POSSESSION
G.R. No. 130316 January 24, 2007
ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners,
vs.
BALTAZAR PACLEB,1 Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court originated from
an action for forcible entry and damages filed by petitioners Ernesto and Elsie
Yu against respondent Baltazar Pacleb.
The antecedent facts follow.
Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier allegedly offered to sell Lot No.
6853-D to petitioners for P75 per sq.m.lawphil.net The lot was approximately
18,000 square meters and was located in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas,
Cavite. Javier supposedly purchased the lot from one Rebecca del Rosario who,
in turn, acquired it from respondent and his wife. The title of the property
(Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. T-118375), however, remained in the
names of respondent and his wife. The instruments in support of the series of
alleged sales were not registered.
On September 11, 1992, petitioners accepted the offer and gave Javier P200,000
as downpayment for the lot. Javier then delivered his supposed muniments of
title to petitioners. After the execution of a contract to sell, he formally turned
over the property to petiti oners.
At the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot was occupied by Ramon C.
Pacleb, respondent’s son, and his wife as tenants. On September 12, 1992,
Ramon and his wife allegedly surrendered possession of their portion to
petitioners. Later on, petitioners appointed Ramon as their trustee over the
subject lot.
Aside from taking possession of the property, petitioners also caused the
annotation on TCT No. T-118375 of a decision rendered in their favor in Civil
Case No. 741-93.2 This decision attained finality on April 19, 1995.
Petitioners alleged that they exercised ownership rights as well as enjoyed
open, public and peaceful possession over the property from September 12,
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1992 until the early part of September 1995. During this time, respondent was
in the United States.
Upon respondent’s return to the Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly entered
the property by means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth
thereby ousting petitioners and their trustee, Ramon.
Despite repeated demands, respondent, asserting his rights as registered owner
of the property, refused to vacate the premises and surrender its possession to
petitioners.
Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry3 in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Dasmariñas, Cavite on November 23, 1995. Respondent filed an answer with
compulsory counterclaim dated December 8, 1995. After the issues were joined,
the MTC required the submission of the parties’ position papers at a
preliminary conference on March 11, 1996. Respondent failed to comply.
On June 17, 1996, the MTC ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the [respondent] and other persons
claiming right under him are hereby ordered to surrender physical possession
of Lot No. 6853-D in favor of the [petitioners] and to pay the sum of TWENTY-
FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal,5 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision
affirming the MTC decision in toto.6
Respondent elevated his case to the Court of Appeals (CA) 7 which rendered the
assailed decision on March 18, 1997:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision dated October 25, 1996 of
the [RTC] of Imus, Cavite in Civil Case No. 052-96 and the Decision of the [MTC]
of Dasmariñas, Cavite in Civil Case No. 182 are SET ASIDE; and Civil Case No.
182 for Forcible Entry and Damages is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.8
In a resolution dated August 20, 1997, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
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Before us now come petitioners who claim that the appellate court erred in
finding that respondent had prior physical possession of the subject
property.lawphil.net
"In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth."9 The plaintiff, however, cannot
prevail where it appears that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter
had possession antedating his own.10 We are generally precluded in a Rule 45
petition from reviewing factual evidence tracing the events prior to the first act
of spoliation.11 However, the conflicting factual findings of the MTC and RTC on
one hand, and the CA on the other, require us to make an exception.
We overrule petitioners’ contentions.
The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment
of a right.12 In the grammatical sense, to possess means to have, to actually and
physically occupy a thing, with or without right.13 "Possession always includes
the idea of occupation x x x. It is not necessary that the person in possession
should himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held by another in his
name."14 Without occupancy, there is no possession.15
Two things are paramount in possession.16 First, there must be occupancy,
apprehension or taking. Second, there must be intent to possess (animus
possidendi).17
Here, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical possession to
justify a ruling in their favor in the complaint for forcible entry against
respondent.
In the decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 (a case for specific performance and
damages against Javier, the alleged vendor of the lot in question) upon which
petitioners based their right to possess in the first place, the trial court
categorically stated:
The [petitioners were never placed] in possession of the subject
property on which [was] planned to be [site of] a piggery, nor [were they]
given a clearance or certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer.18(emphasis ours)
The claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992 was self-serving in
the face of this factual finding. On the other hand, the tax declarations and
receipts in the name of respondent in 1994 and 1995 established the possession
[Type text]
of respondent.19 The payment of real estate tax is one of the most persuasive
and positive indications showing the will of a person to possess in concepto de
dueño or with claim of ownership.20
"[P]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession."21 In this case, Ramon, as respondent’s son, was named caretaker
when respondent left for the United States in 1983.22 Due to the eventual loss of
trust and confidence in Ramon, however, respondent transferred the
administration of the land to his other son, Oscar, in January 1995 until his
return in May 1995.23 In other words, the subject land was in the possession of
the respondent’s sons during the contested period.
Petitioners cite an alleged document (Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang
Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan) dated March 10, 1995
executed by them and Ramon to prove a turn over of possession. They also seek
to prove their exercise of rights over the land through alleged frequent visits
and the designation of Ramon as their own trustee as declared in a joint
affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the MTC. These instruments,
however, fail to convince us of petitioners’ actual occupancy of the subject land.
First, petitioners themselves acknowledged that Ramon and his wife occupied
part of the land as tenants of respondent. Second, Ramon, a mere tenant, had no
authority to sign such document dated March 10, 1995 waiving all rights to the
land. Third, there was no clear proof in the records of the appointment of
Ramon as petitioners’ trustee save their self-serving statements to this effect.
Finally, at the time the Kusangloob na Pagsasauli document was executed, the
caretaker of the land was no longer Ramon but Oscar.24
Most important, the title of the land in question (TCT No. T-118375) remained
in the name of respondent.25 "As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to
the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of
ownership."26 The Civil Code states:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question
arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred;
if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions
are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of
its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
In view of the evidence establishing respondent’s continuing possession of the
subject property, petitioners’ allegation that respondent deprived them of
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POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

actual possession by means of force, intimidation and threat was clearly

untenable. In Gaza v. Lim, we held that:

Where a dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first
having actual possession is the one who is entitled to maintain the action
granted by law; otherwise, a mere usurper without any right whatever, might
enter upon the property of another and, by allowing himself to be ordered off,
could acquire the right to maintain the action of forcible entry and detainer,
however momentary his intrusion might have been.27

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals dated March 18, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42604 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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POSSESSION
G.R. No. 199898 September 3, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LEO DELA TRINIDAD y OBALLES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal assailing the 24 March 2011 Decision1 of the
Court of. Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288. The CA affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Naga City, Camarines Sur
finding the accused guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
The Antecedents
On 22 October 2008, an Information was filed against accused Leo Dela
Trinidad yOballes (appellant) before the RTC, Naga City, Camarines Sur for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A No. 9165, to wit:
That on or about October 21, 2008, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in
his possession, custody and control nine and one-half (9 ½) bricks of suspected
dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or less 475 grams
including its (sic) wrapper; two (2) big bricks of suspected dried marijuana
leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or less 550 grams including its (sic)
wrapper; four (4) pieces of medium size cubes of suspected dried marijuana
leaves weighing more or less 41.1 grams including its (sic) plastic containers;
eighteen (18) pieces of small cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves with
fruiting tops weighing more or less 55.4 grams including its (sic) plastic
container; and seventy[-]seven (77) pieces of small empty transparent plastic
sachet, with a total weight of more or less 1,121.5 grams, which is a dangerous
drug, inviolation of the above-cited law.2
Version of the Prosecution
On 27 September 2008, the Office of the Intelligence Section of the Naga City
Police (Intelligence Section) received an information concerning a certain Leo
De la Trinidad who was allegedly involved in drug trafficking. Police Senior
Inspector Benigno Albao, Sr. (PSI. Albao), Chief of the Intelligence Section,
DE GUIA [Type text]
interviewed the informant and after having been convinced that the information
was true,3 he referred the matter to Senior Police Officer 1 Feliciano Aguilar
(SPO1 Aguilar) and SPO1 Fersebal Abrantes (SPO1 Abrantes) for the conduct of
a surveillance operation for further details.4
The surveillance operation confirmed the identity and exact location of
appellant. The police operatives also observed during the surveillance that
some suspected drug pushers visited the residence of appellant.5
After having verified the report thatappellant is indeed involved in drug trade, a
test-buy was conducted on 10 October 2008.6 The test-buy brought forth
positive result as the police asset was able to buy marijuana cubes, dried
marijuana leaves and fruiting tops worth ₱100.00 from appellant. After the
initial test-buy, the informant was directed by the police operatives to continue
monitoring appellant because there was a report that the latter is in possession
of quantities of marijuana by the kilo.7
On 13 October 2008, a discussion onthe use of code names was made by the
members of the team in order to conceal the identity of appellant and to secure
their operation.8 The code name is "Leonidas de Leon" and the name of the plan
is "Code Plan Sativa."9
On 16 October 2008, around 5:30 P.M., another test-buy took place through
SPO1 Aguilar and SPO1 Abrantesand again, the asset was able to purchase one
brick of dried marijuana leaves from appellant.10
On 17 October 2008, the bricks of marijuana purchased from appellant on 10
October 2008 and 16 October 2008 were submitted to the Camarines Sur Police
Provincial Office.11
On 20 October 2008, the police operatives applied for two search warrants from
the RTC, Branch 25 in Naga City.12One search warrant was applied for violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 while the other one was for violation of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294 or for illegal possession of
firearmsand ammunitions because during the second test-buy, the police asset
saw appellant with a gun which was tucked in his waist. 13Upon receipt of the
search warrants, the team coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), as shown by the Certificate of Coordination. A pre-operation
report was then submitted to the PDEA.14
The police operatives proceededto conduct a briefing for the execution of the
search warrants. The said briefing was made at the Conference Room of the
Naga City Police Office on 21 October 2008, at about 4:10 A.M. 15 The briefing of
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POSSESSION DE GUIA
the teamwas photographed. Among those present are the members of the
raiding team16 and the mandatory witnesses, i.e.representative from the DOJ,
Carlo Lamberto Tayo; media representative, Roy Ranoco; elected punong
barangayof Sabang, Naga City Jose Jacobo and Kagawad Eugene Froyalde of
Sabang, Naga City.
Around 5:10 AM of 21 October 2008, the group proceeded to the residence of
appellant. They wereaccompanied by the DOJ and media representatives
together with the local barangayofficials. Upon reaching appellant’s house, the
raiding team knocked at his door and identified themselves as police officers
from the Naga City Police Office and informed him that they are executing the
search warrants issued by Judge Jaime Contreras. They told appellant that they
have witnesses with them, and read to him the contents of the warrants and
apprised him of his constitutional rights.17 PO2 Quintin Tusara took picturesof
everything that transpired while the operatives were executing the warrants.18
When appellant was asked to produce the items enumerated in the search
warrant, if indeed he really had them, appellant voluntarily presented the items
which he took under his pillow. The items consisted of nine and a half (9 ½)
bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape, two (2)
big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape, four
(4) medium sizecubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the
small transparent plastic sachet, and eighteen (18) pieces of small cubes of
suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the small transparent plastic
sachet.19 Also found were seventy-seven (77) pieces of empty transparent
plastic sachets. SPO1 Aguilar, placed his initial, "FBA," in the said items. 20
No firearm was found at the residence of appellant. An inventory was then
conducted right inside the house of appellant and a certificate of inventory was
prepared by SPO1 Louie Ordonez.21 The Certificate of Inventory and
Certification of Orderly Search were duly signed by the witnesses in the
presence of appellant.22
After making the necessary markings, appellant and the items seized from him
were brought to the Naga City Police Station.23
The seized items were returned to the court of origin but were subsequently
withdrawn for laboratory examination.24A request to the Camarines Sur
Provincial Office was subsequently madeby SPO1 Aguilar and the seized items
were immediately brought to the Crime Laboratory for field test
examination.25 The seized items were duly received by P/Insp. Edsel Villalobos
(P/Insp. Villalobos).26
[Type text]
When subjected to both initial and final test examinations by P/Insp. Villalobos,
the seized items were found positive for the presence of marijuana.27
Version of the Defense
In the early morning of 21 October 2008, appellant was in his house located in
Sabang, Naga City together with his wife and children. Somebody knocked at
their door, so hepeeped through the window and asked who was knocking. He
noticed a lot of people outside and asked them who were they. Somebody
answered that he was Kapitan, so the witness opened the door. They entered
appellant’s house and immediately took pictures of it. He was told to just stay at
the side and asked him to bring out the gun and the illegal drugs. When asked to
bring out the illegal drugs, he heard somebody shouted, "I have already found
it." They went near the table, but he was not able to see whatthey were doing
because the table was surrounded by men. At that time, the appellant was
seated on a bamboo chair with his hands placed on his nape. Thereafter, he was
called and asked to sign on a piece of paper. When he asked what was that for,
they told him that they were for the things found inhis house. A man
approached him and read to him the contents of the warrant. Then, he was
handcuffed and brought to the police station.28
Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated 16 November 2009,the trial court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The RTC found that the
prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
appellant for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165.
Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00).
The RTC ruled that the evidence presented during the trial adequately proved
all the elements of the offense.It held that appellant, not being authorized by
law, with full knowledge that the items were dangerous drugs, had actual and
exclusive possession, control and dominion over the drugs found in his
house.29 It likewise held that the officers strictly complied with the guidelines
prescribed by law on how drug operations should be conducted by law
enforcers and in takingcustody and control of the seized drugs. 30 On the other
hand, accused failed to present any substantial evidence to establish his defense
of frame-up. The RTC placed more weight on the affirmative testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, rather than the denials of the accused because positive
testimonies are weightier than negative ones.31 With the positive identification
made by the government witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime, his self-
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POSSESSION DE GUIA
serving denial is worthless.32 Since there was nothing in the record to show that
the arresting team and the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper
motives, their affirmative statements proving appellant’s culpability were
respected by the trial court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements
of illegal sale of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution. It found credible the statements of prosecution witnesses about
what transpired during and after the test-buy, service of search warrant, and
arrest of the accused. Further, it ruled that the prosecution has proven as
unbroken the chain of custody of evidence. The CA likewise upheld the findings
of the trial court that the entire operation conducted by the police officers
enjoyed the presumption of regularity, absent any showing of illmotive on the
part of those who conducted the same.
The CA likewise found appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-up
unconvincing and lacked corroboration. Itnoted that appellant did not even
present his wife, who was allegedly present during the search, to corroborate
his claim.33
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Appellant raised in his brief a loneerror on the part of the appellate court, to
wit:
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant submits that the trial court overlooked and misapplied some facts of
substance, which if considered, could have altered the verdict. He maintains that
he has no knowledge as to where the illegal drugs were found as he was not in
possession of the same, and alleged thatthe bricks of marijuana were merely
planted by the police operatives.34
[Type text]
Appellant’s contention is belied by the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution. It bears to stress that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi,
has been invariably viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily be
concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.35 They are self-serving evidence, and unless
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot be given weight over the
positive assertions of credible witnesses.36
In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements must beestablished: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which isidentified to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.37 As correctly ruled by the CA, these elements were duly
established by the prosecution. Jurisprudence is consistent in thatmere
possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facieevidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused inthe absence of any
satisfactory explanation.38
The ruling of this Court in People v. Lagman39 is instructive.1âwphi1 It held that
illegal possession ofregulated drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the
accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
exists whenthe drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found.Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place
where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a
house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the
presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is
sufficient to convict.40 Here, accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to
overcome such presumption. He merely insisted that he was framed and had no
knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came from. In the absence of any
contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in full control and dominion of the drugs
found in his house. Accused-appellant argues that the corpus delictihas not been
clearly established. He points out that although SPO1 Aguilar allegedly placed
his markings on the confiscated items, no such marking was indicated in the
certificate of inventory, nor were the weight of the said specimens indicated
thereon. He further argues that the markings allegedly placed on the specimens
seized were not even indicated in the return of the search warrant. 41 Thus, he
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POSSESSION DE GUIA
centers his argument on the contention that the integrity of the dangerous
drugs was not ensured and its identity was not established with moral integrity.
Relevant to appellant’s case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and
handling of the seized dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II, R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof[.]
This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same inthe presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative orcounsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, thatthe physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long asthe integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis
supplied)
Strictly speaking, the aforecited provision of the IRR does not even require that
the certificate of inventory must indicate the markings and the weight of the
seized items. In fact, the rule even sanctions substantial compliance with the
procedure to establish a chain of custody, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are property preserved by the
apprehending officers. In People v. Pringas,42 the Court recognized that the
strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be
possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions,
and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence.
[Type text]
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity
of corpus delictiand the unbroken chain of custody. Aptly noting the findings of
the trial court:
It was sufficiently established that representatives from the media and
Department of Justice and even two (2) barangay local officials were present
during the briefing and even until the conduct of the inventory. And that
immediately after seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs, the same
were inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant and said
persons, who even signed copies of the inventory. The seized illegal drugs were
marked at accused’s residence and in his presence. P/S Insp. Villalobos testified
that the seized items he received from Aguilar already contained the markings,
"FBA". Besides, he also placed his own initials and signatures in blue markings
to preserve and maintain the integrity of the specimens. Thus, there was no
cogent reason why the court should doubt the trustworthiness and credibility of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.43
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there
is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with. Accused-appellant bear the burden of showing that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity
in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public
officers properly discharged their duties.44 Accused-appellant in this case failed
to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting
officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith
and credit.45 In fact, accusedappellant did not even question the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely on his allegation of
frame-up and denial and on the alleged broken chain of the custody of the
seized drugs.
In sum, we find no reason to modifyor set aside the decision of the CA. Accused-
appellant was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIEDand the 24 March 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
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POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

