CELSO LEDESMA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF ILOILO, CONCEPCION LOPEZ,

MAXIMO M. KALAW, and wife, and JULIO LEDESMA, defendants-appellees. (December 17, 1926)

FACTS: Lopez owns lot 228. In March 1915, Lopez sold to the City of Iloilo a part of said lot, now numbered 537 and
703, payable in 10 years. A TCT was issued in favor of Lopez, including 537 and 703 (he inclusion of said lots in said
TCT was evidently an error on the part of someone connected with the office of the registrar of titles). Lopez sold to
Kalaw and wife said lot 228, including lots 537 and 703 evidently by mistake. It is said that the inclusion of said lots 537
and 703 was a mistake because Lopez as well as Kalaw and wife were ignorant of the fact that said lots were
included in that TCT. Lopez, representing Kalaw, sold said lots (228, 537 and 703) to J. Ledesma, which sale was
ratified by the couple. Later a TCT was issued in favor of J. Ledesma. According to the admissions of J. Ledesma lots
537 and 703 were included by mistake. J. Ledesma sold a portion of the lot. Lot 228 was made into two lots, 228-A and
228-B. Lot 228-A remained the property of J. Ledesma. Said lots 537 and 703, according to said TCT, remained the
property of J. Ledesma. J. Ledesma sold to the appellant herein lots Nos. 228-A, 537, and 703. Again, according to
J. Ledesma, lots 537 and 703 were included in the transfer of lot No. 228-A to C. Ledesma by mistake. This action was
commenced in CFI of Iloilo to recover from defendant the municipality of Iloilo a sum as the value of the two lots Nos.
537 and 703 which, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant municipality had illegally appropriated, together with damages
and costs. After hearing the evidence upon the issue presented, the CFI absolved the defendants from all liability under
the complaint. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed. The theory of the appellant is that, by reason of the fact that
said lots 537 and 703 had been included in the registered title of Lopez in 1915, and Lopez included in each succeeding
transfer of title to him said lots, that he was the indisputable owner thereof, and because the City of Iloilo had
appropriated said lots, that he was entitled to recover the value of said lots together with damages.
ISSUE: Whether the inclusion of lots 537 and 703 in the TCT of Celso Ledesma made him the owner of such properties.
HELD: NO An examination of the records shows that as early as April, 1915, said lots had been turned over by
Lopez to the City of Iloilo under a contract of sale for street purposes. That fact was well known. The said lots had
been included as a part of the streets in the City of Iloilo. The same were therefore illegally included, in accordance with
the provisions of section 39 of Act No. 496, in the certificate of title issued to Lopez. That fact was recognized by Lopez
as well as by each of the subsequent purchasers of said lots. The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the
Torrens system, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a
person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which include by mistake or oversight land which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, becomes the owner of the
lands illegally included. The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not thereby necessarily give
to the holder of such certificate said public highways. The appellant, therefore, even though a part of said streets (lots
537 and 703) had been included in the original certificate of title and in the subsequent transfer of title, did not become
the owner of said lots and is not therefore entitled to recover their value from the City of Iloilo nor the damages
prayed for.

Traders Royal Bank vs CA

FACTS:
Spouses Maximo and Patria Capay (the “Capays”) executed a mortgage agreement with Petitioner Traders Royal Bank
(“Petitioner Bank”) pursuant to loan extended by the latter to the former. The mortgage was covered by several parties
and one of which is the parcel of land in dispute. For failure to pay the loan, extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
were instituted over the mortgaged property.
The Capays filed for petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CFI to prevent the foreclosure alleging
that the mortgage was void for failure on the part of the Petitioner Bank to release the loan proceeds. While the petition
was pending, the Capays caused to be filed before the Registry of Deeds of Baguio city a notice of lis pendens over the
disputed and was entered in the Day Book and their certificate of title.
After the lifting of the injunction before the CFI, foreclosure proceedings initiated and the property was sold to Petitioner
Bank as the sole and highest bidder. A new certificate of title was issued in the name of Petitioner Bank sans the
annotation of the notice of lis pendens.
The Capays filed for a supplemental complaint to recover the property which was granted by the CFI ruling that the
mortgage was void for want of consideration and ordering the cancellation of Petitioner’s new title. Petitioner Bank
appealed to the CA. While the case was pending, it sold the land to a certain Emelita Santiago and a new title was issued
in her name. Santiago in turn divided the land into 6 lors and sold these to Maricial Alcantra, Armando Cruz, and
Artemio Sanchez who became co-owners and developed the property. In turn, they sold the lots to separate buyers. Titles
from Santiago to the separate buyers did not contain a notice of lis pendens.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CFI. It denied the appeal of Petitioner Bank for being filed out of
time. The resolution, after becoming final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution to cancel the TCT of
Petitioner Bank and to issue a new one in favor of the Capays.
However, the Writ could not be implemented because of subsequent transfers of the property. A complaint for recovery
of possession/ownership was instituted by Patria Capay and her children, and Atty. Ramon Gonzales against the
Petitioner Bank and the subsequent transferees, which was granted by the RTC.
On appeal before the CA, on the non-bank respondents’ part, granted its motion for consideration dismissing the
complaint. For Petitioner Bank, it ruled that the bank was in bad faith for selling the property knowing that it was under
litigation. Both parties appealed to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Capays has as better right to the property.

