Montecillo vs Del Mar
contending parties;
60 SCRA 234 – Legal Ethics – Lawyer’s Duty to the Courts –
Contemptuous Language
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander.
Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and he
successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower
court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus
the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the
adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals
where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then
filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled
threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he
thinks the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust
decision” and “judgment has been rendered through
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar
from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a
second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then
ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be
punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a
letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines
asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the
CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil
case against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower
court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason
of a compromise agreementwhere del Mar agreed to pay
damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty.
Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC
to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the
Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire
of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme
Court as to who were the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an
explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar
in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even
stating that had he not been “convinced that human efforts
in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless” he would have
continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme
Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court
justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed the
same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in
violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court,
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards
the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two
highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of
alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge
the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that
they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance
of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
Rochelle P. Lacsina 3-B Clarita J. Samala vs. Atty. Luciano
D. Valencia
A.C. No. 5439; January 22, 2007 Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts: Clarita J. Samala (complainant) filed a complaint
against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for
Disbarment on the following grounds:
(a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for
(b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence;
(c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for non-payment
of rental fees; and
(d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court referred the
case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective
memoranda and the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
The Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating
Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but
increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one
year.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated Canons 15
and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: This Court adopts the report of the IBP Board of
Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the
recommended penalty.
(a) On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez,
also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia,
Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC. The Presiding Judge warned
respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being
counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-
MK.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client.
He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties
any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This
stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste. It springs from the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected
not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. One of the tests of inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty.
(b) On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed
before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted
TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite
the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the
name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
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During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent
avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that
was the time that he came to know that the title was already
in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the
complaint, he did not do anything anymore.
Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the
truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for
rescission was filed in 2002. Respondent failed to comply
with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
It matters not that the trial court was not misled by
respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of
Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002
dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in
this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court
by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title
was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was
already issued in the name of Alba.
(c) On initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleged that respondent filed the following
cases:
(i) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272;
(ii) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and
(iii) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia
v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before
the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the
two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she
filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa
and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of
respondent) for trespass to dwelling. As culled from the
records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with
respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to
occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office
pursuant to their retainer agreement.
The Court finds the charge to be without sufficient basis.
The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect
the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest,
on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative
charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was
being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for
protecting the interest of his client and his own right would
be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated
to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
(d) On having a reputation for being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.
The Court finds respondent liable for being immoral by
siring illegitimate children. During the hearing, respondent
admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay
who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still
alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first
wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after
his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.
Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in
one of the apartments being claimed by complainant.
However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a
relationship and does not consider the latter as his second
family. He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay
because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another
in Marikina.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency
that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as
that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21,
10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Lee vs Tambago, 544 SCRA 393, February 12, 2008
Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent,
Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and
the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is
alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged
signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and
two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the
unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a
copy of their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such,
the contested will was executed and acknowledged before
respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence
Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was
never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office of the National
Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA). Respondent, on
the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given
because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public
with due care and with due regards to the provision of
existing law and had complied with elementary formalities
in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was
filed simply to harass him based on the result of a criminal
case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper.
However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy
to the Archives Division of NCAA. In resolution, the court
referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was
affirmed with modification against the respondent and in
favor of the complainant.
Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in
Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal Profession for
notarizing a spurious last will and testament?
Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is
guilty of professional misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's
Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule
1.01nof the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806
of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus,
Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one
year and his Notarial commission revoked. In addition,
because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected
of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is
perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a Notary
Public.
In re: Gutierrez
Legal Ethics – 5 SCRA 661 – Conditional Pardon will not bar
disbarment
Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one
Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the
penalty of reclusionperpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion
of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by
the President. He was released on the condition that he shall
not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco
filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the
latter’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred
considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute
but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It does not
reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the
fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the
pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was
actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having
been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his
official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the
time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree ofmoral
turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession.
Case Digest on Felicidad L. Oronce, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et. al. (298 SCRA 133) Gross Misconduct
Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took
possession of the property in litigation using abusive
methods. She was aided by her husband, a lawyer. The
illegal entry took place while the case was pending in the CA
& while a writ of preliminary injunction was in force.
Held: Atty. Flaminiano’s acts of entering the property
without the consent of its occupants & in contravention of
the existing writ or preliminary injunction & making
utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court, are
unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he says that
they “peacefully” took over the property, such “peaceful”
take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary
injunction that he knew was still in force. Through his acts,
he has flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is
prohibited from counseling or abetting “activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.”
