
thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A
of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
 Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation of
conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal
liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or
forest products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.28cräläwvirtualibräry
 We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat the
purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277
underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the
present and future generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through
the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.29Strong paramount public policy should not
be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its
scope.30
 Third Issue:
 Estoppel
 In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners third issue. It is no longer
material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure
to comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public
prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to
private respondents.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
 SO ORDERED.
 Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
 G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015
 JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y
JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 DECISION
 BRION, J.:
 Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Jackson Padieraos y Quejada
(Padiernos), Jackie Roxas y German (Roxas) and Rolando Mesina y Javate (Mesina). The petitioners seek the
reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision1 dated May 10, 2007 and resolution2 dated December 20, 2007 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 28920. The assailed CA rulings affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 66, Baler, Aurora in Criminal Case No. 3122.

The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of
 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. According to the
Information, the petitioners took away the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as evidence and to
avoid its confiscation and forfeiture. The Information specifically states as follows:
 That at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning on November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Dingalan, Aurora, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid principals, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in their
possession and control 818 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet and valued at
P133,289.00 loaded on a ten-wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and owned by the accused Santiago
Castillo y Cruz without any permit, license or documents from the proper authority and that at about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the following day, November 16, 2002, the aforesaid accessories,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously
and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it
could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool
or instrument of the crime, [emphasis and italics supplied]

CONTRARY TO LAW.
 Accused Santiago Castillo (Santiago), Frederico Castillo (Frederico), and Roger Mostera (Mostera) remain at
large; accused Eddie Gatdula (Gatdula) pleaded not guilty as principal to the crime; while petitioners Padiernos,
Mesina, and Roxas pleaded not guilty as accessories to the crime.

Prosecution's evidence

The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 15, 2002, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (DENRO) Felimon Balico (Balico) approached a truck loaded with lumber, which
was parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora (Dingalan)3 The truck bore the name "JEROME" with Plate
No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera, the lumber's
supporting documents but they failed to produce any.

Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa (Gamboa) and SPO4 Romulo Derit. Thereafter, he proceeded
to the DENR office to report the incident. Some of the DENROs represented that the transportation of the seized
lumber had the required permit but they, too, failed to produce any supporting document.

The DENRO group - composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero (Vivero) and Rodolfo Tumagan (Tumagan) - and the
policemen, Gamboa and Romulo Derit, guarded the truck loaded with lumber.4

The DENRO group decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station at Poblacion. They
transferred the lumber first from November 15 to November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national highway
in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police officers.5

On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived at the
place where the truck was being held in custody.6

Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck,7 agreed with the DENROs and the police officers to bring the
truck to the police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who volunteered to drive the truck; while
Padiernos asked Balico where the seized lumbers were.8

Mesina started the engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on board at the front of the
truck. The DENRO group also got on board at the back of the truck. SPO2 Renato Mendoza (Mendoza) and his
companion, PO1 John Fajardo (Fajardo) follow on a motorcycle.

Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico thought that Mesina would
maneuver the truck so that they could proceed to the police station. To their surprise, Mesina increased the
truck's speed and headed towards the direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving behind their two policemen escorts9 who
chased the truck and fired three warning shots.10

As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled "Saklolo! Saklolo!" but the truck maintained its speed. SPO2 Mendoza
corroborated this testimony; he and Fajardo saw the three DENROs waving but could not hear what they were
saying.

When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza and Fajardo decided not to pursue the truck anymore and
simply reported the incident to the Philippine Army stationed at Brgy. Tanawan.

The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber machine gun and flagged down the truck at Brgy.
Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija.11
 As the truck passengers alighted, petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them, saying that they had no right
to apprehend the truck and the lumber.12

Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores, Sagudang, Fajardo, and Mendoza13 immediately proceeded to Brgy.
Bagting where they found the DENRO group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The DENROs and the policemen proceeded
back to Dingalan, with police officer Gamboa driving the truck to the police station compound.

