1. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes the hotel for more than 20 years at that time.

Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is

452 SCRA 532 (2005)
very unlikely for her to make a scene in the party
FACTS: she was managing. That would only make her
look bad.
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party
was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21
Garden. The party was being held for a of the Civil Code. Art. 19 was not violated by Lim
prominent Japanese national. The person in as it appears that even Reyes testified in court
charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very
the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during close to him – so close that they could almost
the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only
known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list Reyes shall hear whatever is it that she’s going to
of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who tell Reyes and exclude other guests from
invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained hearing.
that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim
Article 21 is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven
approached Reyes and told the latter, in a
by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes.
discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the
They do not know each other personally. She has
party. Reyes however made a scene and began
no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so
shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to
that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
escort Reyes out of the party.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
damage he incurred upon himself. Under the
Garden for damages. In his version, he said that
“doctrine of volenti non fit injuria”, by coming to
he was invited by another party guest, Dr.
the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the
Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing
risk of being turned away, and thus being
to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered
embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-
him in a loud voice to leave the party
inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart
immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr.
herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and
Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart
that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not
the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted
even present any supporting evidence to
out of the party like a common criminal.
support any of his claims. Since he brought injury
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be
Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in held liable for damages.
favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her
“The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-
right and that Reyes deserved to be treated
inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is,
humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the
to which a person assents is not esteemed in law
right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she
as injury, that consent to injury precludes the
should have done it respectfully.
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.”
rights?
2. Spouses Custodio et al vs. CA
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version
G.R. No. 116100, Feb. 9, 1996
of Lim more credible. She has been employed by
FACTS:
Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an
apartment in Interior P. Burgos St., Taguig,
Metro Manila. There were tenants occupying the
apartment at the time of purchase. Taking P.
Burgos St. as the point of reference, on the left
side going to Mabasa’s apartment, the row of
houses are as follows: That of Custodio, then of
Santos, then that of Mabasa. On the right side is
that of Morato and a septic tank. The first
passageway from the apartment to P. Burgos St.
is through these houses. The second passageway
goes through the septic tank, with a width of less
than 1 meter.
Sometime later, one of the apartment’s tenants
vacated it. Mabasa checked the premises and
saw that the Santoses built an adobe fence,
making the first passageway narrower. Morato
also built an adobe fence in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed. Then the
remaining tenants vacated the area. Santos
claimed that she built the fence because of an
incident involving her daughter and a passing
bicycle. She also mentioned that some drunk
tenants would bang their doors and windows.
The RTC granted a right of way and damages in
favor of Custodio and the Santoses. The CA
modified it, ordering an award of damages to
Mabasa. Custodio questioned the right of way
and award of damages in the SC.
ISSUE: W/N the award of damages is in order?
HELD: NO. THE AWARD OF DAMAGES HAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL BASIS. The decision of the
CA which awarded damages was based solely on
the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico
Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the
leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway. However, the mere fact that the
plaintiffs suffered losses does not give rise to a
right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right
of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
breach or wrong. There is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the hurt, or
harm which results from the injury; and damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria. In order
that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish
that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff, a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff, and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. In the case at bar,
although there was damage, there was no legal
injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to
have violated the principle of abuse of right. The
act of petitioners constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as
owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. At the time of the
construction of the fence, the lot was not subject
to any servitudes. The proper exercise of a lawful
right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which
an action will lie, although the act may result in
damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded.
3. Cebu Country Club vs. Elizagaque
542 SCRA 65 (2007)
FACTS: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI),
petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating
as a non-profit and non-stock private
membership club, having its principal place of
business in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein
are members of its Board of Directors. In 1996,
respondent filed with CCCI an application for
proprietary membership. The application was
indorsed by CCCI’s two (2) proprietary members,
namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo. As
the price of a proprietary share was around the
P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then
president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a
share for only P3.5 million. Respondent,
however, purchased the share of a certain Dr.
Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on
September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary
Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May
30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action
on respondent’s application for proprietary
membership was deferred. In another Board
meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondent’s
application was voted upon. As shown by the
records, the Board adopted a secret balloting
known as the “black ball system” of voting
wherein each member will drop a ball in the
ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to
the admission of an applicant, while a black ball
means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as
amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the
directors is required. When respondent’s
application for proprietary membership was
voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30,
1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball.
Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was
disapproved.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf
of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of
reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer,
respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another
letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent.
On November 5, 1997, respondent again sent
CCCI a letter inquiring whether any member of
the Board objected to his application. Again,
CCCI did not reply. Consequently, on December
23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City a
complaint for damages against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether in disapproving respondent’s
application for proprietary membership with
CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for
damages, and if so, whether their liability is joint
and several?
HELD: YES. In rejecting respondent’s application
for proprietary membership, we find that
petitioners violated the rules governing human
relations, the basic principles to be observed for
the rightful relationship between human beings
and for the stability of social order. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad
faith in disapproving respondent’s applications.
This is contrary to morals, good custom or public
policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages
pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of
the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section
3(c) of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a
special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and
submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon
was the original provision of Section 3(c) which
was silent on the required number of votes
needed for admission of an applicant as a
proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was
not printed on the application form due to
economic reasons. We find this excuse flimsy
and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from
being extremely significant, was introduced way
back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before
respondent filed his application. We cannot
fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf
country club, like the CCCI, whose members are
all affluent, did not have enough money to cause
the printing of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping
in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a
unanimous vote of the Board members was
required. When he sent a letter for
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there
was an objection to his application, petitioners
apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent
did not deserve this kind of treatment. Having
been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a
special non-proprietary member of CCCI, he
should have been treated by petitioners with
courtesy and civility. At the very least, they
should have informed him why his application
was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself,
must nonetheless be in accordance with the
proper norm. When the right is exercised
arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
modification in the sense that (a) the award of
moral damages is reduced fromP2,000,000.00 to
P50,000.00; (b) the award of exemplary damages
is reduced from P1,000,000.00 toP25,000.00;
and (c) the award of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses is reduced from P500,000.00
andP50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively.
4. Cabardo vs. CA
May 19, 1998
5. Negros Navigation vs. CA
November 7, 1997
FACTS: Private respondent Ramon Miranda
purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc.
four special cabin tickets. The tickets were for
Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving
Manila and going to Bacolod.
Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the
Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban
City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation
(PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank.
Several of her passengers perished in the sea
tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were
found and brought to shore, but the four
members of private respondents’ families were
never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint against the
Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
damages for the death. Petitioner, however,
denied that the four relatives of private
respondents actually boarded the vessel as
shown by the fact that their bodies were never
recovered. Petitioner further averred that the
Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full
and competent crew, and that the collision was
entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
Tacloban City.
In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in
failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both
the trial court and the appellate court relied on
the findings of this Court in Mecenas v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was
brought for the death of other passengers. In
Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of
negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship
captain and crew members in playing mahjong
during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the
vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to
carry more passengers than it was allowed to
carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only
damages to the full extent. against issues litigated in a previous case. Where
the issue involved was not raised nor presented
Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on
to the court and not passed upon by the court in
the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this
the previous case, the decision in the previous
case arose out of the same incident as that
case is not stare decisis of the question presently
involved in Mecenas, the parties are different
presented.
and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner
contends that the decision in this case should be The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for
based on the allegations and defenses pleaded determining the award for attorney’s fees. The
and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the award would naturally vary or differ in each case.
record of this case.
6. Picart vs. Smith
ISSUES: 1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v.
37 Phil. 813, March 15, 1918
Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of
petitioner to be grossly negligent in the FACTS: Plaintiff, Picart was riding a pony on
performance of their duties, is binding in this Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando. He pulled his
case; pony over the bridge’s railing on the right instead
of left upon seeing the automobile rapidly
2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas
approaching. His pony was unfortunately
v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.
frightened when the automobile passed so close
HELD: 1. No. The contention is without merit. to them. The horse was struck on the hock of the
left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
this Court’s policy of maintaining stability in
thrown off with some violence. As a result of its
jurisprudence. Where, as in this case, the same
injuries the horse died. Picart received
questions relating to the same event have been
contusions which caused temporary
put forward by parties similarly situated as in a
unconsciousness and required medical attention
previous case litigated and decided by a
for several days. Picart seeks to render the sum
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar
of Php31,000 as damages. CFI- La Union
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
absolved Smith.