Supreme Court Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with
Manila
violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan,
SECOND DIVISION
committed as follows:

ELENITA C. FAJARDO, G.R. No. 190889

Petitioner, That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in
Present: Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of
Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
CARPIO, J., jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Chairperson, accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
- versus - NACHURA, helping one another, without authority of law, permit
PERALTA, or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully,
ABAD, and unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,
MENDOZA, JJ. custody and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45
pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025
Promulgated: and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, number, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16
Respondent. January 10, 2011 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16
ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were
confiscated and recovered from their possession
during a search conducted by members of the
DECISION Provincial Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan
Police Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of
NACHURA, J.: Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive
Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of
Aklan.[3]

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense
of Court, seeking the reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court
charged.[4] During pre-trial, they agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding 1. The search warrant subject of this case exists;
petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.
2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the
search warrant in this case who is a resident
of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;

3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo

The facts:
in the evening of August 27, 2002 but does not live therein;

4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;

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POSSESSION
5. The search warrant was served in the house of accused
Elenita Fajardo in the morning of August 28, 2002; and
6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested
immediately upon the arrival of the military personnel
despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw them in
possession of a firearm in the evening of August 27,
2002.[5]
As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the
CA,[6] these are the chain of events that led to the filing of the information:
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial
Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial
Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to
respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and
Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo,
Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were
indiscriminately firing guns.
Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the
elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed
that several persons scampered and ran in different directions. The responding
team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen
before entering the house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist
and the waistband of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked
the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering
petitioners house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension,
DE GUIA [Type text]
they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited for further
instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of
the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops. No agreement
materialized.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police
Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of
the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something.
The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside the
compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro
Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as
witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2)
receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN)
763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The
recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan),
Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search
warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with
a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as
witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioners house. The team
found and was able to confiscate the following:
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing
their authority to possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered
9
POSSESSION
receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance
of the search warrant was defective because the allegation contained in the
application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal
knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the application:
That this application was founded on confidential
information received by the Provincial Director, Police Supt.
Edgardo Mendoza.[7]
They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was
infirm since petitioner, who was inside the house at the time of the search, was
not asked to accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but was
instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the
inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly
belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her
waistband when the raiding team arrived. She averred that such situation was
implausible because she was wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-
strapped hanging blouse.[8]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the
same were already denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20,
2005, respectively denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer
DE GUIA [Type text]
to Evidence. The said Orders were not appealed and have thus attained finality.
The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the
legality of their arrest since they participated in the trial by presenting evidence
for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively waived
such irregularities and defects.
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC
explained:
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a
former soldier, having served with the Philippine Army prior
to his separation from his service for going on absence without
leave (AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to
conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and knowledgeable
about different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a former
soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble
firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of
Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are
the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and
ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and
ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member of
the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a government
property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the
proper place to store those items. The logical explanation is
that those items are stolen property.
xxxx
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law
requires is merely possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to ones control and management. This
has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective.
The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the
law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish
the object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
10
POSSESSION
xxxx
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended
to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good
faith and without criminal intent.
xxxx
To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms
and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential
elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm ammunition or explosive
which may be proved by the presentation of the subject
firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw
accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact
that the accused has no license or permit to own or possess the
firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may be
established by the testimony or certification of a
representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that
the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject
firearm or explosive (Exhibit G).
The judicial admission of the accused that they do not
have permit or license on the two (2) receivers of caliber .45
pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model
M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16
ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber
.45 ammunition confiscated and recovered from their
possession during the search conducted by members of the
PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[9]
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal
possession of firearms and explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1
of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period
and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be
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imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38
caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and
also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other
firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of
two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine
of P30,000.00.
On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated October 25, 2006.
Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed
with its conclusions of law, and held that the search warrant was void based on
the following observations:
[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel
A. Tan did not have personal knowledge of the fact that
appellants had no license to possess firearms as required by
law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that
point during the application. Also, he failed to attach to the
application a certification to that effect from the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this
certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove that
appellant indeed has no license or permit to possess a firearm.
There was also no explanation given why said certification was
not presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during the
application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was simply
ignored.[10]
11
POSSESSION DE GUIA
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners
residence were declared inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers
recovered by the policemen outside the house of petitioner before the warrant
was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession
of a part of a firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866,
as amended. They were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3)
years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, four (4)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, and ordered to pay
a P20,000.00 fine.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the motion was denied in
the CA Resolution dated December 3, 2009.[12] Hence, the present recourse.
At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against
petitioner and Valerio charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of
Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information
must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.
A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated
articles confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate
provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. [13] Illegal
possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five
(35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live
caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:
[Type text]
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period
and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than
.38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .44,
.45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime
was committed by the person arrested.[14]
On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45
caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US,
with a defaced serial number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states:
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition,
disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or
instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms or ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.[15]
This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by
R.A. No. 8294, which categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being
possessed without a license, according to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No.
8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal possession of firearm
according to the above classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a
standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of firearm. Section 1 of
the old law reads:
12
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,

review is consequently only with regard to the conviction for illegal possession
Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of of a part of a firearm.
Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, The Issues
acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two
ammunition. (Emphasis ours.)
(2) receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She
argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced
By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of
to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise
firearm should now particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which
absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the
the seized firearm is classified, and should there be numerous guns confiscated,
policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband
each must be sorted and then grouped according to the categories stated in
of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to
petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the
lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and state Section 1, P.D. No.
receivers.
1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case, [16]because different
penalties are imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do
Our Ruling
so would result in duplicitous charges.

We find merit in the petition.

Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a
quashal, but petitioner and Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment.
First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were
Their failure constitutes a waiver, and they could be convicted of as many
seized in plain view, hence, admissible.
offenses as there were charged in the information. [17] This accords propriety to
the diverse convictions handed down by the courts a quo.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including
seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution,
the validity of the search warrant that led to their confiscation, is now beyond
which states:
the province of our review since, by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and
Valerio have been effectively acquitted from the said charges. The present
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
13
POSSESSION
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in
Section 3(2) of the same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing
rule. Thus, evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be
admissible under any of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[18]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an
officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.[19] It applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has
a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
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the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent.[20]
Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of
the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the
plain view doctrine.
First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the
other law enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner
and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before
they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances
and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived
engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to
cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different
instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious
objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2
Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be
contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of
committing. Indeed, when subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two
(2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.
The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating:
Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they doing?
A They were cordoning the house.
14
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that PROS. PERALTA:
incident. What did he tell you? Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun. do something if any?
A I shouted to seek cover.
Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned
is the police officers were surrounding? xxxx
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock
the following day.
Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you
recall where were you?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of
the flashlight on the place where something was thrown.
Q What did you see if any?
A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.

Q Where were you? xxxx

A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.
Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual
incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.
Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28,
2002, do you recall another unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And can you tell us what was that incident?
A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was
thrown fell on top of the roof of another house.

Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house? Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the
A Yes, sir. rooftop of the house?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Did you recognize him?
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw A Yes, sir.
that something outside the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio. Q Who was that person?
A Zaldy Valerio again.
COURT: (to witness)
Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio? xxxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something
Q Why do you know him? out of the house?
A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of A I was on the road in front of the house.
the Philippines.
Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out
xxxx of the house?
15
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

A He was on top of the house.

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for
xxxx illegal possession of part of a firearm.

Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out? In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms
A Yes, sir. attaches, the following disquisitions in People v. De Gracia[22] are instructive:

Q What was that?

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal
A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.
possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires
is merely possession which includes not only actual physical
xxxx
possession but also constructive possession or the subjection
Q And what did he tell you?
of the thing to one's control and management. This has to be so
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.
if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same
evils, the same perils to public security, which the law
xxxx
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited
weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object
of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have
Q What did you do if any?
no bearing whatsoever.
A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession
xxxx sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of
firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a
Q Who opened the fence for you? violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the
A It was a lady who is the owner of the house. offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith
Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
find?
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule,
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)[21]
intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that
the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by
the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate;
perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not
nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend
to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things,
that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to be so. the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there
The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the
act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession,
without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for
evidence. The liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there
and not on petitioner. was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the
accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to
any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may
16
POSSESSION
have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here
refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with
the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in
convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of
the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or
license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess
the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or
harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of
this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for
as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense
committed.[23]
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is
committed when the holder thereof:
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.[24]
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive
possession of the subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared
that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown.
None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during
their disposal.
At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental
because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop
of petitioners house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners participation,
DE GUIA [Type text]
knowledge or consent in Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of the receivers.
Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only
proceed from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun
seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.
Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof
required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule
is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of
special law.[25] The quantum of proof required by law was not adequately met in
this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not
identified with sufficient particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the
same with any of the seized receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated
that he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of the PISOG arrived
in petitioners house. It is not unlikely then that the receivers later on discarded
were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.
These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that
petitioner conspired with Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a
firearm. There is no evidence indubitably proving that petitioner participated in
the decision to commit the criminal act committed by Valerio.
17
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of submitted a certification[30] to that effect and identified the same in
reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was court.[31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice to prove
not adequately overcome by the evidence adduced by the prosecution. beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[32]

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a
firearm.
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a)
the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who
possessed the same does not have the corresponding license for it.[26]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita
Fajardo y Castro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of

a firearm must yield these requisites:

(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and

(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license
for the firearm to which the seized part/component corresponds.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings United
States Property and the other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented
to the court as Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also identified by
SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded
them.[27] His testimony was corroborated by DYKR radio announcer Vega, who
witnessed the recovery of the receivers.[28]

Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it
was ascertained that Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of
any type, kind, or caliber of firearms.[29] To substantiate his statement, he

18
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

MARIA CARLOS, represented by G.R. No. 164823

TERESITA CARLOS VICTORIA, alleged, among others, that she is the owner of said parcel of land which she
Petitioner, Present:
openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945
Puno, J.
Chairman, or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership; that there is no mortgage or
Austria-Martinez,
- versus - Callejo, Sr., encumbrance affecting said property, nor is it part of any military or naval
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ. reservation; that the property is being used for industrial purposes; and that

Promulgated: there are no tenants or lessees on the property. Petitioner further claimed that
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. August 31, 2005 she has been in possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner; that
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x her possession has been peaceful, public, uninterrupted and continuous since

1948 or earlier; and tacking her possession with that of her predecessors-in-
DECISION
interest, petitioner has been in possession of the land for more than 50 years. [1]
Puno, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, filed an

opposition to petitioners application.[2]

This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76824 entitled Re: Application for Land Registration
During the initial hearing, however, only petitioner and her counsel appeared.
of a Parcel of Land in Taguig, Metro Manila, Maria Carlos represented by
They presented documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional
Teresita Carlos Victoria, Applicant-Appellee vs. Republic of the Philippines
requirements.[3]
through the Office of the Solicitor General, Oppositor-Appellant.
Petitioner later presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of

her neighbors, Sergio Cruz and Daniel Castillo, and Teresita Carlos Victoria
On December 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter,
herself.[4]
Teresita Carlos Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of

title over a parcel of land with an area of 3,975 square meters located at
Sergio Cruz, 83 years old, a native of Ususan, Taguig, and neighbor of Maria
Pusawan, Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Plan Psu-244418. Petitioner
Carlos, testified that the property subject of the application was previously
19
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

owned and possessed by Jose Carlos. He planted it with palay and sold the Victoria admitted that her mother had sold the land to Ususan Development

harvest. Everyone in the community knew him as the owner of said parcel of Corporation in 1996 but failed to deliver the title. Hence, the heirs of Maria

land. He also paid the taxes thereon. After the death of Jose Carlos in 1948, his Carlos made a commitment to the corporation to deliver the certificate of title

daughter, Maria Carlos, inherited the property and immediately took possession so that they could collect the unpaid balance of the purchase price.[7]

thereof. Her possession was peaceful, open, public, continuous, uninterrupted,

Petitioner also presented in court the concerned officers of the Department of
notorious, adverse and in the concept of an owner. When Maria Carlos died, her
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to establish that the land in
heirs took over the property.[5]
question is alienable and disposable.