Evidence for the defense

Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching television with his wife and children when his
former employer, Santiago, arrived and asked him to bring the latter's truck to Cabanatuan City. He refused
Santiago's request because he knew that the truck had been engaged in illegal activities; particularly, the truck
had been previously loaded with lumber that were confiscated.14

Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything and that there was really no problem
with the truck. Mesina finally agreed and rode in Santiago's car. Santiago asked him to fetch Roxas to
accompany them.15

Roxas was resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked Roxas if he could drive his
truck to Cabanatuan City.16 Roxas refused because he had already heard of the truck's apprehension,17 but he
finally relented after Santiago assured him that there was no problem with the truck. They proceeded to
Caragsacan, Dingalan where the truck was parked.18 On cross-examination, Roxas testified that he knew very
well that the vehicle was a "hot" truck but he relied on Santiago's claim that the problem already been settled.19

On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at the waiting shed of Aplayang Malaki,
Dingalan.20 According to Padiernos, he had been waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m.
but only Santiago's group came by.21 Padiernos hitched a ride with them after learning that they would bring
Santiago's truck to Cabanatuan City.22

Padiernos testified that he only learned where the truck was parked when they reached Caragsacan.23

On reaching the place where the truck was parked, they all alighted from the car and walked towards the back
of the truck; Padiernos crossed the street. Mesina saw Santiago talk to DENRO Tumagan and several other
persons for about 25 to 30 minutes.24

Thereafter, Santiago handed the truck keys to Mesina.25 Padiernos seated himself in the front cab of the truck
with Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina took the driver's seat.26 Mesina drove the car towards Cabanatuan City
upon Santiago's instruction.27

The petitioners unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping on the truck to stop
them.28 They also did not notice any motorcycle following them as the truck's side mirrors were broken. They
did not reach Cabanatuan City because the Philippine Army flagged them down.29

After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney bound for Cabanatuan City while Roxas and Mesina boarded a
jeepney bound for Dingalan.30
 The RTC's ruling

The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.31

The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had been used in
violating P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code.32

The RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were categorical, straightforward, and
consistent; they had no improper motive to testify falsely against the petitioners.33 Thus, the RTC disregarded
the petitioners' defense that they did not intentionally take away the truck.34

The RTC also found that the petitioners' testimonies and admissions established their prior knowledge that the
truck had been previously confiscated for illegal transport of forest products. This explains the reluctance of
Mesina and Roxas to go with Santiago in getting the truck.35

The RTC further ruled that Padiernos' defense of denial fails in view of Balico's testimony that Padiernos
gave the DENROs a "tongue-lashing" as they had no right to apprehend the truck and its cargo.36 Padiernos'
knowledge of the status of the truck is also undeniable as he admitted his familiarity with the townsfolk of
 Dingalan and its rampant problem of illegal transport of forest products. The RTC concluded that the incident
and the personalities involved could not have escaped Padiernos' notice, yet he still went with them to get the
truck.37

Finally, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' claim that they did not hear the policemen's warning shots and the
DENROs' shouts because of the noisy engine and the defective windows of the truck. The RTC had observed
during its ocular inspection of the truck that both windows were in order and sounds outside could be clearly
heard even with a running engine.38
 The CA's ruling

The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and adopted its factual findings, but modified the penalty imposed on the
petitioners.39

The CA considered the subject truck as an "instrument" in the commission of the offense, within the meaning of
Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). While the lumber had already been unloaded and
placed in police custody, the truck still served as the essential link to the discovery of the loaded undocumented
lumber. Similarly, its presentation as evidence is material in proving the commission of the offense of violation
of P.D. 705, as amended.40

The CA added that since the petitioners' violation of P.D. 705 is mala prohibita, their intent, motive, or
knowledge need not be shown. Nevertheless, their defense of denial must fail in view of the evidence on record
and their own admissions that they were aware of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity at the time that
they drove it towards Nueva Ecija.41

The prosecution had also clearly established Padiernos's close association with Santiago, Roxas, and Mesina.
Padiernos previously facilitated Santiago's application for mayor's permit as a lumber dealer; Roxas is a family
friend of Padiernos and his father is Padiernos's driver, while Mesina and Padiernos' are long-time
acquaintances.42
 The Parties' Arguments

The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705 because the
DENROs and the police authorities had already discovered the crime and had, in fact, control over the truck
when the petitioners drove it towards Nueva Ecija.43 Article 19 of the RPC only punishes accessories who
prevent the discovery of the crime.44

On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the petitioners' acts were aimed at preventing the discovery
of the crime. The respondent alleges that without the truck, the accused in the present case could easily
produce the necessary transportation documents to account for the entire volume of the confiscated
lumber.45 The respondent refers to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO Dingalan who tried to make it
appear that the seized lumber had the proper transportation permit for 8,254 board feet and 261 pieces of
lumber. This transportation permit did not tally, however, with the actual volume of the confiscated lumber of
10,253 board feet, totaling 818 pieces.46
 The Court's Ruling

We emphasize at the outset the well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for
review. An appeal therefore empowers, and even obligates, the appellate court to correct errors as may be
found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not been raised. It is likewise settled that when an
accused appeals, he opens the whole case for a new trial.47

The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal liability of the appealing accused,
and from imposing the corresponding punishment in accordance with the charges in the Information and the
crime proved during trial.