HELD: NO. THE NON-BANK RESPONDENTS HAS A BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY.
The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their respective predecessors-in-
interest, and were not bound to go beyond the same despite the non-inclusion of the notice of lis pendens filed by the
Capays initially. The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons,
relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot
disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The non-bank respondents was able to prove this
by physically inspecting the properties and inquired from the Registry of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in
the title. Moreover, the Capays did not bother to find out the status of their title 15 years upon filing the notice of lis
pendens. It was not until after the land was subdivided and developed when they suddenly appeared and questioned the
titles. The Capays are guilty of laches.

CARAGAY-LAYNO v. COURT OF APPEALS

133 SCRA 718 (1984)
Melencio-Herrera, J.:

FACTS:
• De Vera died in 1951. His intestate estate was administered first by his widow as later by her nephew,
respondent Salvador Estrada (Estrada).
• As administratix, De Vera’s widow filed an Inventory of all properties of the deceased which included a parcel
of land containing an area of 5,417 square meters in the poblacion of Calasiao, Pangasinan. However, Estrada found that
the entire parcel covered by the Original Certificate of Title No. 63 under the name of De Vera includes a total area of
8,752 square meters.
• The discrepancy of 3,723 square meters in the northwestern portion was occupied by petitioner-spouses Juliana
Caragay-Layno and Benito Layno.
• Estrada demanded that petitioners vacate the disputed portion since it was included in the De Vera’s title.
Petitioners refused claiming that the land belonged to them and, before them, to Juliana’s father Juan Caragay.
• Estrada instituted a suit against Juliana for the recovery of the disputed portion. Juliana counterclaimed for
reconveyance of property on the ground that the disputed portion was fraudulently or mistakenly included in the title.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Juliana Caragay-Layno can seek the reconveyance of the disputed portion

RULING:
Yes. Tacking the previous possession of her father to her own, they had been in actual, open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for about forty-five (45) years, until said possession was disturbed in
1966 when Estrada informed Juliana that the disputed portion was registered in the name of De Vera.
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the indefensibility of a Torrens title. Mere
possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder’s true ownership of all the
property described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally
included. A Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have never asserted any right of
ownership over it.
Petitioner Juliana Caragay-Layno, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the name of another, but
which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties, can properly seek its reconveyance
AMELITA DOLFO vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE
G.R. No. 133465 September 25, 2000
FACTS:
On March 5, 1996, Amelita Dolfo and Yangtze Properties, Inc filed a motion for leave to file and/or admit complaint-in-
intervention in LRC Cases Nos. B-94-60, B-89-14 and B-90-6 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor
Cavite. LRC Cases pertains to a parcel of land located in Trece Martires City; Case No. B-94-60 refers to the
reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title while the last two cases were for the registration of title. According to
Dolfo, she is the true registered owner of said parcel of land as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-320601
issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. Yangtze Properties, Inc on the other hand is the
petitioner's co-movant based on the Contract to Sell they have entered with Dolfo.
The Regional Trial Court denied their motion on the following grounds: 1) a motion to intervene in a land registration
case, being a proceeding in rem, is not allowed and 2) an Order of General Default has already been entered by
the court against those who failed to oppose the application therefore they have lost their standing in court.
Petitioner and Yangtze filed a motion for reconsideration which the court treated as a motion to lift the order of
general default; but the same was denied because her Certificate of Title was of doubtful nature. Based on the report of
the Land Registration Authority Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-320601 in the name of Amelita Dolfo was issued
without any legal basis. Another report from the National Bureau of Investigation shows that the signature of
Antonia Cabuco as the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite appearing on Dolfo's TCT was a forgery.
The RTC then rendered a decision recognizing and confirming the rights of the private respondents over the said
parcel of land and ordered the issuance of the Decree of Registration in their favor.

On August 1, 1996, Atty. Artemio Cana as Acting Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite filed a complaint
to annul Transfer TCT No. T-320601 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor Cavite.
Dolfo and Yangtze filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, to annul and set aside the decision of the
RCT, before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners also prayed that her motion for leave to file and/or admit
complaint-in-intervention be given due course. But the Court of Appeals rendered its decision denying the petition in due
course and dismissing the case.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not a motion to intervene in a land registration case can be allowed
II. Whether of not a Torrens title serves as an indefeasible evidence pertaining to the ownership of a property
HELD:
I.
NO, a motion to intervene in a land registration case cannot be allowed. Land registrations are proceedings in
rem with the sole object being the registration of a parcel of land and does not involve the determination of any right
connected with the it. Therefore a motion to intervene cannot be allowed since there are no personal rights involve in a
land registration case. A party opposing a land registration shall ask for the lifting of the order of general default, and
then if granted, file an opposition to the application for registration. It should also be noted that under sections 14 and 25
of the Property Registration Decree, the only parties to an original application for land registration are the applicant
and the oppositor; there are no third party complainants, cross-claimants or intervenor just like in an ordinary civil
action.