Cruzs testimony was corroborated by Daniel Castillo, 76 years old, Barangay

Elvira R. Reynaldo, Records Officer, DENR Lands Management Bureau, appeared
Captain of Ususan, Taguig.[6]
to certify that their office has no record of any kind of public land

Teresita Carlos Victoria stated on the witness stand that her mother, Maria application/land patent covering the parcel of land situated at

Carlos, was in possession of the subject property until she passed away on Ususan, Taguig, Rizal, identified/described in Plan Psu-244418.[8]

January 6, 2001. Upon the demise of Maria Carlos, Victoria took possession of
Ulysses Sigaton, Land Management Inspector, DENR National Capital Region,
the property with the consent of her brothers and sisters. She characterized
stated that he conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property and found
Maria Carloss possession as peaceful, open, public, continuous, adverse,
that it is within the alienable and disposable area under Project No. 27-B, LC
notorious and in the concept of an owner. She has never been disturbed in her
Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 4,
possession; the whole community recognized her as the owner of the land; she
1968. He also noted that the land is being used for industrial purposes. It had
declared the land for tax purposes; and she paid the taxes thereon. In addition,
several warehouses, four big water tanks and is enclosed by a fence.[9]
Victoria informed the court that the heirs of Maria Carlos have not yet instituted

a settlement of her estate. However, they have agreed to undertake the titling of The trial court granted the application in its decision dated October 24, 2002. It

the property and promised to deliver the certificate of title to Ususan held:
After considering the applicants evidence ex-parte which is
Development Corporation which bought the property from Maria Carlos. based on factual and meritorious grounds, and considering
20
POSSESSION
that the applicant acquired the property under registration
through inheritance from her father, Jose Carlos, and
considering further that her possession thereof, tacked with
that of her predecessor-in-interest, is open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and undisturbed, under claim of
ownership since time immemorial up to the present time; and
considering further that the subject parcel of land is part of the
disposable and alienable land (Tsn, July 3, 2002, p.6) and
considering further that the realty taxes due thereon have been
religiously paid (Exhs. HH, II, JJ, and JJ-1), and considering
finally that the subject parcel of land belong[s] to the applicant
and that she possess[es] a perfect title thereto which may be
confirmed and registered in her name under the (P)roperty
Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), the herein application is
hereby GRANTED.[10]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court. It noted that:
In the instant case, the applicant at the time she filed her
application for registration of title was no longer in possession
and occupation of the land in question since on October 16,
1996, the applicants mother and predecessor-in-interest sold
the subject land to Ususan Development Corporation. This was
admitted by witness Teresita Carlos Victoria x x x
Clearly, as early as 1996, possession and occupation of the land
in question pertains not to the applicant but to Ususan
Development Corporation, thus it can be said that the applicant
has no registrable title over the land in question.[11]
Hence, this petition.
We affirm the findings of the appellate court.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that
the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the
DE GUIA [Type text]
public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.[12]
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but
not the second.
The Court held in Republic vs. Alconaba[13] that the applicant must show that
he is in actual possession of the property at the time of the application, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction []and[], the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.
It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had
possession of the property at the time of the application for the issuance of a
certificate of title. The application was filed in court on December 19, 2001.
Teresita Carlos Victoria, the daughter of Maria Carlos, admitted during the
hearing that her mother had sold the property to Ususan Development
Corporation in 1996. They also presented as evidence the deed of absolute sale
21
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

executed by and between Maria Carlos and Ususan Development Corporation We therefore find that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the issuance

on October 16, 1996.[14] The document states, among others: of a certificate of title to petitioner.
xxx

4. That the VENDOR, by this Deed hereby transfer(s) IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
possession of the property to the VENDEE.[15]

SO ORDERED.

This contradicts petitioners claim that she was in possession of the property at

the time that she applied for confirmation of title.

Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual

possession of the land at that time, such possession was no longer in the

concept of an owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in

the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept

of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other

hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior

right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or

wrong.[16] Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan

Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate

of title to the corporation upon its obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her

possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the law,

only he who possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is

entitled to confirmation of title.

22
POSSESSION
G.R. No. 71283 November 12, 1987
MIGUEL ESCRITOR, JR., ANGEL ESCRITOR, RAMON ESCRITOR, JUANA
ESCRITOR, CONCORDIA ESCRITOR, IRENE ESCRITOR, MATILDE ESCRITOR,
MERCEDES ESCRITOR, HEIRS OF LUIS ESCRITOR, represented by RUPERTO
ESCRITOR, HEIRS OF PEDO ESCRITOR, represented by SUSANA
VILLAMENA, LINA ESCRITOR, WENDELINA ESCRITOR, ALFREDO ESCRITOR,
SUSANA ESCRITOR and CARMEN ESCRITOR, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SIMEON ACUNA, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-01264-R entitled "Simeon
Acuna vs. Miguel Escritor, Jr., et al," a case which originated from the Court of
First Instance of Quezon.
The record of the case discloses the following facts:
Lot No. 2749, located at Atimonan, Quezon, was the subject of cadastral
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch, Miguel
Escritor, as claimant, filed an answer thereto declaring his ownership over the
lot alleging that he acquired it by inheritance from his deceased father. 1 As
required, a notice of hearing was duly published, after which an order of general
default was entered. 2 The lot having become uncontested, only Miguel Escritor
appeared in order to adduce his evidence of ownership.
On May 15, 1958, the Court rendered a decision in the abovementioned case,
Cadastral Case No. 72, adjudicating the lot with its improvements in favor of
claimant Escritor and confirming his title thereto. 3 Immediately thereafter,
Escritor took possession of the property. On July 15, 1958, the Court, in an
Order, directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in favor of Escritor, the decision in
Cadastral Case No. 72 having become final. 4
On August 2, 1958, Simeon S. Acuna, the herein respondent, filed a petition for
review of the above-mentioned decision contending that it was obtained by
claimant Escritor through fraud and misrepresentation. 5 The petition was
granted on July 18, 1960 and a new hearing was set for September 13,
DE GUIA [Type text]
1960. 6 While the proceedings were going on, claimant Escritor died. His heirs,
the petitioners in this case, took possession of the property.
On February 16, 1971 or thirteen years after the disputed decision was
rendered, the Court adjudicated Lot No. 2749 in favor of respondent Acuna,
ordering petitioners to vacate the land. 7 A writ of possession was later issued
and petitioners voluntarily gave up their possession. 8
More than four years later, or on October 13, 1975 respondent Acuna filed with
the same Court in Civil Case No. 1138-G, a complaint for recovery of damages
against petitioners for the fruits of lot No. 2749 which was allegedly possessed
by the latter unlawfully for thirteen years. According to respondent Acuña, the
registration of the said lot was effectuated by the deceased claimant Escritor
through fraud, malice, and misrepresentation. The lower court, however,
rendered a decision dismissing Acuña's complaint for damages, finding that
though petitioners enjoyed the fruits of the property, they were in good faith
possessing under a just title, and the cause of action, if there was any, has
already prescribed. 9
On Appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the judgment of the lower court
was reversed in a decision promulgated on October 31, 1984, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and set aside and
another one entered herein, ordering the defendants-appellees
jointly and severally (a) to pay the plaintiff- appellant the sum
of P10,725.00 representing the value of the fruits appellees
received for the 13 years they have been in unlawful
possession of the land subject-matter; (b) to pay plaintiff-
appellant the sum of P3,000.00 for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, and (c) to pay the costs.
Hence this petition.
The main issue that has to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioners
should be held liable for damages.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the Intermediate Appellate Court made
the pronouncement that petitioners were possessors in bad faith from 1958 up
to 1971 and should be held accountable for damages. This conclusion was based
on the statement of the cadastral court in its August 21, 1971 decision,
readjudicating Lot No. 2749 to respondent Simeon Acuna, that "Miguel Escritor
23
POSSESSION
forcibly took possession of the land in May, 1958, and benefited from the
coconut trees thereon. 10 The Intermediate Appellate Court observed that on
the basis of the unimpeached conclusion of the cadastral court, it must be that
the petitioners have wrongfully entered possession of the land. 11 The
Intermediate Appellate Court further explains that as such possessors in bad
faith, petitioners must reimburse respondent Acuna for the fruits of the land
they had received during their possession. 12
We cannot affirm the position of the Intermediate Appellate Court. It should be
remembered that in the first decision of the cadastral court dated May 15, 1958,
Lot No. 2749 was adjudicated in favor of claimant Escritor, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. In this decision, the said court found to its satisfaction
that claimant Escritor acquired the land by inheritance from his father who in
turn acquired it by purchase, and that his open, public, continuous, adverse,
exclusive and notorious possession dated back to the Filipino-Spanish
Revolution. 13 It must also be recalled that in its Order for the issuance of
decrees dated July 15, 1958, the same Court declared that the above-mentioned
decision had become final. Significantly, nowhere during the entire cadastral
proceeding did anything come up to suggest that the land belonged to any
person other than Escritor.
On the basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction, Escritor honestly believed that he is the legal
owner of the land. With this well-grounded belief of ownership, he continued in
his possession of Lot No. 2749. This cannot be categorized as possession in bad
faith.
As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession of property
knowing that his title thereto is defective. 14 Here, there is no showing that
Escritor knew of any flaw in his title. Nor was it proved that petitioners were
aware that the title of their predecessor had any defect.
Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith, this
should not prejudice his successors-in-interest, petitioners herein, as the rule is
that only personal knowledge of the flaw in one's title or mode of acquisition
can make him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not transmissible from
one person to another, not even to an heir. 15 As Article 534 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides, "one who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the
consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that
he was aware of the flaws affecting it; ..." The reason for this article is that bad
faith is personal and intransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be suffered only
by the person who acted in bad faith; his heir should not be saddled with such
consequences. 16
DE GUIA [Type text]
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and upon
him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. If
no evidence is presented proving bad faith, like in this case, the presumption of
good faith remains.
Respondent Acuna, on the other hand, bases his complaint for damages on the
alleged fraud on the part of the petitioners' predecessor in having the land
registered under his (the predecessor's) name. A review of the record, however,
does not indicate the existence of any such fraud. It was not proven in the
cadastral court nor was it shown in the trial court.
Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor on the basis of his machinations.
What is clear is that in the hearing of January 22, 1958, the Court permitted
Escritor to adduce his evidence of ownership without opposing evidence as the
lot had become uncontested. 17 Respondent Acuna himself failed to appear in
this hearing because of a misunderstanding with a lawyer. 18There is no finding
that such failure to appear was caused by petitioners in this case. On the
contrary, all the requirements of publication were followed. Notice of hearing
was duly published. Clearly then, the allegation of fraud is without basis.
Respondent having failed to prove fraud and bad faith on the part of petitioners,
We sustain the trial court's finding that petitioners were possessors in good
faith and should, therefore, not be held liable for damages.
With the above pronouncement, the issue of prescription of cause of action
which was also presented need not be passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another decision is rendered dismissing
the complaint. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
24
POSSESSION
[G.R. No. 111737. October 13, 1999]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES TIMOTEO and
SELFIDA S. PIEDA, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 28549 entitled SPOUSES TIMOTEO PIEDA, ET. AL.
vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16[2], Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-4590,
for cancellation of certificate of title and/or specific performance, accounting
and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The records show that respondent spouses Pieda (PIEDAS) are the
registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 11-14-1-14) situated at barangay
Astorga Dumarao, Capiz containing an area of 238,406 square meters, more or
less, and covered by Homestead Patent No. 0844 and Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1930. On March 7, 1972, the PIEDAS mortgaged the above described
parcel of land to petitioner, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to
secure their agricultural loan in the amount of P20,000.00. The PIEDAS failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage compelling DBP to
extrajudicially foreclose on February 2, 1977. In the foreclosure sale, DBP was
the highest bidder and a Sheriff Certificate of Sale was executed in its favor. In
the corresponding Certificate of Sale, the sheriff indicated that This property is
sold subject to the redemption within five (5) years from the date of registration
of this instrument and in the manner provided for by law applicable to this
case. The certificate of sale was registered in the Register of Deeds of Capiz on
April 25, 1977. On March 10, 1978, after the expiration of the one-year
redemption period provided for under Section 6, ACT 3135, DBP consolidated
its title over the foreclosed property by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation
of Ownership. Subsequently, a Final Deed of Sale was executed in DBPs favor,
which was registered together with the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
with the Register of Deeds of Capiz on May 30, 1978. Consequently, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1930 was cancelled and TCT No. T-15559 was issued in
the name of DBP.Thereafter, DBP took possession of the foreclosed property
and appropriated the produce thereof.
On July 5, 1978, the Ministry of Justice issued Opinion No. 92, Series of
1978[3] which declared that lands covered by P.D. No. 27[4], like the herein
DE GUIA [Type text]
subject property, may not be the object of foreclosure proceedings after the
promulgation of said decree on Oct. 21, 1972.
On August 24, 1981, the PIEDAS offered to redeem the foreclosed property
by offering P10,000.00 as partial redemption payment. This amount was
accepted by DBP who issued O.R. No. 1665719 and through a letter,
conditionally approved the offer of redemption considering the P10,000.00 as
down payment.[5] However, on November 11, 1981, DBP sent the PIEDAS
another letter informing them that pursuant to P.D. 27, their offer to redeem
and/or repurchase the subject property could not be favorably considered for
the reason that said property was tenanted.[6] On November 16, 1981, in
deference to the above-mentioned opinion, DBP through Ramon Buenaflor sent
a letter to the Acting Register of Deeds of Capiz requesting the latter to cancel
TCT No. T-15559 and to restore Original Certificate of Title No. P-1930 in the
name of the PIEDAS. The Acting Register of Deeds, in reply to such request,
suggested that DBP file a petition in court pursuant to Section 108 of
Presidential Decree 1529[7]. In compliance with said suggestion, DBP petitioned
for the cancellation of TCT No. T-15559 with then Court of First Instance of
Capiz, Branch II, docketed as Special Case No. 2653. The petition was favorably
acted upon on February 22, 1982. Thus, the foreclosure proceeding conducted
on February 2, 1977 was declared null and void and the Register of Deeds of
Capiz was ordered to cancel TCT No. 15559; OCT No. 1930 was ordered revived.
Meanwhile, on December 21, 1981, the PIEDAS filed the instant complaint
against DBP for cancellation of certificate of title and/or specific performance,
accounting and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction averring that DBP, in evident bad faith, caused the consolidation of its
title to the parcel of land in question in spite of the fact that the 5-year
redemption period expressly stated in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale had not yet
lapsed and that their offer to redeem the foreclosed property was made well
within said period of redemption.[8]
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the PIEDAS stating that DBP violated
the stipulation in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale which provided that the
redemption period is five (5) years from the registration thereof in consonance
with Section 119[9] of CA No. 141[10]. DBP should therefore assume liability for
the fruits that said property produced from said land considering that it
prematurely took possession thereof. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the
defendant Development Bank of the Philippines as follows:
1. Condemning the defendant DBP to pay the plaintiffs P201,138.28
less whatever amount the plaintiffs still have to pay the said
25
POSSESSION DE GUIA
defendant DBP as balance of their loan account reckoned up to the
date of this decision; P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; P5,000.00 as
litigation expenses and costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
DBP appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
RTC. The Court of Appeals stated that since DBP was in evident bad faith when
it unlawfully took possession of the property subject of the dispute and defied
what was written on the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, the PIEDAS were entitled to
recover the fruits produced by the property or its equivalent valued
at P72,000.00 per annum or a total of P216,000.00 for the three-year
period. Respondent court stated that said amount was not rebutted by DBP and
was fair considering the size of the land in question. The court added that any
discussion with respect to the redemption period was of little significance since
the foreclosure proceeding was declared null and void in Special Civil Case No.
2653[12] on February 22, 1982. Thus, the right of the PIEDAS to redeem the
property has become moot and academic. Finally, the award of attorneys fees
amounting to P10,000.00[13] was justified considering that the PIEDAS were
compelled to protect their interests.[14]
DBPs Motion for Reconsideration[15] was denied; hence this petition where
it assigns the following errors:
Ground No. 1 The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming The
Court A Quos Decision Awarding Actual Damages In The Amount Of
P216,000.00 In Favor Of The Private Respondents Notwithstanding The
Absence Of Evidence Substantiating Said Award. Thus, The Honorable Court Of
Appeals Had Decided This Instant Case In A Way Not In Accord With Applicable
Law And Jurisprudence.
2. Ground No. 2 - The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming
The Court A Quos Finding That DBP Was In Bad Faith When It Took Possession
Of The Property In Question Notwithstanding the Contrary Evidence Adduced
By Petitioner DBP. Thus, The Honorable Court Of Appeals Departed From The
Accepted And Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings.
3. Ground No. 3 - The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming
The Court A Quos Decision Awarding Attorneys Fees And Litigation Costs In
Favor Of The Private Respondents Notwithstanding Absence Of Evidence
Proving the Same. Clearly, The Lower Court Committed Misapprehension Of
Facts That Can Be Considered A Question Of Law.[16]
[Type text]
DBP maintains that the valuation of the income derived from the property
in dispute allegedly amounting to P216,000.00 was not proven by the
PIEDAS. DBP argues that they granted the PIEDAS a loan of P20,000.00 in March
7, 1972 and up to the time of the foreclosure of the property, the PIEDAS have
paid only P2,000.00 on their principal. The failure of the PIEDAS to pay this loan
is attributable to the fact that said property did not produce income amounting
to P72,000.00 per annum. According to DBP, in the absence of receipts or other
evidence to support such a claim, the Court of Appeals should not have granted
said amount considering that the PIEDAS had the burden of proving actual
damages. Furthermore, Selfida Pieda herself admitted that the property never
produced income amounting to P72,000.00 per annum. At any rate, the actual
amount earned by the property in terms of rentals turned over by the tenant-
farmers or caretakers of the land were duly receipted and were duly accounted
for by the DBP.
DBP also alleges that the mere fact that DBP took possession and
administration of the property does not warrant a finding that DBP was in bad
faith. First, records show that the PIEDAS consented to and approved the
takeover of DBP. Second, Sec. 7[17] of Act No. 3135[18] allows the mortgagee-
buyer to take possession of the mortgaged property even during the
redemption period. Third, DBPs act of consolidating the title of the property in
its name does not constitute bad faith as there is no law which prohibits the
purchaser at public auction from consolidating title in its name after the
expiration of the one (1) year redemption period reckoned from the time the
Certificate of Sale was registered; and neither is there any law or jurisprudence
which prohibits the PIEDAS from exercising their right of redemption over said
property within five (5) years even if title is consolidated in the name of the
purchaser. When DBP consolidated title over the property in its name, the new
TCT issued in its favor was subject to the lien i.e. the right of redemption of the
PIEDAS; if there was a failure to register this in the TCT, DBP should not be
faulted. Besides, even if the five (5) year period of redemption was not indicated
therein, Sec. 44[19]and 46[20] of Presidential Decree No. 1529[21] attaches such
lien by operation of law even in the absence of an annotation in the
title. Moreover, Sec. 119 of CA No. 141 also makes said right of redemption a
statutory lien, which subsists and binds the whole world despite the absence of
registration.
DBP also could not have been in bad faith when it denied the PIEDAS offer
to redeem the property since the denial was premised on Opinion No. 92 of the
Minister of Justice series of 1978 which stated that said land was covered under
P.D. 27 and could not be the subject of foreclosure proceedings. For this reason,
DBP immediately filed a petition to nullify the foreclosure proceedings which
was favorably acted upon prior to the service of summons and the complaint in
the present case on DBP on June 30,1982. If DBP was really in bad faith, it would
not have filed said petition for said petition was against its own interests.
26
POSSESSION
Further, DBP asserts that PIEDAS appointed DBP as their attorney-in-fact
or agent in case of foreclosure of the property under Section 4 of the mortgage
contract, which provides:
4. xxx In case of foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the appointment
of the mortgagee or any of its employees as receiver, without any bond, to take
charge of the mortgage property at once, and to hold possession of the case and
the rents and profits derived from the mortgaged property before the
sale. xxx[22]
DBP was therefore entitled to take possession of the property pursuant to the
mortgage contract.
Finally, considering that DBP lawfully had material possession of the
property after it consolidated its title, DBP was entitled to the fruits and income
thereof pursuant to Section 34, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 34. Rents and Profits Pending Redemption. Statement thereof and credit
therefor on redemption. The purchaser, from the time of the sale until a
redemption, and a redemptioner, from the time of his redemption until another
redemption, is entitled to receive the rents of the property sold or the value of
the use or occupation thereof when such property is in the possession of a
tenant. xxx
Taking all this into consideration, DBP cannot be faulted for taking over
possession of the property in question.
The core issue in this case is whether DBP was in bad faith when it took
possession of the disputed lot.
We rule in the negative and find DBPs contentions meritorious.
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it.[23] Good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof.[24] It was therefore incumbent on the PIEDAS to prove that
DBP was aware of the flaw in its title i.e. the nullity of the foreclosure. This, they
failed to do.
Respondent PIEDAS argue that DBPs bad faith stems from the fact that
DBP consolidated title over the disputed property despite the statement in the
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale to the effect that said land was subject to a five year
redemption period. The period of redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed land
is provided under Section 6 of ACT No. 3135 to wit:
DE GUIA [Type text]
Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property
is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and
after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions
of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive,
of the Code of Civil Procedure[25], in so far as these are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act.
If no redemption is made within one year, the purchaser is entitled as a matter
of right to consolidate[26] and to possess[27] the property.[28] Accordingly, DBPs
act of consolidating its title and taking possession of the subject property after
the expiration of the period of redemption was in accordance with
law. Moreover, it was in consonance with Section 4 of the mortgage contract
between DBP and the PIEDAS where they agreed to the appointment of DBP as
receiver to take charge and to hold possession of the mortgage property in case
of foreclosure. DBPs acts cannot therefore be tainted with bad faith.
The right of DBP to consolidate its title and take possession of the subject
property is not affected by the PIEDAS right to repurchase said property within
five years from the date of conveyance granted by Section 119 of CA No. 141. In
fact, without the act of DBP consolidating title in its name, the PIEDAS would not
be able to assert their right to repurchase granted under the aforementioned
section. Respondent PIEDAS are of the erroneous belief that said section
prohibits a purchaser of homestead land in a foreclosure sale from
consolidating his title over said property after the one-year period to redeem
said property has expired. Section 119 does not contain any prohibition to
convey homestead land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a
right to repurchase said land within a period of five years in the event that he
conveys said land. This is in consonance with the policy of homestead laws to
distribute disposable agricultural lands of the State to land-destitute citizens for
their home and cultivation.[29] The right to repurchase under Section 119 aims
to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public
land which the State had gratuitously given him.[30] Such right is based on the
assumption that the person under obligation to reconvey the property has the
full title to the property because it was voluntarily conveyed to him or that he
consolidated his title thereto by reason of a redemptioners failure to exercise
his right of redemption.[31] It is also settled that the five-year period of
redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at
extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the
one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure. [32] Thus
DBPs consolidation of title did not derogate from or impair the right of the
PIEDAS to redeem the same under C.A. No. 141.
27
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