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY,
and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
This case is truly unique. For this case is an action filed by an
only son, his father's namesake, the only child and therefore
the only heir against his own father.
Two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this
labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the
complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with
each other, were personal matters affecting father and son
relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain
to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come
in the way.
Facts: Petitioner Jon de Ysasi III was employed by his father
Jon de Ysasi and private respondent in this case, as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental sometime in April, 1980. His employment as farm
administrator was on a fixed salary, and his duties include
supervision of daily activities and operations of the
sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, etc.
He lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house
there. Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner
moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work
daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on
two separate occasions in June and August, 1982.
In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the
surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer.
In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and,
thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to
January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private
respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner
continued to receive compensation.
However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private
respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made
oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco,
private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for
the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were
not acted upon. Petitioner then filed an action with the
NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, for
illegal dismissal against private respondent.
NLRC dismissed the case and the subsequent MR filed by the
petitioner was denied. The SolGen opined that the
petitioner's illness and strained family relation with
respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable
reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work
during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any
event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal
without notice and hearing.
ISSUE (relevant to the subject PALE): Was the conduct of the
lawyers in this case in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Ruling: The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties,
as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and
invites reproof. Both counsels may well be reminded that
their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective
causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not
more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth
over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous
ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the
useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation
but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic
forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life.
He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation. Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if
it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that
both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of
them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.
The records do not show that they took pains to initiate
steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between
their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even
as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of
their respective clients. In the same manner, we find that the
labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less
than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards
the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction." Note: Petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Dispositive portion: Private respondent is ORDERED to pay
petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3)
years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being
considered as one (1) whole year.
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PAJARES VS. ABAD SANTOS
30 SCRA 748
FACTS:
1. Udharam Bazar & Co., sued Gloria Pajares before the
Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of
money. (Php 354.85)
2. The complaint averred that defendant ordered from the
plaintiff quantities of ready made goods and delivered to her
in good condition and same were already sold, but did not
make the full payment up to the present time.
3. Instead of answering the complaint, Gloria moved for a bill
of particulars praying that Udharam Bazar itemize the kinds
of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said
company, the respective dates they were taken and by whom
they were received as well as their purchase prices, alleging
that without this bill she would not be able to meet the
issues raised in the complaint.
4. The court , through Judge Estrella Abad Santos, denied the
motion for a bill of particulars.
5. When her motion for reconsideration was denied, Gloria
filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI of Manila alleging that
respondent Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in
denying her motion for a bill of particulars
6. Udharam Bazar filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
the reasons that the allegations of the complaint are clear,
specific and sufficiently appraise the defendant of the nature
of the case of action against her and that the things asked for
in the motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters
which are beyond the pale of such bill.
7. The lower court dismissed the petition also a motion for
reconsideration
8. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Are the allegations of the complaint sufficient to appraise
Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action against
her?
HELD:
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave
abuse of discretion, was committed by respondent judge in
denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the
collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by
private respondent- appellee for the recovery of her
indebtedness of P 354.85 representing the overdue balance
of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and
delivered to her in 1961. Appellee’s complaint precisely and
concisely informed appellant of the ultimate or essential
facts constituting the cause of action against her, in
accordance with the requirement of the Rules of Court.
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her
counsel, to insist on her motion that appellee as plaintiff
“submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the
goods represented by the alleged amount of P 354.85, giving
the dates and invoice numbers on which they were delivered
to the defendant, the amount due on each such invoice and
by whom they were received.|” These particulars sought all
concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the
scope of Rule 12, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which
permits a party “to move for a definite statement or for a bill
of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him to
prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.”
MANUEL C. YUHICO, vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ A.C.
No. 8391 November 23, 2010
FACTS: Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of
P30,000.00 from Manuel Yuhico. Gutierrez then claimed that
he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his
mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed
the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very
soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees
from a Japanese client. Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a
loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the
medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized.
Again, Yuhico readily issued to Gutierrez a check amounting
to P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two
loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a short time." Yuhico
asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and
in a text message he asked for an extension of time to pay.
Later, thru a text message, Gutierrez attempted to borrow
money from Yuhico again. Gutierrez claimed that his
daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take
the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board.
Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts within a
month. However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez
any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez
the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text
message to Yuhico and requested him to give him another
week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to pay his
debts, but to no avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant
complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). On
January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit
his Answer on the complaint against him. In a Resolution,
IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts
and ordered him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to
Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of
just debts and likewise guilty of gross misconduct.
RULING: Atty. Gutierrez is guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT. He
is ordered to pay the amount of P90,000.00 to the Yuhico
with interest.
Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards
of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people¶s faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must,
at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In the instant case, there is no question as to
Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and
his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation.
Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his
dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have
4
contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to
pay.
Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of
employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of
obtaining debts without the intention of paying them.
Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making
promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to
deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico
promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving
excuses without actually making good of his promises, is
clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate
lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and
duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of
the court. Supreme Court also noted that in Huyssen v. Atty.
Gutierrez, the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from
the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment
of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks. In view of the
foregoing, while the court agrees with the findings of the
IBP, it cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar
Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had
already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP
pointed out, the court does not have double or multiple
disbarments in its laws or jurisprudence. Neither do it have
a law mandating a minimum 5year requirement for
readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's
infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, court cannot
disbar him anew.
Nelia Pasumbal de Chavez-Blanco vs Atty. Jaime
Lumasag, Jr,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed
by complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco
against respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., for deceit,
dishonesty and gross misconduct.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 11 December
2001,[1] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commissioner Milagros San Juan found respondent guilty of
the charges and recommended the penalty of disbarment.
Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors reduced the
penalty to a five (5)-year suspension in its Resolution XV-
2002-229 dated 29 June 2001. In a Resolution dated 9
December 2002, the Court, however, remanded the case to
the IBP in view of its findings that no formal
hearing/investigation was conducted.
Upon remand to the IBP, the case was re-assigned to
IBP Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and hearings were
accordingly held thereafter.
Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muñoz,
complainant alleged in her Complaint[2] that she was a
resident of theUnited States of America together with her
husband, Mario Blanco. She also stated that she owned two
(2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City, each with an area
of 400 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and 22163 registered in her
name. In a document dated 20 November 1989, she
authorized respondent, who were her husband’s first cousin,
to sell said lots.[3]
In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported
that he had sold only one lot for the price of P320,000.00
and therefrom he deducted P38,130.00 for taxes and
commissions. And, allegedly, per complainant’s instructions,
he remitted the remaining balance of P281,900.00 to a
certain Belen Johnnes.[4]
In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that
the other lot remained unsold due to the presence of
squatters on the property.
In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in
truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to
the spouses Celso and Consolacion Martinez for the price
of P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had been issued to the
transferees. Mario Blanco confronted respondent with these
facts in a letter, but the latter disregarded the same. Thus, in
May 1999, complainant, through Atty. Muñoz sent a demand
letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn over to
her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.
Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the
properties and his receipt of its proceeds, but he never
tendered or offered to tender the same to complainant.
Despite repeated and continued demands, respondent has
since not remitted the amount equivalent to P838,100.00
(P278,000.00 for the first parcel of land and P560,000.00 for
the second).[5]
Complainant also averred that the Special Power of
Attorney dated 16 January 1989, which respondent had used
to sell the lots is a forgery and a falsified document, as the
signature therein were not the real signatures of
complainant and her spouse. In addition, they could not have
acknowledged the document before a notary, as they were
not in the Philippines at the time.[6]
For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the
accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.[7]
Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was the
true owner of the properties, which had to be titled in
complainant’s name, as Mario Blanco was a U.S. citizen.
Mario Blanco had requested him to look for a buyer of the
properties and, in the course of selling them, respondent
claimed that he had only transacted with the former and
never with complainant. Respondent averred that he had
been authorized in November 1989 to sell the property,
through a Special Power of Attorney, for a price of not less
thanP250,000.00 net for the owner.[8]
Respondent also alleged that the deed of absolute
sale if the two (2) lots had been executed on 19 March
1990 but, only one lot was initially paid in the amount
of P281,980.00, which he immediately remitted to Mario
Blanco. The payment for the other lot was withheld, pending
the relocation of the squatters who had been occupying the
premises. And when respondent had finally collected the
proceeds of the second lot more than three (3) years after,
he asked Mario Blanco if the former could use the amount
for a real estate venture whose profit, if successful, he would
share with the latter. Mario Blanco allegedly did not think
twice and consented to the proposal. The venture, however,
did not push through.[9]
Respondent strongly maintained that the two (2)
lots had been sold for only P563,960.00.[10]
Finally, respondent denied the charge of
falsification. He claimed that complainant and her spouse,
Mario Blanco, had in fact signed the Special Power of
Attorney, but it was only notarized later.[11]
In his Report and Recommendation dated 4
December 2006, Atty. Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at the
following findings:
It appears from the records that
the two lots were sold by Respondent
5
for P560,000.00, not P1,120,000.00 as
alleged by Complainant. The basis is the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 11,
1990 which shows that the two lots
composing 800 sq. meters being sold
forP560,000.00. There appears to be no
documentary basis for the claimed
amount of P1,120,000.00 of Complainant.