Thus, in People v. Manalili et al.,48 the Court held that since the Information in that case contained a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessarily constituting both the crimes of illegal possession of
firearms and of murder, the separate crime of multiple murder may be validly taken into account49 in the
resolution of the appeal before the Court, although the appellants have been acquitted of illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled that the appellants in that case were fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of
multiple murder and granted a fair opportunity to defend themselves.

Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the facts alleged in the
Information and the crime proved in the present case do not make the petitioners liable as accessories for
violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
 The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime

The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense, and not
the technical name that the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of
view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not concerned with the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. His attention should be directed and his
interest should be on the facts alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a crime given in the law with
some technical and specific name," but "did he perform the actsalleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth."50

In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:
 xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck
with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in
favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime.
 Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they were
accessories to the crime, which is merely the public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical name of an
accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual charges against them. In short,
their alleged acts control in defining the crime for which they should stand trial.

These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with each other to take and carry away the
subject truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the
government as tool or instrument of the crime. Notably, the petitioners had been sufficiently apprised of these
factual allegations, against which they should defend themselves.

Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal definition of
"accessories" under Article 19 of the RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused as
accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.

Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of the crime
and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent
its discovery.

Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the
discovery of the crime.52

In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already been
discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the truck and the
loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on November 16, 2002, after its
confiscation.

In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the Information as the legal
definition of the technical term "accessories" does not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information
that serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners.

The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of
P.D. 1829

The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting
an offense committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal
offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled "Penalizing
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."

P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate
the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the following acts:
 Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 xxxx

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent
to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation
of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings
in criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]
 The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the petitioners' acts actually
constituted a violation of Section 1(b) above.

First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice under Section
1(b).

The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck so
that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as
a tool or instrument of the crime.

In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence that is
indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck is an
indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the
permit for the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber. According to DENR
forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna,53 the transport of lumber should be covered with supporting documents that
should be in the possession of the transporter.

Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The term "suppress"
means to subdue or end by force.54

Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its
availability and prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D.
705. This intent was duly proved during trial.

It is undisputed that Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal possession/transport of the
seized lumber. Santiago had every reason and motive to take his truck after its confiscation. Without the truck,
Santiago could be exculpated and the forthcoming criminal investigation or proceedings for violation of P.D. 705
would be frustrated.

The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their knowledge of the status of the
truck and their commission of the crime at Santiago's prompting.

Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of the witnesses and the petitioners'
admissions in ruling that the petitioners knew that the truck had been involved in the illegal
transportation/possession of the seized lumber.

Mesina admitted that he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had beenpreviously loaded with
lumber that was confiscated.

According to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go with them because he already heard the news of the
truck's apprehension. Roxas admitted that he only agreed to join Santiago and Mesina, after being assured that
there was no problem with the truck.

Padiernos' demeanor after the army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the truck's involvement
with the seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad words at the DENROs, saying they had no right to apprehend the
truck and the lumber. This testimony, together with his close association with the other petitioners, destroys his
flimsy defense of denial.

The RTC's findings during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners deliberately drove the
truck to Nueva Ecija despite evident knowledge of the policemen's warning shots, tapping, and the DENROs
shouting for help from the back of the truck.

Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners' admissions, and the findings of the trial court negate the petitioners'
defense of denial of their intent to take the truck and their knowledge of the truck's involvement in an illegal
activity.

The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA - such as the petitioners' close association with each
other, their flimsy defense of denial of their intent to take away the truck, and the totality of their acts showing
their common design to take the truck - lead us to conclude that the petitioners had indeed mutually conspired
 with one another to take away the truck to suppress it from being used as evidence in the criminal investigation
or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705.

Since the crime charged in the Information and the crime proved during trial point to the petitioners' violation of
P.D. 1829, we reverse the CA's findings and find the petitioners guilty of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.