It may be argued that P.D. 27 was already in effect when DBP foreclosed
the property. However, the legal propriety of the foreclosure of the land was put
into question only after Opinion No. 92 series of 1978 of the Ministry of Justice
declared that said land was covered by P.D. 27 and could not be subject to
foreclosure proceedings. The Opinion of the Ministry of Justice was issued on
July 5, 1978 or almost two months after DBP consolidated its title to the
property on March 10, 1978. By law and jurisprudence, a mistake upon a
doubtful or difficult question of law may properly be the basis of good faith.[33]
In the case of Maneclang vs. Baun,[34] we held that when a contract of sale
is void, the possessor is entitled to keep the fruits during the period for which it
held the property in good faith. Good faith of the possessor ceases when an
action to recover possession of the property is filed against him and he is served
summons therefore.[35] In the present case, DBP was served summons on June
30, 1982.[36] By that time, it was no longer in possession of the disputed land as
possession thereof was given back to the PIEDAS after the foreclosure of DBP
was declared null and void on February 22, 1982. Therefore, any income
collected by DBP after it consolidated its title and took possession of the
property on May 30, 1978 up to February 22, 1982 belongs to DBP as a
possessor in good faith since its possession was never legally interrupted.
Finally, we delete the award for attorneys fees. Although attorneys fees
may be awarded if the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission
of the party from whom it is sought[37], we hold that DBPs acts were clearly not
unjustified.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, and the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Development Bank of the
Philippines is absolved from any liability to Timoteo and Selfida Pieda in so far
as it orders the DBP to pay the PIEDAS P216,000.00 as annual produce value of
the land; P20,000.00 in attorneys fees, P5,000.00 in litigation expenses and the
costs of the suit. This decision is without prejudice to whatever liability the
PIEDAS may still have to the DBP with respect to their loan.
SO ORDERED.