However, Respondent in his Comment
stated that the two lots were sold by him
for P563,960.00. In any case, we shall
uphold and apply the amount stated in
the Deed of Absolute Sale.
In Respondent’s letter
dated March 20, 1990, he acknowledged
that he already received P320,000.00 as
the “total value of one lot”. Moreover, the
computation shows that the P320,000.00
was only for 400 sq.m. as the
computation stated: “400 sq.m.
x 800p/sqm=P320,000.00.” Therefore, if
the first lot was sold for P320,000.00,
then the second lot must have been sold
for P240,000 x x x
x x x there was clear
deception on the part of
Respondent when he wrote the letter
dated March 20, 1990 “informing” the
Blanco spouses that he had sold only
one of the two parcels of land
for P320,000.00. This is belied by the fact
that on March 11, 1990, or 9 days before
he wrote the letter, a Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed by him selling the two
lots for P560,000.00. This Deed of
Absolute Sale was notarized on March 19,
1990. During the hearing, Respondent
admitted that the Deed of Sale covered
two lots. Clearly, Respondent was not
forthcoming towards the Blanco spouses.
xxx
x x x Instead of representing
that two lots had been sold
for P560,000.00. Respondent only
represented that he sold only one lot
forP320,000.00 and pocketing the
balance of P240,000.00.
xxx
During the course of hearing,
Respondent claims that the Deed of Sale
referred to above is a fake, and that there
is a Deed of Sale showing a selling price
of P320,000.00 which is the real Deed of
Sale. However, no such Deed of Sale has
been presented by Respondent and no
such Deed of Sale appears in the records.
Later in the hearing, Respondent
retracted his statement claiming he was
merely confused.
As for the alleged falsification of
a Special Power of Attorney dated
January 16, 1989, wherein the signatures
of the Blanco spouses appear in the SPA
when they were not in the Philippines on
January 16, 1989 but were allegedly in
the United States, their absence in the
country has not been satisfactorily
established since mere xerox copies of
their passports, although noted by a
notary public, cannot duly establish their
absence in the country on that date. Other
acceptable documents such as a
certification from the Bureau of
Immigration would have been
appropriate but which, however, had not
been presented. In any case, Respondent
denies the charge of
falsification.[12] (Citations omitted)
[Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended
that, in view of the fact that respondent was already 72 years
old, he be meted out the penalty of suspension of one (1)-
year suspension, not disbarment as had been prayed for and
not 5 year-suspension as had been earlier resolved by the
IBP Board of Governors. Moreover, the IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be ordered to deliver to
Complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus the legal
interest rate of 6% per annum computed from March 1990.
On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-222 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner.[13]
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion
of the IBP, but a reduction of the recommended penalty is
called for, following the dictum that the appropriate penalty
for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[14]
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his
professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold
at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides:
Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct.
There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to
arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent committed
dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the
complainant and her spouse.
Records show that two lots had been sold by
respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of 11
March 1990. Respondent, however, taking advantage of the
absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines
and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in
a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can
be reasonably deduced from the exchanges between the
parties that the proceeds of the first lot had been transmitted
to complainant and her spouse. Respondent’s contention,
though, that he had been authorized to retain the proceeds of
the second is specious, as complainant and her spouse could
not have given the same, having been left in the dark as
regards its sale. And despite repeated demands, to date, there
is no showing that the outstanding amount has been paid.
Thus, respondent’s deceitful conduct warrants disciplinary
sanction and a directive for the remittance of the remaining
proceeds is in order.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court agrees
with the IBP that the same appears to be unsubstantiated.
Settled is the rule that, in administrative proceedings, the
burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the
facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under
no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[15] Mere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.[16]
6
 Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of
the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for
which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or

suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.— A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party to a case without authority to so do.

Complainant asks that respondent be

disbarred. The Court finds, however, that suspension from
the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The
supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member
of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an
erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers,
where the evidence calls for it, the Court will also not disbar
him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. In this case, the Court finds the recommended
penalty of suspension of two (2) years for respondent to be
too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court believes
that a suspension of six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension,
by the way, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a
means to protect the public and the legal profession.[17]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent

Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act
will be dealt with more severely. Further, respondent is
ordered to deliver to complainant the amount
of P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per annum
computed from March 1990.

Let notice of this Resolution be spread in

respondent’s record as an attorney in this Court, and notice
thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.