Under Section 1 of the same law, the penalty for the crime of obstruction of justice is prision correccionalin its
maximum period, or a fine ranging from P1,000.00 to P6,000.00 pesos, or both.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals' decision dated May 10, 2007, and its
resolution dated December 20, 2007. We find petitioners Jackson Padiernos y Quejada, Jackie Roxas y German,
and Rolando Mesina y Javate GUILTY for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. They are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of prision correccional for 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.

 G.R. No. 193313, March 16, 2016
 ERNIE IDANAN, NANLY DEL BARRIO AND MARLON PLOPENIO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 DECISION
 PEREZ, J.:
 Before us is a Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 March 2010 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30729 affirming the
Decision2 dated 22 February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42 of Virac, Catanduanes finding
petitioners Ernie Idanan (Idanan), Nanly Del Barrio (Del Barrio) and Marlon Plopenio (Plopenio), together with
Roberto Vargas (Vargas) and Elmer Tulod (Tulod) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of lumber
under Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705, as amended.

The petitioners were charged in the following Information:

 That on or about the 16th day of October 2005 in the afternoon at [B]arangay San Miguel, [M]unicipality
of Panganiban, [P]rovince of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused[,] with intent to gain, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another did there and then (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess, and in control of twenty
nine (29) pieces of narra lumber with gross volume of 716.48 board feet or 1.69 cubic meter valued at
Php275,844.80, Philippine currency loaded in a truck bearing Plate No. UMU-424 without necessary
permit, license or documents required under the existing laws, rules and regulations of the DENR to the
damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Php275,844.80.3

During trial, the prosecution presented the police officers who apprehended petitioners. Their version goes:

In the morning of 16 October 2005, the PNP headquarters of the Municipality of Panganiban, Province of
Catanduanes received an information that a group of illegal loggers will be transporting narra flitches4along
Kilometer 11, 12 or 13 in Panganiban. At around 3:30 p.m., the OIC Chief of Police P/Inspector Chito Oyardo and
five (5) other policemen were patrolling Kilometer 12 in a motorbike and a compactor when they spotted an
idling Isuzu Elf truck loaded with lumber. The policemen approached the truck. They found out that Idanan was
the driver while Del Barrio and Plopenio were the passengers. Vargas and Tulod were seen hauling lumber to be
loaded into the truck. Petitioners were not able to produce any document authorizing them to transport lumber
so they were placed under arrest. PO1 Ferdinand Bobiles took photographs of the truck, the seized lumber and
the accused. Thereafter, petitioners were first brought to the police station before they were brought to Camp
Camacho in Virac, Catanduanes.5

The defense, on the other hand, denied the charge. Idanan, Del Barrio and Plopemo testified that while they
were traversing Kilometer 12, they were flagged down by policemen. One of them borrowed the truck. Idanan,
the driver of the truck, obliged. One of the policemen drove the truck for about 100 meters while petitioners
trailed the truck by foot. They then saw the policemen load narra flitches into the truck. Not one of them
questioned the police out of fear. To petitioners' surprise, they were then arrested and ordered to follow the
policemen to the police station.6 Vargas and Tulod claimed that they were going to Caramoran and they hitched
a ride with Idanan.

The defense presented a Certification signed by Punong Barangay Elias D. Obierna (Elias) and Barangay
Tanod Benito P. Obierna (Benito) certifying that the police intercepted the truck driven by Idanan; that it was
found empty; and that the police officers asked the driver of the truck to deliver the logs to the Municipal
Office/Police Office Station of Panganiban, Catanduanes.7
 The Obiernas initially denied that they executed the Certification. Elias later on clarified that while he signed the
Certification, he was not present at the time of the apprehension and had no personal knowledge that the truck
was empty. Elias claimed that Santiago Idanan forced him to sign the Certification.8 Benito was present during
the incident. He allegedly saw firewood on two trucks and heard the policemen instructing a certain son of Agoy
to load the lumbers into the truck.9

On 22 February 2007, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of lumber.
The dispositive portion reads:
 WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court hereby sentences accused Ernie Idanan, Nanly del Barrio, Marlon Plopenio, Roberto Vargas and
Elmer Tulod to suffer the imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The 29 pieces of narra lumber subject of this case are forfeited in favor of the
government.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The trial court relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty in giving credence to
the testimonies of the police officers. Moreover, there was no evidence manifesting ill motive on the part of the
police officers to falsely testify against the accused. The trial court held that possession of 29 pieces of narra
lumber with gross volume of 1.69 cubic meters and estimated value of P275,844.80 without any documentation
clearly constitutes an offense punishable under PD 705, as amended.