28
POSSESSION DE GUIA
[G.R. No. 136438. November 11, 2004]
TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner, vs. VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES
BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH DEL MUNDO, ANDOKS
LITSON CORPORATION and MARITES CARINDERIA, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883, affirming in
toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch
259, dated November 14, 1996, in Civil Case No. 95-044.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the findings of the Court of Appeals,
are:
Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Paraaque
City, Metro Manila with an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds,
same city.
Petitioners lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a
strip of land belonging to the government. As this highway was elevated by four
(4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions
of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and
her husband Beth Del Mundo, respondents herein, had a building constructed
on a portion of said government land. In November that same year, a part
thereof was occupied by Andoks Litson Corporation and Marites Carinderia,
also impleaded as respondents.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner
acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of the same area owned by the
government. The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the
Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City.
In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Paraaque City, a
complaint for accion publiciana against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No.
95-044. He alleged inter alia that respondents structures on the government
land closed his right of way to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a
portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.
[Type text]
Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioners allegations,
claiming that they have been issued licenses and permits by Paraaque City to
construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the
subject property as it belongs to the government.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the defendants to have a better right of possession
over the subject land except the portion thereof covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 of the Register of
Deeds of Paraaque;
2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of the subject
premises described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430
and gives its possession to plaintiff; and
3. Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiff against the
defendants, and likewise dismissing the claim for attorneys
fees of the latter against the former.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any
portion of the public land in question. On the contrary, the defendants are the
ones who have been in actual possession of the area. According to the trial
court, petitioner was not deprived of his right of way as he could use the
Kapitan Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming
the trial courts Decision in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment hereby appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto,
with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In this petition, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following
assignments of error:
I
29
POSSESSION
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS CONTAINED A
CONCLUSION WITHOUT CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE
SAME WAS BASED.
II
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE ONLY
ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS
ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF WAY OVER THE LAND OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH
IS BETWEEN HIS PROPERTY AND THE NINOY AQUINO AVENUE.
III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCION
PUBLICIANA IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EXISTENCE
OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS RIGHT OF WAY DOES NOT CARRY
POSSESSION OVER THE SAME.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO
HAS THE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LAND BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES.[5]
In their comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not
err in ruling that petitioners action for accion publiciana is not the proper
remedy in asserting his right of way on a lot owned by the government.
Here, petitioner claims that respondents, by constructing their buildings
on the lot in question, have deprived him of his right of way and his right of
possession over a considerable portion of the same lot, which portion is covered
by his T.C.T. No. 74430 he acquired by means of exchange of real property.
It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioners alleged right of way
exists belongs to the state or property of public dominion. Property of public
dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:
DE GUIA [Type text]
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of
similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Public use is use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open
to the indefinite public.[6] Records show that the lot on which the stairways
were built is for the use of the people as passageway to the highway.
Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it:
(1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of
contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not
subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any
voluntary easement.[7]
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a
property of public dominion, it can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of
right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere
tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate
it for himself. Verily, he can not claim any right of possession over it. This is
clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession.
Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents have better right of possession over the subject lot.
However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants
buildings were constructed on the portion of the same lot now covered by T.C.T.
No. 74430 in petitioners name. Being its owner, he is entitled to its possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
the sense that neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the
disputed lot where the stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
30
POSSESSION
G.R. No. 151322 October 11, 2006
MARIO L. COPUYOC, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA DE SOLA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The parties in this case are vying for the rightful possession of a property
located in Xavierville, Loyola Heights, Quezon City.
Mario L. Copuyoc* (petitioner) and his spouse are holders of a Contract to Sell
dated September 6, 1995, between them as buyers and the Bank of Commerce
(formerly The Overseas Bank of Manila) as seller, while Erlinda de Sola
(respondent) has Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87569 in her name.
On December 18, 1996, respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35, a complaint for Forcible Entry with
Injunction and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. The complaint
contained the allegations that: respondent is the owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 25, Block 6 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision located at No. 6
Guerrero St., Xavierville I, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, by virtue of TCT No.
87569; respondent has been in actual possession of the property since June 7,
1993, when the same was sold to her by Christine C. Quesada, as evidenced by
an Absolute Deed of Sale of Real Estate; petitioner commenced construction of a
house on the property without respondent’s consent and despite demands,
petitioner refused to stop the construction and vacate the premises.1 The
property was described in respondent’s TCT No. 87569, as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 25, Blk. 6, of the cons. subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-6818,
being a portion of Lots 1-8, Blk. 1; Lots 1-23, Blk. 2, Lots 1-14, Blk. 3;
Lots 1-16, Blk. 5; Lots 1-22, Blk. 6, Lots 1-20, 22, Blk. 7; Lots 1-3, Blk. 8;
Lots 1-18, Blk. 9, Lots 1-13, Blk. 10, Lots 1-16, Blk. 11; Lots 1-13, Blk.
12, Lots 58-81, Blk. 13; Lots 6, 8, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 58, Blk. 14; Lots 1-
20, Blk. 15; Lots 1, 2, 5, 11, [Blk. 16,] Blk. 16; Lots 16-24, 26, Blk. 23,
DE GUIA [Type text]
Lots 3-6-12, Blk. 24; Lots 1-9, 11-13, Blk. 25; Lots 2-4, 6, Blk. 26, Lots 2,
4, 6, 9-11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21-22, Blk. 27; Lots 4-5, Blk. 28; Lots 1-4, 10,
12, Blk. 31; Park Lots 1, 2, 3, 5, 6-A, 6-B, 4, 11, Street Lots 4-8 and 10,
21, 23, 24-A, all of Psd-35337; Lots 12 & 21; St. Lots 1, 2, 3 and Park Lot
1, all of Psd-53686, Lots 23-A & 23-B, Blk. 23; Lots 11-A, 11-B, Blk. 31,
St. Lots 22-A, 22-B, 23-A, 23-B, all of Psd-35337, Amd. LRC Rec. No.
7672), situated in the Dist. of Tandang Sora, Quezon City, Is. of
Luzon. Bounded on the West, pts. 1-2 by Lot 23, Blk. 6; on the
North, pts. 2-4 by Road Lot 8; on the East, pts. 4-5 by Lot 27, Blk. 6;
and on the South, pts. 5-1 by Lot 26, Blk 6, all of the cons.-sub. plan.
x x x; containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY SQ. METERS
AND FIFTY (470.50) SQ. DECIMETERS, more or less. x x x 2 (Emphasis
supplied)
On January 15, 1997, the MeTC conducted a hearing on respondent’s application
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, and finding merit on the
application, issued a temporary restraining order on the same day.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim and Opposition to the Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, denying respondent’s
allegations and asserting that: he is the lawful possessor of the property, by
virtue of a Contract to Sell executed on September 6, 1995 in his favor by the
Bank of Commerce; respondent’s title is forged and the property described
therein is located in Tandang Sora, not Xavierville; the Bank of Commerce is a
holder of duly reconstituted title [TCT No. RT-114371 (265907)]** covering the
subject property, including other properties in Phase I of the Xavierville
Subdivision, and had possessed the same for 43 years; a syndicate was able to
procure forged titles after the office of the Register of Deeds was burned during
the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall.3 The property was described in the
Contract to Sell, as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 25, Block 6, of the consolidation-subdivision plan
(LRC) Pcs-6818 (Sheet 2), being a portion of the consolidation of Lots
1-18, Block 1; 1-13, Block 2; 1-14, Block 3; 1-16, Block 5; 1-22, Block 6;
1-23, Block 7; 1-9, Block 8; 1-21, Block 9; 1-3, Block 10, 1-16, Block 11;
1-13, Block 12; Park Lots 1, 2, and 3 and Street Lots 4-8 and 10-16, all
described on plan Psd-35337, LRC (GLRC) Record No. 7672), situated
in Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the N., points 2 to 4, by
Road Lot 5; on the E., points 4 to 5, by Lot 27; on the S., points 5 to
1 by Lot 26; and on the W., points 1 to 2 by Lot 23, all of Block 6, all
of the consolidation subdivision plan. x x x; containing an area of
FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY AND FIFTY SQUARE METERS (470.5)
SQUARE METERS more or less.4
31
POSSESSION
Thereafter, the MeTC held a hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a
temporary restraining order after the 20-day period. When the parties’
respective counsels agreed to maintain the status quo, the MeTC ordered the
submission of their Positions Papers and other supporting evidence or
documents, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
On September 22, 1997, the MeTC rendered its Decision dismissing the
complaint. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiff’s action for Forcible
Entry against defendant Mario Capuyoc is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to cost.
Defendant’s counterclaim is also DISMISSED. Since plaintiff De Sola is
only trying to protect her interest.
SO ORDERED.5
Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
225, which, in its Decision dated October 19, 1998, reversed the dismissal of the
complaint, and ordered petitioner to vacate the premises. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower court’s decision
DISMISSING plaintiff-appellant’s forcible entry suit is REVERSED.
Accordingly, this Court hereby orders that defendant-appellee Mario
Capuyoc and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the
premises known as Lot 25, Block 6 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision
located at No. 6 Guerrero St., Xavierville I, Loyola Heights, Quezon City.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.6
This time, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA),
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52132. The CA,7 in its Decision dated April 30, 2001,
denied the petition, "without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case No. Q-97-
30333 entitled ‘Bank of Commerce v. Erlinda de Sola’ and to the filing of an
appropriate plenary action to settle the issue of ownership of the disputed
property."8
Hence, the present petition for review based on the following grounds:
DE GUIA [Type text]
The Court of Appeals decided questions of substance in a way not in
accord with law or with applicable decisions of the Honorable Court,
particularly:
(i) In holding that Respondent had priority of possession over the
property subject of this case;
(ii) In taking cognizance of the tax declarations which were presented
for the first time on appeal and ruling that these tax declarations prove
Respondent’s prior possession of the property subject of this case.
(iii) In not finding as conclusive, the report of the chief of the surveys
division of the department of environment and natural resources that
the properties as described in the parties’ respective titles are not
located in one and the same place.9
The MeTC found that the property over which the Bank of Commerce holds title
to is not the property mentioned in respondent’s title; hence, there was no
forcible entry to speak of.10
The RTC, however, disagreed with the finding of the MeTC, ruling that
petitioner’s evidence proved that the property in litigation is one and the same,
and that respondent was in prior possession of the property. According to the
RTC, the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses were conflicting. On one hand, the
testimony of Geodetic Engineer Ernesto Erive showed that petitioner’s property
is located in Xavierville, while respondent’s is in Tandang Sora. On the other
hand, the Chief of the Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration
Authority, Benjamin Bustos, testified that the lot described in the title of the
Bank of Commerce is identical with the lot described in respondent’s title. This
was allegedly corroborated in the Order of Reconstitution issued by Bustos,
stating that "[T]he lot described in TCT No. 265907 is identical to the lot
described in TCT No. 265984 issued in the name of spouses Miguel Uy and
Carmela Lim and was ordered reconstituted under administrative Order No. Q-
366 on September 23, 1992."11 The RTC also ruled that the filing of the action
for Quieting of Title by the Bank of Commerce on February 1, 1997, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-97-30333, amounts to an implied admission that the two titles
cover the same property. Given these, the RTC concluded that petitioner’s and
respondent’s titles refer to the same property.12
The RTC also ruled that respondent was in prior possession of the property
inasmuch as the Deed of Sale between respondent and Quesada, which was
executed on June 7, 1993, amounts to possession in legal contemplation.13
32
POSSESSION
The CA upheld the RTC’s findings and conclusion. The CA ruled that respondent
has a better right to the property since the sale between her and Quesada was
on June 7, 1993, while the Contract to Sell between petitioner and the Bank of
Commerce was dated September 6, 1995. While the testimony of Engineer Erive
may have cast a doubt or cloud on respondent’s title, still, until there is a judicial
declaration as regards its nullity, then respondent’s title remains valid. 14
The CA also found that respondent had prior possession of the property, which
began in 1993, and petitioner encroached on such possession. While
respondent did not stay on the property, her regular visits are the same as being
in possession thereof. The CA acknowledged that the tax declarations in the
name of respondent are indications that strengthened her claim of
possession.15 With regard to the testimony of Engineer Erive on the identity of
the property, the CA held that this can be properly threshed out in Civil Case No.
Q-97-30333 presently pending with the RTC of Quezon City.16
Petitioner takes exception to the foregoing findings of the RTC and the CA.
Petitioner argues that despite the execution of the Deed of Sale, respondent was
never in actual and physical possession of the property prior to the filing of the
forcible entry case, unlike petitioner who was able to build improvements
thereon. Petitioner also argues that his predecessor-in-interest, the Bank of
Commerce, has also been in prior possession of the property, as shown by the
fence it built around the area even before it was sold to petitioner. The Bank of
Commerce’s lack of title over the property can be explained by the fact that it
was pending reconstitution and the title was in fact already reconstituted
during the pendency of the case.
Petitioner also objects to the admission by the RTC of respondent’s tax
declarations since it was presented only for the first time during the appellate
proceedings. Even then, petitioner maintains that the tax declarations do not
establish respondent’s actual physical possession.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the evidence presented clearly indicates that
property described in respondent’s title is not the same property bought by
petitioner.17
At the outset, it should be stated that as a general rule, the Court will not
entertain petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which raise
questions of fact, as its power of judicial review is confined only to errors of law.
Considering, however, that the CA and the RTC came up with contradictory
findings with that of the MeTC, the Court is now constrained to analyze and
weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below, as it is
clearly an exception to the general rule.18
DE GUIA [Type text]
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in nature. It is
designed to recover physical possession through speedy proceedings that are
restrictive in nature, scope and time limits. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is
deprived of physical possession by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth. The presence of any of these elements in the present case implies
that the possession of the disputed land by the defendant has been unlawful
from the beginning; that is, he acquired possession by illegal means.19
The principal issue to be resolved in forcible entry cases is mere physical or
material possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession
(possession de jure) nor ownership of the property involved.20 Title is not
involved. Thus, in David v. Cordova,21 the Court explained:
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment
proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession
de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is
questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their
applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper
government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to
the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the
unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold
respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession
in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To
repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is
the right to physical possession.22 (Emphasis supplied)
It is also well settled that in civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. If the plaintiff claims a right
granted or created by law, the same must be proven by competent evidence.
The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of his opponent.23 In the present case, it devolved upon
respondent to show by preponderance of evidence that she was illegally
deprived of possession of the property subject of the forcible entry case for her
to obtain judgment in her favor.24
Coming now to the issue of who, as between petitioner and respondent, has
priority in possession of the property, the Court notes, at this juncture, a basic
33
POSSESSION
error in the decisions of the MeTC, RTC, and the CA, which should be rectified.
All three courts entertained the impression that petitioner’s possession is based
on his claim of ownership of the property. This is not so. It should be pointed
out that petitioner’s right to possess the property is not derived from any claim
of ostensible ownership over the same but on the provision in the Contract to
Sell allowing him to take possession of the property pending reconstitution of
the title and full payment of the purchase price. Ownership remained in the
name of the Bank of Commerce, and petitioner is yet to become the owner of the
property at the time the ejectment proceedings were had. This is simply
because in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor
and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. 25 In
fact, The Bank of Commerce can even avail of the remedy of ejectment against
petitioner in case the latter defaults payment since the former retains
ownership of the property.26 While this particular issue was neither raised nor
brought up, the Court, nevertheless, deems it necessary to bring it up, in the
interest of substantial justice and to avoid further litigation on the matter.27
It has been ruled that a plaintiff in an ejectment case cannot succeed where it
appears that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter had a possession
antedating his own. To ascertain this, it is proper to look at the situation as it
existed before the first act of spoliation occurred.28
As borne by the records, petitioner claims actual and physical possession of the
property, while respondent claims possession through an ostensible ownership
over the property. With regard to petitioner, his claim of right to possession is
derived from the Contract to Sell between him and his wife as buyers, and the
Bank of Commerce as seller. Based on said contract, petitioner was allowed to
take possession of the property. In turn, the Bank of Commerce (then the
Overseas Bank of Manila) bought the property from the Xavierville Estate, Inc.
in a Deed of Sale of Real Estate dated September 8, 1967, and from which TCT
No. 265907 issued on December 5, 1979 was based.
On the other hand, respondent’s claim of possession over the property is based
on an Absolute Deed of Sale of Real Estate dated June 7, 1993 between
respondent and Christine Quesada, and by virtue of which, TCT No. 87569 was
issued in her name on June 8, 1993. TCT No. 87569 was traced back to Ana
Maria Pilarta Figueras, who was the previous holder of TCT No. 76045 issued on
January 6, 1993, and from whom Quesada bought the property. Meanwhile, TCT
No. 80618 in the name of Quesada was issued on February 18, 1993.
Given the surrounding circumstances of this case, the Court finds that petitioner
is in prior possession of the property, and is entitled to remain therein.
DE GUIA [Type text]
First, while it may be true that the Absolute Deed of Sale of Real Estate between
respondent and Christine Quesada was executed on June 7, 1993, prior to the
Contract to Sell between petitioner and the Bank of Commerce on September 6,
1995, it should be emphasized that the execution of a deed of sale is merely
a prima faciepresumption of delivery of possession of a piece of real property,
which is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal
impediment. Said constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive,
may be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land
sold,29 as in respondent’s case. Records show that respondent never occupied
the property from the time it was allegedly sold to her on June 7, 1993 or at any
time thereafter.
Respondent, however, maintains that her "regular" visits to the property
constitute possession. In Dela Rosa v. Carlos,30 the Court held that visiting the
property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession.
In respondent’s case, however, her "regular" visits to the property are not
unequivocal proof of her actual or physical possession. In a span of three years,
i.e., from the time she bought the property up to the time that the complaint in
this case was filed, respondent visited the property only five times.31 Neither did
she construct any improvements or fencing on the property.32 In fact, she does
not even know the road number on which the property is situated given that
she visited the place only five times.33 Her infrequent visits do not constitute
possession, specially considering that these were not coupled with any actual
exercise of dominion over the property.
In contrast, petitioner was able to establish his actual physical possession over
the property, having started construction thereon soon after the property was
turned over to him by virtue of the Contract to Sell on September 6, 1995.
The fact that petitioner does not have a tax declaration over the property was
taken against him. This is erroneous. As pointed out earlier, petitioner is yet to
become the owner of the property. Obviously, he cannot declare the property as
his own for tax purposes since it is still owned by the Bank of Commerce.
Moreover, the RTC should not have permitted respondent’s belated submission
in evidence of the tax declarations. In the first place, possession is the only issue
in a case for forcible entry. Also, there is no justification for the delay in
presenting said evidence.34
More importantly, there exists a serious doubt as to the identity of the property,
which respondent claims as owned and possessed by her. An area delimited by
boundaries properly identifies a parcel of land.35 In this case, the respective
titles of the Bank of Commerce and respondent bear the following boundaries:
34
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

Technical Description TCT No. 87569 in the name of Erlinda R. de TCT No. RT-114371 (265907) in the
Sola name of the Bank of Commerce

Bounded on the North by pts. 2-4 by Road Lot 8 points 2 to 4, by Road Lot 5

Bounded on the East by pts. 4-5 by Lot 27, Blk. 6 points 4 to 5, by Lot 27

Bounded on the South by pts. 5-1 by Lot 26, Blk. 6 points 5 to 1 by Lot 26

Bounded on the West by pts. 1-2 by lot 23, Blk. 6 points 1 to 2 by Lot 23

situated in district of Tandang Sora, Quezon City, Island of Quezon City, Island of Luzon
Luzon

Road 8 bounds the property described in respondent’s title on the north, while
Road 5 bounds petitioner’s property on the north. As testified to by Geodetic
Engineer Ernesto Erive of the Bureau of Lands, who plotted the actual
boundaries as described in the respective titles of respondent and the Bank of
Commerce, Lot 25, Block 6, Road 8 is located 200 meters away. 36 The sketch
plan exhibits this. Engineer Erive also testified that after projecting the
properties on these two titles, it appears that the Bank of Commerce property is
located in Loyola Heights along the western side of Katipunan Street, while
respondent’s property is located in Tandang Sora on the northwestern side of
Commonwealth Avenue.37

The RTC gave greater weight to the testimony of Mr. Benjamin Bustos that the
property described in these two titles is identical. The Court, however, is
inclined to believe otherwise. It should be stressed that the title is the
conclusive proof of a property’s metes and bounds.38 The marked discrepancy
between the two titles clearly casts serious doubt as to the identity of the
property being claimed by respondent. Given respondent’s failure to establish
her claim, including the identity of the property, her case perforce must likewise
fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated

April 30, 2001 is REVERSED andSET ASIDE together with the Regional Trial
Court’s Decision dated October 19, 1998. The Decision dated September 22,
1997 rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35,
is REINSTATED. This is without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case No. Q-
97-30333, entitled "Bank of Commerce v. Erlinda de Sola."

No costs.

35
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

ESTATE OF SOLEDAD G.R. No. 145867

MANANTAN, herein represented Manantan alleged in her Complaint that she was the owner of a 214-
by GILBERT MANANTAN, Present: square meter parcel of land located in Fairview Subdivision, Baguio City
Petitioner,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, (subject property), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54672,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,* issued in her name by the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City. After causing a
- versus CHICO-NAZARIO, relocation survey of the subject property, she discovered that respondent and
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Tavera occupied certain portions thereof [disputed portions]. Manantan

ANICETO SOMERA, Promulgated: advised respondent and Tavera to vacate the disputed portions as soon as she
Respondent. would decide to sell the subject property to an interested buyer. Later, a
April 7, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x prospective buyer approached Manantan about the subject property. However,
upon learning that respondent and Tavera occupied some portions of the
subject property, the prospective buyer decided not to proceed with the sale
DECISION until after respondent and Tavera vacated the same. Manantan repeatedly
requested respondent and Tavera to abandon the disputed portions of the
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: subject property, but the two refused. Hence, Manantan hired the services of a
lawyer who immediately sent a formal letter of demand to respondent and
Before Us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Tavera requesting them to leave the disputed portions. Respondent and Tavera,
Rules of Court seeking to reverse the Decision[2] dated 10 May 2000 and however, ignored the demand letter.Manantan submitted the matter before
Resolution[3] dated 18 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. the barangay justice system of Fairview Subdivision, Baguio City, but the parties
55891. failed to reach a settlement. Upon issuance by the barangaysecretary of a
Certificate to File Action, Manantan instituted Civil Case No. 10467.
The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

In her Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467, Manantan prayed that