2. No, it is not applicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear
Petitioner contends that, assuming that the chance is correctly applied?
Mecenas case applies, private respondents
HELD: Yes. The last clear chance was passed
should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each
unto the defendant driving the automobile. It
as moral damages because in the Mecenascase,
was his duty to bring the car to an immediate
the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the
stop or upon seeing no other persons were on
seven children of the Mecenas couple. Here is
the bridge to take the other side and pass far
where the principle of stare decisis does not
away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of
apply in view of differences in the personal
doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was
circumstances of the victims. For that matter,
almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the
differentiation would be justified even if private
horse and rider to this danger he was negligent
respondents had joined the private respondents
in the eye of the law. Under the circumstances,
in the Mecenas case.
the law is that the person who has the last clear
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other
party. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man
of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
7. Corliss vs. Manila Railroad
FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the
Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he was driving
while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided
with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company
(MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing
in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the
Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious
burns at the hospital the next day, while the
soldier sustained serious physical injuries and
burns.
In the decision appealed from, the lower court,
after summarizing the evidence, concluded that
the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so to
speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk
and attempted to reach the other side, but
unfortunately he became the victim of his own
miscalculation. Plaintiff´s husband was injured
and died as a result of such injuries. Plaintiff
brought an action for damages for the death of
her husband.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
HELD: Complaint Dismissed. ¨ A person in
control of an automobile who crosses a railroad,
even at a regular road crossing, and who does
not exercise that precaution and that control
over it as to be able to stop the same almost
immediately upon the apperance of a train, is
guilty of crominal negligence, providing a
collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident
was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s
husband and she was not allowed to recover.
8. PLDT vs. CA
178 SCRA 94
FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system.
The Spouses Esteban’s complaint alleged that
Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the
creeping darkness and the lack of any warning
light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained
injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a
permanent scar on her cheek, while the
respondent husband suffered cut lips. The
windshield of the jeep was also shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the
contention that the injuries sustained by
Spouses Esteban were the result of their own
negligence and that the entity which should be
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and
Company, an independent contractor which
undertook the said construction work. The trial
court ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas
the CA reversed the ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Estebans can claim
damages from PLDT.
HELD: NO. A person claiming damages for the
negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of such fault or negligence
causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence.
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to the
negligent omission on the part of petitioner
PLDT. The jeep was running along the inside lane
of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside
lane, it would not have hit the accident mound.
That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before
it swerved to hit the accident mound could have
been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson
Street to the south of the accident mound. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal
Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers because he noticed a blinking light while looking
an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that at the speedometer.
speed, he could have stepped on the brakes the
Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for
moment it struck the accident mound.
the payment of the damages he incurred
The above findings clearly show that the because of the accident but he did not receive
negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.
but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of
In its March 3, 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial
the accident, as one of its determining factors,
Court of Davao City, Branch 15 ruled in favor of
and thereby precludes their right to recover
defendant and ordered LADECO and Deocampo
damages.
to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court
9. Lapanday Agri and Dev’t Corp. vs. Angala found that Berenguel was not liable because he
was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and
525 SCRA 229 (2007)
Deocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but
FACTS: On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a the same was denied on June 13, 1995.
Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-93 was
Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of
driven by Apolonio Deocampo bumped into a
Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed
1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475
in toto the trial court’s decision. Petitioners filed
owned by Michael Raymond Angala and driven
a motion for reconsideration. In its March 11,
by Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday Agricultural
2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the
the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present
crewcab which was assigned to its manager
petition was filed before the Supreme Court.
Manuel Mendez. Deocampo was the driver and
bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear
running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao chance applies in the case at bar.
City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City.