II.
As a general rule, title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and serves as the best proof of ownership over
a piece of land;except in cases where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin. TCT No. T-11520
to which TCT No. T-320601 originated cannot be found by the LRA, without it, it cannot be determined if TCT No.
T-11520 covers the same parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-320601 which is supposedly derived from it.
Furthermore, the presumption of authenticity of TCT No. T-320601 has been overcome by the evidences presented by
the Land Registration Authority and the National Bureau of Investigation.
The LRA cannot find any document in the registry vault to support the issuance of TCT No. 320601 in favor of
Amelita Dolfo and that Judicial Forms 109-109-D with Serial No. 2061717 pertains to TCT No.
322182 in the name of Manuel dela Cruz and not of TCT No. 320601. The National Bureau of Investigation
also reported that the signature of Antonia Cabuco as the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite appearing on
Dolfo's TCT was a forgery.
Lastly, Amelita Dolfo cannot also invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It is understood that the Torrens
system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested.
 RODRIGUEZ VS. LIM
459 SCRA412 (2006) (EXCEPTION TO INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE

FACTS:
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the court a quo a complaint for cancellation of certificate of title and injunction against
the spouses Rodriguez. In his complaint, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. alleged that his mother, Dominga Goyma, was the owner
of two parcels of land (subject lots). The first parcel, containing an area of 28,051 square meters, more or less, is situated
in the Sitio of Tulay-Buhangin, Barrio Ilayang Palo, Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon. The second parcel,
containing an area of 260,590 sq m, more or less, is situated in the Sitio of Tulay-Buhangin, Barrio of Laguimanoc,
Municipality of Atimonan (now Padre Burgos), Province of Quezon. The subject lots were registered in the name of
Dominga Goyma on February 6, 1948 under TCT No. T-2857. Two (2) years after Dominga Goymas death, Atty.
Alejandro D. Aguilan went to see Frisco Gudani in Pagbilao, Quezon, and informed the latter about the properties,
including the subject lots, left by the deceased. Allegedly, Atty. Aguilan falsely made Frisco Gudani to believe that if he
would not acquire the properties for himself, the same would be forfeited in favor of the government. Frisco Gudani was
then persuaded by Atty. Aguilan to affix his signature on the following documents: (a) an Affidavit dated March 15,
1973 adjudicating to himself the properties mentioned therein, including the subject lots; (b) a Petition dated March 15,
1973 filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
2857; (c) an Affidavit of Loss dated March 15, 1973 for the loss of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857; and
(d) an Affidavit dated June 27, 1976 stating that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was not the son of Dominga Goyma. After the
subject lots were adjudicated in favor of Frisco Gudani and the second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 was
obtained, Atty. Aguilan likewise made the former sign the Deed of Conditional Sale of Property dated September 10,
1974 covering the subject lots in favor of Eduardo Victa. The two parties to the instrument never met each other and it
was only Atty. Aguilan who was present when Frisco Gudani signed the same. The notary public before whom they
supposedly acknowledged the same was not present.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the substituted plaintiffs, CONCORDIA ONG LIM, EURESTES LIM and ELMER
LIM. Aggrieved, the spouses Rodriguez filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the decision of the
court a quo. The spouses Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were purchasers of the subject properties in good faith and for value.
RULING:
No. The Petitioners cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title with respect to TCT No. T-168607
because the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title.
The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. They cannot deny any knowledge of the fraud that attended the
transactions involving the subject lots, including their acquisition thereof. Stated differently, petitioners cannot claim that
they were purchasers in good faith and for value because the transactions involving the subject lots were so replete with
badges of fraud and irregularities that should have put them on guard about the defects in the respective titles of Frisco
Gudani and Eduardo Victa. Given the fraudulent character of the transactions, the court a quo held that the spouses
Rodriguez could not avail of the protective mantle of the law protecting purchasers for value in good faith. The spouses
Rodriguez were declared to be purchasers in bad faith because they had prior knowledge of the claim of Pablo Goyma
Lim, Jr. over the subject lots and even anticipated his filing of the case against them.
It has been consistently ruled that when the owners duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the
possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had
no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate. In such a case, the
decision authorizing the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title may be attacked any time. Applying this
rule, it is apparent that the second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 issued upon the petition of Frisco Gudani
was void. Further, the certificates of title (TCT No. T-128605 in the name of Frisco Gudani, TCT No. T-128606 in the
name of Eduardo Victa and TCT No. T-128607 in the names of petitioners) that were subsequently issued covering the
subject lots may be nullified because they all emanated from a void document, i.e., the second owners duplicate copy of
TCT No. T-2857 that was procured by Frisco Gudani, or more particularly by Atty. Aguilan, in behalf of Frisco Gudani,
through fraud. Transfer certificates of title may be annulled if issued based on void documents.
 HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 179987, 2009-04-29
Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as
Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the
hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco.
The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had
been in possession of the property in the... manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to
the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had
verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior
to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
Issues:
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under
Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property,"
while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands."
It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, and not the concept of... prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the
30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land
was declared alienable and disposable.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no... longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is... duly
authorized by law.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations
they presented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot.Avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national... evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is... insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
 Republic vs Manna Properties, Inc
GR 146527 January 31, 2005