On 10 March 1998, Soledad Manantan filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch 1, a Complaint for ejectment and
damages against respondent Aniceto Somera and a certain Presentacion Tavera
(Tavera),[4] docketed as Civil Case No. 10467.
respondent, Tavera, and all persons claiming rights under them, be ordered to
vacate the portions of the subject property they were occupying; that
respondent and Tavera be directed to pay her P600.00 and P400.00,
respectively, every month, as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the disputed portions of the subject property, computed from the
36
POSSESSION
filing of the Complaint until possession of the said portions has been restored to
her; that respondent and Tavera be instructed to pay her P30,000.00 as actual
damages, P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.[5]
Respondent and Tavera filed a Joint Answer to Manantans Complaint in
Civil Case No. 10467. In their Joint Answer, respondent and Tavera averred that
the MTCC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 10467, because it was neither
an action for forcible entry nor for unlawful detainer. The Complaint did not
allege that Manantan was deprived of possession of the disputed portions by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, which would make a case for
forcible entry. It also did not state that respondent and Tavera withheld
possession of the disputed portions from Manantan after expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession of the same by virtue of an express
or implied contract, which would build a case for unlawful detainer. Respondent
and Tavera argued that even if there was dispossession, it was evident from the
face of the Complaint that it was not committed through any of the means
enumerated under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and, thus, forcible entry or
unlawful detainer could not be the proper remedy for Manantan. [6]
Respondent claimed in the Joint Answer that he and his family had been
using one of the disputed portions of the subject property as driveway since the
latter part of 1970.The said portion was the only means by which he and his
family could gain access to their residence. He even caused the improvement
and cementing of the same a long time ago.Tavera also explained in the Joint
Answer that she had been utilizing the other disputed portion of the subject
property as an access road to her residence. Her tenement, which consisted of
DE GUIA [Type text]
concrete and permanent structures, bore witness to the fact that her occupancy
of the portion in dispute was continuous and uninterrupted.[7]
Respondent and Tavera additionally asseverated in their Joint Answer
that it would be unjust to prohibit them from using the disputed portions which
serve as their only means of ingress or egress to or from their respective
residences from or to the main road. Their use of said portions had been
recognized by the Bayot family, Manantans predecessors-in-interest. It was only
in 1997, after Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, that
Manantan started to claim ownership even of the portions they had been
using. Respondent and Tavera contended that they could not just relinquish
their right to the disputed portions and yield to Manantans demand, considering
that the latters claim was based merely on a relocation survey. [J]ust to buy
peace of mind and maintain cordial relations with Mananatan, respondent and
Tavera alleged that they walked the proverbial mile and show[ed] their interest
to pay Manantan the equivalent amount of the disputed portions, but Manantan
ignored their proposal and insisted that they buy the whole of the subject
property.
Respondent and Tavera alternatively argued in their Joint Answer that
in case Manantan would be declared as the lawful owner of the subject
property, the MTCC should not disregard the fact that they were builders in
good faith. As builders in good faith, they should be allowed to pay a reasonable
price for the portions of the subject property on which their driveway/access
road, and other improvements were situated.
37
POSSESSION
At the end of their Joint Answer, respondent and Tavera asked the
MTCC to dismiss Manantans Complaint; or in case their driveway/access road
and other improvements were found to be encroaching on Manantans property,
to declare them builders in good faith who should be allowed to purchase
the portions on which their driveway/access road and other improvements
were located and to award them their counterclaims for moral damages
and P35,000.00 attorneys fees.[8]
After submission of the parties respective position papers and other
pleadings, the MTCC rendered a Decision[9] in Civil Case No. 10467 on 21 May
1999, favoring Manantan. The MTCC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case
and that respondent and Tavera were not builders in good faith. It ordered
respondent and Tavera to pay Manantan the amount of P600.00 and P400.00,
respectively, per month, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy
of the disputed portions of the subject property, counted from the date of the
filing of the Complaint up to the time respondent and Tavera would actually
vacate the same. It further ordered respondent and Tavera to jointly and
severally pay Manantan the amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
Respondent and Tavera appealed the MTCC Decision before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, Branch 5. Their appeal was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4435-R.On 29 October 1999, the RTC promulgated its
Decision[10] affirming in toto the appealed MTCC Decision. Only respondent
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals since Tavera opted not to appeal
anymore.
DE GUIA [Type text]
Respondents appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 55891. During its pendency, Manantan died on 20 January
2000.[11] Almost four months later, on 10 May 2000, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision setting aside the Decisions of both the RTC and the MTCC
and dismissing Manantans Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467. The appellate
court held that Manantans Complaint before the MTCC failed to allege facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer. The allegations in the
Complaint merely presented a controversy arising from a boundary dispute, in
which case, the appropriate remedy available to Manantan should have been
the plenary action for recovery of possession within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction over the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467.[12]
The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing
disquisition, the petition for review is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE. The assailed Decision dated October 29, 1999 which
was rendered by Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, in Civil Case No. 4435-R, affirming in toto the other
assailed Decision dated May 21, 1999 rendered by the First
Branch of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Baguio City
in Civil Case No. 10467, entitled SOLEDAD MANANTAN v.
ANICETO SOMERA and PRESENTACION TAVERA, and all
persons claiming rights under them, are hereby both
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING said Civil Case No. 10467.
Accordingly, let a writ of injunction issue permanently
enjoining public respondent Judge Antonio M. Esteves and all
persons acting in his behalf or orders to cease and desist from
further enforcing the assailed decisions.
38
POSSESSION DE GUIA
Manantans counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration [13] of the afore-
mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals but it was denied by the same court
in the Resolution dated 18 October 2000.
Hence, herein petitioner, Gilbert Manantan, representing the Estate of
the late Soledad Manantan, filed the instant Petition for Review [14] before us
raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES, BAGUIO CITY, BRANCH 1, HAD THE JURISDICTION
OVER THE ACTION - EJECTMENT AND DAMAGES
ENTITLED SOLEDAD MANANTAN, PLAINTIFF, V. ANICETA
SOMERA AND PRESENTACION TAVERA, AND ALL PERSONS
CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, DEFENDANTS;
II.
WHETHER A PORTION OF PETITIONERS LAND ENCROACHED
BY RESPONDENT CAN BE RECOVERED THROUGH AN ACTION
[FOR] EJECTMENT.
In the main, petitioner argues that the Complaint is in the nature of an
action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC had jurisdiction.[15]
An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and
when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section,
a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
[Type text]
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis ours.)
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of
real property.[16] This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.[17]
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was
originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an
express or implied contract between them. However, defendants possession
became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their
contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.[18]
A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted before the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court within one year from unlawful
withholding of possession.Such one year period should be counted from the
date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because
only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.[19]
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the
nature of the action, are determined by the allegations in the complaint. [20] To
39
POSSESSION
vest the court with the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant from
the land in an action for unlawful detainer, it is necessary that the complaint
should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing attributes of unlawful
detainer cases, as this proceeding is summary in nature. [21] The complaint must
show on its face enough ground to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol testimony.[22]
Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court
may acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer.[23] The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the
case.[24]
The pertinent allegations in Manantans Complaint before the MTCC are
faithfully reproduced below:
3. That [Manantan] is the owner in fee simple of that
parcel of land, situated in Res. Section K, Baguio City, with an
area of 214 square meters, designated as Lot 7, Pcs-CAR-
000062, and which may be more particularly described in and
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-54672 of the
Registry of Deeds for the City of Baguio;
4. That when she caused the relocation survey of her
said property above-mentioned, she discovered that the
[herein respondent and Tavera] had occupied portions thereof,
by reason of which she called their attention with a request
that they vacate their respective areas as soon as she would
DE GUIA [Type text]
have need of the same, or when she decides to sell the same to
any interested buyer;
5. That only recently, she wanted to sell her property
above-mentioned to an interested buyer, but that upon
knowing of the [respondent and Taveras] encroachments, the
prospective buyer decided not to proceed with the sale until
after the property shall have been first vacated by the
[respondent and Tavera];
6. That she asked the [respondent and Tavera] to
vacate her property, but that they refused to do so, and that
after making more demands which were all ignored by the
[respondent and Tavera], [Manantan] was forced to consult
her lawyer, who immediately wrote them a final formal
demand to vacate her land, but to no avail;
7. That [Manantan] also brought her problem to the
attention of the Barangay Captain of Fairview Subdivision
Barangay, by way of a letter, dated January 21 1998, copy of
which is attached hereto and made part hereof as Annex A, the
same being self-explanatory;
8. That despite efforts at the Barangay level of justice,
no amicable settlement or compromise agreement was arrived
at, as may be evidenced by a Certification to File Action, dated
February 8, 1998, signed and issued by the Pangkat Secretary
Shirley Pagkangan and duly attested by the Pangkat Chairman
Rogelio Laygo, copy of which is hereto attached and made part
hereof as Annex B.[25]
Noticeably, the Complaint does not allege facts showing compliance
with the prescribed one year period to file an action for unlawful detainer. It
does not state the material dates that would have established that it was filed
within one year from the date of Manantans last demand upon respondent to
vacate the disputed portion of land. Such allegations are jurisdictional and
crucial, because if the complaint was filed beyond the prescribed one year
period, then it cannot properly qualify as an action for unlawful detainer over
40
POSSESSION
which the MTCC can exercise jurisdiction. It may be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession, which should be brought before the proper regional trial
court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the
complaint, more than one year has lapsed since defendant unlawfully withheld
possession from plaintiff, the action will not be for illegal detainer, but an accion
publiciana. Accion reivindicatoria, meanwhile, is an action to recover
ownership, as well as possession, which should also be brought before the
proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.[26]
Further, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the
respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion at the time
Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, and it was only
after the conduct of a relocation survey, which supposedly showed that
respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did Manantan begin
asserting her claim of ownership over the portion occupied and used by
respondent. Clearly, respondents possession of the disputed portion was not
pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and,
resultantly, respondents right of possession over the disputed portion is not
subject to expiration or termination. At no point can it be said that
respondents possession of the disputed portion ceased to be legal and became
an unlawful withholding of the property from Manantan. [27]
DE GUIA [Type text]
Since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face
the jurisdictional requirements for an action for unlawful detainer, the Court of
Appeals was correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said
Complaint and should have dismissed the same. There is no possible argument
around the lack of jurisdiction of MTCC over Civil Case No. 10467. In Laresma v.
Abellana,[28] the Court pronounced:
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the
jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action
was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject
matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not
by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would
have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an
action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the
subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the
court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may
dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of
the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could
never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment
may be attacked directly or collaterally.
Petitioner raises a second issue before us: whether petitioner Estate of
the late Soledad Manantan can recover the portion of the subject property by an
action for ejectment.[29] It bears to stress that Manantans Complaint is dismissed
herein for its defects, i.e., its failure to allege vital facts in an action for unlawful
detainer over which the MTCC has jurisdiction. Since Civil Case No. 10467 is
already dismissible upon this ground, it is no longer necessary to discuss
whether petitioner availed itself of the proper remedy to recover the disputed
portion of land from respondent. Resolving the second issue shall be a mere
surplusage and obiter dictum. If petitioner seeks an answer to said issue as
41
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

reference for its future action, suffice it to say that we do not render advisory
opinions. The determination of the remedy to avail itself of must be done by
petitioner with the guidance of its counsel, they being fully cognizant of the facts
giving rise to the controversy and the evidence on hand.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 10 May 2000 and Resolution

dated 18 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55891 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.No cost.

SO ORDERED.

42
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

MARIA CARLOS, represented by G.R. No. 164823

TERESITA CARLOS VICTORIA, alleged, among others, that she is the owner of said parcel of land which she
Petitioner, Present:
openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945
Puno, J.
Chairman, or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership; that there is no mortgage or
Austria-Martinez,
- versus - Callejo, Sr., encumbrance affecting said property, nor is it part of any military or naval
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ. reservation; that the property is being used for industrial purposes; and that

Promulgated: there are no tenants or lessees on the property. Petitioner further claimed that
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. August 31, 2005 she has been in possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner; that
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x her possession has been peaceful, public, uninterrupted and continuous since

1948 or earlier; and tacking her possession with that of her predecessors-in-
DECISION
interest, petitioner has been in possession of the land for more than 50 years. [1]
Puno, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, filed an

opposition to petitioners application.[2]

This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76824 entitled Re: Application for Land Registration
During the initial hearing, however, only petitioner and her counsel appeared.
of a Parcel of Land in Taguig, Metro Manila, Maria Carlos represented by
They presented documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional
Teresita Carlos Victoria, Applicant-Appellee vs. Republic of the Philippines
requirements.[3]
through the Office of the Solicitor General, Oppositor-Appellant.
Petitioner later presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of

her neighbors, Sergio Cruz and Daniel Castillo, and Teresita Carlos Victoria
On December 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter,
herself.[4]
Teresita Carlos Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of

title over a parcel of land with an area of 3,975 square meters located at
Sergio Cruz, 83 years old, a native of Ususan, Taguig, and neighbor of Maria
Pusawan, Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Plan Psu-244418. Petitioner
Carlos, testified that the property subject of the application was previously
43
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

owned and possessed by Jose Carlos. He planted it with palay and sold the Victoria admitted that her mother had sold the land to Ususan Development

harvest. Everyone in the community knew him as the owner of said parcel of Corporation in 1996 but failed to deliver the title. Hence, the heirs of Maria

land. He also paid the taxes thereon. After the death of Jose Carlos in 1948, his Carlos made a commitment to the corporation to deliver the certificate of title

daughter, Maria Carlos, inherited the property and immediately took possession so that they could collect the unpaid balance of the purchase price.[7]

thereof. Her possession was peaceful, open, public, continuous, uninterrupted,

Petitioner also presented in court the concerned officers of the Department of
notorious, adverse and in the concept of an owner. When Maria Carlos died, her
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to establish that the land in
heirs took over the property.[5]
question is alienable and disposable.

Cruzs testimony was corroborated by Daniel Castillo, 76 years old, Barangay

Elvira R. Reynaldo, Records Officer, DENR Lands Management Bureau, appeared
Captain of Ususan, Taguig.[6]
to certify that their office has no record of any kind of public land

Teresita Carlos Victoria stated on the witness stand that her mother, Maria application/land patent covering the parcel of land situated at

Carlos, was in possession of the subject property until she passed away on Ususan, Taguig, Rizal, identified/described in Plan Psu-244418.[8]

January 6, 2001. Upon the demise of Maria Carlos, Victoria took possession of
Ulysses Sigaton, Land Management Inspector, DENR National Capital Region,
the property with the consent of her brothers and sisters. She characterized
stated that he conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property and found
Maria Carloss possession as peaceful, open, public, continuous, adverse,
that it is within the alienable and disposable area under Project No. 27-B, LC
notorious and in the concept of an owner. She has never been disturbed in her
Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 4,
possession; the whole community recognized her as the owner of the land; she
1968. He also noted that the land is being used for industrial purposes. It had
declared the land for tax purposes; and she paid the taxes thereon. In addition,
several warehouses, four big water tanks and is enclosed by a fence.[9]
Victoria informed the court that the heirs of Maria Carlos have not yet instituted

a settlement of her estate. However, they have agreed to undertake the titling of The trial court granted the application in its decision dated October 24, 2002. It

the property and promised to deliver the certificate of title to Ususan held:
After considering the applicants evidence ex-parte which is
Development Corporation which bought the property from Maria Carlos. based on factual and meritorious grounds, and considering
44
POSSESSION
that the applicant acquired the property under registration
through inheritance from her father, Jose Carlos, and
considering further that her possession thereof, tacked with
that of her predecessor-in-interest, is open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and undisturbed, under claim of
ownership since time immemorial up to the present time; and
considering further that the subject parcel of land is part of the
disposable and alienable land (Tsn, July 3, 2002, p.6) and
considering further that the realty taxes due thereon have been
religiously paid (Exhs. HH, II, JJ, and JJ-1), and considering
finally that the subject parcel of land belong[s] to the applicant
and that she possess[es] a perfect title thereto which may be
confirmed and registered in her name under the (P)roperty
Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), the herein application is
hereby GRANTED.[10]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court. It noted that:
In the instant case, the applicant at the time she filed her
application for registration of title was no longer in possession
and occupation of the land in question since on October 16,
1996, the applicants mother and predecessor-in-interest sold
the subject land to Ususan Development Corporation. This was
admitted by witness Teresita Carlos Victoria x x x
Clearly, as early as 1996, possession and occupation of the land
in question pertains not to the applicant but to Ususan
Development Corporation, thus it can be said that the applicant
has no registrable title over the land in question.[11]
Hence, this petition.
We affirm the findings of the appellate court.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that
the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the
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public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.[12]
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but
not the second.
The Court held in Republic vs. Alconaba[13] that the applicant must show that
he is in actual possession of the property at the time of the application, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction []and[], the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.
It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had
possession of the property at the time of the application for the issuance of a
certificate of title. The application was filed in court on December 19, 2001.
Teresita Carlos Victoria, the daughter of Maria Carlos, admitted during the
hearing that her mother had sold the property to Ususan Development
Corporation in 1996. They also presented as evidence the deed of absolute sale
45
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

executed by and between Maria Carlos and Ususan Development Corporation We therefore find that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the issuance

on October 16, 1996.[14] The document states, among others: of a certificate of title to petitioner.
xxx

4. That the VENDOR, by this Deed hereby transfer(s) IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
possession of the property to the VENDEE.[15]

SO ORDERED.

This contradicts petitioners claim that she was in possession of the property at

the time that she applied for confirmation of title.

Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual

possession of the land at that time, such possession was no longer in the

concept of an owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in

the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept

of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other

hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior

right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or

wrong.[16] Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan

Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate

of title to the corporation upon its obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her

possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the law,

only he who possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is

entitled to confirmation of title.

46
POSSESSION
G.R. No. L-33397 June 22, 1984
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Commissioner of Land Transportation,
EDUARDO DOMINGO, CARLOS RODRIGUEZ and PATRICIO YAMBAO in their
capacity as ANCAR Agents, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE AMADOR E. GOMEZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch 1, THE SHERIFF of Quezon City, and
LUCILA ABELLO, respondents.
Coronel Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Subject matter of this case is a 1968 model Volkswagen, bantam car, Engine No.
H-5254416, Chassis No. 118673654, allegedly owned by Lt. Walter A. Bala of
Clark Airbase, Angeles City, under whose name the car was allegedly registered
on May 19, 1970 at the Angeles City Land Transportation Commission Agency,
under File No. 2B-7281.
The Office of the Commission on Land Transportation received a report on
August 25, 1970 from the Manila Adjustment Company that the
abovementioned car was stolen on June 29, 1970 from the residence of Lt. Bala,
at 63 Makiling Street, Plaridel Subdivision, Angeles City. Petitioners Eduardo
Domingo, Carlos Rodriguez, and Patricio Yambao, agents of Anti-Carnapping
Unit (ANCAR) of the Philippine Constabulary, on detail with the Land
Transportation Commission, on February 2, 1971, recognized subject car in the
possession of herein private respondent Lucila Abello and immediately seized
and impounded the car as stolen property. Likewise, herein petitioner Romeo F.
Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation, seized the car pursuant to
Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle
for delinquent registration aside from his implicit power deducible from Sec.
4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to seize motor vehicles fraudulently or
otherwise not properly registered."
On February 15, 1971, herein private respondent Lucila Abello filed a complaint
for replevin with damages in respondent court, docketed as Civil Case No.
82215, impleading herein petitioners, praying for judgment, among others, to
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order the sheriff or other proper officer of the court to take the said property
(motor vehicle) into his custody and to dispose of it in accordance with law.
On February 18, 1971, respondent judge of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila issued the order for the seizure of the personal property. Solicitor
Vicente Torres, appearing for the herein petitioners, submits that the car in
question legally belongs to Lt. Walter A. Bala under whose name it is originally
registered at Angeles City Land Transportation Commission Agency; that it was
stolen from him and, upon receipt by the Land Transportation Commissioner of
the report on the theft case and that the car upon being recognized by the
agents of the ANCAR in the possession of private respondent Lucila Abello, said
agents seized the car and impounded it as stolen vehicle. With respect to the
replevin filed by private respondent Lucila Abello, respondent Court of First
Instance Judge found that the car in question was acquired by Lucila Abello by
purchase from its registered owner, Marcelino Guansing, for the valuable
consideration of P9,000.00, under the notarial deed of absolute sale, dated
August 11, 1970; that she has been in possession thereof since then until
February 3, 1971 when the car was seized from her by the petitioners who
acted in the belief that it is the car which was originally registered in the name
of Lt. Walter A. Bala and from whom it was allegedly stolen sometime in June
1970.
Finding for the private respondent, respondent judge held that —
The complaint at bar is for replevin, or for the delivery of
personal property, based on the provisions of Rule 60, Sections
1 and 2 of the Rules of Court. All the requirements of the law
are present in the verified averments in the complaint, viz:
1. That plaintiff is the owner of the automobile in question.-
petition.
2. That the aforesaid property was seized from her against her
will not for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law,
not under a writ of execution or attachment against her
properties;
3. That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendants,
who allegedly seized it from her on February 3, 1971,
"allegedly for the purpose of verifying the same" (see par. 3,
Complaint), but have refused since then until now to return the
same to the plaintiff.
47
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

4. That plaintiff was ready to put up a bond in double the value
of the car, and has in fact already put up an P18,000.00 bond to
the defendants for the return thereof to the latter, if that shall
be the ultimate judgment of the court, and to pay defendants
damages that they may incur.
Transportation Commission may issue a warrant of constructive or actual
distraint against motor vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-
registration or delinquent registration of vehicles.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The issuance therefore, by this Court of the order of seizure of SO ORDERED.

the said chattel by the sheriff and for the latter to take it into
his custody, is precisely pursuant to the existing law, governing
the subject.

If defendants object to the seizure, the remedy provided for by

law is set out in Section 5 of Rule 60 and that is for them to put
up a counter-bond for the same amount of P18,000.00, which
is double the value of the car in question. Defendants may not
ignore the law under the claim that, on complaint of a certain
party, the Manila Adjustment Company, they have a right to
seize the same as it appears to be the property that was stolen
from Lt. Walter A. Bala several months ago. (p. 19, Rollo)

There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the purchaser
in good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to be respected and
protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a
competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the true owner, the
possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to surrender possession nor to be
required to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an
indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing of an information charging that
the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner by the
transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the
possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor.

Finally, the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize and
impound the car under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which reads:

Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. Any balance of fees for
registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of a
motor vehicle, remaining unpaid and all fines imposed upon
any vehicle owner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor
vehicle concerned.

is untenable. it is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of Republic Act

4136 that the Commissioner's right to seize and impound subject property is
only good for the proper enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land

48
POSSESSION
G.R. No. L-18536 March 31, 1965
JOSE B. AZNAR, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO, defendant-appellee;
TEODORO SANTOS, intervenor-appellee.
Florentino M. Guanlao for plaintiff-appellant.
Rafael Yapdiangco in his own behalf as defendant-appellee.
Lorenzo Sumulong, R. B. Hilao and B. S. Felipe for intervenor-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal, on purely legal questions, from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, Branch IV, declaring the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro
Santos, entitled to the possession of the car in dispute.
The records before this Court disclose that sometime in May, 1959, Teodoro
Santos advertised in two metropolitan papers the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE
500. In the afternoon of May 28, 1959, a certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a
nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the Santos residence to answer the ad.
However, Teodoro Santos was out during this call and only the latter's son,
Irineo Santos, received and talked with De Dios. The latter told the young Santos
that he had come in behalf of his uncle, Vicente Marella, who was interested to
buy the advertised car.
On being informed of the above, Teodoro Santos instructed his son to see the
said Vicente Marella the following day at his given address: 1642 Crisostomo
Street, Sampaloc, Manila. And so, in the morning of May 29, 1959, Irineo Santos
went to the above address. At this meeting, Marella agreed to buy the car for
P14,700.00 on the understanding that the price would be paid only after the car
had been registered in his name.
Irineo Santos then fetched his father who, together with L. De Dios, went to the
office of a certain Atty. Jose Padolina where the deed of the sale for the car was
executed in Marella's favor. The parties to the contract thereafter proceeded to
the Motor Vehicles Office in Quezon City where the registration of the car in
Marella's name was effected. Up to this stage of the transaction, the purchased
price had not been paid.
From the Motor Vehicles Office, Teodoro Santos returned to his house. He gave
the registration papers and a copy of the deed of sale to his son, Irineo, and
instructed him not to part with them until Marella shall have given the full
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payment for the car. Irineo Santos and L. De Dios then proceeded to 1642
Crisostomo Street, Sampaloc, Manila where the former demanded the payment
from Vicente Marella. Marella said that the amount he had on hand then was
short by some P2,000.00 and begged off to be allowed to secure the shortage
from a sister supposedly living somewhere on Azcarraga Street, also in Manila.
Thereafter, he ordered L. De Dios to go to the said sister and suggested that
Irineo Santos go with him. At the same time, he requested the registration
papers and the deed of sale from Irineo Santos on the pretext that he would like
to show them to his lawyer. Trusting the good faith of Marella, Irineo handed
over the same to the latter and thereupon, in the company of L. De Dios and
another unidentified person, proceeded to the alleged house of Marella's sister.
At a place on Azcarraga, Irineo Santos and L. De Dios alighted from the car and
entered a house while their unidentified companion remained in the car. Once
inside, L. De Dios asked Irineo Santos to wait at the sala while he went inside a
room. That was the last that Irineo saw of him. For, after a considerable length
of time waiting in vain for De Dios to return, Irineo went down to discover that
neither the car nor their unidentified companion was there anymore. Going
back to the house, he inquired from a woman he saw for L. De Dios and he was
told that no such name lived or was even known therein. Whereupon, Irineo
Santos rushed to 1642 Crisostomo to see Marella. He found the house closed
and Marella gone. Finally, he reported the matter to his father who promptly
advised the police authorities.
That very same day, or on the afternoon of May 29, 1959 Vicente Marella was
able to sell the car in question to the plaintiff-appellant herein, Jose B. Aznar, for
P15,000.00. Insofar as the above incidents are concerned, we are bound by the
factual finding of the trial court that Jose B. Aznar acquired the said car from
Vicente Marella in good faith, for a valuable consideration and without notice of
the defect appertaining to the vendor's title.
While the car in question was thus in the possession of Jose B. Aznar and while
he was attending to its registration in his name, agents of the Philippine
Constabulary seized and confiscated the same in consequence of the report to
them by Teodoro Santos that the said car was unlawfully taken from him.
In due time, Jose B. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Captain Rafael
Yapdiangco, the head of the Philippine Constabulary unit which seized the car in
question Claiming ownership of the vehicle, he prayed for its delivery to him. In
the course of the litigation, however, Teodoro Santos moved and was allowed to
intervene by the lower court.
At the end of the trial, the lower court rendered a decision awarding the
disputed motor vehicle to the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos. In brief, it
49
POSSESSION
ruled that Teodoro Santos had been unlawfully deprived of his personal
property by Vicente Marella, from whom the plaintiff-appellant traced his right.
Consequently, although the plaintiff-appellant acquired the car in good faith and
for a valuable consideration from Vicente Marella, the said decision concluded,
still the intervenor-appellee was entitled to its recovery on the mandate of
Article 559 of the New Civil Code which provides:
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one who lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.
From this decision, Jose B. Aznar appeals.
The issue at bar is one and simple, to wit: Between Teodoro Santos and the
plaintiff-appellant, Jose B. Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of the
disputed automobile?
We find for the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos.
The plaintiff-appellant accepts that the car in question originally belonged to
and was owned by the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos, and that the latter
was unlawfully deprived of the same by Vicente Marella. However, the appellant
contends that upon the facts of this case, the applicable provision of the Civil
Code is Article 1506 and not Article 559 as was held by the decision under
review. Article 1506 provides:
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but
his, title has not been voided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires
a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value,
and without notice of the seller's defect of title.
The contention is clearly unmeritorious. Under the aforequoted provision, it is
essential that the seller should have a voidable title at least. It is very clearly
inapplicable where, as in this case, the seller had no title at all.
Vicente Marella did not have any title to the property under litigation because
the same was never delivered to him. He sought ownership or acquisition of it
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by virtue of the contract. Vicente Marella could have acquired ownership or title
to the subject matter thereof only by the delivery or tradition of the car to him.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, "ownership and other real rights over
property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and
intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition." As
interpreted by this Court in a host of cases, by this provision, ownership is not
transferred by contract merely but by tradition or delivery. Contracts only
constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while
delivery or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same (Gonzales v. Rojas,
16 Phil. 51; Ocejo, Perez and Co. v. International Bank, 37 Phil. 631, Fidelity and
Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51; Kuenzle & Streiff v. Wacke & Chandler, 14 Phil.
610; Easton v. Diaz Co., 32 Phil. 180).
For the legal acquisition and transfer of ownership and other property
rights, the thing transferred must be delivered, inasmuch as, according
to settled jurisprudence, the tradition of the thing is a necessary and
indispensable requisite in the acquisition of said ownership by virtue of
contract. (Walter Laston v. E. Diaz & Co. & the Provincial Sheriff of
Albay, supra.)
So long as property is not delivered, the ownership over it is not
transferred by contract merely but by delivery. Contracts only
constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership,
while delivery or tradition is the method of accomplishing the same, the
title and the method of acquiring it being different in our law. (Gonzales
v. Roxas, 16 Phil. 51)
In the case on hand, the car in question was never delivered to the vendee by
the vendor as to complete or consummate the transfer of ownership by virtue of
the contract. It should be recalled that while there was indeed a contract of sale
between Vicente Marella and Teodoro Santos, the former, as vendee, took
possession of the subject matter thereof by stealing the same while it was in the
custody of the latter's son.
There is no adequate evidence on record as to whether Irineo Santos voluntarily
delivered the key to the car to the unidentified person who went with him and
L. De Dios to the place on Azcarraga where a sister of Marella allegedly lived.
But even if Irineo Santos did, it was not the delivery contemplated by Article
712 of the Civil Code. For then, it would be indisputable that he turned it over to
the unidentified companion only so that he may drive Irineo Santos and De Dios
to the said place on Azcarraga and not to vest the title to the said vehicle to him
as agent of Vicente Marella. Article 712 above contemplates that the act be
coupled with the intent of delivering the thing. (10 Manresa 132)
50
POSSESSION DE GUIA [Type text]

The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the Civil Code to the case UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed and the
at bar, for under it, the rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if decision of the lower court affirmed in full. Costs against the appellant.
he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from
the finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said article establishes two Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur .
exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1)
has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases,
the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it
without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public
sale. (Del Rosario v. Lucena, 8 Phil. 535; Varela v. Finnick, 9 Phil. 482; Varela v.
Matute, 9 Phil. 479; Arenas v. Raymundo, 19 Phil. 46. Tolentino, id., Vol. II, p.
261.)

In the case of Cruz v. Pahati, et al., 52 O.G. 3053 this Court has already ruled
that —

Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, a person illegally deprived of
any movable may recover it from the person in possession of the same
and the only defense the latter may have is if he has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, in which case, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor. In the present case,
plaintiff has been illegally deprived of his car through the ingenious
scheme of defendant B to enable the latter to dispose of it as if he were
the owner thereof. Plaintiff, therefore, can still recover possession of
the car even if it is in the possession of a third party who had acquired
it in good faith from defendant B. The maxim that "no man can transfer
to another a better title than he had himself" obtains in the civil as well
as in the common law. (U.S. v. Sotelo, 28 Phil. 147)

Finally, the plaintiff-appellant here contends that inasmuch as it was the

intervenor-appellee who had caused the fraud to be perpetrated by his
misplaced confidence on Vicente Marella, he, the intervenor-appellee, should be
made to suffer the consequences arising therefrom, following the equitable
principle to that effect. Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner
to recover personal property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his
being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the
law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has
enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered
by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between
a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this
jurisdiction. (Cruz v. Pahati, supra)