HELD: Yes. Since both parties are at fault in this
The left door, front left fender, and part of the
case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies.
front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that
Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-
where both parties are negligent but the
Delict, Damages, and Attorney’s fees against
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that
LADECO, its administrative officer Henry
of the other, or where it is impossible to
Berenguel and Deocampo. Respondent alleged
determine whose fault or negligence caused the
that his pick-up was slowing down to about five
loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity
to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making
to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable
a left turn preparatory to turning south when it
with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last
was bumped from behind by the crewcab which
clear chance to avoid the collision. Since
was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab
Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had
stopped 21 meters from the point of impact.
full control of the situation since he was in a
Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching
position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
sound before the impact. Respondent was
Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding
seated beside the driver and was looking at the
bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is
speedometer when the accident took place.
done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding
and overturning, compared to running straight
ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the
vehicle if he was not driving very fast while
following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only
driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step
on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He
only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
10. Allied Banking Corp. vs. BPI
G.R. No. 188363, February 27, 2013
FACTS: On October 10, 2002, a check in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo
Mgt. Group International" (MMGI) was
presented for deposit and accepted at
petitioner's (Allied Bank) Kawit Branch. The
check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn
against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva)
with respondent BPI Bel-Air Branch. Upon
receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to
respondent through the Philippine Clearing
House Corporation (PCHC). The check was
cleared by respondent and petitioner credited
the account of MMGI with P1,000,000.00. On
October 22, 2002, MMGI’s account was closed
and all the funds therein were withdrawn. A
month later, Silva discovered the debit of
P1,000,000.00 from his account. In response to
Silva’s complaint, respondent credited his
account with the aforesaid sum. Petitioner filed
a complaint before the Arbitration Committee,
asserting that respondent should solely bear the
entire face value of the check due to its
negligence in failing to return the check to
petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary
period as provided in Section 20.1of the Clearing
House Rules and Regulations (CHRR) 2000. In its
Answer with Counterclaims, respondent charged
petitioner with gross negligence for accepting
the post-dated check in the first place. It
contended that petitioner’s admitted negligence
was the sole and proximate cause of the loss.
ISSUE: What does the Doctrine of Last Clear
Chance enunciate?
HELD: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding
the plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine
necessarily assumes negligence on the part of
the defendant and contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply
except upon that assumption. Stated differently,
the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does
not preclude him from recovering damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the
doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s
failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the
last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which
was the proximate cause of the occurrence of
such loss or injury.
ISSUE: Does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
apply in this case?
HELD: YES. In this case, the evidence clearly
shows that the proximate cause of the
unwarranted encashment of the subject check
was the negligence of respondent who cleared a
post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC
clearing facility without observing its
own verification procedure. As correctly found
by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only
respondent exercised ordinary care in the
clearing process, it could have easily noticed the
glaring defect upon seeing the date written on
the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent
could have then promptly returned the check
and with the check thus dishonored, petitioner
would have not credited the amount thereof to
the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the
antecedent negligence of the petitioner in
accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it
can seek reimbursement from respondent the
amount credited to the payee’s account covering
the check.
11. LBC Air Cargo vs. CA
241 SCRA 270
FACTS: At about 11:30 in the morning of 15
November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed
driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki
motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane
along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del
Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the
LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by defendant
Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On
board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager
of LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated
beside Tano.
When Tano (driver) was approaching the vicinity
of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw
two vehicles racing against each other from the
opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and
waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The
stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely
bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settle,
Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards
the airport road. When he was about to reach
the center of the right lane, the motorcycle
driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the
dust and smashed head-on against the right side
of the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe
injuries he sustained. A criminal case for
"homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed
against Tano. A civil suit was likewise instituted
by the heirs of deceased Monterola against
Tano, along with Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo
Incorporated, for the recovery of damages. The
two cases were tried jointly by the Regional Trial
Court. RTC dismissed both cases on the ground
that the proximate cause of the "accident" was
the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola.
CA Reversed, hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N Tano’s alleged negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: YES, Tano’s negligence is the proximate
cause of the accident.