Tulod and Vargas are at large.11

On 29 March 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming petitioner's conviction.

Petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
offense charged. Relying on an illegal possession of firearm case where the Court held that to support a
conviction, there must be possession coupled with intent to possess, petitioners assert that their intent to
possess the subject narra lumber must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of Tulod and Vargas,
they claim that they were merely hired to load the lumber on the truck. On the part of Idanan, he admitted that
the truck was owned by his father. Thus, their possession over the lumber is considered temporary, incidental,
casual and harmless. Del Barrio and Plopenio meanwhile were merely present at the crime scene. Petitioners
note the testimony of the Chief of Police is far from being candid and straightforward when he had to be
coached by the prosecutor on matters relative to the arrest of the accused. Petitioners accuse the police officers
of planting evidence against them because since the assumption of the Chief of Police to his post, he had never
apprehended anybody for illegal possession of lumber. Petitioners assert that their testimonies are candid and
spontaneous. They even cite the testimonies of the barangay officials as corroborative of their defense that the
truck confiscated by the police officers had no narra lumber on it.

In their Comment,12 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) noted that petitioners were apprehended by the
police offices in flagrante delicto as they were transporting 29 pieces of narra lumber along Kilometer 12 in
Barangay San Miguel, Panganiban, Catanduanes without the required documentation. The OSG added that mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents consummates the
crime. Finally, the OSG defended the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and assailed the defense of frame-
up as weak.

At the outset, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. Evidence to be believed must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.13Petitioners'
statements that they did not complain or put up any resistance when they were arrested despite their
innocence is contrary to human nature and experience. Petitioners should have at least protested if they
believed that they were not committing any crime. Moreover, the allegation of "planted evidence" is
unsubstantiated. There is no proof that that the police had the ill-motive to falsely accuse and testify against
petitioners, aside from the unsubstantiated and far-fetched allegation that the police wanted to impress their
superiors. The presumption of regularity accorded to police officers is unrebutted.

Section 6814 of PD 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, provides:
 Sect. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code; Provided, That in the case of partnership, association or
corporation, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
 part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or forest
products to cut, gathered, collected or removed, and the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
used therein, and the forfeiture of his improvements in the area.

The same penalty plus cancellation of his license agreement, lease, license or permit and perpetual
disqualification from acquiring any such privilege shall be imposed upon any licensee, lessee, or
permittee who cuts timber from the licensed or leased area of another, without prejudice to whatever
civil action the latter may bring against the offender.

Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or
other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (3)
the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.15

Petitioners were charged under the third category, i.e., of possessing and in control of 29 pieces of narra lumber
without the legal requirements as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

Illegal possession of timber is an offense covered by special law and is malum prohibitum. Thus, criminal intent is
not an essential element of the offense. However, the prosecution must prove intent to possess or animus
possidendi.16

Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the object of the crime is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the object of the crime is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.17

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive possession
would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence
and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.18

We find that Idanan, Del Barrio, and Plopenio were, at the very least, in constructive possession of the timber
without the requisite legal documents. Petitioners were found in the truck loaded with 29 pieces of narra
lumber. Idanan admitted to driving the truck while Del Barrio and Plopenio accompanied Idanan. They claimed
to have traveled for almost three hours just to retrieve the cellular phone of Idanan's father from a certain Jojo
Cabrera (Cabrera) in Barangay Poblacion, Panganiban, Catanduanes. When pressed by the prosecutor if they
managed to get the cellphone, they replied that they failed to locate Cabrera. The three accused did not protest
despite seeing that the policemen allegedly load lumber into the truck. Neither did they complain when they
were subsequently arrested. Idanan was the driver. It is presumed that he exercised full control of the vehicle
that he is driving and that he knew what its load was. Having offered no plausible excuse, petitioners failed to
prove to our satisfaction that they did not have the animus possidendi of the narra lumber.

Mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or
criminal intent, is illegal. It would make no difference at all whether the ownership of the lumber pertains to
only one accused.19

The possession of lumber was made without any license or permit issued by any competent authority.

Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code20 thus:
 Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
 3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property
stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing
stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or
the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.