51
POSSESSION
G.R. No. L-36434 October 27, 1973
ELISA ALCANTARA-PICA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IV,
QUEZON CITY, ANATOLIO CARIGO Y TAMBONGCO, respondents.
Virgilio B. Alcantara for petitioner.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this petition for review of respondent court's orders upholding respondent's
right to possession of the car in question as against petitioner in an interpleader
proceeding filed by the Metrocom which had impounded the car, the Court
reaffirms once again the governing provisions of Article 559 of the Civil Code
and its long-established doctrinal jurisprudence that petitioner as owner of the
car of which she had been unduly deprived may recover the same as against the
possessor (without reimbursement of the sum received in a private sale by the
embezzler or wrongdoer from the possessor) even assuming that the possessor
had purchased the same in good faith, since an owner cannot be dispossessed of
his property without his consent and the wrongdoer cannot transfer to another
a title that he does not have.
Petitioner Elisa Alcantara-Pica, a lieutenant-colonel in the AFP Nurse Corps, is
the lawful owner of a 1966 model motor vehicle, Toyota 1600 S. Engine No. 4R-
411530, having purchased the same on installment basis from Delta Motor Sales
Corporation to which she mortgaged the same to secure payment of the balance
of the price thereof which amounted to P12,252.87, interests included, as of July
2, 1972.1
Private respondent Anatolio Carigo in turn claims ownership of the same
vehicle by purchase on July 30, 1971 for $11,000.00 from one Monico Maniquiz.
The latter traced his title to the vehicle by purchase for P6,500.00 on December
28, 1970 from one Rafael Pica who held special power of attorney from
petitioner (executed on June 30, 1969) authorizing him only "to ask, demand,
sue for, and received all sums of money ... which or now hereafter (sic) shall be
or become due, owing, payable, belonging to me" and "to deposit money and to
withdraw the same by check, receipt, draft or otherwise in any bank in my
name" and not to sell or dispose of any property of petitioner's.2
DE GUIA [Type text]
The car in question was impounded by the PC Metrocom, Camp Crame, Quezon
City in connection with Criminal Case No. Q-2008 of the respondent Rizal court
of first instance (Quezon City Branch) entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Anatolio T. Carigo" wherein respondent Carigo was charged for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition which had been intercepted from said
vehicle.
Upon motion of petitioner as well as upon a separate motion of the Metrocom
commanding general who impleaded both petitioner and respondent as
conflicting claimant of the same car, stating that "both defendants claim that
each is solely entitled to the custody of the Toyota Corona car in question, and
plaintiff has no means of knowing definitely to whom of the two claimants said
car should be delivered" and prayed "that a resolution be issued ordering
defendants to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims," respondent court
issued its order dated June 23, 1972 setting aside a previous order to release
the car to the respondent-accused and directed trial fiscal Narciso T. Atienza to
investigate the conflicting claims over the car and to submit to it his findings,
meanwhile ordering "that the vehicle in question shall remain in possession of
the Metrocom, until the real owner of the car is determined."
The trial fiscal accordingly issued subpoenas and subpoenae duces tecum to the
claimants and their respective witnesses, and in his manifestation dated August
7, 1972 reported to respondent court that from the documentary evidence
submitted by claimants and their witnesses, the following facts were
established: the history of the car and the transactions concerning it as above
stated; that petitioner had executed the special power of attorney dated June 30,
1969 in favor of her husband, Rafael C. Pica, in view of her assignment to
Vietnam as a member of the PHILCON; that the sale of the car by Rafael C. Pica
as petitioner's attorney-in-fact to Maniquez and by Maniquiz in turn to
respondent were registered, and respondent was in possession of the car since
July 30, 1971 as registered owner until he was apprehended by the Metrocom
on April 8, 1972; and that the car is still mortgaged to Delta Motor Sales
Corporation by petitioner with an outstanding balance of P12,252.87 as of July
2, 1972.
The trial fiscal thus recommended that the car be released to respondent on the
following grounds:
1. Anatolio T. Carigo is a purchaser of the Toyota car in good
faith, and therefore, his possession of the same is equivalent to
a title (Art. 559, NCC);
2. Registration of a motor vehicle in the name of a person
is prima facie evidence of the fact that the person in whose
52
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name said vehicle is registered is the owner (Motor Vehicle
Law);
3. The registered owner of a motor vehicle is the recognized
owner thereof for all intents and purposes (Uy vs.
Commonwealth Insurance Co., Inc. CA-GR No. 24136-R, Jan. 17,
1964); and
4. The validity of the Deed of Sale executed by and between
Rafael C. Pica and Monico Maniquiz cannot be attacked
collaterally."3
Respondent court in its order dated August 8, 1972 approved the trial fiscal's
recommendation and reproducing the very same erroneous grounds advanced
by the fiscal as above-quoted, ordered the release of the car "in favor of claimant
Anatolio T. Carigo, it appearing that he is the lawful owner of the same.
Petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration dated November 29, 1972
expressly calling respondent court's attention that "the special power of
attorney previously executed by herein movant in favor of Rafael Pica, and
which is relied upon by the investigating fiscal in recommending the release of
the vehicle to Anatolio T. Carigo did not, contrary to the opinion of the said
officer, under its terms, authorize Rafael Pica to sell any property of the movant.
Said power of attorney merely empowered Pica to collect and receive sums due
the movant and to deposit and withdraw the same, from the bank." 4
Respondent court in its order dated January 15, 19735 denied reconsideration
but added that "(A) question of ownership of the motor vehicle is not a proper
subject to be resolved in a criminal case for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. The questioned order is therefore construed as without prejudice
on the part of the parties to bring the proper civil action in court to recover the
possession of said motor vehicle during which action the issue of ownership
may properly be resolved between the parties."
Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration dated February 6, 1973
stating that by virtue of the interpleader filed by the Metrocom for the parties to
litigate their conflicting claims over the car, respondent court had "taken
cognizance and jurisdiction over the subject matter" under its order of June 23,
1972 which ordered the investigation of the conflicting claims and resulted in
its order of August 8, 1972 for the release of the car in favor of respondent, and
prayed that the car be either ordered returned to her or placed back in the
Metrocom's custody for safekeeping.
DE GUIA [Type text]
This last motion was denied as "not meritorious" per respondent court's order
dated February 10, 1973.
Hence, the present petition. Since the only issue is the proper application of
Article 559 of the Civil Code which has been the subject of long-established
authoritative precedents holding that the right of the owner of movable
property cannot be defeated even by proof of good faith in the acquisition
thereof by the possessor, the Court resolved as per its resolution of October 25,
1973, upon noting respondent's failure for over a month and a half to file his
answer within the period given him which expired on September 10, 1973, to
consider the case submitted for decision, for a prompt and expeditious
determination thereof in the interest of justice.
Respondent court manifestly acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of
discretion in having directed release of the car to respondent rather than to
petitioner as the rightful owner who has been unlawfully deprived thereof in
disregard of the express provisions of Article 5596 of the Civil Code and of the
long established doctrinal jurisprudence of this Court as early as 19117 that the
owner may recover the lost article of which he or she has been unlawfully
deprived without reimbursement of the sum received by the embezzler or
wrongdoer from the possessor, even granting that the possessor acquired
possession by purchase or other means in good faith.
Article 559 of the Civil Code was correctly cited but wrongly applied by
respondent court to order release of the car to respondent, when as stressed by
the Court in Aznar vs. Yapdiangco8 dealing similarly with a car which a
wrongdoer had succeeded in registering in his own name and selling to a third
party who acquired the same in good faith, for valuable consideration and
without notice of any defect in the vendor's title, under the cited codal article,
"the rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder,
thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good
faith from such finder, thief or robber." The only exception provided - which is
not applicable here — is where such third party has acquired in good faith the
article "at a public sale" in which case "the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor." The Court therein added that "the
right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by
another is based on his being dispossessed without his consent" and cited the
maxim that "no man can transfer to another a better title than he has himself." 9
In the latest case of Dizon vs. Suntay, 10 the Court once again reaffirmed the
binding force and effect of Article 559 of the Civil Code as upholding an owner's
right to recover an article which he has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of
as against a third party-possessor in good faith.
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Here, petitioner had been unlawfully deprived of her car by her attorney-in-fact Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Rafael Pica who succeeded in illegally disposing the same for the obviously Esguerra, JJ., concur.
inadequate price of P6,500.00 to Maniquiz notwithstanding that his special
power of attorney on its face and by its express terms did not authorize him to
sell any property of petitioner but merely to collect and receive sums of money
due and owing to petitioner and to deposit and withdraw the same from the
bank. Thus, from the very documents submitted by the parties to respondent
court, Rafael Pica as an attorney-in-fact with very limited powers had no
authority to, and could not, transfer title of the car to Maniquiz from whom
respondent claims to have purchased it in turn for P11,000.00, "free from all
liens and encumbrances." Prescinding from the fact that the car was admittedly
mortgaged by petitioner-owner with a balance of P12,252.87 as of July 2, 1972,
it is difficult to surmise how Rafael Pica's transferees could in good faith have
overlooked such subsisting mortgage and secure registration of the car free
from any lien.

Finally, respondent court had duly taken cognizance of the interpleader motion
filed by the Metrocom and required the conflicting claimants to litigate their
respective claims and had commissioned the trial fiscal to receive the parties'
and their witnesses' evidence and upon receipt of the fiscal's report, handed
down its resolution of the dispute.

The Court, therefore, sees no useful end or purpose that can be served by
respondent court's last order of January 15, 1973 belatedly reserving to the
parties the bringing of a proper court action to recover possession of the car
and litigate once more the issue of ownership thereof — when for all intents
and purposes such action has already been duly submitted to respondent court
and its resolution is now properly the subject of the present petition. The Court
holds that the issue of possession and ownership of the vehicle having been
duly litigated below should properly be determinately resolved in the present
case, without further waste of time and effort that would be needlessly
expended in a separate action that would just duplicate the proceedings already
had in the case at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's orders of August 8, 1972, January 15, 1973

and February 10, 1973 recognizing respondent's right to possession of the
Toyota car (with Motor No. 4R-411530) are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof
judgment is hereby rendered declaring petitioner as the lawful owner of the car
to be entitled to its possession and ordering that the same be immediately
returned to her. This order for the return of the possession of the car to
petitioner shall be immediately execute upon promulgation of this decision. No
costs, none having been prayed for.

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POSSESSION
G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner,
vs.
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the
name and style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson, Mary Anne B. Samson for petitioner.
Cendana Santos, Delmundo & Cendana for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The case before us calls for the interpretation of Article 559 of the Civil Code
and raises the particular question of when a person may be deemed to have
been "unlawfully deprived" of movable property in the hands of another. The
article runs in full as follows:
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.
The movable property in this case consists of books, which were bought from
the petitioner by an impostor who sold it to the private respondents. Ownership
of the books was recognized in the private respondents by the Municipal Trial
Court, 1 which was sustained by the Regional Trial Court, 2 which was in turn
sustained by the Court of Appeals. 3 The petitioner asks us to declare that all
these courts have erred and should be reversed.
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as
Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company
for 406 books, payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice
and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check
covering the purchase price of P8,995.65. 5 On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of
DE GUIA [Type text]
the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's
ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00. 6
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz
even before clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle
College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no
such person in its employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more
account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had
drawn the payment check. 7 EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and
arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as
Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he had ordered from EDCA to
the private respondents. 8
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in
Precinct 5 at the UN Avenue, which forced their way into the store of the private
respondents and threatened Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen
property. They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a van
belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to the petitioner. 9
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of
the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of
preliminary attachment was issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal,
finally surrendered the books to the private respondents. 10 As previously
stated, the petitioner was successively rebuffed in the three courts below and
now hopes to secure relief from us.
To begin with, the Court expresses its disapproval of the arbitrary action of the
petitioner in taking the law into its own hands and forcibly recovering the
disputed books from the private respondents. The circumstance that it did so
with the assistance of the police, which should have been the first to uphold
legal and peaceful processes, has compounded the wrong even more deplorably.
Questions like the one at bar are decided not by policemen but by judges and
with the use not of brute force but of lawful writs.
Now to the merits
It is the contention of the petitioner that the private respondents have not
established their ownership of the disputed books because they have not even
produced a receipt to prove they had bought the stock. This is unacceptable.
Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title," thus dispensing
with further proof.
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POSSESSION
The argument that the private respondents did not acquire the books in good
faith has been dismissed by the lower courts, and we agree. Leonor Santos first
ascertained the ownership of the books from the EDCA invoice showing that
they had been sold to Cruz, who said he was selling them for a discount because
he was in financial need. Private respondents are in the business of buying and
selling books and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to part with
their books at reduced prices. To Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one
of the many such sellers she was accustomed to dealing with. It is hardly bad
faith for any one in the business of buying and selling books to buy them at a
discount and resell them for a profit.
But the real issue here is whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived
of the books because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was
dishonored.
In its extended memorandum, EDCA cites numerous cases holding that the
owner who has been unlawfully deprived of personal property is entitled to its
recovery except only where the property was purchased at a public sale, in
which event its return is subject to reimbursement of the purchase price. The
petitioner is begging the question. It is putting the cart before the horse. Unlike
in the cases invoked, it has yet to be established in the case at bar that EDCA has
been unlawfully deprived of the books.
The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the
books that he could have validly transferred to the private respondents. Its
reason is that as the payment check bounced for lack of funds, there was a
failure of consideration that nullified the contract of sale between it and Cruz.
The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached
between the parties on the subject matter and the consideration. According to
the Civil Code:
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance,
subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.
DE GUIA [Type text]
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall
not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that
ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that
such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet
been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the
contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent
the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer
ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
In Asiatic Commercial Corporation v. Ang,11 the plaintiff sold some cosmetics to
Francisco Ang, who in turn sold them to Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic not having been
paid by Ang, it sued for the recovery of the articles from Tan, who claimed he
had validly bought them from Ang, paying for the same in cash. Finding that
there was no conspiracy between Tan and Ang to deceive Asiatic the Court of
Appeals declared:
Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 12 of the Civil Code providing,
among other things that "one who has been unlawfully deprived of
personal property may recover it from any person possessing it." We
do not believe that the plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the
cartons of Gloco Tonic within the scope of this legal provision. It has
voluntarily parted with them pursuant to a contract of purchase and
sale. The circumstance that the price was not subsequently paid did not
render illegal a transaction which was valid and legal at the beginning.
In Tagatac v. Jimenez,13 the plaintiff sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez,
who sold it to Jimenez. When the payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist was
dishonored, the plaintiff sued to recover the vehicle from Jimenez on the ground
that she had been unlawfully deprived of it by reason of Feist's deception. In
ruling for Jimenez, the Court of Appeals held:
The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac
has been unlawfully deprived of her car. At first blush, it would seem
that she was unlawfully deprived thereof, considering that she was
induced to part with it by reason of the chicanery practiced on her by
Warner L. Feist. Certainly, swindling, like robbery, is an illegal method
of deprivation of property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-appellant
56
POSSESSION
was "illegally deprived" of her car, for the way by which Warner L. Feist
induced her to part with it is illegal and is punished by law. But does
this "unlawful deprivation" come within the scope of Article 559 of the
New Civil Code?
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The fraud and deceit practiced by Warner L. Feist earmarks this sale
as a voidable contract (Article 1390 N.C.C.). Being a voidable contract, it
is susceptible of either ratification or annulment. If the contract is
ratified, the action to annul it is extinguished (Article 1392, N.C.C.) and
the contract is cleansed from all its defects (Article 1396, N.C.C.); if the
contract is annulled, the contracting parties are restored to their
respective situations before the contract and mutual restitution follows
as a consequence (Article 1398, N.C.C.).
However, as long as no action is taken by the party entitled, either that
of annulment or of ratification, the contract of sale remains valid and
binding. When plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac delivered the car
to Feist by virtue of said voidable contract of sale, the title to the car
passed to Feist. Of course, the title that Feist acquired was defective and
voidable. Nevertheless, at the time he sold the car to Felix Sanchez, his
title thereto had not been avoided and he therefore conferred a good
title on the latter, provided he bought the car in good faith, for value
and without notice of the defect in Feist's title (Article 1506, N.C.C.).
There being no proof on record that Felix Sanchez acted in bad faith, it
is safe to assume that he acted in good faith.
The above rulings are sound doctrine and reflect our own interpretation of
Article 559 as applied to the case before us.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over
the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The
fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and
EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the
books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully
deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A
person relying on the seller's title who buys a movable property from him
would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original owner
who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second
sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be compelled to
DE GUIA [Type text]
return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the right to
reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it.
It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to
ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase
them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the books had been
paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too
trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never transacted with him
before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as
readily accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity
although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this
unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the
printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby
vesting ownership in the buyer.
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy
herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she
did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere
possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos
nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy them.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the
prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result of its own negligence.1âwphi1 We
cannot see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted
in good faith, and with proper care, when they bought the books from Cruz.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy
is not against the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has
apparently caused all this trouble. The private respondents have themselves
been unduly inconvenienced, and for merely transacting a customary deal not
really unusual in their kind of business. It is they and not EDCA who have a right
to complain.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED,
with costs against the petitioner.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur
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58