FACTS:
On September 29, 1994, Manna Properties, Inc., (Applicant) a juridical entity, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
an Application for registration of two parcels of land (Lot No. 9515 and Lot No. 1006) located in San Fernando, La
Union.
Upon the RTC’s receipt of the Application, an initial hearing on February 16, 1995 was set and a copy of the notice of
hearing together with pertinent documents was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for publication
purposes.
The LRA, upon receipt of the documents, required the Applicant thru the RTC, for the submission of full names and
complete postal addresses of the lot owners since these were not stated in the Application and important for notification
purposes. Hence, the Applicant was directed to submit the required information which the latter complied.
Due to delays for the compliance of documents, the set date of initial hearing was reset from February 16, 1995 to April
13, 1995. However, the LRA requested for further resetting of the initial hearing to a later date since April 13 fell on a
Holy Thursday to allow reasonable time and enable them to cause timely publication with the Official Gazette. Granting
the LRA’s request, the RTC accordingly reset the initial hearing date to April 20, 1995.
Still, the LRA further requested for rescheduling of the hearing since the Official Gazette can no longer accommodate
the publishing of the notice, this time, for lack of material time as the National Printing Office required the submission of
printing materials 75 days before the date of the hearing. The court order was issued on March 15, 1995 which further
reset the initial hearing date on July 18, 1995.
The Opposition now contests that the Application shall be denied since: 1) the Applicant failed to establish requisite
period of possession based on the tax declarations presented; and 2) The Manna Properties failed to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements since under PD 1529, a 90-day maximum period between the court order and initial hearing
date an in this case, there are 125 days in between the two dates.
ISSUES:
WON the Applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements and WON the Applicant sufficiently proven
possession of property for the requisite period.

RULING:
Yes. Manna Properties complied with the jurisdictional requirements. The Court finds Manna Properties not at fault why
the hearing date was set beyond the 90-day maximum period.
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his
application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a
court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court
to the LRA. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation.
A party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to
meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters
within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within
its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither
responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.
No. The Applicant did not sufficiently prove the possession of property for the requisite period based on the presented
tax declarations and witnesses
The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) Sec. 48(b): Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties have been in
possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of
title to the land. SC ruled that the land in question has not become private land and remains part of the public domain.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of possession consists of the testimony of one
of its predecessors-in-interest, Manuel Sobrepeña ("Manuel"), transferee’s affidavits, and several tax declarations
covering the land in question.
While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring
possession. However, the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although
Manna Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving possession since 12 June
1945, a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. It was in
fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration
indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in question. A substitute is not enough.
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141
specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a previous tax
declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued
on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may
have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.
Also, the tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as it bears several irregularities. A small annotation
found at the bottom of the back page states that it cancels a previous tax declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled
tax declaration was issued in 1945, it does not provide any of the required information that will enable this Court or any
interested party to check whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever existed.
The form used to prepare the tax declaration states that it was "FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160." Republic
Act No. 7160 is the Local Government Code of 1991. The sworn undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly
prepared the tax declaration reads, "Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 day of Nov. 1950…" This means that the
tax declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used came into existence. Manna Properties gave
no explanation why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the alleged issuance of the tax
declaration. The totality of these circumstances leads this Court to conclude that the tax declaration was fabricated for
the sole purpose of making it appear that Manna Properties’ predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land
in question since 12 June 1945.

Republic vs Munoz
G.R. No. 151910, October 15, 2007
Facts:
On June 14, 1996, respondent Muñoz filed an Application for Registration of Title of a parcel of residential land before
the RTC of Ligao, Albay.
He averred that no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects his property and that no other person has an interest,
legal or equitable, on the subject lot. He further declared that the property was acquired by donation inter vivos, executed
by the spouses Apolonio R. Muñoz and Anastacia Vitero in 1956, who have been possession thereof since time
immemorial for more than 70 years.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on various grounds, among which is that the land in
question is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
The RTC rendered a Decision dated October 3, 1997 granting the application for registration.
On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject lot because: (1) the notice of
initial hearing was not timely filed; (2) the applicant failed to present the original tracing cloth plan of the property
sought to be registered during the trial; and (3) the applicant failed to present evidence that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo. The appellate court explained that there was conclusive
proof that the jurisdictional requirement of due notice had been complied with as mandated under Section 24 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Furthermore, the failure to present in evidence the tracing cloth plan of the subject
property did not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to act on the application in question. Lastly, the CA ruled that
respondent need not adduce documentary proof that the disputed property had been declared alienable and disposable for
the simple reason that the lot had once been covered by free patent application; hence, this alone is conclusive evidence
that the property was already declared by the government as open for public disposition.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the subject property is alienable property of public domain.