The Information alleged that the 29 pieces of lumber measuring 716.48 board feet were valued at P275,884.80.
Said amount was evidenced by the Statement of Narra lumber materials21 which was presented in evidence and
testified to by Basil Cesar Camba, the person who signed the Statement. Since the amount exceeds P22,000.00,
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be imposed in its maximum period. To
determine the additional years of imprisonment prescribed in Article 309 (1), the amount of P22,000.00 should
be deducted from P275,884.80, thus, leaving the amount of P253,884.80. The net amount should then be
divided by PI 0,000.00, disregarding any amount below P10,000.00. The result is the incremental penalty of
twenty-five (25) years which must then be added to the basic penalty of the maximum period of prision
mayor minimum and medium periods. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods has a
range of six years (6) and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Its maximum period is eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to ten (10) years, and the incremental penalty is 25 years. Had appellant committed simple
theft, the penalty should have been twenty years of reclusion temporal. In qualified theft, the penalty is two
degrees higher. Thus the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.22

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we recommend executive clemency. In People v.
Tomotorgo24 the Court recommended executive clemency to appellant taking into consideration the evidence
that he only intended to maltreat his spouse resulting in her death, his manifest repentant attitude and remorse
for his act. In People v. Abano,25 appellant was convicted of parricide and murder but the court recommended
executive clemency because the Court considered her emotional suffering in the hands of her philandering
husband. In Mendoza v. People,26 petitioner was convicted for failure to remit the contributions of his employer.
Petitioner had managed to settle his obligation but he was not eligible for condonation under Republic Act No.
9003. While it was observed that the penalty imposed on petitioner is harsh, the Court had to apply the law to
its full extent. Thus, the Court recommended executive clemency.

In this case, the resulting penalty is reclusion perpetua. This penalty will be suffered by the driver and the
helpers. The operator of the illegal logging business has not been apprehended. While we sympathize with the
plight of petitioners who were merely following orders and were consequently caught in possession of the
lumber, we must still apply the law in full force. Dura lex sed lex. But considering the facts about petitioners'
participation in the crime, and guided by jurisprudence on instances when the facts of the crime elicited the
Court's compassion for the accused, we recommend executive clemency.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The 29 March 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30729 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners ERNIE IDANAN, NANLY DEL BARRIO and MARLON
PLOPENIO are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to Article 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court shall TRANSMIT the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to petitioners.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.chanro

 CHAPTER IV
CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND PENALTIES
Section 78
Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnership,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found. [As amended by PD No. 1559, and by EO No. 277, prom. July
25, 1987, 83 OG No. 31, Aug. 3, 1987]

RULE 12 CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF SEIZED ITEMS, EQUIPMENT, PARAPHERNALIA, CONVEYANCES AND
INSTRUMENTS SECTION 1. Custody and disposition of seized items.– The custody and disposition of seized items shall be
in accordance with the applicable laws or rules promulgated by the concerned government agency. SEC. 2. Procedure. –
In the absence of applicable laws or rules promulgated by the concerned government agency, the following procedure
shall be observed: (a) The apprehending officer having initial custody and control of the seized items, equipment,
paraphernalia, conveyances and instruments shall physically inventory and whenever practicable, photograph the same
in the presence of the person from whom such items were seized. (b) Thereafter, the apprehending officer shall submit
to the issuing court the return of the search warrant within five days from date of seizure or in case of warrantless
arrest, submit within five days from date of seizure, the inventory report, compliance report, photographs,
representative samples and other pertinent documents to the public prosecutor for appropriate action. (c) Upon motion
by any interested party, the court may direct the auction sale of seized items, equipment, paraphernalia, tools or
instruments of the crime. The court shall, after hearing, fix the minimum bid price based on the recommendation of the
concerned government agency. The sheriff shall conduct the auction. (d) The auction sale shall be with notice to the
accused, the person from whom the items were seized, or the owner thereof and the concerned government agency. (e)
The notice of auction shall be posted in three conspicuous places in the city or municipality where the items, equipment,
paraphernalia, tools or instruments of the crime were seized. (f) The proceeds shall be held in trust and deposited with
the government depository bank for disposition according to the judgment.

CHAPTER IV
CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND PENALTIES

Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable
public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be
guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code; Provided, That in
the case of partnership, association or corporation, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be
liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or forest products to cut,
gathered, collected or removed, and the machinery, equipment, implements and tools used therein, and the forfeiture
of his improvements in the area.

The same penalty plus cancellation of his license agreement, lease, license or permit and perpetual disqualification from
acquiring any such privilege shall be imposed upon any licensee, lessee, or permittee who cuts timber from the licensed
or leased area of another, without prejudice to whatever civil action the latter may bring against the offender.