From every indication, the proximate cause of
the accident was the negligence of Tano who,
despite extremely poor visibility4, hastily
executed a left turn (towards the Bislig airport
road entrance) without first waiting for the dust
to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which
had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the
path of the motorcycle coming from the
opposite direction, that almost instantaneously
caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence
required him not to attempt to cross the other
lane until after it would have been safe from and
clear of any oncoming vehicle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last
clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered
peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect
that where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof (see Picart vs. Smith, 37
Phil. 809). Stated differently, the rule would also
mean that an antecedent negligence of a person
does not preclude the recovery of damages for
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against the liability sought by, another if the
latter, who had the last fair chance, could have
avoided the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs.
Baesa, 179 SCRA 384; Glan People's Lumber and
Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173
SCRA 464).
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling
along the lane where he was rightly supposed to
be. The incident occurred in an instant. No
appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment
Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact;
that could have afforded the victim a last clear
opportunity to avoid the collision.
It is true however, that the deceased was not all
that free from negligence in evidently speeding
too closely behind the vehicle he was following.
We, therefore, agree with the appellate court
that there indeed was contributory negligence
on the victim's part that could warrant a
mitigation of petitioners liability for damages.
12. Achevara vs. Ramos
601 SCRA 270
FACTS: Respondents alleged that in the morning
of April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving a
passenger jeep heading north on the national
highway in Brgy. Tablac Candon, Ilocos Sur in a
reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He
tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the
passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane
and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by
Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo
Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding
prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged
that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of
Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep.
Respondents sought to recover actual damages
for medical expenses in the sum of P33,513 and
funeral expenses in the sum of P30,000, as well
as moral damages and exemplary damages, lost
earnings, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
In their Answer, - petitioners denied
respondents allegation that Benigno Valdez
overtook a motorcycle and bumped the vehicle
driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that on
April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving
southward at a moderate speed when he saw an
owner-type jeep coming from the south and
heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and
encroaching on the west lane of the road. To
avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger
jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of
his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to
move toward the western lane and bumped the
left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners
alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was
careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle,
which he very well knew had a mechanical
defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of
action against the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable to
respondents for damages incurred as a result of
the vehicular accident.
HELD: Petitioners contend that Arnulfo Ramos
own negligence in knowingly driving a
mechanically defective vehicle was the
immediate and proximate cause of his death,
and that doctrine of last clear chance does not
apply to this case. Foreseeability is the
fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent,
a defendant must have acted or failed to act in
such a way that an ordinary reasonable man
would have realized that certain interests of
certain persons were unreasonably subjected to
a general but definite class of risks.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling
and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled
on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno
Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if
he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he
failed to take precaution by immediately veering
to the rightmost portion of the road or by
stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder
of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass
before proceeding southward; hence, the
collision occurred. The CA correctly held that
Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable
negligence by neglecting to take such
precaution, which a reasonable and prudent
man would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances and which proximately caused
injury to another.
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo
Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly
driving a defective jeep on the highway. An
ordinarily prudent man would know that he
would be putting himself and other vehicle he
would encounter on the road at risk for driving a
mechanically defective vehicle. Under the
circumstances, a prudent man would have had
the owner-type jeep repaired or would have
stopped using it until it was repaired. Ramos
was, therefore, grossly negligent in continuing to
drive on the highway the mechanically defective
jeep, which later encroached on the opposite
lane and bumped the passenger jeep driven by
Benigno Valdez. Gross negligence is the absence
of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless
disregard of safety of persons or property. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them.
considering that the time the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of
impact was only a matter of seconds, he no
longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not
apply to this case.
In this case, both Ramos and Valdez failed to
exercise reasonable care and caution that an
ordinarily prudent man would have taken to
prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross
negligence of Ramos and the inexcusable
negligence of Valdez were the proximate cause
of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot
recover damages pursuant to Art. 2179 of the
Civil Code.

The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and

Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when
Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on
the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical
defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to
the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the
wiggling vehicle of Ramos.

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply

to this case, because even if it can be said that it
was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to
avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the western lane of the
passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the
opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of
petitioners stated that when the owner-type
jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger
jeep, Valdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the
western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision,
but the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos
continued to move to the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus,
petitioners assert in their petition that