Held:
Petitioner stresses that in proving the alienable and disposable nature of the property, there has to be a certification from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO).
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, is the existing general law governing the classification
and disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands. CA 141 empowers the President to
classify lands of the public domain into "alienable and disposable" lands of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. Therefore, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public
domain.
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government. It is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the land applied for is alienable and
disposable.
In the present case, respondent Munoz failed to submit a CENRO Certification from to prove that the land subject for
registration is indeed alienable and disposable
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the application for registration filed by respondent Ludolfo V. Muñoz is DENIED.

Gordoland Development Corp., vs.Republic of the Philippines

November 23, 2007 G.R. No. 163757
FACTS:
• Petitioner on November 18, 1996 filed with the RTC, Branch 55, Mandaue City, an application for original
registration of title over 8 parcels of land totaling 86,298 sqm located in different barangays within the Municipality of
Liloan, Cebu. It stated that it obtained title over said parcels in 1995 by virtue of several deeds of sale and assignments of
appurtenant rights from the alleged owner-possessors whom petitioner claims had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation.
• Petitioner presented 1 testimony of its predecessors-in-interest with respect to the eight parcels of land and 2
documentary exhibits which are tax declarations, certifications from the Register of Deeds that there are no subsisting
titles over the subject properties, and certifications from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, declaring that there are no subsisting public land
applications. After submitting its formal offer of evidence, petitioner also filed a Manifestation with an attached
photocopy of a Certification from CENRO Cebu declaring that the tract of land with list numbers attached therein is
alienable and disposable.
• But the list of lot numbers referred to in the certification was not included in the certification, nor was it attached
to the Manifestation. The list was never submitted to the RTC. The petitioners Manifestation merely informed the court
that it had failed to include the said certification in its formal offer of exhibits, and that it was submitting the same in
compliance with the requirements of the application. Petitioner did not move to re-open the proceedings to present the
certification in evidence, have it authenticated and subjected to cross-examination, or have it marked as an exhibit and
formally offered in evidence. The original was never submitted.
• The Director of Lands opposed to the application asserting the following as grounds:
o Neither the applicant/nor his/her/their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior;
o The muniments of title and/or tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants if any, attached to or
alleged in the application, does not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands
applied for or of his/her/their open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation;
o The claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish Title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
applicants who have failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of 6 months from February
16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed
on November 18, 1996;
o That the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the New Philippine Constitution to hold alienable
lands of the public domain; and
o The parcels applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not
subject to private appropriation.

• RTC granted the application on January 16, 1988 and directed the issuance of the respective decrees of
registration for each of the eight parcels of land, all in petitioners name.
• On February 23, 1998, RTC Mandaue received a Report from the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Office of
the Director, Department on Registration, which declared that LRA was not in a position to verify whether or not the
subject lands were covered by land patents, or within the area classified as alienable and disposable. It recommended that
the Land Management Bureau (LMB) in Manila, the CENRO and the Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in Cebu be
ordered to determine and make a finding if the lots were alienable and disposable. Acting upon the LRA report, RTC
then directed LMB, CENRO Cebu and FMB o report on the true status of the lands, it did not recall or suspend its former
judgment.
• Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the petition for registration is defective
2. W/N the land is alienable and disposable
3. W/N petitioners predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
properties for a period of at least 30 years
RULING:
Issue 1
The Supreme Court ruled that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such
requirement is a condition affecting the form of the pleading; non-compliance with this requirement does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith. The purpose of the certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping.
Issue 2
The Supreme Court ruled that the conclusions of the Court of Appeals are well- founded as there is no evidence on
record showing that the subject lots have already been classified as alienable and disposable. The Government must first
declare the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
Issue 3
The Supreme Court ruled that since the land is part of the public domain, the land can never be acquired through
prescription until the government declared such land as alienable and disposable.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed CA’s decision.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF SIN G.R. No. 157485

FACTS:
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against ANCF for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that they are the lawful
heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan. They further claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been
usurped by ANCF. To prove possession, they presented several tax declarations.
ANCF countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said portion of
private respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent
further averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
The RTC remanded case to MCTC who rendered decision on favor of the respondent. The case was elevated to RTC and
Court of Appeals who both affirmed the MCTC Decision. Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decisions of the RTC.
DECISION:
Yes, the CA erred in affirming the Decisions of RTC and MCTC.
The Supreme Court ruled that in the case of Valiao v. Republic, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. ll lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable or there must be a positive act
declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
The Supreme Court clarified that the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court to prove that there is a positive act declaring that the land as alienable and disposable.
Since respondents failed to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, their alleged possession and by the and by
their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.

Thus, the Petition for review is GRANTED.

