36. PEOPLE v.

NEWMAN (taxi driver’s intestines came out)

FACTS: The two-accused were charged and convicted with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Rosita Empio was selling coffee in her store when a taxi stopped in front of her store. The driver asked
her for help saying that he had been held-up on the other side of the bridge. She asked him if he had
other wounds and the driver pointed to his stomach. She got a towel from her house to bind the
wound but when she saw intestines coming out of the big wound on the stomach, she was frightened.
She called other persons for assistance. Upon their arrival in the hospital, Eduardo Yanson, a police
investigator, happened to be in the vicinity. Sensing that the wounded man was in a serious condition,
he immediately took a piece of paper and began investigating by asking questions. He was able to
obtain the victim’s name, address, and the facts that he was held up by two men not known to him,
but one was a short fellow with long hair and the other was tall and stout.

Dr. Orville Paez, resident physician of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital in Bacolod
City treated Efren Bantillo for two stab wounds, one at the 10th intercoastal space, left front side, and
another at the abdomen below the navel.According to the doctor, the victim suffered other minor
injuries, such as a stab wound at the middle left forearm, an incised wound at the left 3rd finger and
the thumb, which injuries could have been caused by a sharp knife. The doctor confirmed the fact that
a policeman interrogated the victim at the emergency room before the operation took place .

The Police Officers, pursuant to confidential information given, were able to arrest the two suspects.
Taken from the suspects were the watch of the victim and his driver’s license. When already taken
into custody, the two accused were investigated thoroughly. They also went to the crime scene and
asked to reenact the incident. After the reenactment, police took the written statements of the two
accused. But before their statements were taken, the police informed them of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and assistance of a counsel. Both, however, admitted that they knew their
rights but were waiving them as they would only tell the truth. They agreed to sign a waiver of their
rights to counsel or to remain silent.

While both accused executed extra-judicial confessions, they have, however, repudiated them. Upon
arraignment, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, both accused entered a plea of not guilty.

The accused-appellants argued that they had not been duly informed of their constitutional rights.
They contend that their oral and written extra-judicial confessions and the photographs showing the
alleged re-enactment of the crime, are inadmissible in evidence. They further claim that they were not
accorded the right to due process.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial admission and the re-enactment of the crime are admissible in
evidence? Whether the two accused were guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide?

HELD: The Court agrees with the contention of the appellants that the questioned extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence against them.

In the case at bar, the two (2) extrajudicial statements and waivers carry the same quoted prefatory
statement. This, to the mind of the Court, indicates that lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the
investigating officers to fully and truly inform the accused of their rights to remain silent and to
counsel during the custodial investigation. The "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was
nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the objectives of
the fundamental law, as to give a semblance of compliance therewith. The right of a person under
interrogation to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of
the right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been "informed" of his rights.

The record also shows that the interrogations were conducted incommunicado in a police-denominated
environment. When the accused gave their confession, their companions in the room were police
officers. Indeed, the Court is far from certain or satisfied that the waivers of counsel and the
subsequent confessions were indeed voluntary and free. Thus, even if the confession of the accused
speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Conviction,
therefore, cannot be based thereon.

As to the reenactment of the crime, the Court notes that appellant Dionisio Tolentino testified that he
participated in such reenactment after he was directed to do so by the policemen. Such reenactment
was scripted, to say the least. Besides, pictures reenacting a crime which are based on an
inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible

All the foregoing notwithstanding, the guilt of the appellants has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Their conviction must be affirmed.
Recovered from the accused Newman at the time of his arrest by the police officers was a watch
borrowed by the victim from his close friend; on the other hand, taken from the accused Tolentino
was the Driver's license of the deceased Bantillo but whose picture was replaced with the picture of
Tolentino. In other words, the two-accused were positively Identified as the persons in possession of
the stolen properties — the watch and the Driver's license. Both accused offered no satisfactory
explanation as to the fact of their possession of the stolen properties. Such evidence abundantly
incriminates them and proves that they took them with animus lucrandi. A disputable presumption
exists that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act. Appellants offered no evidence to overcome or contradict such
presumption. Not even an alibi was presented for their defense.

It is not also disputed that the victim, before he died, told Police Investigators Yanzon and Rosita
Empio that he was held-up by two men — one was tag and stout and the other was a short fellow with
long hair — descriptions which fit the two (2) accused; that he was stabbed twice; and that P60.00
were forcibly taken from his person. The ante-mortem statement, taken together with the other
evidence, especially, the stolen watch and the driver's license of the victim found in the possession of
the accused, points to a conclusive finding that indeed the accused are guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide.

The appellants contend, however, that the dying declaration was not made by the deceased under
consciousness of an impending death. The Court holds otherwise. The victim was brought to the
hospital in a very serious condition. The nature of the two (2) stab wounds was fatal. When the victim
opened the bandage (towel given by Rosita Empio,) his intestines came out.

The connection between the appellants' unexplained possession of the stolen personal properties
taken from the victim and the homicide committed or the attack on Efren Bantillo, is too close and too
obvious. It can only lead to the inevitable conclusion that the men who stole the wristwatch and
driver's license of deceased Bantillo were the very same persons who stabbed and killed him. Logic
and experience easily allow such inference.

Appellants' claim of absence of conspiracy is without merit. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence, it may be inferred from the acts of the assailants. The circumstances of riding the PU Minica
together as passengers; the taking along with them of a stainless knife of Newman; the militant
dispatch and precision in stabbing the victim; their hiding together in Newman's place of work; the
finding that they were together immediately preceding the commission of the crimes up to the time of
their arrest two days later; their apparent haste in departing from the crime scene after its
perpetration to the point of leaving behind the wallet of the victim containing P50.00; and the simple
fact that they were present together during the commission of the crimes, thus giving unto each other
moral and physical aid and assistance — taken together — clearly manifest a concerted action in the
pursuit of a common design to kill and, subsequently, to steal. Conspiracy being present, it does not
really matter that the prosecution had failed to show who as between the two (2) accused actually
stabbed the victim.

37. CONCEPCION v. CA (Bigamous marriage; Who’s the father?)

FACTS:

In December 1989, petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte got
married. They lived in Fairview, Quezon City. In December 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose
Gerardo. In December 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on
the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one
Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive
and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married
Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights.

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him
responsible for the ‘bastardization’ of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration "INSOFAR ONLY as
that portion of the ‘visitation rights’. She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation
rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child." She further maintained that Jose
Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the
rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname. Applying the "best interest of the child"
principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion.

Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the CA. The CA held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. The appellate court brushed aside the
common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son and it gave little
weight to Jose Gerardo's birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. Gerardo moved for a reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario or the illegimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo.

HELD: Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.

Presumption of Legitimacy

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A
child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor
of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The presumption
of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception.
To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the
child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility
of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must
be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside
in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. Or,
the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took
place through the violation of prison regulations.

Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City,
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a
scant four kilometers apart. Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also
that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not
such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario,
stands.

A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is
not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. For reasons of public decency and
morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her
offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family
solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.

Proof of Filiation

The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in
this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall
not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. Moreover, the law itself establishes
the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may
be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law
itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when
the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be
established. Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not
be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. As prima
facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence.
It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo's
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more
conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.