Republic vs. Remnan Enterprises Inc.
(G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014)

FACTS: On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's application for registration. Thereafter, following the required
publication and posting, a scheduled hearing was set. However, on May 30, 2002, only the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was
given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent's application for registration.
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent's application for registration, asserting that the lots are
not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject
properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds
of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said
parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the
respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's application for registration should be denied since the subject
parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to
Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below
the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the
subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to
LLDA's claim, are above 12.50 m.
The RTC granted the respondent's application for registration of title to the subject properties. The RTC found that the
respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of
12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA likewise pointed out that the
respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the application for registration filed by the
respondent?

HELD: Yes. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public
land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D.
No. 1073.Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same;
and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. However, the said
certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable.
The Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land
is alienable and disposable.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Cerquena testified for the respondents that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly
possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and
Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject
properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be
presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for
2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and
that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. The instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.

Lozada Vs Bracewell.

FACTS:
In 1976, Nicomedes Lozada filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in
Las Pinas City with the Makati City RTC, acting as a land registration court. The said RTC then granted the petitioner’s
application.
In 1997, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) subsequently issued a decree in favor of the petitioner.
Within one year from the issuance of the said decree, James Bracewell Jr. filed a petition for review of the said decree
with the RTC of Las Pinas City, claiming that a portion of his land was fraudulently registered by Lozada as his own.
Bracewell also provided proof that such portion was already registered under his name since 1989.
The LRA, finding merit on Bracewell’s claims, subsequently issued to the Las Pinas RTC its recommendation for the
amendment of Lozada’s registration and segregate Bracewell’s land from it. Consequently, the said RTC then decided in
favor of Bracewell, ruling that Lozada obtained the LRA decree and the OCT of his parcel of land in bad faith.
Lozada then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Las Pinas RTC has no jurisdiction over
Bracewell’s petition for review. Lozada argued that such a petition should have been filed with the same branch of the
court which issued the decree of registration (Makati City RTC). However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court’s decision and denied Lozada’s appeal, prompting the latter to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Las Pinas City RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes, the Las Pinas City RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 17 and 32 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, jurisdiction over an application for land registration, as well
as the review of the decree of registration, is vested upon the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the land
is situated. While it is true that the Makati City RTC was the court that issued the decree of registration assailed by
Bracewell, the circumstances surrounding this case must be considered. During the time of Lozada’s filing of his
application in 1976, Las Pinas City has no existing RTC branches yet. However, by the time Bracewell filed his petition
for review of Lozada’s decree of registration in 1998, Las Pinas City already has an RTC. As the subject land in question
is situated in Las Pinas City, the Las Pinas City RTC therefore has the authority to hear Bracewell’s petition for review.
RULING: Petition is denied.
Valiao and Grandea petitioners vs. Republic of the Philippines, Zafra and Yusay, respondents
G.R. No. 170757. November 28, 2011

Facts:
In 1987. Petitioners filed with RTC Kabankalan an application for registration of a 504,535 sqm. Parcel of land, situate
in Ilog, Negros Occidental. In 1988, private respondents, filed to dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1)
the land applied has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res jusdicata that the lot is public domain set in to
bar the application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
The Republic, through OSG, also opposed the application on the following grounds: that neither the applicants or their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; the tax declaration attached in the application, does not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and the subject land is a portion of public
domain belonging to the Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation and that the present action is barred by a
previous final judgment in cadastral case prosecuted between the same parties and involving same parcel of land.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that their predecessor possessed the land from 1916 to 1947, and his possession
was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon predecessor’s
death, the petitioners as heirs possessed the land from 1947 onwards, and in support, the petitioners submitted a tax
declaration date 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio, the predecessor.

Issue: Whether or not the alleged possession of the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest is sufficient to
sustain their claim for prescription and application for registration?

Ruling: No, petition must fail

Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. There must be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. No such evidence was
offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Petitioners, failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.
Petitioners failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject
properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to declare the same
for purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declaration does not necessarily prove ownership but are merely indicia of a
claim of ownership.

Palanca Vs Republic G.R. No. 151312

Facts:
On July 19, 1973, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, (petitioners herein), filed an application to bring the pieces of land they
allegedly owned under the operation of the Land Registration Act. These are: a two hundred thirty-nine thousand nine
hundred eighty (239,980) square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Panlaitan, Municipality of Busuanga, Province of
Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000074, and a one hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred eighty-eight (176,588)
square meter land in Barrio of Panlaitan (Island of Capari), Municipality of New Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as
shown on plan Psu-04-000073. They acquired said realties by inheritance from the late Pedro S. Palanca, who had
occupied and possessed said land openly and continuously in the concept of an owner since 1934, or 39 years before the
filing of said application, and planted on said lands about 1,200 coconut trees on each land, declared the same for
taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereof. The first parcel of land is presently occupied by Lopez, Libarra, an
encargado of herein (petitioners), while the second is occupied by (petitioner) Candelaria Punzalan. In Civil Case No.
573 entitled Heirs of Pedro Palanca, Plaintiffs, vs. Alfonso Guillamac, Defendant, for Recovery of Possession of a Parcel
of Land the Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered a decision on March 4, 1970, declaring (petitioners), the heirs of
Pedro S. Palanca, as the rightful possessors of the land at Talampulan Island, Bario of Panlaitan, Municipality of
Busuanga, Province of Palawan, covered by Psu-04-000074, including the two (2) hectare portion occupied and claimed
by Alfonso Guillamac.
Issue: Whether or Not the heirs of Palanca has rights over the properties in question

Held: No. The heirs of Palanca has no rights over the properties. The court ruled that the Executive Proclamation No.
219 classified these lands as a national reserve and it appears that the said property was never released for public
disposition. At the time of the petitioner’s predecessor’s occupancy, the land remained inalienable. For a public
dominion to be subject for a registration proceeding, the government should exercise a positive act to re-classify
inalienable land to alienable for proper disposition. In an application for a land registration of a property of public
domain, the applicant for land registration must secure a certification from the government that the land claimed (1) has
been possessed in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and (2) alienable and disposable. Moreover, action to
recover property of public domain never prescribes.

Carino v. Insular Government

Facts: Carino is the plaintiff who is an igorot who filed an application to register the land which he and his ancestors
before him occupied for more than fifty years. No document of title, however, had issued. the plaintiff filed a petition,
alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however, establishing
only a possessory title. The government contested the claim of Carino that he now has ownership over the land.
Defendants argument: Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to
permit private titles to be acquired. The plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always,
public land that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine
government is bound to respect.
Issue: Whether Carino acquired ownership of the land
Ruling:
Carino acquired ownership of the land by mode of prescription. The older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the
plaintiff seem to indicate that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. on the
decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands it was stated that for private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent authority but provided that
those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father
was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree.

G.R. No. 134209. January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CELESTINA NAGUIAT, respondent

ANTECEDENTS OF THE CASE

On December 29, 1989, respondent Celestina Naguiat applied before the RTC of Zambales registration of title of four
(4) parcels of land. Respondent alleges that she is the owner of said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase
from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Claderon and their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition on the grounds that the respondent was not in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto and that the lands in
question are part of the public domain and not subject to private appropriation.
RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of Celestina Naguiat adjudicating the parcels of land in her favor.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding a registrable title for respondent on the ground that respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest are in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property for more than 30
years and that upon the completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and
become private property.

ISSUE/S OF THE CASE

Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public
domain.
COURTS’ RULING
No. Respondent never presented the required certification from proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed.
 Submission of tax receipts are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, all lands of public domain
belong to the State. Public lands which have not been reclassified as alienable agricultural land by the State remain part
of the public domain. Declassificaiton of forest and mineral lands and their conversion into alienable and disposable
lands need an express and positive act from the government.

The issue of whether or not respondent have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
parcels of land in question is of no moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession. Occupation thereof in the concept of an owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.

LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge,
Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Iglesia ni Kristo and the Register of Deeds of QC, respondent.
Facts:
On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint 1
for specific performance with damages against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) docketed as Civil Case
No. Q90-6937. Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale dated 20 April 1989
IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both of which IDP is the
registered owner. The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal
occupants in the property within forty-five (45) days from the execution of the contract.
On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of
the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK alleged that the document could
not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite repeated
requests.
On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion on the ground that the IDP was not served copy of
the motion, and the ownership of the INK over the property was still in issue since rescission was sought by the IDP as a
counterclaim. She prayed that the motion be denied, but should it be granted, the Register of Deeds be directed after
registration to deliver the owner's duplicate copies of the new certificates of title to her.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the two (2) orders. However,
on 28 October 1992 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the trial court.
Issues:
Whether or not INK is the owner of the property and entitled to registration of its ownership; and, (b) Whether or not that
INK has a superior right to the possession of the owner's copies of the certificates of title.
Held:
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner's
duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause
shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same to the Register
of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No.
1529 clearly states:
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant
to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary
instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of
Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to
surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person
withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding
owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance
of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new, certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of
the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the former law, Act No.
496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, and all jurisprudence interpreting the former law had established that
summary reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of owner's duplicate certificate of title to the Register of
Deeds could only be filed with and granted by the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court if there was
unanimity among the parties or there was no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest,
otherwise, if the case became contentious and controversial it should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case
where the incident properly belonged.
Moreover, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of the
duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale subject
of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case. When the sale of the property was upheld
by the court in its judgment and the defendant was directed to comply with its terms and conditions, the right of INK to
have the same registered with the Register of Deeds could not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy its right, INK should
be allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct the surrender of the certificates of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are
courts of general jurisdiction, they may therefore take cognizance of this case pursuant to such jurisdiction. Even while
Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender the
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident therein
the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected
with the subject matter of the principal action. This principle is based on expediency and in accordance with the policy
against multiplicity of suits.
Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed
of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots.
Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the
new transfer certificates of title.

Abrigo vs De Vera Gr no 154409

FACTS:
On May 27, 1993, VIllafania sold a house and lot to Salazar and Cave-Go. It became a subject of suit for annulment of
documents.
On December 7, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment approving the compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
Villafania was given one year to buy the house and lot back, she failed to do so.
Unknown to Salazar and Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free patent over the land, which was then cancelled by TCT No/
212598 on April 11, 1996.
On October 16, 1997, Salazar and Cave-Go sold the house and lot to spouses Abrigo.
On October 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house to de Vera. She registered the sale and was issued a TCT.
On November 12, 1997, de Vera filed an action for Forcible entry and Damages against Abrigo spouses.
After the trial, the lower court awarded the properties to the petitioners Abrigos as well as damages. Moreover,
Villafania was ordered to pay damages and attorney’s fees.
The CA ruled a void title could not give rise to a valid one and dismissed the appeal of de Vera. The subsequent sale to
de Vera was void, howerveron reconsideration, the CA held de Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value.

ISSUE:
Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in question?

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Spouses Abrigo base their petition on the general averment that
respondent should have been more vigilant prior to consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected the
property, she wuld have found petitioners to be in possession.
This is contradicted by the spouses own admission that the parents and sister of Villafania were still actual occupants in
October 17, 1997 when de Vera Purchased the property.
The family members may reasonably be assumed to be Villafanias agents, who had not been shown to have notified
respondent of first sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. The good faith stands.
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC. vs. HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ
G.R. No. 171531 January 30, 2009

FACTS:
Respondents are descendants of Pablo Pascua who filed a complaint seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land in
Cabitaugan, Subic Zambales and covered by OCT No. 404 in the name of Pablo.

OCT No. 404 was attached as one of the annexes of respondents’ complaint. It contained several annotations in the
memorandum of encumbrances which showed that the property had already been sold by Pablo during his lifetime to
Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto Morales.

Respondents alleged that Pablo died intestate sometime in June 1945 and was survived by his four children, one of
whom was the deceased Cipriano. In1967, Cipriano executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and
Confirmation of Sales wherein he declared himself as the only heir of Pablo and confirmed the sales made by the
decedent during his lifetime, including the alleged sale of the disputed property to spouses Rodolfo.
Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano, filed a petition with RTC-Olongapo for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of
OCT No. 404. The RTC denied the petition and held that petitioner was already the owner of the land, noting that the
failure to annotate the subsequent transfer of the property to it at the back of OCT No. 404 did not affect its title to the
property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations
since more than 28 years have passed since the issuance from T-10863 to the filing of the complaint and that there is no
cause of action since petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value relying on the clean title of spouses Rodolfo.
RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
CA reversed and held that the ruling of the RTC that petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value is contrary to the
allegations in respondents' complaint.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value.
RULING:
Yes, petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value.
The Court held that it is basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to rely on,
the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since “the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned,” it follows that where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any
cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore
farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto.
Further, it is enough that petitioner examined the latest certificate of title issued in the name of spouses Rodolfo. The
purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had
purchased the property.
Moreover, registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall be, if registered, filed or entered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, there is no question that petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value; hence, no cause of action for cancellation of
title will lie against it. The RTC was correct in granting petitioner's motion to dismiss.

BARANDA vs GUSTILLO
G.R. NO. 81163. SEPTEMBER 26, 1988

Facts:
The origin of this case is a petition for reconstitution of title.
Petitioners (Eduardo Baranda & alfonso Hitalia) and private respondents (Gregorio Perez, Maria Provido Gotera, and
Susan Silao) are in dispute over a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 located at Sta. Barbara, Iloilo.
Petitioners were issued a TCT under their name ( TCT no. 106098). During trial, the CFI of Iloilo issued a writ of
possession in favor of the Petitioners but the respondents refused to honor such issuance because apparently they also
have a TCT under their name ( TCT no. 25772) over the same lot. However, the CFI later held that the TCT under the
names of the respondents was fraudulently acquired.
Hence, the CFI ordered to carry out the writ of possession in favor of the petitioners.
A writ of demolition was later issued, but the respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, and it granted the said petition.
Meanwhile, the acting Register of deeds (RD Avito Saclauso) annotated the CFI’s order to declare the TcT under the
name of the respondents null and void and issued a new one under the names of the Petitioners. However, because of the
separate petitions of the respondents, the new titles under the names of the petitioners were annotated with a “Notice of
LIS PENDENS” by the same Register of Deeds.
The petitioners moved to have the said annotation cancelled.
The respondent Judge, Hon. Tito Gustilo initially ordered RD Saclauso to cancel the said annotation but the later refused
and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration within the same court, invoking SECTION 77 of PD 1529.
Judge Gustilo then set aside his initial order and granted RD Saclauso’s Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens
certificate of title.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the function of the Register of Deeds is MINISTERIAL in nature.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register
an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or
where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the
party in interest thru the Register of Deeds.”
The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he
should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land
Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.